Pod Insights Decoder DOJ antitrust chief is ‘overjoyed’ after Google monopoly verdict About this episode Today, I’m talking to Jonathan Kanter, the assistant attorney general for antitrust at the United States Department of Justice. This is Jonathan’s second time on the show, and it’s a bit of an emergency podcast situation. On Monday, a federal court issued a monumental decision in the DOJ’s case against Google, holding that Google Search and the text ads in search are monopolies.
The court hasn’t decided on the penalties for all this yet — that process is scheduled to start next month. But it’s the biggest antitrust win against a tech company since the Microsoft case from two decades ago. I wanted to know what Jonathan thought of the ruling, what it means for the law, and most importantly, what remedies he’s going to seek to try and restore competition in search.
Links:
Judge rules that Google ‘is a monopolist’ in US antitrust case | The Verge
All the spiciest parts of the Google antitrust ruling | The Verge
Now that Google is a monopolist, what’s next? | The Verge
DOJ’s Kanter says the antitrust fight against Big Tech is just beginning | Decoder
The DOJ Antitrust Division isn’t afraid to go to court | The Verge
The US government is gearing up for an AI antitrust fight | The Verge
Transcript: https://www.theverge.com/e/23979725
Credits:
Decoder is a production of The Verge and is part of the Vox Media Podcast Network.
Our producers are Kate Cox and Nick Statt. This episode was edited by Callie Wright. Our supervising producer is Liam James.
The Decoder music is by Breakmaster Cylinder.
Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Transcript 0:00 Speaker 00 Real innovation is powered by real people. This is AMEX Corporate. Trusted experts, smarter technology, 24/7 dedicated support from day one to answer questions, help set up policies and approvals, and consult on spend capacity as your business needs evolve. Plus, on-demand resources help level up operations at every stage. That's the trusted service you've come to expect. Built to simplify, designed to scale. This is AMEX Corporate.
0:31 Speaker 01 Flowing ad budget on metrics that look great till the CFO sees them? That's bull spend, and marketers are calling it out in Dashboard Confessions.
0:41 Speaker 02 I remember telling my boss, "It'll be good for the brand," when leads were slow. Yeah, it wasn't.
0:49 Speaker 01 Cut the bull spend. LinkedIn lets you target by company, job title, and more. Advertise on LinkedIn. Spend $250 on your first campaign and get a $250 credit. Go to LinkedIn.com/campaign. Terms and conditions apply.
1:03 Speaker 03 Hello and welcome to Decoder. I'm Neelai Patel, editor in chief of The Verge, and Decoder is my show about big ideas and other problems. Today, I'm talking to Jonathan Cantor, the Assistant Attorney General for antitrust at the United States Department of Justice. This is Jonathan's second time on the show, and it's a little bit of an emergency podcast situation. Earlier this week, a federal court issued a monumental decision in the DOJ's case against Google, holding that Google's search and the text ads in search are monopolies, and that Google has acted anti-competitively to protect those monopolies. Importantly, the court hasn't decided on the penalties for all that yet. That's scheduled to happen in something called the remedies phase, which will kick off next month. And Google has already said it's going to appeal. So there's a lot of process yet to play out here.
1:46 Speaker 03 Even still, it's the biggest antitrust win against a tech company since the Microsoft case in the late 90s and early 2000s. And like that case, it promises to shake up the entire tech landscape. For example, Google was paying Apple around $20 billion a year to be the default search engine on iPhones and Macs. And that kind of arrangement will be under the microscope now. So I wanted to know what Jonathan thought of the ruling and what it means for the law, which appears to be coming back to a more practical and intuitive version of antitrust from the extremely technical and economic approach that's been used since the 80s. And most importantly, I wanted to know what remedies Jonathan's going to try and seek to restore competition in search. The European Union has been trying to do that for a very long time, and I wanted to know what Jonathan has learned from those approaches and what new ideas he might have.
2:30 Speaker 03 I'll just warn you, Jonathan is a very good lawyer, and he is very good at not answering the questions. In fact, you will hear him say flat out, he is not going to answer the question several times throughout this conversation. But there's still a lot here about his approach to antitrust, an approach which was just validated in a major way and will inform the big cases yet to come against Apple, Google's advertising business, and more. One note before we start, you're going to hear us talk about Brown Shoes. That is Brown Shoe versus United States, a 1962 Supreme Court case which laid out a practical test for defining a market in an antitrust case. It'll make sense when we get there. Okay. Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter, here we go.
3:22 Speaker 03 Jonathan Kanter, you are the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust at the United States Department of Justice. Welcome back to Decoder.
3:28 Speaker 04 Wonderful to be back with you.
3:30 Speaker 03 I'm excited to talk to you. There's a lot to talk about today. You are here because the government just won a major antitrust case against Google. Tell us about that.
3:38 Speaker 04 We brought a case alleging that Google monopolized various markets in the search industry, and just this week, we won that case with an extensive opinion by a federal court here in Washington, DC.
3:52 Speaker 03 That opinion is 280-plus pages. Yesterday, I described it to my colleague, Sarah Jeong, as readable, and she looked at me and said, "I think you have a very different definition of readable than other people." The conventional wisdom about this case and that decision is that it is entirely about the payments Google makes to Apple to be the default search engine on iOS. Are those payments illegal now?
4:16 Speaker 04 I want to be very careful here. This is still active litigation. We are heading into a remedy phase. So I can talk generally speaking about the case. And what I would suggest is, given that you've read all 280-plus pages, you'll probably observe that the case is about a lot more than that. The case is about the ingredients that go into creating and maintaining a monopoly, whether it's the scale that you need from crawling and indexing, the data that you need from ClickStream and from queries, and the distribution necessary to get the queries that you need in order to generate the scale that you need. And then, of course, the advertising revenue that you need in order to maintain the capital-intensive business.
5:00 Speaker 04 And so all of that is discussed at length in the court's opinion.
5:04 Speaker 03 But the heart of it is the distribution, as you just mentioned, right? Google paying for distribution for search that no one else can get.
5:12 Speaker 04 So the heart of it is, in this case, was Google imposing conditions on access to distribution. So in exchange for getting payments, there were requirements that we alleged and the court agreed were exclusionary, meaning that it would limit the freedom of third parties to work with Google's rivals.
5:33 Speaker 03 Some of those conditions are, were going to be the default. Some of those conditions, particularly as it relates to Apple, are about how good Apple can make its own search products. The court found that the agreement with Apple limited how good Apple could make Siri in some cases, or Spotlight in some cases. Are those kinds of things not allowed generally, or is that just in this case?
5:56 Speaker 04 You know, each antitrust case is very fact-specific. And you're dealing with a monopolization case, everything has to be looked at in context. And so the context starts with, well, how big is the company and how powerful is the company? And what are the elements and ingredients that make that power durable? And then, has the company engaged in exclusionary conduct, including exclusive or exclusionary contract provisions that might harm competition or threaten the ability of rivals to develop and have their full competitive impact? And so in this context, you know, we have a situation where a company with a significant degree of monopoly power is imposing contractual terms that limit
6:37 Speaker 04 The freedom of others to innovate at will and especially to innovate in ways that might threaten the dominant firm competitively. It's very standard in terms of being an antitrust concern.
6:49 Speaker 03 I want to come back to competition. I want to come back to Apple and I want to talk about innovation generally. But I want to start with just some antitrust basics here. There's a lot in this decision that went your way. In particular, it seems like every tech antitrust case has run up against just angst, noise in market definition, just saying what the market for the product is. I'm thinking of Facebook basically arguing its way out of the idea that a market for social networking exists and Facebook is in that market. But here you got the market definition you wanted, right? There's a market for general search and then the court found a market for text ads in search and that Google had monopoly power in this market and it used monopoly power
7:33 Speaker 03 in anti-competitive ways. Did you get everything you wanted from that part of the decision?
7:38 Speaker 04 We got a decision that came out in our favor and so we're overjoyed.
7:41 Speaker 03 Did you get everything you wanted from that part?
7:44 Speaker 04 We wanted the law to be enforced and so we got that, yes. I mean, listen, there are a number of different markets. What we wanted to make sure is we had the ability to articulate that Google exercised, has and exercised a degree of power. Market definition, which is a very technical antitrust term, is really just a tool. It's a tool to help understand, is there a area of commerce where a company has power? Well, how do you gauge its power? Well, you understand, is it big relative to or powerful relative to others in the market? Is the market competitive? How many other competitors are out there? Well, you have to ask the question, well, how many other competitors of what? Right? And so we typically define a market, which is the process of saying, what is the competitive
8:29 Speaker 04 set? What are the range of rivals that might potentially threaten a firm that's alleged to have monopoly power? And to do that, we define a market. We say, what are the general boundaries of the competitive set? And once we define a market and establish that a firm has a high enough market share or enough monopoly power in that market, then the question is, did they do something either to legibly obtain or maintain that monopoly power?
8:55 Speaker 03 But again, so much of tech antitrust thus far has been Furious arguing about market definitions, even in this case. And you argued that there was a market for general search and Google argued that the market was actually answering all queries on the Internet. Right, like just an open text box of the Internet is the market Google plays in. And the court ruled for you. Right, it held that there is a market for general search engines. Do you think that's starting to get clearer, how to make these arguments, how to define those markets?
9:26 Speaker 04 Yes.
9:27 Speaker 03 Because that seems like the problem thus far.
9:28 Speaker 04 So, market definition ends up being an issue in every antitrust case. Because the questions that I just presented, which is, you know, how big is the company? Who do they compete with? Comes up whether it's bricks and mortar or ones and zeros. It is just a fundamental question in almost every antitrust matter. Certainly every civil antitrust matter. But I think one of the things that we've been grappling with in antitrust is how do we apply that in the tech world? How do we apply it in a world where you might have a multi-sided market, where you might have a platform, where the services are given away to one side of the market for free and monetized in a different manner? Where there are significant network and feedback effects?
10:10 Speaker 04 Where competitors might, or competition might emerge, not from a product or service that looks exactly like the one that is alleged to have monopoly power, but might be a new disruptive force in the market. And so, we have to understand all of those dynamics in order to explain to a court why an issue may or may not be a problem. I think we've gotten a lot better at that. I think we've gotten a lot better at understanding how to define markets and bring antitrust cases. And one of the ways in which we've been able to do that is by making sure we understand how the products work and hiring technical experts, technologists. The first day, also understanding how consumers behave in the wild in the tech industry.
10:52 Speaker 04 Our first day of trial, we put forward, and this was, to my knowledge, the first time the government's ever done this, a behavioral scientist. To explain why, how consumers react to default and default settings. How often consumers might or might not switch the default in a browser or on a phone. Why things that might seem small or small little points of friction that exist inside software might have an outsized effect on the way an individual reacts. These are things that we are now incorporating as standard fare as part of our antitrust investigations and in this case as part of our litigation.
11:31 Speaker 03 I want to stick with markets for just one more turn here. There are two ways the courts evaluated this. One is what you're talking about. There's behavior scientists showing defaults. There was a study from Inside Google you brought forth saying people didn't even notice when you switch from Google to Bing on iPhones. So Google itself knows it. You and I have talked about this before. When I was in law school, all antitrust was deeply economics based. It was mathematic, it was opaque. The court here went back to a case called Brown-Chew from 1962. It said they're a practical indicia of market power. And one of them is just like, yeah, everyone talks about it this way. There's obviously a market for general search. And then it also went to when people buy search advertising or they buy advertising
12:16 Speaker 03 on the internet, they're allocating their money in a way that doesn't substitute for other products like TikTok ads or something. Is it the combination? Is that the approach now? You're trying to cover the waterfront here? Is the more practical, hey, like, let's just be honest here approach starting to come back to the forefront?
12:32 Speaker 04 It's all of the above, but I think we lost sight of the practical indicia, which has been at the core of antitrust going back so many years. And you mentioned the Brown Shoe case. What is really happening in the marketplace? What is it that we're trying to measure? And to do that, you have to start with understanding how this stuff works. Is something truly a substitute? Well, let's figure it out. Let's look at your documents. Let's understand what consumers think. Let's see how they behave in the wild. Let's start with the facts and work backwards from that. For a long time, antitrust, you know, tried very hard and I think developed some very useful tools, quantitative tools to help understand and assess these kinds of questions and regression analyses and surveys. And those are valuable, but it only tells you so much.
13:16 Speaker 04 You have to start with asking, well, how does this stuff really work? What are the practical indicia?
13:21 Speaker 03 So you won on the market definitions for general search engines and for text ads on the search results page. The court ruled against you in a couple of ways that are important as well. It found that Google lacked monopoly power in search advertising generally. Actually, found there isn't a market for general search advertising. This case is certain to be appealed. Do you think you will bring that up on appeal?
13:42 Speaker 04 Too soon to say. I won't comment on the appeal other than to say for us, it was really important to make sure that we were putting forward two general categories of harm. One is the way in which users interact with a search engine from the perspective of the user and the way in which advertisers buy advertising that appears in a search engine. And I'm gratified that we were successful in defining markets and proving harm on both fronts.
14:10 Speaker 03 It's all but certain that Google is going to appeal. Sounds like you are going to appeal as well if they do.
14:15 Speaker 04 I would not necessarily take that from this conversation. What I would take is I am not commenting one way or the other, up or down. Can't confirm or deny, just observing what was in the opinion.
14:27 Speaker 03 We have to take a quick break. We'll be right back.
14:38 Speaker 01 Flowing ad budget on metrics that look great till the CFO sees them? That's bull spend and marketers are calling it out in Dashboard Confessions.
14:48 Speaker 02 I remember telling my boss, it'll be good for the brand when leads were slow. Yeah, it wasn't.
14:55 Speaker 01 Cut the bull spend. LinkedIn lets you target by company, job title and more. Advertise on LinkedIn. Spend $250 on your first campaign and get a $250 credit. Go to LinkedIn.com/campaign. Terms and conditions apply.
15:08 Speaker 05 College football is back. So Hilton called to me, the superstition concierge, to make your fan rituals a reality. Need a room to match your lucky number? We got you. Want to make sure our team doesn't wash your lucky jersey? Oh, that smells lucky. Hilton's unmatched hospitality can keep up with any superstition. Even a marching band wake up call at 5:55 in 55 seconds. Hit it! When you need a team that will do whatever it takes on game day, it matters where you stay. Hilton, for the stay.
15:39 Speaker 06 Low energy, unfocused, foggy, you might be dehydrated. Gatorade Zero powders have been scientifically designed to help improve hydration balance in the body. With a clinically proven electrolyte blend and no artificial colors or flavors. Great tasting hydration, no matter where you're going. Shop now online or at retailers nationwide. Gatorade, hydrates better than water. Is it in you? Symptoms noted are signs of mild to moderate dehydration. Consult a healthcare professional if symptoms persist.
16:12 Speaker 03 We're back with the DOJ's Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter to discuss where the Google verdict fits in the history of US antitrust. In general, the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, you and Lena Kahn have pursued some newer theories of antitrust. You've been careful several times in this conversation already to say, this is the heart of antitrust, we're getting back to where it was. But it's gotten away from, hey, just look at practical industry. It's gotten away from, let's look at the realities of the market. You've had to pursue some newer theories of law. You've had to take some shots at cases that may or may not win. This one, obviously, you've won. Do you think it's swinging your way now on changing how antitrust law works?
16:52 Speaker 04 Well, I'm going to look at the cases that we've brought and that we've won, right? Obviously, there's the case that came down this week, the Google case, which probably sits on the Mount Rushmore of antitrust cases. We're really proud of our victory here. We brought a case involving JetBlue's proposed acquisition of Spirit Airlines, and the theory in that case was that the harm would be on cost-conscious flyers. And the court agreed. It took a practical approach and said that these airlines focus on people who care about price and who care about making sure that they can afford air travel, whether it's a student flying home to see her family during a break, or a family of four trying to afford a much-needed vacation. We brought a case involving book publishers and the merger of book publishers and how
17:37 Speaker 04 the harm would not necessarily be, although it could have been, in the higher price of books, but would result in the exercise of power against authors who rely on advances in order to produce professional works. These are obvious concerns from the perspective of the public, as far as we believe. I don't view them as novel antitrust issues, they've just been forgotten. And we haven't had the opportunity to see as many cases involving these kinds of issues over the last few decades because we at the government haven't been as aggressive or as proactive in bringing those cases. But what we have found is when we present courts with facts that are solid, when we present courts with legal theories, as you indicate, that go back to the Heartland cases
18:21 Speaker 04 of antitrust law, and we do a good, solid job presenting our cases to a court and telling a coherent story that holds up on the facts and the law, then not only do we win, but we win decisively.
18:34 Speaker 03 So I'm gonna get real nerdy with you. What we're really talking about here is dating back to the 80s, Robert Bork, the introduction of the consumer welfare standard in antitrust, that said, you have to have prices that go up. And then you have this big problem where a lot of tech companies have free products and it's hard to measure the prices and that's, we've been stuck there. Here, the court looked at search, general search engines, and said, well, they're free, but this one is obviously a monopoly. And Google has obviously acted anti-competitively to maintain that monopoly. It did not really look at pricing in the general search category. It looked at pricing in the advertising side because there's prices there. But you were able to overcome this, you have to find a price that goes up, problem. Is that the beginning of a trend, do you think?
19:17 Speaker 03 Is that you're gonna be able to pursue this more aggressively across the tech industry?
19:21 Speaker 04 I think it's the restoration and validation of a core element of antitrust, which is that the purpose of antitrust laws is to protect competition and the competitive process. The idea is that rivalry and competition leads to the kind of economic freedom and opportunity that we value in our society. But we actually have, and as we think about our antitrust cases in tech, we go back and look at the journalism industry. For decades, there were antitrust cases involving radio and involving newspapers, many of which were offered to consumers for free and then monetized through the selling of advertising. In fact, one of the most Significant antitrust cases, monopolization cases in history is involving the Lorraine Journal case, which involved newspapers and advertising. And so these issues are not
20:06 Speaker 04 necessarily new. They're just being presented to the world in new flavors, which is technology. But I think we have to start from the premise of, well, why, what is it that we care about? What we care about is competition. What is problematic? Well, what's problematic is monopolization or illegal maintenance of monopoly. And what is it that we're trying to do is we're trying to create openings and opportunities for others to compete. And if we go back to those basic principles, I think we can find our true north and enforce the law effectively.
20:38 Speaker 03 So that's the big context that's inside of the law and as law is changing and you're pursuing new avenue, you're pursuing big cases inside of the changing law. I think that's how you end up with Google on the Mount Rushmore of antitrust cases. Let's talk about this case itself and what happens now. I know you're not talking about whether or not you're going to appeal. Google is. Google's going to appeal. They've said they're going to appeal. Kent Walker, who is president of global affairs at Google, sent us a statement, quote, "This decision recognizes that Google offers the best search engine, but concludes we should not be allowed to make it easily available. We'll remain focused on making products that people find helpful and easy to use." He's basically saying, look, we make the best product. The court said we made the best product. Now that's illegal? How would you respond to that?
21:22 Speaker 04 So I will go back to the words of the decision. The court found that Google is a monopolist and that it illegally maintained its monopoly power. And so I'll leave it there.
21:33 Speaker 03 Apple's Eddie Q was a witness in the case. He testified, quote, "There's no price Microsoft could pay to have Bing be the default." If this ends up with Google just not having to pay Apple but still being the default, have you accomplished anything?
21:48 Speaker 04 Well, I think... You know, for first and foremost, what we accomplish in bringing in antitrust cases to make sure that there's accountability under the law. And no company, no matter how large, how significant, is above the law. And so a legal finding that a company is a monopolist and broke the law by illegally obtaining its monopoly power is a significant step forward. And this is the first significant monopolization victory for the United States government in almost 25 years, the last being USV Microsoft. So that in and of itself, the accountability is significant. Second is we want to make sure remedies in any case, whether it's this one or any other,
22:29 Speaker 04 are meaningful and meet the markets where they are today, not where they were 15 years ago. And so what is necessary to pry open competition in a market that's been monopolized for many, many years is an important question that courts will have to grapple with at the remedial phase of any case, including this one. But what we've learned from prior cases, including USV Microsoft, is that remedies need to be forward-looking, especially in the tech market. They need to focus on the incoming inflection points. And we are in a world, for example, where AI is among the most significant inflection points the technology industry has confronted in a very long time. And that has the opportunity to usher in new business models and new competitive threats. What we've learned from history is that incumbents, often with monopoly power, take steps to
23:14 Speaker 04 keep those competitive threats from realizing their full competitive potential. And so remedies in any case, especially in technology cases, must recognize this phenomenon and must be sufficiently effective and forward-looking in nature. One of the reasons why this opinion is so thorough is it explains that it's not just about a contract. It's not just about a restrictive term in an agreement. It's about all of the elements that go into making a technology product, whether it's data, whether it's revenue from advertising, or whether it's the volume of click data and the ability to learn by doing. All of these are important elements and aspects of the case.
23:55 Speaker 04 And any remedy from our perspective and will in any of our cases, whether it's this one or any other, has to recognize the facts as they exist, going back to your Point about being practical, we have to start with the pragmatic, which is how does the market work and what does it take for competition to present itself?
24:12 Speaker 03 It's not just a symbolic victory, right? It's not just accountability. It's about the remedy. That's what you're saying. When are we going to see the remedies phase begin? And how long do you think that's going to take?
24:19 Speaker 04 So again, we defer to the court and its process. And so the court has, and this is public, has ordered a status conference in September, and we look forward to appearing before the court and taking its guidance on the next steps. In terms of antitrust cases generally, some courts will order remedies at the time of a ruling. This court and many others make the decision to bifurcate liability and remedies. And so in that instance, USV Microsoft is a good example. There was a separate remedies proceeding, almost like a remedies trial in that case, which ultimately resulted in a negotiated resolution between the United States and Microsoft, and then a proceeding to assess whether that was in the public interest.
25:00 Speaker 04 And so we have some historical precedents that we can look at to understand how to go about formulating remedies and how to go about a process for litigating that. But ultimately, that comes from the guidance of the court, and we look forward to taking that guidance in this case and any other.
25:17 Speaker 03 You've made several references to the Microsoft case from the late 90s, early 2000s. The decision itself makes tons of references to the Microsoft case. That case ended with a very drawn out settlement process, ultimately some oversight of Microsoft's behavior. Do you think that was a good outcome?
25:31 Speaker 04 I think the court in that case observed that it was an excellent outcome. I think we've made the observation in some of our other filings and cases that platforms of today often give rise to the disruptive technologies of tomorrow. And so if you think about microprocessors created in Bell Labs, giving rise to IBM, which gave rise to Windows, which gave rise to browsers, which gave rise to Google, which gave rise to the technologies that have been built on and found on the internet, one platform often is the springboard for the next. And I think the remedy in the Microsoft case, I think there are people who have observed
26:13 Speaker 04 that it helped open up and preserve at least the opportunity for those new disruptive technologies to emerge. And I think the antitrust laws exist just to make sure there's a fighting chance for that to happen.
26:25 Speaker 03 We have to take another quick break. We'll be right back.
26:37 Speaker 01 Are your ad campaigns lighting up the dashboard, but not the pipeline? That's bull spend, and marketers are calling it out in. Dashboard Confessions.
26:47 Speaker 02 My boss asked for results, so I opened my dashboard for the only positive sounding metric I had: impressions.
26:54 Speaker 01 Cut the bull spend. See revenue, not just reach. LinkedIn delivers the highest return on ad spend of major ad networks. Advertise on LinkedIn. Spend $250 on your first campaign and get a $250 credit. Go to LinkedIn.com/campaign. Terms and conditions apply.
27:07 Speaker 05 College football is back. So Hilton called to me, the superstition concierge, to make your fan rituals a reality. Need a room to match your lucky number? We got you. Want to make sure our team doesn't wash your lucky jersey? Oh, that smells lucky. Hilton's unmatched hospitality can keep up with any superstition. Even a marching band wake-up call at 5:55 and 55 seconds. Hit it! When you need a team that will do whatever it takes on game day, it matters where you stay. Hilton, for the stay.
27:38 Speaker 06 Low energy, unfocused, foggy? You might be dehydrated. Gatorade Zero powders have been scientifically designed to help improve hydration balance in the body. With a clinically proven electrolyte blend and no artificial colors or flavors, great tasting hydration, no matter where you're going. Shop now online or at retailers nationwide. Gatorade: Hydrates Better Than Water. Is it in you? Symptoms noted are signs of mild to moderate dehydration. Consult a healthcare professional if symptoms persist.
28:10 Speaker 03 We're back with the DOJ's Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan Kanter, to try and figure out what he's learned from European tech regulation.
28:18 Speaker 03 One thing you and I have talked about before, and so many antitrust people have been discussing for a while, is the EU has pursued really aggressive measures against Google for a decade or more to introduce competition in browsers, to introduce competition in search. They've mandated browser ballots into the product design of various platforms, and none of it has worked. Google's market share remains untouched. What have you learned from that process?
28:46 Speaker 04 We have an excellent relationship with our colleagues abroad in Europe. The international stage has been dealing with technology firms that have dominant power now for a couple of decades. And so we all watch what each other is doing to make sure that we can learn from it. But we have to enforce the laws that we have here, and we have to enforce the laws based on the interests of our domestic population. And that's what we've done here. And I think we come from a world where antitrust is sort of ingrained in the way we do business. The antitrust laws were written in 1890, and they were written to codify a principle that some argue go back to the Tea Party, which is freedom from the tyranny of monopoly power and corporate oversight.
29:28 Speaker 04 And so these are concepts that are embedded in our essence.
29:34 Speaker 03 Right, but I'm saying a concept that is embedded in the essence of Windows in Europe is that when you open it up, it asks you what search engine you'd like to use, and everybody picks Google. At some point, you're going to have to show up in front of a court and say, these are the remedies the United States government would like. Are you going to say "search engine ballots"? Because they haven't worked.
29:54 Speaker 04 I think what you could probably discern from this conversation is I'm definitely trying to avoid your question and say that I really do need to defer to the process in this particular case to play out. We will speak in our filings and before the court directly in terms of what we believe the appropriate remedy would be in this particular case. What I can say is, more broadly, remedies have to be meaningful. They have to work in the context of where the market is today and where it's going tomorrow. And in a technology market where the conduct is not just a contractual provision, but it's the impact of contractual provisions, the cumulative impact of contractual provisions against the backdrop of massive feedback network effects and data and the need for
30:38 Speaker 04 compute and servers, all of that has to be relevant to understanding the proper path forward.
30:44 Speaker 03 The other part of the decision here is about the search text ads. One of the things the court found in its ruling was that Google had been quietly raising prices on search ads in a monopolistic way. They hit it as noise in the auction process, and they slowly raised the prices. That is potentially billions of dollars in ad spend. Are you going to try to get that back?
31:05 Speaker 04 Again, I'm gonna try to be really cool here and avoid your direct question. And so I'll leave it to our filings to speak for what we're gonna ask for here. But I don't know, that's up to private parties. Accountability is really important in making sure, again, that the remedies actually pry open competition and lead to the next generation of technologies. And you talked about advertising. Well, very often advertising is, just like any other market, some markets you have prices that are, you know, put on a product with a stamp or a tag. In other markets, you have auctions and everything in between. And again, starting with the realities of how products are bought and sold, and then
31:46 Speaker 04 making sure we understand what kinds of competitive pressure can come into play in the context of an ad auction market is something, you know, we understand pretty well and we'll make sure that we get right.
31:56 Speaker 03 You brought up the idea that whatever remedies you seek have to make the next turn of technology innovation more competitive. You mentioned AI when you're talking about that. Obviously, AI search is on the horizon. Search GPT is out there. Google is obviously working to bring AI into search. Google's a little bit afraid of these AI products, right? They have reacted to them very aggressively. Is that not a sign of competition already existing there?
32:20 Speaker 04 Well, it's like I mentioned before, I mean, often when the new disruptive threats come in, that's when we need the antitrust laws the most because they prevent the incumbents from thwarting the emergence of those competitive threats in order to fend off the sea change. If you think back to USV Microsoft, it came right around the time of, you know, was referred to in that case as the internet tidal wave, where people were popping open browsers and instead of running applications on their operating system, they were going out into the wild of the internet and running them on websites. And eventually those became apps. And so those kinds of inflection points can be very exciting and they can usher in new and transformative technologies.
33:03 Speaker 04 But if a company has monopoly power and the incumbent, there's a strong incentive either to keep those new technologies from emerging or developing or thriving, or to drive them in a direction that feeds the monopoly moat, rather than prying open, you know, brand new frontiers. And so we want to make sure, again, that we're not picking in winners and losers, that we're not mandating outcomes, but simply that we're allowing the natural competitive forces of innovation to emerge and thrive.
33:34 Speaker 03 There's a lot of general froth about antitrust and Google in particular in the tech world right now, whether regulating merger and acquisition activity makes it too hard for startups to exit. The similar vein, they're saying, well, if you don't allow M and A, we're just going to come up with other ideas. And AI is extraordinarily capital intensive, extraordinarily talent intensive. We're seeing some other approaches to acquisition in the tech space. So I'm just going to ask you a hypothetical. If a company doesn't buy a company or acquire its shares, but it commits the same money it would to paying all of the investors, employees for their shares, is that still an acquisition in your mind?
34:13 Speaker 04 Thank you for presenting that as a hypothetical. I guess I would say is an antitrust enforcer, substance over form. And so if it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it's not an elephant. And I think we have to, again, be pragmatic and practical about it. And so if it's an acquisition in all but name, then that's what we're going to call it, and that's how we're going to treat it. And we did that in a case we brought and won involving American Airlines and JetBlue, where they entered into an alliance. We essentially told the court it was an agreement that essentially merged the two companies for the purposes of air travel in this certain region. And we treated it as such against appropriate
34:56 Speaker 04 legal backdrop. So, you know, we're not going to let form triumph substance when it comes to anticompetitive behavior. I will say, at the same time, though, our goal is not to get in the way of legitimate business, right? And so we see thousands of mergers every year. I think less than 3%, if not even lower than that, actually get a look, a real in-depth look, and even a smaller percentage, a sliver, get challenged. There's tons of M and A that's occurring. That never sees the inside of our building, that never receives a phone call from the antitrust division of the Department of Justice, because there are no competitive problems. It's just a small sliver of transactions that result in strategic M and A with a firm
35:41 Speaker 04 that has significant market power or can create significant market power that might be a problem. Also, we want our companies to stay, we want companies, people to invest, we want companies to innovate and thrive, and eventually want them to go public. I mean, going, companies going public and, and, and becoming the next generation of, of really strong innovative entities is a great thing from our perspective. And so, I know there's a lot of consternation in the tech center about the cost of going public, and especially for small or micro cap companies. And I think those are legitimate conversations. We want there to be multiple paths to success. If the only way to succeed is through exit to a large dominant tech firm, then I think that's a sign of a fundamental problem in
36:24 Speaker 04 the market. And I think we should ask a broader question is, well, why are we in a world where that's the only pathway to durability?
36:33 Speaker 03 I want to end on a very big question and a very small one. So here's the big question, I think, I want to wrap up the Google conversation with. And it's one that I thought about a lot as I was reading the, the decision. Because it doesn't say this in the decision, but it feels like the decision is a reaction to this idea. For over 10 years, Google's response to any concerns of it acting in an anti-competitive way was to simply respond with, competition is just a click away. Right? You think Google searches acting anti-competitively against Bing or DuckDuckGo or whatever, and Google would say, competition is just click away. People can just choose to use the other search engine, and they pick us because we're the best. I read this decision, and it is a pretty thorough deconstruction of that argument.
37:16 Speaker 03 Right? Saying, here's all of the ways that competition is not just a click away. Right? Here's all the ways that consumers don't even know that they should think about those clicks. They're just doing what's in front of them. Do you think that's done with now that we're going to stop making that argument? Because it feels like that has been the center of gravity in the antitrust argument about Google in particular for most of my career as a tech journalist.
37:41 Speaker 04 I mean, I think it's an extraordinarily unsophisticated argument. And I think, you know, this case, but many of our other cases demonstrate that. The fact of the matter is, these are, you know, billion dollar capital intensive industries. Companies are paying tens of billions of dollars for distribution, accumulating massive petabytes of data, engaging in machine learning. Competition requires all of those ingredients and it's not easy. And we don't want companies to shy away from making those investments or monetizing those investments. But the fact of the matter is, these industries are a lot more sophisticated than a punchline.
38:18 Speaker 03 Do you think that we will actually see meaningful competition search if you get the remedies you want?
38:23 Speaker 04 That is our goal. I believe that is possible. I believe that antitrust law and competitive process and markets can work. I wouldn't be doing this for a living if I didn't truly believe that a market-based economy is the best one we have. And so in order for that to work, though, we need competitors with opportunities. It doesn't mean that everyone's going to win. It doesn't mean that everyone's going to succeed. We just want the chance. We want the opportunity for companies to compete on the merits. And going back to one of the themes we emphasized earlier, when we are particularly concerned when a firm that has monopoly power becomes itself the regulator in an industry and starts imposing rules that tell other non-dominant companies what they cannot, cannot do.
39:07 Speaker 04 And a lot of those restrictions, a lot of those rules and the lack of accountability of those rules that make dominant companies the equivalent of industry regulators is where our focus comes in. And so we just want to make sure that other companies have the freedom to work with whomever they want to work with, to innovate, to incorporate new interesting features when they believe that they can compete effectively.
39:30 Speaker 03 The Microsoft case is really about browsers and the application model moving from Windtel. To the browser and to the web, which happened and the Microsoft case might have created the conditions for that to happen. That made Google, right? That created Google as a company or created the market conditions for Google to exist. Google's argument here, if you talk to folks at Google, the angriest argument they will make in response is this ruling is just going to benefit Microsoft. It's going to mean people have to use Bing instead of Google. And somehow, Microsoft has come all the way back around and they're going to be the winner this time. How do you assess that? And do you see other competitors, other startups that might succeed? And I will just note, everyone knows this, but it's important to note here. Microsoft owns 51% of OpenAI, which is the competitor right now.
40:15 Speaker 04 I think that argument is ridiculous. If you look at our trial and the trial record and the decision that you just went through in detail, it talks a lot about smaller competitors, talks a lot about rivals, talks about indifferent business models that never had the opportunity to fully succeed and compete because they didn't have access to the distribution they needed. We're never going to see the next generation of smaller startups and disruptive players unless we have appropriate degree of antitrust enforcement that keeps them free to compete on the merits of their innovations rather than being elbowed out through restrictive contracts and other provisions. I'll also say this, a couple of weeks ago, I was out in the West Coast in the Bay Area
40:59 Speaker 04 and I had the privilege of sitting down and talking to dozens of VCs and startup founders and innovators. And what I heard overwhelmingly was support for these cases. They believe that a small number of companies are crowding out the ability of new innovative startups to invest in and build and grow and that they feel that the regulatory requirements, not from the government, but from the dominant companies that impede their ability to grow, develop, earn revenue and engage with their own customers the way they want to are impediments to their success. And so I think when it comes to thinking about the next generation of competitive startups
41:44 Speaker 04 and innovators, we need room for them to compete free from anti-competitive behavior. And certainly what I've seen and heard, and it was on display in our antitrust case, was that those startups and innovators are freely coming forward and saying, we need a world in which companies play by the rules.
42:02 Speaker 03 I think that does it for my questions on Google. I'm very excited to see how you pursue remedies. I'm excited to see how the appeals process goes on. But I have one more minute, and I have to ask you, in the same time this is happening, the platform X is suing advertisers and advertising trade organizations for antitrust violations, claiming that they have illegally boycotted X and are withholding revenue. Do you think that makes sense?
42:27 Speaker 04 I can't comment on that. I
42:29 Speaker 03 But I know you want to. So can you can you give us a hint if you think that makes sense?
42:33 Speaker 04 I haven't read the the legal filing, and even if I did, I wouldn't comment on it. So I appreciate the question.
42:41 Speaker 03 The discipline is admirable, as always.
42:43 Speaker 04 Well, thank you, sir. I aim to please.
42:47 Speaker 03 We will have to have you back as we head into the next phase of the Google trial. I think there's quite a lot to talk about here, and you have other big cases coming up. There's the case against Apple. There's another case against Google for advertising technologies. What do you think people should take from this win as they begin to evaluate those cases?
43:07 Speaker 04 The antitrust laws are alive and well, and that we are bringing antitrust cases, and we are winning our antitrust cases, and we're doing so in order to preserve and protect competitive markets and innovation. Ultimately, we want businesses to fight it out lawfully in the competitive field. That's what we're protecting. But antitrust enforcement and our agenda is working because we are litigating our cases with rigor, with sophistication, and we are fighting for the benefit of the American public.
43:36 Speaker 03 Great. Well, Jonathan, thanks so much for coming on Decoder. We'll have to have you back soon.
43:39 Speaker 04 Would love to. Thanks so much.
43:44 Speaker 03 I'd like to thank Jonathan for taking the time to join Decoder today, and thank you for listening. I hope you enjoyed it. If you'd like to let us know what you thought about this episode, or what else you'd like us to cover, drop us a line. You can email us at [email protected] . We really do read all the emails. You can also hit me up directly on Threads. I'm at reckless1280. We also have a TikTok, which is a lot of fun. For as long as TikTok lasts, check it out. It's at DecoderPod. If you like Decoder, please share it with your friends and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. Decoder is a production of The Verge and part of the Vox Media Podcast Network. Our producers are Kate Cox and Nick Statt. Our editor is Callie Wright. Our supervising producer is Liam James. The Decoder music is by Breakmaster Cylinder. We'll see you next time.
44:20 Speaker 07 Where's your playlist taking you? Down the highway? To the mountains? Or just into daydream mode while you're stuck in traffic? With over 4,000 hotels worldwide, Best Western is there to help you make the most of your getaway. Wherever that is. Because the only thing better than a great playlist... is a great trip. Life's a trip. Make the most of it at Best Western. Book direct and save at bestwestern.com.
44:50 Speaker 08 Looking for a simple way to thank your clients or recognize employees for a job well done? A Starbucks card is more than a gift. It's a pick-me-up, a break in their day, and a reminder that you appreciate them. Whether you're shopping for digital or physical cards in bulk, Starbucks cards are the perfect gift to brighten anyone's day. Share the joy of coffee and connection when you give the gift of Starbucks. Shop Starbucks cards in bulk now at starbuckscardb2b.com.
Previous Booking CEO Glenn Fogel wants you to take out your travel frustrations on AI chatbots Next Replika CEO Eugenia Kuyda says it’s okay if we end up marrying AI chatbots Page updated October 26, 2026 · transcript and summary are machine-generated