Pod Insights WW2 Pod: We Have Ways of Making You Talk Hiroshima: The Manhattan Project About this episode What was the Manhattan Project? How accurate is the movie Oppenheimer? Why was the world's first nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima?
Join James Holland, Al Murray, and Iain MacGregor for Part 1 as they explore the monumental decisions that led to the world's first atomic bomb being dropped at the end of WW2.
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Transcript 11,524 words · 7 speakers
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2:01 Speaker 00 Actun, actun. Welcome to We Have Ways of Making You Talk with me, Al Murray and James Holland. And Jim, this torrent of anniversaries of the events at the end of the war is upon us. We have a special guest to help us with one of those events, haven't we?
2:14 Speaker 02 Yeah, we've got a very special guest, a great friend of the show. It's Ian McGregor, who last time we had on talking about Stalingrad, he's stuck with the Second World War, just, but moved in a slightly different direction. And I'm really grateful to him because I don't really understand science. I don't really understand about atomic bombs, but he now does.
2:35 Speaker 02 I mean, we know the basics, don't we? But we don't know anything more than that. So he's going to explain to us about the Manhattan Project in a little two-part series we're doing on the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ian, thank you so much for coming on. Thank you for helping us out and saving us from having to do science prep.
2:51 Speaker 03 I knew you were going to say that.
2:53 Speaker 02 I'm sorry, I'm that predictable.
2:55 Speaker 03 That's what was really good about Chalk Valley, sitting next to Frank, Professor Frank Close.
3:00 Speaker 02 Well, now you're on your own, I'm afraid.
3:02 Speaker 03 I know, I know, it'll be fine, it'll be fine.
3:05 Speaker 00 So, I mean, Ian, what I think is interesting about the build-up to the atomic bomb, I think that everyone knows this, is that there's sort of a race on, isn't there? Bit of a one-horse race, isn't it, to be honest? There's this body of knowledge that's out there, isn't there? The potential for an atomic weapon, sort of idea that's being kicked around by the clever people that understand this stuff. But the Germans, in a sense, get going on it first. Otto Hahn and Strassmann discover nuclear fission in 1938, really?
3:34 Speaker 02 I mean, the German effort is just an absolute shower. Let's just put that absolutely. Cars on the table here, it's pathetic. It's also split into, you know, two factions when they do it. Göring kind of calls it quits in summer of 1942 and it sort of goes on as a sort of skeleton effort thereafter. So I think, I think that's all we need to say about German atomic development, really.
3:54 Speaker 00 I used to have an old joke, which is that the British are the smartest people on the planet because they, it was the British who invented the atom bomb, but they got the Americans to build and test it in their country.
4:05 Speaker 03 Well, I was gonna say, I mean, it's that quote from the Danish physicist at the time, you know, he's on the second rung down from Einstein. So he's the world, he's a world leader. He says that if anyone's gonna build an atomic bomb, if it's gonna be America, they'd have to turn America into one enormous factory. Because that's what it will take to build an atomic bomb and put all the technology together, ramp up industry to work with science and the military. And that's, that's exactly what the Manhattan Project turned out to be.
4:34 Speaker 02 Yeah, yeah, yeah.
4:35 Speaker 00 Yeah. So where does the process actually, actually begin then? Some of these people are world famous, like Albert Einstein, and, you know, to the point where they're in terrible adverts now. Others are names that have sort of faded from the picture.
4:46 Speaker 02 Leo Szilard, I mean, who's he?
4:48 Speaker 03 Yeah. Well, I mean, Szilard's one of the raft of top level physicists that have escaped occupied Europe, well, as it's turning into occupied Europe.
4:56 Speaker 02 Is he Jewish?
4:57 Speaker 03 Yeah, and he's Hungarian. And that's the key. A lot of these physicists, scientists that ended up working on the Manhattan Project, first of all, helping the British, then obviously travelling across the Atlantic and working for the Americans, which would morph into the Manhattan Project. They're escaping religious persecution at first, most of them. And there's quite a few of them that just don't want to work under a fascist dictatorship as well, and they're driven out too. They're washed upon the shores of Great Britain. I mean, I know we're talking about the pathetic attempt by the Nazis to build a bomb. I wrote an article for Cachi Hoya about that a couple of weeks ago. At the time, it's the big red flag you can wave at the beginning of hostilities to think, well, if they get the bomb, is it part scare tactic? Maybe it was based on some kind of reality, I suppose. But Hahn
5:40 Speaker 03 and Strassmann are the ones that discover it, 1938. I suppose where it ramps up is at Birmingham University by 1940. And that's where you've got Rudolf Pals and Otto Frisch. They're the ones that say to the British, well, you do realise, you know, that the study of what we've done, that's enhanced Strassmann's, Hahn's work, is a grapefruit size. I mean, it's great that they put it into the layman's terms, a grapefruit size amount of enriched uranium-235.
6:08 Speaker 02 Yeah.
6:09 Speaker 03 Has enough to blow up a harbour, or potentially it could blow up a city. Uh, and that's what's worrying British military strategists, British politicians.
6:18 Speaker 02 Yeah.
6:18 Speaker 03 Because they're thinking, what if the Nazis get it? I mean, that, that, that it is, it's, it's obviously, it's a red rag.
6:23 Speaker 02 And you have the Maude Committee, don't you?
6:24 Speaker 03 Yeah, yeah, which, well, I was gonna say, it's, it's what Pals and Frisch say that drives the British to set up the Maude Committee.
6:32 Speaker 02 Which is an acronym, isn't it? Military Application of Uranium Detonation.
6:36 Speaker 03 There you go. Which then is telling them that it's a potential for a super bomb. The committee morphs into what will be the government's top secret programme called whimsically, I suppose, Tube Alloys.
6:49 Speaker 02 Yeah.
6:49 Speaker 03 And it's their report, the Tube Allies report, the Maude Report, that really drives the Americans. Because I know we talk about this letter famously Einstein gives to, to FDR. And Zillard is the one who drafts it. So Zillard's the brains. And as we know later on, I mean, Einstein became almost a pacifist and regretted that he'd ever got involved in giving the letter. But FDR thinks we definitely need to do something about this. But his hands are tied to a degree because they're not at war.
7:14 Speaker 02 Hmm. Not only they're not at war, they're neutral.
7:17 Speaker 03 Exactly. And the, the, the original version of the Manhattan Project is basically given about, I think it's a budget of $600,000. It's a committee of 12, a couple of military, obviously they're on board straight away, but they haven't got a big say. And industrialists and scientists, but they're, they're meeting once every couple of weeks.
7:36 Speaker 02 Uh, and from when on?
7:37 Speaker 03 From, from literally within about a month of FDR meeting Einstein and getting the letter. And they say, we need to activate this, but it's done in a very low level way.
7:49 Speaker 02 Right.
7:50 Speaker 03 They're attacked at Pearl Harbour. Everything's getting ramped up, as we all know, we don't really need to go there. But it's really only when they get, uh, the Maude Report, I suppose that that's when it really absolutely takes off.
8:03 Speaker 02 So just explain, explain Ian, what the Maude Report is. Presumably this is by the Maude Committee in Britain.
8:08 Speaker 03 Yes, exactly. It's, it's the team that's, they bring in Rudolf Pals and Otto Frisch into it. Rutherford is the chief physicist for the British delegation. He's going To be involved throughout the war in terms of working on the British project that then goes across the Atlantic and goes into the Manhattan Project. He's always going to be the main, the main voice at the table for us. They do the science and they realise that yes, this could potentially work. It's whether the British have the facilities and the capability, the money, everything else to do it. But it's in that we're at war with Nazi Germany.
8:42 Speaker 00 Yeah.
8:42 Speaker 03 We then, what do we give to the Americans in terms of technology and everything else? And, you know, nuclear technology is just one thing that came out of the, the famous case that we took over to the, to the Americans at the beginning of the war. The MoD committee is driving it from a British perspective, but it's not until after the Americans are actually in the war, the budgets are set up, that it really becomes a, a driving force in terms of the MoD reports, telling them this is exactly blow by blow, how we can put together with enriched uranium, a bomb.
9:11 Speaker 00 And do you have people at this stage saying, I have moral qualms about this? Or are we still in the, because obviously that grows and then certainly after the event, a lot of people develop moral qualms, as you pointed out. Is there this sort of feeling within the scientific community that they're going to do something that's going to change the world? Or are they, you know, just on the, on the tram lines of we need to come up with a weapon to get this war finished more quickly?
9:33 Speaker 03 You could say it's the, the genesis of MAD, mutually assured destruction. It's we've got to get ours before the Nazis get theirs.
9:40 Speaker 00 Yeah.
9:41 Speaker 03 But like we said, the Nazis programme didn't get off the ground, but they didn't know that. I mean, Groves, when he actually, you know, when he's running the Manhattan Project eventually from, you know, late 1942 onwards, the, the fear is amongst the whole team is the Nazis are 18 months ahead of them.
9:57 Speaker 02 And it is always better to overestimate the strength of your enemy rather than underestimate it.
10:01 Speaker 00 Okay. So then now the Americans are in, they've turned on the taps money wise. By late 42, you've got the Manhattan Engineer District, bringing in General Leslie Groves, who's in charge. And I mean, he's a technocratic soldier really, isn't he?
10:15 Speaker 03 Yeah, frustrated. I mean, I, I interviewed a couple of his family and his grandson, Richard Groves, was fantastic on his character. He, he wanted to be a combat leader. I mean, that was the thing. He wanted to, to be, he loved explosives. To be in the artillery, which is kind of ironic considering they'd report to President Truman, who was, who had actually done that in the Great War. He graduated from West Point in nineteen eighteen, so he's then a career soldier in the Army Corps of Engineers throughout his career, right up until the, you know, the beginning of hostilities after Pearl Harbor. But he did some amazing things when you think about it. I mean, when we're talking about the Americans would create the Manhattan Project eventually, government realizes we have to make this a top secret project.
10:58 Speaker 03 And if you're going to achieve that, then it has to come under the auspices of the Army. So it's the US Corps of Army Engineers that take it on. And they've got the budget too. I mean, they're going to be spending billions.
11:08 Speaker 02 So he's appointed in the fall, as they say in America, of nineteen forty two. Presumably, he's, you know, he could have been sent to Northwest Europe, couldn't he? He could have been sent to the Pacific or whatever.
11:18 Speaker 03 His resume is incredible. I genuinely mean this, they should have statues to this guy around the States. Just, you know, you park what he did on the Manhattan Project for a minute. When you think that he was one of the key men who led the rejuvenation of the military infrastructure in the United States over about a four, five year period. You know, they're rebuilding everything, rebuilding everything, construction, new things, whether it's hospitals, training barracks, airports, loading depots. Everything. And he's in charge of that. And crucially, he's then given the job to build the Pentagon, which at the time was the biggest building in the world. He had a team of ten thousand people and he brings it in on time and under budget.
11:58 Speaker 02 Amazing.
11:59 Speaker 03 He actually had applied for a combat commission and he was forty one. And if you see the photographs of him at the time, he's not looking like he'd pass, you know, an assault course.
12:10 Speaker 02 All right, so he's not Matt Damon buff?
12:13 Speaker 03 No, no, and yeah, that's one of the things the film really doesn't address. I mean, Matt Damon, what does he have, about six minutes of dialogue throughout the whole movie? I mean, he just drifts in, drifts out, you don't really get to grips with.
12:24 Speaker 02 Yeah, I mean, I'm looking at pictures of him now. I mean, he's quite a chunkster, isn't he?
12:28 Speaker 03 He just loved his sweets to the point where his staff hid his collection of sweets in the safe.
12:32 Speaker 02 That's just fantastic. I like him more and more, I've got to say.
12:36 Speaker 03 I do. I think he's amazing. He's wise enough to say when he's offered the job and he's showing this disappointment that he's not going to be a combat commander, he says, well, you know, I want to be Brigadier General or he'd end up a two-star general. I can't be mixing with Nobel Prize winners of science when I've just got my high school diploma in physics. I need something that gets me into the room and gets me respect. Obviously, his character and the way he was such a driven, obsessed guy, totally on top of his brief, would help. But, you know, it's his way of wangling a good promotion, a juicy promotion.
13:11 Speaker 00 And then on the science side is Oppenheimer, who of course is a name that, of the two of them, Groves is a name that people who know about this might know about, but Oppenheimer is the, you know, there's a bloody film made about him, you know.
13:23 Speaker 03 Yeah.
13:24 Speaker 02 Yeah, but he was quite, he was pretty famous before the film, to be fair.
13:27 Speaker 03 He was.
13:27 Speaker 02 As was his deeply odd tendencies.
13:30 Speaker 03 I can imagine Sheldon Cooper's been based on it to a degree, but you've got to remember with Groves, the power that he had, I equate him and Tibbetts quite closely in terms of, for such junior men in the military hierarchy, the power that they were given in the war because of the Manhattan Project was, you know, never been done before. There was security fears about Oppenheimer in terms of he was left-leaning, he, you know, he'd been to communist rallies like the film portrays, he had some dodgy relationships with women.
14:03 Speaker 02 Wasn't he trying to poison someone at some point?
14:05 Speaker 03 Yes, that was, yeah, well, that actually did happen, apparently. He injected poison into an apple from a physics professor that he didn't like when he was studying in Austria, and that actually did happen, apparently.
14:16 Speaker 02 That's not normal behaviour, let's face it.
14:18 Speaker 03 A very William Tell moment.
14:23 Speaker 03 No, but like I said, I mean, it's it's Groves that brings him in against everyone's saying his better judgment. And it's again, Groves is in the driving seat. He's already sat down with the top industrialists across America that this time will be meshed together closely with with the military, what they hadn't done in the Great War. They're going to do this this new war is we're going to work together very, very closely. You know, you've already helped me build the infrastructure, the military infrastructure across the United States. Now we're going to be working on the Manhattan Project, which was very close. How many people you'd need to do it, the facilities you're going to be building. I think in nearly every state across the United States, there was some sort of facility that
15:03 Speaker 03 was in the web of the Manhattan Project. You're looking at over 130,000 people. So Oppenheimer is obviously top of the tree.
15:11 Speaker 02 But but Ian, I mean, why doesn't he get in Zillard and Einstein? I mean, I mean, Oppenheimer presumably picks himself because he's the one person who knows how to do this. I mean, bottom line is you can have all the organization in the world, you can have all the money in the world, you can have every state in the US involved, you know, in direct way in in developing this. But but if you haven't got the science, you haven't got the bomb, you know, the buck stops with the science. So so I always assumed that Oppenheimer was was brought in was because he's the one man who can make this happen. Is that not the case?
15:40 Speaker 03 No, no, you're absolutely right. I mean, in terms of, I'd say two things, even though the military and the politicians might know it, might not know him, in his circle of the cream of physicists and science around the world, people like Niels Bohr, people like Enrico Fermi, who would then work in Chicago, at Chicago University.
16:00 Speaker 02 And these are all emigres, even come to America.
16:03 Speaker 03 Exactly. Yeah, but but they're in that, I suppose, Olympic class level of studying innovations and cutting edge physics. So they all know each other.
16:13 Speaker 02 But they're also they're coming to the United States, A, because they're escaping persecution in Europe, but B, because they know that the United States is the one place where they're going to get the funding to do this incredible science, right? I mean, you know, it's the richest nation in the world, even in the 1930s and the in the height of depression. Amazing science doesn't just happen, it happens with enormous financial backing. And if you're going to get financial backing, this is, you know, America's the place to go. But but just go back to Oppenheimer, just be absolutely clear. I mean, Oppenheimer is is chosen to lead this because he is the number one boffin in terms of atomic physics, right?
16:49 Speaker 03 Exactly, and he's working at USC Berkeley, one of the top places to study physics in the world. You know, over the last several years, he developed a world-class reputation for his classes, which he started from bad term, but from ground zero. He had his imperfections, you know, he was a narcissist to a big degree, suffered from bouts of depression. His man management skills, I think he perfected them at Los Alamos. Because of the time sensitivity, there was there was no kind of room for people having hissy fits. He had been renowned for that in the 1930s when he was giving classes, just belittling students, berating students, who couldn't understand what he was writing on the board, where it was perfectly clear
17:33 Speaker 03 to him. But he was pushing the boundaries of nuclear physics. So what was coming over from the Moore Report would have been bread and butter to him. He would have understood exactly what it meant, where it was going. And then, as Jim said, the amigres that were now coming across from Britain to America, to the promised land of having their scientific research funded properly and given the facilities that they needed. He was going to lead that. And Groves, I would say, from what his grandson Richard said to me, Groves saw a bit of himself in Oppenheimer, in terms of he could cajole, sometimes bully, work all hours, be driven,
18:14 Speaker 03 see a problem very, very quickly. So there's countless stories of he would be walking through the labs of Los Alamos, and there'd be a team of younger scientists. You've got to remember, the average age of the scientific team he was going to lead was 28. So these are all guys that have just probably either finished their postgrads or were doing their postgrads, and they've been they've been pulled into the Manhattan Project. He would see these guys ruminating over a blackboard, just being stumped by something. He'd walk past, come back about 30 seconds later, walk in, and it's a cliche, but he did it. And then he'd rework what they did and then walk out. And they're just looking at him, wow, he's just got it. He was able to problem solve on the hoof countless times.
18:53 Speaker 00 Would you say without him, this would never have come off?
18:56 Speaker 03 No, I think it would have happened, it just wouldn't probably happen to Quick. If you take either Oppenheimer or Groves out of the picture, especially Groves.
19:04 Speaker 02 Well, that's really interesting that you say that.
19:06 Speaker 03 Well, that's just, that's just my, I mean, you know, I've done a lot of research on Groves and the two people that I changed my mind on to a big degree. And I super admire them now are Groves and Truman.
19:19 Speaker 02 Yeah, love Truman, big fans of his.
19:20 Speaker 03 But with Groves, absolutely. When you think about, I'm surprised the man didn't have a heart attack or a stroke for, I mean, he was, you know, five hours sleep a day.
19:30 Speaker 02 Well, he got his, he got his three score and ten, didn't he? I mean, you know, despite his, his lack of sleep and love of chocolate.
19:37 Speaker 00 But, but what is remarkable about this though, is how fast it all happens because it's at Quebec where you get the formal agreement signed by Churchill Roosevelt. That there's going to be cooperation on tube alloys and its relocation to Manhattan project. And then Canada comes in on Quebec as well with uranium and heavy water. But that's not, this is in nineteen forty-three. I mean, we, two years later, there's a viable bomb. It's absolutely incredible.
20:00 Speaker 03 Twenty-seven months from a standing start, twenty-seven months.
20:03 Speaker 02 Yeah, that, that is unbelievable. And, and I think that goes some way to underline why in the first part of nineteen forty-five, no one knows whether this is going to happen or not, whether it's going to work. And, you know, we've said, we've talked a lot about, one has to look at the war in North West Europe through the prism of the war in the Pacific by nineteen forty-five. And, and the threat of what is to come and the invasion of the Japanese home islands and all the rest of it. And how could you think anything else when a project like this is happening so quickly and when the science is so unknown? And when you're in such uncharted territories, but I mean, you know, for us Brits, we were a part of it, right? How much did the British contribution play in the eventual, it was fundamental. Okay.
20:39 Speaker 03 Again, you, you read the, you read the research and the letters and the diaries. To a degree, it's part, I would say Churchill dropping the ball in terms of not fully appreciating the potential of nuclear technology. Because he had so many other issues going on, so many major problems going on that, you know, in various parts of the world, knowing how much it was going to cost. Knowing the kind of geography you would need to set up this kind of web of massive industry to produce everything you needed. Britain didn't have it. There was discussions about they could do more in Canada, but America, especially Groves, put the kibosh on that. Groves was not a big fan of too much British involvement in the programme.
21:21 Speaker 03 He almost, I suppose you could argue, put up with them to a degree. But you're right. I mean, as soon as the fundamental structure of the Manhattan Project set up, going on from mid 1943 onwards, and then you've got the dual process of the B-29 programme is taking shape too.
21:38 Speaker 02 Is the B-29 begun for the atomic bomb, or is it specifically for that?
21:43 Speaker 03 In terms of key people in key jobs realising that strategically, if they're planning for a potential war against Japan, then the current fleet of bombers that they had at the time, whether it's the B-17 or the B-24, wouldn't be the kind of plane you would need to then go and strategically bomb
22:01 Speaker 02 Got it.
22:01 Speaker 03 Japanese home islands. So from the late 1930s, they were talking about they needed to develop a better plane. And that's, you know, Henry Hap Arnold, he's driving that, and he drives that throughout the whole war. But the B-29 programme, to me anyway, runs very much in parallel
22:16 Speaker 02 Yeah.
22:16 Speaker 03 with the Manhattan Project. One drives the other.
22:19 Speaker 02 Yeah. So the three key project sites, aren't there, to start off with?
22:22 Speaker 03 Yeah. So, I mean, if you're gonna, you need enriched uranium 235. I mean, that's, that's what's been driving this. That's what was in the Maude Report. That's what started the ball rolling in 1938 in that lab in Berlin. That's gaseous diffusion, which is basically how you get these particles of U-235, is you have to put it through a tube where you've got a filter, a microscopic filter on one end, you've got a piston on the other, and you're pressing this gas through that's picking up these microscopic particles of U-235. Very long, very laborious process where you have to go from one stage of enrichment to the next, to the next, to the next, to the next. Plutonium was far easier, but the uranium production was going to be done in a site called Oak Ridge in Tennessee. And that's, again, that's the, just the
23:07 Speaker 03 Incredible drive and capacity of the Manhattan Project that they're building from scratch, these enormous facilities costing millions, if not billions of dollars in today's money. It's employing tens of thousands of people, most of whom don't know they're working on a nuclear bomb. That's Groves's genius of compartmentalisation.
23:25 Speaker 00 Yeah.
23:26 Speaker 02 But again, that's Groves, is it?
23:28 Speaker 03 Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, that's his policy. I mean, that's his, his plan of keeping everything secret. Obviously not realising that Britain's going to send over Klaus Fuchs one day and blab to the Soviets, but that's for another story. But yes, compartmentalisation, you know, if you're dealing with hundreds of factories, labs, engineering sites spread right across the States, employing over 130,000 people, it's a top secret project. How do you keep it top secret? They don't know exactly what fundamentally everything they're working towards is going on.
23:57 Speaker 00 Well, that begs the question. What do they think they're working on?
24:00 Speaker 03 There are some stories where foremen would come home and tell their kids, oh, we're working on this new toilet paper. And they bring toilet paper home to show their kids. There was a myriad of stories about what they thought they were working on.
24:13 Speaker 03 It's funny how there seems to be an understanding that it was only Oppenheimer's top team that knew they're working on atomic bombs. But there's several instances when you, when you go on the Atomic Heritage Foundation's website and you're reading some of the testimonies that were given in the 1950s and 60s afterwards, there are a lot more dozens of the younger scientists that were working on various smaller elements across the whole site of Los Alamos, which, you know, is a city in the desert. It's 10,000 people. They knew.
24:41 Speaker 00 They'd figured it out, yeah.
24:42 Speaker 03 They figured it out. So a lot of people knew, but Groves is keeping it very watertight. And we'll talk about it later, but when Paul Tibbetts is setting up the 509th Composite Group to actually, you know, they're training to drop the bomb, it's the same thing. The security on what you're allowed to say and not to say is again watertight. And that's driven by Groves.
25:03 Speaker 00 At Oak Ridge, they're producing uranium-235. At Hanford in Washington State, they're producing plutonium reactors. That's got British and Canadian support with raw materials and stuff. And then Los Alamos is, I think, the famous site. The one that, again, if people have heard of it, heard of any of this, they've heard of that. And that's the, as you say, it's a city, they build a city and you've got 10,000 people there. They were their families, aren't they?
25:28 Speaker 03 Yeah, I mean, it's, it's, it's a city, it's keep the scientists happy because they're under lock and key. They're not, they're not really allowed to, to get out much for R and R. You're stuck in the North New Mexican desert. You're surrounded by barbed wire, searchlights, MPs, et cetera, et cetera. But it had everything that you would find, probably a really nice place to live in terms of, if you're a world leading scientist or you're an undergrad that's been drawn into the, to the organisation. You're working, working with key people, world leaders, the best equipment, anything you need for your tests, you get very quickly, usually within 24 hours.
26:02 Speaker 00 And it's still a city to this day, isn't it?
26:03 Speaker 03 Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. It's, it's an incredible place to go. I'd, I'd highly recommend anyone thinking of going out on a holiday there, definitely check it out. The, the Trinity Test Site is, is a great place to visit too, but it's only open twice a year because it's still a military test site. So they only allow you one, once at East End, once in October. Yet they, they open it for 24 hours. But Los Alamos, yeah, I mean, that Site Y, top secret, where everyone goes. Tibbetts himself would go there many times to talk to Oppenheimer.
26:30 Speaker 00 Oh, we should just explain to everyone who doesn't know who Tibbetts is. Tibbetts is the, the pilot of Enola Gay. Who will come to drop the first.
26:36 Speaker 03 Who, who will come to drop it. But that's where, that's the weapons laboratory. So that's the heart, that's the beating heart of the whole of Manhattan Project. Everything across the United States is working towards giving as much knowledge, information and material to Site Y so they can build the bomb.
26:56 Speaker 00 Well, I'll tell you what, we'll take a break right now while people book their holidays in Los Alamos.
27:01 Speaker 00 We'll see you in a tick.
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27:42 Speaker 00 Welcome back to We Have Ways of Making You Talk, where Jim and I are talking to Ian McGregor about the atomic bomb. And I think we've managed to get through this without having to do any physics. And it may yet, it may yet come for us. But we touched on it a moment ago, that the B-29 is a crucial part of this project, as much as anything else, because you can have a weapon all you like, but you need to deliver it. As you said before, the B-17 and the B-24 aren't up to it in terms of range and ceiling, because this is the thing the Americans are really, really keen on is bombing from the stratosphere, out of the way of air defences. So how does this come about?
28:16 Speaker 02 Because the B-29 comes before the Manhattan Project, doesn't it?
28:19 Speaker 03 Oh, yeah, yeah, quite a few years. I mean, they'd had it on the drawing board from about 1936. That's where they decided that they needed, like I said, a bigger bomber than the B-17 in terms of taking the fight to Japan if it ever came to be. And it's not just that they're thinking of what plane will we develop and build to do that, but what kind of ordinance will we use? What kind of studies we're going to do on Japanese infrastructure? I mean, that was, it was all a second web in terms of this is what we need to do to figure out how best to subdue the Japanese before we ever needed to invade them.
28:57 Speaker 00 Yeah.
28:57 Speaker 03 And that's where the B-29 comes in. And I'd argue personally that I don't just mean militarily. If you look at the social, economic, political benefits, as well as the military, then I would say it's probably arguably the most significant military weapon of World War II.
29:12 Speaker 02 That's amazing.
29:13 Speaker 00 I mean, it's an interesting project as well, isn't it? Because they sort of put the cart before the horse, don't they? They've decided there's going to be an aeroplane and it's going to look like this. And they're going to build it. And then, once they've built it, they're going to figure out if it will work.
29:25 Speaker 03 Well, yeah, I mean, it's, it's going to be the highest altitude bomber there can be. It's going to be given the world's first air pressurised cabin.
29:34 Speaker 02 Which is completely groundbreaking at the time.
29:37 Speaker 03 It's unbelievable.
29:37 Speaker 02 Taken for granted now, but it's completely new then.
29:40 Speaker 03 There's a reason why George Lucas used the cockpit of the B-29 for the Millennium Falcon. I mean, it's that futuristic. It's like something out of Dandair.
29:47 Speaker 00 Yeah.
29:48 Speaker 03 The shape of it, everything.
29:50 Speaker 00 Control gun turrets as well, aren't they?
29:52 Speaker 03 Radar the works, but the birth of the the B twenty nine is fraught in multiple crashes, lots of deaths. It loses its first key test pilot and the team that were on board, monitoring how the plane was was flying. I suppose it's innovative in every single aspect in terms of the engines it's going to have. It's going to have fuel injected engines with a reverse propeller thrust. It's going to have the biggest bomb bays. To cut a long story short, it's got twice the range of a B seventeen and it can fly there twice as fast and it can carry twice the bomb capacity.
30:25 Speaker 00 Wow.
30:26 Speaker 03 That doesn't come cheap. So the B twenty nine program will exceed the cost of the Manhattan Project by about half a billion dollars by the end of the war. And I think that by the end of the war, they'd built maybe four thousand two hundred of them.
30:39 Speaker 00 This is being driven by the bomber men, isn't it?
30:41 Speaker 03 Yeah, the bomber mafia is the famously called.
30:43 Speaker 00 Yeah, so who after all have a point to prove, don't they? So this project, it has to become sort of too big to fail. They need this bomber to work.
30:50 Speaker 02 Just like HS two, yeah.
30:54 Speaker 03 I was going to say though, Jim, that it's, but you're right, because HS two, B twenty nine, they're both political decisions.
30:59 Speaker 00 Yeah.
31:00 Speaker 03 That's the key thing. It's, Hap Arnold is, you know, he's, I suppose he is the father of the modern day American Air Force.
31:06 Speaker 00 Yeah.
31:07 Speaker 02 Well, he absolutely is because it becomes the US Air Force after the war, doesn't it?
31:11 Speaker 03 He is the the general groves of the B twenty nine. His same kind of character and he doesn't suffer fools. He's got a clear vision, as has been said about the bomber mafia in terms of it's going to be high altitude bombing that wins wars before our troops ever need to get on the ground to fight it. That's the kind of plane I need. And it will establish, the B twenty nine is going to establish, help him to set up the United States Air Force. It won't be just the, you know, the US Army Air Corps.
31:38 Speaker 00 And in those terms, shape the Cold War as much as the atomic bomb, because it's that kind of plane. It's the proof of concept of that kind of plane that takes a straight to the B fifty two.
31:46 Speaker 03 Still with us now with airframes to the 70 years old being recycled. I mean, it's extraordinary that legacy, isn't it?
31:53 Speaker 02 The Americans are still the number one bomber force in the world.
31:56 Speaker 03 Yeah.
31:57 Speaker 02 They still can bomb anywhere, anything better than anybody else.
32:00 Speaker 03 I wrote an article a couple of weeks ago about the connection between Paul Tibbetts Junior, who flies the Enola Gay, and his grandson, Paul Tibbetts Four, who flew the first combat mission of the B two stealth bomber. And they both commanded the same units as well.
32:14 Speaker 02 Wow.
32:15 Speaker 03 Well, not 80 years apart, 70 years apart.
32:16 Speaker 02 So it's like a family business.
32:18 Speaker 03 Family business, but it shows you that America's at the sharp end of strategic bombing. I mean, it's just as simple as that. But the B 29, it had its military side of things in terms of that's going to be the bomb that's going to just destroy Japan ultimately. But equally, it's going to be the plane that we can rejuvenate the American economy. Specifically in areas like the Midwest that's completely been shattered by the Great Depression. And so like, you know, one of the biggest factories they built is Wichita in Kansas. That's where the predominantly most of the B 29s are going to be built.
32:50 Speaker 02 Can I just say, Ian, we did suggest this to the Prime Minister, that he might want to look at defence as a means of boosting the economy.
33:01 Speaker 03 But in terms of innovation, training the next generation in terms of avionics, electrics, everything else, the B 29 delivered that too. What I found, I didn't know this until I was doing the research, the Japanese had at least a year's grace in knowing that the Americans were producing some big long range bomber that was going to attack them.
33:23 Speaker 02 Say that again.
33:24 Speaker 03 There's evidence that the Japanese had some intelligence that the Americans were on the case of developing a new bomber. Because obviously it saw its first operations in China. That's where it was based before they managed to get onto the Mariana's Islands to set up the air bases there on Guam, Saipan and Tinian. By then, that's when they're in reach of the Japanese home islands. But primarily, they were first in China.
33:48 Speaker 02 Tibbetts is interesting in this story that he is the precision bombing expert.
33:51 Speaker 00 Leads the first raid in France, doesn't he? The stratosphere over Japan isn't what anyone's expected at all. The winds mean it's just impossible to do this kind of pinpoint bombing. And so come March, Operation Meeting House on the 9th, 10th of March, 1945, they abandon all that, don't they? And bomb low level with incendiaries from, you know, 1,000, 2,000 feet. The whole raison d'etre of this pressurized bomber is simply thrown out of the patch, isn't it?
34:17 Speaker 03 Well, I would argue that that's more of a, that's a bigger moral question to answer than the atomic bomb in terms of what that kind of raid would do for the rest of the war across Japan and how many people it would kill. Drakel is crossing the Rubicon. It's basically Hap Arnold's got a commander, Hansel, who believes in high precision bombing. You just said it's not working because of the Japanese jet streams playing havoc with navigation and bomb sites. And he puts in Curtis LeMay, which if, if listeners go and Google him and look at his pictures with his chomping a cigar, looks like a bulldog chewing a wasp, much more pragmatic, you could argue more brutal. He just wants to get the job done because he knows Hap Arnold will fire him and get the next guy in. He'll do the job and he thinks, right, we're just going to go in low level. This new incendiary has just come online, napalm.
35:00 Speaker 03 I'm going to strip the planes back from their armaments, load them up with incendiaries, send them in low level at night and we're going to tackle Tokyo. And like you said, Operation Meeting House, the great Tokyo fire raid. And that's just a prelude of things to come. And it works, kills over 100,000 people, probably kills a lot more than that. But they just don't have the records to show how many people actually were there at the time that died. But predominantly elderly men, women and children, and it works. So he then sends in a second raid a couple of weeks later that kills 83,000 people.
35:29 Speaker 02 Yeah, I mean, it is amazing, you know, 40% of Japan's urban areas destroyed by the end of August, 1945. 8.5 million Japanese civilians dehoused, 900,000, best part of a million killed. And this is before you're dropping an atomic bomb.
35:45 Speaker 03 Yeah, and I've had, when I've interviewed Japanese professors of history over there, they said the number's probably far higher, but it's because a lot of the administration buildings are destroyed. The only way to tell how many people living in the city is their rice ration cards. They're all destroyed. So they actually don't know to this day how many people actually have been killed. Could be double that. They just don't know. But officially, they've just listed it as about at least 900,000 people are killed. But it works. That's the key thing. And I think that's the bigger moral conundrum. Because you're doing it again, and again, and again.
36:18 Speaker 02 Yeah.
36:19 Speaker 03 Yeah. It's not just two atomic bombs.
36:21 Speaker 02 Well, we should get on to Colonel Paul Tibbetts, shouldn't we? And the creation of the 509th composite group.
36:27 Speaker 03 You kind of have to admire his combat resume. You know, enlisted 37, qualified as a pilot 38, specialising in four-engine bombers, went over in that first wave of B-17s that would make up the Eighth Air Force in the UK, was on the first raid, first 100 bomber raid.
36:48 Speaker 02 Yep.
36:48 Speaker 03 Was trusted enough in his skills that Major General Clark handpicked him to fly Eisenhower to Gibraltar for a top secret meeting.
36:56 Speaker 02 For the start of Torch, flying from Bournemouth Airport.
36:59 Speaker 03 I would say that having talked, interviewed his grandson Paul, the family do think could be even a level of PTSD, you might say. Because when you read about some of the arguments he was having with senior staff in North Africa by the time he was there, at the beginning of 43, it's only Doolittle that saves him and says, you know, I've heard there's a, they need a test pilot for the B-29. You've always been one of the best four-engine pilots I've ever met. I'm gonna assign you there before someone court marshals you. And that's where he went. So he ended up test flying the B-29 from, I think, late February 1943. And that's how he gets the gig. If you're building the world's most futuristic, innovative, four-engine, long-range bomber, you need the best pilot. And that's
37:42 Speaker 03 it made, like Groves got the Manhattan Project, makes logical sense why Tibbetts is chosen to run the 509th. I mean, he's got all the attributes.
37:52 Speaker 02 But what is it about it that requires such very special skills? I mean, isn't it just a question of kind of hoisting a bomb beneath you and off you go?
38:01 Speaker 03 In terms of the actual mission, which we'll talk about later, yes. But in terms of, he's got to start from scratch. Training what he hopes will be an elite set of crews. I think it was 15 crews in that were going to be in the squadron. It's like trying to get picked for the British and Irish Lions. They're going to be the cream of the cream. And then those 15 crews that actually make up the 509th will then get whittled down to who's going to be the strike crew that's actually going to launch the, you know, drop the bomb. And so they go through from like September, October, 1944 is when they're formed. He takes them to the training
38:42 Speaker 03 base in Wendover in Utah. They are going to be on a mission singularly different to anything they've ever done. They're going to be dropping a four and a half thousand kilo bomb on a specific target from about 32, 33,000 feet. So he's just training them to the nth degree. And again, I talk about that in detail, having looked at a lot of the testimonies of guys that were, were in that formation. It's relentless. And it's not just relentless from the training and being judged after every mission. It's relentless in terms of, as we talked about, site why for Los Alamos, the security around them. So they're constantly aware that they've got the FBI, US military intelligence agents
39:27 Speaker 03 in the base, around the base. If they go on R and R to the nearest town for some much needed, you know, shut eye, have a drink with their pals, maybe do a bit of gambling. There's several instances where all they'd say is, you know, he's trying to chat up a, a, a local girl, maybe over a drink, say, oh yeah, I'm with the 509. That's probably all they say. They get back to base. They're on a truck going to Northwest Canada within about 24 hours because that's the safest place Tibbetts knows to put them. And so there, there is a turnover. So you've got the stress of getting ready for combat, the stress of thinking, am I good enough? And the existential stress of, I just better keep my mouth shut.
40:02 Speaker 00 And, and Tibbetts knows it's the, an atomic weapon though, because as you said, he's been going to Los Alamos and he know, he's been talking. Talking to Groves and Oppenheimer. He knows what the bomb is, right?
40:11 Speaker 03 Yeah, yeah, he he's given that information from the get go. He's vetted by US intelligence first. And, you know, the cliched line, the mission that you'll go on, you'll be charmed of, could end the war. And then it's in the next few weeks and months that he's given the information. And he has, I would say there's a triangle, Groves, Tibbetts and Oppenheimer. There is a very close relationship with all three for various different reasons. That again, you don't you don't see that in the movie. You don't see Tibbetts anywhere, really. And that's a shame because, again, Oppenheimer almost had a, I would say, a big brother relationship with Tibbetts. Because Tibbetts understood physics to a degree, and he obviously understands engineering to a greater degree. So he wasn't just sitting there blank eyed.
40:56 Speaker 00 No.
40:57 Speaker 02 Yeah.
40:58 Speaker 03 So Tibbetts was able to to take on advice, the refinements they would have to do to the the B twenty nine. He was going to fly in terms of what it would have on board and how they'd modify the bomb bay, how they'd put in a new position in the cockpit for the weapon ear that would arm the bomb. These are all different things that a normal B twenty nine wouldn't have. He was in those conversations. And then when it came to the actual, as we talk about the mission, Oppenheimer again was giving him a lot of advice on, well, this is what you need to expect. This is the kind of maneuvers you're going to have to do to make sure you get out of there alive. So he would have that. And then with Groves, it was it was it was definitely a father, recalcitrant son relationship. He was constant, he was often getting admonished, you know, not bringing the the crews up to speed
41:42 Speaker 03 in how quickly they were being trained. Groves being Groves is just checking the reports on how successful these tests.
41:49 Speaker 00 Are they are they ready? Yeah.
41:51 Speaker 03 Yeah. And then I suppose one of the most famous ones was once Tibbetts knows the five oh nine is ready to go and the bases are ready to take them on Tinian, they just want to get out there. It's a big machine conveyor belt that will get them all out there because, you know, his his whole formation is over fifteen hundred men. And there's everything to do with, you know, supply, security, everything. It takes a long time, not just in flying them out there, but getting Most of the others at my ship.
42:20 Speaker 02 I mean, he only turns thirty in February nineteen forty five.
42:24 Speaker 03 It's absolutely incredible.
42:25 Speaker 02 Unbelievably young still.
42:26 Speaker 03 God. But he's got, this, this is what I admire about him. He's got, you know, excuse my language. He's got the balls to think, right, I am fed up being given excuses by the boffins at Los Alamos, who are constantly, on a daily basis, modifying the bomb. And he, he just knows he's got the code name. He rings, he rings up Washington and just basically gives the code name to say five oh nine is activated, ready to go. And that's it. Once he's done that, it's set in motion. Hasn't told Groves, and this is what I was getting back to about the relationship. Groves rings him, get here right now. He has to fly to Washington where Groves absolutely chews him out famously for about half an hour.
43:06 Speaker 03 Then he sat, sits down almost exhausted and laughs and said, well, it's got us going. He wanted the same thing. He just wanted to be in the circle of trust. He wanted to, he wanted to be the guy to give that order. He didn't expect Tibbetts to. But that shows you a thirty year old with that kind of authority and, you know, character. So, right, I just want to get on with it.
43:26 Speaker 02 He's got the chutzpah that's needed, hasn't he?
43:28 Speaker 03 Yeah.
43:28 Speaker 02 But there's a, there's a fourth player in this, and that's the new president. And, you know, Alan and I have talked a lot about, about Harry Truman this year. And what an enormously impressive individual he is. And, and I think one of the things that's so remarkable is, is when he takes over as president on twelfth of April nineteen forty five, in the evening of that fateful day, you know, he's only seen Roosevelt on the flesh twice since inauguration. And he has no idea about the Manhattan Project at all, despite being in charge of the Truman Committee, which is looking into kind of dodgy spending on, on defence in the, in the Second World War. So, he gets briefed by Henry Stimson and Leslie Groves a few days later. And, I mean, just imagine how you'd just be thinking,
44:10 Speaker 02 oh my God, you know, I thought this job was going to be bad enough as, when I took it on. I never realised I was going to have this thrown on my, into my lap as well. And, and it's just incredible how he, how he responds. Ultimately, the decision to drop the bomb is his. He is the president. He's a, a man of deep Christian faith, deep moral righteousness. And this is one of the biggest moral dilemmas that any man could ever face, whether to use it or not.
44:39 Speaker 03 He strikes me as at that period in his life when he's this job's just been dropped in his lap suddenly. He's quite a lonely figure as well because his, you know, his wife won't move up to the White House. She wants to stay in Missouri and his daughter's not there either. So there's quite a few testimonies of him, you know, just wandering around the West Wing at night, just mulling over, you know, God almighty, what have I got, you know, what have I got on my plate. But, I mean, Stimson actually tells him about the bomb the day he starts office, the first day he starts office, Stimson walks in with, I've got something to tell you, Mr. President. This is just my opinion. I would argue he's an ex artillery officer that's seen combat in this, in the First
45:18 Speaker 03 World War. So he knows the power of explosives. And if he's told by Stimson, one bomb has the equivalent of 15, 20,000 tonnes of TNT, he must be thinking, you know, biggest explosion in history. That's incredible. That could be, does he think that's my ace in the hole? He must know that the war in Europe's almost over. It's pretty much a done deal. But he's still looking at immense casualties in the Pacific.
45:46 Speaker 02 But also, this is changing warfare forever. You know, once you cross that, I mean, you called it crossing the Rubicon in your book, but it is crossing the Rubicon, from which, you know, the world changes forever the moment that bomb gets dropped. You know, that's it.
45:58 Speaker 00 His experience from France, fighting in France, he's seen, he's seen what, what slaughter on the battlefield's like for the, for a soldier. So he's thinking, as you're saying, he might be thinking, great, we don't have to go through that again.
46:10 Speaker 03 It must have not scared him, but intimidated him. But I don't think he was looking forward to it. That he's got to go and now sit down with Stalin. He'll get to meet his hero Churchill, fantastic, but he's got to sit down with Stalin. The Red Army's parked in Central Europe and he's got, he has to sort the Pacific War out. And he's got this new ordinance that, you know, the world has not, you know, has never seen before. No one else has got it. He didn't know at the time, you know, hindsight's a great thing, but at the time he didn't know about radiation, gamma radiation poisoning and everything else that comes with it. All he's thinking is, I've got a bomb that could literally wipe out an army in one fell swoop. That's big. I remember listening to a podcast you gave a couple of years ago where you're talking about the fighting in the Philippines. You're looking at the carnage there.
46:56 Speaker 02 Yeah, I agree with all of that, but I think he feels the moral responsibility of this very, very, very deeply indeed.
47:03 Speaker 03 Yeah.
47:03 Speaker 02 His say so is going to change the world forever. Whichever way you look at it, a bomb that is so destructive, single bomb that's that destructive, that comes with a huge moral burden. And it's a moral burden that he clearly feels very, very keenly. And I think it requires a huge amount of moral courage as well to go with it. I think that's a massive, massive, I mean, that's a sort of scale of responsibility that no other man has ever faced. And the point is that he faces it, you know, and I think that's very much to his credit.
47:32 Speaker 03 There's a nice anecdote after the war where he gets Tibbetts in the Oval Office, and he's got two of the three key leaders of the Manhattan Project in there as well. It's not, it's not that meeting he has with Oppenheimer Oasis, I've got blood on my hands. It's a completely different meeting, different vibe, where he's, I suppose he's saying exactly that to these guys. He's definitely saying it's Tibbetts. He's saying, you know, how do you feel about this? And Tibbetts, as he would say for the rest of his life, I followed orders. And Truman slams his hand down on the table. He said, damn right, you did. I'm the one who takes responsibility for this. I gave you an order and you carried it out. Anyone that has a problem with you, tell them to come to me.
48:11 Speaker 02 Yeah, but also the I followed orders line is, has all sorts of other connotations which emerged from the Second World War. And, you know, sometimes that's just not good enough.
48:20 Speaker 03 Again, it's one of the things that came up in a question the other week is, do I consider Curtis LeMay a war criminal? And I said, well, you can actually take it from the man's own lips.
48:32 Speaker 02 Yeah.
48:33 Speaker 03 He's watching the planes take off from Guam to go and do Operation Meeting House, bomb Tokyo. And he says to his chief of staff, if we lost the war, I'll get executed as a war criminal. You know, he's not stupid, but he's on the winning side.
48:47 Speaker 02 Yes. And the huge difference of all of this is if your enemies surrender, the bombing stops, which is the crucial kind of difference between that and, you know, what the Nazis are getting up to, et cetera. The bombs work successfully.
48:59 Speaker 03 The Trinity Test on the sixteenth of July. That's the plutonium bomb. The plutonium bomb, well, because that's one of the interesting things about this, isn't it? That's actually a different weapon, isn't it? Yeah, yeah, completely, completely.
49:08 Speaker 02 Can you just explain that a little bit, though? It's destructive, but not as destructive as an atomic bomb. And that's why you can still have Los Alamos there today.
49:15 Speaker 03 Yeah, exactly. So with the Trinity Test, they hadn't used plutonium, obviously, it's manmade. Much messier in terms of the radiation it can give out to. The kind of bomb that they thought they would need is the implosion bomb, which is what you see to a degree in the movie. It's how you, because again, I was saying this in the talk, you've got to remember, these guys, these scientists, even though they're the world's best scientists, they're still designing atomic bombs with a slide rule and a pencil. Yeah. There's no computers involved, to a greater degree. The uranium bomb is a gun-activated device. And that's where the British contingent comes in. So that's where Klaus Fuchs is involved in that. So where you're firing a projectile of U two through five,
49:57 Speaker 03 through the tube that will then strike the main section of the U two three five, causing fission. The plutonium bomb was, the explosives placed around the plutonium in the centre, and they're exploding inwards to then cause fission. Uranium, they tested, they knew it worked, they didn't need to do a test. Whereas plutonium, because it was a new substance that they were dealing with, less safe, that they thought, we have to do this on a site where we're a good few miles, I think they're twenty miles away at the end of it, and keeping everyone out of sight. So that, they just didn't know how big this plutonium bomb would explode. Yeah. Uranium, they had a good idea because they'd done the maths. But with plutonium, it was an unknown substance. They thought, right, well, we have to do the test to see how big it was.
50:41 Speaker 03 And there's a good anecdote from that where Groves admitted, again, you see it in the movie, where all the scientific team are there, they're all excited, they're putting on their welded goggles, they're lying face down away from the explosion. They figured out afterwards that where they placed themselves was actually four kilometres too close than they should have been. And even the governor of New Mexico hadn't been informed that they were going to conduct the test. So Groves had written three different drafts of a letter, depending on what happened. Because again, they didn't know. One was, it's a success, this is fantastic. Second was to apologize for all the damage that they caused because it just exploded too much. Third was obituaries, because they'd all been killed.
51:23 Speaker 03 And he'd actually drafted those and he had them in a safe, because that's what they just didn't know what they were messing with. The main focus for the Manhattan Project was the creation of plutonium from the world's first reactor, because after they dropped the first bomb on Hiroshima and then they're going towards Nagasaki, Truman and Groves and the rest of the chiefs of staff, they're having a conversation where Groves at the meeting tells them, well, by October we'll have 100 plutonium bombs online.
51:47 Speaker 00 Yeah, well, and which, considering using as tactical nuclear weapons, if it comes to in the invasion, aren't they, that they even reached that kind of thinking. So how are they choosing the targets in? Because obviously they're bombing the entire Japanese mainland islands, aren't they?
52:02 Speaker 03 Yeah.
52:03 Speaker 00 How do they end up choosing the, you know, these cities that are now infamous, I suppose is the right word? How do they do it?
52:08 Speaker 03 Well, because again, long-term planning, you know, they've been planning this for a couple of years. As much as you're planning and building the atomic bombs, as much as you're planning, developing and building the B29, you're looking at the bombing campaign that's been happening since 1945 across Japan. And they're stipulating, there are certain cities we don't want you really to touch. You know, one or two bombers might have gone over and dropped a few bombs and there was some damage, but predominantly they want to leave intact Hiroshima, Kyoto, Nagasaki, Kikura and Nagata. And that's the, and they set up the target committee. And so the key players are there, Henry Stimson, Van der Boer, who's run the scientific programme, Groves, there's at least a dozen men on there. And Tibbetts will be pulled in eventually. And they call them really fresh cities. And
52:53 Speaker 03 that's because, you know, they know they're going to win the war. They drop these bombs, they can then send in the teams afterwards, to the scientific teams, I should say, to do the assessment of, well, what does one of these bombs do to a completely non-damaged city?
53:07 Speaker 00 They're tests as much as anything else.
53:09 Speaker 03 Well, they're guinea pigs, aren't they?
53:10 Speaker 00 Yeah.
53:11 Speaker 02 Yeah, yeah, yeah.
53:11 Speaker 03 That's what they are.
53:12 Speaker 02 Which is why all the biggies aren't on this, because they've already been bombed.
53:15 Speaker 00 Yeah.
53:16 Speaker 03 Yeah. And that's why on the day of the first attack on Hiroshima, when they dropped the bomb, because they've seen so many single B29s fly over, or at most there's normally two or three, the defenders and the local population don't go into mass hysteria, because all they're seeing is, you know, they call them the B-Sans. B twenty nines, it's what they normally see. So on the day of the actual bombing where Tibbetts is actually above them in the Inola Gate, no one's panicking. They just think, well, there's there's that another single B twenty nine. But across those cities that I've mentioned on the target committees list, that's what they were doing. They were just assessing, okay, what do they look like? Let's take as many reconnaissance photos as possible because once we've destroyed it, our science teams can then
53:59 Speaker 03 measure the radiation blast, measure the damage fire does because the, you know, the result, the resultant fireballs, how many buildings are destroyed, how many people die in the first half mile radius.
54:10 Speaker 02 Yeah, so it's scientific and clinical, isn't it? And there's a target committee to come up with this, which obviously includes Graves and Oppenheimer, but also includes Major General Loris Norstad, who's a deputy chief of the air staff, Brigadier General Thomas Farrell, who's Groves deputy, Colonel John Lansdale, who's a Manhattan Project intelligence and security man. You've got Dr. John von Neumann, who's a, who's an implosion expert. Then you've got a British physicist, Dr. William Penny, who's big into Tube alloys, and Dr. Norman Ramsey, who's a, who's another physicist and as an advisor on bomb delivery tactics. That's a pretty broad committee, isn't it? You'd have to say.
54:45 Speaker 03 Yeah, well, I was gonna say it encompasses politics and the military and the science community. I mean, they're, they're the three arms that have brought this all together over the last two and a half years. But primarily, as you said earlier, it's, it's the president's decision, advised by Stimson. To a degree, his, his confidant Admiral William Lay, who's never been a big fan of the Manhattan Project, you know, he still gives him advice.
55:10 Speaker 02 Well, Lay, yes, he's the one who famously prefers to starve Japan into submission.
55:14 Speaker 00 Well, it's Air Force, Navy, inter-service rivalry.
55:18 Speaker 02 There's five cities which get shortlisted. That list is drawn up in May nineteen forty five, ahead of the test, and they're done in order, right? Order of, of preference.
55:28 Speaker 03 Yeah, yeah. I mean, they, they discuss them in detail and that's where you get the, that debate that apparently happens. That Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, says, well, you can't bomb Kyoto because it's the cultural centre of the country, which will, we need intact if we're ever going to rebuild it.
55:46 Speaker 02 Well, he's honeymooned there, hasn't he? So he knows it personally.
55:48 Speaker 03 Yeah, well, again, I, I researched that a lot. I couldn't find any link that's, he's ever said that. And obviously they do say it in the movie. I looked in several archives and there's no mention of it, even when I was in the, the World War Two Museum in, in New Orleans. I couldn't find it. Sounds nice, but whether he said it or not, I don't know. They're the ones that are saved, whereas, you know, sixty six other cities have been reduced to ashes by Curtis LeMay's incendiary campaign.
56:16 Speaker 02 Sixty six, yeah, okay.
56:18 Speaker 03 And they're the ones that they're going to be chosen. And so when we get to talk about the mission.
56:22 Speaker 02 Well, and we should say what the five are. So Hiroshima is is the first one. Kyoto is still on the list, then later removed, Nagasaki, Kokura and Niigata.
56:32 Speaker 03 Yeah. And even though we, you know, we're obviously going to talk about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Kokura was actually the top target for the committee. That was going to be the first one because it was a major, had a major arsenal there and it was a main military depot, more so than Hiroshima. I mean, Hiroshima was a military hub in the South Island, but Kokura was top of the target list. It's only cloud cover that saved it.
56:57 Speaker 00 Incredible. So 24th of July, 1945, Truman authorizes military use of the bomb as soon as made ready, without further civilian consultation. Hiroshima is confirmed as the first strike target for special mission number thirteen.
57:11 Speaker 02 Why number thirteen? Do we know?
57:13 Speaker 00 Well, I don't know.
57:15 Speaker 03 I don't know. Actually, that's a good question. I don't know that. I just assumed they just plucked thirteen out of the air.
57:21 Speaker 00 Well, we will return for our next episode with Ian when special mission number thirteen gets underway. Thanks for listening, everybody. If you want to listen to these back to back, go to our Apple Podcast channel and subscribe and then you can get these back to back without any adverts or become a Patreon, better still, where you could do much the same thing, plus watch live casts and other bits and pieces of We Have Ways stuff. Ian, this is, this is absolutely fascinating and really, really good to hear this properly in detail and not via perhaps the medium of a Hollywood movie, which I think many, many will have done most recently. Anyway, we'll see you again very shortly. Thanks everyone for listening. Cheerio.
57:57 Speaker 02 Cheerio.
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