Pod Insights The Twenty Minute VC (20VC): Venture Capital | Startup Funding | The Pitch 20VC: Lessons from 32 Years of Fund Investing | Why Exits Will Be Larger & Funds Sizes Bigger | Top Reasons to Turn Down Potential Fund Investments | Fees, Carry, Deployment Pace; What Do LPs Inspect When Fund Investing with David Clark, CIO @ Vencap About this episode David Clark is the CIO of Vencap, one of the leading fund of funds in the venture landscape. David has been at Vencap for 32 years and has been an LP his entire career. In Today's Episode with David Clark We Discuss: 1. From Unemployed Student in Love to Leading LP: How did a girlfriend lead to David taking his first steps into the world of fund investing? What does David know now about fund investing that he wishes he had known when he started? 2. Is Being an LP Harder than Ever Before: Does David agree with Doug Leone, "venture has transitioned from a boutique high margin business to a low margin commoditised industry"? Does David agree with Ryan Akinna @ MIT, "it is harder than ever to be an LP"? Does David think that venture returns will worsen in the coming years? Has the denominator effect for LPs gone? Do LPs have liquidity today? 3. What Makes the Best Performing Funds: What are the single biggest commonalities in managers that did a 3x net DPI fund? Of managers with a 3x net fund, how many had a single company return the fund? How do the best firms do generational transition? How do the best firms take cash off the table and sell part or all of their position? 4. Five Things LPs Hate In Potential VC Investments: What are the two most common reasons David will turn down a manager? How does David feel about the varying fee and carry levels? How does David feel about the compression of deployment times of funds? How does David feel about managers increasing fund size so significantly on every cycle? 5. Fund Sizes, Exits and Concentrating Returns: Why does David believe exit sizes will increase and fund sizes could be even larger? Why does David think that despite the above, the concentration of returns will be even smaller? Is David concerned by the IPO window being largely shut and the increased regulation on M&A?
Transcript 14,773 words · 3 speakers
Speaker names marked ? are inferred from speaking time and the show’s known hosts — they are not voice-verified.
0:00 Speaker 00 One of the prevailing narratives is that you can't get a fund returner for a billion dollar fund. So we had a look at our data and we found forty five investments that have returned a billion dollars to the single fund that invested and were also fund returners. What you need to do is to compare fund sizes today with the exit sizes in ten to fifteen years, because that's when those companies are ultimately going to become liquid.
0:24 Harry Stebbings? This is 20 VC with me, Harry Stebbings. Now, shows like this one today are my all time favourites to do. For any venture manager or investor, I think this will be one of the best podcasts you listen to this year. I'm so thrilled to welcome David Clark, CIO at VenCap, one of the leading fund of funds in the business. David has also been an LP for thirty two years, so there is nothing this man has not seen. Cycle wise, booms, busts, and you can actually watch this episode in video on YouTube by searching for 20 VC, recorded live in the 20 VC studio. But before we begin, I need to tell you about Hive. Twenty twenty four is shaping up to be a big year for the markets with a number of iconic unicorns rumored to be going public.
1:04 Harry Stebbings? Whether you're a fund manager or invest solo, Hive is the best way for you to access the coming wave of IPOs before they hit the market. There is no charge to access the platform and it's live trading data on hundreds of late stage private companies. Best of all, buyers don't pay fees on Hive. Create a free account today at hive.com/20vc. That's Hive with two I's, dot com slash two zero VC and see why they're the fastest growing pre-IPO marketplace in the world. And if Hive provides incredible levels of access, Secureframe? Secureframe provides incredible levels of trust to your customers through automation. Secureframe empowers businesses to build trust with customers by simplifying information security and compliance
1:50 Harry Stebbings? through AI and automation. Thousands of fast growing businesses, including NASDAQ, Angel List, Doodle and Coder, trust Secureframe to expedite their compliance journey for global security and privacy standards such as SOC two, ISO twenty seven hundred and one, HIPAA, GDPR and more. Backed by top tier investors and corporations such as Google, Kleiner Perkins, the company is among the Forbes list of top 100 startup employers for 2023 and Business Insider's list of the 34 most promising AI startups of 2023. Learn more today at SecureFrame.com. It really is a must. And finally, a company is nothing without its people, and that's why you need Remote.com.
2:29 Harry Stebbings? Remote is the best choice for companies expanding their global footprint where they don't already have legal entities. So you can effortlessly hire, manage and pay employees from around the world, all from one easy to use self-serve platform. Plus, you can streamline global employee management and cut HR costs with Remote's free HRIS. And hey, even if you are not looking for full-time employees, Remote has you covered with contractor management, ensuring compliant contracts and on-time payments for global contractors. There's a reason companies like GitLab and DoorDash trust Remote to handle their employees worldwide. Go to Remote.com now to get started and use the promo code 20VC to get 20% off during your first year.
3:13 Harry Stebbings? Remote, opportunity is wherever you are.
3:16 Speaker 02 You have now arrived at your destination.
3:19 Harry Stebbings? Dave, I am so excited for this. I've heard many of your conversations before. You have some strong opinions which I'm excited to dive into, so thank you for joining me.
3:26 Speaker 00 Yeah, no, it's a pleasure, Harry. I've been listening to your podcast for a long time and, and, you know, really impressed by what you've built here and the guests and so honoured to be part of it.
3:34 Harry Stebbings? Do you know it's been 10 years?
3:35 Speaker 00 Wow.
3:35 Harry Stebbings? I'm getting fricking old, but I-
3:37 Speaker 00 You must have started when you were 12, did you?
3:39 Harry Stebbings? I was actually 14, but I'm glad that it was an early start. You've been an LP for 32 years and 32 years with VanCap.
3:47 Speaker 00 Yeah.
3:48 Harry Stebbings? How did you first become an LP and when was that, "I want to do this as a career"?
3:52 Speaker 00 Yeah, funnily enough, I didn't grow up thinking, actually, my life's ambition is to become an LP in VC funds. I grew up in a small village in Northumberland. I'm pretty sure that nobody in that village had ever heard of venture capital. And I hadn't heard of venture capital, but I, I sort of finished university. I actually was keen to kind of go on and, and do a PhD, but kind of life intervened at that time and, and I had to end up getting some real work. And I was just looking for pretty much anything. My girlfriend at the time, my wife now, was, was living in Oxford. I was still living with my parents up in Northumberland. When I came down to see her, I was looking for a job. I saw an advert in the Oxford Times, "Numerate Graduates Required For Global Finance Firm." And I thought, well,
4:36 Speaker 00 it doesn't sound very interesting, but if I don't apply for it, she's going to see it and she'll kill me. That was 1992, and I was fortunate enough that my first boss was willing to take a punt on a spotty, fresh graduate with no experience who'd never heard of VC before.
4:53 Harry Stebbings? I absolutely love that. I mean, often, fear is a great driver. When did you know that you actually loved doing it?
4:59 Speaker 00 For me, I'm curious about things, and I like to really dig into the detail. And it was probably after four or five years when we were starting to see the first dot com companies begin to emerge. I remember we got a stock distribution of Netscape, and it was my job to figure out what we were going to do with stock distributions. So I remember phoning up the CFO of Netscape at the time, it was a six-month public company, and having a conversation with them, and thinking, shit, this is really interesting. I never thought that I'd be doing something like this. But actually, having that not quite a front-row seat as an LP, but maybe a second-row seat into new technology, new
5:39 Speaker 00 developments that are changing society, I struggle to think of a more interesting career in a more interesting way to have spent the last 30 years.
5:47 Harry Stebbings? I mean, it is an incredibly interesting seat to have. It's also a seat that's changed over time, I'm sure. Ryan Akina at MIT said that it's become harder than ever. I'm intrigued. Do you think it has become harder than ever?
6:01 Speaker 00 I can see why you would have that perspective, in the sense that there are just so many funds and managers out there today. You are constantly bombarded by people who are trying to raise money and... Want to pitch you and it's simply impossible if you were trying to to meet with everyone to be able to work through those and to select successfully. And so I think from an LP, one of the things we've learned is that being an LP is all about understanding what you're good at and understanding what you're not good at. And making sure that you are focused. So for us, actually, the last five or six years have been very simple. Because our view was that it's it's been impossible to actually distinguish good managers from average managers, because everyone looked good.
6:43 Speaker 00 Everyone had companies that were getting written up. Everyone could talk about some interesting deals that they'd done. Everything looked great. But I think one of the advantages of having been in this industry for so long is that we've seen cycles happen before. And we've made all the mistakes in the book. I remember in the early nineties, we mass, in the late nineties, rather, we massively expanded our our roster of managers. We did a lot of first time funds and this was all in ninety eight, ninety nine, when things were looking unbelievable. We were backing managers in a fund two where their first fund was showing a hundred percent IRR and a five X TVPI. Couple of years later, those funds were looking very different. And so I think it's really sort of understanding what it is that you want to see in a manager.
7:25 Speaker 00 That's what you have to do in order to be able to do this job successfully and be ruthless about sticking to that particular focus.
7:32 Harry Stebbings? My question to you though then is if you think about the last five or six years, it's impossible to select, everyone looks good. Then you end up doing nothing and you have to stay at the forefront of great managers. You have to ensure that you don't miss the next great franchise. How do you approach that, knowing that you don't want to enter a world where you can't decide, but also you can't miss?
7:52 Speaker 00 Yeah, I think you can miss. One of the things that we've learned is that you don't have to do every great manager out there. You just have to make sure all the managers you do are great. So it's not about trying to see everything and pick every ring, everything that has the potential to rise into that top quartile or top testile. It's about understanding what your lane is, being comfortable in your lane and recognizing that lane is still relevant and is still able to produce the performance that that you expect from the asset class. And I think particularly over the last five years, even if we saw a really good manager, we thought it was the wrong time to intercept them. And actually, there would be a much better opportunity when there was far less noise
8:31 Speaker 00 and far more signal to fine tune that decision. And we saw this back in 2010, 2011, 2012, where we were able to add several top tier managers after the financial crisis, because a lot of their traditional LPs were struggling with the denominator effect. There'd been very little liquidity, so they were struggling to make new commitments. And I think a lot of those managers there recognised it was important to have a reasonably diversified LP base. So not just Ivy League endowments, but also some family offices, some fund of funds. And as you know, as a fund of fund, we don't suffer from the denominator effect because we raise capital and then we invest it. So as long as we've managed to have our clothes before the market turns, we've got capital that we can invest into a much better environment.
9:13 Harry Stebbings? Far less noise and far more signal. Sounds wonderful. Sadly, when you have far more signal, there's far more noise. Traditionally, I agree with you in terms of supply of capital in cycles, but there is a permanence to the rule of capital that is entered venture, I think. And you're seeing a new size of that with sovereigns and pensioners doing what they're doing today. Is that possible anymore?
9:34 Speaker 00 It comes down to understanding how venture works and going back to the first principles of the industry. And that's one of the things that we've always tried to do, is to really go deep on understanding what is it that makes a great fund? What is it that really drives outperformance in the venture industry? And the thing that we constantly come back to is that venture is a power law industry, and it's 1% of the exits that ultimately generate the bulk of the returns created by the entire industry globally. So we're looking at around 30 companies a year that generate more than half of the total exit value for the VC industry. And when we look at who are the investors in those companies, it tends to be the same names time and time and time again. And so
10:18 Speaker 00 for us, we'd much rather spend our time trying to access those very best names than trying to find that needle in a haystack, that one in a 500 new emerging managers that might potentially do that. And if it means we miss out on one of those managers, then we're fine with that, because we've got enough in our roster that Continue to find those key companies and drive their outperformance.
10:39 Harry Stebbings? You're right, absolutely, that there are a continuing set of names that are in the best. Those continuing set of names are also most often in the multi billions of dollars in terms of AUM and fund size. And that will dramatically impede their level of having a five X net fund, say. It is just fucking hard to do a five X net on the size capital they have.
10:58 Speaker 00 It's it's hard to do a five X net full stop. So we had a look at the the pitch book data around DPI. So there was about 1,200 funds that were raised from 2000 to 2014, 15, I forget the exact date. And we looked at what the DPI statistics were for those funds. More than 50% hadn't returned 1X capital. And so these are funds that are more than that are 10 years old now, at least 10 years old now, hadn't returned 1X capital. There was just 6.6% that had generated 3X net DPI. And just 2.6% that had generated 5X DPI. When you're talking about the incidence of 5X funds, let's put that into context. That it's one in 50 funds that's capable of generating a 5X fund, according to the data on PitchBook.
11:42 Harry Stebbings? Mm hmm. Which begs a couple of different questions. Basically, question, is venture really worth the liquidity premium? You are a fund of funds, but the S and P will get you 2.6 over 10 years, pretty much with guarantees and with liquidity. Why bother doing venture?
11:56 Speaker 00 Because it's a power low industry. And if you're able to consistently compound at that top quartile in venture, then you're going to massively outperform the NASDAQ, you're going to massively outperform the S and P.
12:08 Harry Stebbings? But if the fund sizes are so large, you know, we're seeing, I do know names, but I'm not saying anything about their performance. But your Andreessen's, your GCs, your Lightspeeds, your any of the big firm brand names, they're multi billions of dollars. Doing doing a 3X is insanely hard on a lot of funds, but on that, it's so hard.
12:25 Speaker 00 And I think I think for us, that's the one big thing that keeps us awake at night. It's it's have these funds become so big that they can't ultimately deliver that type of performance. And today, we haven't seen that.
12:38 Harry Stebbings? When you say that type of performance, what is the type of performance you need?
12:41 Speaker 00 North of 3X.
12:42 Harry Stebbings? North of 3X.
12:43 Speaker 00 On an aggregate portfolio level. And, you know, we've we've discussed. Disclosed a little bit of the sort of high level performance. So happy to, happy to do that. So we have a group of a dozen core managers and you know, like 90% of all the capital we've invested over the last decade plus has gone to those managers. And when we look at the performance of, of their mature funds, so let's take away the ones that were raised in the last couple of years. We are seeing a net multiple back to us north of three X around that kind of three and a half X on a, on a blended basis, on an aggregate basis. So this isn't pie in the sky numbers. This is what those funds have delivered. And the other thing to look at there is what percentage of them have actually lost money? So go back to that 50% of funds from PitchBook haven't returned one X D P I.
13:24 Speaker 00 What we found is less than 3% of those funds are showing a T V P I of less than one X. Some of those funds are going back 30 years. So that's through the dot com boom and bust. It's through the financial crisis. So what we're able to do still is to capture a significant chunk of that upside while minimizing the risk of losing capital. I don't want to not answer your question on fund size because I think this is, this is really important. And again, one of the prevailing narratives is that you can't get a fund returner for a billion dollar fund. So we had a look at our data and we found 45 investments that have returned a billion dollars to the single fund that invested. And were also fund returners and most of those have happened in the last seven or eight years.
14:07 Speaker 00 The idea that you can't get a fund returner from a billion dollar fund is just untrue. And actually the, the majority of those weren't just a billion dollars. They were multiples of that. I think the most we have is a 15 billion dollar outcome for a single fund. So you have to sort of understand the size of the outcomes that we're now talking about for these funds. Just one last point, Harry. The other thing that I think you also have to bear in mind is that you're comparing today's fund sizes with today's exit sizes. If I look back 15 years ago, I was having exactly the same conversations about funds. They're way too large. You're never going to get a three X multiple. What you need to do is to compare fund sizes today with the exit sizes in 10 to 15 years.
14:50 Speaker 00 Because that's when those companies are ultimately going to become liquid. And if you look at. How those exit sizes have increased over the last fifteen years? Are you saying to me that you don't think technology outcomes are going to get bigger over the next fifteen years?
15:03 Harry Stebbings? So then let's play this game out then. I like that a lot because most people are like, well, we need to compare fund sizes today to exit sizes today. And actually, we've had this realisation that we were wrong in Covid and that companies shouldn't be forty X revenues they should be. And we're back to the normal now. And so it's really interesting to say, hey, project yourself forward ten years to the exit sizes of ten years' time. What do you think the exit size of ten years' time is then?
15:24 Speaker 00 So in the famous words of Yogi Berra, predictions are hard, especially those about the future. We would sort of take a step back and say, is technology becoming more or less important? Is it capturing a smaller or larger share of the economic pie? And are the market sizes for the winners in technology getting smaller or bigger? We think all of those arrows are pointing upwards. Yes, we know the multiples that you will see on those individual companies' earnings or revenues are going to fluctuate. But ultimately, the markets that they're playing in and the share of the economic pie that technology is going to capture, in our view, is only going to increase. And so that gives us confidence that whatever the multiples are at the time of exit, directionally, we're going to see exits get larger.
16:08 Harry Stebbings? Do you worry that we've never had such a strong incumbent set? People often say, oh, we've always had incumbents and they've always been usurped by innovation. We've never had data network effects like we do today. We've never had, you know, Microsoft doing whatever it is, three hundred million in free cash flow.
16:22 Speaker 00 We've never had Lita Khan either.
16:23 Harry Stebbings? No. And so I worry intensely that, yes, the market size increases, the proportion of spend to tech increase, but it concentrates intensely, which is not good for us.
16:35 Speaker 00 Yep.
16:36 Harry Stebbings? Do you share my worry on that?
16:37 Speaker 00 I think you're right. It's clear that the incumbents today have managed to have multiple iterations of their products. The question I would have, though, is how long is that likely to continue? I remember back in the mid nineties, reading The Innovator's Dilemma, Clayton Christensen. And it was a real eye-opener at the time, just around how it's very difficult for those incumbents to really innovate and to disrupt their own business and cannibalise their own business. Models. And it's interesting, you know, look at what's happening with someone like Google today. Look at the reaction to to their AI product that we've just seen over the last couple of weeks. And all those people that are now saying, you know, Google needs to really address where they're going as a business.
17:22 Speaker 00 You know, look at what Elon's done with Twitter in terms of, you know, turning that company on its head. I think there are a lot of challenges for the incumbents and and there's no guarantees that they're going to be able to continue to hold that dominant position. Particularly as we enter different technology paradigms. I don't know if you've if you've had a chance to read Chris Dixon's book yet.
17:42 Harry Stebbings? No, I haven't, but I've got him coming on the show in a week.
17:44 Speaker 00 Oh, fantastic.
17:45 Harry Stebbings? So I probably should be, but yes.
17:47 Speaker 00 But I think what's really interesting there is I study philosophy at university. One of the things we looked at, there was a really small book called The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by a guy called Thomas Kuhn. And it's really interesting about the way that science works in paradigms. And and by paradigm, it basically means a particular way of thinking. And that paradigm exists for a certain amount of time. And then new evidence, new data emerges and the paradigm changes. And when the paradigm changes, it's hugely disruptive. And I see similar things happening in technology. We've seen it with the mainframe, we've seen it with client server, we've seen it with the first generation of the internet. We've seen it with mobile, you know, we're seeing it now with AI. And the one thing I would put on top of that is blockchain and crypto.
18:28 Speaker 00 If we do see blockchain and crypto really emerge as a dominant technology paradigm in conjunction with AI, then I think that's going to have a very significant impact on the incumbents that are out there.
18:39 Harry Stebbings? Do you not think, though, that actually the thing that actually made the prior incumbents usurpable or replaceable, in whatever way we want to call it, is actually the lack of linkage between them and the new platform? And I think what concerns me most is when you look at the platform shift that we see today with AI. Fundamentally, it also all goes down to compute as well. Ability to spend on compute, scale of buy, scale of purchase, scale of data, scale of data quality. There is a core linkage in the prior platform to this platform, which gives them unparalleled advantages that we didn't have when moving from on prem to cloud.
19:12 Speaker 00 Yeah, but I also look at if we were then saying, you know, What's the likelihood that we're going to see another kind of outcome in that multi hundred billion dollar region? You know, you look at something like a ByteDance in China, which has emerged over the last ten years. You know, while a lot of these companies were there, now it's admittedly a different market and more restricted. And those companies haven't been able to to operate to the same extent in China. You know, you look at how OpenAI has really begun to to to win that category now. Still very early and who knows ultimately what's going to happen there. But I still feel optimistic that it's the fundamental nature of technology is that incumbents ultimately have a half life. And that half life has admittedly got longer.
19:54 Speaker 00 But I do think we will still see companies come over time that will disrupt those industries. And it will be based on different technology paradigms.
20:02 Harry Stebbings? So I'm interested, you said about kind of the amount of funds that were able to return a billion dollars and even one that did fifteen billion dollars. Liquidity in venture is one of the most important things. I think it's Horsley Bridge Data, where they talk about the compressed timelines for liquidity. And how unless you take advantage of them, venture is a really shit asset class. But if you do take advantage of them, then it's brilliant.
20:25 Speaker 00 Yeah.
20:25 Harry Stebbings? My question to you is, how do you think about liquidity strategies in those very short timelines? And the managers that do it well and those that don't, because otherwise it is shit.
20:35 Speaker 00 Yeah, no, and I think I would absolutely agree with that. It's the it's the classic thing where there's years where very little happened and then there's weeks where years happen sort of thing. And and so you do see that in in venture. There are short periods of time where you need to capture the value. And if you don't do that, then you're going to struggle. For us, investing in managers who really understand the dynamics of the industry, who've been through those cycles before, or or have people within their firm that have been through those cycles before, and understand the importance of generating liquidity when it's available. You know, from an LPs perspective, the way that you're able to do that is to make sure that you are investing consistently across every vintage.
21:14 Speaker 00 You're not trying to time the market, because if I look at the stuff that we were seeing get liquid in twenty nineteen, twenty twenty, twenty one, these are the investments that we made ten years earlier. And ten years earlier was two thousand and ten, two thousand and eleven. This was financial crisis when people weren't deploying checks.
21:30 Harry Stebbings? I write this stupid schedule and I just don't listen to it at all because it's way more interesting. You know, liquidity is predicated on often IPOs or M and A. You mentioned Lina Khan. M and A is pretty much fucked. I'm worried about that. Do you share my concern?
21:44 Speaker 00 Yeah, in the short term, I do, yeah. I think it's interesting how, you know, the UK regulator can block, you know, two US companies from merging, which is is an interesting one with with Figma and Adobe. I think it's going to be a challenge for the the big tech companies to acquire significant new product. And that goes back to the conversation we were having a second ago about their ability to iterate and continue to to stay in that in that position. But I do think it makes it harder for the M and A market to operate at scale. And so I think for companies, it's becoming increasingly important that they view themselves as standalone businesses.
22:23 Speaker 00 And for the founders to take the view that this is not just a kind of, let's get it to a couple of million dollars in revenue and then we can sell it to someone. It's about how do we build something that's actually durable and sustainable and and standalone. And those are the sort of companies that ultimately are able to go public. I think the impact that will have is that the concentration of returns in venture is going to be even smaller. There there are going to be fewer companies that ultimately account for that performance. And so it's going to be even more important that your backing managers that can identify them, win them, work them. And as you said earlier, know when to get out.
22:59 Harry Stebbings? I I totally agree with you and get you that you said about the UK blocking two American companies from merging. You know, I had Larry Summers on the show and he very much, you know, stated that I can't remember China's a jail, Japan's an old people's home and Europe's a museum.
23:13 Speaker 00 Yeah.
23:13 Harry Stebbings? How do you feel about Europe? Do you share the world's concern around Europe falling drastically behind and ever increasing China and US?
23:22 Speaker 00 I'm not a macroeconomist, so I, you know, let's, I I know my air.
23:26 Harry Stebbings? Well, neither is any venture investor, but we still are fine.
23:29 Speaker 00 Yeah, but I'll, if I'm looking at it from a venture perspective, I think it's important as an LP to know what you know and know what you don't know. I'll tell you what I don't know. I don't know what the next great sector is going to be. I don't know where the next great company is going to come from. I don't know whether Europe is going to outperform China or India or the US. What I have a much better sense of are who are the people who do know that or have a good shot at knowing that. And this comes back to, as an LP, my job is to select managers. And I want to select those managers who can consistently find those top 1% companies, wherever they are, you know, geographically or wherever they are in terms of industry, sector. That's really important. And when I look at our portfolio, there's a reason only 10% of our portfolio is invested in Europe.
24:14 Harry Stebbings? How much is in the US?
24:15 Speaker 00 Seventy.
24:16 Harry Stebbings? China?
24:17 Speaker 00 Ten.
24:17 Harry Stebbings? Is China going to nothing?
24:19 Speaker 00 Not sure. It's come down by half over the last 10 years.
24:22 Harry Stebbings? This is a really interesting thing that, you know, obviously I speak to a lot of LPs. There's been dramatic shifts in allocation towards obviously China and Israel over the last, you know, few years, towards the US and Europe again. There's been an influx of additional capital that's come from that.
24:36 Speaker 00 Yeah, yeah. And we've seen that. I was, I was just chatting to a guy I know at a UK fund earlier today, and they've just recently closed and done a fantastic job and had actually raised a lot of capital from US investors. And he was thinking, a lot of that is possibly those investors taking their China allocation and now moving it into Europe.
24:53 Harry Stebbings? I think we would fall in that bucket. I have one European investor and everyone else is US.
24:57 Speaker 00 Yeah, yeah. I don't care how much is in Europe. I don't care how much is in the US. What I care about is, are we getting exposure to
25:04 Harry Stebbings? The best managers.
25:05 Speaker 00 Those top 1% companies. And that will define the best managers. And so when I look back at the VC exits over the last six or seven years, the managers that we've backed have been in 85% of the top 20 or 30 exits there. So we're consistently getting exposure and not just logo exposure, like proper exposure.
25:23 Harry Stebbings? When did you do your last fund?
25:25 Speaker 00 Our last one was probably 2018.
25:30 Harry Stebbings? I mean this in the nicest way. Is your job not just to not piss off your existing managers? I'm like Alfie's a friend of mine. I would never bother pitching Alfie because it's like 2008 is six years ago. I'm so sorry to be so rude.
25:45 Speaker 00 No, no.
25:45 Harry Stebbings? Do your LPs not ask like, why are we paying fees? That new investment was six years ago.
25:51 Speaker 00 Yeah.
25:51 Harry Stebbings? It's a game of access.
25:53 Speaker 00 Ultimately, what do our investors care about? Our investors ultimately want to try and get the best risk-adjusted returns they can from the venture industry. And we think we have a strategy that delivers that. In a way, trying to sort of understand how that strategy works under the hood, it's a bit like how do our how do our managers find their best company? I don't really care how they do it. There's lots of different ways to be a successful VC investor. I'm less worried about that. I'm more worried about their output than their process. You know, from our perspective, you know, we want to continue to deliver that performance. And so we are paranoid about every time I see, I was just doing something today. There was a new white paper about why emerging managers and small funds outperform. And I'm all over that data because I want to understand
26:34 Speaker 00 what are we missing? What's wrong with our strategy? You know, why should we do a whole load of net new managers? What advantage will it give us?
26:41 Harry Stebbings? I'm loving this. But you said there about output over process. I just think that's so wrong. Because like the investment decision-making process is the product of venture capital. And actually, when you think about sustaining great returns, and when you think about what makes a firm great, it's the process that lead, it's the inputs that lead to the outputs. I could have a random investment in Uber from a friend who I've worked with before. Crap process, crap portfolio, my output will be great. That fun will be great.
27:11 Speaker 00 How do you know if the process works?
27:13 Harry Stebbings? You do a review.
27:14 Speaker 00 Of the process or of the output?
27:16 Harry Stebbings? You can do a review of both.
27:17 Speaker 00 But how can you know the process works unless you judge it by the output? How do you know that, you know, somebody's investment process is better than somebody else's investment process?
27:25 Harry Stebbings? I think you can understand the quality of one's thinking and how they think about creating environments of safety where you actually champion and challenge together. Where you hear all voices when there isn't a dominant voice, when there isn't a bias, a bully, when there isn't uneven confidences in a partnership. When there is an unequal distribution on personnel.
27:43 Speaker 00 So you wouldn't invest in Vinod Khosla?
27:45 Harry Stebbings? I mean, that is.
27:46 Speaker 00 You wouldn't invest in Brian Singerman, where there's a single, where Founders Fund have a single, you know, single GPs can go and do deals. Andreessen Horowitz, single GPs can go and do deals.
27:55 Harry Stebbings? But they champion, they challenge each other intensely. Brian will get pushed back from Peter like nothing else, and he'll get pushed back from Napoleon, and he'll get pushed back from all of his other partners. He will be rigorously challenged. Kozler, yes, I would. Why? Because I think Keith would push back immensely if he didn't like a deal that Vinod liked. And I think Vinod would listen.
28:15 Speaker 00 One of the things that I've seen is that there's no single right way to do venture. There's no single right way to make decisions. There's no single right way to structure a partnership. There's no single right background for a successful VC. And actually trying to predict what the key determinants of of success are. We've tried to do it, and we haven't been able to do it. I would love to see the long-term data from other LPs that says that they have been able to do it. One of the things that that we feel very strongly is that actually all the talk about Edge and how you pick emerging managers, how do you know if you're successful or not with your strategy?
28:56 Speaker 00 It's very easy to talk about, you know, I found this fund, or I've done that, or I look for this. How do you go back in 10 to 15 years' time and say, did that actually work or did it not? And what we've been able to do with our strategy is to look back, because we've been doing it for so long, we've been able to look back at the output and go, that's actually been successful.
29:15 Harry Stebbings? Do you not worry that that is a lagging indicator? It doesn't represent a new strategy. I see, I hear a lot of endowment funds that say, oh, we, we've got the Yale David Swensen model. And I'm like, he did that in the 80s, when there were much fewer managers to select, and venture had much better returns. That is not a comparable strategy today. Do you not worry that that is lagging data that you are now acting on in today's environment?
29:37 Speaker 00 Yeah, and I think, totally accept that that one of the challenges of venture is that the feedback loop is so long. And to be honest, most LPs probably aren't going to be in the same job when that feedback comes. So they're, they're more worried about deploying than they are about what happens 15 years. Down the line when you know when the performance data is is actually in. But then I would kind of flip that around and say, let's go back to the first principles. So I totally accept that. Let's go back to the first principles. Let's go back to the underlying performance data and let's see what strategies can be successful. We think venture is such a power law industry.
30:18 Harry Stebbings? But there are new there are new strategies which haven't been done before to the extent that they have like Sam Altman, who is obviously a fantastic CEO and also invests heavily on the side.
30:29 Speaker 00 Yeah.
30:29 Harry Stebbings? There haven't been cases like him before. And so we don't have data sets to predict forward on or to judge against. How do we think about entirely new models which may be better?
30:39 Speaker 00 Yep. And I think as an investor, we don't feel we need to be out there trying to test these new theories. What we need to try and do is to find when something is working to jump on it as quickly as we can. And then trying to get access in there where we have more signal and more conviction that it's not just a good story, a good narrative, but actually it's going to result in strong performance. We are looking at adding new managers in the market today because we think that signal to noise ratio looks a lot better. Because we're now starting to see a lot of those companies that raise money in the height of the ZERB era, begin to come back down to ground and get a sense of what they're really worth.
31:22 Speaker 00 And so I do think over the next couple of years, you will start to see managers differentiate themselves. But I think for us, the earliest we would intercept a manager would probably be Fund Three. And that's where we've had the most success historically. So if I look at our 12 managers, probably half of them, we ended up doing at Fund Three.
31:39 Harry Stebbings? Why is that the critical juncture?
31:41 Speaker 00 I think it's because you get a better sense in Fund One as to whether or not they've been able to find one of those top 1% companies. And once you have found those, one of those top 1% companies, our experience and our data suggests that you're more likely to be able to replicate that. Again, going back to some of the academic data that's out there, it does suggest that that first success is actually random. But once you've had that first success, there's a high likely or higher likelihood that you can then leverage it and start that virtuous circle and begin to build a franchise.
32:11 Harry Stebbings? Do you care about the ownership on that first success?
32:14 Speaker 00 It has to be material. It's not just the ownership, it's also the role of the investor in contributing towards that success. So if you wrote a $50,000 seed check and turned up 15 years later and found you had a company that went public at a $10 billion valuation, then that's less interesting for us. If you were leading around, if you were on the board, if you were working with the entrepreneur very closely, if you were adding value.
32:42 Harry Stebbings? Do you think VCs add value?
32:43 Speaker 00 I think some VCs add value. I think some VCs don't destroy value. I think there's a wide range.
32:51 Harry Stebbings? Do you care if your VCs add value?
32:53 Speaker 00 We want our VCs to understand when they need to get involved and when they need to get out of the way, because there will be certain points in a company's life where they do need help. No success happens in a straight line. You look at most of the companies out there that have been successful, at some stage they had a near-death experience. And I think the role of a founder, it can be at times incredibly lonely. There are times when a VC needs to be there for that founder and needs to have a hard conversation with them and needs to deliver a bit of tough love, but also needs to be supportive in a way to be a psychological support for that founder. So I think the best VCs are able to do that and can pick and choose their times. There are clearly VCs out there who just need to back off a whole heap.
33:37 Harry Stebbings? I agree with you. I'm just intrigued. On this juncture of like, hey, we tend to often find that ironclad point is the third fund. You acknowledge you can't really judge a process, or it's very difficult to judge a process because of the lack of tighter outcomes. What else is part of the selection process then? Just help me understand how you get excited by a manager.
33:56 Speaker 00 I want to say we've never invested in a manager that has come into us directly. I'll reply to all of them. It's not something we want to spend our time looking at. We have a pretty simple screen. We want to look at what we think are those top 1% companies. We spend a lot of time looking at who were the early-stage investors in them. And then it's a case of us trying to reach out and build relationships with those managers. Our deal flow is all outbound.
34:22 Harry Stebbings? They're all outbound.
34:23 Speaker 00 Yeah.
34:24 Harry Stebbings? Okay, how much is referrals from other managers that you're in?
34:27 Speaker 00 If they're not on our list, none.
34:28 Harry Stebbings? So then, they just help me understand what will lead you to outbound a manager? Is it like, oh, I really like their portfolio? Oh, that's an incredible background. Oh, I've seen their returns in pitch book.
34:39 Speaker 00 It's looking at those top 1% companies. We have a list of all the top 1% companies that we think that, you know, that are out there. They're the ones that have exited, the ones that are just below. And we're looking at who are the investors in those? Who are the early-stage investors? And we start to see names that we don't recognise. That's when we'll get interested and we'll do a little bit of work to see, you know, is this, you know, where did they intercept these companies? Maybe that's when we'll do some soft referencing amongst our GPs and say, what do you think of such and such? If they're not in that screen, then we're not going to spend our time there. And this goes back to the conversation we had right at the start about, is it harder to be an LP today? Yes and no, depending on how you're looking at the industry and how you're screening the potential candidates for investment.
35:23 Harry Stebbings? Okay, but we find one and we are like, yes, that's great. We really want to invest. We want to do the 2018 net new investment. If they're smashing it out of the park and in there, in the top 1.1% of companies, they have any allocation in their funds. Everyone is taking up the allocation. How do you, and respectfully, you're a fund of funds. So you're not a foundation, you're not a healthcare institution. How on earth do you win?
35:47 Speaker 00 Persistence, understanding the entry point as well. Even great firms go through challenging periods of time. You know, one of the reasons why we see great firms fail is because they don't handle succession well. And some of them will handle succession badly, but get there eventually. So there may be an opportunity to intercept during the period where people are thinking, is this still a manager that makes sense? You know, we talked about intercepting a number of our existing managers post-financial crisis. You know, I think there's an opportunity today, you know, we know the lack of liquidity is having an impact on a number of LPs because they need to have distributions coming back in order to make new commitments.
36:28 Harry Stebbings? If you were a good LP, those years weren't bad for distributions, plus the denominator. Denominator effect is better now given my public markets are like, is it really the problem that we thought it was?
36:37 Speaker 00 I think the denominator effect has dissipated. I look at the distributions that we're getting and we had a good 2023, but that was on the back of things that went public in 2021. And one of the metrics we track is what's the value of the public stock that's held by our managers? And that number has been coming down and there've been no net new adds to that list for the last 18 months or so.
36:58 Harry Stebbings? And they don't distribute to you, they hold for you?
37:01 Speaker 00 They will distribute over time. So it probably takes 18 months, 24 months for a position to be fully realised from those managers. So, you know, we're getting to the stage now where those companies that went public in the second half of 21, that they certainly distributed the bulk of the shares that they had. There is some still left. So, you know, we are seeing liquidity still coming back, but it will take time to replenish that inventory. So even if we start to see IPOs in the second half of this year, it's going to be six months before those shares become freely tradable. And again, it will probably be another 12 to 18 months before those positions ultimately get fully distributed.
37:37 Harry Stebbings? Hard question. Those positions are fully distributed. Do you hold or do you sell?
37:41 Speaker 00 We tend to sell because we don't think it's our job to hold public stock for our investors. They have their equity managers who do that and would do a better job than than we would. Now, we don't necessarily go back to the VCs and you and say to them, you should distribute as soon as a stock comes freely tradable. You know, we want them to to use their judgment as to when to distribute stock, particularly if they're still closely involved with that company. Because we've seen a number of occasions where, you know, the very best companies will continue to compound as a public company. Actually, holding for a period of time after that is actually beneficial for for performance.
38:18 Harry Stebbings? I was speaking to a dear friend who's now P and they said, listen, the managers who I will chastise are those who had the chance to distribute in the last few years and did not. Then I will get angry. Do you share that perspective?
38:29 Speaker 00 It depends on why they didn't distribute. I don't think you can take it on a company by company basis. I think you have to look at the overall volume of their work. Let's say they had 10 companies that went public and they decided to hold one of them and they distributed the rest. And they decided to hold that one because there were very specific reasons why they felt there was significant upside there. Then we have no problem with that. But it should be the exception rather than the norm. And I think it's interesting that the criticism that Sequoia had for the Sequoia Fund. It's absolutely the right idea. It just happened that they implemented it at a time in the market where you saw a significant correction once it was put in place.
39:10 Harry Stebbings? I don't disagree with you, but for those that maybe aren't aware, like, can you just explain your thesis why you think it is the right idea? Because many question that at all.
39:18 Speaker 00 When we talk about venture, there's a power law, but that is even true when you look at public companies that come from the venture industry. So there are a handful of public companies that have continued to compound at high levels for multiple years after going public. It's not a systematically different company post-IPO than pre-IPO. Yes, there's reporting differences and they've got to manage, you know, to quarterly expectations to some extent. But I think the very best companies can continue on that journey. And it seems odd that if you're in one of those top 1% companies, ride it all the way. Don't try and sell it early because you need to get points on the board. And again, this comes back to what do our managers do really well?
39:59 Speaker 00 And what differentiates the very best managers from the rest of the pack? They recognize when they do have one of those top 1% companies and they have the confidence and they've got the history to know that if they do hold on to it and things go wrong, it's not going to be fatal for them. But they trust their judgment that actually by doing that, they can significantly add value.
40:19 Harry Stebbings? Do you think you can really tell? And I use Nvidia as a good example here. Nvidia was public for a very long time before the last few years. The acceleration in enterprise value of that company is unbelievable and exceptional. But, you know, bluntly, I remember recommending it to my godfather in 2012 because I saw the rise in usage of mobile gaming and they compute behind that.
40:40 Speaker 00 Yeah.
40:40 Harry Stebbings? I had no fucking idea about AI in 2012 and then being at the forefront of that. And I don't think many of the venture investors would have sold when they went public whenever that was. And so do you think you can even tell, honestly?
40:51 Speaker 00 It depends on where you are in that company's life cycle. So at the time Nvidia went public, it was a very different business and I don't think you could have predicted the AI wave. I look at what happened with Square, for example. So Square went public, it was a couple of billion dollar company. I know two of the venture investors in there held on to that for several years post IPO because they knew the cash app was coming, they knew there was another leg there and they felt that the market wasn't fully valuing the option value of that second product line. And so where you have that sort of situation, then I think it's absolutely right for the venture investors to continue holding.
41:26 Harry Stebbings? I agree with you and I get you. Can I ask, you said about kind of succession and I am really intrigued on that because you said, you know, you like to have that juncture where maybe there's a faltering, but different firms make it through, different firms don't make it through. What have been some of your biggest lessons from 32 years?
41:41 Speaker 00 You don't have to keep rubbing it.
41:42 Harry Stebbings? I know, I'm so impressed. But what are your biggest lessons in those that make it through tough succession and those that don't? Because there's many that don't that we kind of forget about.
41:51 Speaker 00 When we look at the firms that have done it well, I think they recognize it's important and they don't wait too long to address it. There's one of the managers that we backed that has a policy that says, once you get to a certain age, you're out unless you're invited by the rest of the partners to stay within the partnership. I think what that does, it really sets the precedent that this is a partnership, it's a firm and the firm is more important than any individual. And I think that's really important. And where we've seen firms not handle it well, it's where the senior partners and maybe the founding partners have just been there for too long, they've kept too much of the economics, they haven't cleared a path for the people below them to come and really step up.
42:31 Speaker 00 Things change so quickly in venture that you've got to have that continued fresh blood coming through. Otherwise you get stale really quickly.
42:38 Harry Stebbings? Do you think you're close enough to know when things change in the firms that you're in? I don't know the firms you're in and respect that, but I'm sure I could tell you some horror stories right now of firms, things that are happening in your firms because my friends are in them. It's like founders know founders, do you know what I mean?
42:54 Speaker 00 Yeah, yeah.
42:55 Harry Stebbings? Do you think you're close enough to know?
42:56 Speaker 00 It's probably a fund later than the issues would start to emerge, but at the same Time, you probably hear general scuttlebutt about what's going on in there and, and you know, how much of that actually plays out. You can almost hear too much and, and not understand, or I'll find it a challenge to really appreciate what's material for the firm. And everyone likes to moan about where they work. That's never changed. I think for us, what we tend to look for is, is to make sure that firms have that process where, you know, we're seeing a continual flow of new people coming in and they're being valued for the work that they're doing and the senior partners stepping aside.
43:35 Harry Stebbings? How do you know the work that they're doing is good?
43:36 Speaker 00 It's trying to sort of understand who are the value drivers within a portfolio. You know, who are those top potential 1% companies? And then understanding who actually sourced those deals, who did the work? Are they the ones that are being elevated within the partnership? And is there enough room at the top end to let them have the freedom to come in and, and continue to do those deals and ultimately start to influence the behaviour of that partnership and, and the strategic direction?
44:01 Harry Stebbings? Who do you think's done generational transition the best?
44:04 Speaker 00 I think there's two interesting ways of doing it. So if I look at the firms that are on, I, I look at someone like Excel, who, you know, is probably on the third or fourth generation now of leaders within that firm. I think they'd probably admit that they didn't get everything perfect, but I think they've handled most of those transitions like pretty well. And it's, it's really hard. I think Sequoia have a really interesting way of doing it as well, where, you know, people kind of step aside and, you know, Don Valentine stepped aside for Mike and Doug, you know, Doug stepped aside for Roloff. So I think they understand the importance of doing that. The other way is I think Foundry Group have done a really good job.
44:39 Harry Stebbings? I love Foundry Group.
44:40 Speaker 00 Because they've understood that actually, we're not going to try and do that. There's a group of people here that want to work together and when we're done, we're done. I really respect that, that they haven't tried to pretend.
44:50 Harry Stebbings? Do you know Foundry Group? I cold emailed Brad Feld when I was 18 and he would get on a call with me, he would help me, he would mentor me. I think it's astonishing, this industry, for the amount that actually the best do give back, which is really special.
45:02 Speaker 00 Yep.
45:03 Harry Stebbings? Can you talk to me about your re-up process?
45:05 Speaker 00 Like if you asked me today, I could tell you who we would re-up with and who were the ones where there's more of a decision. I think 90% of the managers that we have, you know, we're very happy with, we know we're going to re-up with them. And in a way, our diligence on them is a continuous process. It's not about, oh, they're now raising a fund, let's kind of meet them and talk to them for the first time. We spend time with our managers as much as we can without getting in their way, but we also, you know, make sure that we're doing a lot of work behind the scenes to understand the quality of their portfolio. You know, do they continue to have those key companies? Are they, you know, in their more recent funds? But having said that, for every investment we do, we still go through a full diligence process. You know, we'll take references, we'll write our full investment recommendation.
45:46 Harry Stebbings? You've got to give Alfie something to do.
45:50 Speaker 00 But I think that's more confirmatory diligence that like, have we missed something here? It's not a case of, do we think there's something we're worried about here? It's really a case of making sure that there's not something that's fallen through the cracks that we haven't missed. And also, you know, to be perfectly honest, if something goes wrong in the future, we want to be able to point to our LPs and say, look, we've actually done a thorough job here. We're not just sitting there and, you know, on the beach smoking cigars and not doing any, you know, not doing the work, you know, we are properly looking after the money that we've been entrusted with.
46:23 Harry Stebbings? I know, I totally get that. Do you always do three funds?
46:26 Speaker 00 No.
46:27 Harry Stebbings? Do you always do two funds?
46:28 Speaker 00 No.
46:29 Harry Stebbings? Why would you not do the second?
46:31 Speaker 00 So there's been an instance of a manager where we've only done one fund and there were very specific reasons for that. It was mainly a China fund and there were, you know, some team issues.
46:42 Harry Stebbings? Is team the number one reason you won't do a fund? I think the best funds break down because of partnerships breaking down.
46:48 Speaker 00 The two reasons we would say no to an existing manager would be performance and succession. So the succession in a way is team.
46:57 Harry Stebbings? If a manager is surprised that you're not coming back, is that your fault?
47:02 Speaker 00 Yes.
47:02 Harry Stebbings? Do you get ahead of it?
47:03 Speaker 00 Yes.
47:04 Harry Stebbings? How far ahead of it?
47:05 Speaker 00 So one of the things we do with a lot of our managers is we send them our internal benchmarks. So we will compare, you know, all of their funds to all of the other managers. This is great because, you know, Cambridge or PitchBook or PreQuinn compare, you know, they show the market. But our managers want to really understand how do we compare with our peers. So one of the things we do is, you know, every quarter, every six months, we'll send them the benchmarks that, that obviously all anonymize. But we'll show where their fund ranks. Because it's a relatively small number of managers, we group it by three years. So if you're a 2015 fund, we compare you to funds that we did in 14, 15 and 16. So there's a decent sample size there. And by doing that, it shows them it's obvious if they're not performing. So we do it by IRR, we do it by TVPI and we do it by DPI.
47:50 Speaker 00 So we've had some conversations with people that where we've said, look, you know, you guys are really good on IRR and TVPI, but you're lagging on DPI. How are you thinking about that? And some of them will go, oh, look, we think we've got a couple of really good companies here. We're not selling them, you know, we don't want to force liquidity. We want to ride them as long as we can, then that's great. In others, it would be, ah, okay, that's interesting to know. We think there's probably some of our, you know, B companies that we can generate liquidity events for in the, in the near term to help address that.
48:17 Harry Stebbings? So it's always hard when you like say no to a manager that you invested in or not re-upping and you send them, they don't say, listen, this is where you stack rank and like, this is what led to our decision. Cause you can always have an answer back to that. Well, I'm holding some amazing positions that aren't, you know, DPI quite yet, but they will be. Or well, actually, whatever this may be. Is it not better to just say, I'm so sorry, Dave, we won't be investing? Because it will always inspire a conversation. I could argue a thousand ways on the data.
48:43 Speaker 00 Yeah.
48:43 Harry Stebbings? But actually look at them, that's lagging. Look at that shit firm ahead of me. They're all fucking on the beach.
48:49 Speaker 00 I think we want to be honest with our managers. There's also limits to how far that honesty is going to go because we want to give them an explanation as to why. And it's up to them if they want to accept that explanation or if they want to push back on it. And we'll have a conversation, but, but ultimately it's unlikely to, to change our mind. I think most of them, you know, where we have had that conversation have accepted it and moved on.
49:12 Harry Stebbings? What are you sensitive? How do you feel about compression of deployment timelines?
49:17 Speaker 00 So one of the lessons, you know, I said we've made all the mistakes in the book. One of the mistakes we made in the late nineties was deploying our funds too quickly. In, I think we had one fund that was fully invested in fifteen months and it was the worst fund we had. So it was in, you know, in nineteen ninety nine vintage fund. So as you can imagine, not, not the best outcomes there. And I think one of the lessons we learnt there was that time diversification in a fund is so important. We look to invest all of our funds across a three year period. And one of the things I'm really proud of was that when I look at the fund that was deploying nineteen, twenty, twenty one, we did that in a quarter under three years. So even though our managers were coming back, some of them in eighteen months, we still maintained that time diversity in our portfolio. That was really important.
50:00 Speaker 00 And it's something we talk, you know, we push our managers on all the time is, is that we want to see three year investment cycles for them.
50:08 Harry Stebbings? I mean this nicely, you push your managers all the time. Are your managers not just like, come on, like, I gotta queue people out the door, dude, like next?
50:17 Speaker 00 Yep.
50:17 Harry Stebbings? I don't mean that rudely at all.
50:18 Speaker 00 No, no, no.
50:19 Harry Stebbings? Do you know what I mean? It's like.
50:20 Speaker 00 I think they're more polite than that. But I think we recognize that we will give our opinion to our managers where we think there's something there that, that it makes sense for us to talk about. If they don't want to listen to it, then, then that's fine. Ultimately, they're the ones that are playing the game on the field. And as an investor, we trust them to do that. If they decide that, that ultimately they're seeing such great opportunities that they want to put their fund to work in, in eighteen months, then they've earned that right to do that. But they've also must recognize that, that they will be held accountable for what they do. You know, it's not to say that we'll walk away from a manager if they have one bad fund. That's not the case, you know, we look at these as long term relationships. If there is a bad fund as part of that, we want the managers to be honest about,
51:05 Speaker 00 have they really thought about what are the reasons for that? What are the lessons that they've learnt? Now, they might just be saying that and, and will continue to do what they want. But, but ultimately, you know, it comes down to if it's happening consistently, that's going to impact performance. And when it starts to impact performance consistently, that's one of the reasons why we'd walk away.
51:23 Harry Stebbings? How do you think? About fees and carry and sensitivity around those. We've seen some of the best firms and some of the names I'm sure that are consistently in the top one percent of companies even have three and thirty.
51:33 Speaker 00 I've never seen a three and thirty.
51:35 Harry Stebbings? What have you seen that's the highest?
51:37 Speaker 00 Two and a half.
51:38 Harry Stebbings? How do you feel about fee and carry increases to the two and a half, to the twenty five, to the kickers? How do you feel about that?
51:45 Speaker 00 For us, it's about net performance. What does that performance look like after the fees and carry have been taken off? And if it's consistently top quartile and it's consistently strong, then we're relaxed about that. I would prefer to see the carry be tiered. So I've got no issues about paying for performance, but I think it's important, you know, ideally I'd like to have that alignment of interest. So that if you do have, if you have a great manager that has a poor performing fund, then that's reflected in the economics that go back to them for that specific fund. As you said, there's a whole line of LPs queuing out the door, wanting to get into these managers. So that's, you know, realistically, that's not going to happen. Ultimately, for us, it comes back to what's the net performance.
52:23 Harry Stebbings? What other things would piss you off? If there's deployment timelines compressing, you know, fees and carry being elevated, anything else we're like, oh, that's a bugbear.
52:31 Speaker 00 We've talked about fund sizes. That is something that we continue to to look at and to monitor. And it's important that we still feel comfortable that whatever the fund size they're investing out of, that there's an opportunity for them to return the fund with a single investment, certainly for early stage funds. I think for later stage funds, you know, we probably want to see half the fund come back from us or the potential to return half the fund from a single.
52:54 Harry Stebbings? Cass, what's your distribution of dollars across the stack, across early, M, B, C, and then?
52:59 Speaker 00 We've got one or two managers that would have seed funds, but there's probably three or four seed funds that we're invested in across our managers. The majority of them would be early stage and that would be A and early Bs. And then virtually all of them would have some kind of fund to do later stage deals, whether that's a fully fledged growth fund or whether it's more of a kind of continuation fund, a sort of opportunity fund, a select fund, that sort of thing. It varies. We want to be sort of roughly fifty fifty between early and growth. It's a challenge to manage that. If we end up being sort of forty five. Five fifty five, I think we're comfortable with that. We don't want to be thirty seventy.
53:37 Harry Stebbings? How do you feel about the stapling? Because it's hard, you know, and the best managers especially, A, they have IR teams. I'm intrigued to see how you feel about those. They they also say, great, but you need to do India, you need to do growth, you need to do X. And it's like, oh, Christ, I just want to do your early stage fund.
53:54 Speaker 00 Again, we go back to the data and we look at the performance, whichever way we cut it, it's it's it's really interesting. So we looked at what's the performance of of the early stage US funds from our core managers from two thousand and five onwards? What's the performance of the growth funds from our core managers from two thousand and five onwards? What's the performance of the non-US funds from two thousand and five onwards from our core managers? It's all the same.
54:18 Harry Stebbings? It's all the same?
54:18 Speaker 00 It's all the same. In aggregate, it's all the same. You know, it's a point one, point two TVPI difference. It's all the same.
54:25 Harry Stebbings? DPI difference or not?
54:26 Speaker 00 The the growth funds come back quicker with the distributions come back earlier in the growth funds.
54:30 Harry Stebbings? So why don't you do more growth?
54:31 Speaker 00 Because we think the growth is probably more economically sensitive. If you think about what goes into the driver of a great growth, entry valuation is probably disproportionately more important than it is on the early stage. And also the size of exit is as well. So, you know, we've gone through a period where we've had some very strong performing growth funds. And if I showed you a a a list of of of the TVPI of all our core manager funds, you would not be able to predict which was a growth fund and which was an early stage fund. Our best performing core manager fund in the last fifteen years is a growth fund. It's really interesting there. But I I think we feel comfortable that, again, the best managers have that ability to pick the best companies.
55:14 Speaker 00 And as companies are staying private for longer now, it does feel that there's more of an opportunity to generate venture type returns from slightly later stage investments.
55:24 Harry Stebbings? Roger Aronbo said on the show, venture returns will get worse. Do you agree?
55:28 Speaker 00 For existing funds or for new funds?
55:30 Harry Stebbings? Both.
55:31 Speaker 00 Take one by one.
55:32 Harry Stebbings? For existing?
55:32 Speaker 00 For existing. So I think there's no question in my mind that there's still more pain to be had for existing funds. You know, I look at the carrying valuations that we see for a lot of companies and they vary quite wildly. Some of our managers have been pretty aggressive in writing things down. On the times, one of the things we are interested in is when we, when we do get pitched from, from newer managers. One of the things we look at are where are they holding their marks? And generally, we've seen the new managers holding last round value marks and, and not writing anything down. Where it's the more established managers that are perhaps ahead of the curve in, in writing stuff down. So I do think we're only part of the way through that. One of the other things we, we track is loss ratios. So what percent of companies backed by our managers are below one X?
56:17 Speaker 00 Historically, for an early stage fund, that's been 60% of companies don't return one X cost. You know, we've seen that reduce significantly for more recent vintages. My sense is that it's going to go back to the average, it's going to go back to that sort of 60%. So I think there's a lot of pain still to be had. So that's not just companies who are going to see their values reduced. I think there's a lot that ultimately aren't going to be successful and go out of business. And we haven't really had the wave of that happen yet. It feels like that's still to come. I don't know, I'd be interested in your perspective as a, you know, as a VC as well. How are, how are you seeing that?
56:50 Harry Stebbings? You know, the thing that we see from the data that we have, which is a lot, is the chasm in values that different people have in their books. And just extraordinary chasms in value. I was looking at one today and one was valued at 800 million and the other person had it at 10.2 billion. I feel for LPs because I think it's really difficult to get a fair grasp of what is the true value of your underlying book. And I think that's very hard. And I definitely agree with you, the managers who don't need to posture and present a brilliant facade, don't need to.
57:16 Speaker 00 Yep.
57:16 Harry Stebbings? And so I think you get a lot more truth to that. I'm intrigued, you know, when we think about that, you know, Doug Leone said before, we've seen the transition from a boutique, high margin industry to a commoditized, low margin industry. Do you agree with your 32 years of experience?
57:34 Speaker 00 I'm not going to argue with Doug.
57:36 Harry Stebbings? But really.
57:37 Speaker 00 I think what you've seen is, is over the, the last thirty years, the venture industry has expanded significantly. There's almost multiple parts to that industry now. I would say it depends on which part you're talking about. If you're talking about the people that are raising multiple billions of dollars to do the crossover deals, the late-stage private rounds, then I, I think that is more of a capital allocation exercise than it is a kind of craft. So I think returns there will probably come down because the weight of capital will make entry values become efficient. And we've seen that in a lot of other areas as well. So parts of the market, I think that is true.
58:15 Speaker 00 But I also think there are other parts of the market where that's less true because it isn't necessarily about, is capital a strategic advantage? In, in certain parts of the, of the industry, I think it's still a case that too much capital can be detrimental to a company. So I think there's parts of the industry where you will see that craft approach. And, and for me, it's still around, you know, the seed stage, the series A, you know, maybe the early Bs. Before things are really driven by the underlying metrics of the business. And it's more about an understanding of market potential and taking a view on founders. The more quantitative the decision becomes, the more that excess returns will probably get competed away.
58:58 Harry Stebbings? Can I ask you a final one? When you think about your biggest mistake, a fund that you regret doing, when you review that decision, what did you not see that was the determinant of that fate?
59:08 Speaker 00 I think one of the challenges with investing in venture is that there are so many unknown unknowns. And the degree of randomness that is involved as to whether something is successful or not is high. And the earlier you get, the, the, the greater that degree is. So I think there are certainly things that, you know, we couldn't have been expected to predict at the time we were doing the deal. And one of the things we do with our investments is sort of four or five years post-investment, we'll do a decision review analysis of, of those to see what can we learn from that? And how can we improve our decision? One of the big things that we. Learned was we used to only take references on managers from VCs that they had invested alongside. So we wanted to know what were they like as a partner, what were they like on the board.
59:53 Speaker 00 What we didn't do was if somebody was operating in a, in a particular space and we knew one of our managers was one of the top investors there. And they hadn't done any deals with that manager, we just didn't follow up on that. But now we'll actually say, we'll phone, phone that manager up and say like, why haven't you done any deals with this group? Is it just that you're in different parts of the market or are there specific reasons for not having done those deals? And I think sometimes we learn interesting things from that. So I think that's probably the, the biggest thing that's come out of our decision review process is not just to reference people who we know work with each other. But reference people who are in that particular sector and who we would normally expect to have worked.
1:00:34 Harry Stebbings? Do you not worry that that's just competitor shit talk? Do you know what I mean? Which is like, you ask someone, oh, what's it like with X? And they're going to be a competitor in a lot of cases. Well, that's shit and the partnership's breaking down and they have a broken decision-making process and the brand's there. But do you know why that you're actually letting imperfect information then impacts your decision-making process?
1:00:53 Speaker 00 Yeah, I, I, I think the importance there is you have to triangulate. And so there's not just one specific source of information that is primary. And you also have to understand, you have to have that relationship with your VCs that you know, are they the sort of person that preps on everyone? Are they the sort of person that gives everyone a great reference? You, you, you need to sort of have that history with them where you can put that into context, what they're saying. And I think that's, that's really important. And that just comes from time and building those relationships and having those conversations. And it's getting harder, it's getting harder, you know, particularly where, you know, you, you mentioned firms that have, you know, big IR departments. And it's harder to have that interaction with individual partners, you've got to work at it more.
1:01:33 Harry Stebbings? Yeah. I want to do a quick fire with you because I could talk to you all day. So I'm going to say a short statement, you're going to meet some immediate thoughts. Does that sound okay?
1:01:39 Speaker 00 Yeah, go for it.
1:01:40 Harry Stebbings? What have you changed your mind on most in the last 12 months?
1:01:44 Speaker 00 So if you had spoken to me, maybe not quite the last 12 months, but certainly sort of two or three years ago. I think we were incredibly sceptical about LPs doing direct co-investments. Because we looked at the data, you know, we know 60% of deals don't return capital. And we just thought, why would LPs be doing this? What's the likelihood that they're going to be getting into those top 1% companies? My view has definitely evolved on that. I'm not all the way there yet to say that that actually it's a good thing. But I do think there are situations in which there are different ways to optimise for those top 1% companies. One is to do it through the best primary managers, one is to do it through secondaries. And I also think another way selectively is to do it through directs. But directs in established companies, not with seed stage managers.
1:02:29 Harry Stebbings? What would you most like to change about the world of venture?
1:02:31 Speaker 00 I think venture at the highest level is quite exclusive. And so I'd like to try and democratised venture to some extent. And that works on multiple levels. So it's about giving everyday investors the opportunity to invest in a Sequoia or an Axel or an Andreessen or a Kleiner Perkins or an Index and not just Ivy League endowments. Because I think for the average person, it's, you know, it's tough. And venture done well can really drive significant outperformance over a long period of time. So I think giving individuals access to that, I think, would be great. But I also think, you know, looking at who comes into venture as well. I mentioned, you know, no one in the village I grew up had ever heard of venture. I was lucky, someone was willing to gamble on me.
1:03:16 Harry Stebbings? No, no, anyone had heard of venture in Britain 32 years ago. I mean, seriously.
1:03:21 Speaker 00 But I also look, I think about, you know, who's growing up in that village today? And what's their chances of being able to create a career in venture? It's really hard. You need to be an exceptional person in order to do this well as a GP. I would like to see the sourcing of GPs broaden. I think it's a challenge. You, we had the conversation off air about-
1:03:41 Harry Stebbings? Honestly, are you not like centred to this? Like you're the most exclusive, exclusive LP. You add no one, you don't, I mean this nicely, you don't take a chance on anyone in the nicest of ways. Yeah, I know you do at the intersection of Fund Three, but to get to Fund Three, Jesus, you've got to pass through the most golden, hallowed halls of endowment funds to get there. I'm so sorry to just put it like-
1:04:01 Speaker 00 No, no, no.
1:04:01 Harry Stebbings? But it's like, then be the change.
1:04:03 Speaker 00 What we can't afford to do, though, is gamble the money that our investors entrust us with. You know, we have a very specific strategy that that we think is able to generate strong and consistent performance across across the cycle. One of the things we we do want to try and encourage is to get people into the venture ecosystem from a diversity of different backgrounds. So one of the things we do as a firm is we've signed up to a charity called Gain, which is Girls Who Invest. So we take a placement student for six weeks in the summer to give them exposure to that. We run a twelve month placement scheme for university students and we've done that for six years. And so far, everyone that we've taken on board has been a female student.
1:04:44 Speaker 00 You know, I look at some of the things that some of our managers are doing in terms of trying to encourage diverse founders and things are happening there, but it's tough and I totally take your point. Which manager are you not in that you would love to be in? Did Alfie ask you to to ask this one? Go ahead. I don't throw friends under buses. So, I mean, I guess the one, the one man, and it really hits close to home. I have a huge amount of respect for the folks at Benchmark and what they've done. And it's a really painful one. So back in the day, we were investors with both Merrill Pickard, TVI, who were the precursor firms to Benchmark. And I remember having a conversation with Bruce Dunleavy and he said, we're spinning out, we're forming this firm.
1:05:27 Speaker 00 You know, and we said, great, we love you guys, we'd love to invest. And he went, fantastic, it's five million dollars. So this would be mid nineties. At the time, we were managing a portfolio for a UK pension fund and they had the they had the sign off on anything we did. So we went back to them and said, we've got this great investment, five million dollars, Benchmark, you know, fantastic track record from these established firms. We're really excited about it. They went, great, but we can only do four. So we went back to Bruce and said, we're in, but is it okay if we only do four? And he went, no, it's got to be five. We've never invested in Benchmark.
1:06:06 Harry Stebbings? God, that is painful.
1:06:07 Speaker 00 Yeah.
1:06:08 Harry Stebbings? Should UK pension funds and universities be doing more?
1:06:11 Speaker 00 I think if you look at the performance that, you know, the best university endowments in the US have had from venture, then definitely the challenge is will they end up doing the best managers? Or will they get pushed to do local managers? And I think that's one of the challenges that we've seen, you know, particularly in the UK. When the government gets involved, they want to try and encourage the UK venture scene. So they'll incentivize or restrict the ability of of local investors to choose managers by performance.
1:06:41 Harry Stebbings? Yep.
1:06:41 Speaker 00 They'll choose them because they want to try and grow the the UK venture scene. And for us, that's really dangerous. It hasn't worked.
1:06:48 Harry Stebbings? 10 years' time, you'll be 42.
1:06:52 Harry Stebbings? Where do you want to be then? Do you still want to be doing this?
1:06:54 Speaker 00 I mean, the first thing is I just I just like to be around generally.
1:06:58 Harry Stebbings? You're not an adult.
1:06:59 Speaker 00 I'm not taking anything for granted.
1:07:01 Harry Stebbings? You're like 54, no?
1:07:03 Speaker 00 Yeah, 54.
1:07:04 Harry Stebbings? Yeah, you look great.
1:07:05 Speaker 00 Well, thank you.
1:07:05 Harry Stebbings? You'll be 64, you're fit, you're fine.
1:07:07 Speaker 00 Yeah, you never know, you never know. But I think, you know, going back to what we were talking about around succession, you know, for for me, it's really important that we've got some really good people in our team. And it's super important that they have a pathway to grow and become the next leaders of the firm. And I don't want to get in their way. At the same time, I love what I'm doing. And so if they feel it would be useful for me to hang around in some capacity, I'd love to hang around and support them. But I think it's really important that they're the ones in 10 years' time that are driving the company, driving the strategy, driving the future of Vencap. And if I can be helpful to them, I'd I'd love to be helpful to them.
1:07:41 Harry Stebbings? Listen, I've loved this. The best ones for me are real discussions. It's not a script, it's a discussion. This has been fantastic and thank you for being such a great guest.
1:07:49 Speaker 00 Thank you. And I've really enjoyed the fact that we don't necessarily agree on everything.
1:07:53 Harry Stebbings? Anything.
1:07:55 Speaker 00 And that's and that's what makes a market. If everyone agreed on everything, life would be so dull.
1:08:01 Harry Stebbings? I mean, I remember when people used to complain about the show in terms of me being too amenable, where I wouldn't disagree enough with guests. I think that has certainly changed over time. If you'd like to see more from that incredible discussion with David, then you can check it out on YouTube by searching for 20VC, that's 2-0-V-C. But before we leave you today, I need to tell you about Hive. 2024 is shaping up to be a big year for the markets with a number of iconic unicorns rumored to be going public. Whether you're a fund manager or invest solo, Hive is the best way for you to access the coming wave of IPOs before they hit the market. There is no charge to access the platform, and it's live trading data on hundreds of late-stage private companies. Best of all, buyers don't
1:08:42 Harry Stebbings? pay fees on Hive. Create a free account today at hive.com/20vc, that's hive with two I's, dot com slash 2-0-V-C, and see why they're the fastest-growing pre-IPO marketplace in the world. And if Hive provides incredible levels of access, SecureFrame? SecureFrame provides incredible levels of trust to your customers through automation. SecureFrame empowers businesses to build trust with customers by simplifying information security and compliance through AI and automation. Thousands of fast-growing businesses, including Nasdaq, AngelList, Doodle, and Coda, trust SecureFrame to expedite their compliance journey for
1:09:21 Harry Stebbings? global security and privacy standards such as SOC 2, ISO 2701, HIPAA, GDPR, and more. Backed by top-tier investors and corporations such as Google, Kleiner Perkins, the company is among the Forbes List of Top 100 Startup Employers for 2023 and Business Insider's List of the 34 Most Promising AI Startups of 2023. Learn more today at secureframe.com. It really is a must. And finally, a company is nothing without its people, and that's why you need Remote.com. Remote is the best choice for companies expanding their global footprint where they don't already have legal entities. So you can effortlessly hire, manage, and pay employees
1:10:01 Harry Stebbings? from around the world, all from one easy-to-use self-serve platform. Plus, you can streamline global employee management and cut HR costs with Free HRIS and hey, even if you are not looking for full-time employees, Remote has you covered with contractor management, ensuring compliant contracts and on-time payments for global contractors. There's a reason companies like GitLab and DoorDash trust Remote to handle their employees worldwide. Go to remote.com now to get started and use the promo code 20VC to get 20% off during your first year. Remote: opportunity is wherever you are. As always, I so appreciate all your support and stay tuned for an incredible episode this coming Wednesday with the one and only Chris Dixon and Andreessen Horowitz.
Previous 20VC: Bryan Johnson on Why Humans Are No Longer Qualified to Manage Our Own Affairs, How Algorithms Will Run our Bodies and How to Process New Ideas and Challenge Conventional Beliefs Next 20VC: a16z's Chris Dixon on Who Will Win the Next Generation of Venture, The Two Ways to Make Great Venture Investments and Find the Best Entrepreneurs & Why AI Will Strengthen the Position of the Incumbents Moving Forward Page updated October 26, 2026 · transcript and summary are machine-generated