About this episode
Our Global Chief Economist Seth Carpenter concludes the two-part discussion with chief regional economists Michael Gapen, Jens Eisenschmidt and Chetan Ahya on the second order effects of the energy shock from tensions in the Middle East. Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Seth Carpenter: Welcome to Thoughts in the Market. I'm Seth Carpenter, Morgan Stanley's Global Chief Economist and Head of Macro Research. And once again, I am joined by Morgan Stanley's chief regional economists: Michael Gapen, Chief U. S. Economist, Chetan Ahya, the Chief Asia Economist, and Jens Eisenschmidt, our Chief Europe Economist. Yesterday we focused on the immediate impact of the Iran conflict, how the energy shock is feeding through into inflation, and, as a result, shaping central bank decisions across the U. S., Europe, and Asia. Today we're going to go a level deeper and talk about some structural issues in the global economy. It's Wednesday, April 15th at 10am in New York. Jens Eisenschmidt: And 3pm in London. Chetan Ahya: And 10pm in Hong Kong. Seth Carpenter: So, even as we're waiting to see whether or not oil prices stabilize following a temporary ceasefire – or not – the broader effects are still working their way through the global economy. Labor markets, supply chains, and then, of course, back to the more longer-term structural themes like AI driven growth. So, the question, I think, has to be: what does this shock mean, if anything, for the next phase of global growth? And does it reshape it? Does it change it, or do we just wait for things to go through? Mike, let me come to you first. One risk that we've been focusing on is whether this kind of shock really changes some of the structural positives in the U. S. economy. The U. S. has been, I would say, outperforming in lots of ways. We've had this AI driven CapEx cycle. We've had rising productivity; we've had strong consumer spending. What are you seeing in the data about those more structural trends? Michael Gapen: I think what we're seeing in the data right now is evidence that oil is not disrupting the positive structural trends in the U. S. I think AI CapEx spending is largely orthogonal to what we've seen so far. It doesn't mean that we can't see negative effects, particularly if oil rises to say $150 a barrel or more where we think you might see significant demand destruction. But with oil where it is right now, I would say the evidence is it will probably weigh on consumption. Gasoline prices are higher. It's going to squeeze lower- and middle-income households that way. But so far, the labor market appears to be holding up. And business spending around CapEx seems to be holding up. And the productivity story remains in place. So right now, I'd say this is more of a break on consumer spending, maybe a modest headwind. But not an outright hard stop. And I think those positive structural elements and AI-related CapEx spending are going to stay with us in 2026. Seth Carpenter: I hear in your answer part of what for me is always the most uncomfortable part of these conversations. Where I have to come back to say, ‘But of course it depends on how things evolve…' Michael Gapen: Of course, It depends… Seth Carpenter: So, then let me push you on AI specifically. You and your team have published a few pieces recently about AI. How AI is affecting the labor market, and maybe some hints as to how AI is likely to affect the labor market. So how should we think about that? Michael Gapen: While it's still too early, I think, to draw firm conclusions, Seth, we do find that there's some evidence that AI is pushing unemployment rates higher in specific occupations that are exposed to task replacement. So, what we did do is we broke down the data by occupation, and it's clear that the unemployment rate has been rising. But that's just a general feature of the economy at this point in time. Over the last 18 to 24 months, the unemployment rate has gone higher. So, what we did is a second-round effort at kind of controlling for cyclicality. And when you control for those, we do find evidence that the unemployment rate for occupations that have high exposure to AI is higher than you would expect, given the cyclical performance of the economy. But the effect is really small. It's maybe about 1/10th on the unemployment rate. So, I don't want to be too Pollyannish and say, ‘Oh, there's no evidence here that AI is disrupting the labor market.’ We'd say that there is some evidence there. But, so far, it's mild and it's modest. It's a little more micro than it is macro. So, we'll see how this evolves. But that would be our initial conclusion so far. Seth Carpenter: So, Mike, that's super helpful. When I think about the AI investment cycle, though, I have to come back to Asia because a lot of the AI supply chain is there in Asia, especially with semiconductors and others. But there's lots of supply chain around the world. So, Chetan, if I think about different supply chains, different industries in Asia that are at risk, potentially being disrupted by the current shock, where do you focus? And then take a step further and tell me if you see a risk that there's a structural dislocation going on here in any of these sectors? Chetan Ahya: So, Seth, there are two relevant points here from Asia supply chain perspective, particularly the tech sector. Number one, there are some concerns on the supply side issues in the context of helium and sulfur. But from what we see as of today, these companies who need that helium and sulfur are able to pay up. As you would appreciate, this is a sector which is, you know, making a lot of money for those economies, i.e. Korea and Taiwan. And they are able to bid up on gas prices, sulfur, and helium, and still managing their production lines. So, we don't see a supply constraint as of now for their production, but there will be an implication for them if you do see damage on U. S. growth, which is quite meaningful. At the end of the day, these sectors are deep cyclical sectors. But if you do see that, you know, scenario of $150 of oil price and it brings global economy to near recession, then there will be implication for these companies and sectors in Asia as well. Seth Carpenter: All right, so Jens, let me bring it to you then. Because when I think about Europe, I think about a couple things. One, kind of, the intersection of energy vulnerability now markets pricing in tighter policy, industrial exposure, which has been going on for a long time. Takes us back in lots of ways to the energy price shock that started in 2021 and went through all of 2022, where we did see, I think, a hit to European manufacturing that had kind of a long tail to it. So, when you think about the current situation, what do you think this shock means for the medium term? How much of an effect do you think this energy price shock could have on the European economy going out a couple of years? Jens Eisenschmidt: Yeah, I mean, just listening to you guys, I mean, really makes me a little bit more depressed still, in terms of being European economist here. Because I mean, it seems America, well, they have the same energy shock, but at least they have AI. In Asia while they have the same energy shock, but at least they have something to deliver into AI. Europe just has the shock, right? So, in some sense there could be one summary. No, but I mean, going back to the comparison and the question. Of course, we have downgraded, as I said yesterday, our growth outlook. And that's predominantly on simply inflation high that is not great for consumption. Consumption is 50 percent of GDP. So, you want to take down a little bit your forecast and your optimism. And then – to your point – where does this leave Europe? We do have already less energy intense manufacturing than before. So, not sure if you'll see much more, or much further downward pressure on this sector. But, of course, it is an uphill battle from here to get back. To get this industrial renaissance back that to some extent the Germans at least are hoping for. In our growth outlook and our growth revisions, we looked into differentiated impacts. And, of course, one of these impacts is through trade. And again, the backdrop here probably globally is not great for trade – as at least you would not want to be super optimistic in that current backdrop. And that will hurt again Europe. So, to your question, we have an outlook, which is still positive growth; but much more muted than say, a month ago or two. Seth Carpenter: Can I push you then a little bit and say that this shock to the European economy then isn't just a cyclical hit. There's probably an additional sort of structural headwind that might get introduced on the heels of, say, the earlier 2021-2022 energy shock? Jens Eisenschmidt: I would say it's the same thing. It's just a reminder that this is still there, right? Europe needs to, kind of, find ways… I think it's best exemplified by the German economy, who was exporting to the rest of the world. And now it looks like as if China has taken over that role. And so, you have to find a new business model, simply speaking, because the ice cream shop next door is just better than you. And so, this is something, what the European economy has just gotten another reminder, and it came through energy, in particular. So, this is where the similarities are. So that was a [20]22 shock. In the meantime, oil prices had nicely retraced, gas prices had nicely retraced. We have new contracts with different suppliers. But still, I mean, the high energy prices expose us here. Because we are already a continent with very high electricity prices, which are derived from the fossil fuels. And so that is not going to end. And so, the continent really urgently has to address that weakness, that structural weakness. And so yeah, in that sense it's structural. Seth Carpenter: Let me pull this together for maybe a final question for each of you. And I'd love it if you could just answer really quickly. Quick fire answers here. We've got a baseline scenario where energy prices are high. Oil is back up a little bit over $100 a barrel. But I think we, and most of the market, are assuming oil prices gradually come down later this year. Mike, what's the prognosis for the U. S. economy? If instead oil prices skyrocket, say they go through $150 a barrel for a couple of months in a row. Michael Gapen: So, the risk there, Seth, is that you do get significant demand destruction. It's not just a gasoline price story for the consumer. It's about weak asset markets. It's about a pullback in hiring. So, at $150 a barrel or more, I would be afraid about recession risk in the U. S. The U. S. is well positioned to handle an oil price shock, but it also has limits. Seth Carpenter: Got it. Jens, suppose instead we had a rapid de-escalation and all of a sudden in the next two months, oil prices are backed down to say $80 a barrel or so. How much of the damage that you envision for the European economy is already baked in the cake? And how much of it goes away if oil prices retrace over the next two months? Jens Eisenschmidt: I would say a lot for this year is baked in the cake to use your words. While next year, we would be basically back to where we had been before in numbers. 1.2 instead of the 0.9 we are seeing currently. And importantly, the ECB could stay. It would not have to hike into that crisis. Seth Carpenter: So, Chetan, , let me come back to you then to wrap up this whole conversation. We've talked about energy mostly in terms of price, but as we've discussed there is the quantity side of things. So, do you think there's a non-linearity? Is there something that's going to just fundamentally change if instead of the rationing being done by price, we get to a point where there's just simply no supply coming to Asia? Chetan Ahya: Yeah, I think that's a very real risk, and that's particularly more important for Asia because there's a lot of dependence on Middle East, and both gas and oil coming in through the Strait of Hormuz. So yeah, I think there is a risk of non-linearity on Asia's growth dynamics if you see supply shortages. Seth Carpenter: Super helpful. I think that's a great place to leave it. What started as a geopolitical shock is now evolving into something broader, touching everything from inflation, interest rates, possibly productivity and technology investment, and clearly global trade. So, Mike, Chetan, Jens, thank you all for coming to help connect these dots. And to the listener, thank you for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen to podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or a colleague today.