Pod Insights The Rest Is Classified 39. Iran vs Israel: Inside the Shadow War (Ep 1) About this episode How do Israeli and Iranian intelligence fight each other? Who's the man behind the Iranian nuclear programme? And what is the Mossad operation aimed at slowing it down?
Listen as Gordon Corera and David McCloskey look into the shadow war between Iran and Israel and the Israeli attempts to slow down the Iranian nuclear programme.
-------------------
Order a signed edition of David's latest book, The Seventh Floor, via this link.
-------------------
Get our exclusive NordVPN deal here ➼ www.nordvpn.com/restisclassified
It’s risk-free with Nord’s 30-day money-back guarantee!
Exclusive INCOGNI Deal: To get an exclusive 60% off an annual Incogni plan, go to https://incogni.com/therestisclassified
Email: [email protected]
Twitter: @triclassified
Assistant Producer: Becki Hills
Producer: Callum Hill
Senior Producer: Dom Johnson
Exec Producer: Tony Pastor
Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Transcript 8,725 words · 12 speakers
0:03 Speaker 00 For exclusive interviews, bonus episodes, ad-free listening, early access to series, first look at live show tickets, a weekly newsletter and discounted books, join the Declassified Club at therestisclassified.com.
0:17 Speaker 01 Hi, this is Gary Lineker from Goalhangers, The Rest Is Football. This episode is brought to you by Wise. It's only when you start moving money between currencies that you really think about the exchange rate, the fee and what might be hidden away in the small print. Whether you're living abroad, paying someone overseas or just trying to manage your money across borders, you want a fair exchange rate, an easy transfer and no surprises along the way. Wise keeps things simple. Wise is a smart way to move the currencies you need around the globe. It works in more than 160 countries and with over 40 currencies. Most transfers arrive instantly. Wise uses the mid-market exchange rate, like the one you see on Google, with no markups or hidden fees.
1:02 Speaker 01 So when money needs to move, you can see the rate, know the fee and get on with it. Join millions saving billions on hidden fees by downloading the Wise app today. Be smart, get wise, Ts and Cs apply.
1:16 Speaker 02 This episode is brought to you by Petivity. Cat parents are basically mealtime detectives. Who actually ate? Did they finish? Was that less than yesterday? The new Petivity Smart Feeder for cats turns everyday meals into meaningful health insights, helping you identify changes in your cat's habits and be more proactive about their health. Plus, you can feed them from anywhere. Take the mystery out of mealtime. Visit petivity.com, P E T I V I T Y dot com slash cat feeder to learn more.
1:45 Speaker 03 When an intruder approaches a home, they expect a camera. What they don't expect.
1:49 Speaker 04 Stop, this is Simply Safe. Police are on the way.
1:52 Speaker 03 Using smart AI cameras, live US-based agents help deter intruders in under 30 seconds. Don't just record a break-in, stop it from ever happening. Plans starting around a dollar a day. Right now, get 70% off your new system with professional monitoring at simplysafe.com/spotify. 30 seconds response time requires monitoring plan with outdoor protection starting at $49.99 a month. Visit simplysafe.com/licenses for alarm license information.
2:23 Speaker 05 Terrorists murdered an eminent Iranian scientist today. This cowardice with serious indications of an Israeli role shows desperate warmongering. The Zionists seek to intensify and increase pressure on Iran to wage a full blown war. We will descend like lightning on the killers of this oppressive martyr. And we will make them regret their actions. Well, welcome to The Rest Is Classified. I'm Gordon Carrera.
2:50 Speaker 00 And I'm David McCloskey.
2:51 Speaker 05 And those were the fighting words of an Iranian government official after the assassination on the 27th of November 2020 of a man called Mohsen Fakrizadeh. He may not be a household name, but he is an important man. And this week, we're going to look at his story and what it tells us about Iran's nuclear programme and the efforts to stop it and my pronunciation, perhaps, of his name. Gordon, how do you rate it?
3:17 Speaker 00 Your Persian accent during the reading, I think, left much to be desired.
3:22 Speaker 05 It was an Anglo Persian.
3:23 Speaker 00 It's an Anglo, an Anglo Persian accent. That's right. And I have had some extended conversations with Persians about how you actually pronounce Mohsen Fakrizadeh's name. And I've been told my pronunciation is very poor. It's, it's, it's, it's hard. I think it's hard for us Anglos to get the name, the name right.
3:43 Speaker 05 Fakrizadeh is the closest we'll go with, yeah?
3:45 Speaker 00 I think that's, I think that's pretty close. I think you're putting the wrong emphasis on the wrong syllable in there. But it's not, it's, I think it's close enough. It's close enough.
3:54 Speaker 05 So who was he? Why, why are we talking about him and not just the pronunciation of his name?
3:58 Speaker 00 That's right. Well, so as you teed up, Gordon, in your, your sort of C minus Persian accent during the reading.
4:06 Speaker 05 Thanks.
4:06 Speaker 00 Mohsen Fakrizadeh was an Iranian nuclear scientist. And I think it's fair to say that he wasn't, we, we, we know, Gordon, that we love an Oppenheimer reference on The Rest Is Classified.
4:19 Speaker 05 We do.
4:20 Speaker 00 And I think here it's actually apt. I think we could say that Mohsen Fakrizadeh, before his death, was Iran's Oppenheimer. He was the, the father of Iran's nuclear programme, the brains behind it from both, frankly, a scientific standpoint, but also an organisational and kind of bureaucratic standpoint. And he was maybe like the actual Oppenheimer out at Los Alamos, sort of shrouded in mystery as he worked, I mean, even to his own family. But Musen Fakrizadeh, and the reason we're talking about the man today and ultimately the operation that will claim his life, is that he has had a tremendous profound impact
5:03 Speaker 00 on the Middle East from the shadows.
5:06 Speaker 05 That's right, because I think he gives us a glimpse into Iran's nuclear program and that kind of shadowy aspect of this conflict. It's not quite a war, but it is a conflict between Israel and Iran, which has been going on for decades, really, and it's been running pretty hot in the last year or two. You've had drone attacks, we've had missile attacks, we've had air attacks between Israel and Iran, almost for the first time, kind of directly engaging in striking each other, as well as Iran's proxies like Hezbollah seeing their pagers explode in Lebanon. But behind all of that recent activity is this question of Iran's nuclear program.
5:46 Speaker 05 And the issue of whether Iran, as its adversaries like Israel say, is going for a nuclear bomb, the efforts to stop that, and the different ways, often covert, sometimes more overt, in which Israel and others have been trying to stop them. And that's something which I think is has been in the news, but is going to be in the news in the next few months, because it does look like it's coming to a head again. And I think it's quite likely that this year, there's either going to be a diplomatic deal over Iran's nuclear program, or there's going to be a military strike on the nuclear program, I think by Israel and maybe by the US as well. So it is a very important story in the Middle East, and Fakrizadeh is in the middle of
6:31 Speaker 05 it, isn't he?
6:32 Speaker 00 That's right. And, you know, I think, Gordon, I mean, so often in these headlines and these stories about the shadow war between, you know, Tel Aviv and Tehran, or between Tel Aviv and Iran's sort of clients or partners or proxies in the region, we get a lot of the what. So we understand what's happening, be it missile volleys, drone volleys back and forth, be it those pager attacks you mentioned, but we don't often get a lot of the how. We don't really understand exactly how both sides conduct this conflict. And I think the Fakrizadeh
7:10 Speaker 00 Assassination because of some of the information that has come out since, I mean, in the five years since, we actually have a really interesting case study in how the Israelis operate inside Iran and how the Israelis think about this shadow conflict, the risks they're willing to take, the sort of operations they're willing to conduct, and ultimately the threats that they feel from Iran, from its nuclear program, sort of as personified by a man like Moss and Fakrizadeh.
7:41 Speaker 05 That's right, and he's an extraordinarily important figure, but also the operation to kill him is an astounding one, isn't it? In terms of the details of the way it's done, it's a story with robotic killer machine guns, talk about artificial intelligence. I mean, it does sound like something out of sci fi, doesn't it?
8:00 Speaker 00 Well, it really does. And what's so interesting about this story is sort of a robotic machine gun operated by satellite, assisted by artificial intelligence. I mean, that is the weapon that the Israelis will choose to, you know, to use in this operation. And we're not talking about sci fi, we're not talking about the future, we're talking about something that happened five years ago.
8:24 Speaker 05 Yeah.
8:25 Speaker 00 Almost, right? And it's hard, I mean, there's so many interesting questions of sort of spycraft and espionage and how you conduct these operations, but there's also a big question, I think, around whether these sorts of operations, I mean, there's the whole question of whether they're justified, right?
8:43 Speaker 05 Yeah.
8:44 Speaker 00 And then there's the question of, well, do they achieve their goals? You know, do they, do they practically help the Israelis achieve security or political goals, which I think is a sort of evergreen question that hangs over this type of work and one that will, will be absolutely critical to understanding what impact the hit on Moss and Fakrizadeh has. And maybe we should start with him, Gordon, and just kind of dig into the man and his life and kind of set him up to get going.
9:17 Speaker 05 Yeah, and there isn't much on him, is there? I mean, he was genuinely a pretty shadowy figure, even by the standards of nuclear scientists and people in the center of Iran. I mean, few pictures, few details.
9:28 Speaker 00 Netanyahu, the prime minister of Israel, called Fakrizadeh the shadow man in Iran's nuclear effort. And it's fair to say that, I mean, most of what we know About the man really does come after his death or is leaked by the Israelis, right? So just to kind of set up the biography, I think we've got some interesting facts and bits on him, but I think the picture really is not fully complete. I mean, the first photos of the man only come out really in 2018, so a couple of years before he's dead, which is really remarkable in an age of so much just digital content out there, that the first photos come out just a couple of years before he's killed. And I will say, in these photos, if you're trying to get a sense of what this guy looks
10:13 Speaker 00 like, he's very unsmiling, he's well bearded, I think he looks like a very dour, sort of disappointed Persian grandfather, would be how I would urge listeners to picture him. But we do know a few things about him. So he's born in like the late 50s, maybe early 60s, again, not precise information, we have contradictory information about when he's born. He's born in Khomeini, to a conservative, pious Shia family. And so by the time of the revolution in 1979, he's in his late teens, right? So in this kind of very formative period. Now, he is, I think, ideologically devoted to the Islamic State. I mean, he's a true believer, right?
10:57 Speaker 00 He spends time each morning studying scripture and Islamic philosophy, and he'll become a member of the Revolutionary Guards in the aftermath of 1979.
11:08 Speaker 05 And we should probably explain what the Revolutionary Guards are. They are an enormously powerful group within Iran, set up after the revolution in 79 to defend the revolution. They're a military group but separate from the regular armed forces, and they report directly to the supreme leader. They've got militias at home to enforce power, they've got an external wing which runs all these proxy groups in places like Lebanon and Syria and Iraq. But they also run chunks of the Iranian economy, and they're hugely influential within government. So it's a kind of elite within the elite, isn't it? And he's very much part of that.
11:47 Speaker 00 Yeah, that's right. I mean, I think the economic sprawl is also a fascinating piece, because usually, I would say, most of us in the West are going to encounter the name of the Revolutionary Guards, where We're oftentimes reading articles about particular pieces of the IRGC, this Revolutionary Guard Corps that are expeditionary abroad and very engaged in military activity. But the reality of the Revolutionary Guards is that it controls a massive amount of Iran's economic activity as well, and is one of the most powerful institutions inside Iran in even sectors like construction or engineering or things like that. So very sprawling influential group.
12:27 Speaker 00 Now, one kind of interesting detail that we can glean from the photos is that Fakhrizadeh wears a ring, and as a symbol of his devotion, I guess, to the revolution, he's got a silver ring with a large oval, kind of red. Is it pronounced "Agate," Gordon? Agate? How does one pronounce this word? I've looked at it.
12:49 Speaker 05 However you want to do it.
12:50 Speaker 00 However you want to.
12:51 Speaker 05 Yeah, you do it however you want to. I'm not going to correct you.
12:53 Speaker 00 The key here is not my terrible pronunciation of that stone. It's that it's the same type of ring worn by the Supreme Leader of Iran and by General Gassim Soleimani, who had been the head of the IRGC's expeditionary force before he was killed in a US strike back in 2020. Now, like so many Iranians, Mosen Fakhrizadeh, he's also an avid reader of classic poetry. Hafiz and Rumi, this is a big focus in Persian culture, is this type of epic poetry. So he's an avid reader of that. And Mosen Fakhrizadeh, he's a physics professor by training,
13:37 Speaker 00 who is going to earn a degree in nuclear physics from Isfahan University of Technology, and then he's going to become a lecturer at another university in Tehran. He's even got a wonderful alias for his teaching activities, Gordon, Dr. Hassan Mosini. And so we have this interesting duality of the man emerging here, where he is a public physics professor, and in secret, he's a brigadier general, becomes a brigadier general in the Revolutionary Guard.
14:06 Speaker 05 That strikes me as somewhat unusual and perhaps somewhat alien to our cultures. I mean, the idea that your physics professor, if there are any students listening who are physics students, and if their professors might also be kind of clandestine leaders in their country's nuclear weapons program and have a kind of military rank and spend their time lecturing students the rest of the week. It's a kind of interesting example of the, I mean, the covert role of this nuclear program, I guess, and the way in which he's also an interesting man because he is, on the one hand, a kind of academic and a scientist. On the other hand, he's a defense official and within the Revolutionary Guards.
14:46 Speaker 00 So the equivalent, if we wanted to use an Oppenheimer comparison, I guess the equivalent would be that as Oppenheimer is building the bomb at Los Alamos, he's continuing to commute to Berkeley to give lectures or something like that, right? And then he's doing the weapons work in secret while he grades student papers, right? I mean, that's kind of, that is what Faqih Raisadeh is doing. And in fact, later in the story, this duality is going to end up being one of the vulnerabilities that he actually has, right? Because he's going into Tehran to deliver these classes. So even though we don't know a lot about the man, I think we can make a couple judgments.
15:30 Speaker 00 One is that, as I said, he's an ideological true believer, right? I mean, there are plenty of Iranian government officials and sort of bureaucrats who I'm sure are quite ambivalent about the Islamic Republic. Muslim Faqih Raisadeh does not appear to be one of those people, right? He's in the IRGC, he's helping to build Iran's bomb. This is not a man who's going home with real doubts about the system, right? I think he's an Iranian nationalist. He is a kind of a hard man, I think, a hard edge, a practical problem solver, right? He's a physicist, he's a workaholic, we're going to learn. He's pretty humorless, as those pictures show.
16:15 Speaker 00 He's totally secretive. I mean, even his children are not going to be fully aware of what he's doing. And what is going to become his life's work is building an Iranian bomb.
16:29 Speaker 05 And let's talk briefly about Iran's nuclear ambition. So Iran has got a civilian nuclear programme, actually from before the revolution. The issue is, though, from the 80s and 90s, it looks to start to want to secretly at least explore the idea of having a nuclear weapon. It's got the opposition from the US, it's also had this war with Iraq in the 80s. So Iran is looking covertly to try and build this programme, and it's putting together networks to try and smuggle in some of the components, and Faqih Zadeh looks like he's involved in that. Then, in the early 2000s, a secret facility at Natanz, used for uranium enrichment, gets exposed. So for the first time, the kind of rest of
17:13 Speaker 05 the world wakes up to the idea Iran might be secretly going for a nuclear weapon. Iran, of course, says this is all for peaceful reasons, we just want nuclear power. Not many people, not many people believe them. But it's interesting, because at that point it gets exposed, and the Iranians do shift when it gets exposed. And so they actually put a lot of the programme underground, they start to disperse it, they pause some of the weaponisation aspects of it, because they're worried that it will invite a strike. Because this is 2003, when the US has just invaded Iraq, the Iranians are worried that they're going to be next, and that they might be attacked. So they kind of, they take on a different strategy, which is to build up the infrastructure for a bomb without
17:55 Speaker 05 ever actually going, making that last leap towards weaponisation and building it, which they know might invite an attack. So they're kind of trying to get as far as they can without making that that move. And Faqih Zadeh looks like he is playing a particular role. He chairs some meetings, I think, in the summer of 2003, to preserve some of the nuclear programme as it's dispersed, and to try and protect it. And so it effectively sets the scene for what we see in the last 20 years, which is Iran trying to keep pushing as far as it can, but without inviting an attack, diplomatic efforts to try and do
18:34 Speaker 05 a deal to stop it, but also covert and sometimes overt attempts to undermine that nuclear programme and stop it. But Faqih Zadeh is at the heart of this inside Iran, even though he's largely unknown.
18:47 Speaker 00 I was really hoping for a way in Gordon to ask you to give us a briefing on the physics of a nuclear bomb again, which listeners to our Yeah, I'm happy to. previous episodes on Klaus Fuchs will know that both of us are of course highly qualified to talk about, to talk about the physics of a bomb, but I didn't find one in your, in your briefing there Gordon. So kudos to you for, for defending yourself valiantly. I mean, we should also say that in the summer of 2003, this is the point in the invasion of Iraq where US officials are legitimately talking about doing like a left turn, I think they called into Damascus. So just sort of, you know, veering left out of Baghdad to go and wreck the Assad regime. So Oh yeah.
19:30 Speaker 00 this is before the insurgency has really taken off and before the entire kind of nation building project in Iraq seems to have gone down as an abysmal failure. And so what the Iranians and what Moss and Faqih Zadeh I think are doing is pretty logical in 2003 because they've got to be looking next door at Saddam and saying, well, the Americans just went and wrecked a country who actually, you know, didn't have a nuclear program. You know, what might they do if it really becomes fully known how far along we're going, right? Yeah. So it does make sense to sort of pause pieces of it, fragment it, which I think
20:12 Speaker 00 from an intelligence standpoint makes a ton of sense because if it's centralized, it's probably more vulnerable to sort of understanding both your capabilities and also your plans and intentions. Whereas if it's spread out over, you know, 10, 12, 15 pieces of your bureaucracy, I think it's a more difficult collection target for Western intelligence agencies to understand what's really going on. But Faqih Zadeh, he's still in the sort of catbird seat, isn't he? I mean, he's still running this thing to give The supreme leader to give the Iranian government the capability to eventually have a breakout capacity for a nuclear weapon. And by 2020, by the year that he's finally
20:56 Speaker 00 targeted by the Mossad, Fakhrizadeh is running what's known as the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, Persian acronym SPND, which, I mean, sounds very innocent, doesn't it, Gordon? But it's, of course, the hub of Iran's nuclear program. And Fakhrizadeh is really the, I guess, chief advisor on almost anything involving their nuclear capabilities, right, at this point in time. Now, the SPND isn't, they're not only doing weapons research. Fakhrizadeh is helping Iran deal with the COVID pandemic, of all things. The Iranian vaccine is called Fakravak.
21:35 Speaker 05 It's that after him. Is it named after?
21:38 Speaker 00 Named after him. That's right. It's pretty extraordinary. I mean, his kids don't have any idea what he's doing. But clearly, he's got, you know, a very key role in the program. Now, he's also, you know, we talked about him being a really practical man in many respects. And he has built up by 2020, an underground network of suppliers and logistics routes from Latin America to North Korea to Eastern Europe to get the equipment and parts necessary for this sprawling nuke program. Right? Now, something we should address is, why do the Iranians want this? I mean, why is it so important to someone like Fakhrizadeh
22:19 Speaker 00 and to the men around him to have a bomb? Because they're, they're really engaged, I mean, especially in the kind of post, you know, Operation Iraqi Freedom period. I mean, they're engaged in a very risky activity here that could, I guess, put them in the US crosshairs if it's sort of fully revealed and discovered.
22:37 Speaker 05 On the one hand, I think it's entirely logical why Iran would want nuclear weapons if you're the Iranian regime, because it's one of the few things that can frankly protect you from what you see as a US policy of regime change. The lesson of, of, of the Iraq War in 2003 was You know, Saddam got taken out by the Americans because he didn't have a nuclear weapon to protect him. If you've got a nuclear weapon, if you're North Korea or somewhere else, then it's much harder to take you on. So it provides a form of protection. And I think also, as time goes on, they'll look at Colonel Gaddafi and Mama Gaddafi in Libya, who are also around this time, gives up his nuclear programme to the West. So in the wake of the Iraq War, he declares it, he gives it up.
23:22 Speaker 05 And what happens a few years later, that there's a popular revolution, the West backs the rebels, and he ends up dead. So one of the lessons is, a nuke can buy you security. But of course, the dangerous bit is the journey towards the nuke. And I think the Iranians have played a very clever game, which is to build up the capacity, but never actually be seen to make that final leap towards making a bomb, to actually weaponising, which would invite an attack. But to consistently get as close to being able to do that without having an attack as possible, to get them the option. And I think that's what they've got themselves effectively, and what Faqih Zayd is doing,
24:04 Speaker 05 is getting them the option that if they ever feel they need to make that leap, they can do it.
24:09 Speaker 00 Well, and I guess I also think of our old friend Bashar al-Assad in Syria, who attempted essentially to buy a nuclear bomb from the North Koreans and install a reactor in the eastern desert that the Israelis found, bomb destroyed. And then, a few years later, he's dealing with a popular uprising and, you know, he doesn't have that protection, right? And even Ukraine, I guess, which gave up its weapons in the early 90s in exchange for security guarantees, in part from the Russians, that Ukraine would be independent and protected, and look how that turned out.
24:47 Speaker 05 So, yeah, I think it's entirely rational, on the one hand, for the Iranians to pursue this strategy. It's also pretty rational for the Israelis, who see Iran as committed to their destruction, to want to stop them. So at that point, maybe let's take a break, and we'll come back and we'll look at how the Israelis do decide to go after the Iranian nuclear programme and some of the really adventurous ways in which they try and seek to stop it.
25:14 Speaker 06 Does checking your bank statements feel like digging through a dusty attic full of forgotten subscriptions and old free trials?
25:22 Speaker 06 Experian can help take the pain out of cancelling by handling it for you. Think of it as "Operation Get Your Sanity Back." Over 200 subscriptions are cancelable. So get started in the Experian app and see how much you could save. Results will vary. Not all subscriptions eligible. Savings not guaranteed. Paid membership with connected payment account required. See Experian.com for details.
25:41 Speaker 07 Experian. PrizePix packs are here. Rip digital packs and get real basketball, footfall and Pokémon cards on PrizePix packs. Available now nationwide. Once you see your pool, you have a choice to sell back instantly for real cash or ship at home. Cash from your sale will immediately be added to your PrizePix balance. It's just another way to run your game. New users, download the PrizePix app today and use code SPOTIFY to get $25 instantly in bonus packs when you buy your first $5 pack. PrizePix, run your game. 18 plus in eligible areas. Terms apply. Collect responsibly.
26:14 Speaker 08 At Farmers, we go out of our way to keep you in the know.
26:17 Speaker 09 Like by singing, everything for emphasis.
26:20 Speaker 08 That, and by providing you with coverage on a page. An easy to understand language, so you know what's covered and what's not.
26:27 Speaker 09 No confusing legalese that no one gets.
26:30 Speaker 08 In full transparency? We do have to put a disclaimer at the end of this ad, though. Just being honest, that's what you get when...
26:36 Speaker 09 You have Farmers.
26:39 Speaker 10 Learn more at Farmers.com. Underwritten by Farmers Truck or Fire Insurance Exchanges or Affiliates. Products not available in every state.
26:49 Speaker 05 Welcome back. We're looking at the story of Mohsen Fakrizadeh and the Iranian nuclear programme. And we've looked at this man, the Iranian nuclear scientist, the central figure, even if not much is known about him in that Iranian programme. But let's look now at the Israeli side, the people who are going to target him, and the reasons they want to do it, and the people who are behind going after Iran.
27:15 Speaker 00 Well, I think on the Israeli side, Gordon, it makes sense to start the story with a very fascinating man named Merdegon, who was the head of Mossad in the early 2000s. And he actually wasn't the chief in 2020. He had retired by then. And so he's, you know, not a decision maker. But Merdegon's, I guess, philosophy on the fight against the Iranians really lays the foundations for, I think, a new way of dealing with the Iranian threat. And it's pretty important to set him up to understand why the Israelis are doing what they're doing.
27:55 Speaker 00 So he's born in 1945 to Polish Jewish parents who had fled, I think, in the late 30s to Siberia, where they sort of waited out the war. There is this very, I think, emblematic story about Merdegon, because in his office is hanging a picture of a man kneeling in front of a German soldier just seconds before he's being shot. And that's Merdegon's grandfather, who is killed by the Nazis in the Second World War. And Merdegon uses, I mean, that, I mean, first of all, we should just imagine, here's a man who has the picture of his grandfather
28:36 Speaker 00 just prior to execution that's actually hanging in his office. And the lesson is that Jews need to fight. You get down on your knees like that, you're going to get shot, right? Now, eventually, the family emigrates to Israel. Merdegon drops out of high school at 17, enlists in a very elite commando force, the Syratt Mount Gal, sort of becomes, I guess, a feeder for political intel, military, kind of the upper echelons of the Israeli security establishment. But he doesn't make the cut. And the gun, he's very interesting, because he's kind of an outsider in Israel. So he's not a Sabra, he's not a native born Israeli, right? He's not a kibbutznik, right? So he's not a guy
29:21 Speaker 00 who was out on one of these kibbutz farms, sort of, you know, settling the land, right? He's, he's a Russian, right? He's a Russian who's come to, you think about him, I mean, I realize he's born in Poland, but he's kind of a- Russian settler in Israel, I think that's not a bad way to to think about him. Right. So he's going to spend the next few decades in special ops units in the Israel Defense Forces, their military, in the Shin Bet, Israel's internal security force. He's involved in pretty much every one of Israel's wars throughout the the 60s, 70s, 80s. One of the soldiers in Dagan's unit said that Dagan, quote, "had a serious malfunction
30:03 Speaker 00 in his fear mechanism." So he is physically courageous, adventurous. He's also a landscape painter, interestingly enough.
30:11 Speaker 05 It's one way of relaxing.
30:12 Speaker 00 Yes, enjoys that in his downtime. And in 2002, Ariel Sharon is the Prime Minister of Israel, and he appoints Dagan to head the Mossad, which is Israel's foreign intelligence agency.
30:25 Speaker 05 The Institute for Intelligence and Special Task.
30:28 Speaker 00 Yes.
30:28 Speaker 05 Is it's official name, but everyone knows it as the Mossad.
30:32 Speaker 00 So many of these security agencies that we talk about on this show, Gordon, have just wonderfully bureaucratic acronyms to them to hide the fact that they do incredible things. And Sharon, of course, has a very aggressive
30:48 Speaker 05 Yeah.
30:48 Speaker 00 outlook. And we'll say at the time that he wants a Mossad chief with a dagger between his teeth. And so he taps Merdegon for the role.
30:57 Speaker 05 And he takes over from Ephraim Halevi, who who I actually met many years ago, who was the previous head of Mossad, who was a very different character. I mean, Halevi is more of your kind of George Smiley like spymaster. Definitely not a man who, when I met him, had a dagger between his teeth as we we sat and did a kind of quite genteel interview. I did do a a radio series many years ago on the Mossad, and I went over to Israel. And I always remember I arrived at the airport. And when you arrive at the airport at Tel Aviv, they they ask you what you're doing in the country. And they kind of question you. And I thought, well, I better be honest. So I said to the woman there at the kind of, you know, the desk, I said, doing a documentary on the Mossad. And she just looked up and looked at me and went, I'll get my boss.
31:42 Speaker 00 Thus began Gordon's nightmare. Experience of being detained at Ben Verian Airport.
31:46 Speaker 05 No, they were okay. But they, I thought, I must want to be honest about it. But anyway, that was one of the times I met at my Halevi. But Halevi, I think it's fair to say, was a different character. And Sharon wanted, wanted this kind of aggressive character in the form of Mayor DeGahn, who was gonna to be much more proactive, much more arguably violent in what he was willing to do.
32:06 Speaker 00 Well, and Gordon, I don't know if you intended to skip past this wonderful quote that I had put in here. But I'm gonna, I'm gonna read it anyway, because I think it's, I think it's illustrative of the sort of mentality of Mayor DeGahn. When DeGahn takes over, he goes to the Mossad kind of canteen, I guess, a place where the workforce congregates. And he delivers an opening speech, right? And as I was reading the setup for this, in my head, I was thinking of, it's pretty typical when a new CIA director takes over, for them to address the workforce from what we call the bubble, which is our big kind of auditorium that's right there on the Langley campus. Not everybody goes, of course, but it can hold, you know,
32:48 Speaker 00 hundreds of people. Crowd will go in, it'll be on video. It's usually kind of milquetoast stuff, right? And so I'm thinking, well, okay, that's probably what this is gonna be. And so this is, this is a line from, from Mayor DeGahn's sort of opening speech at the Mossad. And he's telling a story about his, his journeys fighting in Lebanon during the Israeli occupation of much of the country. And he said, "In Lebanon, I witnessed the aftermath of a family feud. A local patriarch's head had been split open, his brain on the floor. Around him lay his wife and some of his children, all dead. Before I could do anything, one of the patriarch's sons scooped up a handful of the patriarch's brain and swallowed it.
33:32 Speaker 00 That is how they do things in family feuds in that place. Eat the brain, swallow the power. I don't want any of you to have your brains eaten. You." Eat their brains and then Dagan apparently punches his clenched fist into the palm of his hand as he's delivering that last part. So
33:49 Speaker 05 Yeah, your CIA directors never told you to eat your enemy's brains, did they?
33:53 Speaker 00 They were not, yeah.
33:54 Speaker 05 You were not instructed.
33:55 Speaker 00 No, we were not.
33:56 Speaker 05 I cannot imagine them doing that in MI6 either. It's not the kind of speech you get at the MI6.
34:01 Speaker 00 The opening speeches were far more boring when
34:04 Speaker 05 Yeah.
34:04 Speaker 00 You know, when CIA directors took over.
34:06 Speaker 05 It does tell you something though, doesn't it?
34:07 Speaker 00 It tells you something about the man.
34:09 Speaker 05 About the man and also about that that's what Ariel Sharon wants from the man. And of course, as we said, this is 2002 and just at that point where the Iranian nuclear program is being exposed and made public, isn't it? And where it's suddenly becoming an issue that Iran might want the bomb. And so you can see why this is going to be one of the priorities for him.
34:31 Speaker 00 That's right. Well, and one of my CIA colleagues who got to spend some time with Dagan said that, you know, sometimes when Dagan would be sitting in meetings with American officials who maybe weren't as educated on the region as they should be. Dagan would say in his very thick accent, he'd say, you didn't grow up in this neighborhood, did you? You know, to talk about the region. And I think that idea that the Israelis are living in an extremely tough neighborhood in which if they do not reach out and touch people, they will be they will be sort of victimized themselves, right? Is deeply ingrained in his psychology. And I think as Dagan looks out,
35:14 Speaker 00 he's looking at an Iran that is essentially going to, you know, reach for a nuclear capability which threatens his entire sort of, I think he sees it as an existential threat.
35:29 Speaker 05 Yeah.
35:29 Speaker 00 At this point.
35:30 Speaker 05 And so it becomes a priority to deal with that. And it's interesting, isn't it? Because there are different options and at various points, Israel does look at a full out military strikes against Iran as one of the options to deal with that program. But actually, in the end, they're going to go down the more covert route as the more effective one, aren't they?
35:49 Speaker 00 Well, that's right. And here, Gordon, I think we should commend the work of an Israeli journalist named Ronan Bergman, who has written extensively over the past 20, 25 years about the shadow war between Israel and Iran, and who has written an absolutely phenomenal book on Israeli targeted killings and assassinations called Rise and Kill First. And so, so much of this story, I think, really comes out of Ronan Bergman's reporting. But he reports in the early 2000s on a critical meeting where at Dagan's Mossad, they're basically laying out options for what to do about Iran's
36:29 Speaker 00 nuclear program. And these are the three options that Mossad puts out there. One, conquer Iran. Okay. Two, change the regime. Three, slow the program down. So at the breaking point, they will not be armed with a weapon. I think Kissinger used to joke about how you always wanted to have like three options, right? Two, which were completely unthinkable to the policymaker, and then one that you wanted them to choose.
36:55 Speaker 05 Oh, I'll have that one. Yeah.
36:56 Speaker 00 Yeah, I'll have that one. So there's one realistic option on here, which is slow the program down. And on this kind of menu, I guess, Dagan has put out a lot of different pressure points. There's diplomatic pressure, sanctions, support to the Iranian opposition. One of them, though, is targeted killings, assassinations of really scientists, civilian scientists, involved in Iran's nuclear program. And Dagan is going to call these a series of pinpoint operations meant to change reality. And 15 scientists, researchers, engineers, are put on Mossad's kill list. And one of them, even in the early 2000s, is Mosin Fakhrizadeh.
37:40 Speaker 05 And so it is interesting, this, isn't it? Because as you said, these are not military targets in the classic sense of it. They are scientists and research scientists. The ethics of that, I think, are Questionable, complex. I mean, you know, it's one thing Oppenheimer being targeted perhaps by the Nazis or the Japanese you could imagine during World War Two, but at that point, the countries are at war. So maybe it's slightly different. Here you're in a kind of, there isn't a declared war between the two sides. And yet, you know, one is targeting the scientists of the other. I don't know what the comparison or what the
38:21 Speaker 05 parallel would be for the West today. I mean, it would be as if there's some top AI researcher in a Silicon Valley firm who the Chinese or the Russians targeted.
38:31 Speaker 00 Yeah.
38:32 Speaker 05 You know, they're working at, I don't know, OpenAI or Google, or somewhere, and working on some technology which, which the military in the US was going to use and you took them out. I mean, it's not straightforward, is it? In terms of the ethics, but I guess that goes back to the Israelis, if you like, having a different view of the world, you know, whatever people may think about it and acting in a different way.
38:53 Speaker 00 Well, I think the Israelis essentially collapse the distinction between an enemy combatant and a civilian who is providing a very unique and critical military capability to an enemy state, right?
39:13 Speaker 05 Yeah.
39:13 Speaker 00 Because I think here in the States, I think we would draw a distinction, we'd say a targeted killing, to conduct that lawfully, it would have to be someone who is actually an enemy combatant, right?
39:25 Speaker 05 And posing an imminent threat.
39:27 Speaker 00 And posing an imminent threat, whereas an assassination, which would not be permitted, would be of a civilian, right?
39:35 Speaker 05 Yeah.
39:36 Speaker 00 Who's supporting that, that foreign program. Whereas I think the Israelis, they do not draw a distinction between those two types of of operations.
39:43 Speaker 05 No, and I mean, there's a history of that. If you go back into the past where they're targeting scientists, they're targeting businessmen and engineers. I mean, there was a famous guy, I think it was Joe Bull, who was building a supergun supposedly for Iraq and he gets killed, you know, it's thought by Mossad. So they do have a history of going after those people who are providing, even if they're Foreigners providing capability to a state which Israel considers an enemy. So so it is within that, but this, I guess what we're talking about here is a very specific campaign to try and degrade that nuclear program. Um, a- a- and on the one hand, when you go back to your kind of option list, those three options, it's worth saying that this is partly done to avoid a war.
40:27 Speaker 05 I mean, we can see it as a shadow war, but there is also a sense in which the alternative option for Israeli politicians, and particularly Benjamin Netanyahu, who's kind of very hawkish on Iran, is is actually a military strike. So it becomes a kind of, well, we can either try and degrade them through these covert acts and sabotage and things like that, or else we're going to have to have an all out war. And if that's your alternative, then actually the the being offered the chance to try and slow it down and buy time rather than go to war is a perhaps more attractive one.
41:02 Speaker 00 Well, yeah, and Dagan and some of the people around him will start to call this killing to save lives. And important to understand their their mentality and mindset is Dagan is absolutely horrified by the prospect of an all out war with Iran. It is the thing he is trying most to avoid. And there's a story from two thousand and ten where Netanyahu was apparently close to ordering a strike on Iran and and so Dagan is like apoplectic about this, right? He doesn't think that there is any way that Israel can stop Iran's nuclear project by force alone. Because unlike the Iraqi program in the eighties, the Syrian program in two thousand and seven,
41:45 Speaker 00 the Iranian program is sprawling and vast, right? There's multiple facilities, some of which by the late, you know, sort of, I guess, aughts, early two thousands, you know, it's they're underground, deep in in bunkers that are unreachable by the munitions that the Israelis have. It is homegrown in many respects in that the Iranians have a a really deep bench of scientists and researchers and engineers who are building the capabilities for the program. And so I think Dagan looks at this and says, We can't really stop this militarily, but by killing a few targeted people,
42:27 Speaker 00 we can really slow their progress down, avoid this war, delay it as long as possible and save a lot of lives as a result. And so Dagan's view, I think, is that these killings are a lot more moral because it's the only way to slow down the program and avoid a war that he, I think, believes Netanyahu wants.
42:49 Speaker 05 That's still the case, isn't it? Where people are saying, well, maybe a military strike might happen even this year, but that doesn't necessarily end the program. It might just set it back a few months. But it is well buried, well hardened, and it might just spur the Iranians to move faster once they can rebuild it. So I think it is a really interesting, complicated kind of policy discussion. So back to Fakhrizadeh, at this point, I guess around about 2007, it seems like we start to see evidence of this new Israeli policy to target the scientists, particularly in the program.
43:22 Speaker 00 Well, that's right. I mean, and just a few examples of this. And we should say, by the way, the Israelis don't claim any of these operations, right? I mean, we
43:29 Speaker 05 We attribute them to the Israelis.
43:31 Speaker 00 But they don't claim them publicly, right? So in January of 2007, a nuclear scientist working at this Fahan uranium plant dies under very mysterious circumstances following a, quote, "gas leak", and then Iran is convinced that the Israelis have poisoned him. In 2010, another scientist, this time someone who's actually working directly with Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, is walking toward his car in North Tehran. He opens his car door. A booby-trapped motorcycle next to him explodes and kills him, right? Later that year, in November of 2010, two motorcyclists blow up the cars of two figures involved in the nuke program. One of them is a particle physicist. He was killed by a limpet mine, just attached to his car while he's in heavy traffic. 20 minutes later, a professor of nuclear engineering,
44:16 Speaker 00 who worked on Fakhrizadeh's team, is almost killed in a northern suburb, but he survives. And Dagan By the way, in this sort of period, he, his tournament Mossad is up, right? And some of his successors have taken over. But the program or this sort of set of operations to go after the brains of Iran's nuclear program keeps going. In July of 2011, two gunmen on motorcycles follow the car of a nuclear physicist, expert in the high voltage switches used to trigger nuclear warheads. Bikers kill him, hit him with five shots. And then a year later, in 2012, a chemical engineer at a uranium enrichment facility leaves for the lab, limpet mine gets attached to his car by a motorcyclist. He's killed.
44:59 Speaker 00 Now, Dagan calls these hits divine interventions. Again, the Israelis don't claim them. And I think by this point, it's worth maybe reflecting on what all of this means for Mossafakris today. Because we can talk about this kind of clinically, but for him, he's having friends and colleagues are being murdered.
45:20 Speaker 05 Yeah.
45:21 Speaker 00 You know, by the Israelis trying to stop his life's work from happening. You know, this is going to really affect the operation that we're going to talk about in the next episode is that the security has increased massively on scientists and engineers involved in the program over these years, and especially on Mossafakris today. So they've got bodyguards, cops around their homes. A lot of these scientists are probably very miserable because they're not, they're not soldiers.
45:50 Speaker 05 Yeah, so much of a life.
45:51 Speaker 00 Right? They're not soldiers, they're not in a war zone, they're, they're living in comfortable neighborhoods in, in Tehran. And they're being sort of, you know, put under 24/7 protection because they've had friends and colleagues who are being killed by the Israelis.
46:05 Speaker 05 And you get some of what are called white defections, which, which are where people basically decide, I don't want to do this. I don't want to work on the nuclear program. I mean, you can see why.
46:14 Speaker 00 Yeah.
46:14 Speaker 05 If you're a scientist and you think, well, am I going to work on that? And I might have a limpet mine attached to my car and get blown up? Or shall I go and work on something else? I mean, you can absolutely see why they might ask to be or want to transfer to something else.
46:27 Speaker 00 I actually think this was probably one of the major effects that Mayor Dagan was hoping these killings would have is
46:33 Speaker 05 Discourage people.
46:34 Speaker 00 To create an absolutely chilling effect inside the research institutions, the bureaucracies that that bring these people to work on the new project because Iran is, I mean, obviously it's not a democratic system, it's not an open system, but like you still have people who are probably like, you know, hey, I'll do a two-year rotation to this thing and then I go do something else. Or there's probably some amount of choice involved here. And you've got to think that at night, when some of these scientists go home, talk to their wives about their next rotation or role, you're thinking, maybe I don't work on this anymore. Maybe I go do something else. So I think, I think that absolutely was in to guns, gun sites as he was, he was promoting these attacks. Now, we should note, and we won't go into
47:17 Speaker 00 extensive detail on any of this here, because these are frankly, all, many of these operations are future episodes on the rest is classified, to be quite honest. But the killings are only one component of the havoc that Mossad is wreaking on Moss and Fakhrizadeh in this period.
47:33 Speaker 05 That's right. You've got Stuxnet, you know, the cyber attack, which the US looked to have been involved in as well, which undermines the program. You've got an operation in 2018, I think, when the Israelis break into a warehouse, amazing operation in Tehran, and actually steal the files, you know, some of the files about the history of the nuclear program.
47:50 Speaker 00 So that operation in 2018 is absolutely, to use a technical term, bananas. Because what the Israelis do is they, they literally drive trucks into a warehouse facility in a Tehran suburb that is housing all of the hard copy material on the nuclear weapons program, going back like many years. Many of those papers are actually, you know, written by Fakhrizadeh, and they've got his writing in the margins, his signature on them. And it shows really the full extent of the Iranians deception on the true nature of the program. The Israelis quite literally break into the facility.
48:32 Speaker 00 Steal the material, put it on trucks and drive it out across the border. And that raid, I think, is actually one of the reasons why we even know as much as we do about Mossafar Qaysidah, because so much of the information that's come out about him is coming from those files and documents.
48:50 Speaker 05 So by 2020, Israel has really been pushing in lots of ways against Iran's nuclear program. And it has got Mossafar Qaysidah in its crosshairs now. Really, it's decided that it's going to go after the mastermind, the man at the center of it. And so I think let's take a break there, David. But when we come back, we will look at this really extraordinary operation involving robotic machine guns, artificial intelligence, satellites, covert operatives, which is used to finally get to this man who is at the heart of Iran's nuclear program. See you next time.
49:29 Speaker 00 See you next time.
49:37 Speaker 11 Modafinil was invented in the 1970s and has been used by the highest performers on and off the planet. Soldiers, pilots, and even astronauts aboard the ISS use modafinil in high-stakes situations where full concentration and alertness are paramount. And it's now available in liquid form to qualified patients at mod.com. Visit mod.com for a free consultation and get 10% off your first order plus free shipping with promo code SPOTIFY at mod.com.
50:07 Speaker 07 PrizePix packs are here. Rip digital packs and get real basketball, footfall, and Pokémon cards on PrizePix packs. Available now nationwide. Once you see your pool, you have a choice to sell back instantly for real cash or ship at home. Cash from your sale will immediately be added to your PrizePix balance. It's just another way to run your game. New users, download the PrizePix app today and use code SPOTIFY to get $25 instantly in bonus packs when you buy your first $5 pack. PrizePix, run your game. 18 plus in eligible areas. Terms apply. Collect responsibly.
50:37 Speaker 03 Traditional home security only alerts you after a break-in, and that's too late. SimpliSafe is changing that.
50:43 Speaker 04 Stop. This is SimpliSafe. Police are on the way.
50:46 Speaker 03 We don't just alert, we help stop crime before it starts. Plans starting around a dollar a day. Right now, get 70% off your new system with professional monitoring at simplisafe.com/spotify. SimpliSafe, ahead of crime, in real time. Outdoor deterrence plans start at $49.99 a month. Visit simplisafe.com/licenses for alarm license information.
Previous Introducing... Legacy Next 40. Iran vs Israel: Mossad Assassinates Iranian Mastermind (Ep 2) Page updated November 3, 2026 · transcript and summary are machine-generated