Pod Insights The Rest Is Classified 147. Will Trump Destroy Iran’s Nuclear Programme? (Ep 2) About this episode How do you actually destroy a nuclear programme? What would a US boots-on-the-ground raid inside Iran look like? And do David and Gordon think Trump will take Operation Epic Fury to the next level?
Listen as David and Gordon imagine what it would take to destroy Iran's nuclear programme.
-------------------
THE REST IS CLASSIFIED LIVE 2026 at The Rest Is Fest: Buy your tickets HERE to see David and Gordon live on stage at London’s Southbank Centre on 4 September.
-------------------
Sign-up for our free newsletter where producer Becki takes you behind the scenes of the show: https://mailchi.mp/goalhanger.com/tric-free-newsletter-sign-up
-------------------
Join the Declassified Club to go deeper into the world of espionage with exclusive Q&As, interviews with top intelligence insiders, regular livestreams, ad-free listening, early access to episodes and live show tickets, and weekly deep dives into original spy stories. Members also get curated reading lists, special book discounts, prize draws, and access to our private chat community.
Just go to therestisclassified.com or join on Apple Podcasts.
-------------------
Get a 10% discount on business PCs, printers and accessories using the code TRIC10. Visit https://HP.com/CLASSIFIED for more information. T&C's apply.
-------------------
Email: [email protected]
Instagram: @restisclassified
Video Editors: Imogen Marriott, Bruno Di Castri and Adam Thornton
Social Producer: Emma Jackson
Producer: Becki Hills
Head of History: Dom Johnson
Exec Producer: Tony Pastor
Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Transcript 12,641 words · 8 speakers
0:03 Speaker 00 For exclusive interviews, bonus episodes, ad-free listening, early access to series, first look at live show tickets, a weekly newsletter and discounted books, join the Declassified Club at therestisclassified.com.
0:26 Speaker 01 Where is Iran's nuclear material after it's been targeted in operations Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury? And what would it take to get hold of it and end Iran's nuclear program for good? Well, welcome to The Rest Is Classified. I'm Gordon Corera.
0:42 Speaker 00 And I'm David McCloskey.
0:44 Speaker 01 And David, we're in the second of these two episodes, looking at the issue of Iran's nuclear program, how to deal with it, what to do about Iran's highly enriched uranium. Last time, I guess, we set up a little bit about the nuclear program and some of the early options to deal with it, particularly with the historical lens of how Israel in particular had targeted Iraq and Syria's nuclear program, which was different, though, wasn't it? And we talked a bit about that and how they were more discreet programs, basically two reactors which could be taken out, which could be dealt with by a single bombing run, effectively.
1:23 Speaker 00 And spoiler alert, the answer for what to do now about Iran's nuclear capabilities is not going to be a single bombing run. And so we'd also talked last time about this very complicated and high stakes rescue mission to go and rescue a downed US airman in Iran that took place last week. And we should say again, we're recording this second episode on April the 9th. And that rescue was this complicated mission to bring a bunch of kind of, you know, special mission unit operators from the SEAL teams and Delta Force into this airstrip, fly out in helicopters to go and bring this airman back and get him out. That- Is going to be kind of some of the context that will also bring to the story
2:08 Speaker 00 about what an operation to go after some of Iran's key nuclear capabilities might look like. But I think before we get there, Gordon, it's makes sense to kind of start at the beginning of Trump 2.0, 2025, because, as we said last time, we have this problem, which is that the Iranians are continuing to enrich uranium. And this is one of the major issues that confronts the second Trump administration as it's taking office.
2:44 Speaker 01 This episode is brought to you by HP.
2:47 Speaker 00 In intelligence work, it's rarely the obvious problem that causes failure. It's the overlooked detail or the flaw nobody quite solved, the kind of vulnerability intelligence services look for.
2:59 Speaker 01 And running a business is the same, especially when you're building or growing a team. It's the risks you can't see or don't understand. HP designs technology so devices, collaboration tools and security work together as a single system, helping teams keep everything running smoothly at home, in the office and out in the field.
3:19 Speaker 00 The protection is built in hardware level security, working quietly in the background, helping reduce risk without creating more work.
3:28 Speaker 01 With a team of business advisors, HP helps businesses of all sizes find technology that fits their needs and budget.
3:35 Speaker 00 To see how HP helps businesses work securely and productively, visit hp.com/classified. The rest is classified. Listeners also benefit from 10% off HP Business Technology with code TRIC10.
3:52 Speaker 01 And as we talked about a bit last time, it's not so much that the Iranians are racing for a bomb. We'll come back to that. But what they're trying to do is bring down what's called the breakout time, which is the time between making a political decision to go for a bomb and actually being able to have one and to kind of reduce that time. And at one point, it had been talked about in years. And then it was in months, but you get to the point where a couple of years ago, you know, 2023, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs was saying it was down to days. To have enough fissile material for one bomb, that is different from actually having a kind of full out nuclear capability. And it's different from actually being able to have an actual nuclear weapon.
4:37 Speaker 01 This is worth dwelling on because I think there is a bit of confusion about this, isn't there? And I think people can talk about this breakout time and they can talk about, well, you know, the breakout time to have enough nuclear material for a bomb is days, or they've got enough nuclear material for a bomb, but that isn't the same as actually having a bomb, is it?
4:56 Speaker 00 It's not. And, you know, in, in preparing for these episodes, I, I was struck, Gordon, at how even, even having done a significant amount of very deep reading on the topic, how it can get very confusing and technical very, very quickly.
5:11 Speaker 01 Yeah.
5:12 Speaker 00 And so it's, I think it's important to kind of break out, well, what constitutes a nuclear weapons program? And there are basically three legs to this piece of furniture. One of them is the production of the fissile material. That is what most of the Iranian conversation, the public conversation is about. It is how much highly enriched uranium, at what enrichment level do the Iranians have? So it's the production of the fissile material.
5:41 Speaker 01 Yeah.
5:41 Speaker 00 The second component is weaponization. I mean, I'm tempted, Gordon, to have you give us another science lesson about.
5:49 Speaker 01 Yeah, go back to our Klaus Fuchs episodes if you want those.
5:52 Speaker 00 Go back to our Klaus Fuchs episodes, but you can't just take a big square of highly enriched uranium and like toss it out of an airplane, right? I mean.
6:01 Speaker 01 No, you have to turn it into a bomb. Yeah.
6:04 Speaker 00 It might hit someone on the head. If it fell in the water, it might get somebody sick, but it's not, you got to turn it into a bomb. And that is work on high explosives, electronics, advanced metallurgy, material science. All of these very specialized kind of areas of, of study and machining and fabrication to actually create the warhead. And then the third component of a weapons program. Is the delivery mechanism because that warhead has to be fitted onto something that can then be delivered to your target. And in this case, it's it's a almost certainly a ballistic missile. So it's not one site and it's not just it's not just the production
6:48 Speaker 00 of the fissile material, which again is where we focus so much of our time and energy publicly.
6:53 Speaker 01 Yeah, that's right. And so you're talking about a big program with lots of people and lots of facilities, which also makes this issue of targeting it once it becomes big and dispersed as the Iranian one has been because it's been there for decades harder. So you've got particularly, I guess you've got three sites that are well known, Natanz, Fodoh and Isfahan. Natanz, we talked about last time, is the primary enrichment facility, about 220 kilometers south of Tehran with these underground halls built a little bit below ground, 40 to 50 meters. So they're pretty well protected by reinforced concrete. Then Fodoh, you have a second site, which is built into a mountain and was the Iranians
7:35 Speaker 01 kept secret for many years, but was discovered by Western intelligence in 2009. And that is even more protected from any potential attack. Again, here, this is Iran learning the lessons of what they saw happen in Iraq and Syria with other programs. And then there's Isfahan, which is home to a facility which converts the gas which is fed into the centrifuges. And which also, and this is also important for our story, has got underground storage tunnels. And these are going to be an important part of whether the US could get hold of the material now. So that is the, I guess that's the infrastructure of the sites as we understand them. But if we kind of maybe quickly look at the process and how far Iran
8:19 Speaker 01 had moved on this process, whether it's, you know, weaponization, because it's, we know about the enriched material and we know that they put together this 400 kilograms, something like that, of pretty highly enriched uranium, which is one of the issues. But some of the other areas of weaponization and delivery, it's a little bit different, isn't it?
8:38 Speaker 00 Yeah, I think the the focus on the production of the fissile material makes some sense because the biggest, most well-known sites are all, I mean, the ones you just read out, Atans, Fordo, Isfahan, are all involved in the production of the fissile material, the production of the highly enriched uranium that would be necessary to include in a bomb. But the weaponization piece, the delivery mechanism piece, they're much harder intelligence questions to answer, I think, and they're easier to hide from the outside. I think what we do know is that Iran had not assembled
9:21 Speaker 00 a complete nuclear weapon before Operation Midnight Hammer last summer.
9:25 Speaker 01 Yep.
9:26 Speaker 00 On weaponization in particular, it gets confusing quickly, doesn't it? Because Iran, and there were very, you know, famous declassified or leaked US intelligence assessments that came out that said that Iran had stopped most of the weaponization work back in 2003.
9:42 Speaker 01 Yeah.
9:43 Speaker 00 Recently, it seems that the CIA assessments have shifted a little bit from kind of Iran is not doing weaponization work to something that's a bit more more hedged. But what is what is certain is that Iran had preserved the institutional knowledge and retained the personnel, at least the personnel that haven't been killed by the Israelis.
10:06 Speaker 01 Yeah.
10:07 Speaker 00 And maintain the facilities to kind of weaponize on a compressed timeline if, and this is the crucial point, if a political decision was made to do that final sprint to actually having having the bomb.
10:19 Speaker 01 And it's worth saying, as you go through what it has got, that that is a difficult target as well, isn't it? If you're talking about destruction, this is not like destroying one big domed reactor like in Iraq. You're talking about relatively small research sites, which can be used to do some of the studies in metallurgy to make the components for a bomb, and you're talking about people. So you're talking about a lot of different sites and that is a harder target set, isn't it?
10:48 Speaker 00 It's much harder and we're talking when you when you've spread this out and think about, yeah, the the facilities where you're doing the, you know, geophysics testing, the high explosive testing, the detonator development, places where you do the component manufacturing, you're talking about dozens of facilities and you're talking about a lot of people. I mean, the other angle to this that's that's difficult to deal with is that a lot of the the capability winds up becoming over time because now this is a very old ish program at this point. It's been it's been around for a while.
11:23 Speaker 01 Twenty five years, maybe, yeah.
11:24 Speaker 00 Is that, you know, it's in people's brains.
11:27 Speaker 01 Yeah.
11:27 Speaker 00 Which, again, hence the need for these assassinations as seen from the Israeli perspective, because you destroy the facilities, but you also have to destroy the people who are critical to.
11:35 Speaker 01 Yeah.
11:36 Speaker 00 In particular, the weaponization, right? And we've talked about some of those assassinations on the program. But when you broaden the scope and you look at, you know, there's probably 25,000 people in the broader program and hundreds to maybe low thousands involved in weaponization. So when you see numbers of Israeli assassinations of like, okay, they kill 15 or 20 Iranian nuclear scientists or engineers at the outset of the 12 day war last summer. Yes, that is doing damage to the program, but there are a lot of other people who are involved or could be involved, you know, to replace the people who were killed.
12:11 Speaker 01 Yeah. And so I think what you can say is that things like the assassination program degrade the program because you take out some of the best brains, but they don't destroy it, you know, and I think that is one of the the lessons for that. So that's weaponization. The delivery system, I think, is interesting, isn't it? Because this is also one of the other big topics of the the recent or the ongoing war, wherever we are in it, which is this issue of Iran's ballistic missile capabilities, because it has been developing ballistic missiles and it had these medium range ballistic missiles, the Shahab III, which have got ranges of, you know, one to 2,000 kilometers, which can reach targets in the Middle East. Now, there was this very interesting moment a few weeks back where they did fire a missile at Diego Garcia, this UK US.
12:53 Speaker 01 Base, quite controversial, military base in some ways, didn't hit and one got intercepted. Raised questions about whether they actually have a longer range missile capability, but some people think what had actually happened was that they'd actually just taken out some of the payload so that the missile would go further. But it's led to at least some debate about what the extent of Iran's range might be in terms of striking targets. Could it hit European targets? But I think it's worth saying that they they certainly are developing those kinds of missiles. But that is different from actually having worked out how to build a nuclear warhead and put a nuclear warhead on a missile. So they are not at that stage, despite the fact they've certainly got
13:38 Speaker 01 a pretty extensive missile program, which also poses a pretty big challenge if you're trying to destroy the capability to deliver something.
13:46 Speaker 00 Well, and you see the problem now in Operation Epic Fury where the Iranians are still firing ballistic missiles. You know, I mean, despite all of the assaults on the launchers, on the missile stockpiles, on these underground missile cities, at the kind of upstream manufacturing and production capabilities, like the Iranians are firing them at a severely reduced pace, but they're still firing them.
14:09 Speaker 01 Still doing it, yeah.
14:10 Speaker 00 You know, you have an issue of just there's a huge amount of of stuff that you would need to destroy. And and in this case, I mean, on the missile program, I mean, you're you're talking about dozens and dozens of facilities that are involved, right? And every kind of you know, piece of the of the production pipeline all the way up to the up to launch. Not counting all these dispersed launch positions or support installations and a bunch of stuff that we don't know about. And I mean, I think this is part of why the the US Israeli campaign hit thousands of targets in the opening days of Epic Fury, because there's just so much, there's so much to hit. And, you know, if you put all of that together, the production of missile material, the weaponization and the delivery.
14:56 Speaker 00 I think it's helpful to kind of marry all of this and say, where were we on the eve of Midnight Hammer?
15:03 Speaker 01 Which was the last year's operation, last summer's operation.
15:06 Speaker 00 That's right. Now, the best analysis of kind of the IAEA verification and monitoring reports suggests that by June of 2025, so right before the 12-day war, right before Midnight Hammer, Iran had 440 kilograms, 970 pounds of uranium enriched up to 60%. Now, Gordon, I didn't, I resisted doing this in the first episode of this series. But can you explain for us, when we say 60%, what 60% means what?
15:41 Speaker 01 So there are two different types of uranium, 235, 238. You want the more fissile material, so you need to enrich it to increase the amount of the fissile material, which naturally is at only 0.7%. You get it to 3 to 5%, this is, I remember all this from previous episodes, you've got enough for fuel. But once you get above that, you can claim it's for research.
16:06 Speaker 00 Well, it's research for a bomb.
16:08 Speaker 01 Yeah, it's research for a bomb. But you need to get it up to 90% really for a weapon. As we said, I think last time, the hard work is at the early stages. And the more, if you like, of the highly enriched uranium you've got, the easier it is to remove the less highly enriched and to enrich it further. So it gets easier the higher you go up the scale. So 440 kilograms of 60%, you know, enriched uranium is technically enough for, I think, nine to 10 nuclear weapons, maybe? Something like that. So it's a significant amount. You know, we're going to be coming back to that 440 kilograms because it isn't the entirety of the Iranian nuclear program. But it feels like that's where the political debate has centered is, is on that material and what has happened to that material.
16:49 Speaker 01 And we know about that from the last time it was inspected from the IAEA, which was actually quite a few years ago, I think 2022, 2023.
16:59 Speaker 00 This isn't new, this isn't like. New information, right?
17:03 Speaker 01 No.
17:03 Speaker 00 This is, it's years old. Yeah.
17:05 Speaker 01 It's years old, but that's what we, that's the last time it was kind of independently checked. And that's what Iran is thought to have had. So that's, you know, that is a key aspect to the program that we're looking at. But actually, you know, when it comes to delivery systems and weaponization, we've talked about that, that, you know, that they're not necessarily there yet. But it does mean that the gap between how long it would take Iran to become a nuclear state has been shrinking if it took that decision. And that gap has been shrinking, particularly since the joint nuclear deal was pulled out of by the Americans, to a shorter period, which then increased the pressure to do something,
17:46 Speaker 01 which led to those strikes, June 2025, which of course, as we know, David, obliterated the program.
17:53 Speaker 00 Totally, totally obliterated it, which is why Pete Hegseth is saying, well, actually, you know, you need to, you need to hand over all this other stuff or we'll come get it. I thought, I have to say, Gordon, you know, I don't like being in a position of having to give you compliments. It's a very uncomfortable position for me, but I should say, I should tell listeners, and I'm, I'm man enough to do this, that I put Gordon Corera on the spot here with that little science explanation.
18:20 Speaker 01 Because it's not in any notes. I had to do that. I had to do that from here.
18:23 Speaker 00 He nailed it. He did that. That's right. That is the, Gordon Corera is the official science explainer of the rest is classified.
18:31 Speaker 01 The rest is science.
18:32 Speaker 00 The rest is science, yeah.
18:33 Speaker 01 V-Sauce and how to price, step back. And I don't think so.
18:38 Speaker 00 You're going to be in V-Sauce's chair before you know it, explaining these kind of things.
18:42 Speaker 01 Yeah, I don't think so.
18:43 Speaker 00 So, June of 2025, Israel and the US have decided on a military option to deal with Iran's nuclear program. Although, different from Epic Fury, the Israelis hit Iran first, and then we kind of pile on the back end and hit the, hit these nuclear facilities. So the Israelis started with Operation Rising Lion. Killed dozens of senior officials in the opening salvo, including 14 nuclear scientists. Nine of them are simultaneously killed in something called Operation Narnia.
19:14 Speaker 01 Really?
19:15 Speaker 00 When you peel it back, it's murdering nine people in their homes while they sleep.
19:20 Speaker 01 Can I just say, C.S. Lewis would not, the author of the Narnia books, would not have approved, I think.
19:26 Speaker 00 You don't think he would approve?
19:27 Speaker 01 I don't think he would have approved of, oh, he would definitely not have approved of that. And also, Rising Lion, it's a bit like Aslan from the Narnia stories. Anyway, it's a, it's a, yeah, it's an Israeli operation which does kill a lot of scientists.
19:39 Speaker 00 Well, they're involved in the weaponization program, to be, to be fair. Like, they're not, you know, they're, they're involved in work to give the Iranians a nuclear bomb.
19:48 Speaker 01 Capability, but yes. An option.
19:53 Speaker 00 You keep, hold on now, hold on. Okay, so you have.
19:56 Speaker 01 Here we go.
19:56 Speaker 00 I feel that, that the gap from, and I think we're both in agreement.
20:02 Speaker 01 Yeah.
20:03 Speaker 00 That the Iranians did not have a nuclear bomb prior to, they don't have one now, we don't think.
20:08 Speaker 01 Yeah.
20:08 Speaker 00 And they didn't have one prior to Operation Midnight Hammer and the 12 Day War. The gap from where they were to a bomb.
20:19 Speaker 01 Was shortening.
20:21 Speaker 00 Was shortening. And I think when you look at the, kind of, the analysis of the IAEA inspection and verification reports, and, and the IAEA's view on how advanced the weaponization effort was, which admittedly is like, they have gaps, right? The Iranians aren't being forthcoming about the weaponization aspects
20:42 Speaker 01 Yeah.
20:43 Speaker 00 of their nuclear capabilities. We're not talking about a significant amount of additional, kind of, engineering work. Like, it's, it's a very tight timeline. They were very close in 2003, and it's been, it's been 23 years. So presumably, even, you know, presumably that gap has been closed a bit in the intervening quarter century.
21:09 Speaker 01 I always just think, so this is also, and we'll come back to this when we do Iraq WMD, is I'm slightly scarred by the number of times I've heard officials talk about how close a country is to a bomb. By using how much enriched uranium they might have, or how much material they might have, or how long theoretically they might have to to get it, because it is often used deliberately as a means to kind of justify action or to try and persuade the public. And I just think it's always worth a little bit of caution when people tell you how close they were to a bomb, or that this was enough material for this many bombs, because it is very different to have some enriched uranium to being able to, and you know, we've talked
21:51 Speaker 01 about this, to being able to have a bomb, to then even being able to have a deliverable bomb, to testing a bomb without getting attacked, but we know while you do that, to having a deterrent capability with a bomb. There's a distance there, and I just think it's always worth keeping that in mind. But anyway, I think we I think we do agree. Yeah.
22:08 Speaker 00 And I guess the the issue with that, which I think you would you would agree with is on the, you're right, like, it's oversimplifying things to say, oh, well, if you have, you know, 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, that's roughly the equivalent, or the amount you would need for nine or 10 bombs. That's a true statement, but it doesn't mean that you in two weeks can have nine or 10 bombs.
22:27 Speaker 01 Yeah, yeah.
22:28 Speaker 00 But the problem with the weaponization and the delivery side of things is that those are the aspects of the program where you are by definition going to have the biggest intelligence gaps. Because the verific- quote unquote verification at the IAEA or the monitoring that'd be doing, they're not doing any of that on the weaponization side. I agree with you that that, you know, political officials, military, even intelligence officials can get over their skis pretty quickly in kind of ringing the bell and saying, oh, well, they're the Iranians are at the, you know, doorstep of a a nuclear bomb because they've got this much highly enriched uranium. Like, that's that's overblown. But the reality is, you probably won't see that final push, whether it's six months of work, nine months
23:13 Speaker 00 of work, whatever, you probably won't spot that, or you have to assume you won't spot that. And you kind of have to use, in some ways, the fissile material as crude of a strategic warning or proxy, it is, you have to use the fissile material as the indicator. Of how close you are.
23:33 Speaker 01 Which is where we've got to actually now, because that is
23:36 Speaker 00 Right.
23:37 Speaker 01 In a way where the debate is focused on. But yeah, I mean, we got to Midnight Hammer, haven't we? June 2025, in which, as you said, the Israelis start the campaign, but then the US follows through by deciding this is the moment to target these nuclear sites. And this is always what Israel had wanted and needed, because it's only the US which has the, what are called the massive ordnance penetrators, the GBU-57 bombs, which can get into those buried hardened nuclear facilities which the Iranians have been protecting.
24:14 Speaker 00 The bunker busters, the massive ordnance penetrators, the MOPs, I guess the MOPS. It's the largest conventional bunker busting bomb in the US arsenal. These things are, I mean, gigantic. They can only be carried by B2 bombers. I mean, they're essentially designed specifically for targets in Iran and North Korea. Each one weighs about 30,000 pounds. They're GPS guided. They're 20 feet long. And they're designed to reach through about 200 feet of earth or 26 feet of reinforced concrete before they detonate, which is insane. And on June 22nd of last year, the US hits Natanz, Richmond facility, strikes the site with at least two MOPS
24:59 Speaker 00 in a double tap strike, which amazingly go through the same penetration hole. So they drop one, goes in, and then they drop the second one and guide it into that same hole. On Fordow, which is that site buried in a mountain near Kham, Iran, the US drops 12 of these bombs on the 22nd of June. And this part is wild. They target two specific vulnerability points that have been identified from older schematics and historical satellite imagery. There is a ventilation shaft, which I
25:35 Speaker 00 As I was researching this pictured as that exhaust hatch on the first Death Star, Gordon.
25:41 Speaker 01 At the end of Star Wars.
25:42 Speaker 00 At the, at the end of Star Wars episode, For a New Hope.
25:45 Speaker 01 Where Luke has to get guided in. Yeah.
25:48 Speaker 00 That's right. So, you know, that's, this is where you put the proton torpedo. So there's a ventilation shaft at Fordow that connects to a central hallway and it leads to these kind of two main underground halls. And then there's a kind of a concealed service structure on the other side of the mountain ridge that's located directly above the south end of the centrifuge cascade hall. So essentially what this means is if you get into that, into that ventilation shaft, you can have a massive impact on the facility.
26:13 Speaker 01 Yeah.
26:14 Speaker 00 So 12 of these bombs are dropped there. And then Isfahan, which is this more upstream, it's involved in the production of fissile material, but it's not an actual enrichment facility. It's hit by several rounds of Israeli strikes before Midnight Hammer. And then during Midnight Hammer, the US sends Tomahawk missiles at this main uranium conversion facility, which collapses all four tunnel entrances to the underground storage complex that's north of the main site. And this.
26:44 Speaker 01 Yeah.
26:45 Speaker 00 Is where it's, you know, it's believed that those highly enriched uranium stockpiles are stored and they were, they were moved there prior to Midnight Hammer.
26:56 Speaker 01 Yeah. Some, some people have done some kind of satellite imagery where they think they're spotting the type of canisters and we'll come back to them where you would keep that kind of material being taken to that site by the Iranians just ahead of the attack. So Isfahan, even though it's not one of the kind of main production facilities, is thought to be where that highly enriched uranium is, is now. So those, you know, stepping back, that, you know, those strikes last summer certainly massively damaged Iran centrifuges to enrich more uranium. So put a lot of them, question mark, all of them out of action, made it harder to, in other words, get more or enrich the uranium further, although it's still, you know, leaves some unknowns.
27:37 Speaker 01 But the crucial question is that stock of 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, which was thought to be in a. Isfahan, because that was buried there, and we'll come back to that, at the end of Midnight Hammer, and is thought to still be there. So if we then come up to February of this year, Epic Fury, the nuclear programme gets hit again, doesn't it? There are more strikes at Natanz and Isfahan. Israel supposedly also struck at a covert nuclear weapons development compound northeast of Tehran, because they were worried that perhaps Iran was relocating some of the weapons development to that facility. But, I mean, we've seen a very different target set this time, in which, as we've all seen,
28:19 Speaker 01 you know, it's been targeting a lot of the missile programme, a lot of the military leadership, administrative hubs, even bridges, we should say, and broader scientific establishments. There's been this effort to try and dismantle, I guess, the whole military infrastructure and scientific and engineering infrastructure around the regime, not just the nuclear side, but also missile production. But still, that has left unresolved this issue of the highly enriched uranium.
28:51 Speaker 00 Yeah, because despite all of this destruction, the Iranians still have 440 kilograms, 970 pounds of uranium enriched to 60%. And as we've discussed, that's, you know, enough for 10 nuclear weapons. If you, you know, finish the weaponization and, you know, pairing of a warhead with a delivery mechanism, all that, but from a just pure, how much fissile material do you need? It's enough for probably 10 weapons. And there's a fundamental problem here, which is that you can bomb facilities, you can kill scientists and engineers,
29:29 Speaker 00 but you can't destroy the already enriched fissile material if you can't get to it with a bomb. And we should say, under Isfahan, there's been a whole bunch of relatively new underground work that the Iranians have done to harden that facility. And it doesn't seem like we can get there with the mops, right, the bunker busting mops.
29:54 Speaker 01 Yeah.
29:54 Speaker 00 And, and we'll come back to this a bit later. This target is not a facility. We are talking about almost 1,000 pounds of stuff that would comfortably fit in. Like in a single truck.
30:08 Speaker 01 Yeah.
30:09 Speaker 00 So you can't bomb it, right? They already have this stuff. You can't bomb it. What do you do about that highly enriched uranium?
30:17 Speaker 01 And I guess the answer is the only possibility is if you can't get the Iranians to hand it over, as Pete Hegseth and others have been calling for, you've got to go get it. And that means a ground operation. So let's take a break there. And when we come back, we will look at what a special forces operation on the ground to deal with Iran's nuclear programme might really look like. See you after the break.
30:43 Speaker 02 There we are getting a statement from Number 10 on that flight with 350 passengers on board.
30:51 Speaker 03 The Great Game, strategic struggle between Britain and Russia.
30:59 Speaker 04 We assess, Prime Minister, with high confidence it was Russian.
31:05 Speaker 05 Holding the Russians accountable is World War III.
31:07 Speaker 06 They took down a British passenger jet containing 350 people.
31:10 Speaker 03 Man in the Kremlin is playing, Alex. Got to ask yourself, do you want to play or not?
31:17 Speaker 00 You're the Prime Minister. You've done nothing!
31:24 Speaker 05 We would need to understand the policy context.
31:26 Speaker 03 All the relevant context will be structured as a framework today and disseminated into an operation order or FRAGO.
31:34 Speaker 07 A FRAGO that says to kill the President of Russia.
31:39 Speaker 03 Yes.
31:41 Speaker 05 New from Goalhanger. Who is going to be able to pull this off? You're my soldier, are you Sergeant Tom MacDuff, Duffy? An audio drama journey like no other.
31:52 Speaker 06 Men like Duffy, they are our most valuable weapons.
31:56 Speaker 05 Devized as a technically rigorous geopolitical action thriller. We have two types friendly KIA. Where Britain plays its strongest hand. He's the best. Against its strongest foe. Do it Duffy! Bear Hunt. Available now wherever you get your podcasts.
32:26 Speaker 01 Well, welcome back. We are going to be looking now at this question of whether the US could do a special forces ground raid, a larger version of what they did, I guess, to rescue an airman inside Iran, but this time to go after the highly enriched uranium, this 440 kilograms.
32:46 Speaker 00 970 pounds.
32:48 Speaker 01 Yeah, 970 pounds for those who are dealing with different forms of measurement. But we think we know where it is, but no one's totally sure. But the suggestion is it is in Isfahan, as we've talked about. But I think what's interesting is buried in Isfahan, because as we've heard, Isfahan has been hit multiple times. And so the idea is this is not stuff just sitting there in a warehouse, but it is buried probably under rock, whatever.
33:16 Speaker 00 And there's probably sharks that have lasers on there, you know, laser beams on their forehead that are.
33:21 Speaker 01 Winnie James Bond.
33:22 Speaker 00 Yeah, that's right. I do picture a kind of villain's lair that this must be sitting in. You know?
33:28 Speaker 01 Yeah.
33:29 Speaker 00 If it's just in a musty room, it's going to be kind of disappointing, isn't it?
33:33 Speaker 01 Yeah.
33:33 Speaker 00 But it probably is. And you're right that what has probably happened is that it was put in Isfahan prior to the strikes last June, and it's probably been buried there. It does seem that there are, you know, tunnels, obviously tunnels that get into these, this underground complex at Isfahan that probably sealed off with earth in February. I mean, again, probably to further harden them from the kind of special operations raid we're going to be talking about. But US officials have said that they think there's a very narrow access point through which the material could be retrieved. Now, the other piece to this, though, that I think it just is worth mentioning is.
34:16 Speaker 00 It is possible that some of that highly enriched uranium could be still at Natanz, could be at Forto.
34:23 Speaker 01 Yeah.
34:24 Speaker 00 There's been a lot of confidence on the part of the Trump administration that, you know, we know where this stuff is, exactly where it is. I think privately, there's probably less certainty about that. There's also, we should say, over 2,000 pounds of highly enriched uranium that's been enriched to 20%.
34:41 Speaker 01 Yeah.
34:42 Speaker 00 And again, that the gap from 3% to 20% is a lot harder to do than 20% to 60%. And so even though getting that 20% up to weapons grade is now much more complicated because destroyed a lot of the enrichment facilities, that's another piece of the problem too, right? Because I think there's a, there's a tendency, and we're going to talk about the operation in terms of going after this 970 pounds, 440 kilograms of the stuff that's enriched to 60%, but there's actually a broader and kind of hairier set of problems that I think.
35:14 Speaker 01 There might be more out there.
35:15 Speaker 00 Nobody wants to talk about. So we may not know where all of it is. It might be spread across multiple facilities. It's also, as we've said, it's been a long time since the IAEA has verified its location. So when we talk about 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, what is that? That is roughly the volume, if you had it all together, of a large oil drum. So again, this is the culmination of billions of dollars of Iranian, you know, sort of R and D and industrial might has led them to create something that could fit inside a large trash can.
35:48 Speaker 01 Yeah.
35:48 Speaker 00 As the centerpiece of this program.
35:50 Speaker 01 And what about 20 of them, 19 of them, something like that of these tanks?
35:54 Speaker 00 Well, so it's, it's probably stored, it's not all together because it's like, if you were going to put that volume of stuff, it would fill up a, a large oil drum, but it's probably stored in steel cylinders and the size of them, you look at the different reports, is speculation about how big they are, but it's maybe like 20-ish scuba-sized steel tanks.
36:14 Speaker 01 I mean, it's so small, isn't it?
36:16 Speaker 00 This is a small target. As we've said. It's probably buried underground at Isfahan. And again, how do you go get it? There are plans to do this, we should say, before we get into it. They, the plans exist. I think there have been plans to do this for some time. It's also something that the US military, in particular, some of these special mission units has trained for.
36:38 Speaker 01 Yeah.
36:38 Speaker 00 So the JSOC, the Joint Special Operations Command, has spent years preparing to secure or seize Pakistani nuclear weapons in a crisis. As one example of just kind of a counter WMD mission.
36:50 Speaker 01 Yeah.
36:50 Speaker 00 Squadrons from Delta Force and the SEAL teams have practiced entering these kind of deep underground shelters at a site near Las Vegas, aided in part by the US Army, what they call nuclear disablement teams, which are trained on how you dispose of nuclear material or disable nuclear power plants and reactors.
37:10 Speaker 01 Yeah, and it's worth explaining to people why there are these contingency plans to go after Pakistani nuclear weapons. And they really got developed, I mean, Pakistan, you know, was developed the bomb, tested it in late 90s. But it was the fear that a kind of Al Qaeda style takeover of Pakistan in the 2000s. And then they would have control of a nuclear stockpile of the country, which Pakistan had developed to counter India's bomb. And so that's why this mission had been there, just in case of that kind of emergency scenario that they felt they need to go after Pakistan's weapons specifically. And I think the Pakistanis know that, even if they don't like to talk about it. But, but yeah, that is a kind of very, you know, close parallel, isn't it?
37:54 Speaker 01 Of, of the kind of mission you might be talking about, to go in and go after, in it effectively in a hostile situation and get hold of the nuclear material.
38:03 Speaker 00 I also think there's been training done specifically for Iran, well before Epi Fury. I think this problem was, was understood inside the US military and inside JSOC, you know, and, and for example, I mean, it's not publicly linked to Iran, but these nuclear disablement teams, you know, have done mock raids on nuclear facilities, like with the Rangers, for example. There was a 2024 exercise that simulated a raid under fire on a decommissioned facility mocked up like an underground nuclear site. So you kind of read between the lines, I guess it could be North Korea, but the point is these cluster of kind of fairly elite
38:43 Speaker 00 US special mission units paired with some of the technical expertise in the US military establishment on disposing of the stuff have have trained for years on how you might get into one of these underground facilities and extract stuff.
38:55 Speaker 01 Have I ever told you about my top secret mission to extract nuclear material from a reactor?
39:00 Speaker 00 Gordon, how have we done? We've done so many nuclear focused episodes.
39:03 Speaker 01 I have never told you this before.
39:05 Speaker 00 You've never told me this.
39:06 Speaker 01 You can, I will put a link at it, 2010, 2010. It was from a nuclear reactor in Serbia, which the Serbs had agreed the nuclear material from the reactor could be shipped out by the IAEA and the Americans and taken to all places, Russia for reprocessing, because the fear was that someone could get hold of it and get a nuclear bomb. So I got taken along for the ride and it was a wild ride. Wait, I said it's my only time in a nuclear reactor.
39:31 Speaker 00 Why were you taken along?
39:34 Speaker 01 But it was really kind of, it was crazy because they, we went to this reactor and it was all secret that this was happening. So we had to not report to them until it had finished its journey because the fear was the material could get hijacked on the way by terrorists who could then have a kind of material for a dirty bomb. So we went to the reactor and they shut down the streets of Belgrade through the night. So that this convoy of which we were part could drive out to first to a kind of train station. And then the nuclear material in these big kind of things got loaded on a train and then taken to a port in Slovenia. And then goes on this roundabout journey around Europe. So I have actually escorted nuclear material on a top secret mission out of a nuclear reactor, which ended up in Russia, which is
40:17 Speaker 01 if I wanted to make it sound a bit James Bond, but there wasn't any shooting and there wasn't any guns, but it was a kind of wild ride anyway. Anyway, that was a slight digression.
40:26 Speaker 00 What did, what did they ship the nuclear material in?
40:28 Speaker 01 It was in big, big, big containers and the IAEA did the kind of monitoring of it.
40:33 Speaker 00 That's a technical term. Big, big, big.
40:36 Speaker 01 Okay, I could tell you because I'm looking at it up. There were. Blue, big, these big blue bombproof, fireproof containers, which I think are the similar ones that we were seen moving stuff to Isfahan. So just to give you a reference point, on that Serbian route, there was only 13 kilograms of highly enriched uranium on it.
40:54 Speaker 00 Wow.
40:54 Speaker 01 So a lot less actually was being taken on that journey. So it was enough to fit basically on one truck compared to what we're talking about, the 440 kilograms with the Iranians have got left over. So it's a pretty substantial amount in these scuba tanks that I like to think of, all stacked up in a warehouse, buried underground.
41:12 Speaker 00 There's a guy, a guy smoking, the security guy smoking next to him. I, but don't you, so 13 kilograms, like you could fit that on a bicycle. Like somebody, you could have just ridden, ridden out with that on your back.
41:24 Speaker 01 Yeah, I think it's a bit heavier than that. And I think it's in these, it was in these big containers. So. And there was all this special tracking equipment on it and it went by boat. It's crazy. And they were, that's why we had to keep it secret.
41:37 Speaker 00 I'm glad it's safely in Russia. That's good. I'm glad we got it to safety. Mission accomplished.
41:43 Speaker 01 Mission accomplished from Carrera, Agent Carrera, who does it again. He got the nuclear material to the Russians. Well done. Let's go back to Iran. Let's talk about what it would take though, to get hold of this material because, I mean, you know, we're talking about material buried underground. Someone I spoke to, a former intelligence officer, said, if you're going to try and get to it, you probably need miners, as in the equivalent of people with hard hats and pickaxes.
42:05 Speaker 00 And giant mustaches.
42:08 Speaker 01 This is not a small operation, would it be, you know, to, to, to go to this site, assuming it is in Isfahan and get it, is it?
42:15 Speaker 00 Maybe both of us have used the word raid at multiple points and like raid is not the, is not the right word. Cause raid implies that you're in and out quickly and, you know, it's, it's dangerous, but you can do it fast. Like that, that's not really what we're talking about here. So spoiler alert, this would probably be the largest special operation.
42:36 Speaker 00 In history.
42:37 Speaker 01 Yeah.
42:38 Speaker 00 And that's according to a former NATO commander. It's risky. I think it's very risky, but I do think it's feasible and we'll talk about what that means. And it would take some time.
42:48 Speaker 01 Yeah.
42:49 Speaker 00 As we've discussed. So who would go on this operation? Now, you would need a significant amount of operators. SEAL Team Six, Delta Force, these kind of very elite special mission unit guys. For reference, I mean, the rescued airman we talked about, there were a hundred plus.
43:09 Speaker 01 Yeah, a hundred operators. Yeah.
43:11 Speaker 00 In Venezuela, there were 200.
43:13 Speaker 01 Yeah.
43:13 Speaker 00 For the Maduro raid. So hundreds and hundreds, this would be more. And then in addition, this is what makes this so different is in addition to the operators. Let's assume we're just talking about Isfahan here. This is what you might need for one facility. Hundreds and hundreds of operators and maybe three to 4,000 brigade sized kind of blocking force. Right. Which is going to control access to the facility. While the operators and some of these technical experts work. So very much unlike Venezuela operation or the raid to get Osama bin Laden. You're talking about a very large number of people involved. As we discussed, the core operators would be kind of, you know, from these tier one units, Delta SEAL Team Six. They both have counter WMD missions and have trained for those.
43:57 Speaker 00 Attached to them would probably be a nuclear disablement team. Maybe scientists as well who would come in once the facility is is under control. There probably also be additional specialized units, you know, maybe green berets. Maybe even more, I guess, conventional type units like the 82nd or 101st Airborne Division. And it's possible that there could be Israeli special forces that would supplement these units as well.
44:23 Speaker 01 And it's worth saying, some of those airborne forces are or have been on their way to the Gulf.
44:27 Speaker 00 Yes.
44:27 Speaker 01 And I think one of the thing that has been noted in terms of the force size that the US has sent to the Gulf. It is not enough to do a ground invasion, you know, in the sense of a full on war. But if you are talking about having the option for that, this kind of special operation. Then the kind of force which is being sent to. Region would be what you need, the kind of brigade sized force to do the perimeter security, because I think that's what's so interesting about this. And I think requires a bit of unpacking is that this is not a mission where you go in, takes a couple of hours, drop the guys, pick them up, go out with the nuclear material. You would actually
45:05 Speaker 01 need to go in for a considerable period to this site to ensure you could get access to it. You would effectively have to set up a base, a perimeter and hold it against Iranian opposition for some time, wouldn't you?
45:23 Speaker 00 You would. And spoiler alert, you would probably have to be on the ground for at least days. So you're not going to do this in a single period of darkness, like the rescue of of the airman, or like the bin Laden raid, or like the Maduro capture. This is happening over a long period of time. So it's probably worth talking about, okay, this force of thousands.
45:41 Speaker 01 Yeah.
45:41 Speaker 00 How do you get them there? How do you do the infill? And how do you get it all set up? So the workhorses would probably be Chinook helicopters flown by the Nightstalkers, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. In Venezuela, there were at least six, maybe eight. So there'd be a lot more here. You'd probably also have, it's a C-130 variant called the MC-130J Commando. It's basically modified so it can fly at very low altitudes. So it's designed for covert transported infiltration. And it can also conduct, and this will be really important in this case, conduct aerial refueling of helicopters. So you could have a lot of helicopters, you could need to have a constant refueling
46:22 Speaker 00 network above this site so that you can maintain air superiority or dominance over a particular area for a long period of time. Now, those C-130 variants, they can carry maybe up to 80 soldiers. And interestingly, Gordon, six of those MC-130Js were conducting training at an RAF base.
46:43 Speaker 01 Mildenhoe, yeah.
46:44 Speaker 00 Yeah, possibly indicating preparation for a mission. It's also closer to Iran than if they were in the States. So this group might reach Isfahan. Again, Isfahan, by the way, 500 kilometers inland.
46:57 Speaker 01 Yeah.
46:58 Speaker 00 They could go from ships and bases in the Persian Gulf. And even though the US and Israel have destroyed much of Iran's air defense infrastructure, as we saw from the rescue of the, in particular, the pilot.
47:12 Speaker 01 They can still shoot stuff down. Yeah.
47:14 Speaker 00 So you would need a huge number of supporting air assets to ferry in all these troops and protect them.
47:21 Speaker 01 Yeah.
47:21 Speaker 00 While they work on the ground. Now, Maduro raid, there were 150 plus aircraft in the support package. So it would have to be significantly larger than that.
47:31 Speaker 01 Yeah. And then I guess the point is, what you've got to do is, is effectively either use existing airfields or make your own runway airstrip on which to land them. And to, you know, to place these, because you've got to bring in heavy equipment. I mean, this is the thing, isn't it? You know, you're not just dropping off a few guys from helicopters. You're going to need heavy digging equipment in order to be able to get to this site and the nuclear material, which again is really challenging and to make sure you have control of the skies, that you're taking out any potential incoming Iranian military or, you know, Revolutionary Guards who are in the region are trying to get there. You've got to be kind of taking them out. I mean, there's a lot already going on
48:15 Speaker 01 just to get your teams to the site, to create that kind of cordon where you can land a team and hold a airstrip in order to do the extraction or to do the mission.
48:25 Speaker 00 Yeah. And I mean, there's multiple Iranian bases that ring Isfahan, right? The city itself that would need to be hit. I mean, maybe they already have been. You would think that there would be some amount of missiles, rockets and drones that would be constantly inbound and that you would have to deal with probably from an air-to-air standpoint. So you would have to have assets in that kind of support package that can destroy inbound missiles and rockets and drones. You would need real time satellite coverage. You'd have a whole, you know, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance kind of web of drones and planes and satellite imagery that are going to be looking at this whole thing in real time, a steady relay of dozens and dozens of refueling
49:07 Speaker 00 tankers to allow for that whole, you know, sort of set of kind of that that air support package to stay in the air for a long period, like potentially days.
49:17 Speaker 01 Yeah.
49:17 Speaker 00 So it's not, it's not a simple thing. Now that blocking force of maybe a brigade, three to 4,000 people would need to seize the area around Isfahan to establish a cordon so that nothing can come in or out that that we don't want. You mentioned the airstrip, right Gordon? It's it's possible because there are bases there. The other option is, you know, you could commandeer an existing Iranian facility and use that as your kind of staging point, or you could create a makeshift airstrip nearby. And as we saw with the the rescue of the airmen.
49:51 Speaker 01 That can go wrong. Yeah.
49:52 Speaker 00 That could go wrong.
49:52 Speaker 01 You can get stuck. Yeah.
49:54 Speaker 00 What you probably would do is you would have engineers from what are called combat deployable construction battalions, the CBs, that would go in and be able to make effective runways, right? They could actually do the engineering and construction work in real time. Like they can construct if you have the right length and if you have the right soil and the right setup, they could construct suitable runways in just a couple of days. So if you need to increase the kind of amount of runway capacity, you know, you could do that with engineering work. You mentioned the diggers and the kind of the fact that you're going to have to actually get into one of these facilities, which is buried under potentially hundreds of feet of earth and rubble at this point. So you would need
50:37 Speaker 00 what we'd all recognize as sort of typical construction equipment, earth moving stuff, big diggers, right?
50:42 Speaker 01 The builder.
50:42 Speaker 00 Right? Yeah, exactly. Kind of.
50:44 Speaker 01 Sorry, that's a very British reference, but yeah.
50:46 Speaker 00 Woo, we get it. We get it.
50:47 Speaker 01 Yeah.
50:47 Speaker 00 But you you would also need what I think is not a commercially available tunneling equipment.
50:55 Speaker 01 Yeah.
50:55 Speaker 00 That would be able to get through reinforced doors. Because this is going to be one of the big problems and one of the things that drives the timeline is that. Underneath all of this rubble.
51:08 Speaker 01 Yeah.
51:08 Speaker 00 You probably have a situation where the way in is to get through a door, a piece of reinforced metal.
51:18 Speaker 01 Yeah, but not a normal door, I was gonna say.
51:19 Speaker 00 It's not a normal door.
51:21 Speaker 01 Yeah.
51:21 Speaker 00 It's probably four-ish feet thick. And so you, what you're basically doing is you're having to bore through a safe underground, essentially. And we'll, we'll come back to this. So.
51:36 Speaker 01 Yeah.
51:36 Speaker 00 You have, you need to get all that equipment in, right? So you could, you could parachute some of it in on pallets. Or once the airstrip is up, you could land the equipment and then bring it to, to the site.
51:47 Speaker 01 Yeah.
51:47 Speaker 00 Now, keep in mind, this whole time, you have, you're potentially engaged in firefights with Iranian forces who are firing stuff at you or trying to breach the perimeter, right? So just keep that in mind.
52:00 Speaker 01 So it's good, and this is gonna take hours to get even to the points and to drill.
52:04 Speaker 00 So the main blocking force is holding that perimeter. And what you probably have is this kind of, the special mission unit. So it could be Delta Force, it could be the SEALs, plus this kind of engineering component that go inside. I think this is, it's fascinating because so much of the driver of the timeline comes down to, to this piece of it. So again, those entrances are buried in earth. How deep is that earth? Well, is it 50 feet? Is it 100 feet? You need to use earth-moving equipment to basically tunnel. This is where your, you know, comment about miners is, is spot on. Cause you have to essentially dig a tunnel through the earth. And then you get to the skin of this door. It's not a normal door. It's like the Hoth base doors.
52:47 Speaker 00 It's like 20 to 30 feet wide, 20 to 30 feet tall. It's up to four feet thick. You can't break it down with a battering ram. You can't blow it up. It's made of alloys that are resistant to boring and drilling. And again, that equipment, like I actually think it is highly classified. Tunnelling and boring equipment that is going to essentially carve or dig or bore a hole through that door that would be large enough for somebody to walk through. So you think about how much force and energy that's taking.
53:20 Speaker 01 Yeah.
53:20 Speaker 00 It could take maybe eight to 12 hours to do that. A long time. It's going to take you more than a single period of darkness to do that. And keep in mind, like, you're not just standing out in the sunshine while this is happening. You're already at the bottom of a very deep dark hole. You're wearing night vision goggles because it's pitch black down there. This is brutal.
53:40 Speaker 01 Yeah.
53:41 Speaker 00 Brutal work. You've got 80 plus pounds of the usual kit because again, you'd have to assume at some point, someone might be shooting at you. So you've got body armor on. You've got those goggles. One of the guys I spoke to, you know, who had some sense of the planning for these types of missions said, it's like, it's more like working on an oil rig. And it actually, it made me think of, of the film Armageddon, Gordon.
54:03 Speaker 01 Classic. Bruce Willis, isn't it?
54:05 Speaker 00 Bruce Willis, Ben Affleck, Owen Wilson, young Owen Wilson, where they're, they're drilling a hole on an asteroid hurtling through space. That's more of what this is like.
54:15 Speaker 01 Exactly. It's, it's, it's not a normal military operation. And as you said, this means we are talking about not just hours, but potentially days when you think about trying to get down there. And in comparison, I mean, the whole Maduro operation took about 30 minutes. Bin Laden raid, 40 minutes. I mean, this is completely different. So then you get finally to your target, maybe under fire, who knows? Is it booby trapped? I guess that's possible. I mean, we don't entirely know how much the Iranians have prepared for this eventuality, what kind of things they've done, but you've got to now get in there and work out how you're going to get it out.
54:58 Speaker 00 And I don't think anyone is quite sure how these facilities are laid out.
55:04 Speaker 01 Hmm.
55:04 Speaker 00 We probably have some sense, but. Again, it's this problem of like, you know, the I A A had inspected stuff years ago. It's like, well, do you know, do you have a layout from 2023?
55:15 Speaker 01 Yeah.
55:15 Speaker 00 Is that still right?
55:16 Speaker 01 It's gonna change.
55:17 Speaker 00 So as operators, you know, you get through the hole, let's say.
55:21 Speaker 01 Yeah, and you're in, yeah.
55:22 Speaker 00 You're underground.
55:24 Speaker 01 Yeah.
55:24 Speaker 00 And you're deep underground potentially. So communications are a problem. Not only is it a problem that you can't see.
55:31 Speaker 01 But your radios are not going to work back to, back to whoever's running the mission. So you're kind of on your own.
55:36 Speaker 00 There's probably been a, a solution created for this, but I think it's, it is safe to say that communicating and surviving underground is really, it's hard.
55:45 Speaker 01 And Isfahan is pretty big, isn't it? I mean, we think.
55:48 Speaker 00 It's big.
55:49 Speaker 01 It's not, this is not like a one warehouse target.
55:53 Speaker 00 The underground facility at Isfahan is thought to be about 20,000 square meters, which is about 215,000 square feet. That is roughly the size of the hardened facility that NORAD has at Cheyenne Mountain. It's bigger than a Walmart super center.
56:10 Speaker 01 Wow, that big.
56:11 Speaker 00 I don't know if that means anything, if that means anything to you, Gordon. And it's, it's basically four American football fields of floor space.
56:18 Speaker 01 Three football fields for our English, British, non-American, international listeners, by the way, three soccer.
56:25 Speaker 00 Three soccer, three soccer fields.
56:26 Speaker 01 So yeah, we're in this kind of crazy underground place, buried in a mountain or buried deep underground, I guess. You don't necessarily have a map of what it looks like now. Maybe they do, maybe they've managed to steal one, maybe they've managed to kind of use some ground penetrating radar to work out where it is. But then you've got to find your way to wherever this highly rich uranium is held. Again, have you got the intelligence to know exactly where it is? And can you be sure if you spot a bunch of big scuba tanks or trash cans? Can you be sure that they are the real thing? Because without wishing to give the Iranians any ideas, and I'm sure they may have thought of this already, I'd be tempted to put some dummy ones in there, hide them all over the
57:10 Speaker 01 place, put in 300 trash cans or scuba, you know, scuba tank sized things and let people work out which ones have got the real stuff in and which one have them and have them in different rooms.
57:20 Speaker 00 As I was researching this, Gordon, I did have this question that I, I haven't seen any answer to, and I wanted to put it to you, which is. When you get through the hole, you get through the door, what do you think's in there right now?
57:32 Speaker 01 Part of me wonders if the whole thing is kind of buried half, buried buildings? Or what you, you're wondering whether it's like Indiana Jones raids the lost art warehouse with lots of kind of boxes endlessly and you've got to kind of open up all the boxes and go, oh, that one's got the Ark of the Covenant, that one's got the highly enriched uranium, I don't know, I have no idea. I don't think anyone does, do they, apart from maybe Iranians?
57:52 Speaker 00 Yeah, I kept thinking, when you get in there, is it just an abandoned, is it like an abandoned warehouse where it's like the lights are off, but otherwise you're kind of moving around and able to navigate through there?
58:02 Speaker 01 You've got to find it and confirm that it's the right stuff.
58:05 Speaker 00 Right.
58:05 Speaker 01 We all know you can use some, the equivalent of a Geiger couch or something like that to establish what it is.
58:11 Speaker 00 Well, and then, and so then you're faced with what do you do with this stuff, assuming you can find it, right? So if you blow it up, which is kind of a bad option, it would basically, it would basically splatter everywhere, it would release a toxic hydrogen fluoride, you probably wouldn't want to do that in the, in the facility, because you also might not be totally sure you could, you'd want to have full certainty that you had destroyed all of it if you're going to take this risk, right? One of the other options that's been raised is that you could kind of dilute it or sabotage it on site, which is doing something called down blending.
58:44 Speaker 01 That strikes me as difficult. That strikes me as to be sure that you've down blended it and that it couldn't be upblended, whatever the correct phrase is.
58:54 Speaker 00 Enriched, I believe enriched is the phrase.
58:57 Speaker 01 Going back to his highly technical, I'm showing my limits of my nuclear knowledge, doesn't strike me as straightforward and probably not quick. To be a successful operation, you want to say you've got it. I mean, that's what, if you go back to Pete Hegseth and others' comments, is that they want to, they want to extract it, which again is certainly more ambitious than the option of just kind of blowing up a room. You've gone down, now you've got to go back up through, you know, whatever hole you've drilled, carrying what we think are maybe up to 20 tanks of highly enriched uranium.
59:27 Speaker 00 Yeah, there's a whole, I guess, piece to this on the equipment side, which is, well, how do you move that stuff up the tunnel? I mean, there's a whole. Engineering and kind of construction piece to this, that's, that's front and center. But again, as you extract it, and whether that's going out on a Shunok helicopter or a bunch of C-130s, those planes could be shot at.
59:47 Speaker 01 Either the Iranians recover it, or it blows up and disperses in a, you know, radioactive cloud, which would not be great, not just for Iran, but the region, I guess.
59:56 Speaker 00 And if, you know, another complication is that if moisture enters the cylinders during transport, that could interact with the uranium gas to actually produce a toxic, I'll read this directly, so I get it right, ural fluoride and hydrofluoric acid gas, which might cause an explosion. So you could have, you have a handling concern consistently, which I think is why you have these engineers from their disablement team or the Department of Energy or somebody who understands how to handle this stuff safely. And then, once you've gotten it all out, then it could be eventually downblended in the US or elsewhere.
1:00:32 Speaker 01 Well, you could, you could put it on a, put it on a convoy with me and take it to Russia.
1:00:37 Speaker 00 Or take it to, take it, the Gordon Corera.
1:00:39 Speaker 01 The Carrera option, I'll guard it.
1:00:42 Speaker 00 The Carrera option where it ends up in Moscow. But all of that we've described is like, that is what, when we talk about what would it take to actually destroy or eliminate Iran's nuclear capabilities, what we have just described at one facility is probably not even the answer to that question.
1:00:58 Speaker 01 It doesn't necessarily get everything. Yeah.
1:01:00 Speaker 00 It doesn't necessarily get everything, but that is a big piece of it.
1:01:03 Speaker 01 Okay. So as we, as we wrap up, I guess the, the, the point we've made, it's not easy. If, if anyone had worked that one out. So maybe the question is, I mean, I'm not a great fan of predictions, but do we think it's going to happen? My view, it, it, it's an option.
1:01:19 Speaker 00 Oh, you gotta be, you gotta be more, come on, Gordon. That's, that's weak sauce.
1:01:23 Speaker 01 No, okay. More than an option, I think Trump and his team are actively preparing to do it if they feel they need to. They are preparing to do it, but that is very different from giving the go ahead.
1:01:33 Speaker 00 Sure.
1:01:33 Speaker 01 They are clearly getting everything in position that if they feel they have to do it, they will do it. But I think it does come down to. Are there other options? Will the Iranians? The Iranians aren't going to give this up easily.
1:01:46 Speaker 00 Would they? Do you think they would give it up at all?
1:01:48 Speaker 01 I find it really hard to see. They want to maintain the right to enrich uranium. That's something they've said all along for peaceful purposes, which we've discussed. It's something many would dispute, but, but, so I find it very hard to imagine they do that. I mean, there, there were other options in the past, which is you could put it under IAEA supervision and down blend it. You know, there are things you could probably do and find ways to negotiate some way of giving the Iranians some room to say, well, we've still got it. But it's for the Americans to say, well, it's no longer dangerous. So I don't know. What do you think?
1:02:22 Speaker 00 Well, as we should say, you know, in, and we have the Hegseth comments from yesterday, the 8th of April. You know, in late March, the White House Press Secretary set up mission to retrieve the highly enriched uranium is an option on the table. So very much to your point. I mean, it is under consideration. I will venture a guess and say that I think it will happen.
1:02:41 Speaker 01 Wow.
1:02:42 Speaker 00 Potentially after, you know, maybe a period of kind of stabbing in the dark diplomatically to see if one of the options you just presented, like the Iranians turning it over to the IAEA might pan out, which I don't think it will. I, I realize I'm going out on a limb here with this prediction, but I think, I think Trump will do it. And I think he will do it because unlike the destruction or attempted destruction of Iran's ballistic missile force, its navy, or the regime going after 20 ish scuba tanks of stuff, you can do that. You can get that.
1:03:21 Speaker 01 And then you can claim a big win.
1:03:23 Speaker 00 You can say, look, every president for the past 25 years has tried to figure out a way to deal with Iran's nuclear program. I solved it. Now, I think what we're seeing is like on the regime side, on the military political objectives that have been set or thrown out there to justify the conflict. You can claim victory on them. It's harder, I think.
1:03:47 Speaker 01 Yeah, although with this administration, I think they they they would they will they will claim victory with whatever they get.
1:03:52 Speaker 00 That's true, and they have, and they have.
1:03:53 Speaker 01 Yeah, and they already have, even though, you know, the Straits of Hormuz are kind of barely open, if if at all. So I think I kind of agree with you that it would give them something they could definitively claim as success without having changed the regime. But, boy, the risks are high. But I also think the nightmare for both the US, Israel, and the whole region is you leave in power an angry hardened Iranian regime run primarily by the Revolutionary Guards.
1:04:25 Speaker 00 Which is what we're we're headed to be clear.
1:04:27 Speaker 01 What we have now, but who've seen that perhaps the only deterrent that they could develop against future attack is to have a nuclear bomb. You've basically created an incentive for Iran to do what it's not done before, which is race and do whatever it can to get a nuclear bomb, because it's the only thing, as per the North Korean example, that can protect it in its mind from future attack. And you think they may try and do that, then then that would drive you towards thinking, we need to resolve that nuclear question and try and get the nuclear material, and that might be the only way of doing it.
1:04:59 Speaker 00 Yeah, you know, so there's the question, do we think it's going to happen? And I'm saying yes. I think you're saying maybe. Is that as far as you go?
1:05:09 Speaker 01 I'm hedging.
1:05:10 Speaker 00 You're hedging. Well, so here's here's a second question, which is, do you think it should happen?
1:05:15 Speaker 01 I'm not sure. Should is such a weird word, because I kind of think I would like there to be a nice diplomatic solution in which Iran agreed to give up maybe its highly enriched uranium.
1:05:25 Speaker 00 Let's say you attempt that and don't get it. Don't get the diplomatic solution.
1:05:29 Speaker 01 As I said, I think the US and Israel have created a situation because there was a lid, to some extent, on the program with the the JCPOA, the Iran deal. That lid's been taken off. That has created now a dynamic where there may not be many options to solve it if, as I said, Iran does race for a bomb now. But it is also, I think you have to acknowledge, partly a situation created by policy choices from the US and Israel, who pushed to get rid of that deal, which was imperfect, completely agree, but at least had some kind of lid on that program.
1:06:02 Speaker 00 But if you just looked at it from today, if you were An advisor to President Trump, which this podcast might be a good jumping off point for you to to get a job in the White House. Would you advise him to?
1:06:13 Speaker 01 Well, what's interesting is I think there'll be people around him who will say do it. Because I think he's a risk taker. There are people around him who who want who are very determined to deal with Iran.
1:06:24 Speaker 00 I would I would advise him to do it. The reason for that is because I there's a lot of the a lot of the war aims that have been tossed out there, I think, are unrealistic, probably not going to generate. And in the very first podcast we did after the start of Epic Fury, the emergency episode, what I said was, I think the return on investment here is likely to be pretty low.
1:06:48 Speaker 01 Yeah.
1:06:49 Speaker 00 It's not that it's zero. It's not that it's zero, but it's that-
1:06:51 Speaker 01 You damaged the Iranian military, but but you've not you've hardened the regime and not fundamentally changed it.
1:06:58 Speaker 00 And you've destroyed a lot of its infrastructure to and its defense industrial base and a lot of its military capacity, but it's still there and it can constitute a lot of that stuff. But when you when you zoom all the way out and you think about what are American strategic interests with respect to that part of the world and in particular Iran? I think that it is in our interest that the Iranians do not have a nuclear weapon or a nuclear capability. And I think it's in our interest that the that the Strait of Hormuz be opened and that there be a free flow of of oil and goods out of out of the Persian Gulf. What I fear is that if we don't actually go and get this highly
1:07:43 Speaker 00 enriched uranium, that will have ended the conflict, having a self inflicted wound by the Iranians having closed the strait for a long period of time. We will have made some progress on degrading the nuclear program.
1:07:58 Speaker 01 Yeah.
1:07:58 Speaker 00 But we will not have taken the closest thing that we have to a kill shot, which is getting all of this highly enriched uranium that they've spent decades producing. And making it much, much, much harder for them to, in the future, get a weapon because we've destroyed so much of the enrichment infrastructure and we've taken the stuff they've already enriched. If we don't do that, I worry that what is already, I think, a low ROI on this conflict is going to be even lower.
1:08:27 Speaker 01 And I guess maybe we should end with me summarizing David's views as they will either give it to us or we will take it out, which is, I never thought David McCloskey and Pistol Pete Hegseth would be so aligned, but I think basically you're in tune there with the Secretary of War. That would be my guess. But I do take your point that the options have narrowed, as they say. But David, I think that's been a really fascinating kind of insight into what that raid might look like and the really hard options now facing those who are worried about Iran's nuclear programme. Just a reminder, though, that we also have something very interesting, which is going to kind of talk a little bit
1:09:07 Speaker 01 more about this, a live stream with David Ignatius, who is a top columnist with some of the best sources, I think, on the US intelligence community for the Washington Post and also writes novels as well. Another one of these people who writes novels.
1:09:20 Speaker 00 Another one of these strange people.
1:09:23 Speaker 01 These people who seem to write fiction, make stuff up, which is going to be Friday 17th of April on YouTube. The link is in the episode description. That's 5pm British Standard Time, 11am Central Time on Friday the 17th with David Ignatius. But just a reminder, do sign up for the club. We've got a great series coming up on lots of things, but including Iraq WMD with some really interesting.
1:09:46 Speaker 00 Can we tease the guests?
1:09:47 Speaker 01 No, let's not tease them left. Let's save it. Let's save it. Some very exciting guests who were directly involved, it's fair to say, on Iraq WMD. Also Steakknife, Northern Ireland, where we've got some guests, Patrick Radenkeef, Peter Taylor, amongst others, talking about that.
1:10:02 Speaker 00 It's one of the most cheerful series we've ever done, right? The brutality of intelligence work and murder and the troubles. It is fascinating and it's a fascinating story about the complexities of agent handling or not handling agents who are doing really nasty things.
1:10:16 Speaker 01 Yeah, that's right. So do join us. For those, do sign up at therestisclassified.com. Sign up for their newsletter as well. But otherwise, see you next time.
1:10:24 Speaker 00 We'll see you next time.
Previous 146. How the CIA Rescued a Pilot Inside Iran (Ep 1) Next 148. Can Europe Salvage its Relationship with Trump? Page updated November 13, 2026 · transcript and summary are machine-generated