Pod Insights Real Vision: Finance & Investing The Next Big Trade - Rick Rule Makes the Case for Uranium About this episode For the past 45 years, Rick Rule has been investing and speculating in the natural resource industry. The president and CEO of Rule Investment Media and the chair of Equinox Gold joins Harry Melandri to talk about why he’s turning his focus to uranium. In short, Rick is taking a long view on a resource that could help solve what will soon be a global energy crisis. Never miss an episode of Next Big Trade - subscribe here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Transcript 0:03 Speaker 00 Hey everyone. If you like this podcast, go behind the paywall to get privileged access to the smartest minds in finance. Join the Real Vision community and learn how to become a better investor. Visit realvision.com/rvpod and use the promo code PODCAST10 to get 10% off our essential membership for the first year. Here's what's coming up on this edition of the Next Big Trade.
0:26 Speaker 01 If Real Vision posts this on YouTube, there will be comments in the questions section that says, "What a despicable human being. He's profiting on Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Three Mile Island and Fukushima." From a contrarian's point of view, oddly, that's music to my ears.
0:45 Speaker 02 Hi everyone, and welcome to the Next Big Trade. I'm your host, Harry Malandri from MI2 Partners. Enjoy the show.
0:53 Speaker 02 This week, we are joined by Rick Rule, President and CEO of Rule Investment Media LLC and the Chair of Equinox Gold. Rick's been a professional investor and speculator in natural resources and gold for 45 years, and he's financed numerous natural resource companies over those 45 years. So, Rick, thank you so much for coming on. It's a real pleasure.
1:16 Speaker 01 It's a pleasure to be back with Real Vision. Thank you for having me back.
1:18 Speaker 02 How's it going? How's your day treating you?
1:21 Speaker 01 You know, life is great. As you can see, Harry, I failed retirement miserably. I tried retirement. It lasted about five days. I was very, very unhappy. So I failed it completely. This is my retirement garb, shirt and tie. And I'm back enjoying myself immensely.
1:36 Speaker 02 I've failed to reach retirement. I think it's one of those things you're meant to aspire to. So I'd like to get to that place. And then I'd like to say, no, thank you. But it's like knighthoods in the UK or something. It's great to be offered them, whether or not you're going to take them. So, a question I usually ask, which usually goes badly wrong as well, is, before we go into your main investment thesis, could I ask, what's on your mind these days? Anything that is not the investment thesis? What's got your attention right now?
2:06 Speaker 01 Well, maybe a different investment thesis. I'm starting a new bank. I'm a serial entrepreneur. And when I see holes in the market, I can't help but try to fill them. This experiment goes back to a couple of things. One, I'm a fairly large customer of three very large banks in the United States, and I would describe my relationship with these banks as sullen but not quite mutinous. And that's not the relationship that you want with a service provider. It also goes back to helping found another bank about 20 years ago, Everbank, with my friend Frank Trotter. It was one of the first online banks, and we had a wide range of customer-friendly products, foreign currency CDs, index CDs, precious
2:51 Speaker 01 metals index CDs. They grew the bank from a standing start to $28 billion in AUM before they sold it to TIA Kref. And so those two things, the fact that there are enormous holes, product holes, both in the lending side and the deposit side in American banking, and I have a team with whom I've done it before, has met that I'm celebrating retirement at age 69 by starting a new bank, and I'm really, really excited about it.
3:20 Speaker 02 So, one of the great joys of serial entrepreneurship is you've done this before. Let's be a little bit more specific about this. I'm curious. I've got a terrible relationship with my, not a terrible, I have a feudal relationship with my banks. They do what they want to me, and I occasionally apologize for not being as good a customer as I could be. What holes do you see in US banking at the moment?
3:47 Speaker 01 Well, for one, I'm fairly financially sophisticated, and the variety of products offered up by the banks, which mostly seem designed to hoodwink me, are such that even a person like myself with 49 years in finance has difficulty understanding them. I'm also of an age where when I phone an institution that I'm either borrowing a lot of money from or lending a lot of money to, I like to talk to a human. In our prior bank, we had a policy, all phone calls answered within five rings. I think that deposit products ought to fill customer needs.
4:28 Speaker 01 So at our last bank, like in this one, you'll be able to get a certificate of deposit in many different currencies. You'll be able to open a checking account and a banking account in many different currencies. So if you're a Canadian business person wanting to do business in the US, or a US business person who imports and exports from Canada, as an example, you'll be able to open up a Canadian dollar bank account with our bank. It seems simple, but try doing it at one of the large Canadian banks. As an American, it would seem to be impossible. I've also noticed huge holes in lending. I've been in the precious metals business all my life, and there are no US chartered banks that I know of
5:12 Speaker 01 that like to lend money against precious metals, against bullion, gold and silver held in storage. The idea that somebody wouldn't want to lend against good collateral, where they control the collateral, seems absolutely laughable to me. Similarly, now, the big thinkers in the oil and gas business, the people that have dominated oil and gas lending, are leaving the space. It's a wonderful business, and as long as people continue to drive, the fact that maybe Biden doesn't like it, and Angela Merkel doesn't like it, and Trudeau doesn't like it, doesn't matter. When most people go to their garage and turn the key to the right, they want the car to start. So it's going to be a pretty good business.
5:54 Speaker 01 This is really banking, a game of blocking and tackling. I know for sure that the big banks, I can't compete with them. But they can't compete with me either. And so I'm looking forward to doing battle. Hence the name of the bank, Battle Bank.
6:11 Speaker 02 That's fantastic. So, look, I'm British, so I live in the United States. That gives me, and that's by the unique perspective, it gives me a specific perspective on problems with banking. And what I've got to tell you, the environment was, I think it was deliberately made less friendly for people who want to do big international transfers, because they're sick of tax evasion. And possibly because they want to extract more tax in the future, so you need to lock that regime down to make it harder to do it. But the whole FATCA thing can make, you know, makes life pretty miserable if you're trying to move money around the world. Luckily, my career as an international drug kingping never really took off, although it did look
6:55 Speaker 02 a very high margin business. But regardless, it just throwing money around, moving money from the UK to the US and the US back to the UK, it's expensive, it's stupidly expensive, you get terrible service and you have a lot of paperwork to do. So good luck to you. I suspect you'll find out things about what the authorities intend for banks that you didn't expect.
7:19 Speaker 01 I have to tell you this, Harry. I've now had interviews with the Fed, with the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, with the FDIC. And while I have problems with the mandate of all three of those agencies, I like the people. I found them smart. I found them helpful. This was not my intention, by the way. You know, I, I looked forward to a three agency discussion, the same way you might look forward to Root Canal. And I actually came away very pleased with the people, if not with the mandate.
7:50 Speaker 02 Well, exactly. And, you know, I don't like to out myself, but a long time ago, before I was thrown out of the brownies, I used to be a Bank of England employee. They gave us really nice chequebooks. We got the best chequebooks. My bank is fantastic. But yeah, I can't, all of us, we're all fairly well briefed and we knew our, knew what we meant to know and unfailingly polite, except for me. What can I say? I think central bankers are good people, but sometimes the good people are asked to do tough things. So it just is what it is. I, you know, I'm puzzled about the investment environment at the moment. How are you looking at things? Are equities cheap? Are bonds cheap? Neither? Both? I mean, what do you think of the overall investment environment?
8:35 Speaker 01 I think equities are probably reasonably priced if you don't believe that there's a recession coming down the pike. One of my problems in life is that I've always been optimistic about my own business, but I've always been afraid of the world, so I've accurately forecast approximately seventeen of the last three recessions. And I've stopped listening to myself. What I really look for now is value in areas where I have specific expertise, which is to say where I think my ability to analyze is better than my competitors, or areas that are demonstrably specifically cheap. I think that micro-cap equities, cash flow positive micro-cap equities, I'm not talking
9:18 Speaker 01 about the penny dreadfuls, but I think companies with market capitalizations less than a billion dollars, or hopefully less than three hundred and fifty million dollars, are woefully undervalued. They aren't being bought by the ETFs, they aren't generating commissions, and the dichotomy in value, albeit at higher risks, between the micro-cap stocks and the big stocks is striking. It wasn't so two or three years ago. Two or three years ago, the large-cap stocks ex-tech were reasonably well-priced, given the risk-reward juxtaposition, but the bottom's fallen out of the micro-cap market, and all
9:59 Speaker 01 of the liquidity, all of the volume, all of the research, all of the ETF stuff is in the large caps. I'm concerned about bonds, too, because I'm concerned that someday the market might regain control of interest rates. And the bond market would be an absolute mess if you had a real yield. If yields return to the forty-year mean, which is to say real yields return to the forty-year mean, there'd be an absolute catastrophe in bonds. I'm particularly concerned about the junk market, which is one of the places I came from, the junk bond market. So many high-yield issues are controlled in the ETFs. And while the ETFs are highly liquid, the underlying components of the ETF aren't.
10:44 Speaker 01 And if you ever began to have disintermediation out of the ETFs, and the ETFs were forced to sell these illiquid instruments that they own... I think it'd be a total mess. You may remember, Harry, references in the 1980s to owl bonds. An owl bond was an illiquid issue when you called your broker up to sell and your broker said, "To who? To who?" And I'm terrified, I mean, really, truly terrified that we're going to see a circumstance in the credit market where there's a flight to quality and there's no bid, there's nobody to sell to. I hope I'm wrong.
11:24 Speaker 02 So I'm not quite old enough to remember the owl bonds, but I know what you mean because I kind of started, I was at the central bank in the late 80s. But yeah, euro bond flows have waxed and waned and mostly waned over the last 20 years. Now that liquidity is only primary, there's no real secondary liquidity. If the investment management firms would like to trade bonds, they have to trade with other investment management firms. This is a probable catastrophe and, you know, in the making, I'd say the Fed is fully aware of this. Otherwise, they wouldn't have set up that facility when COVID struck to soak up liquidity from asset management firms that wanted to trade corporate bonds.
12:07 Speaker 02 So if you had a corporate bond, you could go to the Fed and they'd pay you a price they deemed appropriate. God knows how they would know, but there you go. I suppose the whole point is the price was not appropriate. That's why they were paying you. Otherwise, you know, you'd have found a price in the market. But yeah, I can see a potential problem down the line if the authorities are foolish enough to allow it to happen. I can also see that question mark. You know, I was struck by you saying if real yields went positive again, they're just about going positive now. Or rather, Lincoln are selling off fast enough that real yields are going positive
12:46 Speaker 02 relative to very low breakevens. And I don't know, what is the natural, natural situation? Are we meant to get paid a positive real interest rate? Why do we think that is natural? I'm not sure.
13:00 Speaker 01 You know, what you do as a saver is you defer consumption in favor of somebody for whom the consumption is of more value than the interest. The idea that you should lend to me and you should forego consumption now in my favor. And you should be paid back an amount that allows you to consume less than you could have consumed when you lent to me, while at the same time taking a credit risk. In other words, the idea that you should be punished for taking a credit risk seems somehow unnatural to me.
13:32 Speaker 02 Sure.
13:33 Speaker 01 As a depositor. The idea, I mean, the, the value proposition offered up by the US 10-year Treasury, you know, the deepest, most liquid market in the world, basically is that these guys promised to pay you, what, three and a half, in a currency where the purchasing power is deteriorating by about 9% compounded. Our mutual friend Jim Grant refers to that as return-free risk. I don't think that return-free risk is a natural part of the financial structure. I think it's a construct of 40 years of benign climate and the politicization of finesse. At any rate, I'm on strike. I'm not buying any return-free risk. It seems like absolutely no fun to me.
14:17 Speaker 02 You have withheld your consent. I see. So, I spent a long time puzzling over this question, and I came up with an answer. It's probably a bad answer, because lots of my answers are bad. My wife tells me frequently, other people do too. But my answer is as follows. Over in China, there are currently four grandparents, on average, for every grandchild. This demographic nightmare of spoiled grandchildren is coming to a, to a country near you. It's, it's coming everywhere. And what that really means is we've got a problem obtaining and locking in future consumption. And by, by the way, for anyone listening to this nonsense I'm talking now, this is entirely my, you know, my, my theory.
15:00 Speaker 02 Nobody serious actually gives it much credence, but it's, it's my way of explaining what, what I observe. So we now have a problem, not, in the past, a problem was always getting hold of current consumption. There was lots of people who promised you future consumption, but very few people who would promise you current consumption. So you often offered people terms, you paid them a premium on their current consumption to persuade them to defer. These days, my problem is a Fifty six year old is how I can lock in the best forward consumption I could. I don't really have a problem right now. I've got everything I need. I could get more extreme needs. I could, my wife might, my wife might develop a love of boats
15:41 Speaker 02 or second homes or something, but right here now, my bigger problem is how to lock up the standard of living I'd like to become accustomed to in ten years' time. And I don't have many choices. And if the demographic problem that China has is replicated in other countries, it might turn out that actually getting hold of that future consumption could be on even worse terms than I'm currently facing. So, you know, that's how I explain the inexplicable, but, you know, for what little it's worth.
16:11 Speaker 01 Well, we'll talk a lot about demographics in the next part of this interview because it's a, it's an important part of the uranium thesis. And I look forward to that visit.
16:20 Speaker 02 Well, let's, let's get going. This is what we're all about. So, so Rick, tell us about the next big trade. What should we be invested in?
16:27 Speaker 01 Well, I, I confine myself to natural resources and conventional financial services. As I told you earlier in this interview, I've made mistakes in lots of sectors and I'd prefer not to make mistakes in the future. So I constrict myself to, or constrain myself, pardon me, to areas that I think I know better than my competitors, one of which is natural resources. Natural resources are a rather unique investment area. They are capital intensive, they are deeply cyclical. And one of the things I've learned in my life is that to take advantage of that, you must be a contrarian or you will be a victim. There isn't very much middle ground. And so what you do is you look for sectors
17:10 Speaker 01 where the industry pricing has the industry in liquidation. That is oddly, you look for sectors in liquidation where the price, the selling price of the commodity is less than the median cost of production. You don't do this out of, you know, some sense of self hate. You do it because if the commodity is necessary for the well being, material well being of humankind, either the price goes up or the commodity goes away. This has served me well for forty years. It took me ten years to learn it, and I was served poorly in those ten years. So you look for something where the industry pricing structure signifies that the industry
17:52 Speaker 01 is in liquidation, and you look for a sector too, if you can find it, that in addition to the economics is out of favor politically. In the natural resource-based businesses, I could name lots of those. I could talk about coal if I wanted to, which is also not a bad trade. I could talk about oil and gas, which is what I talked about in Real Vision two years ago. But what I want to talk about today is uranium. Not only is the industry in liquidation based on current pricing, but if you want to hear something that's hated, just look at uranium. If Real Vision posts this on YouTube, there will be comments in the questions section that says, "What a despicable human being.
18:36 Speaker 01 He's profiting on Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima." From a contrarian's point of view, oddly, that's music to my ears. I don't have much competition there. So let's go through the trade. The trade really involves the electrification of life in the first instance, the increasing amount of electric power, electric gadgets, that you and I use. But more importantly, it also goes to the electrification, the increase in material living standards of humankind. Many people don't realize that 1.2 billion people on Earth have no access to primary electricity.
19:18 Speaker 01 Another 2 billion people on Earth experience energy poverty, meaning intermittent or unaffordable energy. The whole world wants to live like you and I, and mercifully, the last thirty years, we've done a great job of bringing them up. And you and I want to live better, and all of that takes power. People say, "What about wind?" I'm all for it. "Sun?" I'm all for that, too. The problem is they're intermittent. You know, the sun doesn't always shine. Other than in the legislature, the wind doesn't always blow. We need baseload power, and that's where uranium comes in. It's the densest fuel known to humankind, and that's important, too. If you are in an area that experiences resource poverty, a place like Japan, or Korea, or Taiwan,
20:02 Speaker 01 one fairly small building in Japan could store enough uranium to power Japan Inc. for five or six years. They simply can't store that much liquefied natural gas, or that much coal. So, the first argument in favor of uranium is the simple electrification of the world, and the increasing electrification of the part of the world that can easily afford to pay for it. Not just electric cars, everything that we use. The second part of the uranium thesis is carbon. I'm not gonna get myself into the global warming debate, but I'm also not gonna bother debating with anybody that we ought to pump less crap into the air, and pump less crap into the ocean.
20:46 Speaker 01 Our method of living on Earth needs to be as harmless as we can make it. Nuclear power generates no by-product carbon. There's no suit. There's nothing like that. People point to radiation. The truth is, there is one coal fly ash field in Ohio that generates more background radiation than every nuclear plant in the world combined. It's odd that when you talk about the pollutant by-products from uranium, even in terms of radiation, they're fairly low on the by-product pollution scale. But it's the economics that really get me. I love a commodity where the price must go up, and it can go up.
21:30 Speaker 01 If a price must go up and can go up, I submit to you that it will go up. So here's the arithmetic. On a global basis, the total cost to produce uranium, I'm not talking about just the mine cost, but the cost of capital, in particular, social rents, taxes, royalties, fees, but also prior-year write-downs, which is to say unsuccessful capital efforts in exploration. The total cost to produce a pound of uranium is estimated about 60 US dollars a pound. Right now, the stuff is selling on the spot market for 50 US dollars a pound. So we make it for 60, we sell it for 50. We lose 10, and being miners, we try and make it up on volume. And we aren't doing a good job.
22:11 Speaker 01 The world is using about 200 million pounds and we're producing about 125 million pounds. So we are running down inventories at about 75 million pounds a year. But it gets worse. The incentive price for new uranium, which the world is going to need in two or three years, is more like 75 dollars a pound because of inflation in the supply chain and increasing social rents. So merely to maintain current production takes 60. To bring on new production, remember that we're in a 75 million pound deficit, takes 75. And demand for uranium, despite the wishes of the big thinkers, is growing fairly rapidly.
22:54 Speaker 01 The price can go up too, because the cost of nuclear fuel relative to the total cost of generating electricity from a nuclear power plant is very low. They spend more on lawyers and lobbyists and certainly much, much, much more on depreciation than they spend on power. If the price of the fuel input in a nuclear power plant were to double, on average, that would increase the cost associated with producing electricity by about three and a half percent. In other words, it's in irrelevancy compared to things like interest rates, the cost of capital, taxes and regulation. So I submit to you that the price must go up.
23:39 Speaker 01 It must go up because it's the most affordable form of baseload power in the world, even in countries like the United States that pretend that they can afford to be stupid about power. 20% of our baseload power is nuclear and 13% of our total consumption is nuclear. If the price doesn't go up to cover the cost of production in six or seven years, the alternative is that the lights will go out. If you're thinking about the thesis, think whether it's more probable that the price of uranium will go from 50 to 75 dollars or the lights will go out, because those are the only two alternatives. So I would submit to you that since the price must go up and the price can go up, it will go up. But the thesis gets a little better than that, which is to say increasingly this
24:23 Speaker 01 has become evident to voters. And as a consequence of being evident to voters, it's evident to politicians. Three years ago, a public opinion poll was taken in Japan, and a mere 21% of Japanese voters, post Fukushima, were in favor of uranium. Today, the number is 61%. The Kyoto protocols are popular in Japan. Energy security is popular in Japan. And there is a new understanding that despite the sort of strange love fear that people have of uranium, that the risk of mortality from uranium, unless something goes really, really, really wrong, is really, really, really low.
25:06 Speaker 01 The co-founder of Greenpeace has come out in favor of nuclear power plants. The changing politics of nuclear power plants even has President Biden, who had a campaign promise to get rid of it, now suggesting he's going to subsidize it. I need to be careful who I choose as my friends, of course, but I say that just to illustrate the changing political winds around uranium. The other, another thing that's happening is the spot market. The uranium business, the uranium spot market, has been oversupplied since Fukushima, way oversupplied. And the price of uranium on the spot market fell from $85 to $16 or $17 post Fukushima.
25:49 Speaker 01 It's taken a long time to wade through that spot market overhang, but we've begun to do it, aided, of course, by my former employer, Sprott, Inc., launching the Sprott Physical Uranium Trust, which now has 55 million pounds of uranium in inventory, taken off the spot market. Now, for the last 10 years, utilities haven't bothered to do structured term contracts in uranium because it was cheaper to buy it on the spot market. But that game is over. When the price goes up and the price gets locked in by utilities for the five or six year timeframe, the producers' future cash flows are both assured and visible.
26:32 Speaker 01 And there is nothing that the market likes to see as much as rising earnings that are both secure and visible.
26:41 Speaker 01 So, and I guess the final catalyst has been that a lot of the oversupply came from Japan post Fukushima. And I've thought for three or four years that the biggest impetus in terms of near-term demand will be the pace of Japanese restarts, but I didn't know what year that would occur. It turns out that that year is 2022. The Chinese are building nuclear power plants like mad, but they're going to affect demand five years from now, six years from now, seven years from now. Japanese restarts change demand right now, and we're having that happen. So my suggestion to you is that this is inevitable and imminent simultaneously. Two different words.
27:24 Speaker 01 The difference between those words have punished me from time to time in the past, but in this circumstance, it's a situation that has to happen, and I believe will happen fairly quickly. By fairly quickly, I mean in the one to two-year timeframe.
27:34 Speaker 02 So there's a lot to process there, and you know, my job is to push back.
27:40 Speaker 01 Great.
27:41 Speaker 02 I should disclose, I actually own some uranium stocks, almost definitely the wrong ones, but I do have Cameco, for example, which is one I bought without thinking too hard.
27:52 Speaker 01 That's a right one.
27:53 Speaker 02 Well, it just, you know, how wrong can you be buying a big Canadian producer? That was what I was thinking, minimizing wrongness, not maximizing rightness. But when I think about this problem, so you've touched on loads of the issues, one of the things I think about is I don't really see, you know, extracting from Japan, you've just informed me, I didn't know the Japanese are starting to restarting power production. I don't see many new nuclear facilities starting. I see places where they had nuclear facilities and they're now thinking of not retiring them.
28:30 Speaker 01 Yes.
28:31 Speaker 02 When they had been planning to retire them. That's got to be a positive, right? Absence of a negative has got to be a positive. But you'd think the baseload argument would say, we've got to build new, more nuclear, more. Now, in the UK, there are plans to put these mini-nuclear plants into action, and they're attractive, they don't produce nuclear waste to the extent that the bigger plants do, and the accidents are likely to be smaller. Lots of small plants will give you a smaller, a larger number of small accidents rather than a bigger number of very big, you know, a small number of very big accidents. But am I wrong to think that we have yet to see that wholesale adoption?
29:11 Speaker 01 You've brought up a lot of points there. Let's try and deal with them in reverse order. The first is with regards to waste. If you lived your whole life on electricity generated from nuclear, the waste would fit in the glass that you're drinking out of now. The most important thing about the waste is that we store it, where we can get it back, because as technology improves, we're gonna need that waste. But let's get back to your point. We don't see nuclear power plants getting built because we live in societies that have believed for 20 years that they don't need them. The Chinese, the Koreans, the Taiwanese, the Indians, people in the UAE feel very differently. And there's an absolute rash of new plant construction. I don't mean plans, I don't mean permits, I mean construction.
29:56 Speaker 02 Construction, yeah.
29:57 Speaker 01 Particularly in China. But we've seen a circumstance now where even in Great Britain, your outgoing PM has said our answer is nuclear, and the Conservative Party is angling with the British public to spend about, or cause to be spent, 20 billion pounds sterling on large nuclear plants. The small plants, the SMRs that you talk about, will also make a difference. But they'll begin to make a difference in five or six or seven years. This is a technology that, while not in its infancy, hasn't reached commercial proportions yet. What we are seeing in the West, rather, and you noted this, rather than new construction,
30:40 Speaker 01 has been the deferral of plant shutdowns. That is to say, plants that had been slated for shutdown are now extended. In the case of Diablo Canyon in California as an example, where nuclear is deeply unpopular, the shutdown was slated to happen in 2022, and now it looks like it's gonna happen in 2042.
31:02 Speaker 01 This is a circumstance where that's going on around the world, led of course by China. But the whole world has come to understand that they're power deficient. The whole world too, as a consequence, I think of the Russian Ukrainian adventure, has been that people have come to understand that the demand for energy security is worth something. We've seen in Europe the consequences of an energy policy revolving around solar, where the sun doesn't shine, and access to third-party power, which is to say Russian gas, which doesn't work.
31:45 Speaker 01 Even the Germans now are talking about deferring their three remaining plant closures. And the Germans, of course, are buying electricity from anybody they can, including the French, who generate it from nuclear.
31:59 Speaker 02 So one of the things that comes to mind when I think about problems of nuclear is the thing that happened, engineering failures. Like Fukushima, which I probably pronounced completely wrong, was a series of cascading failures. In particular, there was a tsunami. The tsunami overtopped a tidal wall, sorry, a sea wall, and that flooded a power generation facility that was meant to drive the power to do the cooling. The reason why we have less nuclear power being generated right now in Europe is because the same reason we have not very much hydro being generated.
32:40 Speaker 02 The rivers are running really dry, so the reliability of coolant is not available to them. And so they've had to shut down to reduce... Oh, I may have got that completely wrong because I'm guessing why, but I think the problem is a lack of water on certain nuclear plants. You know, isn't this a problem going forward? Why won't this happen again? This is why we stopped consuming a lot of uranium. Why couldn't we just have one more accident to throw a spanner in the works?
33:09 Speaker 01 It's interesting that when we have a non-nuclear accident, it doesn't seem to inspire the same fear. As an example, Pacific Gas and Electric in the Bay Area had a natural gas pipeline blowout that roasted 82 people. But because everybody has natural gas in their homes, people are much less afraid of it. The truth is that the mortality rate and the sickness rate around nuclear power relative to other forms of power is extraordinarily good, but it isn't emotional. And yes, there was an engineering failure at Fukushima. It's worth noting that that engineering failure
33:51 Speaker 01 resulted in very, very little radioactive sickness. About a thousand people, pardon me, were killed in the general evacuation. And thus far, as I understand it, there have been about five deaths attributable to nuclear power. Now, Chernobyl was a very different circumstance. There is a chilling quote, and I forget the guy's name, a senior Russian official who was of, I forget the guy's name, so I'll just say the quote. He said, "We made the policy decision, because they only had one concrete shell around Chernobyl, that Ukrainians were cheaper than concrete. And the consequence of that was a deliberate
34:33 Speaker 01 underinvestment in capital equipment." That's something that you don't want to do with any power source, a thermal source or anything else. No large-scale industrial activity is riskless. But when you compare the narrative around nuclear power with the statistics around nuclear power, particularly if you throw on top of that the politics of carbon and the politics of energy poverty for 3 billion people on Earth, my suspicion is that the time has come for uranium.
35:04 Speaker 02 You know, I share your netting, your, of the accounting of the pros and cons. I, that's why I bought some. I didn't buy a life-altering amount of it, but it did very well. Sadly, I bought life-altering amounts of other things that didn't. Often how the cookies crumble. So I'm, I'm, you're pushing on an open door to some degree. The main thing I'm interested in is how, how big I should size the trade and what could go wrong. Because usually when I say what could go wrong, something goes wrong.
35:36 Speaker 01 I think three principal risks. One would be a plant accident. A plant accident would delay the trade 10 or 15 years. And on a net present value basis, being 10 or 15 years early isn't early, it's wrong.
35:53 Speaker 01 The second would be a synchronized global recession or depression that reduce society's ability to build nuclear power plants and reduce their need for them too. The Japanese would have less need for restarts if the Japanese economy wasn't shipping export goods around the world. So a synchronized global recession or depression, I think, would depress the trade. I think the other thing that you need to be concerned about in all markets would be rapidly rising interest rates. Rapidly rising interest rates would make new plant construction more expensive. They would raise the cost of equity too, because the capitalized value of distribution streams would go down.
36:36 Speaker 01 And so I think those three things are the things that make me nervous. Recession, depression, which I'm always afraid of. A plant failure, which I'm less afraid of, but would be catastrophic. And rapidly rising interest rates, which would increase the cost of capital and lower the capitalized value of the distributions from all industries. By the way, rapidly rising interest rates wouldn't help
37:01 Speaker 01 or won't help if they occur, any of our portfolios.
37:05 Speaker 02 So I guess one could argue that uranium and nuclear power is particularly capital intensive. So it will hurt the efficacy, the commercial viability of nuclear even more than the other major sources. I was doing that which you could laughably call my homework, which is unusual for me, I was a terrible student in many ways. But I was watching a video of yours and you repeated a phrase I've heard many places, which is the cure for high prices is high prices. Now, there's been a broad commodity rally in the last couple of years. It's, you know, like agriculturals tick the box, energy tick the box, metals tick the box, everything's rallied.
37:49 Speaker 02 Do the fundamentals really justify those prices? Are we about to buy the highs in commodities?
37:57 Speaker 01 I have fears around that, I have to say, and I think it depends on the commodities. I believe that if saner heads begin to prevail in Russia and Ukraine, that pulses in grains can come down a lot. I believe too that agricultural minerals, which is to say ammonia and potash in particular, could come down. What you see in the extractive industries, oil and gas and mining, has been that society has been under-investing in the means of production around those societies for a very long time, and continues to do it now. The International Energy Agency estimates that the oil and gas industry by itself is
38:39 Speaker 01 under-investing in sustaining capital investments necessary to maintain production to the tune of about a billion dollars a day, a day, deferring new project investments, cutting back on exploration, but even cutting back on field maintenance. And when you do that, and you've seen the results of it in places like Venezuela and Mexico, you don't turn the money tap back on and have the well begin to produce again immediately. To turn around a field like Cantonal in Mexico would take billions and billions of dollars, which Mexico inconveniently doesn't have, and it would take three to five years to re-establish reservoir dynamics. The same with the Marcaibo reservoir in Venezuela.
39:22 Speaker 01 So I would argue with you that again, absent a major recession or depression, that the mine, the extracted commodities are going to do better than we think, simply because we're coming to a supply cliff due to under-investment. If we begin to invest now, this supply cliff won't last. We'll fix it in a decade. It's getting from here to there. It'll be a challenge.
39:48 Speaker 02 So, quite often when I think about this, it's very easy to get trapped in a Malthusian doom loop. It's like, it's, it's, because, you know, what would, I have a horrible suspicion, I've asked this question before, but what would resource depletion look like? And resource depletion is one thing, under-investment is another.
40:07 Speaker 01 Yeah. Resource depletion is a function of price, really. We will find with natural gas prices as high as they are, we have more gas than we ever dared believe we have. We even have more gas in northern Germany, in those shale basins, than the Germans would want to believe. These prices for natural gas... I didn't think I'd live to see them. And at this price, a peak natural gas supply wouldn't happen for 200 or 250 years. So, you know, when you talk about resource depletion, you really need to juxtapose price and cost of capital, cost of capital, including social rents.
40:49 Speaker 01 The Malthusian argument is an argument against technology. Right now, as an example, in the mining industry, we can see about one Anstrom into the earth, which is to say that if an outcrop, if we can't literally trip over it in some circumstances, we don't find it. As the price of mineral commodities goes up and our ability to use things like deep penetrating radar and satellite imagery to look at arid areas that are unpopulated, we will find more resources, but we need to spend the money to look. The Malthusian argument is one that I don't think we need concern ourselves with, certainly in your children's lifetimes.
41:31 Speaker 02 The stronger form of that argument, or perhaps a weaker form, I'm not sure which way of round it is, but it would be, not that it's we're going to run out of resources, but the cost of extracting those resources will go up faster than our ability, than the price, or the viability of that. And people in energy often speak about the energy return on energy extraction.
41:56 Speaker 01 Right.
41:57 Speaker 02 Which seems to me to be more intuitive way of looking at the same thing. If it costs you two barrels of oil to get one barrel of oil, probably isn't worth getting the barrel of oil. How about in that form? Do you dismiss the argument in that form as well?
42:11 Speaker 01 Well, I probably argue it differently. First of all, what you're talking about, I guess, is the physical property of entropy. And things like hydrogen right now are net energy consumers, as are the so-called agricultural fuels, ethanol and things like that. They actually consume energy. They're politically expedient, but they don't conform too well with the laws of physics.
42:38 Speaker 01 Um, it's important to note, though, that over the last thousand years, but also over the last hundred years, that the price of commodities has fallen, uh, in real terms, and in particular relative to other goods and services continually. I think we're going to come into a period of time, it might be ten years long, twenty years long, where the price of resources reverts to mean. Uh, but I believe that as technology improves, uh, if politics improves, uh, if we're able, as an example, to look for minerals across the Tethyan Metalurgenic Belt, that part of the world that goes from Romania to Mongolia, we're going to find lots of stuff. We're just needed to get out there and get it.
43:20 Speaker 01 It's going to take us ten years or twenty years to get from here to there. And the ten or twenty years that we get from here to there means, I think, that extractive materials will be a better investment theme than we believe, not as a consequence of Malthusian, uh, excesses, but rather as a consequence of under-investment in exploration, in technology and in production.
43:42 Speaker 02 Yeah, it's not a resource depletion issue, it's just an under-investment issue, and this could all have been fixed if we'd actually bothered to invest any money. And there were really good reasons why people didn't invest money in these areas, uh, the main one being we weren't going to need dirty energy anymore, so why would you, why would you put twenty years of money into something that would be phased out in ten?
44:01 Speaker 01 I read, I read the other day that, uh, you know, a guy who owns a big porn channel got five hundred million dollars in dividends last year. There were obviously better places to invest.
44:11 Speaker 02 Well, exactly.
44:12 Speaker 01 But extractive industries, I, I just didn't have to have that opportunity availed to me, but, uh, you know, I, I think it's true that the technological revolution that we've undergone in the last thirty years has meant that things like new algorithms, new molecules, have been more attractive places to put money than natural resources. I think that the balance will shift a little bit, but I certainly wouldn't be one of those, uh, although I've done it, I wouldn't be one of those who had half of one's net worth in extractive industries. I think you need to right-size your portfolio.
44:48 Speaker 01 Relative to the risk you want to take and the timeframes involved.
44:52 Speaker 02 I know we're gonna be running out of time, but I did want to touch on something that I took from your podcast with Maggie Lake. I listen to Maggie's stuff quite frequently because I don't know what I'm doing and she does. So it's quite good for me to listen to somebody who's a professional broadcaster. And you talked about how Warren Buffett had hacked the tax code and developed, you know, a durable competitive advantage while simultaneously taking advantage of that tax code. Can you flesh this argument out for people who are listening? Because I thought you hit the nail on the head with this.
45:31 Speaker 01 It's not an argument, it's just an observation. I'm a student of Buffett. And I like his focus on big, simple ideas. One big, simple idea is the fact that regulators around the world want a solvent insurance business. And the upshot of that is, if you're Warren Buffett and you're insuring very long-tailed risks, you can set up policy loss reserves that are based on your own calculation of your risk. And as long as you maintain that cash in a separate pile, you can invest it, but you can't dividend it, or you can't salary it. Buffett calls that a float. The rest of the industry calls it a policy loss
46:13 Speaker 01 reserve. What's cool about that policy loss reserve is the money that you dedicate to that reserve every year comes off the operating income of your other businesses. So in the case of Berkshire Hathaway, if my memory serves me well, last year, they paid tax equal to about 11% of profit. So the $20 billion that they earned out of the Burlington Northern Railroad, you know, $2 billion and change went to the taxman, and the rest went to policy loss reserves.
46:48 Speaker 01 I haven't done the work for some years, but I used to compare the policy loss reserve with the policy loss experience at Berkshire Hathaway. And for the years I observed it, the reserves exceeded the experience about six to one, with the blessing of the regulators. So while Buffett tells you that you need to pay more tax, he's very cautious. He's very competent at making sure that he doesn't.
47:16 Speaker 02 Well, that's the thing. First of all, bad things sometimes happen to good people, and apparently Warren Buffett is not a good person by that piece of logic, because bad things never happen to him, apparently. But also, also, taxes, I think, are always better paid by other people. I think that's the basic principle of tax, isn't it? So, yeah, I think the gist here is that it's great if you can accrue returns, not pay taxes on them, in a reliable way. And the other thing that Buffett did is get a business which reliably makes a reasonable rate of return of eight to 12% every damn year. If I could... Are there other businesses like that you've found?
48:01 Speaker 02 What else is like that?
48:02 Speaker 01 Well, banking is, I think. That's one of the reasons why I'm attracted to banking. Banking is a business. It's a really, really, really good business, if you don't screw it up. If you have a bank in the US, depositors put up the first $250,000, they're not lending it to you, they're lending it to the federal government. And whether the federal government should have good credit characteristics or not, they're regarded as having good characteristics. So you have a subsidized cost of funds. That's pretty attractive. I mean, right now, if you control your non-interest expense, the difference between the interest expense and even the yield on a two-year treasury, particularly if you get to leverage at 10 to 1.
48:45 Speaker 01 Which you do, is extraordinary. You know, the FDIC considers seven percent to be a well-capitalized bank. I've never had the courage to run a bank at seven. Ten has always felt like, felt better to me than seven. But the point of all this is that banking itself is a very good business. And if you see a well-run community bank, notice I said well-run, those banks can earn fifteen to twenty percent return on equity and continue ironically, particularly in bad markets, to grow faster than their larger competitors. The idea that you can earn a reliable rate of return and reinvest that by building your equity base while at the same time increasing concomitantly
49:31 Speaker 01 your deposit base makes it a uniquely good business, from my point of view.
49:38 Speaker 02 So how should I have gotten my uranium exposure? What vehicles would you recommend? Not, actually, let me rephrase that. You are recommending nothing, but what vehicles are you interested in?
49:49 Speaker 01 I tell people two things. I think that the beta in uranium will be outstanding. So for people who don't want to do the work, or for people who have something to invest but not much, I would simply recommend buying the equity ETF operated by my former employer, Sprott, symbol URNM, while at the same time buying the physical uranium trust. I actually think the beta, the uranium beta relative to the broad market, will be spectacular. And if you don't want to spend a whole bunch of time working on it, buying two investments that cover the waterfront. One, if you think uranium's going to go up, buy uranium, not storing it in your basement, but rather through the trust. And if you think the stocks are going to go up, buy a broad-based group of stocks.
50:35 Speaker 01 I think out of seventy five or seventy six uranium companies worldwide, there are only thirteen that are, from my point of view, either investable or worthy speculations. The investable pile is Kazatomprom. You take political risk in Kazakhstan. Many people don't want to invest in countries they can't spell.
50:56 Speaker 02 I love political risk. Political risk is my favorite risk.
50:59 Speaker 01 Me too.
51:00 Speaker 02 That's why I lost so much money in Russia.
51:02 Speaker 01 You know, those are the two that are investment quality, really. And then you come below there to the, well, China General Nuclear, which is about in the same league, frankly, as Cameco and Kazatomprom, but one where the finances are too opaque to allow me to take a full position in it. And then you come down the quality chain, and you come down the quality chain, there are probably eleven or twelve that are decent speculations. If your listeners care what I have to say about their uranium stocks, I'd love them to go to Real Investment Media. You can list any of your natural resource stocks there, and I'll personally rank them, one to ten. Doesn't mean I'll be right, by the way.
51:45 Speaker 01 One's best, ten's worst, and if I have an individual comment that I think is worthwhile on a company, I'll add that, too. That, of course, includes uranium stocks, but there's about eight hundred companies in our ranking database worldwide.
51:58 Speaker 02 Eight hundred is a lot. We shouldn't get into the weeds. It'll take a while to sort through them all. Rick, thank you so much for that. I found it very useful. Maybe I should increase my position size in the uranium thing. I've just got to shop around a little bit more. I'm pretty sure I've got something I shouldn't have, although thank you for reassuring me on Cameco. We should do this again sometime.
52:21 Speaker 01 I look forward to it. You know, as I say, I failed retirement, so I'm always coming up with new investment ideas. Mostly, they're not good enough that I invest in them, but occasionally you can catch me on a day when I'm, you know, feeling both smart and aggressive on a topic like uranium that I'm happy to talk about.
52:37 Speaker 02 You know, forty-five years' experience usually comes with a few bangs. I'm grateful to take advantage of it without taking the blows. Thank you so much.
52:46 Speaker 01 A pleasure. Thank you.
52:48 Speaker 02 All right. That's a wrap on the next big trade. Be sure to subscribe wherever you get your podcasts, and as always, head over to realvision.com for financial insight you won't find anywhere else.
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