Pod Insights Real Vision: Finance & Investing The Essential Conversation - What Will the World Look Like in Five Years? About this episode “Regionalization” is the transition from a world of stable prices and consistent growth to one of rising costs of living where the threat of global famine is real. The breakdown of an economic order framed by just-in-time supply chains requires a rethink of trade networks and relationships. Geopolitical strategist Peter Zeihan addresses these issues and more in his new book “The End of the World Is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalization.” In the third episode of our ‘Best of 2022’ series, Zeihan joins Real Vision’s Maggie Lake to talk about implications of this transition, including the end of China’s time as a great power but the perpetuation of the U. S. dollar’s status as the global reserve currency. Recorded on May 31, 2022. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Transcript 12,106 words · 3 speakers
0:00 Speaker 00 The next interview in our Best of 2022 series was one of our most-watched conversations this year. In this interview, Maggie Lake speaks with geopolitical strategist Peter Zeihan as he lays out his view for what he believes the world will look like in five years as we move from globalization to what he calls regionalization.
0:28 Speaker 01 Hi, Peter. Welcome back to Real Vision.
0:30 Speaker 02 It's great to be back.
0:32 Speaker 01 So you have a new book coming out this month. Congratulations. The title is The End of the World is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalization. And you don't mince words in this at all. In the introduction, you write, or you say, "We've been living in a perfect moment, and it's passing. The world of the past few decades has been the best it will ever be in our lifetime. Instead of cheaper, better, faster, we're rapidly transitioning into a world that's pricier, and worse, and slower. Our world is breaking apart." That is pretty ominous sounding. Talk to me a little bit about what forces are driving this transition.
1:17 Speaker 02 Well, I think it's good to talk about what forces created the world we know. The whole idea of globalization is that anyone can go anywhere at any time and interface with any partner, buy any commodity, ship into any market, without needing a military escort. And that was something that was unheard of before World War II. The world used to be imperial. Well, the Americans created globalization, patrolled the global ocean so we could all do all these things. But it came at the cost of subjugating your security policies to the United States for the Cold War. We basically bribed up an alliance, and it worked. But the Cold War ended 30 years ago, and in the last seven presidential elections, we've gone with the candidate who was less interested in globalization at large. And that includes the shift from Trump to Biden.
2:02 Speaker 02 The second big issue is demographics. One of the many, many unintended side effects of globalization is it enabled people to move off the farm and into the cities where they would participate in manufacturing and services jobs. Well, when you move into town, you have fewer kids because they're no longer free labor. They're more of a luxury good, if you will. You've placed that forward for 70 years, and in most of the advanced world, we now have more people in their 60s than their 50s than their 40s than their 30s. So the whole consumption and production cycles that we've become used to simply are no longer even mathematically possible. And we hit the tipping point this decade.
2:45 Speaker 01 So why, let's talk about the, the sort of the globalization, you know, in terms of American politics. Why are we turning away from that? What is it about that that's, that's no longer working for Americans or Americans are no longer buying into, which is, which is the sort of premise that you lay out? Why? Why the change in sentiment?
3:06 Speaker 02 I'd give you a couple of reasons. First of all, because of the consumption shift globally, we are now maintaining a global system that costs money. I mean, patrolling the global oceans, keeping everyone from shooting at one another, that takes effort and time and money. And since there is no longer a security payback from the American point of view, the cost benefit analysis has really changed over the course of the last 30 years. And then second, part of what made globalization work is the Americans would sublimate their own industry to encourage growth abroad. So ultimately, this has worked for us because we designed the products, they build them. But some of the countries that are doing the building are now more powerful than they
3:47 Speaker 02 would have been in a de-globalized world, China's at the top of that list, are starting to have their own ideas about how the world should function. And to think that the Americans are going to subsidize the Chinese expansion over the long haul, that they're going to bleed and die so that the Chinese can import food and energy, that's a bit of a reach. And so we're seeing a broad adjustment through both American political parties that are turning against the very idea of an open global system.
4:14 Speaker 01 So they don't want to pay for it. Is there no, is it, is there no benefit to the American economy through that, though? I mean, we seem to have integrated so much into this idea of globalization.
4:29 Speaker 02 There's definitely some upsides. It's kept inflation low for 40 years because we have these bottomless levels of Chinese demand that were making manufacturing goods on the cheap. Now that cost us manufacturing jobs, but it did keep the cost of living on a global basis and in the United States lower than it would have been otherwise. The post-Soviet collapse did something similar by dumping oil and nickel and everything else on the global market when their industry collapsed. They could still produce the raw commodities. So from roughly 1985 until roughly 2015, this has been the highlight of globalization. This has been the high watermark and it's been fantastic. We've seen record economic growth in the world at large and strong economic growth
5:13 Speaker 02 in the United States as we focus on the things that we have a huge value-added competitive advantage in. But everything is now changing. With the demographic profile shifting around the world, there aren't a lot of young people to do the consuming and so the globalization process has become kind of a product dumping project for all of the foreign companies that are selling to the United States now. Because our baby boomers did something that no other baby boomers in the rest of the world did. They had kids. So, you know, we can take the crap out of the millennials on a regular basis and we should, but they've got something going for them that their cadres around the world don't. They actually exist.
5:56 Speaker 02 So, American millennials are at the peak of their consumption right now. And in the rest of the world, there's not a whole lot left.
6:04 Speaker 01 The demographic issue is so interesting to me because it's, it's clear to see and yet so few people talk about it. I mean, I know this is, this is one of the things you base your, your view on. Is there something that we don't understand about it? Do we think it can be easily corrected? You know, why is this so important to you and why doesn't it factor into some of the other macro frameworks out there?
6:30 Speaker 02 Well, as the joke goes, demographics move at two speeds, glacial and lightning. We know exactly what's going to happen this year. It's going to be the majority of baby boomers will turn 65 and will go into retirement. That has investment and tax applications, consumption and production implications. And we've known this is coming since 1965, when the last of the baby boomers were born. But when something only takes place over decades, you always think, oh, we've got time to adjust that later. Well, we're in the here and now, and we're actually dealing with the complications coming from the baby boomers leaving us. That is going to take us decades to deal with, and I can guarantee you, there are no companies and no financial institutions,
7:12 Speaker 02 and certainly not the Federal Reserve, that are ready for this, even though we know that it's been coming for 40 years.
7:18 Speaker 01 Yeah, I mean, when I first started out, there was an economist I interviewed, and they talked about the ticking time bomb of demographics. And, and literally no one, you couldn't get anyone to talk about it, though. And, and I don't think you get elected, I don't think it's very, it works very well in politics when you deal with a long-term problem. Like, we're not built for that, right? We're built for short-term fixes.
7:42 Speaker 02 Absolutely, but we're definitely gonna have that short-term problem now.
7:46 Speaker 01 So now it's the problem, now the long-term problem.
7:48 Speaker 02 It's right around the corner. The majority of the baby boomers retire at the end of this year. Now, we understand to a certain degree that whole argument of the snakes swallowing the watermelon, and now we have to pay for them in terms of pensions and social security and Medicare and Medicaid. And, and that's all true, and that's all right, and we should worry about that. But that's only half the problem. The other half is that they're not just turning into tax takers. They are at the height of their earning potential right now. When you're 65, but you haven't yet retired, this is as much money as you will ever have. And so it's not so much that we have to learn to pay for the retirement of the boomers. We have to learn to pay for everything else without the boomers' capital. And that is something that we are woefully unprepared for.
8:34 Speaker 01 Yeah, that's a great point because you do just think of it in terms of funding, what it looks like in this country, funding social security, other countries, the pension system goes by a different name, but you do think of it on the cost side, not on the sort of active economic activity side, labor force side. I want to dive into that a little bit more, but let's pull the conversation back, I think, to the here and now. Talk to me about supply chain. So there are things happening right now in the world that kind of fit into your narrative that you've been frankly talking about calling for for a while, and supply chains are one of them. In this new, so if we understand that the forces
9:16 Speaker 01 that are kind of creating, created the world we were living in and now are changing and we're transitioning, how does that impact something like supply chains? What's going to happen to the supply chains? We already saw them during COVID broken. There's a feeling that when we rebuild them, when they correct, when we're past COVID, we can sort of push out some of the inflation that we're dealing with.
9:40 Speaker 02 Yeah, I mean, it's not going to happen.
9:43 Speaker 01 Right.
9:44 Speaker 02 So each chapter in the book deals with a different economic sector, and the two chapters for transport and manufacturing are very tightly interwoven because most manufacturing these days deals with the creation and the shipping and the addition of value to various intermediate products. That requires a sanctified transport system that is cheap, that is secure, and that everyone agrees you just don't mess with. And we have had that from 1985 until 2015, but that is now breaking down. The two big things that are going on in the world right now in 2022, number one is the China lockdown due to COVID because their vaccine
10:25 Speaker 02 doesn't work and because Omicron is the most contagious pathogen we have ever dealt with. We know that we're going to have interruption after interruption after interruption. Shanghai's been shut down for two months. They're hoping to reopen in June. We will see, but we know That as soon as they open, the Omicron will come right back, break it down again. And again, China just falls out of the system. The second big thing, of course, is the Ukraine war. And most of the industrial products that the Russians export, they export via the Black Sea, which is now a war zone. And so those have been interrupted. And it doesn't matter if it's oil or nickel or copper or machine parts, whatever it happens to be, it's not as reliable. And these are just two things that are happening right now.
11:11 Speaker 02 When you remove the Americans from maintaining the globalized system, you're going to have that in a lot more places. What's going has what's going on in China isn't just going to be about health, it's going to be political. What's going on in Russia isn't just going to be security, it's going to be demographic. And all of these things combined make multi-step supply chains, especially in the Asian space, impossible to maintain. So we are going to have to rebuild industry without them in North America. Now, we've been working on this since the first year of COVID. COVID plus Trump really got people to take this issue seriously. And we're getting shorter supply chains that are closer to end consumers that use less water and less energy and shorter transport links and cheaper labor in terms of productivity.
11:56 Speaker 02 It's a net gain, but you don't double the size of your industrial plant overnight. This is a five to 10 year process. And while that is going on, capital's getting dedicated to that, which means it can't be dedicated to other things. And we can't take the full advantage of these new supply chains that are closer to home until they're done. So we have at least another five years of high inflation as we struggle through this transition. And there's nothing that government can do to make it better. Now, government can make it worse, but not better.
12:33 Speaker 01 So there are.
12:36 Speaker 01 And you're right, there was talk of this before because we have sort of seen these vulnerabilities, but COVID really drove it home. Five-year pain, but are you talking about a major reinvestment in North America? Who are the winners from that? Because it sounds like anybody who's in manufacturing, anybody who builds things again, transportation, the capital's flowing into areas that it frankly hasn't in a long time.
13:02 Speaker 02 Absolutely. We're seeing a huge, actually, we were seeing a huge level of reinvestment in this country before Trump, before COVID. Those two factors simply sped it up. Biden's actually putting some government oomph behind it, and the dislocations in China are convincing companies that have doubled and tripled down on China like Apple that maybe that wasn't the best choice. So this is rapidly becoming the conventional wisdom in the manufacturing space. And in terms of general winners, it's going to be a locality by locality point of view. There are states, there are cities in the United States that are actively going out and recruiting this sort of investment, and they are getting an outsized return for that investment. A lot of these cities are in the South. Texas, of course, is doing very
13:46 Speaker 02 well. And we're even seeing some retooling of some of the heavy industry in the Midwest. In terms of sectors, manufacturing, transport, energy, labor, all of it, because we now have limitations because of demographic aging for how much labor we have and for how much finance we have. So there's certainly a first mover advantage play here.
14:07 Speaker 01 The capital that's being diverted there now, is it, it's not going elsewhere, but some of that was just going into asset markets in the form of stock buybacks.
14:17 Speaker 02 Sure.
14:18 Speaker 01 You know, is it necessarily a net loss for the economy? Or is it, especially coming from the private sector, money that maybe was being focused to shareholders that's now going back into the real economy, which is something that some economists are saying is needed and is better for economic growth.
14:36 Speaker 02 Oh, I agree with both of those. I would just add, it's also inflationary. So, you know, we solve one problem, we get another one. Now, on the backside of this, once all the industry is built... We know that we're going to have lower production costs and lower retail costs on the back end. There are very, very few economic sectors where an industry that is based in the United States and Mexico is more expensive than those that are based in East Asia. The only reason we really think of China as a manufacturing power still, still is simply because of the, the sunk cost of the industrial plant has already been paid for. And we would have to resync that here in North America. And that's not cheap and that's not quick.
15:15 Speaker 01 Staying with the impact on America, does this change immigration? Can you, can you, can you lure population back in? If you, if it's not coming through natural birth rates, can you increase your population through immigration policy? Is that a way to, to run around anybody's demographic problem?
15:32 Speaker 02 We can. We have done this multiple times in the country's history and we will in the future. The question is how far in the future. The United States, both on the left and the right, is feeling relatively anti-immigrant right now. And everybody understands the Republicans and the Trump side of that. But on the Democratic side, remember that the Biden administration is attempting to resolidify the union movement within American industry, within the Democratic Party. And he's only having occasional success. So don't expect to see any strong federally sponsored pro-immigration policies for the next few years. It's going to take corporate America making its case in each individual
16:14 Speaker 02 city and those cities and states then going to the federal government for an ask. That's not going to happen this year. Probably not next year either.
16:24 Speaker 01 So if, if that's how it plays out in the US, and what we're talking about is is sort of the end of globalization, a regionalization, sounds like tough five years, but has some positive aspects, aspects for America. How does that play out in Asia?
16:40 Speaker 02 Well, for the United States, these are good problems. Yes, we'll have inflation, but it's because we're rebuilding things here in the United States in a constrained environment. We would like to, we, I would love like to see this five to 10 years earlier before we had the labor crunch, but here we are. We'll make it through this. But in East Asia, now, the labor crunch situation in East Asia is far worse than it is in the United States. Because while we have millennials, they don't. And they also have something called the one child policy, which has been gutting the Chinese demographic for 40 years now. And China is now the fastest collapsing demographic in human history. And there is no way the PRC survives the next decade in its current form.
17:23 Speaker 02 They just don't have the tax structure and the labor structure to even try. So this was always going to fail this decade. Covid may be speeding things up a little bit. And the end of China as kind of a major centerweight in the East Asian geopolitical structure, that is something that is going to reverberate for decades to come. Now, from the American point of view, this is all a net gain. From the Japanese point of view, this is all a net gain. But for some of the countries that were trying to have their foot in both worlds, have their cake and eat it too, this is a bit of a disaster. So if you are Korea, or say Thailand, or maybe even India, or you've tried to balance your security needs with the United States, your economic needs with the Chinese, you're
18:08 Speaker 02 about to lose both. Because the Americans are no longer interested in patrolling the world, and they're resourcing their entire manufacturing system. That doesn't leave a lot else for anyone else.
18:22 Speaker 01 You, you are so bearish on China's survival, but there are so many others who believe that China is our biggest threat. They are the dominant power. They will continue to grow in economic power and strength, just because they can do whatever they need as a centrally controlled economy and a dictatorship under the guise of, of communism, that, that, that they'll do what's necessary in order to re-engineer their country and their economy. Where, where do you disagree with that view?
18:56 Speaker 02 Pretty much on every point. So demographically, they're in collapse. There's no way we can rework that. The Chinese are releasing bits of their 2020 census now, and they're grudgingly admitting that they overcounted their population by in excess of 100 million, all of whom would have been born since one child and most of whom would have been women. So even with like some low level cloning, China's not going to survive this decade. They don't even, they don't even have the numbers to try. Second, the Chinese have a lot of ships, but most are very small. And almost all of them can't sail more than 1,000 miles from port. And only that if they're moving slow and not dodging and no one's shooting at them. So the Chinese don't have the naval capacity to go out and secure markets or resources.
19:40 Speaker 02 They are entirely dependent on the US Navy to do that for them. And to think that a core tenet of the US national policy in this era is to bleed and die so that the Chinese can import raw materials and export finished goods. That strikes me as a stretch. Third, they've lost their government. I think one of the biggest problems they're having right now is the chairman himself, Xi Jinping. He's enacted a cult of personality that is tighter than anything that has ever existed through Chinese history. And it's gotten so tight that no one wants to bring him information about anything. And no one wants to do anything if they think it's going to clash with what he wants. So we have this policy paralysis throughout the entire Chinese system.
20:25 Speaker 02 They are now incapable of changing. I think the best example I can give you is that in Shanghai, they are now literally disinfecting runways at the airport because of COVID fears. There's just no functional policy coming down from the top. Because when you only have one dude, can you imagine if you're in a Fortune 500 company? And the CEO had to direct every specific thing, him or herself? Now, that for a country of 100 or 1.4 billion people, excuse me, 1.3 billion people. Everything is seizing up. They're not making progress on transport. They're not making transport in the information or the digital economy. They're breaking down their own stock market because they've turned everything into cult of personality, economics.
21:11 Speaker 02 This is how countries die.
21:15 Speaker 01 Is there anyone there who, what are the possibilities of a coup? It's sort of the same thing in talking about Russia, right? This is what we, what we believe to be happening around Putin is that questions rather swirl. Does he even have information from the military campaign in Ukraine? Has he created a situation where everyone's afraid to speak any truth to power? In both these cases, isn't there economic interest or core group who see what's happening and say, we need to do something, we need to make a change and find cover for it? But let's start with China. Isn't there the possibility that, that someone will break this cult of personality and there'll be a change in power?
21:58 Speaker 02 It's a nice thought, but Xi has really done everything he could to purge the system of all potential rivals. And that has included intimidating the silence or imprisoning anyone who is capable of independent thought within the bureaucratic, bureaucratic system. So you never want to rule out something like a coup. It could happen, but if that did happen, it's difficult to see whoever would pull it off to be able then to control the country on the other side of it. They might be a regional leader and they might be fine for their region, but the rest of the Chinese system would have a different opinion on who should be in charge. That's how civil wars begin. So I don't think that's a great thing to put your hopes into if you're hoping for China to remain part of the international system.
22:42 Speaker 02 In the case of Russia, it's not quite so tight, but which is not to say that it's not tight. There's probably six people remaining that have access to Putin on a regular basis, three of whom are toadies and who are incompetent. That's like the Defense Minister Shoigu or Medvedev, the former president. And then there's three people who are actually intelligent, like Petrushov, who is ran the KGB for the longest time, or excuse me, FSB now, or Igor Sechin, who's in charge of the state oil concern. But of everyone within the Russian elite, the only one who might have the guts to actually off Putin is Igor Sechin himself. But if there's one thing everyone else in Russia agrees upon, it's that Igor Sechin
23:26 Speaker 02 is kind of a prick and they would all kill him if he actually tried. So there's not a lot of hope in terms of Kremlin watching or Forbidden City watching in terms of what might be a smooth transition from these two leaders.
23:42 Speaker 01 And I'm laughing, Peter, not because any of this is funny. It's deadly serious, but I appreciate your relatability in the way you describe this. So both of those difficult situations, both of those contributing to the supply chain issues we're seeing, both of them, you sounds like you believe are not a momentary issue, not COVID, just COVID related, not just war in Ukraine related. These are issues that are going to continue. Or does Russia seem more temporarily bound in the offensive against Ukraine?
24:18 Speaker 02 Yeah, the COVID disruptions were about substitution. The disruptions we're now starting to see are about flat out replacement. We know that the system that made everything that we know in 2019 is not coming back. We know that the Russian materials are falling off the market. If it's not because of boycotts or sanctions, it's going to be because a lot of the productive capacity in Russia was done by Western technocrats, especially if you're talking to energy in eastern Siberia, which is the stuff that feeds into China. And then the Chinese can't adapt anymore. In that sort of environment, we need to rebuild a fundamental system elsewhere. That takes time. That takes money.
25:01 Speaker 01 I want to touch on the supply side on food because you were early and very loud about the risk of famine. It sounds an extreme. I remember being caught off guard when we were first talking the early days of Ukraine. And yet now it's screaming from every major headline, every magazine publication, the very real risk of famine around the world and what that's going to do. Anything that you see that can stop or reverse this?
25:28 Speaker 02 Not really. It takes 10 years to bring a new potash mine and processing facility online. It takes at least three years for a nitrogen system or a phosphate system. The Chinese have removed phosphate from the system because they're concerned about food security in their own country.
25:44 Speaker 01 These are fertilizer materials you're talking about.
25:46 Speaker 02 Exactly. Yes, fertilizer.
25:49 Speaker 02 China used to be the world's largest phosphate exporter. Potash comes from Belarus and Russia primarily. Canada is a big supplier, and so this is good for the United States, but for everyone else, it's kind of screwed. And there are some new facilities that are coming online, but they were already kind of baked into the math because they've been coming for years. So we knew they were coming. There may be a little bit of surge capacity, but it's already too late for the northern hemisphere's planting season. I mean, if you're going to apply fertilizer, you've already done it this year. And fertilizer prices based on type are up between 50 and 200%. That means in the United States, we have seen a significant amount of crop switching as farmers choose outputs that don't require so many inputs. And that's something we can do here because we can finance the difference.
26:34 Speaker 02 It's not a problem, but most of the world doesn't have access to something like farm credit. Now you go to the rest of the world and you're talking about farmers either not planting on what they consider to be their marginal lands, because those will only produce with fertilizer or and/or using less fertilizer for the crops that they just choose to grow. So we know we're going to have a poorer harvest on a global scale, but we're not going to know just how bad that is until probably the end of the third quarter, beginning of the fourth quarter. And then the final piece is of course grain stocks. We have about two months globally in terms of stocks we've saved up, but half of that is in China.
27:19 Speaker 02 And every time the Chinese have tried to tap their grain stocks, they've discovered that it's rotted almost to nothing because their storage facilities are awful. In the case of some of the grains, they don't even have facilities. They just literally make a big pile of it along the side of all the roads. And then low and behold, half of it rots in two months. So we really only probably have four or five weeks in terms of reserves, and that's very concentrated in specific countries. By the time we get to October, we're going to have a very solid idea of just how short we are.
27:51 Speaker 01 I mean, that's just a every time you say that it's just has it's daunting. It has such serious and tragic implications for so many countries around the world. And it doesn't seem like it's going to right itself. When you see when you there's so much volatility in financial markets. If I could just overlay this on. And there is a sense that you see these big price moves up because of exactly what you're talking about. But then everyone kind of reversing and then they go back down very quickly. Because I think there's some sense that there is going to be a resolution. These things tend to like mean revert really quickly. And I think it's confusing a lot of people.
28:25 Speaker 02 Absolutely.
28:26 Speaker 01 If it plays out the way that you see, you don't you don't see any reversal. You see elevated prices shortages and elevated prices. I mean, using elevated, I think it's probably, you know, I'm understating the case. Sky high prices for the foreseeable future. When it comes to food stuff and energy.
28:46 Speaker 02 Part of the reason that we're not panicking about the food situation right now is most of the world at the moment is eating last year's harvest. And so there was no problem with the inputs into the system. And so when you can't really tell what India is going to produce in four months. You look back and you see the flows are fine. That's that's helpful to a certain degree, and it certainly takes away some of the panic. It's not until we start the harvest season in the northern hemisphere that we're really going to have a good idea. Now with energy, the shock has not yet hit. The Indians are proving willing to run the potential botlockade and the potential embargoes and the potential boycotts in order to get Russian crude on the cheap.
29:27 Speaker 02 And as long as they are doing that, there's probably about a million, maybe a million and a half barrel more of demand out of the world for Russian crude than there would be otherwise. Now with the Europeans on May 30 deciding that they were going to go ahead with an oil block. That is going to make about two and a half to three million barrels of Russian crude homeless. That's a big deal. So we're only now getting to the point where there's significant, permanent reductions on Russian output. And if that holds for just a few weeks, pressure will build up within the Russian system through their pipes, all the way back to the wellheads. And they're going to have to shut it in.
30:13 Speaker 02 And as a rule, in the permafrost, once you shut it in, that well is now never going to be turned on again because you get cracks throughout the system from the pressure builds. This is the permafrost. It's problematic in many ways.
30:26 Speaker 02 That crude doesn't come back. And the only way that the Russians were able to bring it back after the post-Cold War collapse was by bringing in Western technicians who are no longer available. So at some point later this year, we're looking at somewhere between three and six million barrels of Russian and Kazakh crude just falling off the market and never returning. That's not priced in yet because it hasn't happened yet, but we'll get there relatively soon.
30:51 Speaker 01 What does that mean for for oil, especially because any and we'll talk about the green energy or clean energy push, but we know there's going to be a gap where the two don't meet, even on the most accelerated optimistic basis. What does that mean for crude oil and fuel prices?
31:08 Speaker 02 There are so many things moving, it's hard to put a number on the price. If this had happened very, very quickly back in March, we'd probably be talking about $170 crude. That might be a little bit high now because the Chinese have partially gone offline with their lockdowns. We've had a little bit of demand destruction. We've got the shale sector accelerating their output. They're probably going to be able to kick another million and a half barrels into the system before the end of the year. That suggests that 170 is probably a little high, but 150 is still a good kind of stake in the ground.
31:37 Speaker 01 Hmm.
31:38 Speaker 02 Probably. Energy prices are very fuzzy.
31:42 Speaker 01 But definitely not what we need. Again, this goes back to the more expensive, not enough. I mean, it's a it's a you're looking at it. You're describing sort of this five year period of scarcity.
31:54 Speaker 02 Yes.
31:54 Speaker 01 Going from a place of abundance to scarcity on on many of these fronts when it comes, especially commodities.
31:59 Speaker 02 And it's happening at the same time that we're losing the baby boomers' investment capital. So dealing with it is going to be inflationary on its own from a financial point of view.
32:10 Speaker 01 What about the dollar? You talk about the dollar as well, the sort of dominance of the dollar. How do you see that playing out in this transition?
32:19 Speaker 02 Every time the United States does something that some country finds annoying, everyone talks about the end of the dollar. But if you look at what has happened with the sanctions on the Russians so far, the Europeans have basically ceded their position in international currency control to the United States. And that means that they've joined in with the Canadians, the Taiwanese, the Koreans, the Japanese, the Australians, the Kiwis. There's only one currency anymore. And everybody really only has one place to go. Because if you look at the demographic structure of the world, the United States has the millennials. That's a consumption base now. It's a production base for the future. That's great. If you look at most other countries, they don't have that class. So the tools you would normally use to shape monetary policy,
33:03 Speaker 02 primarily interest rates, do not work in a society where there isn't a lot of consumption. That's what you're trying to regulate primarily with interest rates. So the US Fed can still do that. Most other countries cannot. Which means this tightening process that the Fed is going through is making an ever larger delta in terms of interest rates between the United States and everybody else. And currency markets are adapting appropriately. We've got $2.5 trillion in negative sovereign debt out there, and money is just flooding from that into the US dollar. So for the next several years, you should expect the dollar to go nowhere but up. Maybe not in a straight line. That would be way too convenient.
33:47 Speaker 02 But this is the future for at least the next half decade, probably more than that. Because remember, over the course of this decade, we're going to see a lot of demographic implosions, first and foremost in China. And that capital, once it has a chance to run, is going to run to someplace with rule of law and a lot of liquidity. There's only one option.
34:10 Speaker 01 Now, when people talk about that kind of dollar strength, they call it the dollar wrecking ball. Because while it sounds like, oh, the dollar is going to go up, and it's already the sort of global, you know, currency of value, but has huge implications for all the other currencies and for the rest of the world.
34:30 Speaker 02 First and foremost, you're talking capital flight. During COVID, that was probably a little over $2 trillion a year. It's certainly going to increase. That is going to make it even more difficult for these countries to adapt to the changes in supply chains and demographics and economic norms. The second big thing, of course, is the debt market. There were a lot of countries, especially in the developing world, that took out huge volumes of debt in the 2010s, when the US dollar was relatively weak to the global norms. We now see the other side of that. And you should expect a series of not just currency crisis, but debt crisis in at least the majority of the countries out there. That is also unavoidable at this point.
35:10 Speaker 01 And this is where it gets tricky, because while on the surface, this sounds like a rising US after a transition period. Everything's globally connected. We've seen what happens to the financial system when you have places, countries, large companies, large banking systems collapse, default, come under strain. The entire system seizes up, and it hits the US as well. Wouldn't that argue for the US staying engaged, staying involved, as opposed to retreating into some regionalized, even if they're growing stronger while they do that?
35:49 Speaker 02 It's a question of what's the difference between the financial economy and the real economy? And there's definitely something to be said. As a rule, when times get tough for the average American, whether it's because of inflation, or disease, or war, whatever it happens to be, the Federal Reserve just ignores whatever the financial system wants and focuses on the real economy. We're not there yet. We'll probably get there next year. There's only three parts of the American economy that are internationally linked at all. One is tech manufacturing. That's all in East Asia. A lot of that's now coming back. Number two is agriculture, because American farmers and ranchers are just so hideously productive that they have to export about 1/3 of the calories that they produce.
36:33 Speaker 02 Finance isn't the only other one. And if there's one thing today's Democrats and Republicans agree on, it's that the financial world is not a group they speak for. So the political support that might have existed during the W administration or the Bill Clinton administration, that's, that's gone. And we're looking at a system now where the government is going to be focused on the real economy and what financials happen, or what the financial world does with that is what the financial world does with that. Now with all the capital flight coming in, I don't think it's going to be quite so bad as you think. But there are going to be a lot of debt defaults that just have to be sucked up.
37:13 Speaker 01 So in China, there have been talk that you were talking about the grain, that, you know, them, them stockpiling. People have made the argument, and I, and I just heard it again in the last few days, that they're stockpiling, they're, they're making themselves sanction proof. They're stockpiling because they anticipate trouble. They anticipate war. They anticipate they may have to be on a war footing. I mean, this is what the, the, the sort of China hawks, who are incredibly concerned about their growing power are kind of bracing for.
37:43 Speaker 02 I, I don't think the Chinese are anticipating a conflict. I mean, the US certainly does have an interest in a war in the Western Pacific right now. And if, when the Chinese look at what's happening in Russia with Ukraine, they realize that every bit of their plans for Taiwan have proven incorrect. The international community did not just accept the deal. The war was not over in a week. And the concept of boycotts that individual consumers could actually shape corporate policy? Wow, the Chinese have no frame of reference for that at all. So I think actually the risk of a war of China trying to take over Taiwan has dropped. The sanctions proofing, that makes a lot more sense.
38:25 Speaker 02 The Chinese are discovering that sanctions really can hurt a major country that happens to be a food and oil exporter. Can you imagine the damage for China, which is a food and import oil importer? They're concerned that if these sanctions were put against China, for whatever reason, that that would be the end of China within a year. And they're right. There's only two things you can do in that circumstance. Stockpile so you can buy more time. Or fundamentally change your foreign security output so that sanctions don't happen because you are no longer perceived as hostile. And because the Chinese no longer can adapt their policy, because there's only one guy making all the decisions.
39:09 Speaker 02 Trying to sanction proof is all you can do. It won't work. China imports eighty-five percent of its energy and eighty-five percent of the inputs to grow its food. So the most they can do is buy a few weeks. But what their system is as it is right now, that's the best case outcome.
39:25 Speaker 01 China has a demographic problem, but India, Africa, there are Indonesia. I mean, there are, there are, there are countries, regions in that, across that whole part of the world that have young booming, young generations.
39:43 Speaker 01 Why is that not an asset to them? Or is it an asset that will help them in this sort of transition, in this world that we're moving into?
39:50 Speaker 02 It's absolutely an asset. Just make sure you don't take demographics as a factor. And that's everything. They feed into the picture. So a good example, two good examples are Mexico and India. They were relatively late to industrialize. And so their birth rate collapses happened later than they didn't say Russia or China. If you look at the demographic pyramid for India, it goes down from the top as a pyramid like it's supposed to. Then you get to about the thirty-year-olds and then it goes straight down. So the birth rate bust that hit the advanced world also hit the advanced developing world just thirty, forty years later. And if anything, the birth rate breaks in the advanced developing world are faster and
40:35 Speaker 02 harder than what happened in the rich world. In order to make that demographic dividend stick, you have to be able to have an industrial system that takes advantage. In this, I think India overall is going to do fine. They're putting the capital in the right places. They're diversifying their manufacturing base. They're doing, what they're doing is a little bit of an echo of the United States as regards China. And I think that's going to do very well for them moving forward, especially since they're the first stop out of the Persian Gulf. They'll probably never even have an energy crisis. Energy pricing, different issue, but not a shortage.
41:13 Speaker 02 But if you move into sub-Saharan Africa, there isn't much of a manufacturing footprint at all. Most of their incomes comes from raw material extraction and export without adding any value locally. What they've done in many ways is the worst of all worlds. They've used the income from those raw commodity exports to purchase things of the modern world, electronics, computers, food, and that's enabled their populations to grow without actually expanding their capacity to do things at home. That works so long as international capital keeps flowing and international supply chains keep running.
41:54 Speaker 02 But should those breakthrough break for any reason, you're looking at catastrophic damage in the countries that haven't been able to pull themselves up, and that's going to hurt in a lot of places.
42:07 Speaker 01 And and a region where government stability, political stability.
42:11 Speaker 02 Already.
42:13 Speaker 01 When we look at the the number of young people, workers, productivity plays a role here, though, right? Like, if you have less people and you have found a way to be more productive, you can get by with less people or no?
42:25 Speaker 02 No, you totally can. There's just two things you have to keep in mind. Number one, if you run out of young people, it's not just a production thing, it's also a consumption thing. And we are not to the world of AI where AI is consuming products. We're nowhere close to that. Thank God. Number two, productivity. Oh, yeah. If you don't have a lot of young people, you then have to export those products. And let me give you a third one, too. Automation is expensive. If you don't have a strong capital base, it's very difficult to get the money to operationalize these technologies. And one of the unsaid dirty secrets of automation is it has to be constantly updated as the
43:06 Speaker 02 product set changes. That is a huge capital suck. And we're now moving into a world where export options are thinner and capital costs are higher. So I'm all for automation in places that it works, but it really needs to be co-located with consumption that makes it work in Mexico, that doesn't make it work in China.
43:28 Speaker 01 What about Europe? We haven't talked about Europe that much, except that they've ceded the currency dominance to the US. We know that Europe has an aging population. They've got war at their doorstep. In some ways, that's accelerating some things, especially when you look at energy and energy dependence. How does Europe fit in, or what does Europe look like in this new world order that we're moving to?
43:51 Speaker 02 There are really only two countries in Europe that have managed to maintain a replacement-level birth rate: France and Sweden. Everybody else has really passed the point of no return. In the case of the Germans and the Italians, that point of no return was in the 1990s. So there's really not a lot we can do there. The European Union has become an export union, and it is now starting to admit that it is completely dependent upon the United States as a consumption base and as a security guarantor. And that is starting to reshape their politics. We're still at the early stages of that process, but you're going to see a lot more change in terms of European policy next year, as countries either admit the inevitable, or rail against the dying of the light, or in
44:33 Speaker 02 the case of, say, France, go in their own way, because their demographics are fine. It's a big challenge for Europe to hold together in this environment, before you even consider the fact that we now have a war on Europe's doorstep, and they're starting to squabble over who gets what energy from what source. Next year is going to be very trying for the Europeans, as all of these trends come to a head.
44:58 Speaker 01 This was the European Union, the Euro, this was an experiment that was supposed to bring peace and prosperity to Europe. Does it survive this?
45:06 Speaker 02 I mean, that's a tough one. Ultimately, the Euro is a political project, not an economic one. Because to think that a monetary policy that is appropriate for Germany is appropriate for Greece, I mean, that's kind of silly.
45:17 Speaker 01 We already saw that strain. We already saw that strain in the sovereign debt crisis, and it came awfully close, but it held.
45:24 Speaker 02 It held, and that's... You know, if you had asked me this question before February 22nd and the war started, I would have said blithely that of course the euro is going to disintegrate because it was a political project, not an economic one. They've got all these differences, you know, those clash currents and it just can't work. But then the Russia war or the Ukraine war happened and the Europeans are actually more united at this point than at any time since the Treaty of Westphalia in the 1600s. This has been a pleasant surprise to me. And you know, since it is, since euro is a political project, the Europeans choose to pay for that. And right now they are choosing to be united and that generates a lot of
46:07 Speaker 02 hope on the political side that just wasn't there before. And in Europe, in any society where demographics are aging and old and the normal rules of economics break down, it's all about political choices. And for now, they're choosing to matter.
46:24 Speaker 01 And this is such an interesting point that you bring up because you can lay that on some of the assumptions, right? If there's, there's always the possibility, you're sort of pointing out the, the sort of factors at work here, but there is this sort of unknown, because you could say it's slightly irrational what they're choosing because it's going to cost a lot more from a pure economic point of view, but there are other motivations in all of this, right? So this scenario that you lay out in China, the scenario even in the US, these are also, we have to lay on that the choice, there's going to be a path where people have to choose what they want to do.
47:02 Speaker 02 Absolutely. And choices can make things better or worse. So great example, of course, with the Ukraine war is the United States. Ukraine is not a NATO ally, but we saw an opportunity to destroy the country that has been pointing nuclear weapons at us for 75 years. And we're taking it. That's a choice. It's not free. It will generate more heartburn down the road, no matter how it turns out. But We are no longer in the globalization era where it's all about economies of scale and economic efficiency. That world was going to go away without any of these conflicts. The conflicts are just speeding things up.
47:43 Speaker 02 And now we have countries making choices that are specifically not based on economic rationale. That can go well, that can go horrible. Right now, the Ukraine war, still up in the air.
47:57 Speaker 01 Hmm. What about the role? You talk a lot about the geography of success. And I think we've touched on this, right? It looks like US is, has some components that put it in a, in a strong position to weather this challenging time. Difficult five years, but longer out, some of the potential. What, what factors determine the geography of success?
48:23 Speaker 02 It's gonna be a little different everywhere, but it really helps to have borders that are not easy to roll tanks through. And it's very good to have land that allows you to grow your own food. Those are kind of like the two baseline ones. And so for the United States, we're pretty good. We've got deserts and mountains to our south. Even if Canada was hostile, we'd still have forests and lakes separating us from their population centers. And the Greater Midwest is the largest chunk of arable land in the world. Beyond that, the only issue that we have ever had is on the other side of an ocean. So the United States military does not really worry about defense because there's no one who can reach us. It's all about offense. And that's why we've got the supercarrier battle groups and the marine expeditionary units. And that allows the United States to play in the other hemisphere as opposed to being
49:07 Speaker 02 the receiver of that sort of thing. The Chinese is, are a great example of how it all doesn't work. The land quality is poor. There are barriers internally that separate various chunks of their populations from one another. So if you're in Southern China or Central China, you have a very different idea of what China is compared to someone who's from Beijing. And there are some buffers, but most of the buffers work against you instead of for you. The Chinese have the first island chain off their shore, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and so on, that have always been hostile to mainland China and have always inhibited mainland China's ability to interface with the rest of the world. But the only reason that the Chinese system even exists right now is because at the end
49:52 Speaker 02 of the World War II, the Americans changed the way the world worked. And we told countries they could no longer have colonies, and the Japanese went home, and the Europeans went home, and for the first time in Chinese history, there was no foreign power gunning for them. And they made hay out of that, a lot of hay.
50:10 Speaker 01 How does technology fit into this? So when we have these huge problems of whether we're talking about food production or energy, which we touched on how expensive traditional energy will be, don't know what you think the timeframe is in terms of booting up, you know, the green, the shift to clean green energy or alternative energy, whether you think that's accelerated now, or, you know, what's going to happen from capital. But some of these seem like insurmountable, but there are all these sort of innovations that people are working on that we may or may not, may or may not exist right now. What is it, what is the potential for a technological solution to come into play that could alter some of the factors that you're talking about?
50:54 Speaker 02 Something you have to keep in mind whenever you're talking about technology, regardless of the sector you would like to apply it to, is time a cost on labor. You need a lot of young people who are interconnected, who have access to a lot of capital to do the research, and then ultimately the operationalization of the new technology. And if we're moving into a world where it's a little bit more broken up, we won't have that same critical mass, we're certainly not going to have the financial capability, and the economies of scale that you need to justify the rollout are going to be more limited. So even in the United States, which is going to Shrug off many of these problems. You should expect the rate of technological progress to slow considerably.
51:37 Speaker 02 And that limits the number of technologies that we can apply because we just can't adapt to all of them. So some good news, some bad news. The good news. Agriculture. We're moving into something that I call digital gardening. You basically have AI on your tractors and your modules and you give individual attention to each individual plant. So they do something that's kind of like facial recognition to recognize the state the plant is in. Is it thirsty? Does it need fertilizer? Is it a weed? And then you squirt it individually and it's all automated. That suggests in large farm row crop facilities like we have in the United States, a doubling of yields while using a quarter of the inputs within a decade.
52:23 Speaker 02 That's already past prototyping stage, so very positive. On the flip side, look at green tech. Solar and wind work great in places that are sunny and windy. That's not where 80% of the human population lives. So we need a breakthrough in two things. Long range power transfer and energy storage. Now, a lot of people are talking about moving into batteries in a big way, and that's great. But batteries are one of the more environmentally damaging technologies we have. And if you're putting it in a place that doesn't have good wind or solar capacity, you're probably looking actually at a net carbon contribution to the system instead of a reduction. It's not true everywhere, but it is in most places.
53:08 Speaker 02 What we really need is something that's better than lithium. That's a material science question, and we don't have a prototype for that yet. So you should expect that code to be cracked, not this decade. Because you have the prototype, it then takes 10 years to expand the industrial footprint, to mass produce it, and then another several years for mass application. So you're realistically, the best case scenario for green tech.
53:35 Speaker 02 You're talking the late 2030s.
53:37 Speaker 01 Which is far, but we've seen the whole vaccine COVID. I understand what you're saying about regionalization and if people are not together. You know, part of the breakdown of that globalization is you lose some of the innovation. But we saw, you know, again, the choice to come together. No one thought it was imaginable that that you'd come up with a vaccine. Now, is it distributed everywhere? No, are people not getting it at the same access to it? Absolutely. But the fact that they were able to come up with a vaccine to this pandemic so quickly. For some suggested the fact that if you make the choice to collaborate across, you know, technology allows you to do that virtually from academics to governments to,
54:22 Speaker 01 you can increase innovation, you know, hyperspeed innovation. Could not that, could that not be applied to things like energy if there was the will?
54:31 Speaker 02 I don't want to say no, but it's very unlikely because you're talking about something that would be a mass manufacturing build out. One of the reasons that the mRNA vaccines happened so fast is they had already been past the prototype stage. They were already used fairly extensively through agriculture. So, you know, the jump from cattle to humans is not an insignificant one, but it's not like they were starting from scratch. And as we saw, they have been able to code the vaccine in less than six weeks. So this is a technology that was already reasonably mature. When you're talking about green tech, we're not to the prototype stage yet.
55:08 Speaker 01 Right.
55:08 Speaker 02 There are a lot of.
55:09 Speaker 01 That's an important distinction.
55:11 Speaker 02 Yeah, a lot of people have irons in the fire and, you know, this is the, where the smart money is going. I don't mean to suggest we won't have a breakthrough, but even if we do have the breakthrough today, you're still talking 10 years before mass application.
55:24 Speaker 01 Yeah, and deploying it and the manufacturer, you know, there's infrastructure. And we always say infrastructure takes a long time. So that would be the difference that you say, which is so interesting. Want to touch on Latin America because we've skipped that in the whole travel around the world when we're talking about geographic success. Again, some countries seem that they would have a population. What are the factors that you're thinking about there? They have resources, they have food products, some of them, not all of them. How does how does that go?
55:52 Speaker 02 Overall, Latin America is a net energy and food exporter. So for a world that is going to be energy shy and food shy, Latin America writ large should do reasonably well. But it's important to separate Mexico from the rest of Latin America. It's got a healthier demography writ large. It's got a better industrial plant, has a more educated workforce. It's part of the NAFTA system. It really doesn't kind of match economically, or dare I say even culturally with the rest of Latin America. Moving into South America, the Brazilians are going to be facing some issues. They're okay for energy, they're okay for food,
56:33 Speaker 02 but they've got a very difficult geography. Basically, think of Brazil like a table that's lost two legs. But the high side is on the coast. So anything that wants to flow, it has to go up, up, up, up, and then straight down. And that limits their ability to participate unless they can have a lot of capital come in to help with infrastructure. That happened in the last 15 years. That's not going to happen moving forward. So a lot of the value add we've seen in industry in Brazil is very questionable. I mean, we're not talking like a Chinese style collapse here, but the golden age is probably over. But on the flip side, things are just getting going in Argentina. Now, I know, I know, I know, Argent-ricantina. Everybody's like, you know, the place is a basket.
57:17 Speaker 01 Fall out of the financial system.
57:19 Speaker 02 Oh, my God, yes, yes. And everything that you think about Argentina is true. However, it's got the best land in the world outside of the Midwest. It even has a good river system to help with local transport, and it has zero security concerns. So in a world where rule of law breaks down, where long range transport's more difficult, where finance is restricted, you know, for the Argentines, this is just a typical Tuesday. So it's not so much that they're rising to the meeting, it's the meeting's falling to them. And in finance, it's all about the delta. So this gets really interesting really fast. Not recommending you buy property in Argentina because it's still Argentina.
58:00 Speaker 02 But Argentina is likely to be one of the big winners from this transition as the global system breaks down.
58:06 Speaker 01 So if we sum it up, and you know, I'm so that we started out by saying it's so ominous, the title, and you know that the world is collapsing. But what you're, I think, laying out are the factors to be aware of, and the fact that there is this transition period that's going to be, it sounds like, difficult for everyone. But then on the other side of that, there are some changes that are going to be super beneficial to some, and very problematic to others, that both policymakers and investors need to be paying attention to. Is that a fair way to surmise?
58:39 Speaker 02 Absolutely. I just underline that it's a little different for every region, and it's a lot different for every sector. Anything that is a gangly supply line that requires dozens of participants in multiple continents, that's just going to stop. And so if that's an industry you care about, you need to look at how countries are resourcing product production to their own localities. We're probably going to have a series of regional trading systems with very little interconnection between them. You'll probably have a French-centric one in Western Europe. You'll probably have a Turkey-centric one in the Middle East and Southeast Europe. You'll probably have the Japanese reaching out to a whole lot of folks. But because of their demographics, they're going to do it with trade and money
59:21 Speaker 02 instead of warships. This is a good thing. And then, of course, the Western Hemisphere is kind of its own thing.
59:29 Speaker 01 Is there, as we're thinking about this, so it's interesting to me that you sort of point out Japan as a winner, because they are, have been dealing with an aging population, that time bomb for so long. You know, they've run up huge debt trying to support it. They've been stuck in this deflationary environment. But it sounds like you think they come out as a winner.
59:49 Speaker 02 There are definitely, let's call it a relative winner. A couple of things to keep in mind about Japan. Number one, they've got the world's second most powerful navy. So they have a capacity to reach out in a way that very few countries can, or they only have a dozen. Second, you're absolutely right. This is the first country to go through that demographic transition. For them, it started in the eighties and it's well past the point of no return. But it's gone at such a slow rate and the Japanese have been able to adapt their policies to it. One of the reasons that we all think of Japan as an automated robotic place is because this is a conscious choice. As they deal with fewer and fewer workers and consumers,
1:00:30 Speaker 02 they've had to automate. Now, they've done this under the aegis of the American-led globalized system, and that has allowed them to do things over thirty years that other countries are going to have to do over like five. And they've realized that they can no longer be a power unto themselves. So two things come from that. Number one, they have a program that's basically build where you sell, and they use foreign investment to go into countries with healthier demographics and construct their products there. That's basically the whole model for Toyota in Texas.
1:01:00 Speaker 01 I was gonna say the south, the southeast in the US.
1:01:02 Speaker 02 Absolutely. Very successful. Second is that they've realized that they can't do this by themselves. And so they've made the conscious strategic choice for permanent long-term alignment with the United States. And they did that successfully when Trump was president. They are the only country in the world that has been able to get well on well with both Trump and with Biden. They basically bought their way in, and it's working for them.
1:01:31 Speaker 01 Does it matter who's president in the US when you're talking about the trends that we've discussed?
1:01:37 Speaker 02 It would matter if the trend flipped. On our road from Bill Clinton to W. Bush to Obama to Trump to Biden, we've become more and more economically nationalist. And if that were to change, it would matter. But I don't think the American population at the moment is interested in engaging in the rest, with the rest of the world economically. I just don't think that's even in the cards. And I think Apple's decision to start pulling out of China is kind of the quintessential example, because they were always the furthest, the most extreme when it comes to doubling down on the East Asian system.
1:02:11 Speaker 01 Has the balance of power shifted from corporations slash shareholders to workers?
1:02:19 Speaker 02 Oh, that's a good one. I think we're seeing some of that. Part of that is environmental and social governance shifts, which do give the workers a bigger say and do give consumers a bigger say. But the core issue is going to be demographic. We are in the middle of a worker bust between the boomers retiring, large generation, and the zoomers entering the workforce, small generation. We're currently at a gap of about 400,000 shortage workers, or a shortage of 400,000 workers per year. You would think that would give a lot more negotiating power to workers. The only reason I don't want to underline that, I'm not quite sure, is because we are coming out of COVID and everything has yet to settle. But the
1:03:04 Speaker 02 mechanics certainly suggest that that is going to be the trend for the next few years.
1:03:10 Speaker 01 This sounds like an odd question to ask you, but are you pessimistic about the future? Because when you see the title of the book, and having spoken to you a couple of times now here on Real Vision, you know, I leave with my head sort of like, oh, it just sounds so ominous and the world is collapsing and there's no hope for my children. But but are you pessimistic? Or is there optimism in there? It's just the world's going to look different?
1:03:34 Speaker 02 The world is going to look very different. And there's a lot of things in the wider world to be very concerned about. I am concerned about a number of countries simply decivilizing when they lose access to the inputs of a modern world. That that means a breakdown and regression. That's unavoidable. I'm specifically really concerned about the agricultural question, because the carrying capacity of everyone's lands without agriculture, I'm sorry, without fertilizer, you're talking about it dropping by half. So we're going to lose hundreds of millions of people, maybe even a billion, in the better case scenarios. But based on where you are, that might not apply. And in the case of the United States, you've got a stable consumption system, a reasonably robust labor system, no security
1:04:17 Speaker 02 threats, energy self sufficient, food self sufficient, and an educational system that hasn't worked great for the last 20 years, but is actually really well geared to training up the next round of manufacturing workers. So all the elements that you need for revitalized America are already here.
1:04:40 Speaker 02 All you need is a shock elsewhere to underline the fact that things need to move. Covid did that. Trump did that. Biden's doing that. The Ukraine war is doing that. Covid in China is doing that. Everything is moving in the direction it needs to in the United States. We will emerge from this in a much better position. Just that the road from here to there is not a straight line.
1:05:02 Speaker 01 What countries are you most concerned about?
1:05:05 Speaker 02 China, one of the top of the list. You've got over a billion people that simply cannot be fed with the land's quality and with the inputs that are going to be available. It is by far the country that is going to suffer the most. Other countries that are dependent upon international interactions for trade and for capital, I'd say Korea and Germany are at the top of that list for slightly different reasons. I don't see how the Germans make this work. Their supply chains are dependent on a half a dozen countries. And as long as the Germans are turning a blind eye to Ukraine, those half a dozen countries are really mad. But if the Germans start acting like everyone says that they
1:05:48 Speaker 02 want to, and they want the Germans to rearm and put troops in Poland to fight the Russians, we've seen this movie before. I don't see a good path out of this for Germany that is positive. For the Koreans, by the numbers, everything's worse. But if there's one thing I've learned in my life, it's never underestimate the Koreans. They can make hay out of anything. We'll see.
1:06:11 Speaker 01 We'll see. Peter, fantastic to catch up with you. There's a lot to think on and sit on in this, but so appreciate all your insights and congratulations on the book.
1:06:20 Speaker 02 Thank you very much.
1:06:24 Speaker 00 Well, we hope you enjoyed one of our most watched interviews of the year. And now I just want to give you the key takeaways. Zehan argues that globalization works incredibly well between 1985 and 2015, but that is breaking down currently. This year, Covid-related supply chain issues and Russia's war in Ukraine exposed major cracks in that system. Zehan says there's a lot of capital going to work to bring supply chains to North America, but stresses there will be very high inflation until that happens, and he believes it will be a five to 10-year process. Now, as this transformation is happening, Ze Han does not see China as the threat that many do.
1:07:06 Speaker 00 Instead, he's completely bearish on that country's survival due to demographics, its small navy, and Xi Jinping as a ruler. Ze Han's outlook for food and oil prices this year just didn't pan out, but remember, he made those calls at the start of Russia's war in Ukraine before other events transpired. Now, he accurately called the upward trajectory of the US dollar and thinks it will continue to head higher. Ze Han expects the rate of technological progress to slow considerably, so he does not believe technology will be able to solve the world's most pressing issues. And finally, Ze Han has his eyes on Latin America like many experts you heard at Real Vision this year.
1:07:51 Speaker 00 Though, he makes a distinction between different countries, which is important to note. In his view, Argentina could be the beneficiary of the breakdown of the global trade system.
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