Pod Insights Real Vision: Finance & Investing The End of China as We Know It? About this episode 🚀 The Exponential Age is going to permanently change the world on every level, including your day-to-day life. Have it work in your favor - https://rvtv.io/3FAb8hjAndreas Steno Larsen sits down with George Magnus, a distinguished economist and China Centre research associate at Oxford University. They examine the critical junctures in the Middle Kingdom’s economy, from real estate turbulence to its demographic woes and new global trade strategies. Recorded November 9th. And check out the Exponentialist — a new research service from Raoul Pal and David Mattin detailing how exponential technologies are reshaping our world… and what that means for investors: https://www.realvision.com/thefutureUnlock the potential to showcase your brand to our global audience. Contact us at [email protected] for advertising inquiries. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Transcript 0:00 Speaker 00 People are going to lose their minds. This is a moment in history unlike anything humanity's gone through. It's a very different world for humans to come.
0:07 Speaker 01 Take a step back and see the broad picture, which is the way all these technologies are interlinked.
0:13 Speaker 00 Because this is all about exponentiality, and humans can't think in exponential terms.
0:17 Speaker 01 How consequential do you want to say machine intelligence is? It's almost certainly as consequential as writing. How long did writing take to disseminate through the human population? You know, hundreds, thousands of years. And we're dealing with it now on a scale of months.
0:33 Speaker 00 But in this kind of world, you're compounding 100% growth every year, and the numbers become astronomical.
0:40 Speaker 01 AI is going to spot patterns in the world that were just completely invisible to us.
0:45 Speaker 00 Even if you think that the AI and the robots are your demise, you might as well bloody invest in them and make some money out of it. If not, you're just going to be angry man shaking your fists at the clouds.
1:08 Speaker 02 The end of China as we know it. Welcome to this Real Vision Deep Dive Interview Series, today with a focus on global macro, with a particular focus on the developments in China. It's my great pleasure to introduce the independent economist and research associate at the China Center at Oxford University, George Magnus. George authored the book Red Flags: Why Xi's China Is in Jeopardy in 2018. And he's also the former chief economist of the UBS Investment Bank. George, it's a sincere pleasure to be able to host you here at Real Vision. Thank you for joining us.
1:44 Speaker 03 Great to be back here, and thanks, Andres.
1:47 Speaker 02 George, we have a lot to cover today because of the developments in China. I've personally struggled with getting Chinese developments right. So I really look forward to this discussion on the developments in the Chinese real estate sector, the new business model that they're trying to develop, and also the ramifications for financial markets and financial stability. But the first question I'd like to address with you is the question I started asking at the very top of the show. Is China now transforming into a new business model? So, George, is this the end of China as we know it?
2:31 Speaker 03 That's a nice dramatic way to put it to start off with. I don't think there's any question, Andres, in my mind that China is in a transition. And if that means by definition that China has reached the point at which you can no longer extrapolate into the future, the way it has performed and the features that accompanied it during the eighties, the nineties and the two thousands and so on, then I would say, yeah, China is at the end of that period and it faces an hour transition to something
3:12 Speaker 03 else. We don't really know what that is. And I think certainly on my, I haven't been to China since before zero Covid, to be honest, but certainly up until that point and my contacts there subsequently certainly continue to reveal that some economists in China, policymakers that I had loose contact with, certainly acknowledge that China needs to change, but politically it's really difficult for Leninists to change the kind of model that they believe is necessary for their survival and for their raison d'etre, which
3:53 Speaker 03 is to rule unchallenged. So we're in a very, very interesting, the 2020s are very, very interesting and that's what really prompted the book and the title about Xi Jinping being in jeopardy because the future could no longer look like the past.
4:11 Speaker 02 George, in your words, what sort of characterized the Chinese business model or the Chinese economic model up until recently? It seems from the outside like it was very dependent on real estate and construction.
4:24 Speaker 03 Yes, so let me just kind of go back slightly.
4:30 Speaker 03 In the sense that China's business model, its economic development model, was very similar in many ways to that of Japan and South Korea and a lot of Asian tiger, well, I say a lot, I mean, the Asian tiger economies.
4:46 Speaker 03 Based on high rates of savings, high rates of investment, very mercantilist in terms of its characteristics.
4:56 Speaker 03 But whereas Japan and Korea and Taiwan and Singapore, for example, made the transition from being those kinds of economies to what they are today. And that did involve both, you know, I mean, widespread economic reform, but also political reform as well. China is kind of unique in the sense that no country really has had as sustained a high level of investment as a share of its economy that compares in any material way. So China's investment rate is still about forty-four or forty-five percent of GDP.
5:38 Speaker 03 Nobody got near that. India's today is about ten percentage points or more below that. So the problem is that when, obviously, we now look at real estate as well, which is a very, very particular aspect of this kind of high investment rate.
5:56 Speaker 03 And, you know, what was a housing welfare system twenty-five, thirty-five years ago was transformed into a market as we know it.
6:08 Speaker 03 Very, very high and sustained rates of investment. But of course, the government treated the property market as a sort of a one-way, countercyclical
6:19 Speaker 03 tool, really. So whenever the economy was losing momentum, as it did, for example, during the financial crisis of two thousand and eight, nine, then again in two thousand and eleven, then again in fourteen, fifteen, you know, the government was continuously pumping up the real estate market, but never deflating it when the economy was doing very well. So it was a one-way bet. And I think, you know, we learned ourselves in two thousand and eight what one-way property bets look like when they eventually give up the ghost.
6:51 Speaker 02 Yeah, we did indeed. And admittedly, I've tried to dip my toes into the long Chinese real estate bet a couple of times this year with zero luck. So I'd like to get your take, George, on the current status of the real estate sector in China. We've obviously seen the headlines with Evergrande, Country Garden in trouble over the past couple of years, some of the big developers in China. So what's the status here and now? Is the real estate sector still struggling?
7:18 Speaker 03 Yeah, I think it is. I mean, this, it's, it's a little bit kind of horses for courses. I mean, just like, you know, not everywhere in the United States looked like Las Vegas or Florida in 2008. Not everywhere looks like some of the kind of lower tier, so-called lower tier cities, like tier three, tier four cities. These are administrative levels of cities in China, the tier one cities that everybody knows, like Shanghai, Shenzhen, Beijing, you know, and so on. Things are not quite as bad in the, in the tier one cities, but the lower down in the administrative pecking order you get, you know, the worse
7:59 Speaker 03 it is in terms of oversupply, empty apartments. There are probably something like, I don't know, the last count, maybe something like 50 million empty homes in China, which is about 12% of the housing stock. The levels of activity in terms of transaction volumes, sales, investment are 20% or so down on what was a weak year in 2022, down maybe 30 or 40% compared with pre-COVID. I would say during the winter this year and into early 2024, things may not look quite so grim because things have fallen, you know, levels
8:40 Speaker 03 have fallen so far, but you can have a little bit of a kind of a cyclical lift. And the government has been taking a lot of measures to try to stabilize the housing market, abandoning restrictions on developers, those infamous three red lines that were introduced in 2020, making it easier for Um. Not only existing new mortgages, mortgagees to get um financial good deals for mortgages, but also existing mortgage holders, um allowing migrant workers uh the right to urban registration in some smaller tier cities in um uh some provinces, not nationwide.
9:22 Speaker 03 Um. And um yeah, smaller down payments and so on and so forth. So, you know, things may not look quite as grim, but structurally and systemically, the market, the real estate market in China, you know, is gonna have to shrink in the next ten, fifteen years. Um. And and it will do, you know, e- either wildly or steadily or in some kind of shape or form. It's only question really of how that's gonna be managed.
9:50 Speaker 02 We already get a lot of questions coming in and um I'd like to bring up a question from Jordan already now because it relates to the discussion we have right now on real estate, George. He's asking for your opinion on the demographic trends in China and how related they are to these changing winds in real estate in in China. What's your view on the demographic trends ahead and how they will sort of impact the Chinese business model?
10:17 Speaker 03 Yeah, and that's a great question, which ties in um as the question I'm sure knows um to the real estate market. Because one of the things which I think we're kind of all a bit like kind of anxious about really is that because of the low birth rate and uh, you know, it might be as low as one point one, one point two children per woman. Um. I don't think that's, it's probably, that's probably a bit lower than the official number, but um certainly there are demographers that think it may maybe as low as that. Um. But what that really means is that the the population or the cohort of first time buyers, so people aged between twenty five and thirty four, thirty five, something like that.
10:57 Speaker 03 But this this group of people in society is going to shrink probably by orders of magnitude, maybe about a quarter between now and twenty forty, twenty forty five. So the rate of household formation is going to be uh much lower than it has been, certainly during the years when the property market was booming. Um. And we also see this not just in terms of low birth rate, but also low rates of marriage. So this year there'll be fewer marriages than any time since nineteen eighty. And property is something that is very closely associated with marriage and dowries and so on. So the demographics for China in terms of the real estate market are really, really
11:42 Speaker 03 not good. So not only do you have the oversupply problem and the fact that the sector is far too big for the economy, but you also have these adverse kind of demographic shifts as well. But that's the big, that's kind of a microcosm in a way of, you know, the big picture. The big picture is shrinking working age population from now to the foreseeable future, rising old age dependency, the fact that, you know, obviously, as in other countries, China's not unique in this regard, the financial capacity of individuals and of the state to accommodate and integrate age-related costs of pensions, healthcare, residential care
12:27 Speaker 03 and so on is not great. So it's, you know, it's the old mantra about getting old before you get rich. In other words, you know, we find it difficult with our income per head of like forty, fifty, sixty thousand dollars. In the OECD world, China's obviously not there yet by a long chalk. I mean, it's twelve, twelve and a half thousand dollars, much inferior, a kind of social security welfare system. In fact, the government doesn't actually even believe in welfareism as we do in the West. So, yeah, these are going to be big challenges for China going forward.
13:02 Speaker 02 George, where does this leave structural growth ahead in China? We've obviously grown accustomed to these centralized growth targets. And I think for this year, they targeted five percent initially, or was it five point five? So where does it leave that target ahead? Should we expect that target to get continuously lower over the next five, 10 years here?
13:23 Speaker 03 Well, just as a matter of behaviour, I mean, the government actually says it's not publishing five-year targets anymore for GDP. The fourteenth five-year plan, which came out for the year, for the period twenty twenty one to twenty twenty five, I mean, doesn't have, kind of, it has an implicit target in the sense that they want to double GDP and per capita GDP over that period, but it doesn't actually have a formal target, but they have retained the, and said that they would continually continue to set annual growth targets. So this year, as you say quite correctly, I think it was, quote, about five percent.
14:08 Speaker 03 And, yeah, it probably will be, quote, about five percent on official data. And the IMF has just actually revised up its expectation for this year, I think, to something like five point three or five point four. But this is, you know, this is, this was basically a kind of a five percentish growth in China's economy on a really, really bad twenty twenty two. So whether it could grow at that sort of rate in twenty twenty three, I think, is a little bit kind of doubtful. And I think that if we look at, as you know, as economists call it, trend growth or potential
14:47 Speaker 03 growth, which is basically a product of, you know, land, labor, capital, quantity and quality, productivity and so on. I mean, the likelihood is that China's maximum sustainable growth rate now, I think, is about half of what it was in the two thousand and tens. So it will be, I think, around two to three percent. So it's halved between now and two thousand and tens. The two thousand and tens was roughly half of what it was in the two thousand. So China's really, its growth rate has really just come down, back down to earth. And Xi Jinping's problem is not that he caused the problem of lower growth, I mean, it was
15:28 Speaker 03 going to happen anyway, and predates his ascent to power, but he hasn't really addressed the issues and the systemic problems associated with it.
15:39 Speaker 02 If we look at the path ahead for the Chinese business model, given this issue of demographic trends being, if not outright abysmal, then at least trending in the wrong direction, paired with high debt levels and structurally lower growth. What's the plan for China here? Because I kind of get the feeling that in the Western media, there is this narrative that China is currently like a deer stuck in the headlights, right? So where does it leave China? And how do you think that they will sort of develop the business model from here?
16:12 Speaker 03 Yeah, good question. And we thought we might get an inkling of an answer, waiting for the Politburo to announce what we thought was going to be the Third Plenum of the 20th Party Congress. So the Third Plenum is not always, but typically, the event, the party event, at which the government speaks about and discusses the long-term kind of economic strategy. Many people will remember that 10 years ago in 2013, there was huge excitement about the Third Plenum and about the 364 reform measures that were announced, split between 60-odd sectors.
16:57 Speaker 03 And, you know, it included things like elevating the role of the market from supporting economic development to being a pillar of economic development, which was the official language at the time. And most of what happened at the Third Plenum in 2013 basically got ditched pretty soon. And certainly by the time China went through its financial crisis in 2015-16, most of the Third Plenum reform measures were really underwater and forgotten. And the government obviously has switched direction since then, or basically emphasized a change of direction towards more repression and control.
17:38 Speaker 03 So we were awaiting announcement of a third Lenin. It hasn't happened. It might happen in December. It might not. If not, it'll probably happen next year. But I'm not really very optimistic that the government is going to announce the kind of changes to the structure of China's economy that we would necessarily think are appropriate. And I say that not just kind of with a Western economist hat on, which of course I wear by definition, but also there are many Chinese economists who actually are saying, you know, we have to do more about consumption. We have to do more about opening up. We have to reform our service-producing industries.
18:21 Speaker 03 But these are not things that come naturally to Leninists, and it certainly doesn't fit very well with the overall ambition and goals that the party has in which it believes that the party leads everything, quote unquote, which is everything from the economy and commerce to society and social intercourse and so on and so forth. So what can they do? Well, Xi Jinping obviously lays a lot of belief and stresses all the time something that he calls new productive forces, which are really the industries and the sectors that are at the cutting edge of science and technology. So electric vehicles, batteries, climate change mitigation,
19:03 Speaker 03 green economy, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, for heaven's sake, is something which the Chinese are absolutely desperate to be able to do on their own without having to rely on, you know, Korea, Japan, the United States, Netherlands and so on. So, yeah, that's the goal. And they want to have, you know, global brands in these industries and they want to be able to bring prosperity to the country and to citizens through developing these sectors, for example. But like in most countries, they're pretty small relative to the boring bits of the economy like wholesaling, retailing, distribution, transportation.
19:47 Speaker 03 And many of the things that never reach, you know, beyond, you know, somewhere very, very low down on your online version of the New York Times or Financial Times or whatever. So really, what's the key is you have to develop these new technologies and you have to have the kind of diffusion mechanisms in your society and in your institutions, which allow these to reach the boring bits that never really, you know, that are essential to what we do and how we live. And that's the problem, I think, is A, the new productive forces side of the economy in China is too small to compensate for real estate or everything else. And there are genuine questions about the institutional mechanisms that allow
20:32 Speaker 03 the diffusion and transfer of technology to other places.
20:38 Speaker 02 We're going to take a quick break and be right back with more of today's top analysis on the Real Vision Daily Briefing.
20:49 Speaker 02 Speaking of Financial Times, I think probably a month or two ago, they published a chart on the export trends of cars from various large car manufacturing countries around the world. And all of a sudden, China is now placed as number one in car exports globally, likely basically driven by the move to electric vehicles globally. But what do you make of that trend? China now suddenly being a large car exporter. We also see the same trend within solar panels and stuff like that. Is that a core component of the new strategy of the CCP?
21:29 Speaker 03 I think it certainly is. I mean, and, you know, there's no question that China has succeeded in this area, you know, perhaps beyond certainly the expectations of automobile companies in the United States and Europe and elsewhere. And started earlier and put more money into it. And they are now where they are. So I think for the United States, it maybe isn't such a problem because of tariffs and restrictions. Restrictions on entry to the US market as it is for the moment, at least for the moment in the EU. Where I would think that the big automobile companies are having a bit of a panic really about how they're going to cope with the competition from China.
22:15 Speaker 03 And why I imagine that lobbying, you know, of the commission, for example, to for for protection is probably going to heat up quite a lot. But, yeah, I mean, obviously, there are technical issues and technological issues and national security issues, which probably aren't really within my competence. So I don't really know whether it makes a big difference. Whether we, you know, open our markets up to Chinese EVs or not. But and certainly in batteries, you know, it may not be the end of the story. I mean, people are already starting to talk about solid state batteries as the successor or the next generation of batteries after lithium.
22:56 Speaker 03 And Japanese car companies are allegedly supposed to be quite far advanced in this research. So that's kind of an evolving story of competition really between China and other countries. But I think for the time being, you know, we, yeah, I mean, the automobile firms are going to have to deal with the with the problem of having an outsized and very, very efficient competitor in terms of Chinese EVs.
23:25 Speaker 02 I think this is sort of the perfect bridge building to the next topic, namely trade patterns between the Chinese mainland and the West. The Donald Trump administration in this trade case led by Peter Navarro inaugurated this trade war against China during Trump's reign. And if we look at trade data right now, it's pretty clear that it had an impact. So what are your takes when watching trade patterns between China and the US and China and the West in general right now? Will we ever get to trade with China in the way that we did before the trade war was started?
24:03 Speaker 03 Well, I think it's, I mean.
24:07 Speaker 03 Forgive me and certainly correct me if I have misinterpreted your question, but if the if in your question there somewhere embedded in there was the word decoupling or de-risking, then my view is yes, I think, you know, we are going to see over time a kind of a continuous recalibration of the way in which trade happens and with whom. So, for example, and I'm not even anticipating or allowing at this stage for what might happen if, for example, Donald Trump were to, you know, go back to the White House in 2024, he's already said that he's going to introduce a 10% tariff across the board
24:50 Speaker 03 on imports into the United States, which certainly would have a significant effect, I think, in changing trade patterns. But leaving that to one side for the time being. I mean, what's quite interesting is how the US-China trade relationship has changed. I don't think it was ever going to be the case that tariffs were going to really change the drivers of trade surpluses and trade deficits, which is really about domestic savings and domestic investment. But the tariffs certainly did result in extra costs for
25:28 Speaker 03 consumers, and they certainly have changed some aspects of the pattern of trade. But I think that the bigger effect, if I may say so, has been the recalibration of supply chains which has started, partly as a result of the tariff war, but more specifically because of things that have happened under the Biden administration and more recently in China and Europe itself and other countries, which is really to become less dependent on one another. And in this sense, you know, we can see broad stability in sort of levels of imports and exports from China to the United States, or even actually some kind
26:13 Speaker 03 of decline at the margin. But that's because Because a lot of exports and imports have been redirected in a way to countries like Mexico or to Central and Eastern Europe, in Europe's case, or to other Asian economies. As, you know, this kind of diversification is taking place, either to avoid or evade, I should say, export controls or restrictions on, you know, who you can buy products from and sell them to and so on. And that goes for both sides, really, because the United States and China are both doing this kind of thing. So there are costs, of course, involved in recalibration of supply chains, but also beneficiaries.
26:54 Speaker 03 So those countries with smaller GDPs that actually are the beneficiaries of new investment or new production facilities. India is a case in point as well. You know, they will show or experience quite significant benefits, which I think will not be lost on investors either.
27:12 Speaker 02 George, we've obviously also seen these trade trends impacting Chinese geopolitical opinions. Was it this spring we had a load of headlines around the BRICS club?
27:27 Speaker 02 Basically trying to form a new currency that should compete with the US dollar. Those were these sort of the early headlines ahead of those BRICS meetings. So given these trade trends where we trade less with China, what are the geopolitical plans from the Chinese administration here in terms of securing trade partners around the world?
27:49 Speaker 03 Well, I think, just to, for the sake of purity, shall we say, I think it will be some time before we trade materially less with China. Because China is obviously, it's like a third of global manufacturing value added. So that role in the global trading system, you know, is pretty secure for a little while. It'll take time, and I think it'll be over, you know, an elongated period of time, that these changes will take place. But having said that, I think, yes, I was quite amused really in a way by some of the hype that accompanied,
28:28 Speaker 03 you know, the meeting of the BRICS and the addition of new countries, including Argentina,
28:36 Speaker 03 I think Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Egypt, for example, UAE.
28:41 Speaker 03 Yeah, this is a kind of a governance vehicle, I think, for China. I mean, I have absolutely zero confidence that there's going to be a viable BRICS currency any time that we could look into the future. And I think that the idea that this kind of disparate group of countries could ever have what we call kind of an optimal currency area, which would be the basis on which it would have a single currency, or I mean, they might want to use the yuan more intensively than it is for trading and invoicing purposes. And that may indeed happen to some degree if, for example, oil trade or fossil fuel
29:26 Speaker 03 trade gets, you know, repriced in yuan rather than in US dollars, or if, you know, China manages to kind of redenominate a lot of its trade, as it has done with Russia, into its own currency. Having said that, I think one of the things that is also important to remember is that from a kind of global currency perspective, what really matters isn't the currency that you invoice somebody in or receive payment in, but how you accumulate your balances. So if you're running surpluses and somebody pays you, I mean, the Chinese obviously don't need any yuan because they can print as many as they like, but do the Saudis need lots
30:11 Speaker 03 of Chinese currency when they peg their currency to the dollar? No, of course not. Do other countries like Brazil or even South Africa, do they want to have basically substitute, you know, dollar liquidity for the limited, more limited liquidity you get in RMB or yuan? I think that's very kind of doubtful. So I, I'm not really, I, I think there is a lot of hype about this. I think, you know, that as a governance tool or organization, I think BRICS really fits into China's plans pretty well, but I don't think it really has the kind of financial sector implications which many people were inclined to think it did.
30:53 Speaker 02 It leads me to discuss the ramifications for global financial markets of these trends seen in China, George. And one thing that we get a lot of questions around is the development in the Chinese yuan. You've already touched upon the yuan's role in the global payment system and in the global financial infrastructure. When the Chinese yuan was included in the Special Drawing Rights from the IMF, it seemed like a step forward for the Chinese in terms of including yuan more in global trade. So where do you see the path ahead for the Chinese yuan? Do you think it will prove to be a viable alternative to the US dollar from a reserve perspective as well?
31:38 Speaker 03 No, not really. I mean, I think the yuan could be a kind of, you know, an important second, part of an important second string or maybe third string. Because if the US dollar is really at the top of the tree, then the euro is the kind of next big, most important currency. Then you've got a whole kind of raft of currencies underneath that, including the Japanese yen, Swiss franc, sterling, South Korean won, Swedish krona, I mean, Australian dollar even. So the BIS, for example, has commented and pointed out quite poignantly really that the shift in global currency reserves
32:20 Speaker 03 or the composition of global currency reserves in recent times really has not been, you know, away from the US dollar into the yuan, but really away from the US dollar into other Western satellite currencies around the US dollar. And I think that's quite important. Why is that? Because many of these currencies offer the liquidity, the instruments, the governance system, the rule of law, the things that people really value in terms of being able to accumulate balances or hold reserves. Remember, China has capital controls, outward capital controls, which, and is a mechanic...
33:02 Speaker 03 Country that wants to run trade surfaces. If you do these two things or both of them. Um. How are foreigners ever to really build up their claims on you? Just can't happen. Um. So unless people are prepared to contemplate the idea. Uh, with validity that, you know, China is either going to start running trade deficits. Or that, I mean, in perpetuity, or that it will relax and abandon its outward movements, outward controls on capital. I think this idea about diversification or challenge to the dollar is just like fairy tale, to be honest.
33:39 Speaker 02 In relation to the discussion on capital controls and the underlying capital flight that we've seen recently in China, we we get questions on the foreign direct investment numbers. For the third quarter, I think they were released earlier this week and for the first time in the time series history, as far as I remember, we actually had a negative print for the inwards foreign direct investment into China during the third quarter. What do you make of that?
34:06 Speaker 03 I'm not sure. Um, I'm not sure for a couple of reasons. Well, one is, I don't really know whether what the specifics of that quarter were that might be possible to extrapolate. Um, but I suspect that what we, well, I certainly don't suspect, I mean, I can see that the negative quarter actually followed about five quarters of progressive steady decline quarter on quarter. So in a way, this was kind of very likely to happen. Um, whether it continues to be negative or just very low, I think is a moot point, but it's a bit horses for courses, I think, Andreas, you know, because we keep hearing stories about the German car companies, for example, faced with
34:52 Speaker 03 a kind of a bit of a crisis in China about fight or flight. In other words, do they try to struggle back and regain market share in China? Or do they just quit and just, you know, decamp to other countries or back home? And the evidence that we have, such as it is so far, is that companies like VW and Mercedes, for example, are gonna dig their heels in and try and fight. And actually, that that means they have to put more money into China in order to to compete. But by the same token, there are other companies, many small and medium sized enterprises, for example, plus a few bigger companies, that have probably have reached the point
35:34 Speaker 03 where they think that the idiosyncrasies of doing business in China are just not worth the hassle anymore because of, you know, the campaign against CEOs and senior employees, the laws that have been passed on anti espionage and cybersecurity, data transfer. And it's just much more difficult and much more politically awkward to do business in China nowadays. And that's all caused part of the whole kind of geopolitical problem and the repression that the party itself is imposing on the business sector in China. So it's, I guess it depends on what business you're in and, you know, what, and the size
36:18 Speaker 03 of your company. Obviously, the bigger companies are much more likely to stay in China for longer and, you know, try to fight back. But I think the weakness of those numbers actually was quite revealing. It tells us that, that clearly something is afoot in terms of the appetite that foreign firms have for putting money to work in China.
36:38 Speaker 02 We're going to take another quick break and be right back with more of today's top analysis on the Real Vision Daily Briefing.
36:49 Speaker 02 Just this week, we also released the latest set of Chinese inflation trends. And this month, again, we got the confirmation that we actually have deflation in China, in sharp contrast to what we see across most Western economies. So that odd cocktail of deflation in China and inflation in the US and elsewhere around the West, what do you make of that cocktail, also considering trends in the foreign exchange space here?
37:17 Speaker 03 Well, I think, yeah, we've had a couple of months when we've had sort of negative prints on the Chinese CPI. I mean, obviously, that, you know, that variable is very, very heavily influenced by food prices, in particular by pork prices. So it's not always easy to say with, you know, conviction, you know, China is in deflation. I mean,
37:45 Speaker 03 But what we do know by looking at also not just the CPI, but also wholesale prices, but the GDP deflator for what it's worth, plus what's happening to stock prices, for example, the direction of movement of interest rates. If you, you know, put all the kind of anecdotal and circumstantial evidence together, you can see that China is flirting with deflation. I don't think it's actually deflating in the way that we understood it post-financial crisis in the West or in Japan, say, you know, twenty, twenty-five years ago. But it's definitely flirting with it. And, and what that speaks to really is the, the weakness of demand. I mean, that's plain and simple.
38:29 Speaker 03 I mean, if, if demand was stronger in the Chinese economy and if particularly consumer demand was stronger, we wouldn't probably be seeing these very, very low waris and prints on CPI and PPI.
38:44 Speaker 02 I'd like to bring in a question from one of our viewers in relation to this discussion because I find it to be a very timely debate, given that we see inflation at least above target for the first time in, in ages in Japan. So the viewer is asking for your opinion on the demographics in China and how demographics with an aging population impact the inflationary impulse of the economy. So given these demographic trends that we discussed earlier in China, how would you expect sort of long-term trends in inflation to play out in China?
39:20 Speaker 03 Yeah, that's a good question. And, and actually, you know, probably the, the stock answer is probably the one that is, it's too early to tell. But it's very interesting because traditionally, I mean, a lot of demographers really associated, you know, the aging populations with, you know, stagnant economies and too many old people, not enough dynamism, not enough youth enthusiasm for spending money, et cetera, et cetera. And thought that they would be places that deflation would, you know, take root.
39:58 Speaker 03 And certainly, the Japanese experience post the bust has been one of, you know, until relatively recently, as the question has said, has been one of deflation and more or less, you know, stagnant demand. But I think that this, I think my own view is really a little bit different from that. And I, there was quite an interesting book that came out last year or two years ago by Charles Goodheart and, or Goodheart and Prashan, I think they, the two authors, in which they, they made a pretty convincing case, I thought, that aging societies actually would be places where inflation would be more likely.
40:41 Speaker 03 The reason being, because of what happens to the labour supply curve and the fact that you keep on running into skill shortage, or you will run into labour shortages, skill shortages, which are normally, unless there are particular governance circumstances, they would normally start to push up wages and, and that would help to, well, not help, that would basically lift the cost structure of providing goods and services and therefore feed through into not necessarily high inflation, but more elevated inflation. And I think that's probably, I mean, we don't really know this yet, it's a bit, as I said, it is a bit early to tell, but I think that's the more likely outcome in my view.
41:25 Speaker 03 So, you know, as ever, there are so many things which are influencing inflation in Europe, United States, all other parts of the world at the moment, never very easily to, to separate out and distinguish or isolate the demographics specifically, but I think that as a general rule, I think the price of labour is going to go up as a consequence of demographic change and the shrinkage in the labour force.
41:58 Speaker 02 Interesting, George. Speaking of inflation versus deflation, China hosted the Central Financial Work Conference roughly a week ago. And at least from the headlines made from the conference, it sounded like systemic risks were sort of high on the agenda in China. So this conference held a week ago. What were the key takeaways and what are the focus areas in terms of systemic risk and financial risks here?
42:24 Speaker 03 Yeah, you have to be really nerdy like me to notice what happened there. But I think it was quite important, to be honest, because all of this was foreshadowed at the National People's Congress, which is the annual meeting of China's parliament, if you want a better word, in March. And they did foreshadow at that meeting
42:48 Speaker 03 a new financial regulatory architecture, which has really now taken form. So what used to be the National Financial Work Conference is now called the Central Financial Work Conference. First meeting happened recently, as you pointed out. And what the readout from that meeting, well, I think we're on for about two or three days, is that the government is really concerned about financial risk, financial stability, and the inadequate or low level of provision of financial services.
43:26 Speaker 03 So there are lots and lots of proposals that were raised at this meeting.
43:33 Speaker 03 And some of them, well, you know, if you take out all the flowery language and all of that kind of stuff, obviously, they want to do better at doing lots and lots of different things. But the bottom line really is that the party is in command. Politics are in command. The party is in control. And the problems about surrounding local governments in China, which are linked, obviously, very closely to real estate, land, property prices, and so on, that's still a seriously unfinished business, which they need to address and get on top of. But whether they have the wherewithal politically to be able to, you know, really hit the nail on the head, as they say,
44:19 Speaker 03 is remains to be seen, really. I mean, there there are only really three options which they can take. One is to transfer many of the local government's liabilities to the central government's balance sheet, which Beijing really doesn't want to do. The second is to orchestrate exit plans for local governments, which might involve selling off local services and local SOEs, state enterprises, to the private sector or withholding or cutting back on the provision of public goods and services, which obviously is politically toxic. And the third is to fudge it, you know, debt restructuring, longer maturities, lower interest rates,
45:01 Speaker 03 extend and pretend. I think that's probably what will happen, but that's just kicking the can, right?
45:08 Speaker 02 Speaking of the debt burden in the Chinese economy, we've obviously had a lot of attention given to the federal budget in the US lately, given the large issuance pace of the US Treasury. But fill us in a little bit on the debt distribution in the Chinese economy, because it's not the federal government who holds the large burden here, isn't it?
45:29 Speaker 03 No, so the federal government's debt, or the, sorry, not federal, central government's debt is probably only about twenty to tw- I think perhaps the highest estimate I've seen is about twenty-seven or twenty-eight percent of GDP. But that's kind of completely dwarfed, really, by local and provincial governments. And that's really because the functions that local and provincial governments perform are very, very considerable in terms of, you know, they're the ones that pay for education and health and welfare and infrastructure, you know, they buy up land and so on and so forth.
46:09 Speaker 03 So, given kind of also the debt, so-called hidden debt, as it's called, of so-called local government finance vehicles plus other off-balance-sheet liabilities, it's estimated really that, you know, local government debt, all told, is probably, it's about sort of sixty-five to seventy-five percent of GDP, so.
46:35 Speaker 03 The lion's share of the debt outside of the central government is actually is in local and provincial governments, but also most of the rest of the debt burden in the economy is amongst state enterprises. And coming up on the rails, as they say in horse racing, is consumer debt, household mortgage debt, which has been growing very, very quickly. But it's been quite interesting to watch what's been happening in the last year or eighteen months, where I'm not really sure about the net numbers, but there have been quite a lot of reports about mortgagees paying off their mortgages because they don't really want to have that debt burden, you know, like a millstone around their neck anymore.
47:17 Speaker 03 So if that becomes more of a pattern, that could be an interesting phenomenon for the sector.
47:25 Speaker 02 Indeed, George. And one thing that we can, quite a few questions on here, is the question of the real estate issues spilling over to other sectors in the Chinese economy. And a couple of questions also relate specifically to the fact that typically when we see troubles in the real estate sector, there's a tendency for these troubles to spill over to the banking system. So who holds the back in China now that we see troubles in real estate space?
48:00 Speaker 03 Yeah, and there's a couple of issues here. I mean, obviously, what we're all familiar with, because it's like in the financial press all the time, is the problems that developers have, like Evergrande and Country Garden and, you know, maybe forty or fifty other private sector developers that have missed payments on their obligations. So this is kind of quite a deep rooted problem. I think that the banks are not really, I mean, obviously, some banks are going to be exposed to the financial problems that the developers have. But my impression really is that the banks are not really hugely at risk from the problems that developers have had.
48:44 Speaker 03 Developers raised a lot of money in the shadow banking sector, which has now been shrinking, and also from their own clients, right? Because the pre-sale model of housing transaction in China means that the developers were effectively borrowing money from households who, you know, who had to take out mortgages at the time, but who had to wait for their properties to be built or completed, whilst the developers used that money to go and finance construction somewhere else. So they were effectively borrowing money, in effect, from households.
49:27 Speaker 03 But the questioner is absolutely right. I mean, there is just no place on earth where the banking system is immune from real estate booms and busts. I mean, they all enjoy it on the way up, and they all suffer on the way down. And, you know, we've seen a number of small banks, regional banks, community banks, closed down or merged or rescued by local government authorities since 2018, 2019.
50:00 Speaker 03 And I think that this is something which I'm sure that the Central Financial Commission, which is the sort of supreme political body over the new financial regulatory architecture, will be very anxious about the connectivity and about maintaining good order amongst the banks and watching for problems that might crop up. It's also the case that property is the collateral for somewhere between about a third and two-fifths of all loan transactions. So if... Prices drop or continue to drop over time, then obviously that affects the value of the collateral
50:42 Speaker 03 and that could affect, you know, the balance sheets of financial institutions too. So it's definitely something to watch. I mean, it may not be as dramatic as we experienced it in two thousand and eight because no major Chinese banks, in my judgment, are going to be allowed to go bust. So I don't think it manifests itself necessarily as a sort of a Lehman moment for China, but that doesn't mean to say it's costless at all.
51:11 Speaker 02 Not at all. George, we are a community of investors here at Real Vision. So I'd like to conclude today's discussion with the very practical discussion on whether China is investable, given all of these troubles that we've discussed today, both with real estate developers suffering, weak demographic trends ahead, slowing structural or trend growth in China. So what's your sort of structural fundamental take on China as an investment vehicle?
51:44 Speaker 03 Yeah, I mean, it's something that's been sort of quite common, commonly discussed certainly this year. A couple of investment banks have had kind of papers on this, haven't they?
51:55 Speaker 03 I mean, from a technical point of view, I have to say, you know, it looks, or it seems to me like you can still do trades in China. And, you know, there's liquidity, you know, bid offer spreads are mostly pretty reasonable. If you're interested in, or one is interested in kind of new opportunities, then, you know, there are a lot of firms and sectors which are pigeonholed under Xi Jinping's new productive forces of science and tech, you know, which presumably will be quite interesting for investors to be part of. And if you're, you know, selling luxury goods, Gucci handbags
52:34 Speaker 03 to the Chinese, the fabled middle class in China, you're on nobody's radar screen really, because, you know, it's nowhere near national security, et cetera, et cetera. So the idea about, you know, China is uninvestable, I mean, technically speaking, I don't think that's right. The question is whether you should be building up your exposure to China, or if you want to, how you should do that is a different question. And I think the economic outlook, we've spoken about, you know, the governance situation, we've spoken about.
53:05 Speaker 03 The clampdown on, you know, due diligence firms, I mean, if you want to buy or take a participation in a Chinese firm and you can't get information about its political relations, you can't get information about its ownership structure, you can't get information or you might be restricted in terms of data transfer or data sharing. I mean, these are things which are the kinds of things which must make investors much more wary about having or building exposure to China. Obviously, there are a lot of companies will still be very much engaged with China and you don't have to buy, you know, companies that are listed on the Shanghai or the Shenzhen exchange. You could buy your own company in your own country.
53:48 Speaker 03 You know, and that exposure will, you know, it'll be good or it won't be depending on the company's performance. But I think the idea that, you know, people are going to build up their China exposure from whatever it is, five, six, seven percent to like 15, 16, 17 percent. I think personally, that's, that's an old wives' tale. That's just not going to happen, I don't think.
54:13 Speaker 02 George Magnus, the research associate at the China Center at Oxford University. Thank you very much for being with us here at Real Vision.
54:20 Speaker 03 Thanks for having me, Andres.
54:21 Speaker 02 And to those of you watching out there, thanks for the great questions. It's been a pleasure hosting this deep dive in global macro with a particular focus on the Chinese economy. It's safe to say that we have a lot of China watching ahead of us still here at Real Vision. So stay tuned. Thanks for watching.
54:44 Speaker 00 People are going to lose their minds. This is a moment in history unlike anything humanity's gone through. It's a very different world for humans to come.
54:51 Speaker 01 Take a step back and see the broad picture, which is the way all these technologies are interlinked.
54:58 Speaker 00 Because this is all about exponentiality and humans can't think in exponential terms.
55:02 Speaker 01 How consequential do you want to say machine intelligence is? It's almost certainly as consequential as writing. How long did writing take to disseminate through the human population? You know, hundreds, thousands of years. And we're dealing with it now on a scale of months.
55:18 Speaker 00 But in this kind of world, you're compounding 100% growth every year and the numbers become astronomical.
55:24 Speaker 01 AI is going to spot patterns in the world that were just completely invisible to us.
55:29 Speaker 00 Even if you think that the AI and the robots are your demise, you might as well bloody invest in them and make some money out of it. If not, you're just going to be angry man shaking your fists at the clouds.
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