Pod Insights Real Vision: Finance & Investing The $17 Trillion Question (w/ Jim Grant ) About this episode Real Vision Live Replays. It isn't hard to find data indicative of the madness that pervades the current market environment, but to Jim Grant, founder of Grant's Interest Rate Observer, no data point encapsulates this quite as clearly as the staggering $17 trillion of negative-yielding debt outstanding in the world. As an avid historian of interest rates, Grant argues that the only certainty is that this will end and most likely it will end badly. In this interview with Max Wiethe, Grant explores why he is so certain that this monetary experiment will end badly, the unintended negative consequences that can be seen in credit markets as yield starved investors grope for any yield they can find no matter the risk, and the opportunities this presents for investors willing to bet that a guaranteed loss on your investment will eventually fall out of fashion. As well the pair will discuss the implications of Biden's selection of Janet Yellen as his Treasury Secretary and potential for a return to an inflationary environment. Recorded on Dec 3, 2020. For Jim's charts, click here: https://rvtv.io/3lBES10 For Listeners: Checkout skillshare.com and learn a new skill. You can use a unique promo link skillshare.com/realvision Protect your portfolio and join 130,000 members by signing up at masterworks.io with promo code REAL VISION today to skip the waitlist. See important information at masterworks.io/disclaimer Checkout Jordan Harbinger Show @ https://www.jordanharbinger.com/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Transcript 0:09 Speaker 00 Hello everyone and welcome to Real Vision Live. For Real Vision, I'm Max Wiethe. I'm joined today by Jim Grant. He's an author, historian, and the legendary founder of Grant's Interest Rate Observer. Thank you so much for joining me today, Jim.
0:22 Speaker 01 Entirely welcome, Max. Nice to be here.
0:24 Speaker 00 Well, this is, truly, the pleasure is all mine here. And really, it was a pleasure because I got to read Grant's Interest Rate Observer, actually, for the first time. I have been a fan and I've listened to your-
0:35 Speaker 01 Where have you been, Max?
0:37 Speaker 00 Well, I've been poor. And so, I have had the pleasure of being a Real Vision subscriber, and I was introduced to you through Real Vision and your series here, and your wonderful interviews. But, I got to read it for the first time. And as somebody who, you know, really took the title very literally, I was surprised at how much you observed beyond just interest rates. So, my first question for you is, what exactly is an interest rate observer? And how does it play out in your writing?
1:08 Speaker 01 Well, we got into business when there actually were interest rates. This was 37 plus years ago. God, you should have seen them, Max. They were towering. And by then, the world had been through a generation and a half's worth of truly remarkable, fair bond market. We'll start out at like 2 and 1/4% in 1946, and by the time it ended in 1981, they had ascended to 15%. So, interest rates were all the rage. And then, the topic was the discipline of real interest rates. Interest rates pitched well above the rate of inflation. And the thinking was that with rates so high-
1:52 Speaker 01 That the federal government would have to be, not to watch itself in its fiscal affairs, because after all, the bond vigilantes, they were a thing, would withhold their favors if they decided, the bond vigilantes decided that inflation was coming on. So that was the, that was the kind of background setting to our founding in 1983. So the interest rate seemed the very, the very thing to the kind of the, the marketing sizzle. So fast forward a mere generation and a half, and here we are. And interest rates the world over have made news for other reasons. They are at literal 4,000-year lows. There is a book called The History of Interest Rates.
2:35 Speaker 01 Cilla and Sidney Holmer co-authors. And if you plow through that, you will see the lowest rates since 2000 B.C. Featuring, featuring of all things, Max, more than $17 trillion worth of securities priced to yield less than nothing. And I'm here to tell you, that was not the first thing at the top of the mind of the market in 1983. So if you live long enough and, you know, eat right, get plenty of exercise, you will see astounding things on Wall Street. So in the absence of rates, and actually, we never have devoted our single-minded attention staring at interest rates.
3:15 Speaker 01 But what we hope to do in every issue, every couple of weeks, is to feature a long idea, a short idea, credit or equity, a comment on monetary affairs, an observation on something that's very, maybe it's the history of the idea of fiduciary prudence that featured in our issue of ours. We try to, I don't know, I try to imagine what I would like to read if I were a subscriber. And so, you know, that's, you know, I, I am also, I'm mindful of that. Actually, we can hardly compete with a massed computing power of Wall Street, I mean, if we were to get into the quant business, we would be.
4:00 Speaker 01 And not at the front of the line of, of excellent.
4:09 Speaker 01 Practitioners. So we have to look for our niches and one of our niches is history. I am fascinated by financial history. I think that the financial past, I won't tell you where the next tick is coming from, but it will help you put in perspective the financial future, helps you put in perspective the financial present and help you to imagine the financial future. To my mind at least, imagination is one of the unsung qualities of successful investor. The idea to see beyond the present moment, not like caught up in things as they are or have recently been. So history is one of our things as well.
4:45 Speaker 00 Yes, and I noticed that and I read that section on the history of fiduciary responsibility. And it wasn't just about the history of fiduciary responsibility. It was alluding to potential changes that will occur in the future about fiduciary responsibility in terms of the fact that, as you said, 17 trillion of negative yielding debt. It's not so unreasonable to picture a future where that allocation of 17 trillion dollars to negative yielding debt might be looked at as imprudent and a failure of exercising that fiduciary responsibility. And so it isn't as much purely an analysis of the past as it is the future. And I will
5:25 Speaker 00 say, your taste, if your goal is to pick what you think your readers might be interested, your taste is impeccable because it was a pleasure to read those. But I was surprised at some of the...
5:38 Speaker 01 That piece next was really about the cycles of financial ideas. So in the beginning, you know, people thought that you had to be in perpetual English government securities, called JILs, right, called consoles. That was a bedrock, very definition of prudence. Well, along comes an entrepreneur who says, you know, that's not necessary. They say, look at equity, it's regenerative, that helps you get into the current of financial and commercial progress. So these ideas roll along. So you will read in the Wall Street
6:20 Speaker 01 Journal, you have to, you will read as a descriptor of present day bonds, you will read something like "super safe", this adjective, "super safe", "super safe treasure", "super safe bonds". Well... Isn't safety a function of price and value and not inherent in the nature of an asset less? That was the point of that piece, to show that there ain't nothing like inherent prudence or safety. It is a matter of, certainly to be assured, of social consensus and financial consensus, but fundamentally, underneath it all, it's a matter of price and value. And sometimes the world is in accord with that idea, and sometimes it couldn't care less.
7:02 Speaker 01 For the moment, I think the world could scarcely care less about price and value.
7:08 Speaker 00 Yeah, and you talk about the changing financial ideas, and one, anybody with a little bit of intellectual honesty would say that clearly you have a view, you do have a view, and perhaps that view is shaped by the financial history and the views that you've lived through. So you were born into the great bond bear market of the post-war years, and you, as you said, you formed your business after the great inflation of the 70s. So one might ask, are you not keeping up with the times? Are your views influenced by that history?
7:49 Speaker 01 It's someone to think I'm not keeping up with the times.
7:53 Speaker 00 But...
7:55 Speaker 01 It is an excellent question. I think to a degree, we are all prisoners of our environments. Now, the good that a historian can contribute is to help people escape from that, they call it, I think the fancy word now is presentism. But I'm certain that I carry the luggage of the bond bear market and of the great inflation with me. I certainly wish I had shut it off rather sooner. But, you know, I was born in July 1946. Bonds made their... Made their high in price and low in yield in April.
8:36 Speaker 01 Now, my mother told me about that, but I lived through from that moment to 1981. So, all I saw was rising interest rates to the extent that I paid attention in my very youthful years. Interest rates rose, that's what they did. So, lo and behold, what has followed is we are now knocking on the door of year forty, year forty, this is the thirty-ninth year of the great bond bull market. And people, you have to have some gray hair, as you have recalled, in preceding their market bonds.
9:19 Speaker 01 So, I think that, possibly, now this is my personal regard, but I'm going to propose that my kind of imprisonment in my own life experience, that's ending. And now, I'm the carrier of the wisdom of what can happen to bonds at a time of fiscal recklessness and monetary malfeasance.
10:02 Speaker 01 So, that's my story, and I'm kind of sticking to that, Max, but I certainly concede that a lot of the errors I've made over the course of, I'm better than almost fifty years now, in or near Wall Street, a lot of the errors I've made have been a lack of imagination about what can happen. So, if you would ask me in September thirtieth, nineteen eighty-one, when bonds intraday hit fifteen percent on the thirty-year, tell me, Ken, do you think that in your lifetime, and may it be a long life one in your lifetime, do you expect that you will live to see the thirty-year trading bond trading at less than more than a half percent? And I was like, "Fucking say." Would you, Jim, do you expect that you will live to see a Japanese junk bond trading
10:47 Speaker 01 at 1% or a Portuguese sovereign debt trading below zero? And I would not have answered. Why certainly? Because anything is possible in this time of financial heterogenious heterodoxy. And we certainly live in a time of financial heterodoxy, meaning that anything goes. I mean, this is, in fact, let us get down to some of these charts, shall we?
11:16 Speaker 00 Yes.
11:17 Speaker 01 Now, we need a visual aid here, Max. This is fabulous stuff. All right. The first one was going to sound, I promise you, might even brace you, this is going to sound a little bit antiquey. This is the saying of a lord, an English nobleman, in the first half of the 19th century. His name was Lord Liverpool. So I'm going to read it myself. "The tendency of the convertible paper currency is to create fictitious wells, bubbles which, by the bursting, produce inconvenience." Which is a little bit word inconvenience.
11:53 Speaker 00 Yes. It's very English, is perhaps the most English part of that whole statement.
11:59 Speaker 01 Right, okay. So what he is driving at is that without an anchor, without something in the way of a tangible definition of money based ideally upon a weight of a precious metal, that the temptation will be irresistible to over-issue that currency. And the proliferating, count-serving, more dollars, or mire, or what have you, they will tempt people into things they ought not to do. Speculate on unreasonable situations, pay unreasonable prices, and generate a bubble, which by its bursting will produce what the British would call inconvenience, and what we would call a really bad day at the office. Right?
12:41 Speaker 01 So that was laying down the law almost exactly 20 years ago. So that would seem, as I say, to be somewhat of an antique statement, except I hope to show you. That is the very absence of such inhibitions as the gold standard that have led us to this really interesting juncture of finance. All right, so let's have the next one. So the next one, I think is, is this, uh?
13:08 Speaker 00 This is the unreal rates.
13:10 Speaker 01 Right, all right. So way back when, the thinking was that when you get a rate of interest, a policy rate of interest, below the rate of inflation, you're asking for trillion, you're asking for inflation. Because, you know, cost nothing in real terms to borrow, people will borrow, they'll overdo it. Another, not quite a contemporary of Lord Liverpool, but a guy after my own heart named Walter Badgett, said that money wants to be prolific and credit wants to be ubiquitous, meaning all around us, all right? That was during the gold standard, but real interest rates, very low or negative, would induce overborrowing.
13:53 Speaker 01 So, we, look at, look at how, for how long we have been enjoying the fruits, especially the fruits of mostly negative rates. All right, so on to the next one. So this is, uh, this is a little, yeah, this is our Thanksgiving cartoon in Grant's, and this is a takeoff on Norman Rockwell's World War II series of the Four Freedoms. This is, he called it Freedom from Watch. And what the readers of Grant saw was that we actually have freedom from real interest rates. And that has, has informed and juiced up every single marketer of the sun. That has given us the everything bubble.
14:36 Speaker 01 All right, so on to the next one. So, without the inhibition...
14:45 Speaker 01 Of a dollar convertible into gold at someone's request. Or other features of the dear dead days of monetary and fiscal orthodoxy. What you have is you have a lot of borrowing, a lot of lending, right? So what this graph shows is headline, House of Good Intentions. And it shows you that the rise, the pre-pandemic rise in federal debt, despite these laws and resolutions by Congress that attempted to rein in things on the federal fisc. For example, Graham Rudin's Holling, Graham Woodman Hollings Balanced Budget Act of what, 1985?
15:29 Speaker 01 And then Budget Enforcement Act of balanced budget, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. In other words, it doesn't aid good because the dollar can be materialized at the tap of your keyboard, right? So on to the next one. And this shows the still grosser federal debt. This goes back to 1970 or so. And that's a fateful year in our financial history because that was the year that Richard Nixon got in front of the TV cameras and said, no longer will the dollar be exchangeable into gold at $35 an ounce. But dollar will be what the dollar will be. It'll be something that the market will sign, right?
16:10 Speaker 01 So from 1971 to date, the dollar has been a piece of paper or a digital impulse. And I submit to you that what this has given us is, or has certainly has allowed, has incentivized this, that's the issue with the federal debt. I mean, it took 190 odd years to get from, you know, the first trillion. And Ronald Reagan got on television around the time that bond yields peaked, 1981, the fall of 1981, he got on television saying, we have just reached a trillion dollars in debt. That fact alone explains our difficulties.
16:55 Speaker 01 That was when long bond was pulling up to 15%, right? But notice what happened then. What happened then was it went from 1 trillion to what it's today, 27 or 28 trillion. But rates have done nothing except go down. Perfect, right? Finance is all about paradox, all about that thing that can't happen that does happen. So what we have proven to ourselves is that the federal debt is of no consequence to anything except to the convenience of the portfolio class, right? And then those recipients have the goodies. So the final graph would be, it's another cartoon.
17:37 Speaker 01 So this is Grant's editorial comment on, you know, way back, not so way back, but when Ben Bernanke was getting started with Kiwi, with zero Fed Fund rate. Anna Schwartz, who was in open treatment, wrote the Monetary History of the United States. Anna Schwartz says, scolding me, she, you know, Ben Bernanke knows only two numbers, zero and trillion.
18:04 Speaker 01 But, so, okay, so that, that, that, these sightings, you know, describe to me the kind of the, the arc of our monetary, ARC of our monetary, you can see it. What we have seen over the course of kind of 100 years, take a last 100 years, is less and less do individuals bear the consequences of poor financial decisions. Like more and more is credit being supported and risk being sometimes nationalized by the federal government, certainly from the Deposit Insurance Act, 1934. And in 1935 came another law that very few people know about, which was henceforth.
18:48 Speaker 01 The stockholders of a national bank would not themselves be taxed for the capital call when their bank ran into difficulties. Up until that time, if you owned shares in the first National City Bank, what City Bank is called, and City got into trouble, you would get a capital call for the unpaid in portion of the par value of your shares. Wow. So that would make you more, make you pay more attention to the balance sheet, right? So the owners of banks were at risk. So that ended in 1935. And presently, a law comes too big to fail. It's 1984. More and more lending, more and more borrowing. And so
19:31 Speaker 01 through 2008, when the Treasury Secretary summons the big shot bankers, New York City, my goodness, these people are worth trillions on the hoof. And he says, all right, fellows, you are going to accept. You, you'll take 50 billion, you'll take 70 billion, you 100, for the good of the country and for your own virtually bankrupt firms solvent by courtesy firms. You'll take it. And they say, oh, yes, we'll take it. And they signed it down by a bar.
19:59 Speaker 00 Except for one, except for one person who wouldn't accept it and, and he was taken out to pasture.
20:05 Speaker 01 And did. But, but, but the point survives the exaggeration. So, so that is kind of the, that's where we find ourselves. Now, it's not all bearish, on the contrary, right? It's rather bullish, this, these effusions of credit, right? This Fed put, people don't object. People do not object. So what, but our job is to, is to say, okay, it's great for now. But when, if ever, does it end? That's the question for the House.
20:35 Speaker 00 Well, we, we have a lot of questions from the audience, and many of them are along that line of when and what will be the cause? And if so, then what are the investable opportunities that arise from this unraveling or the popping of this bubble? And, and there are many bubbles that one could point to that are a result of this, either in equities, but, but you seem particularly focused on the
20:58 Speaker 00 Seventeen trillion of negative yielding debt and the bond market as the biggest bubble of them all and the most obviously bubbly for lack of a better word. But before we get into that, there is a question from Brian in the audience, which I think is important. And you alluded to some of your errors over the years. But Brian wants to know, who do you look to when you need a contrarian opinion to challenge this view that you have? Have these people changed over the years? And he adds that he's a big fan of your interviews and podcasts. And I know in particular, you had Stephanie Kelton at your grants conference this year to talk about MMT. So you aren't scared of a little bit of challenging to your view.
21:43 Speaker 00 Is Stephanie Kelton the type of person that you go, that you look at for the contrarian opinion? And how have the Stephanie Keltons of the world affected you as the years have rolled on?
21:55 Speaker 01 Well, the first person I can sell is Mr. Market himself. And I have learned to have a much deeper respect for the currents of the market. I mean, I'm a little bit ambivalent about this because I absolutely deny that markets efficiently digest and reflect all available information at all times. Efficient markets hypothesis to me is of a piece with some post Keynesian equilibrium models, the Fed basis.
22:33 Speaker 01 It's unerringly accurate or irretrievably inaccurate. So you have to be, so I try to pay attention to what the market seems to be saying, although the market today seems to be under the thrall of the monetary authorities. But so that's one thing. I pay attention to really intelligent people who absolutely think I am full of beans. Now Stephanie Kelton might be a limiting example. She is a fabulous debater and she is extremely thoughtful and she has written this book
23:13 Speaker 01 that challenges every single notion of financial probity and good practice that I hold dear. Now she says that. When the treasury issues a bond, it actually is, that's treasury liability, but look, it's somebody else's asset. And of course, that's a truism. But when you, when you stop and grapple with the, with the, with the, with the postulates of modern monetary theory, it does you a world of good because you're forced to refine and adapt your own view to what you take away from that. And it sharpens perhaps your, your objections to other parts of that body of doctrine. But so I read, I read the papers as we all do. I try not
23:58 Speaker 01 to linger too long on the things that reinforce my view. But isn't it fun to read somebody who says you're absolutely right?
24:05 Speaker 00 It is.
24:06 Speaker 01 I, I tried. But there's a, a, a very close and dear friend of mine, Paul Isaac, who runs a hedge fund at Arbor Partners, and he's a valued guy. He is a, he is a very eclectic thinker. He seems to know everything. In fact, I once dedicated a book to Paul, one of my books, I said, Paul J. Isaac, comma, who somehow knows everything.
24:30 Speaker 00 Yes.
24:31 Speaker 01 And he is a very good sounding board. I pay attention to the quarterly pronouncements and analyses of Washington Investment Management. Now, just as wrong as I have been on bonds for, shall we say, politely, a while, so has Ben Washington's number one analyst, Lacy Hunt, been absolutely on the money. Interest rates could go to minus 20 percentage points. I'm not sure they, I'm not sure they could bear it. I, I wait in expectation, now they're changing their minds, but, and Gary Schilling, this deflation guy.
25:12 Speaker 01 And I respect his judgment and try to absorb what I can from his views. But was it Brian who asked the question? No, Jim Chanos is a short seller who is necessarily on the opposite side of almost everyone at most all times, right? And he will, I think he stopped at this call, the relevant sell-side analyst who was often by him sitting down, say, let's have a talk about this situation. I want to, I want to hear the full case. And every single, in our, in GRASS, we undertake security analysis every year, most of our bears, but we always begin analysis with a contrary point of view.
25:53 Speaker 01 We try to address that first because if you don't do that, Mr. Market will surprise you with a left hook to the ribs, which really hurts.
26:04 Speaker 00 Yeah, I, I noticed that in your writing and you, you don't throw your, your errors in the trash bin to be forgotten. Your most recent, or the second most recent edition highlights one of your errors in, in a recommendation about a Mexican REIT, which has not performed. So you, you aren't scared of, of admitting your, your wrongs, but you still do have this conviction about the eventual popping of, of some of these bubbles. And, and I would like to ask, what will be the needle? What will pop this, this 17 trillion dollar negative yielding debt bubble?
26:44 Speaker 00 And you, you allude to some of the investable opportunities that you think will absorb some of that 17 trillion dollars. So I, I would like to, to start to, to address that question. What potentially could be the popping and where is the money going to go?
27:01 Speaker 01 Well, we lost, that's always the way of things. But the 17 trillion is, to my mind, it is the, it's a little bit like the Tesla of fixed income, right? It's something that seemingly is inexplicable on the basis of price and value.
27:25 Speaker 01 The point of interest rates is to reward those who are prepared to wait. So the reason you get interest when you have cash balances is you are not going to go out and call Amazon Prime and get something by drone, right? You're not the impetuous kind of person. Interest rates reward patience and punish impetuosity. That's the theory. Irving Fisher himself, the great interest rate theoretician, made this up. So negative nominal interest rates are a contradiction. But they are a confection of the central banks. They do not exist in nature. They are unnatural.
28:09 Speaker 01 That's my conviction. And because unnatural has blown up to the tune of 17 trillion, and because, and because banks have gotten used to it, that is astounding thing. It's now second nature. Greece, negative nominal, yeah, that's today, that's news. So these things have become matter of fact with the Treasury, you know, bond connection, nothing. And people haven't forgotten what came before this. So one has led to think, I'm led to think, well, it's not for the ages, the state of affairs, it's not for the ages. So what might change? That's your question as well as mine.
28:51 Speaker 01 So what I think is that it could be a credit event, or it could be inflation. That's a truism. I happen to think that inflation is the more likely because it is the, I don't know, because it's the more contrary, because it comports more with the cycles that I identify in financial history, it comports more with the evaluation of things on the board. So what we cannot do, at least what I cannot do, is predict the future. I have proven that to my reader's satisfaction over the course of decades. But what we can do here is to observe how the future is being handicapped. Right. And we can see where opportunities might lie.
29:37 Speaker 01 From the point of view of valuation and valuation is totally tied in with positioning and therefore with conference. So let's take you so so let's say inflation is going to be the pin that is going to finally find the bubble of debt and of negligible interest rates that certainly almost uncountable volume of negative real interest rates worldwide. So that's the pin. What I say. Oh, that would make sense in a way. Look, look at some of the things that you can point to, but that that would indicate that the world is positioned wrong for this outcome, wrong in a huge, massive way. Well, first of all, is that it's a very popularity response.
30:21 Speaker 01 Have to have bonds, like balance of portfolio. Then why they yield nothing. The bond is a promise to pay money, but we have no definition of money. A money is money is wherever they want to make it. Is that okay? People say, yeah, that's okay. It was not okay until about 15 minutes ago in the long sweep of financial history.
30:40 Speaker 01 So I say that that the monetary system is broken, that bonds priced as they are are limitation to hasten the breakdown of this monetary system. So what do we do about it? Well, I noticed in October, we had a sighting that I still amazes me, which is the that the market cap of Exxon intraday dipped below the market cap of Zoom.
31:10 Speaker 01 Now, Exxon was kicked out of the Dow, I think in August.
31:14 Speaker 00 Yes.
31:15 Speaker 01 It was then it was the longest surviving
31:20 Speaker 01 stock in Dow Jones Industrial Average. And that, you know, that's, that's kind of a little bit of a retail bell. But nonetheless, it it focuses, it focuses, it concentrated my attention more than had been concentrated or focused on energy. So we have, with the help of some friends of ours, including D K R, and this partner, Adam Rosenzweig, we have come to take a new and quite bullish stance towards energy. I should also add, with the help of, inspiration of our friends at the Holstein Kinetics, that Maurice Stahl is a very smart cookie.
31:58 Speaker 01 So what we see, Grant, now I'm going to acknowledge myself, is that a lot of energy investment opportunities are on trading as generational lows. And the backdrop to that, of course, is not just the pandemic and the cessation of commerce and the collapsing energy demand, but it's also a function of the well-considered views of many people, the fossil fuels are going away. They don't necessarily know when. And it's another reflection of the political pressure on people to conform with that very popular, and for all I know, accurate prescription, and to not go near Exxon, even with somebody else's money.
32:43 Speaker 01 So to me, this is a setup in oil and perhaps especially in natural gas, to at least consider this chain of events that would lead us to an unscripted inflation, to a lagged and at first a disbelief in monetary response to this unscripted, unimagined event, to a rate of inflation lifting off seemingly at first inexplicably. And then people say, oh, well, it's not going to be a system. But by that time, the central banks will not have twigged on to it. They can't, because there's so much debt. They could scarcely raise the fund rates two and a half percent in 2018, right? Market, market sold off in the face of this.
33:26 Speaker 01 So that is a rough description, not very, I'm afraid not very orderly description of my current thinking about what might change things and how one might begin to think about profiting by this change. It would be a sea change, not only in the world's perception of the investment merits of bonds, but also the world's expectations for monetary practice, you know, because it is the goodest thing. Central banks, if they were stocks, they'd be trading at six times book value. Eighty-five times, not very, yes, because they seemingly haven't discovered the philosopher's stone, right?
34:09 Speaker 01 Just listen to Jay Powell, he knows stuff.
34:12 Speaker 00 Well, I would like to play the counterpoint to the negative yielding bond bubble, which is that it's an opportunity cost bet and that if you actually see negative returns for most assets, you yourself in your interview with Lee Gearing, you talk about how commodity investing is fighting against the tide as efficiency with which we pull commodities out of the ground lowers the prices of them over time as we get more and more efficient and that's human nature is to strive for that efficiency. So what if that wins out, that efficiency wins out and we see negative returns from commodities?
34:49 Speaker 00 Another famous bubble spotter, GMO, forecasts pretty negative returns from most asset classes over the next seven years. And so if you are guaranteed to not lose as much in these negative yielding bonds, then the opportunity cost is there. We have, we are awash with capital to allocate and there's a shortage of assets to allocate them to. And so if that is the case, then perhaps losing a half a percent a year doesn't look so bad if the alternative is losing seven.
35:22 Speaker 01 Max, you know what? You have the makings of a great investment, of a great central banker. That is the best speech I've ever heard defending the indefensible. But I will, yeah, let's say you are a big sovereign wealth fund, right? And you can't go out and buy Swiss franc notes and secret in safe deposit boxes. You have too much money, so you are willing to accept minus 25 basis points for safekeeping. That is in fact an entirely defensible thing to do. I agree with you entirely. But I think that the fact that these rates are negative at nominal terms, the fact that the European Central Bank especially, I think, has thought out of its way to destroy the
36:07 Speaker 01 credit market's function of reflecting credit risk. These are huge dangerous signals about the stability and even the relevance of the bond market as a market.
36:23 Speaker 01 One point you made, I think, is a point that many have tended to make near the top of any market to which they aren't addressing themselves. That is that there is presently now a shortage of securities to invest in. That shortage will vanish instantly come the first downdraft the Fed is apparently not able to contain. There will be a great redundancy of bonds to invest in from that day, and indeed a great redundancy of very high-grade securities. But I think you make a very good case for the case I don't believe in.
37:00 Speaker 00 Okay, all right. That's fair enough. I would like to switch now from my own questions to some from the audience. At Real Vision, we are fortunate enough to have an audience with wonderful questions. And they came in ahead of time, and we have some people asking questions as we sit here. But I would like to switch. And we got a question ahead of time from Kial, who says, who wants to ask about gold and gold miners. So we'll get into these potential plays to benefit if this bond bubble does end up popping. There's a current narrative that gold is no longer required as risk insurance, as the recent vaccine announcements will allow the world to reopen and reflate, which will drive interest rates higher.
37:44 Speaker 00 Maybe gold should be viewed as central bank lunacy insurance. If the world financial system can't function with interest rates above current levels, then central banks must constantly intervene in perpetuity. Could this be viewed as a central bank put on gold and thus very good for gold mining stocks going forward?
38:01 Speaker 01 Yeah. Well, that is in fact a very fine question. I think that the Fed is kind of both arsonist and fireman. It intervenes all too predictably to, in times of trouble, to lower rates and infuse the system with more credit. The credit adds to the fragility of a system over-leveraged, as it is. So we have more leverage, more encumbered. With every passing cycle, the system is less able to absorb rates of interest that begin
38:46 Speaker 01 to knock on the door for real. And yeah, and there's this other spill of an accident and so the cycle continues. I think gold comes in handy for that particular dynamic. The, you know, every, every investment asset class has its kryptonite. And for gold, that kryptonite is real rates of interest. Now, you should not own so much of this stuff, very little in fact, perhaps. If you are of a mind that we are on the verge of a regime in which some central banks will allow us to earn a real rate of return on our savings. Um, but I think we're a long way from that.
39:29 Speaker 01 So I, I think that the gold is an investment in monetary disorder. It's not necessarily a hedge against it because I think we have monetary disorder. You are investing in, uh, the accident proneness of a financial structure that has been over leveraged and over, over managed by these central bankers who know much less than they think they do and who don't know anything about unintended consequences. It's not in their models. These, these people are kind of these, these people, it sounds derogatory, doesn't it? Our friends, the central bankers are, are kind of, um, are NASA scientist Mark Kay, right?
40:13 Speaker 01 They are, uh, physicists who didn't perhaps quite get hired by Bell Labs and they write these papers to be spation economists, this and that. And if you look at their papers, the first few paragraphs are perfectly intelligible. They are in English. And then come the graphs and the algebra and, and then to me at least they version to, uh, into insensibility. And then, but you skip to the back and then they have bibliography, sectations, scholarly sources. It's rare you ever see in the back. A book or a paper cited that is more than, published more than five years ago, 10 years ago, tops. And what this has to do with this great question is that the central bankers work on
40:58 Speaker 01 a static kind of model, an equilibrium model. They don't, they are unwilling to contemplate that their actions have adverse reactions. If the Fed were pushing pills instead of interest rates, the FDA would want to have a word with it because it never talks about side effects. Jerome Powell, very intelligent man, gets up and talks about what he's doing. We're not going to, we're not going to think about, think about raising rates. And if one of the obedient and compliant members of the financial press would ever stop to ask, Mr. Chairman, can you help us work through the unintended consequences
41:40 Speaker 01 of raising of negative nominal interest rates or negative real interest rates? Say, let us start with pension funds and what you call, or fastidiously, reaching for yield. That would be taking risks with other people's money that you, you are inciting them to take. Could you linger on that one for five minutes in this press conference? But no, that's, CNBC has not got around to asking that question yet. But Real Vision will, Max.
42:09 Speaker 00 Yes, I will ask that question. And, and you allude to it in, in your writing. You, you talk about three, three corporate credits that you think are an example of that reach for yield. And, and really the credit market as the perfect encapsulator of this, of these side effects. Do you think that the side effects are limited to just the credit market or is that just the, the clearest encapsulation of, of the side effects?
42:39 Speaker 01 No, I think it's, it's one clear encapsulation. For example, we had the steepest GDP collapse ever since they began, keep in record, 1954, followed by the tightest jump on credit spreads.
42:54 Speaker 01 So these things, again, don't occur in nature, right? Something's going on, Max. But I think that interest rates are prices, perhaps the most consequential prices in capitalism. And what we have going for us, under the rule of the central banks, is a regime of price control. Which name, price control, is a very clarifying name, because nobody's in favor of that, not even the Keynesians are in favor of price control, but we have that. Now, 150 years ago, my friend Walter Badgett uttered his famous saying, he alluded to the national symbol of Britain. He said, "John Bull," he said, "John Bull can stand many things, but he can't stand 2%."
43:37 Speaker 01 Meaning, a rate of interest as low as 2% on government bonds would incite people and induce them to go and buy Peruvian centuries, by the way, which we just had another issue with. So, especially abnormally, or unnaturally, or artificially low interest rates disturb the entire calculus of investment. They induce people to take longer risks, to reach for credit that really is not suitable for them or their clients, because everyone's competing for returns, right? You can't opt out of the world. I'm in the business of instructing the world, as a journalist, a little bit, that's all
44:18 Speaker 01 we do, but I have, as somebody with a soapbox, I have the privilege, once in a while, saying the fact, you understand exactly what you're up to, but people who are watching, that are in the business of making a return for their clients, that's not their game. What they have to do is take the world as it is, unimproved world, which is the only one we have, therefore, not a bad world, and to make a go of it. So it's brutal for them. But that's what they've got to do. They have to make do with what there is, but to answer your question of so long, of so many minutes ago...
44:53 Speaker 01 So these low rates confuse and disarray, disassemble, and make rather a mess of many markets, of most markets.
45:07 Speaker 00 Well, we'll say, we'll call it an inconvenience again. And a lot of the questions, a lot of the questions we got in are about what the central bankers have left to avoid potential inconvenience, assuming that that is their goal above all else, is to avoid, avoid this inconvenience. So, you know, we have questions about, you know, do you think that we could see the IMF agreeing to impose with all member countries a debt jubilee? Are you of the mind that a debt jubilee is potentially possible?
45:44 Speaker 01 Nothing this year is impossible. We've seen it.
45:49 Speaker 01 So I rule out nothing. I've learned not to dogmatize and what inclination I had to insist prior to 2020 has gone with the singular year. So, yeah, I think a debt jubilee is not likely. But central bankers are up against this dilemma of their own making. The leverage of the world is kind of a, I think it's David Rosenberg's, it's kind of a tourniquet on the body commercial. It cuts off circulation, it inhibits movement, it's bad mojo. But how do they, you know, well, if they were cunning enough, they would, knowing enough
46:31 Speaker 01 or clever, I think they would induce a, it was like, say, four and a half percent, you can swing that away. But how to jump the shark from 1.8%, which I seem not to be happy with, to say, three or four, without getting to 10, that's the problem.
46:52 Speaker 01 I, they are in a box. I'm not going to help you.
46:56 Speaker 00 Yeah, well, we have another question about potentially the next step, at least here in the United States. Do you place, Tim wants to know, what the probability you think of yield curve control being put into place? And what do you think would be the catalyst for them to implement such measures?
47:17 Speaker 01 Well, I think that's a high probability of that. In fact, I think de facto, as this very shrewd interest rate observer Jim Bynum pointed out some months ago, it almost seems as if it were in place. The 10-year note, as you know, has traded for many months, a range of, say, 70, 90 basis points. It seems to break out once in a while, both to the upside and downside. But so we have a kind of interest rate, at least if that control stability built in, that research seems to approve of it. But, you know, we had experience with interest rate, yield curve control in the 1940s. The Fed fought its way out of
48:01 Speaker 01 it in 1951. But the Fed now is lovey dovey with the Treasury. The Fed, under the current leadership in 1951, just wanted no more part of carrying the Treasury's water and subsidizing massive wartime debt. But now, what you have with Janet Yellen, the Treasury, and Jay Powell, the Fed, is something, let us do business together. Let us do more business. So I think, I think one of the things about our disinhibition today, with no more fiscal orthodoxy, no more monetary orthodoxy, who's going to say it is really a bad idea for the Treasury and the Fed to get two folks, and for the Fed, to buy even more of the
48:45 Speaker 01 Treasury's offerings? Who's going to say that? It would sound, it almost sounds strange. It would, it would sound as if it were off the wall, rather than the practice of joining hands and feet and arms, the Treasury and the Fed, sounding as if it were bad practice. So I think in answer to Tim's question, yes, I think we'll have control as a policy or as a de facto occurrence is with us or will be with us soon.
49:12 Speaker 00 Okay, well, Christos in the audience actually suggests an interesting potential outcome, which is could the central banks immunize the debt away? The ECB holds now something like 80% of the boons and the JCB holds a majority of JGB. Could a solution be that these are swapped for 100-year zeros, essentially expunging the debt?
49:35 Speaker 01 Yeah, it's kind of a debt for equity swap, right? 100-year zeros never come.
49:41 Speaker 01 Debt for equity swaps go back to the South Sea, don't bubble, I dare say well before that. So yes, possibility. I ruled out nothing, but I'm not sure how Mr. Market is going to would interpret such a radical movement. I think that at some point, the central banks will become two clara by half and will take the next radical step that will totally freak out people who to date have seemed almost certainly unobservant about the steps we have taken to get moving on.
50:23 Speaker 01 In fact, the Fed has now has bought junk bonds for more than important than buying the signal its willingness to buy them. That's much more important than the actual modest purchases for investment in great corpus. What can prevent the Fed from buying equities? Yeah, I'm one point seven years ago, I said, yeah, Fed, I think I'm buying equities. So the next crisis, what are the inhibitions? So this again, I think.
50:46 Speaker 00 She actually suggested Congress to reconsider the charter and to open them up. And I think she said that relative to other central banks around the Fed is relatively limited in their ability.
50:59 Speaker 01 DOJ has been buying ETFs. So, you know, junk bonds are first cousin to equity. In fact, some of them are very close, very close indeed to equity. So you could make a. One of these all too clever economist arguments that there's no big difference between triple C rated junk equity where it's simply taking a different portion of the capital structure in the interest of the, I think the phrase now is market functioning. By the way, let me say one thing about the Fed's radical interventions in March. The Fed's radical interventions long predated March.
51:37 Speaker 01 You know, in the fall, the repo market, the market for financing of treasury securities went haywire in September, right? And the Fed weighs in and fuses the repo market with hundreds of, with trillions of dollars over and over again. And Fed's balance sheet was growing at a rate in February that caused people to say, wow, whoa, this is a new thing. So this was, this was a month before, was it March 26th or March 27th, the fateful, you know, all in policy merchant party. So this has been going on for a long time.
52:17 Speaker 01 Every cycle's bigger, every cycle's more radical, and every cycle, the investors accept it with fewer raised I-Rs. Oh, yes, that's, that's, that's just the Fed being the Fed. Thanks a lot. Thanks, fellas.
52:31 Speaker 00 Well, there are some people who tend to agree with you, and Bobby points out that there's a significant net speculative short position in 30-year bonds. So some people tend to agree that, that there is some unwinding to happen here. Do you think that, do you think that this trade is potentially right? And, and what do you think could unwind it? So when, when you think about people shorting the longer end of the curve, do you think that they're right? Or do you think they're wrong? And if it were to unwind, what would, what would take place?
53:03 Speaker 01 Well, of course, there's a lot of speculative interest in the bond market on both sides. If somebody's taking the other side of that, against the 30-year bond, there is an ETF run by our friend Nancy Davis that is always a yield curve ETF. You can, you can get long this ETF, which would give you, you can express if you get the yield curve, well, steven, that's the point I, yeah. So these things do exist. I think the most likely candidate for a catalyst for a steepening of the curve would be, of course, a succession of inflation prints or a bunch of news that suddenly becomes
53:45 Speaker 01 undeniable. You can imagine people saying, "Yeah, I looked past this inflation problem when we were printing money at the fastest rate in any peace term era that was in April magazine. I looked past it when the federal debt climbed one trillion within a single calendar month. That was also in the spring. I looked past it when the supply chain seemed to break down on the back of government interventions to lock us all down. But now, I think, you know, these new inflation, I'm imagining now, these new inflation things, this is a little bit worrying. So let me lighten up on bonds. So that's when this might begin to happen. And we'll see. Well, as my friend of mine used to say, we'll know more in 10 years, Max.
54:30 Speaker 00 Yes. Well, let's say that happens. Do you think the Fed starts buying longer duration?
54:35 Speaker 01 It might. Yeah. If I were running the Fed, and don't you wish I were, Max, if I were running the Fed, I would say, ladies and gentlemen, interest rates are prices, and we don't administer prices. We let them be discovered. And for that reason, we will not, the Fed, we buy longer term bonds. We won't allow the market to have its head expressed because, ladies and gentlemen, in the absence of market determined rates, we are left with what we have, which is a cartelized banking system stuffed to the gills with the government's debt. We are left with a credit market that has ceased
55:19 Speaker 01 functioning to distinguish between among credits. We are left with this statist contraption that some people on Wall Street call a market. It's not actually a market, ladies and gentlemen. It is our idea of what the market should say. That's the speech that wants to be given, but won't be given. So, yes, the Fed may run by longer term bonds.
55:42 Speaker 00 Well, Jim, I think there are some people who probably would wish for that, but to use our word of the day, I think it would be far too inconvenient to have you.
55:51 Speaker 01 Yes, it would be very inconvenient. Maybe Judy Sheldon should get in the Fed Department, give that speech in the councils of the Fed. In fact, yeah, let's make sure that happens.
56:01 Speaker 00 Okay, well, we are running towards the end. Do you have a little bit of extra time? Because we got a bunch of questions that we haven't quite gotten to.
56:09 Speaker 01 I have a couple of minutes. I'd be happy to give short answers and short questions.
56:14 Speaker 00 Short answers and short questions. Well, you are on Real Vision, so we do have to ask you about Bitcoin and central bank digital currencies. So do you believe that Bitcoin or any other cryptocurrency can be considered digital hard money or have intrinsic value?
56:31 Speaker 01 I confess to you, this is not my cup of tea. I look at Tesla, which is, I think, at 920 times earnings or something, 120-something times enterprise value. EBITDA makes half a billion, half billion dollars and has a billion plus in tax credits. I look at Tesla, I say, how is that? It's got, what, it's got six, eightfold this year? And then I look at Bitcoin, and I think to myself, huh? I mean, what's the intrinsic value? I don't know. People love it. It makes, it absorbs most of the electricity produced in Iceland.
57:16 Speaker 01 The fact, it makes Gold Mine look green, but it has this fan base that is saying that there is a point of takeoff on which Bitcoin is going to go to $100,000 a coin. Can Tesla go to a half million dollars a share? I don't know. But to me, Bitcoin is kind of a Tesla of a monetary asset. It's, you know, gold is, its value is indeterminate. It yields exactly what Bitcoin yields. Its book value is exactly what Bitcoin's book value is. But gold has, you know, has a multi-millennial history. You get, you get up a percent or so of the above ground stock every year, 2% if you're lucky every year.
58:01 Speaker 01 It's a, you can't fork it, as you can fork these currencies, you can't, digital currencies, you can't actually manufacture. So I salute the people who got long Bitcoin. I salute real vision for it. It's a cash of Bitcoin, but it's one of the many things in life I have sat out.
58:18 Speaker 00 Okay. We got a question from Tej about investment opportunities under a Biden administration. So what sectors do you see investment opportunities under Biden? And specifically, he wants to know about your thoughts about ESG investing and whether you think this trend is here to stay? And if so, where, where would you be looking within that framework?
58:40 Speaker 01 Yeah, I don't see anything about the Biden administration would be dispositive for investment decision. There are some tendencies perhaps being built in such as a lovey-dovey relationship with the Treasury and the Fed, which may help to speed by imagined inflation scenario. But as ESG, I think that there are plenty of opportunities there. And I'm, I'm not going to come up immediately with the name of the very imaginative people who are doing the following, but readers of Grant's know about this. So here goes the argument for how to play ESG in our business, that what you don't want to do is buy an ESG ETF.
59:20 Speaker 01 And I'm going to ask Harrison Waddillo and with your shot, Harrison, if you could prompt me on the name of the nice people who brought us this idea on, on the ESG ETFs. And there's a, there's a company in Europe that's, but anyway.
59:38 Speaker 00 I, I actually, I have the report right here in front of me, so I can, I can tell you.
59:44 Speaker 01 The editor of Grant's Interest Rate Observer, not, just, just tell me the name of the While you're looking, Max, I will describe the MO, okay? What you want to do is not to buy one of these exchange trading funds that specializes in virtuous corporate, you know, emissions company. What you want is to invest in companies that are currently polluting, but which have in place a plan to become, to get on the virtuous side of the line.
1:00:24 Speaker 01 And they will use the investment offered to them to make the necessary adjustments. Whereas Apple's not going to get any greater. But if you buy one of these ETFs, you're buying Apple, you're buying Facebook, huh? So what? You're just, you're a virtual stakeholder if you buy one. But to pick out current companies that are a problem, are becoming less of a problem, and are determined and have a realistic plan to implement that plan, great. You are actually contributing to a solution. So that was, that was, that's the thesis.
1:00:59 Speaker 00 It came from Will Thompson at Massive Capital.
1:01:02 Speaker 01 Yes.
1:01:03 Speaker 00 Yes, Will Thompson at Massive Capital. And to synthesize what you just said a little bit, it's, it's a bit of like an index inclusion play where you're finding the company that is, has the plan in place that is going to get it included in the index. So you don't want the company that's already there. The flows, the flows are already there. So you want the company that, that has a plan that's going to get it in there. So instead of like the case of Tesla joining the S and P 500 where it's just pure market cap growth, it is the, the ESG component of their business plan allowing it to eventually benefit.
1:01:37 Speaker 01 I thought this massive plan was just so imaginative and so right. You know, it struck me as why it all matters, all counts. It's an investment proposition. Anyway, I fall for it.
1:01:51 Speaker 00 Okay. Well, since we're running out of time here, I'd like to give you the opportunity to leave viewers with a closing thought.
1:02:01 Speaker 01 Ladies and gentlemen of Real Vision, buy low, sell high.
1:02:06 Speaker 00 That's a fair one.
1:02:07 Speaker 01 And in full awareness of the arc of monetary evolution, or retroaggression, I don't know what that is.
1:02:16 Speaker 01 What times we're in and what opportunities these times afford us. And what a pleasure it is to live in them. So, thank you, Max.
1:02:23 Speaker 00 All right, thank you, Jim. It was a pleasure.
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