Pod Insights Real Vision: Finance & Investing Is This the End of US Dominance? About this episode Turkey has been the best-performing equity market in the world in dollar terms in 2022. Meanwhile, the Mexican peso and the Brazilian real have been among the strongest currencies against the buck this year. Amid global upheaval unlike anything in recent memory, emerging markets have become much more attractive to investors. Is this a durable trend in asset allocation? Andreas Steno Larsen welcomes Whitney Baker, the founder of Totem Macro, for a conversation about the convergence of deglobalization, inflation, and quantitative tightening and the emergence of emerging markets as we transition to a multipolar geopolitical-macroeconomic regime. Follow Whitney on Twitter @TotemMacro. Recorded on November 23, 2022. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Transcript 0:02 Speaker 00 Hey everyone. If you like this podcast, go behind the paywall to get privilege access to the smartest minds in finance. Join the Real Vision community and learn how to become a better investor. Visit realvision.com/rvpod and use the promo code PODCAST10 to get 10% off our essential membership for the first year. And now to today's episode.
0:24 Speaker 01 Hi, this is Andreas Steno from Real Vision speaking. Why is Turkey the best performing equity market in dollar terms this year? Why is the Mexican peso performing versus the US dollar? And why is Brazil back in fashion during a global cost of living crisis? Those are some of the questions I've been asking myself over the course of the year in an environment with falling stock markets throughout the Western world. And I've invited one of the very best emerging markets specialists I know globally to discuss
1:04 Speaker 01 whether this is an early warning signal that the US asset outperformance is about to end. So this is make or break time for geopolitics and potentially for dollar asset markets. So let's get to the interview with Whitney Baker from Totem Macro.
1:27 Speaker 01 It is now my great pleasure to be joined by Whitney Baker, the founder of Totem Macro. I had the chance to interview Whitney a couple of months ago, and it was an immense pleasure. So I really look forward to today's conversation as well. Welcome to the show, Whitney. It's great to see you.
1:41 Speaker 02 Thank you, Andreas. How are you doing?
1:44 Speaker 01 All good. I mean, it's really interesting times in global macro. And I wanted to take a deep dive into the sort of intersection between deglobalization, inflation, and emerging markets today. And I think no one's better at assessing these three trends in tandem than than you, Whitney. So why don't we take the top down picture first? If we look at the current theme of deglobalization, when I listen to CEOs on earnings calls at the moment, it seems as if every CEO talks about it, but they haven't done much about it yet. What's your take on this whole trend of deglobalization?
2:26 Speaker 02 Yeah, so I think it's interesting, actually, that you're framing the conversation this way because tech is really the sharp end of the spear in terms of reflecting the shifting both cyclical and secular conditions that we've grown accustomed to, right? And one of those environments has been globalization and the extreme degree that it's sort of gotten taken to, even before COVID, but then with all of the demands on imports and trades and good supply and all of that stuff that COVID necessitated. So it's an interesting, like, microcosm of all the major inflections that are happening. And on the globalization side, I think what I would say there at the higher level is it's not just that companies now, who if you think about who the biggest beneficiaries
3:08 Speaker 02 of globalization have been, in large part, it's multinational companies who are able to offshore a lot of their cost base, but still through the magic of these sorts of virtuous, easy money and debt accumulation cycles in their own home bases, they were able to effectively, you know, pay less on labor abroad, but at the same time, people were able to afford more and more real purchasing power at home. And so that was like an ideal environment for multinationals, particularly US ones, right? And there was a bunch of other elements to that tax efficiency and so on that also helped from a profit standpoint. And so it's not just that companies now have to switch from prioritizing the cost side
3:50 Speaker 02 of, you know, their, when they're doing their calculus around where to have their supply chains and how to structure their businesses. In the past, it was like, look, everything's cool, we're all friends now, Cold War is over, you know, US is basically protecting all the shipping lanes, we all follow their rules. And in that kind of a world, you can prioritize cost and cheapness and efficiency of sort of just in time or efficiency of inventory hold and stuff like that. You can't do that anymore for reasons that are not so much commercial in nature, are more related to, you know, there was this massive shock facing governments and businesses alike where they couldn't get critical things that they needed. If you think about it, it's like, it started with generic drugs and PPE during COVID and
4:33 Speaker 02 semiconductors and all the various bottlenecks that we put Our inflated demand pushed the available supply to such limits that those chains started to break. And then obviously, most recently, energy dependencies in Europe and so on, creating all sorts of chaos. And so it's like, when you think about this world that we've been building for 10,000 years of more and more integration as a society. The last 50 years was this extreme blow off of that. And it's left us with these huge interconnected dependencies across different countries. And this, this very specialized sort of world of production that we live in. And so even if companies are now, and like to your original point, this is a time of extreme uncertainty for a number of different reasons, right?
5:17 Speaker 02 So companies know they have these spending priorities that, all right, we gotta go and build a new supply chain for X in somewhere that's sort of like a friendly nation or a home nation. And that actually doesn't get us any incremental IRR. It's not like we're doing it for price sensitivity reasons or optimization reasons. We're doing it simply because we cannot be in a position where we can't stock shelves anymore or have availability of critical supplies. And so it's like, there's this whole set of corporate spending priorities that are both responding to the extreme amount of demand that we have and the limits that that's created. But also from a more structural standpoint, or saying, look, next five or 10 years, we can't have total reliance on China or whatever in this world of, you know, just
6:02 Speaker 02 shifting order and shifting security of those previous dependencies. So I doubt that this is something that, you know, you're going to hear in earnings calls right now, like, oh, we're going to go and spend X billions on, you know, retooling our supply chain in the next couple of years. But it's something that's a structural spending initiative that will have to happen over the next three to five years. And it's not just companies, it's governments who have to do it too, like to your things that we've talked about in the past on CHIPS Act and semi-supply and the role that government is having in ensuring obviously, energy is a very topical point in ensuring the security of supply across the world. And so there's a whole bunch of different sort of CapEx and spending initiatives that have to happen at all sorts of different player levels
6:48 Speaker 02 to prioritize a world where maybe it's not fully integrated anymore. And it's just that marginal delta that I think is starting at the moment.
6:57 Speaker 01 I would like to get back to the sort of global ramifications of a potential capex pickup over the coming decade as a consequence of this trend. But before we get to that, let's take a deep dive into the technology sector. You mentioned tech initially in your response to my first question, and I would like to get your take on whether the tech sector in the US is actually moving towards bringing the supply chain back from China to, say, shores closer to the US. Apple, for example, announced that they wanted to move parts of their supply chain from China to other regions. Is it actually a trend, or is it mostly hot air at this stage?
7:35 Speaker 02 I think mostly what you've seen as an actual trend is, obviously, there was a huge exodus of companies out of Russia, and mostly Russia was a demand center for a lot of companies and suppliers. You've seen, at the same time, a little bit more deliberate movement of operations and sort of tech alliances out of China, either because they're sort of seen as like the next potential issue where we know there's obviously a bilateral set of tensions between the US and China, and the US, at least, you know, with respect to semiconductors and things like that, is forcing people to stop selling into that market or to adhere to certain rules and restrictions and so on that never used to
8:17 Speaker 02 exist. And obviously, this all started back with Trump, but has continued under Biden and is generally, generally makes sense, given the evolution of where we are in the world, that you have this upstart rival, that the US is sort of protecting its incumbency, you have this rival that has a whole different set of values. And at the end of the day, those two powers have goals that are just not aligned with each other anymore. So even if, you know, you come out of the G20 last week and everyone's talking and, you know, it's good face-to-face meeting and it's, it's a plus that the G20 still exists as an entity and can draft and communicate and all this stuff. But at the end of the day, those frictions between the two main sort of power centers of the world are not
8:58 Speaker 02 that tractable, and they're attracting different allies to their respective causes. And you probably end up with a bit of a non-aligned movement. In the middle like we had during the Cold War. So the problem is from a tech perspective, where do you actually move your supply to? Because a lot of this stuff is very long lead time, right? So you're thinking about building a new advanced node fab. Where are you going to do that? Can you do it in India? Can you do iPhone assembly in India? I mean, they're trying, right? And so there is a mar- definitely a marginal move of incremental investment spend out of that area. But there's not, you know, something massive and wholesale, like, okay, we're just gonna scrap in the way that Russia was massive in wholesale. It's like, we'll scrap
9:40 Speaker 02 that. We just, we won't do business there anymore. I think people are sort of dealing with the China issue with a little bit more, you know, incrementalism, I would say. But the thing about tech is, um, you know, I think the bigger point is not so much that like globalization and thinking about supply chains and security of supply, it's gonna affect all sorts of industries, not just tech in particular, because we've come out of 15 years of no investment across pretty much any industry, right? And even like looking at semis, it was the same. It was like, okay, from 2015 onwards, revenue surged for advanced semis. The so- total annual size of that industry continued to go higher. And yet there was no incremental change in CapEx
10:23 Speaker 02 from 2015 through to 2022. And so then you ultimately, sorry, I should say 2021, because then there was a big CapEx response. But you're growing into, um, what was like a very limited availability of supply. And that same thing is true with respect to tech, as it is with respect to energy and basic materials and, you know, industrial or manufacturing capacity, housing. There was literally no investment in anything physical, uh, for most of the last cycle. And so you're just hitting these supply issues at the exact point in time when people need to figure out, okay, well, we need to actually expand capacity. Where is the right place to do that? So these two things are intersecting at the same time, which means
11:05 Speaker 02 that the potential for that shift of CapEx to new sort of destinations and recipients is probably bigger than at a point when, let's say, everything was already oversupplied. If everything was already oversup- Applied, you're sort of gonna like get the longest useful life out of those things as you can and maybe walk a little bit of a balance between using that stuff, using the capacity you've already spent money on, but also trying to have some sort of tail risk or hedge capacity somewhere else. And now it just seems like, look, everybody hasn't invested for a long time. They gotta do it anyway. They're gonna try to do it somewhere friendly or somewhere where you at least are taking into account as a factor, how secure that place is.
11:45 Speaker 01 In hindsight, it is now very clear that we struggled with a lack of supply of various goods, but also technological goods throughout the pandemic, but it seems as if the tide is turning a bit when we look at that exact question today. So if we look at the semi sector as as an example, it seems as if inventories are now growing as a consequence of the post pandemic economic trends. So what do you make of that supply demand imbalance at the current juncture?
12:15 Speaker 02 Yeah, that's so that's a hundred percent right. So here's here's the issue. Um, this was never a supply issue. It was never like, you know, if you think about like, there was a very easy way to tell whether prices are going up because of a supply shock or prices are going up because of demand shock. And the simple way to tell is, did the volumes that got transacted go up or go down? You know, we basically got to a point where we were spending, like if I'm talking about the US, we were spending in real consumption terms about, you know, if a hundred was Jan 2020, we got to about one eighteen, we're still at about one seventeen. And so there's not really been a big softening in real consumption, but what has happened is
12:57 Speaker 02 initially, there was this huge disproportionate demand surge for tech and handsets and PCs and everything like that, that you just physically needed during the pandemic, as well as other consumer goods. And those things push the availability of existing supply to the limits of what of what could be supplied, including from imported supply from abroad. And so you had this surge in imports and this big trade deficit and all these things associated with trying to plug a you know, a fundamentally huge. Excess demand gap. And now what you're seeing is just a violent shift out of goods and tech to services and broader parts of the economy, which are much larger parts of overall spending. So when I look at things like the fact that, you know,
13:42 Speaker 02 you know, inbound port volumes are down or trucking throughput is down or goods demand is down or or tech hardware prices are down. If you look at the anatomy of the inflation prints for the last couple of months, pretty much of the very few components that are falling, most of them are tech related or or consumer goods related, right? And what you're seeing instead is this surge in mix shift towards where people are spending. So I think fundamentally, if you look at things like supply indicators that, yes, of course, they got stretched because demand was so extreme. But that was not really the core cause of why inflation was high. The core cause of why inflation was high was because people were given so much money to spend on things without having to actually produce things. And so you just exhausted the available supply.
14:27 Speaker 02 So, yeah, the supply chain issues are coming back, but the issue is we still have this huge amount of excess demand, which is now being fed by this organic, high income, high wage growth sort of, you know, purchasing power. So we got to choke that off before we can fully bring inflation back to something more reasonable.
14:54 Speaker 01 Over the past, say, one or two months, I've seen several gauges of supply chain bottlenecks making the rounds on financial Twitter, on sell site research, etc., because they are basically showing that we are close to square one from before the pandemic when it comes to a lot of these supply chain indices, right? But where does that leave inflation when consumption is moving towards the service sector? Is this inflation a done deal at this stage? Or is inflation just shifting?
15:25 Speaker 02 So for me, like everything, even in the latest print, which, and to be clear, we've seen three or four prints like this, this year, where the core, you know, breadth of the basket, if you look at most of the inertial components, as well as most of the volatile components of the basket, are all pointing to something that looks like in the, in the region of five to seven percent core inflation. And that's been going sideways. And we look at things in sort of a timely sense. So we look at three-month annualized, seasonally adjusted, and things like that to really try to get, instead of looking at year-over-year, a timelier picture of what's happening. And all of those reads are just bouncing around in the core space sideways. So five to seven, and that's consistent with, you know, household
16:06 Speaker 02 income growth of five to seven. And then on top of that, they've got an excess savings drawdown that's being spent, and credit accelerating everywhere, and that's enabling even a little bit of positive real growth on top of high inflation, right? So that's how that whole thing is being funded and, and netted out. The problem that we have here is, you know, like I say, we gave people all this extra cash, they didn't have to work or earn it, they then spent it. So people who sold them things were like, all right, shit, you know, we're, we, now we have to invest and expand our capacity. And so they've all started to do that. And so even just the act of them paying people to work for them so they can increase supply, and them doing more CapEx and things like that to secure physical goods and so on. Those things then create a, a self-reinforcing cycle of,
16:51 Speaker 02 okay, higher income for them, higher sales, higher spending, higher wages for the people they hire, then the higher wages get spent on more nominal spending by, you know, people who are now employed or earning more and so on. So that is a cycle that's really difficult to choke off. And you need, the only way to really do it is either with a real credit crunch, or interest burden shock of some kind, or a real income squeeze. And on the credit side, the issue there is, you know, real rates are negative five, six percent. They'll probably get to more like negative three percent over the course of the next, you know, six months or so, just because of what's priced in from a tightening standpoint. But the reality is, you know, as EMs
17:35 Speaker 02 Know who have to deal with these inflationary external shocks all the time and the recessions that are sort of mandated by them. You can't really choke off borrowing if real rates are negative three to five percent. You can't really squeeze somebody's incomes if their incomes are growing faster than interest rates. So their incremental interest burden, it's just definitionally impossible to squeeze them in that case. And so unlike say Europe and the UK, which have had a huge, you know, real income squeeze forced on them at the national country level because of the four or five percent of GDP hit that they're taking from higher energy prices. The US is net neutral energy. And so even if energy prices are higher for producers,
18:17 Speaker 02 uh, sorry, are higher for consumers, that results in producer profits, which get taxed and redistributed. And at an economy wide level, it all kind of stays within the same system. So the problem is that in the US at least, you know, and pretty much broadly outside of Asia, we are looking at five to seven percent core inflation pretty much everywhere. The latest print was consistent with that, but had, you know, and this has been a sort of optimistic tendency of folks to look at one or two items that are hyper volatile and happen to go down like twenty percent last month or whatever and say, okay, well, that's, that's it, you know, it's over. Um, and so last month that was medical services and it was used cars.
18:57 Speaker 02 And in, I think it was the July print, it was airfares because jet fuel went down and oil prices had led that. And so there's these sort of like very, um, you know, let's say inconclusive, but people sort of trying to grasp at straws because that ultimately is what the market is already pricing in is really rapid disinflation. And so if we don't get that, uh, market pricing is invalidated as it currently stands. It's already very, uh, very richly valued. And as I say, like basically expecting us to go back to the same twenty, thirty year type environment that we have known.
19:33 Speaker 01 Before we move on to the ramifications for the tech sector and potentially also emerging markets of a more sticky inflation environment, I would like to get your take on a slightly academic question, because it seems as if you've referred to real rates as the difference between spot inflation at Fed funds policy rates. But if you look at real rates in forward terms, they are now priced clearly in positive territory. So if you take the difference between a 10-year swap and the 10-year zero coupon inflation swap, we have positive real rates of probably more than one and a half percent by now. So what do you make of the difference between the front end and the forward pricing of inflation expectations relative to interest rates in this discussion?
20:18 Speaker 02 So there's a few things. That is the mispricing from my perspective, because ultimately what the market is saying, and it's not just the fixed income market, like look at the equity market, it's saying, all right, earnings are going to be 8% higher next year, no real, you know, demand compression or big recession of any kind. And yet, and this whole time, by the way, like the Fed is hiking, but inflation's way up here, so you've got negative realized real rates the entire time. And yet, regardless of the fact that there's not going to be a major recession priced into the equity market, regardless of the fact that the rate curve suggests that you're just going to have essentially people's incomes outpacing the interest, the interest rate or the incremental change in their interest burdens this entire time, somehow out of
21:03 Speaker 02 thin air, you're going to get this magic disinflation back to the world that we've known. And I think the thing that's important about that is, well, like, what are the mechanics behind that, right? The only thing that actually explains that and would make that what I view as pretty inconsistent pricing, would square that circle, is like, let's say, in the 5% to 10% chance that we can get somewhere, you know, somebody has been ring fencing all sorts of supply, there's just a whole bunch of baby boomers in some basement somewhere that are going to come back out and like, you know what I mean? Like, we're going to get this huge increase in supply, there's factories that have just been sitting idle that are going In nowhere and they're just gonna turn it all on.
21:44 Speaker 02 And then, you know, despite the fact that China's been basically catatonic this whole time, doesn't matter. Like when they come out and they start adding to global energy, base materials, spent general consumption, spending, demand. That that's gonna be more than absorbed by the non-existent supply that exists. I mean, you know what I mean? It's like, how do you think about what the market is basically uh thinking of in terms of that sequence of events to bring inflation down? From my perspective, you know, you actually have to squeeze people in order to bring inflation down. People are very reluctant to voluntarily uh cut their spending and their real standards of living. Unless, you know, they lose their job, in which case there's, yeah, their incomes go down for one thing.
22:27 Speaker 02 But also there, they sort of precautionarily cut their spending in advance of that. So if we saw like a huge weakening in the labor market, you would start to see that translate much more to lower income and spending power, but also lower willingness to spend, probably less willingness to draw down all of the excess savings that folks built up and haven't spent yet. That sort of thing, less willingness to keep spending on credit cards and that sort of stuff, right? So you need to see something like that, like some real weakening in this crazy hot labor market, crazy hot excess consumption relative to, you know, available supply. And those imbalances have never been anything like this extreme. Like the way that we've, we've count this is you need something like a recession and a half on average. We take the average recessions for 50 years.
23:12 Speaker 02 You need like a recession and a half just to get the labor supply, demand and the consumption, supply, demand back to something that's almost a previous cyclical peak. Like it's almost in line with the peak of the dot com cycle if we had a recession and a half from here. So that is how hot these economies actually are. Um, and so from my perspective, you actually need to really eat into that. So the reason I look at real, realized real rates is because they actually give you a sense of, okay, people's incomes are, they either are or they aren't mechanically getting squeezed by the interest burden, starting to outpace their income growth, which mechanically eats into their spending power. And at the same
23:52 Speaker 02 Realized real rates being positive is a pretty strong deterrent to incremental borrowing. Whereas realized real rates at negative three to five percent, like you see this in EMs undergoing BOP crises all the time. You can't actually choke off the the inflation and the excess spending, the current account imbalances that cause problems for them in those moments. Without really engineering a radically higher and positive realized real rate. And at that point, you start to squeeze credit availability and squeeze spending so much that you get an immediate import contraction and stabilization. So that's what basically Europe and the UK need to be doing. But because they're developed countries who are used to stimulating.
24:33 Speaker 02 Um, and you know, their policy, their sort of supportive policy actions and downturns being useful and helpful. They are now subsidizing all of the energy shocks, but by and large, about eighty percent of it. So even where there used to be a sort of a, an ultimately I think will be a possibility for a real income squeeze of some meaningful size. That can help Europe and and the UK ultimately stabilize their inflation problem. That's not going to happen if you if you intercept that real income squeeze on the private sector by just capping everybody's energy bills and so on. So, you know, it's, it sounds brutal, but this is how inflationary recessions work. You don't have a policy lever available to you.
25:12 Speaker 02 And the more you try as a, you know, fiscal or monetary policymaker to fight against an adjustment that's needed. The farther away you get from from stability and like Latin America knows this like very well, you know, which is why they hiked so aggressively so soon.
25:28 Speaker 01 Yeah, a couple of weeks ago, I I made a study on the amount of stimulus. Um, being uh made available to address the um current energy crisis in Europe. And as far as I can calculate, Germany has either guaranteed directly spent or bail out in sectors within the energy space. To the extent of eight percent of GDP this year. Um, so I mean, when the Germans spend that much, you better watch out.
25:54 Speaker 02 Right, right. And somehow, you know, what's interesting about that is somehow, you know, they're allowed to, it's a downturn, it happens to. To be a dependency that they're particularly reliant on and they're allowed to spend whatever they want. But like, go back to 2011 and there's a capital dependency that the peripheral countries have on the core. And all of a sudden, that's like a bridge too far for the core, you know, and so you're forced into austerity, but without actually taking the same actions themselves in response to this shock. So I think there are some fundamental, uh, let's call it cultural divides and inconsistencies within that block still. But yeah, Germany has been very extreme in subsidizing.
26:33 Speaker 01 Well put, Whitney. If we look at the side effects of potential sticky inflation for the technology sector first and then emerging markets afterwards.
26:45 Speaker 01 The technology sector is obviously a high duration asset. That's pretty clear, seen from the price action over the past 12 to 18 months. But let's assume for a second that we need to bring real rates in spot terms even higher. Will this just increase the malice in the technology sector? Or is there any glimpse of hope from this disinflating CPI that we've seen in the US?
27:09 Speaker 02 Uh, I don't think so, no, for a variety of reasons. One is, and coming back to that kind of inconsistency in market pricing, tech is at the, it's sort of the extreme example of that, where you had really a variety of things inflate tech. And if, and this goes all the way back to 2010, right? So coming into COVID, there was already huge divergences between tech valuations and everything else, US valuations and everything else. And a big part of that was because coming out of the GFC, you had like 12 years of deleveraging everywhere, dealing with these old economy bubbles that, that, you know, basically turned over with the GFC and people deleveraging and dealing with that and the disinflation associated with that. The only real two sectors in the world that did a lot of borrowing
27:54 Speaker 02 and managed to get, so get their economies off the ground and so on, were the US corporate sector and the Chinese sort of official SOE sector, right? And they build us out from a growth standpoint coming out of the GFC. And so those were the two engines of this cycle, basically tech in both places, disinflationary global cycle. Old economy stuff, basically fixing itself, doing balance sheet repair and so on. Lots of deleveraging equals perfect environment for a lot of central bank stimulation to offset those deflationary forces. And, you know, longer duration assets with disinflationary cash flow profiles that tend to benefit from disinflationary environments. Doing so well. And that was a situation like, you know, even before COVID.
28:37 Speaker 02 And the US bubble really sucked in a lot of incremental dollars from global investors, both in the fixed income space and in the risky asset space. So dollar has been by far the biggest recipient of flows from abroad. And obviously, the quantitative easing that has been going on intimately throughout and like on turbocharged since COVID. Mechanically fed into those bubble assets. Because what tends to happen when free money is printed like this, well in excess of what was given out fiscally. Is that it chases assets that have done well. It tends to be like, okay, I'm just some, the central bank just bought my bond off me. I need some new duration assets. First, I'm gonna go, you know, incrementally out the duration curve.
29:19 Speaker 02 But then all of those yields come down and now I can't get any decent returns that way. So I'm also gonna, okay, I'm gonna go long duration, but also high risk. Okay, let's try to get the riskiest cat, you know, longest duration cash flows profiles that we can. All right, well, that all is very expensive now. Let's go not only long duration and long risk, but long, you know, down the liquidity curve. We'll get into stuff that has a liquidity premium or should do because it's private equity and you know what I mean? So it's like all of those, people have been forced mechanically out all of those curves for the last 12 years. So you have this issue where, and particularly in the last couple. We have this issue where there's going to be a continuous sucking of that liquidity just by virtue of quantitative tightening.
30:03 Speaker 02 And as that liquidity contracts, so you imagine like, let's say you had the, you know, Federal Reserve that's over here holding everybody's beers. And so everybody's over there, they can get more beers because they've just, you know, they've got a resting place for it on the Fed. Now all of a sudden Fed's like, look, we can't, we can't hold this anymore. Shoves it back into the sort of private hands and then. Just beers fall to the ground, right? Like that's the the sort of analog, right? Is there's not enough space in private balance sheets to hold all of these assets at these valuations at prevailing prices. And so you're seeing this mechanical realignment of prices. The things that did the best when flows were the most abundant are the things that are super
30:41 Speaker 02 sensitive to that valuation V rating. And then on the other hand, you have the earnings issue, which is, okay, if inflation is coming down, um, which I don't believe that it is in any sustainable way. I think my view is continued to be, look, the, you know, money and credit gives you purchasing power. Purchasing power leads actual spending because you need to have the means to spend and pay for things. The spending itself then leads broader price movements in those categories and for those items, right? And so if you're looking at last month's price, uh, you know, outcomes for a couple of different categories, you're not really skating where the puck is going. You're not saying like, look, here's what the, okay, there's a credit acceleration in every part of this economy. Okay.
31:25 Speaker 02 There's a very strong organic income growth that's driving this high nominal spending cycle. All that stuff, if anything, is accelerating. How is that going to be consistent with, you know, meaningful disinflation? But let's say there is, right? The reason that would be happening is because demand is falling and where demand is falling is most particularly acute in goods, tech products, things that are inherently, these are normally disinflationary products anyway, right? And now they're dealing with this collapse in volumes at a time when they have high inflation, which means definitionally, you can't really pass through the inflation if your volumes are collapsing. So there's this issue around, even if you don't think there's a big recession, which I don't, because I don't think policy settings are tight enough to generate that.
32:09 Speaker 02 Um, the US sector, the US index, let's say, is so geared to tech and consumer discretionary that the earnings can fall and go back to something that looks like 20 or 30% lower, like pre-COVID levels, even without a meaningful recession, just because there's that aggressive switch out of goods and into um, services and other forms of spending. Within a high nominal growth environment. So I think there's really three ways to uh lose in tech. One is that earnings are going to normalize. The second is that inflation comes in higher than priced and therefore this idea that you know, the Fed peaks out in six months and then reverts to easing. That gets priced out. And then thirdly, you just have the mechanical
32:52 Speaker 02 derating that follows quantitative tightening and the flows, you know, getting sort of stopped from where they were previously going.
33:08 Speaker 01 If you um look back at 2020, I spoke to Emil Kalinowski um a couple of weeks ago and he told me that the QE of 2020 reminded him of the liquidity event of Noah. I think that was such a great picture of how big a a liquidity injection we had throughout uh the pandemic. And obviously, you're right, that exact liquidity is now being pulled in the other direction out of markets. And I think that's uh obviously important to note when it comes to the tech sector. I wanted to get your take on emerging markets. And since we are recording uh just uh ahead of the um Thanksgiving, um what better option to discuss Turkey? Um because if I look at
33:51 Speaker 02 That was very smooth, Andreas.
33:53 Speaker 01 It was. Uh but um if I look at the global returns on equity markets uh on a country by country level, interestingly, you find Turkey at the top of the list, basically, this year, measured in dollar terms. Uh you find other emerging markets such as Brazil and Mexico in green territory in sharp contrast to what you see across the board throughout the West, right? So what do you make of emerging markets, broadly speaking, in this inflationary environment uh with less liquidity injected by uh Western central banks?
34:25 Speaker 02 Yeah, so, um, obviously, um, you know, it's like twenty countries within it. There's commodity exporters, importers, goods exporters, importers, surplus stuff. There's all sorts of different country particulars with different exposures to all sorts of global conditions, right? So I don't want to like tar them all with the same brush. But I think the one commonality that you can apply, if you kind of hold Asia out of it for a second, because North Asia, coming back to the previous point, there's like two twin engines of this cycle that delivered all of the asset returns that were very tech dominated. And that was North Asia and the US. And by North Asia, I mean, you know, Korea, Taiwan, China. And China obviously has come way down for a variety of other reasons since then.
35:08 Speaker 02 But those were the things that were leading. Outside of that, the main commonality I would say is that emerging markets have not received any flows of any meaningful size since 2013, 14. You know, like they had, if you go back to the last time, there was a lot of QE in response to a crisis, which was GFC, of course. At that point, EMs had clean balance sheets. They all had crises from like 9097 through to 2002. So by the time 2006, '07 rolls around, they're still like in pretty good shape and they've been rebounding out of these distressed conditions and assets have been surging with the commodity boom and global manufacturing and globalization boom and so on. All that was great. So the Fed starts printing a bunch
35:50 Speaker 02 and people think, okay, I don't want to have anything to do with these like CDO squareds or whatever, but I'm just going to take this free money and put it in to my previous point, what has been working and what had been working was BRICS and so on. And so you got this situation where in 2013, and even before that, 2010 to 13, was just a huge influx of flows into these riskier, more volatile EMs like Brazil, Turkey, and so on. You actually had at a point where commodity prices were nearing all time highs. You had this huge China demand support coming out of the GFC. You had people like Brazil running record deficits with a record overvaluation on the currency because of these flows coming in at that, at that time. And so when QE switched to QE
36:35 Speaker 02 UT in 2013, 14, the Fed got lift off and the dollar rally from at that point, very cheap levels to, you know, reasonably expensive levels and now very expensive levels. All that stuff hit where the money was going, right? When the money stops, look at where it just went. That's the thing that's going to need to deal with having lower inflows and usually less deficit or less excess spending or whatever. That was, that was your riskier EMs back then. And for 10 years, they've had no capital coming in. So the fact that capital flows are effectively sort of stopping, capital flows driven by both QE in this round in COVID, as well as the cross-border flows of risky speculation that came into the
37:17 Speaker 02 US. Those two things are both stopping now at a point when US assets or like, let's call it the last cycle's winners are still priced for them to effectively keep continuing. They're still priced for the same structural environment that we've been in. And so that repricing is what leads to ultimately, you know, just like in the dot com bubble, fading tech bubble, de-rating, even through the Fed pivot. And actually inflation did come right, right back down. They cut rates five points. Still tech doesn't get, it's not like it surges back because the bubble was built on a psychology and a set of peak flows that they will never get back to. And so you just get this steady de-rating. But then you also get this rotation as people move from those assets
37:59 Speaker 02 that are now doing badly into assets that are distressed and cheap and probably beneficiaries of a sort of different, more, you know, a different cycle with different drivers. And that's what's going on fundamentally in a part, those riskier parts of EM. Like at a certain point, right? Like we've, we've had Turkish banks, we've had this, this position since the trough of the balance of payments crisis in Turkey in September of 2018. Now, that country. Has mismanaged all sorts of shit, but to be fair, like they have had really unlucky and massive balance of payment shocks in three quick successions, which have led to this ingrained inflation problem. And of course, they reacted to each of those really badly. But at the end of the day,
38:43 Speaker 02 there are stocks that are trading on one and a half times earnings and your earnings go up four times, like even in dollar terms, that's just not fundamentally sustainable. Like there's, and and that's the case actually in a lot of emerging markets today where they, these are countries and companies that are able to navigate high inflation and volatile macro environments. Their banks know how to do it. Their companies know how to do it. Their households know what to do. And so in any event, that you see earnings surging in these sorts of old economy places, even in like Turkey, which is much more of a manufactured, cheap manufacturing base than it is a commodity producer like Brazil or or Chile or whatever. But these places that have been loathed and hated and trade at like incredibly distressed valuations on surging earnings,
39:28 Speaker 02 those gaps just don't, they aren't sustainable and they never, they never sustain. So it's a question of the assets catching up to the fundamentals being much, much less bad than people thought when they priced those assets down.
39:42 Speaker 01 The final piece of the puzzle is the development in the US dollar as a consequence of this global inflationary environment. You kind of mentioned that you consider the dollar to be relatively expensive at this level. So what do you make of the US dollar in a scenario where inflation is stickier than priced into next year?
40:05 Speaker 02 Yeah, so there's a few things, right? The, it's important when you see something like the dollar moving higher and and mostly what people look at is like the DXY, which is a very narrow comp versus the major DM crosses, Euro in particular. But when you look at at something like that, you know, people have these, this is generally an issue in markets. People have these narratives. It's like, oh, I expect the dollar to go up because the Fed is hiking and that must be what's happening, right? If that were what was happening. Then you would see inflows into dollar fixed income or even short dated deposit inflows and you're not seeing that, right?
40:42 Speaker 02 The other alternative explanation is, okay, it's a debt squeeze. People are need to, you know, like we had in the GFC, people are short dollars and have liabilities and need to go source those to service their debts. And if you, if that was what was going on, you would be seeing dollar debt shrinking and people scrambling for a way to basically source dollars to satisfy that. You'd be seeing much bigger blowouts. And all sorts of indicators of credit stress, which are very benign, like at this point about half what they got to in COVID, which itself was very benign because liquidity was so forthcoming. So the thing that's really going on with the dollar is two different dynamics at the same time, and they both relate to energy. The first thing is, as soon as commodity prices exploded in February, March, uh, all, you know,
41:26 Speaker 02 like all commodity prices by and large are settled in uh dollars and traded and dominated in dollars. And there's some movement away from that, but by and large, that's how it works for the world's big commodity importers. And so these big, you know, huge increase in commodity prices meant that the overall volumes that were needed to be traded by physical commodity traders, the guys who go and, you know, Vito gets the oil from Russia and brings it somewhere else or whatever. If you add up all of that aggregate trade finance that was needed just to facilitate higher commodity prices, that flow has moved hand in glove with the dollar in the early part of the year. So it was not so much a debt squeeze or a flight into higher yielding US assets.
42:09 Speaker 02 It was shit like for three months, we need more dollars. We need working capital to basically facilitate physical commodity trade. And there was a squeeze from a working capital standpoint. Then that faded and what you're left with, once those prices then hit the importers economies is huge balance of payment shocks in the UK, Europe, uh, Japan and parts of North Asia. And so those are the currencies that are down. Like if you look at Lat Am currencies in to EM yielders actually writ large and total return space are up. Um, and they obviously don't have the same issue. around their external, uh, external shocks from energy. And so ultimately, that's what's going on with the dollar. It's not fundamentally sustainable.
42:54 Speaker 02 Um, in the sense that the commodity working capital squeeze is already absorbed. And on the European and, um, particularly on the European and UK side. Like what you need to see is some real adjustment lower in spending so that their current accounts are not in such bad shape as a result of the energy piece. You're still not really seeing that. So it's sort of like. You're looking at it like it's Brazil in 2013 and you know, they gotta take some more steps, but when they do, it's going to be very cheap and you're going to buy the trough. That's sort of how I look at those currencies. But in Asia. Where there's been a lot of currency stress versus the dollar as well, because again, they're huge net energy importers. They actually have a lot of levers they can use.
43:35 Speaker 02 To manage different priorities, like they, they, they all have property bubbles that are now busting, so they need to liquefy those. Their financials, the Taiwanese lifers, the, uh, Korean pensions, the Japanese banks. Those are the big buyers of dollar assets in this cycle, particularly treasuries, right? And they're sitting there taking losses on these assets and they're very leveraged financial entities, particularly Japanese banks and Taiwanese lifers. And so whether it's the private sector in Asia that needs to sell this stuff because they burned through their capital hole. Or whether it is the sovereigns who have decided like the Bank of Japan, like, okay, well, I don't really want to have any more currency volatility here. I'm going to sell reserves and at the same time ease domestically.
44:18 Speaker 02 Because I have the freedom to do that because I have so many reserves. Um, then that's exactly what they're starting to do. So you're now getting that thing where the US is basically. Because of the denomination of energy created stress, the dollar created stress for these countries. And now they're turning around and dealing with that by selling. Dollar assets in pretty meaningful size. So that just adds again to this liquidity hole that the Fed is already creating for dollar assets.
44:44 Speaker 01 If you haven't seen the chart on balance of payments out there in Germany, I urge you to look it up. It basically looks like a Bitcoin chart. It's a nosedive. Pretty interesting stuff happening this year in global macro and energy markets, not least.
44:59 Speaker 02 Yeah.
45:00 Speaker 01 But before I allow you to leave, Whitney, I wanted to have your take here finally on the sort of strategic ramifications for asset allocation. If we get stickier inflation, a weaker US dollar and potentially a slightly better performance in developed, sorry, emerging markets relative to developed markets. What would be the ramifications for global asset allocation trends?
45:27 Speaker 02 Yeah, so with, you know, with, I could add a whole bunch of detail around which emerging markets and how the best expressions are and so on. So, but without going into that, the world you've just described is literally the exact opposite of how investors are positioned and how global market caps are comprised, right? There is more US dollar assets in the world than there ever has been before, owned by foreigners than ever before. That net, you know, portfolio liability to the rest of the world is up 20 points of US GDP just in the last 10 years. So everyone has come into US because it had the, it was the highest yielding of all the major developed currencies during the last cycle. And on the tech side, obviously, it had the best returns and so people chase that.
46:12 Speaker 02 So you're now in a situation where like US stocks are about half of global market cap, which is bigger than it's ever been, even in 1929. And so there's like an extreme imbalance there. And on, because of people coming in and buying those assets and pushing them up, the dollar itself as well is very elevated in real and nominal terms, no matter how you want to look at the currency valuation there. So of course foreigners who have, or even domestics, although the domestics won't notice the currency issue as much. The foreigners who have basically come running into these assets, duration assets in the US, that no matter whether it's bonds or stocks are down 20 to 30% this year. And, you know, to some degree, they've got an unhedged dollar position as well that at least is helping them.
46:53 Speaker 02 A little bit, but dealing with the the sort of at least partially offsetting the underperformance of US assets. Um, you know, that that's a situation that is maximally painful for people if you actually need. You know, you've spent twenty years building up exposures to disinflationary, long-duration assets, which are exactly, of course, the opposite of what you want in a high-inflation world, where the dollar's falling and more old economies, sort of cash flow businesses are doing well and so on. So I think the first point would be, from my standpoint, I'm not like my bar for holding any dollar asset at this point is very high. Um, sometimes there's a credit trade or spreads blow out in some part of my space that makes it worth it.
47:37 Speaker 02 But by and large, I don't want to be exposed to these things that have benefited from this twenty years of unconstrained liquidity that's now inflecting. Um, and then I guess from a more, you know, like, let's say, less tactical um point of view. You want to have things where they have the ability to pass through inflation in earnings. So you capture nominal GDP growth in the cash flows of whatever asset you're going to be exposed to. So inflation hedge assets, commodities, stuff like that. And you want that thing to be cheap enough that it's not going to de-rate on those cash flows either. Like, it's got to start out so cheap and and, you know, not dependent on incremental liquidity that you like if they can grow cash flows by ten percent and not de-rate, good, you're going to get like a reasonable positive return
48:20 Speaker 02 in an environment of like pretty persistent challenges for the bulk of global market cap, whether it's bonds or stocks. So I think about, you know, cash flow protection, cheapness, you know, dependency on liquidity, global diversification probably being more value additive than it has been in the past when the US was like the only game in town. Um, and sort of pivoting ahead of ahead of all of those changes, because this is very like one cycle to the next, you always get this two- to three-year period where the last cycle's assets just get priced to perfection and like they're going to extrapolate these peak conditions into infinity. And then it's a slow, you know, because asset returns are just a function of what happens versus what's priced.
49:03 Speaker 02 It's just a slow burn of deflation as people realize, oh, okay, the tech, the tech bubble's over, you know, and it gets priced out and those flows move and create a realignment in valuations.
49:16 Speaker 01 The old economy is back. That was what I heard from your response to that question.
49:21 Speaker 02 It's gotta be.
49:22 Speaker 01 And it will be very interesting to watch over the coming years. Thank you very much for joining us at Real Vision. We love the contributions you provide day in and day out to the global macro community, Whitney. So Whitney Baker from Tolda Macro, thank you very much for being with us.
49:39 Speaker 02 Thank you so much, Andreas. It was my pleasure.
49:44 Speaker 01 Wow. I guess this was an eye opener to me, this interview. I've been leaning long dollar assets for many years in a row, but I've started to slowly but surely reshuffle my views when it comes to this US outperformance of the rest of the world in the asset markets. And I think Whitney has a couple of interesting points when it comes to this US outperformance in equity space relative to the rest of the world. The US outperformance was led by the technology sector. And the technology sector is not the place to hide currently as a consequence of, first of all, quantitative tightening,
50:27 Speaker 01 sticky inflation and de-globalization. So those three things is not a perfect cocktail for technology and therefore not a perfect cocktail for the US equity market relative to the rest of the world. And secondly, we see interesting moves in geopolitics supporting a slightly more multipolar world, which could be of importance to some of the emerging markets that could actually benefit from a multipolar world. So in essence, the US outperformance of the rest of the world could be ending as a consequence of de-globalization, sticky inflation and tighter liquidity conditions.
51:12 Speaker 01 Thank you for watching.
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