Pod Insights Real Vision: Finance & Investing Around the World in 30 Minutes About this episode U. S. equity indexes held modest gains at midday Monday, as investors prepare for midterm elections with particularly global potential consequences. Andreas Sten Larsen goes around the world with Jacob Shapiro, the founder and chief strategist at Perch Perspectives, for briefings on the major geopolitical issues and their impact on financial markets, including Europe’s energy crisis, China’s reopening, and America’s elections. We also hear from Alexander Stahel, the founder and chief investment officer of Burggraben Holding AG, about the multiple challenges that will combine to extend Europe’s energy crisis into and beyond 2023. Watch the full conversation featuring Alexander Stahel and Andreas Steno Larsen here: https://rvtv.io/3WzREk0. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Transcript 0:07 Speaker 00 Hello everyone and welcome to the Real Vision Daily Briefing. I'm Adel Esteno and it's a new week with loads of geopolitical questions high on the agenda. It is today Monday, the 7th of November, and we're going to ask the question whether we are all too pessimistic when it comes to geopolitics in light of the rumors of a Chinese reopening. And it's my great pleasure to be joined by one of the very best geopolitical strategists out there, Jacob Shapiro, to discuss this question. Jacob, it's good to see you. How are you?
0:42 Speaker 01 Thanks. I don't know if I'm one of the best, but I am optimistic, so I'm in the right place.
0:48 Speaker 00 That's a good way to start this discussion, Jacob. But before we talk China, I wanted to get your take on the midterms, obviously upcoming this week. Any strong expectations for the result?
0:59 Speaker 01 I don't know that I have strong expectations or any insights that I can add to your audience. I would just say that, you know, even at the beginning of this year, it seemed a foregone conclusion that the Democrats were going to get slaughtered in the midterms, and they're probably going to lose the House. But if you look at the 538 polls, I think it's something like 15% or 16% chance that the Democrats pull out the House, and the Senate seems like a toss-up. So the Democrats have been able to make up some ground here over the course of the year. Whether it's enough ground or not, I have my doubts about that. But the polls are such that I wouldn't hazard a prediction there. We're just going to have to see where the dice fall.
1:31 Speaker 00 Fair enough. A question of importance after the midterms is the question of energy policy. We know that Joe Biden has used the Strategic Petroleum Reserves over the past couple of months ahead of the midterms. Is there something brewing in terms of the energy policy post the midterms, also in relation to the use of SPR?
1:54 Speaker 01 I don't have any inside information there, but I can tell you that there are limits to how much of the SPR you can actually use. Eventually, you're going to run out. I'm not ideological about this. I can make the argument that releasing from the SPR makes sense when inflation is the highest that it's been in 40 years and you have a Russia-Ukraine war that is disrupting the supply to the extent that it is. I can make the opposite argument that this was an irresponsible time to go to the SPR. It does seem to me that Biden, in particular, has the sort of old-school way of looking at politics, and he felt like he was not going to do well unless he lowered prices at the gas pump. I think I actually came on Real Vision a couple of months ago and poo-pooed that idea, but he brought prices down at the gas pump, and his approval ratings, they're not great, but they've gone up since then. So maybe he has his finger more on the pulse than I do. But there is a finite
2:36 Speaker 01 amount to what the US can do there. The flip side of this, and I'm sure we'll talk about this later, China matters a lot more here, I think, than releases from the US SPR. If the COVID reopening story is for real, suddenly, demand for oil, I think, is going to go up considerably, and we're probably looking at higher prices. If China stays locked down, if their real estate crisis still hurts, it doesn't really matter to me what the US does, then we're kind of just peddling around with degrees.
3:01 Speaker 00 Yeah, let's look into that question a bit later. Before we move to China, I wanted to get your take on the conflict in Ukraine and the spillovers to US politics first. If we look at the Republicans, at least parts of the Republican Party have been talking about the so-called defunding of the Ukrainian conflict post the midterms. Is this a topic that will grow in relevance in the incoming months?
3:28 Speaker 01 Maybe, but it really contradicts what I've sort of been hearing. I grew up in rural Georgia. I hang out around a lot of Republicans and conservatives, and I find that most Republicans and conservatives that I talk to, unless there's been a total sea change that I missed, don't like Putin, are waving Ukrainian flags out in their yards. It actually seems to me that American support for Ukraine is one of the only things that is uniting the American electorate. I'm here in downtown New Orleans, a very liberal part of the city. People are flying Ukrainian flags. I go home to the farm in Georgia, I see people flying Ukrainian flags. So if the Republicans are making that move, it would be interesting. I would say, though, when I'm I made this point when the appropriations bill came out in September that authorized over $12 billion worth of aid to the Ukrainians.
4:10 Speaker 01 Talking to that bill was 20 million versus 12 billion for the water crisis in Jackson, Mississippi. And this is one of the problems of polarization in the United States. The United States is so polarized at home that it can't make decisions about where it needs to allocate funds. But they're willing to throw billions of dollars at a problem that comes abroad. So if you're a populist, if you feel like your sector of the economy or your part of the country is not doing well because the government hasn't been focusing on it because it's so polarized and deadlocked. Yeah, this might be a pivotal issue that you want to use, especially in the context of elections. This is one of the things also that makes me pessimistic about US foreign policy here over the next couple of years. I think here in the United States, we are going to be a little bit self-absorbed when it comes to politics.
4:52 Speaker 01 And if the United States is self-absorbed, you'll see that reflected in more geopolitical instability because powers will be more opportunistic because they're not going to think the United States has the bandwidth to care that much about it.
5:03 Speaker 00 I wanted to throw in a question from the audience already in relation to this discussion on the domestic stalemate in US politics. We had a question earlier today on the Twitter feed sounding like this. Are there any areas of bipartisan overlap that might lead to effective legislation in a divided Congress? Or are we looking at two years of nothing passes?
5:26 Speaker 01 Well, that depends what happens in the midterms. But let's say that the most likely scenario happens and that there is sort of a split in Congress. Usually when you get to the end of a presidential term and you have a split Congress, the president really has only place to go, which is foreign policy. Now, if there really is a sea change in support about Ukraine, there's really only one foreign policy that Americans can get on board, whether they're Republican or Democrat, and that is China. And I think you're seeing that in general. The one thing that Americans seem to agree about and that their politicians seem able to work with each other about is that China poses a systemic threat to the United States. Now, the ironic thing about that, though, is I think a lot of the inflation that the United States has seen is driven on the supply side. And if you want to attack supply side inflation, whether you like China or not,
6:10 Speaker 01 you want Chinese factories humming double time and you want all the Those things coming out into the world as quickly as possible. So I think ironically, the United States has got itself into this position where the White House wants to bring down inflation. The Fed wants to bring down inflation. And yet we also want to go after China, the second largest economy in the world, doubling down on a trade war with all these semiconductor restrictions that I've been hearing could get a lot worse. So there's a lot to kind of unpack there, but I do think that the American electric and US politicians seem to be on the same page about China. Whether that will stay, once we see some of the economic ramifications of being on the same page about China is a different question.
6:46 Speaker 00 Let's stay with this topic of supply chain issues for a minute here. What's your current assessment of the supply chain issues? Are they abating fast enough for this to sort of spill over to lower inflation pressures next year?
7:02 Speaker 01 That really depends which sort of corner of the economy that you're in. Some places, some parts of the economy, these some haven't. In general, I think we've got issues on the supply side. I was a little bit more optimistic going into the summer because if you remember in June and July, the White House was leaking that, oh, we're going to reconsider some of these Trump tariffs on China temporarily. We're going to have some kind of reprieve. We want to get global trade going again. Then, of course, Nancy Pelosi went to Taiwan and we had a Taiwan Strait crisis. And since then, we've got a real doubling down of the US-China trade war. These semiconductor restrictions that came out in the last couple of weeks are far more serious than anything the Trump administration did toward China and anything the Obama administration did towards China.
7:41 Speaker 01 So any optimism that I had there has pretty much gone up in smoke, especially with the US now pressuring allies like Japan, like the Netherlands, saying, you got to get on board or we're going to get mad at you as well. So, you know, there are some ways where the fears of global recession are driving down prices and fears over demand destruction. That is giving you somewhat of a reprieve in inflation. But if we're going towards this multipolar world and companies and countries rebuilding supply chains, that means that means goods are going to cost more. That's a pretty simple equation. I don't see that going away in the current monetary environment.
8:12 Speaker 00 If we stay within the topic of US-China relations, this Chips and Science Act that you referred to, sort of trying to bolster US semiconductor capacity, what do you make of it? Is it important to know?
8:25 Speaker 01 Well, I think we're sort of cutting off our hand despite our face, in a sense. The global semiconductor supply chain is arguably the most interconnected, most sophisticated supply chain in the world. It is, in some ways, the perfect emblem of globalization. Taiwan specializes in the fabs. And South Korea specializes in memory. And Japan specializes in things like photoresist. China assembles a lot of the lower-end things. We do a lot of software design in the United States that a lot of other countries can't do. The Netherlands has a true monopoly over the equipment that you need to actually create the most cutting-edge chips. So if you're going to go after China when it comes to semiconductors, you just have to understand the United States has some domestic capability, but it certainly can't replicate the entire semiconductor supply chain by itself
9:09 Speaker 01 in any kind of meaningful timeframe. And that's why you're seeing auto companies are saying, well, how are we going to get our chips? That's why you're seeing all these exceptions going out and exemptions going out from the Biden White House to, okay, TSMC, you can wait a year before these things actually count in. Okay, Intel, you can wait a year before we're actually going to enforce some of these things. So from that point of view, I think it's the United States has this goal about containing China. But the problem with globalization and being as interconnected as we are with China means if you go after them for real, you're also going at yourself a little bit. And I think the White House is facing what happens when you go after China and go after yourself in the context of this inflationary environment.
9:49 Speaker 02 We're going to take a quick break and be right back with more of the day's top analysis on the Real Vision Daily Briefing.
9:55 Speaker 00 Jacob, what do you make of the potential Chinese response to all of this? We obviously know that Taiwan is of interest to China. But do you see Taiwan as sort of the obvious next step for China to intervene in? Or what's the next step here?
10:15 Speaker 01 No, I don't see that. China is up the creek without a paddle, as we used to say back home on the farm. They're in a really difficult position. They cannot achieve all the ambitious goals they have for their economy to 2025 without foreign investment, without foreign know-how, without foreign technology. So the United States is leaning on a pressure point. It really is affecting the Chinese economy here. Look, when it comes to Taiwan, I will be the first to tell you that China wants Taiwan. I'll also be the first to tell you that I think in the long run, China probably will have Taiwan. But we're talking about a time horizon there of decades. Right now, here today, or for the next two to five years even, I'd be willing to say, China simply doesn't have the military capability to go after Taiwan. They just started building advanced amphibious landing craft in the
10:59 Speaker 01 last couple of years. They just started graduating fighter pilots who can go on and off aircraft carriers, I think around 2015, 2016. The playbook for China with Taiwan is Hong Kong. It's not like what Russia's doing in Ukraine. It's about isolating Taiwan politically, economically, all these different ways, so that it's a fait accompli, and they can just flip the switch one day and nobody's going to defend them. That's why ironically, if you go after these semiconductor supply chains, you're actually sort of shooting Taiwan in the foot. Because once the world doesn't need Taiwan anymore, once everybody has their own fab capacity, or a couple of countries outside of Taiwan have their own fab capacity, so nobody's going to have an interest in actually defending Taiwan beyond sort of rhetorical statements, which I don't take very seriously in my line of geopolitics. So no, I'm not
11:44 Speaker 01 worried about China going after Taiwan militarily on a two to five-year time horizon. I do think, though, that the Chinese strategy of very slowly over time isolating Taiwan economically and politically is working and will probably work in the end.
11:58 Speaker 00 We've obviously had a lot of chatter about a potential reopening of China this week and last week. President Xi is traveling again. He takes visits from Germany. The Pfizer vaccine is apparently approved now in China. So there are these bits and pieces outside of the more official rumors, so to speak. What do you make of this potential reopening story, first of all?
12:22 Speaker 01 Well, right now, it's based on a lot of rumors, and I don't put a lot of stock in rumors. I will say, though, that point you made about the Pfizer bio and tech vaccine, that one sort of made me sit up in my chair. Now, it's not approved for Chinese citizens. It's approved for foreign expats in China. But one of the things that has prevented China from reopening up is that they have not been willing to import foreign vaccines. They've been trying to give Chinese citizens their own crappy vaccines, and a lot of Chinese citizens haven't been taking them. I think it's something like 200 million Chinese people who are in whatever China qualifies as elderly haven't gotten vaccines. A little weird when you think about this authoritarian totalitarian state can't even get shots in Chinese arms, but you and I probably wouldn't want experimental Chinese vaccines either. They're not very good.
13:04 Speaker 01 So if China is taking a step towards importing foreign vaccines, that could be a big sign. In general, though, I think we just have a bunch of mixed signals. You have a lot of rumors on the ground about maybe China is reopening. You have Mr. Market obviously telling you that for some reason, people are optimistic. They're seeing some things. You're getting the National Health Commission and other sources in China coming out and very stridently saying, there's nothing to this. It's still zero COVID. We're tweaking things around the edges, but we're not actually changing policy that much. So there's a lot there to kind of figure out before we can say which way it's going. I'm not ready to decide which way it is, but I think it's serious enough to consider. I will just say one more thing for your audience, which is, don't get too hung up on the rumors about China's COVID reopening.
13:49 Speaker 01 There are still plenty of other, much more important things that we absolutely know are happening in China right now. They are staring down the barrel of a real estate crisis. They're trying to engineer a soft landing in the real estate crisis. That's a huge deal in an economy where most middle-class citizens have their wealth, not in stocks, not in bonds, but in real estate. The other thing, and I thought this went underreported last week, was that China's announced, the Ministry of Finance announced last week, a major tax reform initiative. China really doesn't have real estate taxes or inheritance taxes and things like that. They were actually going to try and pilot a property tax this year. They had to pull it back because of the real estate crisis. So if we're getting Xi showing his hand about how he's going to redistribute wealth from the coast to the interior, if he's going to start taxing different companies
14:33 Speaker 01 or different individuals in different ways, that's all real tangible stuff we can sink our teeth into that is not screen caps of rumors of, oh, they might be opening up at some point or another. So I'm not saying ignore it. It's a huge story if it's true. There's a lot of conflicting information, but there's also a lot of other really important stuff happening in China.
14:51 Speaker 00 Yeah, and we obviously had extremely poor export and import data out of China today. So the economy is suffering big time currently as a consequence of this real estate crisis. So let me throw a thesis at you in relation to this real estate crisis. As far as I can see, it is basically a self-inflicted crisis. They wanted to take down some of the over-leveraged parts of the real estate sector. So if it's a self-inflicted crisis, you can also solve it again overnight. Is that a fair assessment or what do you think of it?
15:23 Speaker 01 One man's self-inflicted crisis is another man's responsible governance. What has the entire world wanted out of China for decades? Responsible government, stop with the empty debt spending and calories. You're absolutely right that the Chinese government and Xi Jinping wanted to punish property developers for lending irresponsibly. He told them and warned them in 2018 and 2019, stop lending irresponsibly. There's not going to be 2008 or 2015 level stimulus for you if you do things irresponsibly. I'm not going to backstop everything. It's why some of the real estate companies that are sort of closer to the Chinese government, they have gotten bailed out or they've gotten favorable terms on things, whereas these property companies that didn't, that ignored the rectors from the Chinese government have not been doing well.
16:05 Speaker 01 So I actually view it as a positive for China long term if they stick to their guns here. If they have to reverse course and bail out the property sector, which to your point, they absolutely can if they want to, but if they are forced to do that from a position of social stability, they're just kicking the can down the road and eventually they're going to have to open that can and eventually they're going to have to take their medicine. I actually view it as a very positive thing for Xi Jinping's rule going forward for China's macroeconomic health and stability. If it can say, no, we're not just going to throw out the stimulus to you. We're not just going to bail you out. There are going to be consequences for businesses that fail or do things that don't act on market principles or are not in line with what the Chinese Communist Party said. So I agree with what you said, but I'd spin it a little differently.
16:51 Speaker 00 Seen from your sort of geopolitical perspective, is China at all investable given this ongoing real estate crisis, given this almost permanent zero COVID policy?
17:03 Speaker 01 Absolutely. I would be cautious about where I invest and what I invest in. I think that in large part, I don't think, a lot of foreign investors, when you're buying China ETFs, it's all Alibaba or Tencent or the big Chinese tech names. That's actually, in some ways, the least interesting part of the Chinese economy to me. If you want to invest in China, you want to find the small companies that are at the center of innovation or that are being backed by the Chinese government that are going to fill in for these parts of the supply chain that apparently China's not going to be able to advance anymore. So China's chipmaker, main chipmaker semiconductor company is SMIC. That's a great, that's a great potential opportunity, especially if they're going to be the Intel or the TSMC of China in sort of a multifurcated world. So I don't buy this idea that China's uninvestable.
17:48 Speaker 01 There are only a few countries in the world that are truly uninvestable. North Korea, Russia today, like, that's uninvestable. China's high risk, high reward. I would be very cautious and very surgical about where you go in it. But there are certainly opportunities in the world's second-largest economy with over a billion people, which is having to basically rebuild its supply chains from scratch on the go. There are absolutely opportunities there.
18:11 Speaker 00 Fair assessment, Jacob. If we move to another story surrounding China from just this week, we've seen headlines that China plans to travel to Saudi Arabia, maybe to even orchestrate a deal with the Saudis on oil and a potential broader cooperation, right? Is this the first step from the Chinese in terms of trying to end the US hegemony and maybe even the so-called petrodollars? Is it something that we should be scared about, seen from the US soil?
18:42 Speaker 01 China would love it if it was only so easy that Xi Jinping goes to MBS and has a tea or whatever they drink there and they end US hegemony. No, we're not there. Now, China's been, has become one of Saudi Arabia's, if not Saudi Arabia's, most important customer. And the United States is now a major oil producer. So United States dependence on Saudi Arabia is much less. So that's been kind of true over time. But go look at stats from the IMF or the Bank of International Settlements about how much the yuan is actually used as a global currency. It's something like Like two and a half percent. It's roughly in line with the Canadian dollar and the Australian dollar. So should we be concerned that Australia and Canada are going to take over the world too? A lot of that yuan is held by the Russians anyway, for reasons that we don't have to go into.
19:25 Speaker 01 So, no, it doesn't herald the end of the petrodollar. It doesn't herald the end of American hegemony. What it does tell you is that this huge seismic shift where the United States is no longer a net energy importer and is not dependent on the Middle East for its oil. And where China, which for most of its history, didn't have to go outside of the Middle Kingdom to get its resources, now has to go to the Middle East, now has to build enough of a military capability to protect its supply chains from the Middle East. That's a huge seismic shift in and of its own right and comes with its own attendant things. I think we can talk about that shift without waxing philosophical about the end of the petrodollar.
20:01 Speaker 00 Yeah, fair, Jacob. Let's move to another big oil producer, a member of the OPEC plus, namely Russia. If we look at the current status of the conflict in the eastern parts of Ukraine, a month or two back, we heard about progress being made by the Ukrainians week in and week out. But it seems as if that progress has sort of caught a standstill. What's your assessment of the most recent moves of the conflict here?
20:32 Speaker 01 I don't know about a standstill. If you believe the reports, they attacked Sevastopol with drones at the end of last weekend, causing Russia to temporarily blink on the grain deal. The problem is the weather. It's getting cold. You've got muddy conditions there that it's really hard to move across. I think both sides are trying to establish their defensive lines and their gains for the winter and into the spring, when it's really hard to fight over that terrain. And probably you'll see a reanimation of that conflict after the spring mud goes away. So I wouldn't, I wouldn't make any conclusions based on Ukraine's progress slowing down quite yet. What I see is that Russia is continuing to mobilize and trying to establish its position. Ukraine is making opportunistic attacks as it wants. And it seems to me we're getting towards a frozen conflict, literally, just for the winter and into the spring muddy season.
21:17 Speaker 01 And once we get past that, if Vladimir Putin is still president of Russia, which is an if, you'd probably see that conflict kick off again.
21:25 Speaker 02 We're going to take another quick break and be right back with more of the day's top analysis on the Real Vision Daily Briefing.
21:35 Speaker 00 There's been a lot of discussions ongoing around the Western sanctions on Russia, also in the energy space, in particular on oil. What do you make of these sanctions on oil? Do they work as intended? Or will they ever work as intended? What's your take?
21:54 Speaker 01 It depends what "work" means. If the sanctions were designed to deter Russia from invading Ukraine or to stop it from invading Ukraine, they obviously failed. So, I mean, you can inflict, maybe it will inflict enough pain on the Russian economy so that the Russians overthrow Putin and then it stops. But I think by just about every objective metric so far, we can say that the oil sanctions have failed.
22:16 Speaker 00 And what's your assessment of the Russian economy in the context of these sanctions? How much suffering do they actually impose on Russia by now?
22:27 Speaker 01 That's more difficult to say. What I hear on the ground in Russia is that things are very difficult. I mean, Russia has basically gone from being a great power to becoming China's de facto gas station. So congratulations to Vladimir Putin for that amazing strategic maneuver. Look, this is not going to be easy for Russia. Russia is rich in mineral commodities and it has powers around it that are going to want to import those mineral commodities. But I think obviously Russia has become a very weak economy and it's showing that it's a very weak country in general. I alluded to them pulling out of the grain deal momentarily last week after Ukraine or after someone, it was probably Ukraine, attacked Russian ships around Crimea. What happened after Russia decided to pull out of the grain deal? Exports kept going.
23:12 Speaker 01 Nobody gave a crap. Everybody was just like, "Okay, Russia, thank you for your angry statement. We're not going to take you seriously at all now." So when I think about Russia, actually, what I'm thinking about over at Cognitive Investments is who benefits the most from a weak Russia? And the answers to those questions are countries like Poland, countries like Germany, even China to a certain extent, although they don't want to lose their other balance against the United States. But there's also a lot of cheap energy they want there. They get to move into Central Asia without a lot of opposition. So I would tell your audience to think about what Russian weakness means and to think in some of those areas of Eastern Europe, Central Asia, East Asia that may have been ignored or that we might not have been thinking about because we're too focused on whatever crazy statement comes out of the Kremlin.
23:57 Speaker 00 Obviously, we have no gas flowing to Europe from Russia via the Nord Stream pipelines anymore, and we almost have no gas flowing via the Yamal Europe pipeline either. So this was basically the hot topic two, three months ago in Europe ahead of the winter season. You were one of the very few calling for a bit more optimistic scenarios for Europe this winter. Please take us through your thinking on the energy scenarios ahead for Europe this winter.
24:27 Speaker 01 Happy to. The first thing I will say is that it was not hard to be optimistic because if you actually go back and look at the headlines, people were writing things like, this is the end of European civilizations. We know it. People are going to be dying in the streets because they're not going to be able to keep their homes. My point was, no, no, prices are going to be extremely high. There will be a lot of pressure on these governments. Energy-intensive industries in countries like Hungary, like Slovakia, we're going to get that euphemism of demand destruction. It's going to bleed into Germany as well. But this really comes down to a political question. Do you think that the European Union is going to come together in the face of this crisis and A, use its combined resources to make sure that there is enough energy to go around for the winter and into next year? And then B, going forward, is Europe going to invest as a result of this crisis in energy
25:12 Speaker 01 infrastructure and in alternative sources of energy so that this doesn't happen to them again? I'd also remind your listeners, if you look at a chart of what the Europeans have been paying for natural gas over the last five to seven years versus what we pay in the United States, they've been paying way more. It's not like they were getting cheaper natural gas from Russia than we've had in the United States. In some ways, if this galvanizes Europe into actually investing so that in two, three years from now, it is driving down the cost of energy in a way that it wasn't even in the last five to seven years, that's going to be a net positive for Europe too. I'd also just remind your listeners, one of the moments that I got where my optimism really crystallized was, I think it was, I think it was in August or September, I'd have to go back and find the date.
25:54 Speaker 01 The German government came out and said, as a result of the potential energy shortages at night, we will now turn off all of the lights on the historic building in Germany. And I stopped and I said, okay, so it's taken six months to turn Turn off the lights on the historic buildings in Germany in an energy crisis. I'm pretty sure we can find 10, 15% energy reduction for things that actually don't matter. And I'm sure we can supplement with some coal. Let's build some floating LNG terminals that are going to come or rent them and that are going to come online in January. Let's cobble together as much things as we can. Let's, let's change our, our story about nuclear power. I'll know the Germans are really serious when they start thinking about extending the life of nuclear reactors and building new nuclear reactors.
26:34 Speaker 01 So again, I don't mean to downplay how high prices could go, especially if you get a particularly cold snap, even for a week or two. One of the reasons I look really good right now is because this was one of the warmest months of October on record for Europe. Somebody, I was joking on my podcast the other day, Putin really should have talked to a meteorologist. Apparently if you look at meteorological cycles, it would have been a much colder winter in Europe in a couple of years from now. Maybe he didn't have time, but it's been an extremely warm October. All the forecasts suggest that it's going to be a pretty warm winter in general. So you could get a cold snap for a week or two that caused one of those crazy spikes. But in general, I'm pretty optimistic.
27:12 Speaker 01 The place that I'm not optimistic is you've got a bunch of wealthy European states purchasing coal LNG at spot prices, hand over fist. And so they're muscling out poorer countries like Pakistan that can't meet the European level of money that they're throwing around. Asian countries like Japan, South Korea. If you get a cold snap there and suddenly there's competition for some of those cargoes, you could see some very explosive temporary movements. So I'm not saying everything is going to be perfect over here, but in general, it's much more nuanced. It's not doom and gloom. There's problems, but then there's also opportunity. And I think with Europe, a significant long-term opportunity, once you get past this period of two to three years, maximum of pain.
27:55 Speaker 00 I wanted to play a soundbite for you in relation to this discussion on European natural gas supplies. It's from a discussion I had with Alexander Stahel, a Swiss commodity expert last week. In the interview called A Long Crisis or a New Reality from our Make or Break series. So let's listen to Alexander and get back to this question.
28:17 Speaker 03 Not from Spain, because they don't have enough pipe capacity into France. So it doesn't really flow and that's one of the bottlenecks that we discussed in many, many tweets over the last 18 months, where we simply have what I call imperfect infrastructure. It's one reason why prices react more volatile is because they have to, so to speak, accommodate within a imperfect infrastructure of Europe. Now, you could say, why don't you deliver the stuff into Germany? Now, they are at the moment also quite full in storage, but they have a lot more storage, like six times more storage than Spain. So now you could argue, why don't they go there? Well, because the Germans don't have import terminals.
28:58 Speaker 03 They will have in January and then the thing should flow better into Europe. But it's what I call again the rotation, right? Europeans' gas infrastructure was 30% coming out of Russia. It was a lot accommodated around the Russian flows, but also so many LNG and so on. But now suddenly we have to go more or less in 18 months accommodating a different way of importing gas and that creates bottlenecks. And one is certainly from Spain into France. France has a lot of storage, but it doesn't have that much terminal capacity. But again, their storage is full too at the moment, so that would not be the solution. The worst example probably is the UK.
29:42 Speaker 03 The UK has a lot of terminal capacity, two very large ones. And yet, they almost have, you know, if the storage is full, they could accommodate four days of gas supply into the UK, which is a joke.
29:58 Speaker 00 The entire interview with Alexander Stahel is already available at Real Vision for subscribers. But back to you, Jacob Shapiro. Alexander's point is that we've built storages in Europe, and I say we, since I live here, over the course of the year, due to the Russian flow still being intact throughout most of the year, right? So next year could be a much bigger issue without any Russian gas flowing. What do you make of that discussion?
30:25 Speaker 01 Well, I'm not going to ascribe what I'm about to say to Alexander, because I think he's right and... Infrastructure is a problem. If we're still having the same conversation 12 months from now and Europe has not gotten together and thrown a lot of money at developing infrastructure very, very quickly, I'm wrong. And this could be a thing that is really going to lead to deindustrialization in Europe and demand destruction in general. But just remember the median error. First, it was there was going to be a cataclysmic crisis in the winter. Then it was, no, it's really going to come in the springtime. That's when things are going to get bad. Now it's being pushed back to, no, it's really next winter because we're not going to be able to fill up the storage containers. I mean, this is Seventh Day Adventist type stuff. If the forecast is not right the first time, just put a different date on it and push it back a little bit. So again, I think Alexander's much smarter than I am when it comes to commodities. I would even accept that maybe
31:09 Speaker 01 I'm downplaying the risk to commodities. And I already told you, I think there are going to be significant price spikes. If you get a cold snap, you're going to see spikes that maybe look like some of the concerns that we had in the summer. But I'm the political expert here, and my political forecast is that the European Union is going to come together and realize, okay, like Germany, some of these Eastern European states, we bet on Russia, we bet wrong. So now we need to marshal a lot of investment very, very quickly in order to make sure we're not dependent on Russia, to make sure we have European-wide energy infrastructure, so that Spain can import LNG and send it over to the Czech Republic if they need it. We're going to have to do that extremely quickly. We're going to have to source LNG and natural gas from other parts of the world. We're not just going to be able to go to Russia and get everything we need.
31:51 Speaker 01 We're going to have to work a little bit harder and send diplomats to more countries and things like that. But I expect 12, 24 months from now, especially when all the LNG that's coming online from countries like Qatar, the United States, maybe Canada, Australia, there will be plenty of opportunity for Europe to drive the cost of energy down if they use this crisis as a moment to invest. The best example I can use of this is I think the German plan to help their energy sector and industrial companies and consumers is something like 200 billion euros. Newsflash, they can afford that. All that German austerity over the past couple of decades, you save so that when you have a crisis, you can intervene and then buy yourself enough time so that you can avert a real cataclysm. So if I'm
32:34 Speaker 01 wrong here, it's because I'm wrong about the politics of the European Union, and the European Union is going to fall apart. And the Spaniards are not going to be willing to help the Czechs and the Germans aren't going to be willing to help the Italians. I don't think that's the situation we're in. I think in some ways Russia has done more for European unity than any other country could have thought possible. Like, and in that sense, I'm bullish about the European Union and therefore, though I think that there will be problems in the next year or two, I do think beyond this, Europe will be okay. And that's where I'm looking. I'm, we know that there's going to be problems this winter. The question is, what's going to happen two, three years from now in Europe? I think this crisis means two, two or three years from now in Europe looks a lot better than most people are saying.
33:12 Speaker 00 Fingers crossed. Jacob, I wanted to allow time for a few questions from the audience around another couple of geopolitical hot topics. We have a question from our member Ralph asking you what you make of the moves Turkey is making to leverage and strengthen its strategic position right now.
33:35 Speaker 01 Well, full disclosure, I'm very bullish on Turkey. I've been long Turkey now for a long time, a long time for about 11 months now. Turkey is ideally suited for a multipolar geopolitical world. It stands to benefit a lot. It is still fairly dependent on Russia for energy imports, but again, they've got a lot of natural gas in the Black Sea probably coming online here in the next two, three years as well. So if Putin had picked this war two, three years from now, I'm not sure that Turkey would have been this kind of pragmatic, you know, wheeler dealer in the middle, willing to play all sides. But in general, look, Turkish politics have some problems and we've got a Turkish election coming up in June. And once we resolve the result of that election, we probably, we probably decrease the uncertainty a lot. But this is a country that has astride some
34:18 Speaker 01 of the most important trading lanes in the world. It's the only country in the Middle East that is a modern industrial economy. It's stealing market share from Europe in some ways in terms of manufacturing. It is a true Mediterranean power too. So if you look at where Turkey's been building, building military bases, they're in Libya, they're in Djibouti, they're, you know, confronting the French in the Mediterranean over their position in Libya. So I think Turkey is a rising power. It'll be really interesting to see what happens in the June election. But I think what's going to happen is either Erdogan's going to get reelected and he's going to Have to dial back some of his quote unquote unorthodox monetary policy. Or if you believe the polls, the 85% plus inflation, and that's just the official number, is leading to a real Turkish opposition congealing together for the first time in over 20 years.
35:02 Speaker 01 So can you imagine a scenario where Erdogan's no longer there and a Turkish opposition comes in that is much more friendly to foreign investment? That could be an incredible move. So in general, I like Turkey's geopolitics. If it even gets a modicum of political stability, watch out.
35:17 Speaker 00 Yeah, fair assessment, Jacob. Last thing I wanted to touch upon is Brazil. We've got a bunch of questions on Brazil since it's been one of the better performing markets worldwide, basically, through this cost of living crisis this year. We obviously have Lula coming in as the next president come January. What do you make of Brazil and maybe Latin America as a region in light of Lula becoming the next president?
35:46 Speaker 01 Well, again, not investment advice, but over at CI have been bullish Brazil. I am doubling down on Brazil in the wake of the results of the election. The Brazilian election is a great example of how we focus too much on personalities. Bolsonaro and Lula are both very strange men. Bolsonaro, my favorite story about him is that he said, if you get the COVID-19 vaccine, you're going to turn into a crocodile. Lula was in Time Magazine a couple of months ago, saying that the war in Ukraine was Zelensky's fault. So we're sort of out of the frying pan into the fryer here when it comes to Brazil. But Brazil's geopolitical strengths and advantages outweigh the crazy personalities. This is a huge economy with all the sorts of commodities that are booming right now in the rest of the world and that everybody's going to want going forward. They have no real rivals in their vicinity.
36:31 Speaker 01 The only potential rival is Argentina, and they're a complete dumpster fire, so they don't have to worry about them. Brazil totally has scale if it wants to build up and be that most important power in South America. I think the other thing that's going on in Brazil, if you look underneath the sexy, catchy politics at the very top level, there's a lot of changes in terms of where are interest rates going and what's happening with the tax code and are Brazilian entrepreneurs growing? You're getting positive answers to all those questions. If we zoom back a little bit, Latin America in general, like any region, there are bright spots and there are dark spots. In general, I think it's a good time for Latin America. It's rich in commodities
37:12 Speaker 01 and resources. It's away from a lot of the geopolitical instability in Eurasia. Latin America in some ways was the continent, or I shouldn't say the continent, was the region of the world that suffered the most from China ascending into its role in globalization because instead of actually becoming integral parts of the supply chain, they just sent commodities to China and China got all of the intellectual property and foreign investment and became the manufacturer of the world. And I think that's beginning to change. So there are parts of Latin America where you do have more rule of law, more stability, places like Brazil, places like Chile, maybe Mexico, that's kind of, we need a whole nother session just to talk about that one, where I'm optimistic. There are other countries, Peru right now, as long as that government's in place, stay away. Argentina is in a show
37:56 Speaker 01 me position. Until they show me that they can have a modicum of stable governance, staying very, very far away. First returns on the new Colombian president. He hasn't been more center-left than I thought. He's been able to pass some more things than I thought he'd be able to. And now he's cozying up with Venezuela this week. So Colombia too, I would start to cast or raise an eyebrow at. But there are certainly opportunities in Latin America and geopolitically, Latin America should do better in a world that is more multipolar, where they get to not just be a provider of commodities, but actually welcome in manufacturing and foreign investment in those sorts of ways.
38:31 Speaker 00 Doubling down on the positivity on Brazil, positive on Turkey, less skeptical than consensus on Europe, and maybe more skeptical than the current hope to visit on the Chinese reopening. Is that a fair summary of this 30 minutes geopolitical talk, Jacob?
38:51 Speaker 01 Couldn't have said it better myself. Apparently, we didn't need to talk. You should have just done that for 30 seconds and we could have chatted about basketball or Kyrie Irving or something.
38:58 Speaker 00 Jacob Shapiro, it was an absolute pleasure to host you at the Real Vision Daily Briefing. Thank you for joining us.
39:05 Speaker 01 Cheers.
39:07 Speaker 00 And thank you out there for watching the daily briefing. We will be back again tomorrow with Jared Dillian guesting the show. See you there.
39:20 Speaker 04 What's up revolutionaries? Thanks for tuning in to the Real Vision Daily Briefing. For more content like this, head over to realvision.com and get unfiltered access to the very best, brightest and biggest names in finance.
Previous The Next Big Trade - Luke Gromen on Why It's Best to "Be Long Energy" Right Now Next Let’s Talk Election Day Price Action Page updated October 28, 2026 · transcript and summary are machine-generated