Pod Insights Real Vision: Finance & Investing Are We Trapped in a Silent Depression? With Jeffrey Snider About this episode 🔥 GET 3 months of Real Vision for Just $49 https://rvtv.io/3ZyY70tJeffrey Snider, host of EuroDollar University, joins Maggie Lake to discuss the market reaction to today's Fed Beige Book release, the significance of some selling in U. S. 20-Year Treasury bonds, what he expects from the Fed in November, and why the global economy may be stuck in a "silent depression."You can join Jeff's free webinar on Friday, October 20 @ 6:30 p.m. ET here: https://event.webinarjam.com/register/18/qqx25toToday's episode is sponsored by KraneShares KCCA ETF, the largest, most liquid, and only public market California allowance ETF. Please read the prospectus before investing in KraneShares. Learn more about the KCCA ETF here: https://kraneshares.com/KCCA/realvision. Investing involves risk. Principal loss is possible. KCCA is distributed by SEI Investment Distribution Company (SIDCO). Unlock the potential to showcase your brand to our global audience. Contact us at [email protected] for advertising inquiries. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Transcript 0:00 Speaker 00 Hi, everyone. Today's Real Vision Daily Briefing is sponsored by Crane Shares. Learn about their KCCA ETF at craneshares.com/kcca/realvision. Now to the top analysis of today's markets.
0:25 Speaker 00 Are we trapped in a silent depression? Hi, everyone. Welcome to the Real Vision Daily Briefing. With me today is Jeff Snyder, host of the Eurodollar University. Hey, Jeff, it's great to have you back on.
0:35 Speaker 01 Hi, Maggie. How are you?
0:36 Speaker 00 I'm doing OK. I finished a very long conversation with Peter Zeon today. So anybody who knows him, I'm doing as best as can be expected after covering every problem in the geopolitical landscape. But we've got some other issues that are market-related that I want to talk about. And the idea of a silent depression is one that you've been discussing on YouTube. But it seems very contrary with the markets been focused on this week when you think about the stronger-than-expected retail sales, the potential for sticky inflation, the 10-year yield, which hit a 16-year high today. So walk us through your thinking a little bit right now. How is your view? What's your view? And how's it square up with some of these market narratives that are out there?
1:21 Speaker 00 And let's start with bonds, maybe.
1:24 Speaker 01 Well, you know, it's the idea that we've left the 2010s behind. And we don't really, we've never really settled what the 2010s were. It was kind of lackluster. But by the time we got to 2018 and 2019, we heard stories about the low unemployment rate and labor shortages and the emergence of all sorts of inflationary pressures. And then we got the pandemic, which sort of interrupted everything. And then the post-pandemic period has been characterized, at least by most people, as red-hot economies everywhere, a massive inflationary breakout. And so you go back to the 2010s, and it looks like that's been left completely behind. But when you examine all the statistics and the evidence, what you see is that we're still living in the shadow of the 2008 crisis, whether retail sales...
2:10 Speaker 01 In September 2023, were good or not, it doesn't change the long run shape of the underlying economic condition or the background that we're trying to navigate in. And, you know, just to be clear, this is not a US only phenomenon, nor a Western phenomenon. And it explains much of maybe the geopolitics that we were talking about with Peter, where we have this prolonged period of economic stagnation that really has never been accounted for, nor has anybody answered the question about, you know, where it came from or why it's still there. There have been some, you know, some commentators who have offered some suggestion. You know, Larry Summers back in 2014, he said secular stagnation. Some people started to pay attention. Then, you know, again, the unemployment rate went down and everybody just forgot all about it.
2:55 Speaker 01 But when you look around the the global economy, especially some of the emerging markets, China, for example, what you see is that 2008 continues to be that major inflection point where the rate of change didn't fall off a cliff like the 1930s. It just, it fell down and then it completely changed thereafter. So even though output is growing, it's not growing in the same way, nor the same sustainable fashion as it did before 2008. So while we have variable short run conditions here and there along the way, we still, when you step back and look at it from a wider angle and from a larger perspective, you still see that silent depression in the background. And the longer it goes,
3:37 Speaker 01 the tougher it gets for geopolitics on top of everything else.
3:41 Speaker 00 So why, so we, so the data you look at tell you that we are in this silent depression, or at least it's a prolonged period of subpar growth. So two things. Why is it? What happened around the great financial crisis that cast this enormous shadow? I mean, you just mentioned that we never really got to the bottom of it. Do you have a sense of sort of what the root or the roots of the problem, where that lies?
4:11 Speaker 01 Actually, you know who had the answer? It was a fellow by the name of Ben Bernanke. And he wasn't talking about the 2008 crisis when he gave us the answer. He actually wrote a paper in 1983 where he said, "Look, we explained the Great Depression, its prolonged nature by the fact that the early collapse after 1929, essentially you had a monetary deflationary panic like we had had previously throughout industrial history. But that particular monetary collapse impaired the banking system so that credit creation, redistribution throughout the 1930s remained impaired to the point where we didn't have a recovery where one should have happened by the mid 1930s at the latest." So what Bernanke said was, "Look, if you have a broken banking system, you shouldn't expect a recovery."
4:56 Speaker 01 I'm oversimplifying quite a bit here, but that was the general gist of it. So we had another major monetary breakdown in 2008. It wasn't about subprime mortgages. It wasn't a financial crisis. It was a dollar shortage, a euro-dollar shortage specifically. And in the euro-dollar method of money, it's the banks who created redistributes euro dollars. And so by having that crisis to begin with, we already impaired the banking system and the ability of the banking system to supply and distribute money and credit throughout the economy to have a recovery. It was, in essence, a repeat of the 1930s. And it was never fixed. It was never solved. And all the statistics you see, and that's not just, I mean, macroeconomic accounts like GDP all over the world, they fell off trend and never gone back.
5:41 Speaker 01 We have monetary indications that continue to point toward repeated dollar shortages. Every couple of years, we go through one. And every time we go through one, it short-circuits the economy that might have a plausible path to recovery. And it just, we're stuck in this rut, this 16, almost 17-year rut, where it's all of these things combined, in the big-picture sense, have changed the way the global economy operates. We have less globalization, less cooperation, less trade, less financial flows. Everything is more inefficient and rigid. With less economic cooperation, of course, you have less political cooperation, because if we're not...
6:20 Speaker 01 benefiting in the same way. We don't have the same incentives to get along. We don't have the same incentives to ignore each other's, you know, whatever bothered me about you yesterday that I ignored when the economy was great. I'm going to focus on that today because there's not the same incentives to do so. So it's a monetary breakdown, but more than that, it's it's a complete change in the banking system, which, I mean, regulations that came along afterwards didn't help. Because they make credit and risk taking that much more expensive and capital intensive. So it's a whole bunch of stuff that combined. That when you look at them in isolation, you think it doesn't seem all that bad until you put all of these together in one big comprehensive picture. You see, 2008 comes back, it shows up literally everywhere.
7:05 Speaker 00 That's amazing. You have a chart you sent over and I want to go through some of them, but this is this is worrying on so many levels because there's there's no apparent remedy or you can't solve the problem if you're not even defining it. So it sounds like we've been saying all along with this Fed aggressively hiking interest rates, something's going to break, something's going to break. It sounds like you're saying it was already broken. It was already broken and it's not fixed and no one's talking about how to fix it. And that is the banking system.
7:36 Speaker 01 That's where it starts. And it's really, I mean, you talk about what's really defining the last several years. It's fragility, right? And, you know, we can see it everywhere. It's not just in US banks or US regional banks, global banks. I mean, we can't forget about Credit Suisse earlier this year. And so we have this immense fragility in the monetary system. But again, everybody just kind of forgot about it because number one, it's so long in the past. You don't think that something like this could last for 16 years. And number two, I mean, authorities have said, don't worry, but we've got this covered. We'll just do QEs forever until we fix the problem. When you have to sit back and realize the reason they continue to do QEs is because it isn't fixing the problem.
8:20 Speaker 01 And that maybe the point of QE and all of the monetary programs that were done up until recently was simply to get people to stop paying attention to the way the the the economy and the system has changed and transformed over the years since. So after all of that happened, we have this incredibly fragile system that doesn't perform in robust and resilient fashion. So of course, we should expect things to go wrong and break down.
8:44 Speaker 00 So did the actions taken by monetary authorities during the great financial crisis cause these problems? Or were they already in route? Because you said it wasn't subprime. Were they already happening and it just caused a breakdown and that was the response mechanism? Is it the cause or was it a symptom of what was broken even before the great financial crisis?
9:09 Speaker 01 Central bank policies are always reactive. They're never proactive. So something happens, they react to it. Usually something happens and then a long time later they react to it when it becomes clear and obvious. So, you know, there was, we can never, we can never say for sure about counterfactuals, but it's, I mean, the system was heading toward that direction anyway because it had been inherently unstable, especially during the later years of the real estate bubble. Obviously, it was, it was no longer moderate. It was quite immoderate. And there were a number of inherent contradictions and inherent flaws in the methodology anyway. So it was likely it was heading for a breakdown. And when it actually finally showed up, I mean, authorities downplayed it for as long
9:51 Speaker 01 as they possibly could because that's what they do, until it became clear that you could no longer do so. And then afterward, it was, what do we do to fix it? Well, if they don't really know what the problem is, the solution they offered was let's just kind of hope it all goes back to the way it was. If we buy enough time, we get enough people to believe that we're doing something helpful, then maybe the thing will just fix itself and we won't have to worry about it. But that, you know, that was, it's more of a hope than it is an actual solution or strategy. And they've been following that same strategy repeatedly all throughout the last 15, 16, now 17 years. It's basically the same situation that the Japanese found themselves in a few decades before.
10:33 Speaker 01 We're just following along the Japanese path, except now on a global scale rather than just the one particular economy.
10:39 Speaker 00 Hey, everyone. We're going to take a quick break right now to hear a word from our partners. We'll be right back with more of the day's top analysis on the Real Vision Daily Briefing.
10:51 Speaker 00 So Nick asking, when it comes to the Euro-dollar issue, it sounds like the Fed can't control or fix the issue. How can it be fixed? So are we right in thinking this goes to your sort of larger theory that everyone's lost control of the Euro-dollar? Sort of that big shadow money system that's out there that no one can really control? Is it related to that? Is Nick following along the right line of thinking there?
11:20 Speaker 01 Yeah, the question is, what do you do about it? Now, once you realize that's, that's an issue and that's the problem. How do you fix a banking system that largely operates outside of pretty much any jurisdiction? I mean, that's what Euro-dollar actually means. Means lying, it's, it's a system that's offshore, not just offshore of the US, it's offshore everywhere. And it's one of those situations, once the horses are out of the barn, you can't really get them back in. Once the banking system realized the risks that were inherent in undertaking the activities that the Euro-dollar system needed in order for it to function, in order for the economy to function the same way, you can't go back. And, you know, the way that banks operate these days, whether good or bad, they completely
12:03 Speaker 01 changed the way in which they operate, which means they can't, they literally cannot operate the way they did before. And of course, there's a whole set of questions about whether we want them to. But in the grander scheme of the monetary system and continue to operate it the way it needs to be operated, we would need them to go back to that old way in order for it to be able to perform in the same sort of capacity. So we're kind of stuck between a rock and a hard place because we don't want banks to go back where they were doing subprime mortgages and a lot of other really stupid, insane stuff, too.
12:32 Speaker 00 Like they all had hedge funds basically built in under the roof, right? And were prop trading all over the place.
12:38 Speaker 01 They were hedge funds, they weren't banks. I mean, that's another discussion that we need to have, too. Do we even need these banks at all? Because all they are really is either money creators and, like you said, hedge funds or glorified bookkeepers. And if they're not going to be money creators and hedge funds, then what do we need them for? Because we can do bookkeeping in a different way. But you're exactly right, that the entire nature of... Banking changed and it had to change in order to operate this Euro dollar system, which was, I mean, there was a lot of positives that went along with that for a long period of time. We had a period of unparalleled global prosperity, leading up to 2007, 2008. It would have been nice to take off some of the stupid stuff and maintain some level of sanity, but in many ways, that's just human nature. When we get into these periods of prolonged
13:22 Speaker 01 good times, we just kind of lose track of sense and, you know, we think there is no risk.
13:27 Speaker 00 Greed, isn't that just a definite, didn't you just define greed?
13:30 Speaker 01 Yeah, exactly.
13:32 Speaker 00 I think so.
13:32 Speaker 01 It's greed with no downside, right?
13:34 Speaker 00 And it'll be, there'll be no risk or no consequences, right?
13:37 Speaker 01 Right.
13:38 Speaker 00 We don't need any cargo.
13:39 Speaker 01 But if we think that there is no consequence to being greedy, then the greed really takes over. And they took over the entire banking system that had become detached from what a bank actually is supposed to be.
13:49 Speaker 00 From any social utility, anyway, probably.
13:51 Speaker 01 Absolutely. So that's the big question here is, we can't go back to 2007, but we gotta go forward to something else. But here we are, and we're not doing either. We're not going back to 2007, nor are we moving forward to another system, at least officially, governments aren't doing. I mean, that's what digital projects and currency and cryptocurrencies are.
14:11 Speaker 00 I was gonna say, somewhere, someone's listening to this and their, their brain's going crazy because they're, when, when we're talking about the sort of that system, that we don't have a replacement, they're thinking, they're thinking digital assets. I know, certainly in our audience. And that is, that is a high level connection, but I don't want to, I don't want to get, go down that today because we won't, won't have enough time. But I think what you're saying is so important, and you're not hearing this in very many places, because we keep thinking like, what, what's going on? Like, things don't make sense. And we hear correlations are breaking down, traditional models aren't working, forecasts aren't working. And I think you just really eloquently explained that that's going to continue to be true unless you get to
14:52 Speaker 00 the root of what's going on. And, and sort of address and shine a light on all these tentacles, which carry all the way back from that blow up. So I, I, I want to talk about, let's pull up some of your charts. So, so we, people can see why. You're not just sort of thinking about this in your head, but you're looking at, because I just said to you, oh, you think there's a silent depression right as we were coming on air? And you said, I don't think there is one. The data is telling me there's one. So let's look at some of this data. And maybe let's start with the economic ones, Brian. And I think it's interesting. This is such an interesting conversation to have paired up with the conversation I had with Peter Zion. This was accidental booking, but it's an amazing
15:37 Speaker 00 side by side conversation because you're talking about the financial back end of it. And he's very much talking about the implications. So we know what's been happening in the US. Let's pull up China. You sent some charts over on China. So Brian, it's sort of under, I don't know which one you're looking at, but there's China real real GDP and there's China PBOC total social financing. What one do you want to pull up?
16:04 Speaker 00 Jeff, to sort of highlight why you, maybe the export one, that's really ugly. Why you see this as weakness that's just not limited to the US and that dates back to some of what happened in the great financial crisis. Just tell Brian to pull up whatever one you want.
16:19 Speaker 01 Yeah, that's a good, I mean, the trade statistics are good, GDP statistics. You could, you can see any of them, any of them where you just, you know, look, 2008 shows up as the inflection point in all of them. And just, again, not unlike the, maybe the impression that we have about the 1930s where you have this massive collapse. And then it's just, you know, it's disaster from there. What you have is an inflection point where you have a a contraction, a severe one in 2008, but then the growth after it is severely constrained. It's not the same level of growth. And so you see this continuous ratcheting down of economic activity following 2008. It's a little bit at a time and it's almost like the proverbial boiling frog.
17:00 Speaker 01 Because on a multi-year scale, you're not necessarily going to notice how things are slowing and slowing and slowing and occasionally contracting. It's not coming back in the same way after those contractions. You just don't notice that over a lot of, a long period of time, things have really changed. And when you sit back, You look at it from sixteen years ago and you look at some of these charts and you see, oh my god, I mean, this is a prolonged period where the operation of pretty much every part of the global economy has just incrementally fallen off and fallen off and fallen off. And over that much time, it creates enormous accumulating consequences, not just in terms
17:42 Speaker 01 of monetary systems like we're talking about or banking operations, but again, in the social and political spheres too. And China is such a huge part of it because the Chinese built their entire economy, and so much of the world economy was built on what the Chinese were doing, on this euro-dollar growth period. They were going to transform China from a backward subsistence agricultural economy into a modern industrial powerhouse and then further into the socialist paradise that Marxists and Leninists have been dreaming of for, you know, however many, however many decades. And they got interrupted in 2008. And ever since 2008, in the middle of this transformation, they, they realized it's not the same anymore.
18:24 Speaker 01 So the Chinese have to deal with both the economic, financial, as well as the political fallout of not being able to finish that transformation, which spills over into all of these other spheres. In real, in pure economic terms, China has less demand for its goods, it doesn't build as much in China, which means it's not, it's not demanding other raw materials and other, other, other pieces of assembly from the rest of the world. So in just a direct economic circumstances, there's a slowdown there, but there's also monetary and financial flows that get disrupted too. China was the centerpiece of the globalized euro-dollar world, and they're the ones that are bearing the biggest brunt of it currently because after sixteen years of being unable
19:07 Speaker 01 to restart their growth engine, not for lack of trying, it really places enormous strain on everything that they do, including the political, the political structure there.
19:18 Speaker 00 Yeah, absolutely. And we dove into that today in that conversation. So what about treasuries? If we're in this silent depression and we can't really get growth going, why are treasury, why do we see treasury yields moving higher? Everyone thinks it's because the economy is so hot, Fed's going to have to keep raising rates. I shouldn't say everyone, but you know, a common narrative. Fed's going to have to keep raising rates, maybe inflation stays hot. So bond yields are after artificially being held low are going to, you know, skyrocket. We've seen, we see them today at 16 year highs. What's happening there? Do you, how are you looking at this?
19:57 Speaker 01 Well, first of all, it's not that bond yields were artificially held low. That's a misconception too. Our bond yields were low consistent with a silent depression. Throughout history, you look at the behavior of interest rates. This is what Milton Friedman called the interest rate fallacy. Low rates are associated with tight money and depression. You think about the 1930s, you think about Japan in the 1990s. Rates went down and they stayed down, not because central banks wanted them to, but because demand for safety and liquidity was always high. And in a depressionary circumstance where growth is always at best questionable, you want to own safe and liquid assets. So there was, there was other reasons like collateral shortages too. But there was a number of reasons why interest rates were low and none of them had anything to do with central banks.
20:39 Speaker 01 But now central banks have been confronted by the aftermath of the supply shock where consumer prices have surged on a transitory basis. Yes, I'll use that term. And so they have decided they need to do something about it. And so the only reason that rates are going up is because central banks are trying to force them up. And in various parts over the last, what has it been 18 months now? The central banks have been raising rates. The bond market continues to resist those rate hikes. We saw that after October and November of last year, where rates kind of skyrocketed in August and September as they do seasonally. And then despite continued rate hikes from the Fed and ECB, rates kind of went sideways to lower for what? Six, seven months there pretty solidly.
21:23 Speaker 01 And then they started to tickle back up in the middle of this year. And then we get to August and September. September again and what happens rates go up just like they do every September. And we're into the period where as we get out of the September effect. What is the market going to look is the market going to continue to go higher or the rates going to continue to go higher? Or are they going to go back to what they've been doing over the last year and a half and fight against the Fed increases? That's what yield curve inversion means rates want to go lower. Because they don't think that anything has substantially changed, except that one factor. And that one factor is Jay Powell and Christine Lagarde, not the economy, not the monetary situation. Certainly, when you look along some of the monetary indications.
22:05 Speaker 01 It's monitor bond yields and bond curves have to factor in short term interest rates and the trajectory that everybody expects them to be. But that doesn't mean that those are the only determination for yields. And that's why you see inverted yield curves.
22:17 Speaker 00 We're going to take another quick break to hear a word from our partners. We'll be right back with more of the day's top analysis on the Real Vision Daily Briefing.
22:28 Speaker 00 Yeah, so the short end is responding to what they're hearing from the Fed, but the long end is fighting that with the consistent narrative that. This is, I mean, the name could not be more perfect. What we're talking about anti fragile from YouTube asks, where do you stand on rate hikes? One more and we're done. I mean, it sounds like you think it's only a matter of time before yields start moving lower. Because we're stuck in this quicksand of an economic situation.
22:55 Speaker 01 Yeah, so what part of the problem is to answer the question is we're trying to game plan. What a bunch of politicians are going to do with short term monetary policy rates. And that's not always an economic or a series of economic considerations. That's about other factors, right? I mean, how is the Fed going to react to incoming data? Let's, I mean, we might as well be pop psychologists. So, yeah, I mean, it's likely the Fed is going to raise rates, maybe one or two times. It's hard to know for sure. And it's not really sure about when they might actually start to turn around because they have been made. They've made it very clear. They don't want to. They want to leave short term rates as high as they possibly can because they believe that there's this psychological component to inflation.
23:37 Speaker 01 People get normalized to high consumer prices, suddenly that will become inflation. It's a misreading of the 1970s. So the Federal Reserve is going to do what the Federal Reserve is going to do. But the question is, what is the economy actually doing? What is really happening that maybe the Fed doesn't see? And that's what we'll see, I think, over the weeks ahead that are really important. When you look at this September pattern, and again, this happens every single year going back to 2017. Rates go up in September and they sometimes continue into October and maybe even November. And then you get toward the end of the year and more of the fundamental assertions in the market start to come back out to the forefront again.
24:17 Speaker 01 So the next couple of weeks will be important about which way the fundamental part of the bond market will respond, regardless of what the Federal Reserve is going to do. Is it going to be like last year where even though central banks were even more aggressive, rates continued to go down? Or is there something actually changed this year? That's what we need to figure out from the bond market.
24:37 Speaker 00 Yeah, so I'm going to ask about supply in a second, but I want to bring up the dollar. Somebody in the chat, and I've lost you, mentioned the dollar milkshake theory. When I was speaking with Peter today, we covered a lot of ground. And one of the things that came up is the idea that the world is moving away from a dollar standard. I know it's something you think about. Let's listen to a clip of that and then we'll talk on the other side.
25:01 Speaker 02 The Chinese were very clear at the BRICS summit, but they had no interest in a post-dollar world. It's just that wasn't picked up by US finance because it doesn't match the de-dollarization drama mantra that we're all talking about here. I mean, it's really not a discussion in Beijing or in Johannesburg or in New Delhi. But the only one, the only country that feels that they have a strategic interest in a non-dollar world are the Russians. And they just want everyone to use the ruble, which is of course stupid.
25:32 Speaker 00 So you completely reject this because that de-dollarization theme is strong.
25:37 Speaker 02 It's strong. It's strong in your world and nowhere else.
25:41 Speaker 00 Right. Yeah. Interesting. Because we hear a lot about the weaponization of the dollar, the, you know, the, the, the US using SWIFT as the beginning of the end of the reign of the dollar.
25:54 Speaker 02 There's got to be an alternative. The yuan is not internationally exchanged. The rupee is a very soft currency. The Russian system is under sanctions and the Brazilians have no idea what they're doing. There is no alternative here at all. The closest would have been the euro, but 10 years ago, when they were having their financial crisis, they started confiscating insured banks' deposits to pay for their bailouts, which eliminated any possibility of it ever being the euro. And in the aftermath of the sanctions on Russia, the euro and the yen are de facto subsidiaries of the US dollar now. I mean, there's just, there's not even anyone who's pretending that they might be next.
26:34 Speaker 00 So that was only a small piece of the hour-long, more than that conversation that Peter and I had. We talked about war in the Middle East, Ukraine, China, threat of nuclear conflict, you name it. As always, really thought-provoking stuff. The full conversation is available on our website. Let us know what you think in the comment section. If you're not a member, you should be. Just hit one of the links in the chat or come to the website and come be part of the community and part of the conversation. So Jeff, your thoughts on the dollar? Because this, I, this, this narrative is a strong one, especially on Twitter and some other places. What, what is your outlook for the dollar? How are you thinking about that here?
27:14 Speaker 01 Yeah, I think I agree with Peter, and I would actually take it a step further. Not only is there not a political will to really undertake what needs to be done, I think the reason that's the case is because on certain level, they realize, and what I meant, I mean, you know, foreign nations that have been singled out as trying to replace the dollar by a whole bunch of, you know, a whole, whole group of commentary out there that have made a cottage industry out of the dollar is doomed narrative. And that's really what this is about. But essentially, I don't think people stop to realize and really think about what a reserve currency is and how it gets accomplished, because it's a gigantic task. It's not something you just, "Oh, we can change the paper in the printing press and print different kinds of notes, and that's the end of the game."
27:59 Speaker 01 In a modern reserve currency standard, it's an enormous undertaking, and it's one that has developed over so many decades on an ad hoc basis that to replicate it would be sort of like creating a competing internet and starting from scratch. Because the euro-dollar system is really a telecommunications network, all sorts of sophisticated architecture, financial utilities and everything that have gone into it. You can't just replace it. Even if you had the will, it would take you an enormous amount of time and testing and effort and everything else to do so. And it's, who's going to invest that amount of resources and political capital with no certain payoff at the end of it? It's not that there are certain counterparties or certain parties around the world wouldn't
28:44 Speaker 01 like to change the reserve currency system, but they realize it's just not going to happen. They can't do it. They literally can't do it, because you cannot replace all of the functions of the reserve currency that the euro-dollar, even as impaired as it is, continues to do and do really well. And that's really, it's to make a common medium available in as wide a coverage as possible, and to be accepted in those places at as wide a coverage as possible. And it's not something you just snap your fingers and it happens. And it doesn't happen overnight. There's a tremendous amount of structure that has been involved in it, that, you know, you can't just replace it on a whim.
29:24 Speaker 00 Yeah. So Anders is asking, what about all the supply of bonds that's coming and that has been problematic so far? How does that plug into? The situation you're describing.
29:40 Speaker 01 Well, that's, I mean, that's another don economic factor that you have to take into account. And this, I mean, it's tough to say that it hasn't played a role in why interest rates have gone up recently. I mean, the federal government went crazy here. I mean, absolutely insane. What did they issue about a trillion dollars in what a three month window? But in the same sense, you look at it and say, you know, the, the feds are selling about 95 billion in four week treasury bills every week. When they were selling the most in history before that was about 70 billion and back earlier this year during the debt ceiling, we're only selling 35 billion or 30 billion. So they've gone absolutely crazy selling treasury bills and yet the market has absorbed them.
30:20 Speaker 01 Now, maybe there's some issues about some of the longer term notes, but as far as the actual, uh, the, the, the short term treasury bills, which usually make up the fiscal difference. Market has taken them and then some you look at treasury bill yields, they're pretty much stable and flat. So I don't necessarily believe supply is the reason why treasury note and bond yields are going up, but it's certainly a factor because that's, these are just gigantic. Uh, numbers and gigantic deficits that have to get financed and that's certainly something to keep in mind as we go forward. But we, we've seen this before. Every time the deficit goes up, whether it was 2018, we heard too many treasuries all throughout 2018 and 2019. And yet, once we got to that fundamental level in November of 2018, rates went down again.
31:05 Speaker 01 So supply is a factor and someday would be nice if the government stops just spending money like they, like they can print it because. You know, it, those are, there's long term consequences to doing that too. But it's, I don't think supply is going to bring back a bond vigilantism.
31:21 Speaker 00 Yeah. Oh, interesting. So we have a quite a few people asking, what do you do in this environment? First of all, it, do you see any strains or potential issues? We, you know, you've mentioned, we see these collateral problems behind the scenes flare up that cause these dislocations. Everyone's kind of been watching for them. We haven't, we, I mean, we've seen, we, we saw the gilt market, but are you concerned about something like that happening? Especially if most people are not looking at the right things right now?
31:54 Speaker 01 Yeah, there have been a number of indications that have started to really tick up here. And it goes back to late July through the summer. It seems to correspond pretty well with oil prices. It's almost got a 2022 energy crisis vibe to it, though not to that extent just yet. We see interest rate swap spreads fall. The Italy to Germany spreads are really rising. In fact, that was over 210 basis points, which is a critical threshold that causes enormous trouble. And it's, you know, Maggie, these esoteric indications, it's not immediately apparent what they're actually telling you or how that relates to collateral. What do we care about Italian bond spreads to Germany, you know, to Germany bonds?
32:35 Speaker 01 It really, because Italian bonds are such a huge part of euro-denominated collateral, and there is no euro system versus dollar system. There is only the euro-dollar overlay to top of it. And so if we have this enormous piece of collateral in Europe, in euro-denominated terms, that is being treated like a second-tier collateral all of a sudden, and it's, I mean, we're talking about trillions of euros in debt and a lot, hundreds of billions that are used as collateral, then re-hypothecate and re-pledge and reuse all over the place. It becomes an enormous problem for European banks and foreign banks that are operating in the euro area. And as they have to navigate these collateral issues, it causes them to create, to absorb problems themselves, and then their operations are impaired. It gets transferred all over the world.
33:19 Speaker 01 So a collateral problem in, say, in Italian BTPs can quickly become something you also see in Japanese government bills, which we have seen too. So you've got a bunch of these warnings that are coming together, suggesting that slowly as oil prices have crept up, as gasoline and gas, natural gas prices and energy prices in general have crept up, thanks to our friends in Saudi Arabia restricting supplies of oil, it's led to a lot of uncertainty, it's led to some more of the same collateral problems that we observed heading into September and October, the gilt blow up last year, that we can see in a lot of these important ways. The one difference here, one thing that we have in our favor, is the supply of treasury bills.
34:02 Speaker 01 There's a huge amount of them available, but the question is... Despite the huge amount of treasury bills, which is helping, we still getting these other indications which suggest that there are other problems in terms of redistribution and circulation of collateral throughout the global system. So the short answer to your question, and it gets more complicated than that, is yes, we are seeing a couple of really serious signals suggest that strain is elevated and rising, and it may have something to do, and I think it's strongly corresponding to the rise in oil prices. So as oil goes up farther, maybe it continues to go up, the level of strain in collateral, therefore money across the rest of the euro-dollar system, that's going to get elevated too. In
34:45 Speaker 01 fact, we've also seen credit spreads rise over the last several weeks. That's another one to keep in mind.
34:50 Speaker 00 We're going to, we know that's a, that's a big concept. Jeff is making it sort of simplifying it for us, which is not easy to do, but we'll, we'll circle back around to that in coming weeks and get more of his sort of in-depth thinking on it. So watch out on the platform because we're not going to be able to get to it here, Jeff. So I'm squeezing an extra couple of minutes in because some of the questions Christopher asking, is the Swiss franc a good place to park emergency reserve funds? And J and J saying, what do you think is the best way, what do you do based on the themes you're discussing? Gold, gold miners, energy and tips all sound decent to me if he's right. Again, we're not, financial advisors is not a financial advice, only you know your risk and what's
35:32 Speaker 00 right for your portfolio. But, but generally, Jeff, if people are concerned about the things you're talking about, like, what do you do about it?
35:39 Speaker 01 Well, gold's interesting here, especially that interest rates are rising, which are usually the death knell to gold. Gold is, you know, competing with interest rates because gold doesn't pay, doesn't pay an interest. So, you know, the opportunity cost of owning gold is higher interest rates. And usually you see interest rates go up, gold should be going down, but yet there's quite a tremendous demand for gold for something. Obviously, I think that's a good hedge for not just dramatic, dramatic increase in inflation, which I obviously don't think that's going to happen. I think there is a tremendous geopolitical hedge as well as financial hedge that That's driving gold demand here. And the Swiss francs, as far as other competing currencies, you could do a lot worse.
36:24 Speaker 01 Because the Swiss National Bank actually take their monetary policies and their monetary outcomes very seriously. And they are very serious about maintaining a stable currency, though there are questions about their ability to do that. I mean, think back to 2015, January 2015, we had enormous trouble there. But out of all of the, you know, the currency opportunities around the world, you could do a lot worse than the Swiss francs.
36:49 Speaker 00 And it sounds like you're worried that that energy, especially since it is a sort of harbinger of maybe trouble, is going to continue to go higher. You think we're looking at higher energy prices?
37:00 Speaker 01 We still see like the WTI curve that's steeply backward dated, which is going to be priced positive. And ironically, Maggie, the higher oil prices go, the more likely we're going to see deflation in the future, because it's just going to break the monetary system, it's going to break down collateral, it's going to break the economy. We can't afford to pay another big spike in oil. And so I think the higher that goes, the greater the probability of all of these things happen.
37:25 Speaker 00 All right. Great stuff. We never have enough time when we have you on, Jeff, but appreciate you really shining a light into areas that people are not talking about, they're not looking at, and maybe countering some of the narratives out there that are more popular. We really always count on you to bring it. And thank you so much for doing that. It really helps educate us all.
37:45 Speaker 01 It's my pleasure. I hope one day I get to be popular too, but I don't think so.
37:50 Speaker 00 We always have a lot of love for you, so you are with our audience, anyway. Thank you so much.
37:56 Speaker 01 Good enough, more than good enough.
37:57 Speaker 00 Yeah, that's great. And just a reminder before we go, for those of you who are doing it, or if you want to and you haven't yet, there's still time to complete the Ledger Quest. 100 of you who pass the quest will win a custom RV branded Ledger device. Plus, it's going to give you a ton of information about digital assets, so you can make sure you're making the connections we mentioned earlier. To participate, just watch the Festival of Learning, all the contents on our website, and then you can go to realvision.com/ledgerquest. It's still open for, I don't know, another week or 10 days or something. So don't. Procrastinate. All right. Thanks, everybody. Thanks, Jeff. We'll be back tomorrow with Darius Dell. In the meantime, everybody, take care and good luck out there.
38:39 Speaker 00 Thanks for joining us, everyone. Today's Real Vision Daily Briefing is sponsored by Crane Shares. Learn about their KCCA ETF at craneshares.com/kcca/realvision.
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