Pod Insights The Real Estate Espresso Podcast Lessons From WeWork About this episode On today’s show we’re talking about Adam Neumann, the founder of WeWork.
There are probably few entrepreneurs in recent memory whose rise and fall has been documented as extensively as Adam Neumann.
WeWork went from being one of the most celebrated private companies in the world, valued at roughly $47 billion at its peak, to one of the most spectacular failed IPOs in recent history.
The company ultimately filed for bankruptcy years later.
But perhaps the more interesting story for investors isn’t the collapse of WeWork.
It’s what happened to Adam Neumann afterward.
Because somehow, after becoming the public face of one of the largest venture-capital failures of the past decade, Neumann managed to convince sophisticated investors to give him hundreds of millions of dollars to build another real estate company.
There is a lesson in that.
And it starts with understanding what actually went wrong at WeWork.
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Transcript 0:01 Speaker 00 Welcome to the Real Estate Espresso Podcast, your morning shot of what's new in the world of real estate investing. I'm your host, Victor Manash. On today's show, we're talking about Adam Newman, the founder of WeWork. There are probably few entrepreneurs in recent memory whose rise and fall has been documented as extensively as Adam Neumann. WeWork went from being one of the most celebrated private companies in the world, valued at roughly $47 billion at the peak, to one of its most spectacularly failed IPOs in recent history. The company ultimately fell for bankruptcy years later. But perhaps the more interesting story for investors isn't the collapse of WeWork. It's what happened to Adam Neumann afterwards. Because somehow, after becoming the public face of one of the largest venture capital failures of the past
0:45 Speaker 00 decade, Neumann managed to convince sophisticated investors to give him hundreds of millions of dollars to build another real estate company. There's a lesson in that. It starts with understanding what actually went wrong at WeWork. Newman describes a pivotal moment in December of 2016. He was sitting in a car with Masayoshi Son, the founder of SoftBank. Newman had been hoping to raise about 300 million. 28 minutes later, that conversation turned into a commitment measured in billions. Most entrepreneurs would describe that as the greatest fundraising meeting of their lives. Newman increasingly describes it as the moment when things started to go wrong. Until then, WeWork had been growing around a fairly understandable business proposition. Take office space, make it flexible, create an attractive environment, build community around
1:30 Speaker 00 it, charge a premium. There was real innovation here. But once billions of dollars became available, the objective subtly changed. Instead of asking, where can we profitably expand, the question became, how fast can we grow? They sound similar, but they're not. Growth without capital discipline can temporarily disguise an enormous number of mistakes. If you're opening buildings faster than anyone can measure the performance of the buildings you opened last year, weak unit economics can disappear inside consolidated growth. The problem will sound familiar to anyone who really knows real estate. Imagine buying one apartment complex, you operate it for a couple of years, you understand the rents, expenses, maintenances, Turnover and the capital requirements, then you buy a second property.
2:13 Speaker 00 That's very different from buying fifty properties before you know if the first five are actually performing. Newman now acknowledges that WeWork began attracting executives, investment bankers and advisor, who are increasingly focused on valuation and the IPO rather than the underlying business. That created another problem. The capital structure started influencing the operating strategy. Eventually, the company wasn't just building a business. They were building a narrative necessary to support the next valuation, and that's dangerous territory. Because the valuation is not the same thing as value. Then, of course, came governance. Newman had enormous authority. The board wasn't providing enough friction. Relationships with investors became mediated by lawyers, bankers and executives.
2:57 Speaker 00 One of Newman's most interesting observations in retrospect concerns his relationship with Masayoshi Son. As SoftBank became uncomfortable with the trajectory of the business, Newman failed to just pick up the phone and speak directly with SoftBank. Instead, communication increasingly flowed through intermediaries. Newman now identifies that as one of his most significant mistakes. That might seem like a minor detail, but it's not. In a highly leveraged relationship involving billions of dollars, trust between principals can matter every bit as much as the spreadsheet. Once the trust deteriorates, capital can disappear very quickly. WeWork's IPO process exposed weaknesses that private markets had tolerated. Public market investors were considerably less forgiving.
3:40 Speaker 00 The IPO collapsed, Newman was removed and his reputation appeared destroyed. Which brings us to the interesting part of the story. How do you raise money after that? Newman did something surprisingly important. He didn't pretend WeWork never happened. He incorporated the failure into his new investment thesis. In a long-form conversation with Rick Rubin, Newman, over three hours, repeatedly takes responsibility for the outcome rather than blaming SoftBank his board or the market. His argument is effectively this: The mistakes that happened between 2016 and 2019 were the tuition required to become the entrepreneur he is today. Investors can decide whether they believe that or not, but it's a power. Powerful framing. There's two ways to view an entrepreneur who's lost billions of dollars.
4:23 Speaker 00 One is, why would I ever invest with this person again? The other is, few entrepreneurs on earth have received more expensive education. Newman also changed something else. He changed the governance. Now, his new company, called Flow, has been backed by Marc Andreessen and Ben Horowitz. Newman speaks very differently about that relationship. He values the fact that they challenge him. They will tell him things that he doesn't want to hear. And he's even suggested that if investors like Andreessen and Horowitz have been sitting on WeWorks board earlier, they might have demanded proof of unit-level profitability before supporting continued hypergrowth. That's probably the most important lesson of the story. Experienced entrepreneurs often say they want a board that supports them, but better entrepreneurs eventually learn that they need a board that occasionally stops them.
5:07 Speaker 00 Andreessen Horowitz ultimately invested $350 million in Flow in 2022, reportedly the largest individual check the firm had written up to that point. Now, Flow subsequently raised additional capital and achieved a multi-billion dollar valuation. Now, whether Flow ultimately succeeds or not remains to be seen. But Newman's ability to raise that capital tells us something important about failure. Investors don't necessarily require a perfect track record. They require confidence that the mistakes from the previous cycle will not be repeated in the next one. Real estate has plenty of investors who made mistakes during the last cycle. Some overpaid, some used too much floating rate debt, they underestimated operating expenses. Maybe they assumed rents would rise forever. Important question is not whether someone made a mistake,
5:51 Speaker 00 but number one, were they able to recover from it? Or number two, can they explain why they made the mistake? Newman's second act is therefore less about redemption and is about institutional memory. As you think about that, have an awesome rest of your day. Don't make some great things happen. We'll talk to you again tomorrow.
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