Pod Insights The Real Estate Espresso Podcast Does This Feel Like 2008? About this episode Today we're pulling back from the headlinesand putting today's multifamily stress in its proper historical context. The data coming in from every corner of the lending market is telling a very consistent story. The question is no longer whether there is stress in multifamily. The question is whether the current cycle is starting to rhyme with the last major credit cycle in 2008 to 2010. Let's start with the anchor number: 0.78%. That is Fannie Mae's multifamily serious delinquency rate as of March 31, 2026. This is not a market-wide apartment default rate. It is specific to Fannie Mae's multifamily guaranty book of business, and it measures loans that are 60 days or more past due. The peak in 2010 was 0.8%. We are basically there.
The CMBS default rate is nearly 7%. These should be alarming numbers.
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Transcript 0:01 Speaker 00 Welcome to the Real Estate Especial Podcast, your morning shot of what's new in the world of real estate investing. I'm your host, Victor Manash. Today, we're pulling back the headlines and putting today's multifamily stress in its proper historic context. The data coming in from every corner of the lending market is telling a consistent story. Question is no longer whether there is stress in multifamily. The question is whether the current cycle is starting to rhyme with the last major credit cycle in 2008 to 2010. So let's start with the anchor number, 0.78%. This is Fannie Mae's multifamily serious delinquency rate as of March 31 of this year. It's not a market-wide apartment-to-fall rate, it's specific to Fannie
0:43 Speaker 00 Mae's multifamily guarantee book of business, and it measures loans that are 60 days or more past due, expressed as a percentage of unplayed principal balance. But it matters because Fannie Mae is one of the cleanest, most consistently reported, long-run series we have for multifamily credit performance. The prior number was 0.74% at the end of Q4 of last year, 0.68% at the end of Q3, and 0.57% at the end of 2024. So the number that looked concerning in late 2025 was not the peak. The deterioration continued in 2026. Fannie Mae attributed the increase to additional loans becoming seriously delinquent as a result of sustained market challenges. That is careful
1:28 Speaker 00 corporate language, but the message is clear, credit performance is weakening. So let's compare this back to the great financial crisis. At the end of 2007, near the peak of the last real estate bubble, Fannie Mae's multifamily delinquency rate was only 0.08%, almost nothing. Then the crisis hit. By first quarter of 2009, after Lehman Brothers and the TARP program, it had climbed to about 0.34%. By the end of 2009, it roughly doubled again to about 0.63%. And critically, multifamily stress, it lagged. By 2010, Fannie Mae's multifamily serious delinquency rate reached roughly 0.8%. And then came the slow recovery, approximately
2:10 Speaker 00 0.24% by the end of 2012 and much lower again in the years that followed. So today's 0.78 percentage point is therefore not just another data point. It's within a few basis points of the GFC peak for Fannie Mae credit. It already exceeds the level reported by the end of 2009. That's a strong signal and it's not getting any headlines. Doesn't mean the entire apartment industry is defaulting at that rate, but it does mean that even the agency financed, better underwritten part of the market is now showing stress levels that are approaching the worst period of the last cycle. The bank data tells a parallel story, although definitions are different. The Mortgage Bankers Association third quarter 2025 report put bank and thrift commercial multifamily delinquencies
2:55 Speaker 00 on a 90-day or more past due at 1.27%. Banks have more flexibility than securitized lenders to extend demand restructure and avoid forcing a formal delinquency. That means the reporting delinquency rate may understate the true level of economic stress. A loan can be current only because the lender has agreed to modify the terms, defer the problem, or give the borrower more time. In the CMBS market, mortgage-backed securities market, we see a delinquency rate of 6.59% at the end of Q3 of last year, and that's on a 30-day basis or more. Multifamily-specific CMBS has been running even hotter, with TRP reporting that multifamily CMBS loans have a delinquency rate in the range of 7% in late 2025.
3:40 Speaker 00 That's not just approaching GFC-style stress. In parts of the securitized apartment market, this distress is already at crisis levels. Bridge loan performance is the hardest to pin down because much of that data is private, but the mechanism is obvious. Floating rate bridge loans originated in 2021 and 2022 were often underwritten at cap rates and interest rates that no longer exist. A borrower who expected to refinance at stabilization is now facing a very different capital market. Higher base rates, wider spreads, lower proceeds, more conservative debt coverage requirements, and in some markets, falling effective rents. Many of these properties are not broken at the property level. They're broken at the capital structure level.
4:22 Speaker 00 So during the great financial crisis, the stress was driven by collapsing economy, by frozen credit markets, by falling values, and a broad repricing of risk. Vacancies rose, rents weakened, and overleveraged properties could not service the debt. Today, the mechanism is different. Employment has been more resilient, but the apartment market is absorbing a massive wave of supply that was greenlit during the low-rate frenzy of 2021 and 2022. These deliveries are arriving at the same time that cost of capital has reset dramatically higher. And there's another important parallel. In the GFC, the worst stress came from the worst underwritten loans that were done in 2006 to 2008.
5:02 Speaker 00 In today's cycle, the pressure is concentrated in 2021 and 2022 originations. Loans written when rent growth looked unstoppable, cap rates were compressed, and floating rate looked harmless. Many borrowers are not betting on today's income. They were betting on tomorrow's refinance, and that refinance window has narrowed completely. The rate of ascent matters, and in the last cycle, Fannie Mae's delinquency rate moved from 0.08 at the end of '07 to roughly 0.8% in 2010, a tenfold increase over three years. In the current cycle, the rate moved from 0.24% in 2022 to 0.78% in the first quarter of this year, more than a tripling in a little over three years.
5:44 Speaker 00 The absolute move is smaller, but the direction and the persistence are absolutely unmistakable. So here's a conclusion. Current multifamily cycle has already entered the same neighborhood as the great financial crisis. For Fannie Mae, absolutely that's the case. The causes are different, the credit outcome is starting to rhyme. In the great financial crisis, the trigger was the collapse in the financial system. Today, the trigger is the collision of excess supply, higher rates, lower refinance proceeds, and loan maturities that were underwritten for a world that doesn't exist anymore. This makes this cycle much more dangerous than the headline numbers suggest. It's not a good news story, but it's one that needs to be told. So as you think about that, pay close attention and have an awesome rest of your day. Go make some great things happen. We'll talk to you again tomorrow.
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