Pod Insights Planet Money The year NYC went broke About this episode In 1975, New York City ran out of money. For a decade it had managed to pay for its hundreds of thousands of city employees and robust social services by taking on billions of dollars in debt. But eventually investors were no longer willing to lend the city any more money. New York teetered on the edge of bankruptcy — the city shuttered more than a dozen firehouses, teachers went on strike and garbage piled up in the streets.
Rescuing the city required the cooperation of the state of New York, the banks, the city workers unions, giant property owners and … the White House. But President Gerald Ford was adamantly opposed to bailing out NYC, prompting the famous New York Daily News headline — “Ford to City: Drop Dead.”
On today’s show, the story of a group of private citizens who were deputized by the state of New York to try to save the city’s finances. Led by investment banker Felix Rohatyn, the group had to put together a grand bargain that everyone would be willing to agree to, and to come up with the billions of dollars the city needed to survive.
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Today’s episode of Planet Money was hosted by Keith Romer and Nick Fountain. It was produced by James Sneed with help from Sam Yellowhorse Kesler and Julia Ritchey. It was edited by Jess Jiang, fact-checked by Sierra Juarez, and engineered by Debbie Daughtry and Cena Loffredo. Our executive producer is Alex Goldmark.
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Transcript 0:00 Speaker 00 This episode's sponsor is HubSpot, which offers the following message: What if, instead of updating your CRM, your CRM updated you? HubSpot's self-updating CRM keeps your customer context current, so you can win more deals. Learn more at hubspot.com.
0:17 Speaker 01 This is Planet Money from NPR.
0:24 Speaker 02 Every Tuesday morning, this very easy to overlook, but incredibly important thing happens on the street where I live in Brooklyn. Three employees of the City of New York roll up in a giant truck and take away all the garbage for the people in my apartment building.
0:45 Speaker 02 Those guys in their stained, dayglow-green t-shirts, they are just one part of this vast army of workers who make us city like New York even possible to live in.
0:58 Speaker 02 An hour or so after the sanitation guys roll through, my daughter packs up her bag.
1:04 Speaker 03 Am I gonna need a raincoat today?
1:06 Speaker 04 I don't know, look at the weather.
1:07 Speaker 02 And heads out to her public middle school.
1:10 Speaker 04 Bye, sweetie.
1:10 Speaker 03 Bye.
1:12 Speaker 02 Where she will be educated by yet more city employees. Those sirens you are hearing, those are because just down this street, from where my daughter catches her bus each morning, there is a fire station manned by, you guessed it, city employees.
1:28 Speaker 05 Altogether, more than 300,000 people work for the City of New York. 300,000 people who make it possible for the city to function. And this marvel of social coordination, like so many things in our world, is made possible by money.
1:45 Speaker 02 Yeah, my family pays city income tax and property tax and sales tax. And because my wife is self-employed, something called the Metropolitan Commuter Transportation Mobility Tax. And all of those taxes pay for the sanitation workers and the teachers and the firefighters.
2:01 Speaker 05 Those city employees mostly get paid every two weeks. But the taxes and the big chunks of money that come from the state of New York or the federal government, those come on a completely different timeline. Income taxes are due in April. A lot of property taxes are due in July and January.
2:19 Speaker 02 Lots of cities like Chicago, LA, Houston, Philadelphia, San Francisco, they deal with this with a little financial magic trick. They move money from the future, when the taxes come in, to the present, when they need to pay their workers. The cities pull off this trick by selling short-term debt, little IOUs that only last for a few months.
2:41 Speaker 05 Now, New York has generally had enough cash on hand that it hasn't had to use this short-term debt trick for a while. Partly, this is because New York is just very, very careful about this stuff. Because 50 years ago, it was very, very not careful about it. And the city stopped functioning in some of the basic ways a city needs to function to survive.
3:07 Speaker 02 Hello and welcome to Planet Money. I'm Keith Romer.
3:10 Speaker 05 And I'm Nick Banton. Sometimes, to understand how things work, it can help to look at a moment when they stopped working altogether. So today's show is going to be about New York City 50 years ago, in 1975, a year when the city ran out of money and couldn't find anybody willing to give it to them.
3:29 Speaker 02 What it takes when no one trusts you enough to loan you the several billion dollars you need to get by, and just how hard it can be to re-earn that trust.
3:46 Speaker 00 Stay tuned for the following announcements and messages from our sponsors. This message comes from Capella University. That spark you feel? That's your drive for more. Capella University's FlexPath learning format lets you earn your degree at your pace without putting life on pause. Learn more at capella.edu.
4:05 Speaker 06 This message comes from LinkedIn. Owning a small business comes with a lot of challenges and means juggling multiple things at once. It's even harder to do it efficiently. But with LinkedIn, you get all the tools you need to grow in one place. With LinkedIn, simplify your sales, marketing, and hiring so that you can actually run your small business. Learn more at LinkedIn.com/PlanetMoneyShow.
4:29 Speaker 00 This episode's sponsor is HubSpot, which offers the following message. What if instead of updating your CRM, your CRM updated you? No catching up on manual edits, no more guesswork. HubSpot's self-updating CRM keeps your customer context current and helps you understand what to do next. So, marketing builds more demand, sales wins more deals, and customers keep coming back. Learn more at hubspot.com.
4:55 Speaker 02 The 1970s were a tough time for the government of New York City. White flights and the loss of manufacturing in the city had taken a big chunk out of the city's tax base. At the same time, there was a big surge in demand for the city's really quite generous social services. Big influxes of lower-income folks had moved to New York. There was a nationwide recession.
5:17 Speaker 05 Steve Clifford remembers the city back then as an exciting place to live, but also a pretty dysfunctional place to live.
5:24 Speaker 07 Everybody thought New York City was going to hell. Nothing seemed to work. The subways were, you know, 120 degrees in the summer. There was crime. There was dirt. There was just dirt everywhere.
5:40 Speaker 02 Back then, Steve had two jobs. He ran a business with a friend of his making fiberglass furniture for interior designers. And he had started working part-time as a consultant for the city controller. For one of his first projects, he spent a lot of time digging through the city's books.
5:57 Speaker 05 Steve had worked on city finances before, and he did have an MBA from Harvard. But otherwise, he says, he was not your typical city hall employee.
6:06 Speaker 07 I was late to start as a hippie. But I, you know, I had long hair. And, you know, I wore jeans and dashiki and whatnot. Had a loft in SoHo. I was taking lots of dope.
6:22 Speaker 02 Money was tight for the city back then. So Steve says New York made extensive use of that financial magic trick we mentioned earlier, where it took the money it was going to get in the future and transported it to the present.
6:34 Speaker 05 Yeah, the city would sell IOUs for lots of things, for the real estate. Taxes it expected to receive for the state and federal aid it was counting on later in the year.
6:44 Speaker 02 And banks were plenty happy to buy up all of these IOUs. They paid a pretty good interest rate. Lots of individual investors, big insurance companies, other banks were happy to take those IOUs off the banks' hands. And rating agencies said New York City debt was pretty safe.
7:01 Speaker 07 You could look at Park Avenue and you can say, these guys can't go broke. I mean, you want to talk about, you know, real property? I mean, these things are worth billions. The city can't go broke.
7:14 Speaker 05 Now, Steve's small part in this whole drama had to do with what he found when he poked around in the city's books.
7:21 Speaker 02 How would you describe the financial record-keeping of New York City?
7:26 Speaker 07 Well, there was no record-keeping. There was, I mean, there was a balance sheet, there was an income statement, and, you know, there were the computers whirring in the background and, you know, what was going on was the Wizard of Oz.
7:45 Speaker 02 See, Steve had gotten his hands on all this different information about all the different funds and accounts and sub-budgets that had anything to do with the city's finances.
7:56 Speaker 07 And I started to, you know, just, almost for the fun of it, started adding these things up.
8:04 Speaker 02 And what he discovered was a very, very big problem.
8:09 Speaker 07 What had happened was for the, at least for 10 years, there was a totally uncoordinated charade of different people devising different gimmicks that produced accounting revenue, but didn't produce cash.
8:26 Speaker 05 Steve says for about a decade, New York City made moves that appeared to balance the city's budget, but very much did not.
8:34 Speaker 07 The city would, in various places, just delay.
8:40 Speaker 07 An expense, like a payment for the pension funds. It's supposed to be paid in June 30th, but we'll pay it, we'll pay it in July and that it'll go into the next year's budget. Give us more for this year.
8:54 Speaker 05 Or the city would pretend that its estimate at the beginning of the year for how much tax it would take in was the final number that went on its balance sheet, regardless of how much money it actually took in. And in a narrow sense, all of this was legal, but these kinds of financial shenanigans didn't exactly accord with generally accepted accounting principles.
9:18 Speaker 02 And if you squint just right, you can maybe even feel a kind of sympathy for the politicians who are doing this stuff. All of the things they were elected to do, to launch new government initiatives or provide the generous social services New York City was famous for back then, to, you know, to help people, to make the world a better place, all of that takes money. Moving some things around on the balance sheet made it possible.
9:44 Speaker 05 Also, it let them add jobs and raise wages and make nice with powerful unions, whose votes they were going to need in that next election.
9:51 Speaker 02 Yes, also that. But once you stop squinting, what you see is that all of this budgetary sleight of hand, it was funded by debt, by those IOUs the city kept selling year after year.
10:06 Speaker 07 Nobody understood the cumulative effect of all these things, absolutely no one.
10:12 Speaker 05 So Steve wrote up everything he found and took it to his boss, the city controller, Jay Golden.
10:19 Speaker 07 I started explaining all these gimmicks to him and said, look, we got $3 billion in debt and no way to pay it because it's all been created by these gimmicks. Now, Jay didn't know what to make of me because I was still this hippie guy, you know, who wore jeans to work and sandals to work. And so I go in and tell him, look, the city's bankrupt. I mean, that's, you know, history actually was.
10:48 Speaker 07 That can't be.
10:50 Speaker 02 Steve did manage to pretty quickly convince his boss that yes, the city was in fact in a rough spot. But even if the city completely swore off the budget shenanigans that had created that $3 billion deficit, it still owed billions of dollars more because of the shenanigans it had already done.
11:08 Speaker 05 And in the meantime, for the city to avoid default and keep functioning, it had to keep borrowing. When it came time to pay off one of those IOUs, kind of their only move was to issue more IOUs.
11:22 Speaker 07 The only thing they could do was roll it over. Roll it over, roll it over.
11:28 Speaker 05 Towards the end of 1974 and into 1975, the trust that the banks had that New York City would make good on its debts and avoid default slowly started to erode. And the interest rates that the banks demanded on those IOUs drifted higher and higher.
11:44 Speaker 07 The banks started saying, wait a minute, what's behind this roll it over? And they say, well, our, the faith and credit of New York City. And the banks say, well, that's great. Now, how much money does the faith and credit have? And that's when it all, all went, all went nuts.
12:00 Speaker 02 It all came to a head one day in February of 1975. The moment was actually included in a film by the BBC.
12:08 Speaker 07 Morning, ladies and gentlemen. Today, the city of New York is offering for competitive bidding sale 260 million tax anticipation notes, of which 100 million will mature.
12:18 Speaker 05 That morning, the city tried to hold an auction of IOUs, where syndicates of banks would come in and put their bids into a little tin box. But that day, there were precisely zero bids.
12:31 Speaker 04 The announcement on behalf of the controller is that the offer, which we had expected to receive and announce at 2 o'clock this afternoon, is now expected at 4 o'clock. Well, does this mean that you have not been able to sell them so far today?
12:49 Speaker 05 We'll have a further announcement at 4:00. Yeah, that day, nobody thought it was worth lending the city any more money. Couple of weeks later, the city was able to sell some new short term debt, but that was the end of the line. And without being able to roll over its debts, New York City only had enough cash on hand to get through a month or two.
13:09 Speaker 07 So having the city run out of cash, I mean, what you would have is
13:15 Speaker 07 the welfare checks don't go out and you don't pay the cops on the same day. And I mean, you can imagine what, I mean, total chaos.
13:24 Speaker 05 The person presiding over this fiscal debacle was the city's mayor, Abe Bean. When journalists demanded to know what was going on, he put the blame on the state of New York and the federal government for not sending more money to help the city fund its social services.
13:41 Speaker 04 The basic cause of our crisis, among other things, is the fact that the city of New York is carrying costs which are not appropriately New York City costs.
13:53 Speaker 05 One of the people watching this drama unfold was Donna Shalala. She was not a big fan of Abe Bean.
14:00 Speaker 01 He was short, inarticulate, bumbling.
14:05 Speaker 05 Donna would later become the Secretary of Health and Human Services and a congressperson. But back in the seventies, she was a politics professor with an expertise in the relationship between city and state governments.
14:16 Speaker 01 The mayor, the mayor Abe Bean was totally over his head. He couldn't even explain, even though he had been the comptroller of the city, he couldn't even explain how many employees they had.
14:28 Speaker 05 Donna lived in New York City, so she was paying attention to what was happening. But her main focus at the time was a book she had started writing. And then history came knocking on Donna's door.
14:39 Speaker 01 I got a phone call from the governor of New York, Hugh Carey. Just beginning the summer, it must have been June of 1975. He called. And said, what are you doing for the summer?
14:52 Speaker 02 By then, the state had already prepaid $800 million in aid to try to keep the city from defaulting on its debts. But Governor Kerry wanted a longer term solution, and he had a new plan, which he proceeded to explain to Donna over the phone.
15:07 Speaker 05 Yeah, he had helped to create a brand new government entity to help fix New York City's debt problems. And he wanted to know if she was willing to be a part of it.
15:16 Speaker 01 He made it sound like it was going to be a quick in and out.
15:19 Speaker 02 Just a little, a little summer project for you.
15:21 Speaker 01 Exactly.
15:21 Speaker 02 And then go back to, back to your book. Yeah. How did, how did that work out?
15:24 Speaker 01 Well, I never did finish the book, but I had a life-changing experience.
15:32 Speaker 02 Governor Kerry's new government entity was called the Municipal Assistance Corporation, or the MAC. It was created as a way for New York City to get its hands on the money it needed without anyone having to lend directly to the city itself.
15:45 Speaker 05 Like, look, we get it. You don't trust the city government to pay you back. So forget about the city government. Lend MAC the money instead and let them worry about the city.
15:57 Speaker 02 And MAC did have a couple of things going for it. It got first dibs on sales tax collected in the city, so it definitely had money coming in. And it was backed not by the credibility of New York City, but by the credibility of New York State.
16:11 Speaker 01 It was originally set up to issue bonds to stretch out the debt of New York City, to give them some time to get their house in order. I think that's the simplest way to explain it.
16:26 Speaker 05 Donna was 34 years old and the only woman on the MAC board. The rest of the board was made up of the heads of big companies, a senior partner at a powerful law firm, and this famously charming investment banker named Felix Rohden.
16:41 Speaker 01 He had an instinct, not for politics, but how to pull people together to get decisions. I think I was a pain in his butt initially, but he coached me along, and we became very good friends. And I learned a lot from him about leadership.
16:59 Speaker 02 Rohitin was really good in front of TV cameras. He had this great overbite smile, these two big bushy eyebrows. And he was just so fundamentally calm. It was almost like he was wryly amused by everything that was happening.
17:13 Speaker 00 I really never knew how really fraudulent the accounting was. I mean, they did things with numbers here that are just absolutely unbelievable. They would estimate revenues, you know, going ahead one century and estimate their expenses as of yesterday. But this is kind of a way of life.
17:32 Speaker 02 Rohitin was known as a dealmaker, but his main thing was mergers and acquisitions, not getting people to buy New York City's debt.
17:39 Speaker 01 He just assumed, because he didn't know a lot about municipal finance, that we could go into the market with bonds that were backed by the full faith and credit of the state, that had first dibs on New York City government money, that were at 8% or 9%, and that the market would just absorb those bonds.
18:02 Speaker 02 And how did that turn out?
18:05 Speaker 01 It was much more difficult. No one believed in the credibility of New York City government.
18:13 Speaker 02 Donna and Felix and everyone else on the board worked hard to get people to believe the MAC bonds were credible, to get people to buy all this new debt.
18:22 Speaker 01 We had to peddle the bonds, the MAC bonds, all over the country. And so we all got on airplanes.
18:30 Speaker 02 You personally, you were like flying around the country?
18:32 Speaker 01 With David Rockefeller.
18:34 Speaker 02 As in, one of the Rockefellers. At the time, David Rockefeller was the head of Chase Manhattan Bank.
18:39 Speaker 01 We landed in Dallas, private plane, went to the Dallas Athletic Club to meet with the bankers, the great Texas bankers. And when we pulled up, one of his staff members came and said, Donna can't go in the front door because they don't allow women in the front door.
18:59 Speaker 02 Wow.
19:00 Speaker 01 And he said, so we'll take her around and she can go in the back door to meet with you. And David Rockefeller turned to me and he said, Donna, he said, I've never gone in a back door in my life. He said, follow me. And he walked me right through the front door of the Dallas Athletic Club.
19:14 Speaker 02 Were you able to convince any Dallas bankers to purchase Mac?
19:17 Speaker 01 No, someone stood up and said, why should we invest in a place in which the mayor doesn't know how many employees he has? David Rockefeller couldn't answer that question. So I don't think we sold many bonds that day.
19:28 Speaker 05 And Mac had trouble selling bonds kinda everywhere. Legally, Mac was a completely separate entity from the city of New York, but potential bond buyers still had a hard time totally trusting them.
19:41 Speaker 02 Which meant the city was getting closer and closer to running out of money altogether. Mayor Beam announced a series of spending cuts. The city would pull back on social services and eliminate jobs. The very large and very powerful city workers unions were understandably not real happy with the mayor's plans.
20:06 Speaker 06 The sounds of people striking and protesting layoffs. In New York, a large group of laid off policemen and their supporters gathered in protest near City Hall.
20:16 Speaker 05 At airports and hotels, members of the police union handed out brochures to tourists titled, "Welcome to Fear City." The brochures warned how dangerous the city would be when police were laid off and offered tips for how to survive a visit. Don't take the subway, stay off the streets after 6:00 PM, do not walk anywhere.
20:38 Speaker 02 In early July, in 90-degree heat, sanitation workers staged an unofficial but very comprehensive strike. No garbage has been picked up in the city since the weekend. The refuse piles up at the rate of 28,000 tons a day. A woman from Manhattan thought the layoffs could have been avoided. I think it's a terrible, terrible thing. I think Beam and all his other people should take $2,000 off their salary. How do you feel about having 5,000 less cops on the ...28,000 tons of garbage on the sidewalk. Terrible. I'm frightened stiff. I was afraid to ride the trains before I walked the streets. Now you can be sure I'll be locked in a house. For Donna, the sanitation workers' strike was sort of the worst thing that could have happened.
21:19 Speaker 01 It was a disaster. Right in the middle of what we were trying to do. We had garbage all over the streets.
21:25 Speaker 02 Do you remember sort of like walking down the streets of New York?
21:28 Speaker 01 Yes, smelling, trash all over the place.
21:31 Speaker 05 In some parts of the city, people threw the piled up garbage into the middle of the street and lit it on fire.
21:39 Speaker 02 Meanwhile, Felix Rowedin, the public face of the MAC board, was everywhere, on TV, in the newspapers, doing everything he could to get the bankers and the union leaders and the state and city officials to get on the same page and find a way to stave off default. I still cannot believe that these men, who are very decent men, aren't going
22:00 Speaker 05 to come to the conclusion that their future, along with everybody else's in the city, is in their hands, that they're not going to do something about it. After the break, Mayor Abeen takes a little trip down to Washington, D.C. And President Gerald Ford inspires one of the most famous headlines in New York City history.
22:24 Speaker 06 Stay tuned for the following announcements and messages from our sponsors. This message comes from Capella University. You know that feeling when there's a spark building inside you, that you were meant for more? That's your own drive, pushing you towards what's next. Capella University gets that. With their FlexPath learning format, you can set the pace and earn your degree without putting life on pause. You've built experience and know what you're capable of. Now, this is your time to turn that momentum into more. The only real question is, what can't you do? Learn more at capella.edu. This message comes from LinkedIn. Owning a small business comes with a lot of challenges
23:06 Speaker 06 and means juggling multiple things at once. It's even harder to do it efficiently. But with LinkedIn, you get all the tools you need to grow in one place. With LinkedIn, simplify your sales, marketing, and hiring so that you can actually run your small business. Learn more at LinkedIn.com/PlanetMoneyShow.
23:25 Speaker 00 This episode's sponsor is HubSpot, which offers the following message. What if, instead of updating your CRM, your CRM updated you? No catching up on manual edits, no more guesswork. HubSpot's self-updating CRM keeps your customer context current and helps you understand what to do next. So, marketing builds more demand, sales wins more deals, and customers keep coming back. Learn more at hubspot.com.
23:51 Speaker 02 OK, so here was the problem facing New York in the summer of 1975. The city owed billions of dollars in short-term debt that it did not have the money to pay for. It also needed to pay the salaries of all its teachers and police officers and sanitation workers, and it didn't have the money for that either. And no one would lend it any more money to get out of this mess.
24:14 Speaker 05 Even MAC, the Municipal Assistance Corporation, that had been created to be this safer proxy to lend to because it was backed by the state of New York, even MAC was having a hard time selling its bonds. On its own, MAC couldn't solve the city's gargantuan debt problems.
24:30 Speaker 02 Donna Shalala says, "Nobody really knew just how bad things would get if the city defaulted on its loans and ran its reserves down to zero." But they knew it would be bad. It would have been the end of the growth of New York City. The school system would have been totally underfunded. Municipal jobs would have shrunk. It would destroy one of the great economic engines of the world. A default would have been bad for the investors who held the IOUs from the city and would have to take a loss, bad for New York real estate developers who would have had a harder time getting loans themselves, for the city workers' unions whose members would face layoffs and wage cuts, for the state of New York, who would have its biggest city
25:14 Speaker 02 basically stop functioning, and, last but not least, bad for the federal government, which would have the country's financial capital in full-on meltdown.
25:24 Speaker 05 But at the same time, bad as it would be, no one really wanted to be on the hook for bailing New York City out of its multi-billion-dollar hole. And Donna says this is where Felix Rohatyn really shined.
25:38 Speaker 01 He just had confidence in his ability to do the grand deal.
25:43 Speaker 05 A deal that would require buy-in from everyone.
25:47 Speaker 01 People had to take cuts. Everybody had to give something up if they wanted to keep New York City solvent.
25:54 Speaker 02 Whenever you turned on the news, there would be Felix Rohatyn, warning about the possible consequences of New York City defaulting, how a lot of big companies that were headquartered in the city might just pick up and leave. And, and once that starts, then you've created a situation where in 10 years,
26:11 Speaker 05 you'd have a, a city where you have more and more services required and less and less people paying for the services, and you might end up with a gigantic slump. And away from the cameras, Rohatyn was constantly trying to convince all the big players in the city to do their part.
26:27 Speaker 01 It was his effort to get the unions and the real estate industry and the businesses all to share the pain, as he would say it. And the only way he could do that was to make sure that they understood the implications of bankruptcy. Here are the advantages to you, and guess what the disadvantages are?
26:52 Speaker 05 And slowly but surely, Rohatyn helped broker these pretty astounding seeming deals. Like, some of the city's biggest property owners agreed to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in real estate taxes, months before those taxes were due.
27:06 Speaker 02 After months of haggling, the city employees' unions signed up to take billions of dollars from their own pension funds and use that to purchase the bonds that Mac was having such a hard time selling on the open market.
27:18 Speaker 01 Everybody was concerned about their own jobs, whether they were in the private or public sector.
27:23 Speaker 02 It sounds almost like the commonality of purpose that comes in a war or something, where if this goes down, we're all going down with it.
27:30 Speaker 01 Well, that was exactly the feeling. Why would the real estate guys have paid their taxes in advance? Out of loyalty to New York City, yes. But at, at the deeper sense...
27:43 Speaker 01 They and Felix understood that this great city, on its knees, that the country couldn't survive without New York.
27:54 Speaker 02 I mean, there is also in that story, as I understand it, they also got a discount, right?
28:00 Speaker 01 Absolutely, but we got the cash.
28:03 Speaker 05 And Donna says that same Big Apple mix of public spiritedness and naked self-interest kind of drove all of these deals.
28:10 Speaker 01 Well, it's transactional. It's a New York transactional.
28:13 Speaker 02 Yeah, right? Like, I'm gonna do the right thing, but I'm also gonna get a little, a little piece of the deal for myself.
28:20 Speaker 01 Yep.
28:20 Speaker 05 When it came to the state of New York, the things it wanted the most from the city were assurances that the debt problem would not get any worse and that none of this would ever happen again.
28:31 Speaker 02 Creating the MAC was just the first part of a plan that developed over months. The second part of the plan went like this. In exchange for funding a $2 billion aid package to the city, the state legislature forced the city's elected officials to give up a lot of their power over their own budget. New York City politicians would no longer be able to just fund every exciting new initiative or genuinely important social service by fiddling with the balance sheet.
28:59 Speaker 05 A presumably more responsible but less democratic entity was created to watch over the city budget, the Emergency Financial Control Board. The control board got the final say over basically every last financial move the city made and made sure that the city was making the deep cuts it had to to actually balance its budget.
29:19 Speaker 01 The state essentially took away home rule from the city for the financial part of the city.
29:27 Speaker 02 But even with the real estate folks paying their taxes early and the unions using their own pension funds to prop up MAC bonds and the state throwing in billions more, there was still one big piece missing, one institution whose involvement would do more than just fill the hole in the budget, one that hopefully would signal to markets that New York City wasn't going to be allowed to fail. That institution? The federal government.
29:54 Speaker 05 Yeah. In the fall of 1975, Mayor Abe Beam traveled to Washington DC to plead his city's case.
30:01 Speaker 07 What we want is the use of the federal government's credit through guarantees on our securities until we are able to re-enter the credit markets on our own.
30:12 Speaker 05 In other words, Beam was asking the federal government to bail out New York City. But the president, Gerald Ford, was not having it.
30:22 Speaker 07 Responsibility for New York City's financial problems is being left on the front doorstep of the federal government, unwanted and abandoned by its real parents.
30:36 Speaker 02 In a speech at the National Press Club, Ford made all the usual arguments you hear made against any bailout. Why should taxpayers make investors whole on a bad bet they made? What kind of example would bailing out New York give to other cities who might be tempted to cut corners with their budgets?
30:54 Speaker 07 I am prepared to veto any bill that has as its purpose a federal bailout of New York City to prevent a default. I am fundamentally opposed to this so-called solution.
31:10 Speaker 05 The next day, the New York Daily News busted out a headline for the ages. Ford to City: Drop Dead.
31:18 Speaker 02 Do you remember seeing that headline?
31:21 Speaker 01 Of course. I had it for a long time, framed.
31:25 Speaker 02 But despite what Ford said in his speech, the federal government, and Gerald Ford in particular, were caught in the same incentive trap as everybody else. The country couldn't afford to have New York City actually descend into bankruptcy. And Ford had a presidential election coming up, and New York had a lot of electoral votes.
31:45 Speaker 05 So in December of 1975, the United States itself was finally pulled into Felix Rohit's grand bargain. The government pointed up more than $2 billion in short-term loans to New York City.
31:58 Speaker 01 I talked to Jerry Ford about it years later. He used to have a conference in Vail. And I used to sit next to him at dinner because he told his wife I was the only one that knew anything about football. But I talked to him about that. Did he regret it?
32:15 Speaker 02 No, because he said it, it hit, from his point of view, it forced the city to pull itself together and to get it done. And that's where the story usually ends. Grand bargain achieved, fiscal crisis averted. But in reality, it wasn't quite that neat. It took years of raising taxes, slashing public services, and cutting back the number of police officers and teachers and sanitation workers to get the budget to balance. And the city became a harder place to live, especially if you were poor.
32:46 Speaker 05 But the math, the actual numbers in the city budget, did start to reflect reality, how much the city took in and how much it sent out. And eventually, the markets finally started to believe what the city was saying about those numbers. In 1979, for the first time in four years, New York City was once again able to sell its short-term debt.
33:10 Speaker 02 It's worth noting, New York City, not the last place in the country to be completely overwhelmed by its debt. Philadelphia and Washington DC in the 90s, Detroit and Puerto Rico in the 2010s. Each one had a similar debt crisis. But because of New York City, they also had a playbook to follow, a series of difficult and painful moves that could eventually lead them back out of that crisis.
33:45 Speaker 02 The New York City debt crisis was not the only economic debacle of the 1970s. If that happens to be your thing, we've also got an episode about the 1970s out of control inflation and one about Richard Dixon trying to manipulate the Fed. You can find links in our show notes. Also, we here at Planet Money, we have made a book. If you'd like to preorder it, you can go to planetmoneybook.com. Today's episode of Planet Money was produced by Samuel Horst Kessler and James Snead with help from Julia Ritchie. It was edited by Jess Jang.
34:17 Speaker 05 The show was fact-checked by Sierra Juarez, engineered by Debbie Dottry and Sina Lefredo, and we had research help from Will Chase and Jane Gilvin. Our executive producer is Alex Goldmark.
34:28 Speaker 02 Special thanks today to Dennis Coleman, David Schleicher, Lyle Clark, Kevin Henigan, and everyone at Classical King FM in Seattle.
34:36 Speaker 05 Your kings.
34:37 Speaker 02 I'm Keith Romer.
34:38 Speaker 05 I'm Nick Fountain. This is NPR. Thank you for listening.
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