Pod Insights Planet Money The obscure pool of money the US used to bail out Argentina About this episode Last month, during the longest government shutdown in U. S. history, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced that the United States had offered to functionally loan Argentina $20 billion. Despite the sums involved, this bailout required no authorization from Congress, because of the loan’s source: an obscure pool of money called the Exchange Stabilization Fund. The ESF is essentially the Treasury Department’s private slush fund.
Its history goes all the way back to the Great Depression. But, in the 90 years since its creation, it has only been used one time at this scale to bailout an emerging economy: Mexico, in 1995. That case study contains some helpful lessons that can be used to make sense of Bessent’s recent move. Will this new credit line to Argentina work out as well as it did the last time we tried it? Or will Argentina’s economic troubles hamstring the Exchange Stabilization Fund forever?
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Transcript 5,205 words · 14 speakers
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0:20 Speaker 02 The federal government shutdown that just ended went about a month and a half. Hundreds of thousands of federal workers were put on furlough. Flights were being canceled because of a shortage of air traffic controllers. People didn't get their food stamps. But last month, despite most federal spending being paused, Treasury Secretary Scott Besant announced that the United States did have $20 billion for Argentina to help that country through an economic rough patch.
0:51 Speaker 03 We should say he is totally allowed to do this. No congressional input required. The reason Besant can just unilaterally make this move is this. For the last 90 years, the US Department of the Treasury has had this kind of private slush fund with billions of dollars in it. It is called the Exchange Stabilization Fund. And mostly, it just sits there. But Bessent's announced on social media that he was putting it in action.
1:16 Speaker 02 In what we used to call a tweet, now, I guess, a post, Besant explained that the US Treasury had started using the fund to buy up Argentine pesos and that the United States stood ready to swap $20 billion more US dollars for its equivalent in pesos.
1:33 Speaker 04 What was your reaction to that?
1:37 Speaker 04 Bold move, Mr. Treasury Secretary. Bold move.
1:42 Speaker 03 That is Brad Setser. He's a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and kind of the go-to expert on international financial flows.
1:51 Speaker 02 Brad says part of what makes the move so bold is that this swap of dollars for pesos amounts to basically a loan of billions and billions of dollars.
2:01 Speaker 04 We're willing to take those pesos, but we don't want the pesos. Argentina really-- we're not doing this to get pesos. The Argentines are doing this to get dollars.
2:09 Speaker 03 Secretary Besant did a bunch of TV hits making the case for why the US was helping out Argentina in this way.
2:16 Speaker 05 What we're doing is maintaining a US strategic interest in the Western Hemisphere. America first doesn't mean America alone.
2:25 Speaker 02 Besant wants the US to have a strong ally in Latin America. And Donald Trump and Argentina's president Javier Millay seem to be pretty tight.
2:34 Speaker 03 We've talked about Millay on the show before. He is this very colorful character. He's an economist who describes himself as an anarcho-capitalist.
2:44 Speaker 02 Also, he has sideburns that make him look a little like half Wolverine, half lead singer of AC/DC.
2:49 Speaker 03 Millay's big project is cutting government spending. He symbolically brandishes a chainsaw at his rallies.
2:56 Speaker 04 I mean, Millay is very willing to cut public spending. And that's his, that's his political superpower.
3:04 Speaker 02 Under Millay, for the first time in 14 years, Argentina has a balanced budget. And inflation is down from almost 300% annually to closer to 30%.
3:16 Speaker 03 Now, the timing of Besen's $20 billion offer was not an accident. It came just weeks before this big congressional election in Argentina, an election that a lot of people viewed as a referendum on Javier Millay's whole budget slashing experiment.
3:35 Speaker 02 And remember, Trump and Millay, they seem to be buddies. Trump wants him to succeed. And Scott Bessent was pretty clear that he hoped that $20 billion credit line would give Millay a boost.
3:47 Speaker 05 Argentina has 100 years of decline, and President Millay is working against history. And he's done a fantastic job. And I am sure that when we see the elections this month, that he's going to do well, his party will do well.
4:03 Speaker 02 Unusual, sure, to lend $20 billion to someone whose name you cannot pronounce. But also, Argentina has historically not been the most responsible borrower.
4:13 Speaker 03 It has not. Argentina has defaulted nine different times on its debts. It currently owes the International Monetary Fund more than $50 billion, more than six times the next closest country.
4:26 Speaker 04 The rap on Argentina is that it borrows a lot of money and it never repays. They haven't repaid the IMF loan they took out in 2018 and 2019. They haven't repaid the swap from China. They haven't repaid the IMF loan they took out earlier this year.
4:43 Speaker 03 So for Brad, the US offering to send Argentina $20 billion was, what did Brad call it? Bold.
4:50 Speaker 04 You know, it was very noticeable that Secretary Besant described Argentina as a model, a beacon. And I thought, wow, we don't usually have to give bailouts to countries that are models and beacons.
5:03 Speaker 02 This is the kind of stuff that puts a little flutter in Brad's financial flow nerd heart.
5:09 Speaker 04 It's been a long time since we've had a high profile bailout of a troubled emerging market economy. It's been even longer since the US Treasury put the relatively small sums available at the Exchange Stabilization Fund at risk. Secretary Besant, you've made my life interesting again.
5:30 Speaker 02 Hello and welcome to Planet Money. I'm Keith Romer.
5:33 Speaker 03 And I'm Erica Barris. $20 billion. That's a lot of money. $20 billion would pay for about half of the total budget managed by USAID last year, before the Trump administration shut it down. It would pay for a full year of the FBI, DEA, ATF, and Federal Marshal Service combined. But Scott Besant is allowed to offer that money up to Argentina, all on his own, because it comes from the Treasury's private slush fund.
6:03 Speaker 02 Today on the show, we will take a look at the long history of that obscure fund Scott Besant used to help out Argentina and try to figure out, are we ever going to see that $20 billion again?
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7:13 Speaker 02 Let's start with a fun piece of trivia. This is not Brad Setser's first time on the show. In fact,
7:20 Speaker 09 You were on the first ever Planet Money podcast.
7:24 Speaker 02 NPR, we're calling it Planet Money.
7:28 Speaker 09 A little-known, little-remembered fact, but yes.
7:29 Speaker 02 This, right here, is our first ever podcast. Dun, da-dum. All right, so today I'm going to talk to Brad Setser. He's with the
7:38 Speaker 03 Back then, we went to Brad to ask about China purchasing US debt. Today, we're talking to him about that obscure little slush fund that Scott Bessent used to help out Argentina.
7:49 Speaker 09 Can you talk a little bit about how the Exchange Stabilization Fund even came to be?
7:54 Speaker 04 So it's one of these, you know, little tools, pools of money available for the US government when, you know, when the world needs help. But its original purpose was to kind of stabilize the price of the dollar relative to gold.
8:10 Speaker 02 Yeah, back in the 1930s, the US was still on the gold standard. And during the Great Depression, a lot of folks were like, who knows what's going on with the dollar? I trust gold. And they would show up at the bank and literally trade in their dollars for gold at the official rate of around $20 an ounce.
8:27 Speaker 03 But President Franklin Roosevelt did not want people burying gold in their backyards. He wanted them out spending their dollars, getting the economy going again.
8:36 Speaker 10 After all, there is an element in the readjustment of our financial system more important than currency, more important than gold. And that is the confidence of the people themselves.
8:48 Speaker 03 So FDR suspended the gold standard for nine months. But the US did eventually get back on the gold standard, at least internationally. And when they did, they lowered how much a dollar was worth, kind of by a lot.
9:00 Speaker 02 In order to keep this new value of the dollar stable, Congress gave the Treasury Department this little pool of money to help influence the market for the dollar. Actly named the Exchange Stabilization Fund, you know, to stabilize exchange rates.
9:17 Speaker 03 The gold standard, of course, is long gone, but the fund stuck around. Congress never took the money back, in part because it's useful for Treasury to have a fund that lets it act fast when it needs to.
9:30 Speaker 04 It is the pool of money the US uses to intervene in foreign exchange markets. It's basically set aside for emergencies. And it is rarely used, but when it is used, its effective use is important.
9:46 Speaker 03 Yeah, you can think of the fund as like sitting over in a corner of Treasury with a sign on it that says, "Break Glass in Case of Emergency."
9:53 Speaker 02 Now, the fund sometimes gets employed in complicated ways during giant economic messes like COVID or the global financial crisis. But in currency markets, it's mostly used when some big world currency gets a little out of whack. In the 1980s, the fund was used to reset things between the dollar, the franc, the Deutschmark, and the yen. In 2011, the fund was used to help out the yen after a tsunami hit Japan.
10:18 Speaker 04 Usually when the US intervenes, it buys the currencies of other advanced economies, not emerging economies.
10:24 Speaker 02 Occasionally, the fund will loan money to emerging economies. But big loans to emerging economies almost always come from the IMF, the International Monetary Fund, not the Treasury Department.
10:35 Speaker 03 Which is part of why Brad kind of sat up in his chair when he heard that Bessent was going to use the Exchange Stabilization Fund for Argentina. Because of Argentina's long history of defaulting on its debts, it counts as an emerging economy, not an advanced one.
10:50 Speaker 02 And in the Exchange Stabilization Fund's 90-year history, there's only been one other time it's been used at this scale to help out an emerging economy. A single time, just once. In 1995, the United States offered to lend $20 billion to Mexico.
11:07 Speaker 03 The Mexico story is pretty fascinating in its own right, but it's also useful as a way of understanding what Scott Bessent is up to in Argentina. So we're going to spend the next little bit looking at what happened the last time the US used the Exchange Stabilization Fund in this way.
11:25 Speaker 02 For that, we reached out to someone who was very plugged in at Treasury back then, Jeffrey Schaefer.
11:31 Speaker 11 Well, I had been kind of deeply involved with Mexico from the time I arrived.
11:36 Speaker 03 Jeffrey started working at the Treasury Department during President Clinton's first term.
11:40 Speaker 11 I was the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs when the Mexican debt problems arose.
11:49 Speaker 03 Jeffrey had worked on the NAFTA free trade deal, and he'd been paying a lot of attention to what was going on with Mexico's currency, the peso.
11:56 Speaker 02 How would you explain what the problem was in Mexico?
12:00 Speaker 11 Well, the fundamental problem was, I think, an unrealistic commitment to an exchange rate that got more and more out of line with reality.
12:12 Speaker 02 Erica, are you ready to do a little exchange rate explaining?
12:15 Speaker 03 So ready.
12:15 Speaker 02 The only correct answer is yes.
12:17 Speaker 03 Yes, yes.
12:18 Speaker 02 OK, so towards the end of 1994, one Mexican peso was worth about 29 cents. Like, you can think of that as the price of the peso. But like anything else, the price of the peso would move up or down depending on how much people wanted it, following the law of supply and demand.
12:36 Speaker 03 The Mexican government had committed itself to keeping the price of the peso high, which was great for Mexican consumers. The peso was worth more, so essentially, anything that was imported into Mexico was cheaper. Also, it helped keep inflation down.
12:50 Speaker 02 But the way the Mexican government was keeping the price of the peso high was by buying the peso themselves.
12:57 Speaker 11 You can buy it with gold, or you can buy it with foreign currency, in most cases, dollars.
13:03 Speaker 03 Yeah. Like most countries, the Mexican government had billions of US dollars in its reserves. Think of it like a government bank account filled with foreign currency. And whenever it seemed like the price of the peso was dipping a little, they would jump into the currency market and spend those dollars to buy pesos and keep the price up.
13:23 Speaker 02 Which is fine if you have an infinite number of dollars to buy pesos with. But the Mexican government did not have infinite dollars. And it had taken out these complicated loans that it was essentially going to have to repay with dollars, not pesos.
13:38 Speaker 11 We were watching the situation and...
13:42 Speaker 11 Knew that the problems were building up. I can remember sitting at, over coffee at the senior Mexican officials, saying that they really needed to do something and outlining the kinds of things they needed to do.
13:54 Speaker 03 To Jeffrey, the solution was obvious. Mexico needed to stop propping up the peso. They needed to let the market determine the price, to float the peso. But the Mexican government didn't want to.
14:07 Speaker 02 But then, at the end of 1994, a new president, Ernesto Zidio, took over in Mexico. And he was open to a change in strategy. He knew that Mexico needed to stop propping up the peso. And he tried to let its value go down gradually, in a controlled way. But by then, it was too late.
14:27 Speaker 11 The old team just passed him off this untenable situation. And so it immediately blew up. I got a phone call from my counterpart at the Mexican hacienda, which is what they call the treasury, saying that they had run out of money. The exchange rate was falling. They were going to have to let it go the next day. And--
14:48 Speaker 02 So they had reached a point where they decided, we're going to let this currency just float. We're not going to try to keep it.
14:55 Speaker 11 Well, they were at the point where they had no choice. They had no resources left to try to maintain it.
15:00 Speaker 03 Now, Jeffrey understood that there is a big difference between intentionally letting your currency devalue little by little and what was about to go down in Mexico.
15:09 Speaker 02 Markets seemed to figure out that the Mexican government had already spent most of its dollars, which meant that there would be nobody left to prop up the peso. The price of the peso would fall like a rock. And investors would start pulling all of their money out of the country. It would be like a bank run, but on an entire country.
15:29 Speaker 03 And this wouldn't just be bad for Mexico. If Mexico's economy self-destructed, it would be bad for the US economy, too. The two countries are very economically intertwined. Plus, illegal immigration from Mexico, which was also a hot-button issue back then, would have surged.
15:44 Speaker 02 On top of all that, there was a risk of contagion to other emerging markets. Investors could get skittish and pull their money out of those economies, too.
15:53 Speaker 11 Which country's next? Is it Argentina? Is it Brazil? Is it Peru?
15:57 Speaker 02 Back in the US, Jeffrey and his boss were trying to figure out what to do about all of this. Meanwhile, there actually wasn't a permanent Secretary of the Treasury. Bob Rubin had been nominated, but not yet confirmed. And where is Bob Rubin during these conversations?
16:11 Speaker 11 He's fishing somewhere in the Caribbean.
16:13 Speaker 02 Why was he fishing in the Caribbean?
16:15 Speaker 11 The last vacation before he takes over as the Secretary of the Treasury.
16:19 Speaker 03 Eventually, Rubin gets back from the Caribbean. And then on January 10th, 1995, he gets confirmed and then sworn in at the White House the very same night. President Bill Clinton is there. Bob Rubin's wife is there.
16:33 Speaker 11 And as soon as the swearing in was over, his wife left and we went into a meeting with the president.
16:40 Speaker 02 So the swearing in happens and then Rubin is like, OK, bye, honey. I'll see you at home.
16:46 Speaker 11 He said goodbye and sent Judy home, yeah.
16:49 Speaker 03 They explained to President Clinton that they think the US needs to bail out Mexico.
16:53 Speaker 11 And the president very quickly agreed. He said, this is going to be politically awful, but it's what we have to do.
17:00 Speaker 02 Congress did agree that it was going to be politically awful.
17:04 Speaker 12 Why do you want to intervene in Mexico at all? Are we trying to prop up the Mexican government? That would be wrong.
17:10 Speaker 13 Why should I, as a congressman, vote to put American taxpayers at risk again and again and again?
17:16 Speaker 11 Well, so then you said, what is Plan B?
17:20 Speaker 03 Plan B is the Treasury Department's little private pool of money we were talking about before, the Exchange Stabilization Fund. The fund had started with $2 billion, but because of interest it earned on loans from the fund and gains on currency held in the fund, it now had about $25 billion in usable funds.
17:40 Speaker 02 How certain was everybody that this was a lever you could pull?
17:48 Speaker 11 Well, I think there was certainty that it was a lever we could pull. The question was, was it a lever that we wanted to pull?
17:56 Speaker 02 For President Clinton, going it alone without the backing of Congress and lending Mexico all that money was a huge political risk.
18:04 Speaker 11 If we succeeded, if it came outright, it would not be by reelection time a liability.
18:09 Speaker 02 And if you failed and it didn't come outright, it would be a liability by election time.
18:15 Speaker 11 Oh, yeah.
18:15 Speaker 02 Like, it could cost him the presidency.
18:17 Speaker 03 For the folks at the Treasury, there was a second risk.
18:21 Speaker 02 I saw somebody, somewhere, referred to the stabilization fund as a weapon you can only use once.
18:28 Speaker 11 Well, our view was we could only use it once if we didn't get it back. I mean, if we got it back, it showed it worked, then those resources would be available to use when the same situation arose again. But in fact, you couldn't, you could only fail once.
18:43 Speaker 02 Treasury did have the money to bail out Mexico. But if Mexico couldn't pay back the loan, that was pretty much the end of the exchange stabilization fund. So if there was another currency crisis somewhere, Treasury wouldn't be able to help.
18:57 Speaker 03 But if they didn't use the fund, Mexico could melt down. So they decided they had to pull the lever. They were going to offer to loan Mexico $20 billion.
19:09 Speaker 02 Now, if you were going to lend another country $20 billion, you do want to think through how you were going to lend that money. Jeffrey said he took as a guide something known as Badgett's dictum. Walter Badgett, 19th century writer, early editor of The Economist. And Badgett said, assuming that whoever you are lending to is solvent, a lender of last resort should follow three rules. Lend freely, at a penalty rate, against good collateral.
19:37 Speaker 03 So lend freely.
19:39 Speaker 11 That means lending more money than you think they're going to need.
19:43 Speaker 02 And that is so that the market, which is in some sense acting in a kind of panic, is reassured.
19:51 Speaker 11 It's reassured and it's willing to begin to come back in.
19:55 Speaker 03 On top of the US's $20 billion, contributions from the IMF and others brought the number to over $50 billion, way more than Mexico needed.
20:05 Speaker 02 So that's lending freely. Explain at a penalty rate. Like, what's the reason to charge a little bit more than you would be charging normally?
20:12 Speaker 11 Well. One is to keep them from coming to you when they didn't need to. But the other was to incentivize them to go back to the market as soon as they were able to go back and repay us as soon as possible.
20:24 Speaker 03 The interest rate on the bailout was a lot better than Mexico could have gotten from banks and investors in the midst of this crisis, but it was still pretty high.
20:31 Speaker 02 And then finally, against good collateral, what's that?
20:34 Speaker 11 That means to have an assurance that you are going to be repaid.
20:39 Speaker 02 Yeah, one part of the deal Jeffrey worked out with his Mexican counterparts was about collateral. If Mexico did not make their payments on time, the US could claim the revenue the Mexican National Oil Company got from its exports.
20:52 Speaker 03 It took weeks for the team at Treasury to settle on all the terms with the Mexican government. Finally, they got the money flowing from the Exchange Stabilization Fund to Mexico. And then they waited for their bailout to show any signs of working. And waited. And waited.
21:11 Speaker 11 The market just didn't look, didn't look good. The Mexicans, in terms of compliance with the program, that was fine. But the interest rates were getting very high and the peso was continuing to weaken and it looked like it might not come together.
21:28 Speaker 02 Four months, the peso stayed in crisis. And kind of so did Jeffrey.
21:34 Speaker 11 Bob Rubin called me into his office and I was clearly very visibly showing the stress in my face. And he said, Jeff, we're doing the right thing. We've done the right calculations, but that doesn't guarantee it's all going to work out. And you have to be prepared to accept the fact that it doesn't work.
21:53 Speaker 02 But it did start to work out. Gradually, the market changed its mind. Investors started to get it into their heads that the United States wasn't going anywhere.
22:04 Speaker 11 I think it was a matter of, in the end, of staying the course. And the market would see we're still there and we're still putting the money out.
22:11 Speaker 03 Mexico was ultimately able to come out the other side of its crisis. And by October of 1995, they started paying the US back.
22:21 Speaker 02 In the end, because of the interest Treasury was charging, the US made a profit on the loan of around a half billion dollars. Jeffrey actually brought a photo into our interview from the day Mexico made its final payment.
22:34 Speaker 11 And the president's shaking my hand. Bob Rubin standing in the background.
22:38 Speaker 02 It's rare, I feel like, to get one's life achievements captured this precisely.
22:44 Speaker 11 I hadn't realized there was a photographer in the room. And then he got just the perfect moment.
22:49 Speaker 02 Like, this is the moment when the President of the United States said, "Thank you for helping solve this crisis."
22:55 Speaker 03 Jeffrey says he had been planning to leave government for the private sector for a while. And this was kind of mission accomplished for him. He left his job at the Treasury the next day.
23:05 Speaker 02 So that's what it looks like when you lend $20 billion from the Exchange Stabilization Fund, and it works. Next, we turn our attention back to our current $20 billion experiment in Argentina. That's after the break.
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24:45 Speaker 02 OK, as of last month, the Exchange Stabilization Fund has now been used twice to extend a $20 billion credit line to a troubled Latin American economy, in the 1990s with Mexico, and now in 2025 with Argentina.
25:00 Speaker 03 And there are plenty of similarities between what was happening in Mexico back then and what is happening in Argentina today. Argentina, like Mexico in the 90s, has been propping up the value of its peso by using its dollar reserves to buy pesos on the open market.
25:16 Speaker 02 Argentina, like Mexico in the 90s, owes billions of dollars coming due within the next year that it doesn't have the dollars to pay for. And as if that wasn't enough, Argentina is running a current account deficit. In other words, there is more money going out of the country than coming in, like billions of dollars more.
25:35 Speaker 03 Right, there is no question that Argentina can use an extra $20 billion. But does that mean it's a good idea for the US to lend it to them?
25:45 Speaker 02 We should say there are significantly more assets in the Exchange Stabilization Fund than there were back in the 90s. The vast majority of that is this weird kind of IMF-not-quite-money called special drawing rights. And it does look like the US has sent almost $1 billion worth of special drawing rights to Argentina, which presumably Argentina uses to pay back a little bit of its IMF loans. But for all kinds of reasons, what you can do with special drawing rights is just a lot more limited than what you can do with regular old currency. And there's only about $40 billion in regular old currency and easily convertible assets in the fund.
26:28 Speaker 02 So a $20 billion loan to Argentina would take a big chunk out of that.
26:33 Speaker 03 We asked our financial flows expert, Brad Setser, to help us evaluate the credit line for Argentina using Walter Badgett's three main conditions for a lender of last resort: lending freely, at a penalty rate, against good collateral.
26:47 Speaker 02 So lending freely, essentially, like, if our goal was to stave off a liquidity crisis for Argentina, did we lend enough, do you think?
26:56 Speaker 04 Probably not. $20 billion is enough to get you through the end of this year, take you probably through half of next year. If you were lending something closer to $40 billion, then I would say, yeah, that's probably enough. So close, but not quite.
27:11 Speaker 02 So it sounds like lending freely, it sounds like you're giving maybe a B or so?
27:18 Speaker 04 Yeah, B+.
27:19 Speaker 02 OK.
27:19 Speaker 04 It's a big sum of money.
27:20 Speaker 02 Brad says he gave Besen higher marks because of this extra move Besen made. To prop up the peso, Besen used the fund to buy pesos on the open market. It's estimated the Treasury bought more than $1 billion worth of pesos this way.
27:35 Speaker 04 And that's, that's pretty extraordinary.
27:37 Speaker 02 A little risky, Brad says, but yes, also extraordinary. And then the second piece, at a penalty rate, you know, to avoid moral hazard, to encourage them to get out of this, this loan as quickly as they can and get back into the markets. What grade do we give there?
27:54 Speaker 04 Incomplete. I mean, the financial terms of this loan have not been disclosed. Might be at a penalty rate, might be at the US Treasury's cost of funds. We just don't know.
28:02 Speaker 02 Brad says it is very unusual for a deal like this to get signed without some official statement laying out the terms of the deal or without requiring Argentina, in this case, to change its approach.
28:14 Speaker 04 I mean, the US never gives people unconditional support. That's very, very unique.
28:19 Speaker 03 The IMF did have some conditions attached to its most recent $20 billion loan to Argentina. But so far, Besen hasn't indicated the US is adding anything to those conditions. We've reached out to Treasury several times, asking for the specific terms of the US deal, but we didn't get a response.
28:36 Speaker 02 And then against good collateral?
28:39 Speaker 04 C. Gentleman C.
28:43 Speaker 02 Gentleman C. That's, I mean, in my memory from college, a gentleman C was, you didn't do that well on the paper.
28:50 Speaker 04 Right. Look, as far as we know, there's no collateral and no policy conditions beyond the IMF program. And this is where I think perceptions differ. I mean, a lot of people think you don't need to have conditions on a government like that of Javier Malley, which is really committed to running a balanced budget, to slashing public spending.
29:11 Speaker 03 Slashing public spending is kind of Malley's entire brand.
29:15 Speaker 04 His chainsaw's real. So the argument would be you don't need conditions when the government wants to do this anyway. But President Malley and his economic team didn't actually meet what I think is an important component of the IMF program. They didn't meet the target to rebuild Argentina's foreign exchange reserves ahead of the election. And so to me, the missing bit of conditionality is really making sure that Argentina rebuilds its foreign exchange reserves.
29:43 Speaker 02 Because if it doesn't, Argentina could end up in an even worse spot than it's in right now sometime next year.
29:50 Speaker 03 Brad thinks there is a path out of this trouble for Argentina, so long as Malley is willing to stop propping up the peso.
29:56 Speaker 04 He's done the hard work on balancing the budget. Important, significant, real financial accomplishment. He has to complete the job. And yes, you know, you kind of got to take a chainsaw to some of Argentina's import spending.
30:12 Speaker 02 It seems like a sort of second chapter of austerity. First was cutting the social services, cutting back the budget. And then now it is cutting the value of the currency that buys everything.
30:23 Speaker 04 You know, look. They've done half of what they need to do. That's a big step. They just need to do the other half.
30:30 Speaker 02 But in an interview with the Financial Times last week, Malley made it clear he was not open to any significant weakening in the peso, and that he was plenty willing to draw on the $20 billion from the Exchange Stabilization Fund if and when he needs to. If that happens, most of the fund's cash would be committed to Argentina, potentially for years, no matter what other crisis might come along.
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31:27 Speaker 02 And I'm Keith Romer. This is NPR. Thanks for listening.
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