Pod Insights Invest Like the Best with Patrick O'Shaughnessy Chris Bloomstran - An Update on Public Markets - [Invest Like the Best, EP.171] About this episode My guest today for a flash update is Chris Bloomstran, the founder and CIO of Semper Augustus and a popular past guest on the show. We talk about his view on the state of the public equity market, why it will be hard for the market to deliver great returns for the next decade relative to the last, and where opportunities may lie. Please enjoy.
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Show Notes
(1:42) – (First question) – Adjustments to his portfolio in the age of a pandemic
(6:41) – Chris Bloomstran Podcast Episode
(9:36) – The Federal Reserve Act
(12:32) – Surprising action in the markets during the crisis
(13:08) – 2020 Investment Letter
(15:02) – Why we won’t see the same performance in tech over the future as we’ve seen the last decade
(21:00) – The carnage in energy sector and return potential
(30:06) – Berkshires activity since the crisis started
(35:48) – Where sectors are valued in the current market
(41:12) – Expectation for deflation over inflation
(48:54) – Characteristics to look for in businesses to own over the next 10 years
(52:05) – Economic factors they are focusing on
Learn More
For more episodes go to InvestorFieldGuide.com/podcast.
Sign up for the book club, where you’ll get a full investor curriculum and then 3-4 suggestions every month at InvestorFieldGuide.com/bookclub
Follow Patrick on Twitter at @patrick_oshag
Transcript 10,808 words · 4 speakers
Speaker names marked ? are inferred from speaking time and the show’s known hosts — they are not voice-verified.
0:00 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? I know firsthand how complex the tech stack is for asset management firms. And seemingly every new tool and data source makes the problem even worse, adding more complexity, more headcount and more risk. RidgeLine offers a better way forward. One unified platform that automates away the complexity across portfolio accounting, reconciliation, reporting, trading, compliance and more, all at scale. RidgeLine is revolutionizing investment management, helping ambitious firms scale faster, operate smarter and stay ahead of the curve. See what RidgeLine can unlock for your firm. Schedule a demo at ridgeline.ai. This episode is brought to you by Koyfin. I've become very interested in the best software tools in investing. And when I asked Twitter for the best Bloomberg alternative, the overwhelming winner was an excellent new product called Koyfin.
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1:08 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? Hello and welcome, everyone. I'm Patrick O'Neal and this is Invest Like the Best. This show is an open-ended exploration of markets, ideas, methods, stories and of strategies that will help you better invest both your time and your money. You can learn more and stay up to date at investorfieldguide.com.
1:29 Speaker 02 Patrick O'Neal is the CEO of O'Neal Asset Management. All opinions expressed by Patrick and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of O'Neal Asset Management. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions. Clients of O'Neal Asset Management may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast.
1:54 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? My guest today for a flash update is Chris Bloomstrand, the founder and CIO of Semper Augustus and a popular past guest on the show. We talk about his view on the state of the public equity market, why it will be hard for the market to deliver great returns for the next decade relative to the last decade, and where opportunities may lie. Please enjoy our conversation.
2:15 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? Talk to me a little bit about how you are thinking about or actually making adjustments to your portfolio in light of what has to be the most bizarre and challenging macro backdrop that we've ever faced as investors in our sort of collective careers.
2:31 Speaker 03 Well, there's no doubt. Nobody's seen anything like this. You can draw parallels to periods like the Great Depression or the World War II period, but I don't think you've ever seen the enormity of entire broad swaths of the global economy just stopping on a dime. Going into this, and one of the themes of my letters in the last few years has been that we've really built up inordinate levels of debt in society at all levels: household debt, corporate debt, government debt. And for that, we think that the debt stock relative to the size of the economy is unsustainable. I think, given where we are, trying to work
3:11 Speaker 03 out of an over-levered capital stock comes with deflation over time. And because of the dangers of leverage, we've intentionally really pivoted the other way in the last handful of years, even prior to the crisis. We've gone out of our way to ensure that we own businesses that if they don't have net cash in the balance sheet, to the extent they're using any material levels of debt that it was taken on with a purpose, say for an acquisition that makes sense, but with an eye toward running the overall capital level leverage-wise at a reasonable level over time. And so we had pivoted, but I tell you, you get these kinds of periods where you get enormous downdrafts on a daily basis.
3:54 Speaker 03 And investors can do two things with that. We sat there at the market lows, really, in late fall of '08 and into March of '09, looked at the portfolio and said, you know, we could flip out of a number of these businesses that we own that we think are really well-run with great balance sheets and good managements. If we're right and we're at a market low, we would make a hell of a lot more money liquidating a whole big chunk of this portfolio and buying more levered businesses. Because you're going to capture a lot more of the upside when you flip into things that wind up surviving the worst part of the downdraft, don't fail and come out. And we refuse to do so.
4:36 Speaker 03 And so the opposite way to approach that is you get a decline like this, or at least like what we had up until a couple of weeks ago. And we run around with a working list of businesses that we don't own, but that we'd like to own. And I think the world has caught on to the notion that durable returns on equity make a lot of sense. Owning businesses with pricing power makes a lot of sense. And so there are some genuinely very outstanding, good businesses that just typically are very expensive and expensive enough to take a lot of the expected return out of the equation. If you own a business that you've got a sense of reasonable organic growth, just in terms
5:18 Speaker 03 of simple yardsticks, you know, if you think 25 to earnings is a fair number, well, too many of these things have traded at 35 to 40 times. And if you believe a company trading at 40 times, which would be an example of a Costco that we just talked about, I think at some point Costco trades at 25 times. The growth curve is not what it was when we bought the stock for the first time in 2004, I think it was. They'll open stores at a rate of 25, say, to 30 per year. The net number of new stores per year is not as accretive to the installed base of stores. They're still going to have terrific same-store sales growth. It's still a terrific franchise, great business. But I find a multiple at close to 40 times for the business to be pretty high.
6:00 Speaker 03 You could say, well, sure, but how much of the depreciation of the fixed assets of the business are actually real? And that's, and that's a fair point. And so you draw a couple, three points off the valuation. It's just too expensive. You get these downdrafts and you're getting to the point where a lot of the businesses that we'd like to own, we're getting close enough to buy. And then we almost flipped the switch and launched into this recovery phase. When the Treasury and the Federal Reserve got more active in the capital markets and for that, we're just bewildered where we are today. And we had done some of that. If you want me to talk about some of the things we're thinking about government, the Fed and Treasury, I can. But we've been very active. We'll go entire years and do very little in the portfolio.
6:45 Speaker 03 Last year, for example, we simply watched everything go straight up. We added one new business to the portfolio, one, Olin Corporation, which we brought into the small position and it was the price decline this year. We've really made it a material position for the firm. We've had the opportunity to liquidate some things in the portfolio that are good businesses, but they're just too expensive. So Dollar General, which we talked about, I think, last time we recorded late last summer. Dollar General, if you had to pick a business that was gonna sail through this crisis, that's the one. Food supply chain is essential to the economy. Dollar General sells into largely rural America, seventy percent of their stores.
7:29 Speaker 03 All of their stores are open with access to food and necessary household goods. They're terrific and you have a sense that we're in a recession. I think we're in a very deep recession. My sense is the recession lasts a lot longer than people would probably think coming out the backside. And Dollar General happens to be a business that historically has done better in recessions than they have during boom times. Some of that is at the margin on increased use of the food stamp program. But the stock has done too well. We had Dollar General, we've had it in the portfolio for more than three years. I think we're in it at high sixties per share. We couldn't have bought it any better.
8:09 Speaker 03 We bought it when all the retailers were being chucked out because Amazon was gonna take over the entire swath of the retail economy, which probably is the case for a lot, but it's certainly not the case for a company like Dollar General or Costco, two retailers that we own. And the stock is up for the year and it's just performed too well and it's trading at a price where you look at opportunity cost and we had other names in the portfolio and other businesses that we've kind of been hoping to buy for a long time that some of which we've had a chance to buy. And so taking Dollar General down over a series of transactions from 4% of capital to 1% of capital has freed up capital to buy things that are very good businesses, but at much, much better price points that give us a much higher expected return for the duration.
8:54 Speaker 03 So not unlike 2008, we've been very active and my sense is that with this run up leaves us scratching our heads. You know, we talked just a minute before we got on the line, I'm sure you look at your portfolios as well at OSAM. And if you had said to me, Chris, let me paint a scenario for you, three months from now, four months from now, we're going to have the entire global economy stop, all the restaurants will be closed, all of the retail in this world will be closed, the airlines will be running 5% of their fleets, aircraft manufacturing will have stopped globally, auto manufacturing will have stopped globally, and you're down 12% for the year. It doesn't reconcile.
9:39 Speaker 03 I mean, there's something wrong with this picture. I think what's wrong with that picture is just an enormous amount of intervention on behalf of government, which we understand. I mean, I get that you don't want to penalize households and you don't want to penalize businesses for this stoppage in the economy for however long it lasts. And so the folks in Washington are expending every resource times 10, trying to inject liquidity into the system. And for that, I spent too much of my Easter Sunday rereading parts of the Federal Reserve Act, trying to figure out whether what the Federal Reserve is doing is even legal or not. I'm not sure it is, but you can't flaw what's taking place.
10:21 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? Right. And doesn't matter as an investor, you have to play the game.
10:25 Speaker 03 We have to play the game and then you have to decide because we're playing the game. A, we like to think we play the game a little bit with our heads in the sand. You know, we like to think you can ignore the macro and just focus on business, business, business, and price, price, price, and that's what we do. And for that, I think we've got a collection of businesses that will fare well in any economic or monetary environment. Now, that's not to say that Disney is not on its back at the moment with big swaths of the company not running, not open. But we would look out in a case like Disney to where they were in 2019. If you think we're on the back end of this curve and we're going to put people back to work,
11:06 Speaker 03 at what point does Disney get back to full levels of capacity utilization? And what does that look like? Is there any permanent drawdown to their use of their entire capital stock? And so we're doing a lot of that kind of work. But I think you look at just what's happened with the economy and you've got projections all over the map. You've got a couple of the Wall Street houses saying that GDP is going to be down 40% on an annualized basis for the quarter or for a six-month period of time. We've got the Fed President here in St. Louis, James Bullard, who came out three or four weeks ago and said 30-plus down on GDP. And so you kind of break down the components of GDP. And there are several ways to look at it, but I mean, there's no doubt consumption, which is 70% of the economy is going to be down.
11:51 Speaker 03 So if, I don't know, and I've got the numbers in my letter. I've got the table in the front that kind of showed where we were at year-end versus various secular peaks and troughs throughout time. And our sense was at the end of 2019 that we were at a secular peak. On almost any fundamental metric you can use, price to sales, cash flow, dividend yield, prices were very high. We overlay that with total credit market debt to GDP, which has been 350% since 2007. Again, I go back to there's too much leverage, but GDP is going to be down. Consumption, if it's 70% of what was going to be a $22 trillion economy, I mean, it's not unreasonable to think that GDP comes in this year, nominal GDP now, not inflation adjusted, comes in maybe 10% below expectations.
12:35 Speaker 03 I don't think for the year it'll be near as bad as some of your pundits have suggested. But if consumption is 70% of that number at $14 trillion. It's going to be way down. I look at our own household consumption and my wife, you know, God love her, she's a professional shopper. She's not running around to stores, but she's leaning heavily on Amazon. I think if you looked at our house from Google Earth, you would think the Bloomstrands are running an Amazon distribution center right there in St. Louis.
13:05 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? You mentioned already the surprise, if you were to have been given the setup at the start of the year and to have had a broad portfolio only down 12%. I look today, the NASDAQ is now up on the year, which is just kind of remarkable. What else has surprised you most, given the setup that we've already discussed? So, said differently, looking at the market, what market action in sectors or industries or companies has been most odd to you so far in the COVID market period?
13:35 Speaker 03 Well, I think the five big tech companies that I wrote about in my letter this year, it was remarkable the degree to which they held up. Now, they're outstanding, collectively, they're outstanding businesses. You think about Amazon's business being up during a crisis, that's happened. Microsoft's cloud business, Azure, being up during the crisis. So, some of those were to be expected. But going into the year, when I was writing my letter this year, and I don't know, February 11 or 12, collectively, those five businesses together were valued at 20% of the overall S and P 500. And we ran through some fun math in the letter that effectively said, if you're expecting these stocks to compound for the next decade at the same 24% that they had for the last 10 years, if you're
14:19 Speaker 03 expecting their revenues to grow at 19 and a half percent, you're delusional. You're just not going to get it. And I would say for most of the last 10 years, these stocks generally, as a group and even individually, were not very expensive. You take the cash out of Google, really cheap at times. Microsoft, we owned for a decade. I wrote about Microsoft in January of 2000 and predicted shareholders would lose money for the next 15 years, which they did, but we bought the stock. In the low twenties in 2006, owned it for a decade, trimmed it when it was expensive, bought it when it was cheap, and finally sold the whole thing without a doubt, three or four years too soon. I didn't get that the cloud was going to be as big of a deal for Microsoft. But the stock traded at 38 times earnings in 2000.
15:04 Speaker 03 It traded at 21 times earnings when we bought it into the duration of our ownership, most of the duration of our ownership for 10 years, and traded back into the 30s to earnings. Profit margins had fallen. They were washed out in the low 20s. Now they're back to 30%. So that group, really, I don't think is going to produce even near the same results, not just in terms of share price, but in terms of sales and the margin structures that they've enjoyed.
15:34 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? Just real quick to interrupt there. So they're sort of priced as if they will, maybe especially given the backdrop here and the fact that many of them are at or near highs despite the macro environment. Just say a little bit more about what you discussed in the letter as to why you don't think those kind of 19% revenue type compounding experiences are as likely over the next decade for those huge tech companies.
15:59 Speaker 03 It was the same logic I used 21 years ago now to Microsoft when the market cap was 620 billion and revenues were only 20. It was simply the price was too high. We took a 10-year horizon and a 20-year horizon, using market cap, using sales and using net income, and ran scenarios at compound growth rates of, on the high end, 25%, 20%, 15%, 10%, and then 4. And we basically said, the S and P 500, if we assume for the next decade or two decades will grow at 4%. Well, a lot of people would say, well, that's crazy, except if you look at the last 10 years and consider that sales...
16:46 Speaker 03 Have only grown three and a half percent a year for the S and P 500, kind of matching nominal GDP growth. Most people wouldn't believe it, given the performance of the stock market for the last 10. But it's been three and a half percent and you've got profit margins that peaked, in my opinion, and probably won't return to those levels, perhaps even in my lifetime. In the third quarter of 2018, we saw a net profit margin of a little over 12.1% on the S and P 500. Most of that during 2018 was on the back of the big tax cut, which took marginal rates from 35% to 21% through an additional accelerated depreciation. There were a lot of angles, but a lot of that benefit was exhausted over the course of the first three quarters. And so you had the peak, making the assumption
17:31 Speaker 03 that sales grow for the next decade at 50 basis points more than they had for the last decade, which I don't believe. But if you assume 4%, if you assume no margin increase, so you hold profit margins at year end 2019's levels in the low elevens, and you just extrapolate those out at four, and you assume no more multiple expansion. So we went out with the S and P 500 trading at 23 times trailing earnings on a reported basis at the end of 19. So at 23 times trailing, we'd make the case that you're not going to get any multiple expansion. But let's
18:10 Speaker 03 just hold multiples at 23 and let's hold margins at 11, low elevens percent. So I think it's reasonable to assume the S and P does 4% by those three yardsticks for the next 10 years or 20 years, starting at year end 2019. Running the same, and then running those various same three yardsticks for those five companies individually and collectively, you simply get to mathematical impossibility by growing at 20%. You grow, if you're starting at a 20% base, if these five components are 20% of the index and they grow at 20% for the next decade or two decades, you start to get to where the five components are more than 100% of the S and P 500.
18:51 Speaker 03 So you get to impossible figures. And running those scenarios and kind of working backwards down the growth curve for all three, again, market cap and sales and net income, I kind of got to where I could buy. Revenues, which were, stocks were 20%, revenues were 8% of the S and P 500, let's say, and net income was 14%. I could get revenues growing at 10% a year for the next decade and becoming a larger multiple, somewhere south of 20%, but those five companies can't become, in my opinion, more than 20% of the sales of the entire S and P 500. You just have the laws of large numbers diminishing returns. And I wrote, and I still believe, I don't know what stops it,
19:36 Speaker 03 if it's simply inertia, but regulation comes along. The point where these five get so big, and they're already having regulation issues in Europe, you just stumble into new competition. Who knows what it's going to wind up being? Who would have known that a company like Google was going to come along and just eviscerate the entire traditional advertising business? I've got a couple of friends in here in town, in town here, who ran Southwestern Bell's Yellow Pages directory business. And I remember when Google was in its early days, had just gone public, these guys swore on a stack of bibles that it wasn't a threat because locally they had boots on the ground. Well, it wasn't but two or three years before they were done. The advertising agencies that are all inside the big couple conglomerates now, Omnicom,
20:18 Speaker 03 they're all trying to cut costs just to stay alive and they're gone. I don't know what it will be, and that's not a conversation for this COVID crisis, but these are genuinely great businesses. They have very, very good balance sheets, balance sheets. Collectively, they've got net cash on the balance sheets. We simply found the prices too high and the scale of the businesses in aggregate being too large. But for the last 10 years, if you'd only owned those five companies, and maybe you throw in a Visa and a Mastercard, so seven businesses, if you'd only owned those five or seven, that's all you needed. And then you get to the first quarter here and all of the chaos. If you had just owned those five, you were down maybe 9%
21:01 Speaker 03 at quarter end when the S and P 500 was off, what was it off? 19%, 20%, down 32 or 33% at the low. Those five businesses held up better than all. You take the top 20 companies in the S and P 500, and collectively, they've held up better. And so I think good businesses tend to keep you out of trouble. You just get to the point where if you're thinking beyond what's happened during a crisis and for the next 10 or 15 or 20 years, you're just not going to get the same returns. But I think the problem is, you're probably not going to get very good returns out of the broad stock market either.
21:34 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? Let's go to the literal opposite story, which I think in this market has been the energy market. So if the big five tech have navigated this with sort of amazing resilience, I think on the other end of the spectrum, just like no one could have predicted what we're facing economically, it would have been very hard to predict the action that we've seen in oil markets and therefore in energy equities. I'd love to get your take on this space, since I know it's one you're interested in and maybe even have a few investments in. What's your take on what's happened in energy and whether or not the relative carnage there versus the big five tech has created any sort of opportunity for much better long-term returns than what you see in the S and P 500?
22:12 Speaker 03 We've owned oil and gas in various iterations over the entire history of our firm, and we've done them well. We've made cyclical investments early on in a couple of the deepwater drillers. In late 90s, oil was under $10 a barrel. The world thought it was headed before. We spent a couple of weeks in Houston and talked to all of the drillers and wound up owning Transocean and Diamond. We wound up tripling our money with way too little capital. We did the same thing again with the same two companies. The next time oil traded down to those lows. We've owned ExxonMobil cyclically. We, I think, have a good history buying it when we thought it was cheap, selling it when it was dear.
22:51 Speaker 03 The problem with oil is, and the world learned this lesson in a hurry here this quarter, with OPEC really existing in perpetuity with a sword over the head of the industry. If you take US production of oil and gas, we were a bit player globally 20 years ago. The United States was producing four to five million barrels a day. Our net consumption is in the high teens per barrel. Today it's 20 million barrels a day. Before the crisis, it was 20 million barrels, abruptly down for a very short period of time. So we've gone from producing 25% of our crude needs to producing 12 out of 20 barrels. And so
23:35 Speaker 03 at the margin, that incremental 7 million barrels a day over the last decade. Has really eaten into OPEC and it's really eaten into the international oil community. We stand up and say we're energy independent. Well, we're not. We still import a net eight million barrels a day, but now we're starting to export various crude products. And so you're Saudi Arabia and you see this and forever Saudi and most of these nations that participate in OPEC are very dependent upon oil and gas to meet their federal budgets and their spending needs. You know, there's very little middle class in a lot of these countries. They're very wealthy in Saudi Arabia. You have the princes and the sheiks. And then you've got the poor and the poor, the vast, vast majority of the population.
24:18 Speaker 03 They need and OPEC needs as high of a price as possible to run their affairs. And generally they'll go in cycles, but they will typically keep oil off the marketplace and never run full out. Well, here in the United States, we've been running full out and it's kind of a nutty thing. We saw the lessons this year with the collapse in crude. But if you follow the cycles, even ExxonMobil, which we think at least historically had been best of breed, best capital allocators, we own Exxon today. And I think in the last 10 years, the businesses eroded considerably. They used to zig when the industry would zag.
24:57 Speaker 03 When their competitors were ramping up CapEx and exploration and they sensed that we were going to get to a oversupply. Exxon had a great history of backing off their CapEx when everybody else was spending money. And then they would go make investments when you were in cyclical downturns. Well, then they bought XTO and they couldn't have done it at a worse time, really at the peak of the gas market. And over the last 10 years, they've been hitched this dividend policy. They've just increased the dividends in perpetuity to the point where in the last couple of years, they've not earned the dividend. If you're the CEO of a business that is hitched to a high dividend payout, it's absolute handcuffs. Olin's in that same boat.
25:38 Speaker 03 My recommendation to the folks that run Olin has been during this crisis, you've got to cut the dividend. It's 80 cents a share. They're in the list of the dividend aristocrats, which is one of the stupidest things you can have because you're obligated as a cyclical business to always pay the dumb dividend. Well, in oil's case, that's $120 million they ought to be freeing up, but they haven't freed up. In Exxon's case, they've got a dividend that's going to be $3.48 a share this year. But they didn't even earn that last year. They didn't earn it the year before. They didn't earn it the year before that. They're hitched to a payout rate that's over 100% of their capital. If you're not earning on a free cash basis your dividend, you're borrowing money. And so Exxon has obliterated their balance sheet. They've gone from $10 billion in debt.
26:22 Speaker 03 Going into the year, they had about 47, maybe 50 billion in debt. Here in the crisis, they've done what everybody's doing. They're drawing down revolvers and they're floating debt issuance. They've had two bond issues in the last month where they've collectively raised, I want to say $18 billion. Now they've got $70 billion in debt. They've got more cash from the proceeds of the issue, but they're burning through capital. They cut the CapEx budget by 30% a couple of weeks ago, but they haven't touched the dumb dividend. So we did a deep dive on a bunch of little independent oil and gas companies last year because this crisis didn't just start. These businesses and the service sector in particular has been incredibly weak. The small independent producers have been incredibly weak for the last couple, three years.
27:06 Speaker 03 We have some really good investors, really highly regarded, and I won't mention it, but companies like Antero Resources, big institutional ownership from high-class investors, and these stocks are down, were already down 95 to 99% prior to what transpired in the first quarter. So you get into the depths of the coronavirus and the global economy flat on its back. And we really had an assault from OPEC when they said they were going to pump full out. Couldn't happen at a worse time. I think intentionally happened. It was couched as the conflict with Russia. Russia was going to produce, so Saudi said, "We're going to produce and we're going to flood the world with too much crude." Well, that just exacerbated the problem.
27:51 Speaker 03 And so the entire oil and gas patch just got absolutely crushed. Exxon traded at 30 bucks a share, having traded at $100 a share a couple of years ago. There were numbers of businesses that were down already, like I say, 90, 95%. And during this deep dive, ignored a number of businesses and could not get comfortable with any of them because what you've seen... And I think the world's known this is you have a massive amount of debt that finances this industry. At the end of the day, this is not a business that generates sustainable free cash profits. They're cyclical profits, but they don't generate returns on capital. They're actually net, over long periods of time, capital destroyers. And so there were
28:33 Speaker 03 an enormous amount of debt coming due in late 20 throughout 2021, 2022, and you were going to see an enormous number of bankruptcies. So here we are with ExxonMobil, have made it a bigger position. We look at where they produce around the globe, and we think they've got pretty reasonable break evens in various places. The refining operations are running at 65% of capacity, but they have fields that break even at $30, $35, $40, a lot of production. And so you're not back there on an oil bound, on a current spot basis or futures basis. But if we get oil back to, say, $45 to $50 sustainably, Exxon's in good shape. When they calculate their reserves, they're overstated, using a longer
29:17 Speaker 03 term, higher oil price. But I think they're fine. At today's prices, you'll wind up making a lot of money. But they are not businesses, Patrick. You can own durably for 30 years. Because they're just going to destroy capital. It's a shame for a lot of reasons. But they're cheap. And so as long as you get through the capital structure and you get through the capital needs and sources of liquidity and current demands for capital, you find the ones that'll survive and you'll wind up making a lot of money. Because we'll come out of this thing and we're going to put people back to work and we will use more oil and gas. We're not going to be topping up our refiners, which can't even take more crude. We're not going to be layering on crude on tanker ships. We'll use it. It was a painful downturn, but the industry ought to learn. You still live at the mercy of
30:00 Speaker 03 OPEC, and only for their mercy of keeping crude off the marketplace. And for that, these are really terrible businesses. And yet we own a couple of them.
30:09 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? Right, right. Well, obviously, ultimately, price is a key variable in all this, even for, I love the expression from a famous value investor that they made all their money going from very bad to bad in businesses because the price is just too low. So yet another variable that one must consider in this strange market.
30:26 Speaker 03 I think that's very well put. That's kind of the nature of investing in cyclicals, is you can only own them when they're very bad. You can only buy them when they're very bad. You can't have an expectation of good. I think that's a perfect way of putting it.
30:38 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? Everyone listening that knows your work will know your deep exploration of Berkshire Hathaway, its model. You've been a big investor there for a very long time. Know the ins and outs of their balance sheet, maybe like nobody else. And so I think it's been a very curious thing to watch Berkshire in the coronavirus market period, sort of doing perhaps the opposite of what many would expect of them, given Buffett's famous buy American IM op-ed in the New York Times in the 2008 crisis, when he was aggressively bidding and setting up interesting structures with places like Goldman Sachs and Wells Fargo to sort of act as a backstop and get paid very well for doing that. Whereas in this period, he's really, the only notable activity seems to be sales of banks and airlines. No major
31:23 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? landmark purchases, at least none announced, and a huge cash pile by absolute standards, if not by relative standards. I'd love you to just talk through your reaction to Berkshire's activity or lack thereof so far in the COVID period.
31:36 Speaker 03 Well, there's very little activity to observe yet because, to your point, they've been extremely quiet. I think the 08 crisis evolved over a longer duration. And so when companies like Goldman and GE needed capital, you didn't have the massive federal intervention immediately like you've had in this crisis. And I was going to say, it's a good thing Berkshire doesn't own airlines and money center banks. Well, they do, and they're meaningful positions. You saw them take their Southwest Airlines and their Delta positions below 10%. Just last week, they shrunk their Bank of New York position to 10%, which was really regulatory driven in that case.
32:15 Speaker 03 So it's hard to know what's going on inside the business. I think you've not seen the deals like they did during the crisis yet because of the no ability of this federal money that's coming to the party. You've got the airlines with their hands out to the government trying to come to terms over whether and how much equity ownership via warrants that the government's going to wind up taking. Well, Berkshire can't get in front of that, the same way they can't get in front of outside of the coronavirus, a bidding war for outright ownership of companies when private equity has so much capital on the sidelines waiting to deploy. I'm not sure they were at the point where they were able to get capital on terms that made sense to Berkshire when there's so much more free money coming from the federal government.
32:57 Speaker 03 But it's interesting. It's hard to know what's going to happen. I think the airlines are going to get diluted. We own a couple of suppliers of parts to airlines. They're good businesses and we're struggling with what the back end curve looks like for replacement parts. We're looking struggling with what the build profile looks like for construction of wide body jets. The 787 and the Airbus A350, for example, in the case of Hexcel, which supplies intermodulus carbon fiber. But it's hard to know what Berkshire's done. It's going to be really interesting to see. My expectation would be of the $125 billion in cash that they would have bought back a whole bunch of shares. They spent on the order of seven or eight billion dollars last year buying stock back
33:41 Speaker 03 average of $202 or $203 on the B shares. Well, the stock traded as low as 160 and I think there've been days and moments where I can spot Berkshire's buys on the open and on the close. I'm probably, I could be wrong, but I presume they've spent a fair amount of capital. It's gonna be interesting on the equity front to see what they've done. The airlines, we had held off in a big way owning these things. It was obvious coming out of oh eight, oh nine, when they all restructured. It was a different business. They got a lot more religion in terms of cost structure. They got control of their gates. They weren't killing each other on price, but all these actions were gone outside of a recession.
34:23 Speaker 03 I think the carriers figured out how to sell first class seats for a price that people would actually pay. Instead of giving those seats away to their frequent flyer platinum status customers for free because nobody was buying the seat. So instead of selling a first class seat for $3,000, they would sell it for $1,200 or for $900. So there was a lot of good done. But we sat on sidelines and said, it's mirroring to see how this industry fares when you get the next recession and who blinks first. Because you've got a history of blinking and taking fares down to levels below breakeven. So when load factors start to get below 85%, you start to get into trouble. And obviously, nobody could have seen this thing coming where you really shut down global airline traffic to the degree we have. You've got federal money coming.
35:08 Speaker 03 And on one hand, I wouldn't be surprised to see Berkshire having sold out or materially sold down the airline structure, knowing that this will not be the same business going forward, knowing that demand will not return to 100% of 2019 levels. Hard to know what's happened in the portfolio. I don't know if they've sold down banks. The banks seem to be in more trouble than the world thought. They had to meet Graham Dodd standards and they apparently were better capitalized. But outside of the banking structure and in shadow banking, the fact that you've got all these credit funds that look like long-term capital management leveraging up at obscene multiples to equity capital, 25 to one, 50 to one, 100 to one.
35:53 Speaker 03 I wrote about two years ago, the degree of debt in levered loans and the CLO marketplace. We were running around talking to university endowments and their CIOs and pension CIOs. I bet you that nobody runs cash and fixed income by simply owning individual credits. So Berkshire goes into the year with 125 billion in cash, but what's their cash invested in, T-bills? Nobody does that.
36:21 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? It's a crazy time for such an interesting company. I can't wait to see the buyback activity. Looking back now, once we get the data, but it has been somewhat surprising and perhaps their method for capturing value created by COVID is simply in their own stock. I'm curious, you've mentioned energy on one end, the top end of the tech ecosystem on the other end as contrasting examples. Are there other areas that you see as sort of wildly cheap or what seems to be wildly expensive in this market today on April 14th, 2020?
36:55 Speaker 03 The places where you still have enormous upside, if you believe the durability of Federal Reserve and Treasury intervention in the marketplace are businesses that were destined to fail. Lousy retailers that were already going out. Macy's is just in a slow bleed. They were going to go from 900 stores to 800 stores coming out of this downturn. If they don't follow Chapter 11 very quickly, which may not be the case now that you've got access to capital here for the time being, I think they'll still accelerate their number of stores that'll close. The mall retailers, even Mr. Buffett is invested in, at least he was invested in Seritage, Simon Property, all of the big malls, just long-term businesses
37:40 Speaker 03 that are probably going to zero in a lot of cases are still cheap, even though they're up 50% to 100% off their lows, they're still down 60, 70% off their highs. So if you're willing to swim in that pond and go find the most over-leveraged businesses, even though you've had an enormous recovery, there's a whole bunch of them that are still down 70, 80, 90%. We're not doing that. The things that we own today, I mean, there are a lot of businesses that are really cheap and still down materially for the year, not as cheap as two weeks ago. But I would contend that coming out the backside of this, that we'll have deflation for an inordinately long period of time. I think a better way to think about what to do with capital today is think about how capital's going to work. For the next 10 or 20 years, certainly for the next 10 years.
38:23 Speaker 03 And if you bake in short-term interest rates, which are already at the zero bound. If you bake in a Federal Reserve that will be determined to try to compress long-term Treasury rates as close to the zero bound as possible. And you go back to the Fed-Treasury Accord that existed during the latter part of World War II. And into the period immediately after the war that allowed them to run enormous federal deficits. Increase the household savings rate to the point where we actually managed to finance the deficit from household savings. We rationed a lot of what was consumed at the household level. I think coming out the backside of this, you can bake on deflation. And if corporate credit levels were at all-time highs. And if government debt levels, on-balance sheet debt levels,
39:09 Speaker 03 which were already at the point where you get diminishing returns out of the next incremental dollar of debt that's taken on. This all smacks of deflation. And so we're in a period where none of these things are going to fail. I mean, if you figured this out and realized they're not going to let businesses fail. We're going to probably violate the Federal Reserve Act and buy secondary corporate bonds, both investment-grade and now high-yield, as of last Thursday's announcement. We're going to buy ETFs, we're going to buy high-yield ETFs, which I think is way beyond the Fed Charter. Well, they've put a stake in the ground and said, we're going to get enough liquidity into this system. And we've got the firepower to do it. Well, yes, they have the firepower to do it.
39:51 Speaker 03 But it's going to take a four-plus-trillion-dollar deficit this year, which is going to add an enormous amount of debt to the Fed balance sheet. We're going to take total credit market debt from $76 trillion to somewhere north of $80 trillion. Debt to GDP, which has been 350%, is going to be at least 400% of GDP. The only way to deal with these kinds of debt levels is deflation, which comes with austerity, which comes with things like lower wages versus higher wages. Well, we're not mentally set up for that. We haven't seen this since the 1930s. And so if I'm right, and we have deflation for the next 10 years, let's say, then finding businesses that have pricing power,
40:34 Speaker 03 because very few are going to have it, that also have rock-solid balance sheets. Is the way to survive and make decent returns for the next 10 years. If you survive this COVID crisis because you happen to have access to capital, because the treasury has allowed the Fed to lever up its balance sheet at 10 to 1 for high-grade corporates and for the securities that they're allowed to own, treasuries and agencies, maybe munis, but not high-yield, not ETFs, not CLOs, not commercial mortgage-backed securities, this is all crazy. They're all going to live, but you're going to come out of this thing with even more leverage than you had. Even good businesses like Disney is going to come out with more debt on the balance
41:17 Speaker 03 sheet, and they already had debt on the balance sheet because they financed the Fox deal last year. We're introducing more leverage into the capital structure of business than existed prior to 2019, and if we have deflation, then these companies are going to bleed badly. And I think you've got a decade of restructurings. You have to be vigilant. And so, yeah, I think the companies that we own are the right businesses, and to the extent we've been able to add to those, it's been the right thing to do.
41:45 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? Can you say a bit more about this deflation versus inflation concept? I think your viewpoint on deflation is a bit against the grain, where maybe the simple argument would be with as much money being pumped into the system, the expansion of M2, of the money supply, of everything the Fed has done to introduce liquidity, that the naive expectation would be inflation, not deflation, and that the way to get rid of that debt would be to inflate your way out of it. So can you just maybe draw a little bit more detail around why you expect deflation versus inflation?
42:17 Speaker 03 Yeah, the problem is the same problem that the Japanese have had for the last 30 years, going back to their peak in 1989, and that's you can run up the money supply, but an increase in the money supply, if you want to call M2 money, M2 is really your monetary base times little m, which is the money multiplier, but M2, let's just say M2 is the right number. Well, if your GDP was going to be, let's say, $22 trillion going into the year, probably 20 by year end, I mean, M2 at last week's print was 16 and 1/2, maybe 16, 7 trillion dollars off the top of my head. Which means the velocity of money, which is what nobody thinks about, isn't working. So none of this federal money, none of the $2 trillion spending, none of the leverage
43:01 Speaker 03 that's incorporated in these special purpose vehicles, the commercial paper deal, the various credit funds, the various term asset backed facilities, none of these are stimulative. And I think it's been proven academically that at higher and higher levels of on balance sheet federal debt, the incremental use of debt starts to produce diminishing returns where it's not effective. And so that's deflationary. So the answer then becomes, and I think you're right, the end game, the end game is inflation. The end game is probably hyperinflation, given where we are, because here and abroad, there's simply too much on balance sheet debt. But we will go through various iterations of what the Japanese have done.
43:44 Speaker 03 We did the first iteration of quantitative easing during the financial crisis, and we had to do that because we were going to a 1930s style downturn. But then we had the three iterations of quantitative easing, one, two, and three. And that didn't push up GDP. I talked about earlier that sales for the S and P 500 have grown at three and a half percent. Nominal GDP has barely grown. If you go back to the beginning of my career, in my investing career, total credit market debt to GDP was about 200%, up from 158% during the middle of Reagan's first administration. Well, interest rates were sky high. It took the 30 years coming out of World War II, 40 years to utilize the capital stock
44:25 Speaker 03 that was overbuilt in the 1930s, and we had this glorious growth in real GDP per capita at an enormous level. Well, in the subsequent 20 years, in 2000, when the tech bubble peaked and the Nifty 50, the new iteration of the Nifty 50, the big caps peaked at 40 to 60 times earnings, the NASDAQ traded at 240 times. We had taken on an enormous amount of debt to that point, and debt was 250% of the economy. And we were stunned at that number. It was just crazy. GDP was 10 trillion and debt was $25 trillion. So we had the downturn, the stock market broke, S and P dropped 50%, NASDAQ dropped 80-plus percent. We had a mini recession in two thousand and two and then recovered.
45:08 Speaker 03 And we really put credit to work in things like the mortgage stock. We did the household finance and covenant light, no covenant loans. And it was a stunning seven years from two thousand to oh seven. And the GDP grew from ten trillion dollars to fourteen trillion dollars. But the debt stock, total credit market debt doubled from twenty five to fifty trillion dollars. We took an incremental twenty five trillion dollars in debt to grow the economy by four. Think about that. And so we had the great financial crisis. We've then taken the Fed's balance sheet from eight hundred and fifty billion dollars. The first thing they did was took up that first bailout with the various SPVs, the various facilities they had, the conduits.
45:53 Speaker 03 And we added a trillion or a trillion and a half dollars to the Fed balance sheet. That had to be done to avoid going to a nineteen thirties. I'm not sure they needed to do the QEs. But in the subsequent years, we've taken the Fed balance sheet from what was eight hundred and fifty billion dollars. It got up to four and a half trillion dollars a couple of years ago. And then we tried quantitative tightening, where we were going to run it down. I remember the president of the Fed in San Francisco saying, well, we're going to get this balance sheet about halfway to where it was. So you would have said two and a half trillion dollars. And what they proved was you can't do it. You know, we had nine increases in the Fed funds rate. And you started to really weaken the economy, weaken the global economy. We got into a trade war. Well, China was already weak.
46:34 Speaker 03 In the last five years, even though profits for the S and P five hundred rose, profits more broadly under NIPA, National Income Product Accounts, have been in decline. And last year, we had the S and P up thirty one and a half percent. Profits were flat and it looked for most of the year like profits were going to be down year over year. So the tax benefit was gone. So here we are, we came out of oh seven, oh eight, oh nine at three hundred and fifty percent debt to GDP. Now we're sitting here at three hundred and fifty percent again. So for the last ten years, we've taken on three dollars and fifty cents in debt to grow GDP by a dollar. So from oh seven, GDP has grown from fourteen to twenty one trillion dollars. We've added seven. But now we've gone to seventy six trillion dollars in debt.
47:19 Speaker 03 There's an inefficacy of the ability to get money into the economy and have it work. And that gets back to this velocity of money. And so velocity, I remember when I, twenty years ago, when we started the firm, I always had it in my head that M two times velocity is GDP. M two is always about half of the size of the economy. So back when we had a ten trillion dollar economy, M two would have been five trillion dollars. And the velocity of money was two. Well, now the velocity of money is down to about one point three and declining. There's no way to get this money working because we've already got an overbuilt capital stock. That applies whether capital is property, plant and equipment, or whether it's services. We simply have too much stuff. We have too much retail square footage. We have too much restaurant square footage.
48:04 Speaker 03 We have too much manufacturing capacity globally. And so we're in big decline and you can't simply introduce more debt on top of debt and call that the solution. So, yes, I fear that hyperinflation is the end game, but we're not there yet. I think everybody thinks that all these QEs is absolutely creating inflation and it's not. Only when the Fed really turns the liability side of the balance sheet into notes, currency, instead of going through the treasury, when the Fed directly monetizes the debt, buys treasuries that are not issued first by the Treasury Department to finance deficit spending, then you'll probably get it. But till then, it's just deflation, deflation.
48:46 Speaker 03 And so we'll do numerous iterations of ongoing QE to try to get inflation up. You know, we're going to try to get inflation up to that Fed target of two percent. I just don't see it. We fast forwarded by a decade over the matter of three months in terms of how much debt the system could really bear. And now it's beyond kind of that tipping point where there's no ability to take new debt and grow the economy. And I think that's problematic. And so my bet would be deflation, deflation, deflation. And hopefully we don't get hyperinflation. In my lifetime, I'd always hope we can get it through my kids' lifetimes, my grandkids, all bets are off. You can't control that much from the greats. But so it's coming. I just don't think it's coming yet.
49:26 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? I'd love to review the characteristic profile. You mentioned one or two already, which is this notion of pricing power, maybe capital efficiency in contrast to the very capital inefficient growth, which is how I would characterize the increasing debt load to produce the same amount of GDP as a sort of capital inefficiency. What other characteristics do you think are most important to look for in businesses to own prospectively over the next, say, 10 years alongside pricing power?
49:55 Speaker 03 Well, I think you better sell things that are essential that households need. If you go back to the Great Depression, when GDP fell by half, nominal GDP got cut in half. The consumption was similar to where we are today. It was 70% of the economy when GDP was $103 billion in 1929. We cut the economy in half, the consumption grew to 90%. So everybody now knows unemployment went from 3% or 4% up to 24.9 is always the headline number. Well, you still have to eat and drink. So businesses that sell things that you need, food, food products, drink, consumer goods companies should be in terrific shape unless they've just layered on too much debt.
50:36 Speaker 03 Because what's going to wind up happening is if the price level starts falling by 2% a year, it's problematic for everybody. You know, I go back to portfolio companies like Dollar General, which I think is perfectly weathered for a deflationary environment, except that if the overall cost level, cost of goods sold declined by 2%, you're going to be pushing back on wages by 2% to try to maintain margins. But if you're a levered business, if you've got an enormous amount of debt in the capital structure, even nominal declines in your top line.
51:10 Speaker 03 can have profoundly bad impacts on the backside. So I would make sure you own staple companies. I regret now having owned and sold PepsiCo a few years ago because a company like that is perfectly situated. Their beverage franchise, but also their salty snacks. PepsiCo still is a business that has pricing power. Now, they may have to adjust the price level to the overall inflation level, but they're in a command position in terms of distribution. They're in great shape. Companies like that. Businesses that are going to have a permanent, a long tail falloff in demand. Again, I go back to these things that I struggle with that we own. The supply chain to the airline industry. My experience had always been when you had a deep recession, that the backlogs at Boeing and the backlogs at Airbus would
51:55 Speaker 03 disappear. And that was the case. I have vivid memories over the last 30 years during recessions, where we would park airplanes in the desk. But the thing that happened during those downturns was even though the backlog disappeared, production never really stopped because there was still enough order flow. Well, if we're going to wind up with 85% of capacity utilization two or three years from now, all of these new aircraft that have been built, it's a game changer. So that really impacts companies that sell into the supply chain, that you know, that sell into the parts business for replacement. It's very disruptive. I think this three-month period is going to wind up being incredibly disruptive for the economy.
52:38 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? Any closing thoughts, Chris, as you look forward? Things that you are most keyed in on rates of change that you're paying closest attention to, whether it's in your businesses or in the economy? Things that you would leave people with to consider?
52:50 Speaker 03 I've watched the economy for the 30 years that I've managed money, move production to the lowest cost of production. So Nike moved production to Vietnam. And then as Vietnam grew, they moved production to China. I think our relationship with China is irreparably
53:09 Speaker 03 harmed from this episode. And so we all know that the Chinese held the supply chain for our pharmaceutical industry kind of over our heads at the most inopportune moment. But I think about if I'm running a manufacturing company and I need to grow capacity. And my decision now is, am I going to locate a plant in Dothan, Alabama or in Wuhan, Hubei province? I'm going to Dothan, Alabama. The southeast could have a resurgence as we bring manufacturing back home. I think about companies like Starbucks. We've always said we would never directly own a Chinese business. And so Luckin, a couple of weeks ago, had a lot of people laughing unless you own the
53:54 Speaker 03 company. But we own Starbucks. Starbucks is a top five holding of ours. And the premise on the growth curve at Starbucks is very heavily dependent upon opening new stores in places like China. And if we really have genuinely irreparably gone the other direction, and you've seen Japan now introduce federal money to try to help industry take supply and manufacture out of China. If we go down that path, which we very well may, and perhaps we even should, then you get to where we've seen governments around the globe commandeer assets. Well, Starbucks has a whole bunch of stores already on the ground in China.
54:37 Speaker 03 They ended their East China joint venture, which was done on a license basis, a franchise basis. And now the company owns those stores. I think on the table, my biggest concern prior to this crisis had been that at some point, the Chinese commandeer Starbucks stores and kick them out of the country. Something that gets very much on the table. And if that's the case, then Starbucks is not worth mid twenties earnings. If they have sixteen thousand, let's say, company owned stores and another sixteen thousand franchised and licensed stores, we think the number of stores will grow high single digits over the next 10 years, but they have to grow in China. And so, yeah, I think everybody's going to do a lot of thinking about what the whole landscape looks like on the backside of this.
55:19 Speaker 03 If we're a more insular economy, if globe becomes more insular, that absolutely has a bearing on world trade. We have seen in the last three years, getting back into that GDP discussion, this year will probably be accretive because we're probably, so the total number of exports and imports are both declining precipitously, just like the 2008. During most recessions, the aggregate numbers don't decline to where they're negative. Well, they're both going to be negative this year, but if you think about the equation, exports minus imports, exports are probably declining less abruptly than imports. So that differential will be accretive to GDP, but the absolute number is going to be down 30% from where it was, the absolute level of trade. So if you go back to the 1930s, the absolute level
56:04 Speaker 03 of trade was only, exports and imports were only 3% or 4% of GDP. And we were a net exporter. So if we were 103 billion, we were exporting 4 billion and importing 3 billion. And I'm kind of rounding up, I don't know exactly what they were. Well, now, those numbers are more like 13 and 18% of GDP, and we're in at imports. Global trade and global supply chains are much more a fabric of the global economy. And I wouldn't be surprised to see a retrenching, both here and abroad. And that has very profound implications for a whole lot of businesses. So you really need to understand your cost structure, but you really, I think, I think we win this because we were ahead of the curve. I kind of feel
56:47 Speaker 03 like the patsy at the poker game, because in the last two weeks, we've lost because everything else that has too much leverage are the things that are getting bailed out by all this federal action. But if I'm right, we have deflation, then you have to be a lot more careful with debt and balance sheets than I think the world has grown accustomed to over the last 30 years.
57:07 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? I love it. Such a fascinating place to close. So many interesting topics covered here today. What a crazy time. And it's always fun talking to you about what's happening in markets. Chris, I appreciate your time yet again.
57:18 Speaker 03 Well, Patrick, I look forward to maybe a month out, two months out, and seeing you in New York City when we're all
57:25 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? Definitely.
57:26 Speaker 03 declared to travel and we'll have a cocktail and look back on what hopefully is the COVID.
57:31 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? Or three or four.
57:33 Speaker 03 Or three or four. But hopefully this thing's in the rearview mirror before long.
57:36 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? Chris, have a great day.
57:37 Speaker 03 Thanks, Patrick. Take care.
57:40 Patrick O'Shaughnessy? Hey everyone, Patrick here again. To find more episodes of Invest Like the Best, go to investorfieldguide.com/podcast. If you're a book lover, you can also sign up for my book club at investorfieldguide.com/bookclub. After you sign up, you'll receive a full investor curriculum right away, and then three to four suggestions of new books every month. You can also follow me on Twitter @Patrick_OShag. If you enjoy the show, please leave a quick review for us on iTunes, which will help more people discover Invest Like the Best. Thanks so much for listening.
Previous Josh Kopelman - The Past, Present, And Future Of Seed Investing - [Invest Like the Best, EP.170] Next Ali Hamed – An Update on Private Credit - [Invest Like the Best, EP.172] Page updated September 29, 2026 · transcript and summary are machine-generated