Pod Insights If You're Listening Criminals, if you're listening About this episode In last Thursday's episode, we talked about one of the most sophisticated intelligence operations in recent history, when Israel planted bombs in thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah.
But it wasn't the first time something like this has happened. Today, Matt and Kara trace the long history of people accidentally spying on themselves: from the CIA's best-selling encryption machines, bought by governments around the world, to the "secure" phones that tricked organised criminals into incriminating themselves.
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0:09 Speaker 01 Hi, it's Sam Hawley from ABC News Daily, the podcast that brings you one big story affecting your world each weekday in just 15 minutes.
0:19 Speaker 02 Hezbollah is a mix of different things. On one hand, it's a political party. It's also a social service network. I mean, they have hospitals, they have pharmacies, they have schools. It's also an ideology.
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0:46 Speaker 03 G'day, Matt Bevan here, this is if you're listening. In last Thursday's episode, we talked about one of the most sophisticated intelligence operations in recent history, when Israel planted bombs in thousands of pages and walkie-talkies used by the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah.
1:01 Speaker 01 Handheld radios used by members of the armed group detonated simultaneously, a day after thousands of pages were exploded in a similar fashion,
1:14 Speaker 01 leaving behind destruction and even death.
1:17 Speaker 03 It was an extraordinary operation, but it wasn't the first time something like this has happened. History is full of examples of people who tried to outsmart spies only to actually play right into their hands, when the tools people trusted to keep them safe turned out to be the real danger. Cara Jensen-McKinnon is the supervising producer of this show, and she doesn't know what I'm about to talk about. Hello, Cara.
1:45 Speaker 04 Hello, I've been brought in. I'm not under duress, I can confirm.
1:54 Speaker 03 Okay, before we get to the other examples that I've found of this, just remind us of how these pages ended up in Hezbollah's hands.
2:01 Speaker 04 Yeah, so they've decided that they need these pages. So they go to Gold Apollo and this saleswoman who they've done this business with before. And she says, you know, I don't have any of those old pages, but I do actually have a whole shipment of these new special shiny pages and I can give them to you for free.
2:19 Speaker 03 Yeah, yeah.
2:20 Speaker 04 And it's, you know, clearly a great deal for them, but a big mistake. And then, as we kind of outlined in the episode, they each contained explosives.
2:29 Speaker 03 I subsequently figured out that they didn't give all the pages for free.
2:33 Speaker 04 Yes.
2:33 Speaker 03 It was like a sample box. What do you think of these pages? And one of the incredible things was, as we talked about in last week's episode, Gold Apollo was a Taiwanese company, but they were not the company that was actually selling the pages to Hezbollah. This woman who had worked for Gold Apollo had then basically been hired by Mossad to be the face of their front company where they were selling these Mossad-made pages. And one of the extraordinary things from that story was other people started contacting the Mossad front company, asking, we hear that you're selling, or perhaps giving away pages.
3:16 Speaker 04 Boxes of free pages.
3:17 Speaker 03 And so the Mossad company was like, all of our pages have bombs in them.
3:22 Speaker 04 Yes.
3:23 Speaker 03 We don't want to give you the pages, but they couldn't sort of say, well, they're not for sale. So what they started doing was they started quoting outrageous prices.
3:31 Speaker 04 Oh my gosh.
3:32 Speaker 03 I don't know what the prices were, or indeed what a reasonable price to pay for a pager is in 2024.
3:39 Speaker 04 Yeah.
3:39 Speaker 03 I would have thought like 10 bucks, but I don't know.
3:42 Speaker 04 The other thing to me is like, as a child who grew up watching The West Wing and ER, I really assumed that pages would be a bigger part of our adult life. And I've never even held a pager in my life as an adult or as a child. I've never even seen one in real life.
3:59 Speaker 03 Oh, my father had a pager. For like a brief period of time in the late nineties and people would, you know, send a message to the pager and basically the message was just call me back.
4:12 Speaker 04 Right.
4:13 Speaker 03 The only message that anybody sent to pages was just like, I need to talk to you. Can you call me back? It was very low tech, which is exactly what Hezbollah wanted.
4:21 Speaker 04 It makes sense.
4:22 Speaker 03 And so that's the, the story behind this vulnerability that had been basically created by Hezbollah being paranoid of having phones. And I was kind of going, well, why couldn't they just have burner phones, you know?
4:35 Speaker 04 Yeah.
4:36 Speaker 03 And the reason was that Israel is able to basically pick up through signals intelligence strange patterns of people buying new SIM cards and calling each other. So it kind of doesn't even help to get burners. Like they can't listen in on your calls necessarily, but they can sort of go, these people are all talking to each other at this time and in this pattern. And so they can get information from it. But for some reason you can't get that from pages. I mean, I'm not even sure that that is true of pages. It may have just been something that they were told about pages because of this next story, which is about a company called Crypto AG.
5:18 Speaker 03 This is kind of the absolute gold standard of what we're talking about here, which is a supply chain attack. I'm going to send you their website. It's an archived version of their website because their website doesn't exist anymore for reasons that will become obvious as I continue telling the story.
5:34 Speaker 04 I'm opening it up. It's a very old school webpage.
5:37 Speaker 03 Yes, this is from two thousand and two.
5:38 Speaker 04 It looks very two thousand and two, kind of web one point O by the looks of it. There's information here about Crypto AG. One stop is not enough. Crypto AG is the one and only choice if you are looking for an independent partner for your security solutions.
5:53 Speaker 03 Yep.
5:54 Speaker 04 And then there's various images of like guys getting into cars and military looking people doing serious stuff.
6:01 Speaker 03 People who have very busy lives.
6:03 Speaker 04 Yeah.
6:03 Speaker 03 They've got very busy lives. They're businessmen. They're doing important things.
6:07 Speaker 04 Yeah.
6:08 Speaker 03 Now, at the very bottom of the website, you can see their address. Can you see? That is.
6:12 Speaker 04 It's in a very long word in Switzerland.
6:15 Speaker 03 Yes.
6:15 Speaker 04 Yes.
6:16 Speaker 03 So Crypto AG is a company that by two thousand and two, obviously had a website, but Crypto AG was born in the nineteen fifties as a private company that could create cryptographic solutions to allow you to send messages without the messages being understood. Now, do you know anything about the way that things were encrypted in the World War Two era? What I'm actually asking is, have you seen the Benedict Cumberbatch movie, The Imitation Game?
6:49 Speaker 04 I have seen that movie. It's basically, is this the Turing test movie?
6:54 Speaker 03 It was about Alan Turing, who the test is named after.
6:56 Speaker 04 Oh, right. Yes. It was about the time before that test existed.
7:00 Speaker 03 Yes. So Alan Turing was like a British computer pioneer during the nineteen forties. And, you know, the thing that he became famous for is the Turing test, which is something that we once used to try and tell the difference between a machine and a human, if you're talking to a machine and a human, trying to tell the difference between them. Which AI has passed quite some time ago. But what he did during World War Two was basically, the Germans had invented this cryptographic machine. They called it the Enigma machine.
7:30 Speaker 04 Oh, yes.
7:31 Speaker 03 Do you remember looking at one of these things?
7:33 Speaker 04 No, I just remember the plot of the movie washing back over my mind.
7:38 Speaker 04 Yes.
7:39 Speaker 03 So the Enigma machine, basically, just like a keyboard, like or like a typewriter looking thing. But you would sort of put in settings into it and you would be like told on this date, you know, on the second of July, this is the way that you set up the machine.
7:56 Speaker 04 Yes.
7:57 Speaker 03 And then, so for example, on the keyboard, you could press M and like the E letter would light up.
8:03 Speaker 04 Right.
8:04 Speaker 03 Right?
8:04 Speaker 04 Yes.
8:05 Speaker 03 And so as you typed, it would tell you a totally different letter. And you would then send your message that sort of seemed totally random and indecipherable. Because like you would type, if you're listening and it would come out as G H E P, whatever, you know.
8:23 Speaker 04 Yeah, yeah, like a cipher.
8:24 Speaker 03 Exactly like a cipher. And then the person you would send the message, whether it was like a radio message or a telegram or like a physical letter to whoever it was you were sending it to. And that person then, if they had the same settings on their Enigma machine, would type in what your message said and it would decode it, basically.
8:43 Speaker 04 Yes.
8:43 Speaker 03 And the, the whole story of the movie is about them figuring out how to decrypt the Germans' messages, the encrypted messages. So after World War Two, this company Crypto A G started basically selling this type of machine, like Enigma machines, except even more advanced, to businesses, companies, governments, whoever wanted to encrypt messages to each other.
9:07 Speaker 04 Mm hmm, mm hmm.
9:08 Speaker 03 And it was basically set up exactly the same way, a very analog sort of mechanical thing with plugs and knobs and, and that kind of thing. And by the 1970s, the guys who ran Crypto A G did know people who were sort of in the US government. And so they would sort of talk to the people in the US government from time to time. But by the 1970s, the US was basically saying to them, your machines are just too good now. It's reached the point where your machines are so like detailed and so good that it's mathematically impossible for us to crack the codes that are being sent. And we don't like that.
9:47 Speaker 04 Right. But surely that's a good, I mean, that's an advertisement for their capacity as a security company, right?
9:52 Speaker 03 Yeah, absolutely. They were a really excellent company.
9:54 Speaker 04 That's great.
9:54 Speaker 03 They were really cornering the entire global market. So the CIA, the NSA and their West German intelligence counterparts bought Crypto A G.
10:06 Speaker 04 Mm hmm.
10:07 Speaker 03 They bought the whole company.
10:08 Speaker 04 Okay, the big dogs.
10:09 Speaker 03 And they said, we're not actually gonna make the analog rotor ones anymore. We're going to sell like digital ones. So it was essentially just like a sort of a digital 1970s typewriter.
10:22 Speaker 04 Yes.
10:23 Speaker 03 Like all of the encryption stuff, you don't have to plug anything in, you don't have to do any of those weird things. All the encryption stuff is done inside the machine by like microchips and it's way simpler.
10:34 Speaker 04 Okay.
10:34 Speaker 03 But in fact, what they'd done is they'd set up the machines so that no matter what the settings were on the machines, no matter how you encrypted your messages, the NSA and the West Germans would be able to read them.
10:49 Speaker 04 Oh, good. They are sneaky like that. I mean, that's been their general vibe since the beginning.
10:55 Speaker 03 Absolutely. And so they sold these machines. Hang on, I'll send you a map of their client.
11:01 Speaker 04 Okay. Oh, good. The usual suspects.
11:06 Speaker 03 It's basically everybody.
11:08 Speaker 04 Exactly.
11:10 Speaker 04 All of South America, all of Central America, almost all of Africa, almost all of Asia, basically. Almost all of Southeast Asia.
11:19 Speaker 03 Eastern Europe.
11:20 Speaker 04 Yeah, it would be faster to list the countries that aren't covered by this.
11:22 Speaker 03 Iran is there and all of the countries that are generally sort of a bit hostile towards the United States. You can see Vietnam is there, but notably and crucially, China and Russia are not on the map. They kind of saw the whole thing as a bit suspect, so they didn't do it.
11:41 Speaker 04 Yes.
11:42 Speaker 03 But the point was that all of those countries that that you can see there, which is basically, basically every country between Indonesia and Mexico.
11:50 Speaker 04 All countries.
11:51 Speaker 03 Were sending what they thought was highly encrypted, totally unbreakable messages, which the Americans basically just could read straight away. It was basically they were just sending open text messages, according to the Americans.
12:06 Speaker 04 Okay.
12:07 Speaker 03 Now, I'll send you a paragraph from the eventually declassified report on the effectiveness of this. So the Germans ended up bailing out of it in 1993. This is talking about the time when the Germans and the Americans were in league together.
12:23 Speaker 04 Okay.
12:23 Speaker 03 Over this system.
12:25 Speaker 04 Says the American-German partnership on Minerva.
12:28 Speaker 03 Yeah, Minerva is like the code name.
12:29 Speaker 04 Has continued for over 20 years. To the Americans it represented. Over forty percent of NSA's total machine decryptions and was regarded as an irreplaceable resource. To the Germans, however, it was even more important, accounting for ninety percent of the BND's diplomatic product reports. The BND regarded it as the lichpin of its highly productive intelligence relationship with the Americas.
12:52 Speaker 03 So forty percent of the information that the NSA was gathering
12:56 Speaker 04 Wow.
12:57 Speaker 03 And ninety percent of what the Germans was gathering was because all of these countries were using machines that they sold them.
13:07 Speaker 04 That's crazy.
13:08 Speaker 03 Isn't that amazing?
13:09 Speaker 04 This is trickery.
13:10 Speaker 03 Like, all of these countries had the old-school rotor-based systems, the analog systems.
13:16 Speaker 04 Hmm.
13:16 Speaker 03 And the company, Crypto AG, basically said to them, "Oh, no, those are too insecure. You need to buy these new digital systems for all of this." Whereas the analog systems were totally unbreakable, and there was absolutely nothing wrong with them at all.
13:34 Speaker 04 Wow.
13:34 Speaker 03 They did send two versions of the same product line, so they'd send the real ones that actually couldn't be cracked to friendly governments and banks.
13:44 Speaker 04 Uh-huh.
13:45 Speaker 03 And everybody else got the rigged model.
13:46 Speaker 04 Yep.
13:47 Speaker 03 The other amazing thing is it was a significant profit-making business.
13:51 Speaker 04 Well, yeah. I mean, you look at all these customers.
13:53 Speaker 03 Yeah, yeah. So it made millions and millions of dollars in profit, which the Germans and Americans were just like, "Great, thank you very much. We'll put that into CIA operations." And so the CIA was partially funded by the people that they were spying on, which is
14:06 Speaker 04 Wow.
14:06 Speaker 03 amazing.
14:07 Speaker 04 And then what happened in the end?
14:08 Speaker 03 Well, basically, in 2018, the CIA sold the company.
14:13 Speaker 04 Oh.
14:13 Speaker 03 Because it had basically become worthless, because of course, everybody had mobile phones.
14:20 Speaker 04 Uh-huh, I see.
14:21 Speaker 03 Who is going to be typing on the kaching, kaching, old, you know, digital typewriters when you can just send fully encrypted text messages using WhatsApp, basically?
14:33 Speaker 04 Yes.
14:33 Speaker 03 So now we're going to get into the part of the story that I think that you're probably most familiar with.
14:37 Speaker 04 Okay.
14:37 Speaker 03 Which is the story of the Anom.
14:40 Speaker 04 Yes.
14:41 Speaker 03 App.
14:41 Speaker 04 Yes.
14:42 Speaker 03 So in 2018, when the CIA was selling off Crypto AG, at the time, the biggest company for encrypted phones for organised criminals was a company called Phantom Secure.
14:58 Speaker 03 And Phantom Secure, what they sold was basically a phone that did nothing except send encrypted messages to other people who had that type of phone. You would have your normal phone and then you would also have your Phantom Secure phone, which would send the encrypted messages, the ones that you didn't want anybody to read.
15:18 Speaker 04 Your bad guy phone.
15:19 Speaker 03 Yeah. The thing is like you and I, when you and I send WhatsApp messages to each other, that is encrypted. Nobody can read that.
15:25 Speaker 04 It's for the best.
15:29 Speaker 03 But the thing is that if anyone ever got a hold of one of our phones, all the messages are sitting there unencrypted on the phone.
15:36 Speaker 04 Yep, yep.
15:37 Speaker 03 But these phones, basically if you put in the wrong passcode onto these phones, they totally erase themselves immediately. And so they're theoretically very much more safe.
15:47 Speaker 04 Right.
15:47 Speaker 03 So the CEO of Phantom Secure, Vincent Ramos, was arrested in March 2018 on racketeering charges. He went, yeah, I realised that my, my app, my company basically is entirely built to.
16:03 Speaker 04 Allow criminals to chat.
16:05 Speaker 03 And I'm aware of this and, you know, and he pleaded guilty. There was also a French-based equivalent, which also was being basically taken down by the authorities. Now, you may see that at this point, these guys are still going to want to buy these things.
16:21 Speaker 04 Yeah.
16:22 Speaker 03 But they're not just going to buy them straight from the FBI. You know, they're not going to fall for a trick like Crypto AG. So what the FBI did was they found the guy who was making the phones. And basically said, you go to jail or you make phones for us and sell them for us.
16:42 Speaker 04 Right.
16:42 Speaker 03 So just the same way as the Israelis recruited the lady from Gold Apollo.
16:49 Speaker 04 Yeah.
16:49 Speaker 03 The FBI recruited the guy who had been making Phantom Secure's phones. And made. Basically the same product, but now it was called Anom.
17:00 Speaker 04 Hmm.
17:01 Speaker 03 And I feel like you're across what ended up happening with Anom.
17:04 Speaker 04 I really am. Yeah. So basically they had this entire network of phones that obviously belonged to all of these criminals. This Anom technology was, it ended up being built by the FBI and the AFP here in Australia, and it was a way to keep tabs on every single text message that every single criminal was sending every other criminal. So basically unbeknownst to all of these criminal syndicates who were using this, people in the offices of the FBI and the AFP were a hundred percent across every single text message they were sending.
17:40 Speaker 03 They might as well have just been sending it to [email protected] . Yeah.
17:43 Speaker 04 Exactly. And then I think it was in like 2021, they basically decided that, okay, we've got enough intel obviously on everyone. And so they kicked in like a couple of hundred people's doors and arrested all of them on one day. It was like 800 people that they arrested for sending these text messages across many countries, including Australia, but across many other countries. And it was huge.
18:12 Speaker 03 Yeah, it was massive. But notably, do you know what country that they didn't arrest anybody in?
18:16 Speaker 04 No, America?
18:17 Speaker 03 Yeah. So basically the FBI set this whole thing up, but then realised that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution basically made it illegal for them to do this.
18:28 Speaker 04 Right.
18:29 Speaker 03 Because it was an illegal search and seizure operation. And so they couldn't do this on American soil or to Americans. And so the FBI basically had to bring the AIP and various other international agencies on board.
18:43 Speaker 04 Hmm.
18:43 Speaker 03 And yes, no Americans were arrested.
18:46 Speaker 04 Wow.
18:47 Speaker 03 On this American plot, which is pretty crazy.
18:50 Speaker 04 Okay, that is crazy.
18:51 Speaker 03 And it's just the same pattern over and over again, where all these companies go, oh man, if I just use a commercial system for my communications, then those guys are going to spy on me. So what I'll do is I'll circumvent that by finding a system to circumvent the vulnerabilities of the commercial system, but then it turns out that you're actually just buying it straight.
19:14 Speaker 04 Exactly. I think it's basically just an advertisement for just chatting, you know, just speaking IRL.
19:19 Speaker 03 Yeah, yeah, yeah, that's right.
19:21 Speaker 04 The CIA doesn't own that yet.
19:22 Speaker 03 My favourite thing about Anom, as opposed to the Crypto AG story with the typewriters, is with Crypto AG, all that was doing was encrypting the message. The CIA or the Germans still had to intercept the message, you know? So you could send an encrypted message in a letter, send it over a fax or whatever it is. The FBI still had to do a lot of work in order to try and grab that message, which they could then easily decrypt. But with the Anom phone system, that was just directly sending it. They didn't have to do any work at all.
19:57 Speaker 04 Yeah, it's crazy.
19:59 Speaker 03 And they were charging a pretty large subscription payment.
20:04 Speaker 04 My god.
20:04 Speaker 03 For the Anom system, and that was just going into consolidated revenue for the FBI.
20:11 Speaker 03 But, I mean, the interesting thing about all of this for me, and the reason that I think it's relevant, apart from the fact that we were talking about the pager story the other day, is, I mean, can you imagine, Cara, a situation where every intelligence agency and government and all these places around the world all started using the same CIA-connected company for all of their communications and operations? Can you imagine if, like, something like that happened?
20:39 Speaker 04 Is this, are we talking Palantir here? Because it sounds, it sounds like we're about to do it again with Palantir.
20:47 Speaker 03 I mean, Palantir might be an entirely above-board, totally secure company. I have no idea. I don't know how Palantir's systems work. We did two episodes on Palantir just a few weeks ago, but we don't have detailed information on how it works. We've never seen the software, and even if we had, we wouldn't know how it worked. But the idea that the CIA and the FBI have this long history of creating software.
21:11 Speaker 04 Yes.
21:11 Speaker 03 That very specifically sends every piece of information in a way that the NSA or the FBI can intercept and read, there seems to be a pattern that people should possibly be a little bit aware of.
21:21 Speaker 04 Just don't accept a free phone. If you're a criminal listening, well, okay, maybe I won't talk directly to you.
21:28 Speaker 03 Maybe we don't advise the criminals and terrorists.
21:31 Speaker 04 Sorry, our criminal listeners, I won't be advising you.
21:35 Speaker 04 But if somebody gives you a free phone for whatever reason, maybe think twice about taking it.
21:40 Speaker 03 That being said, we can recommend Carrefone.
21:43 Speaker 04 That's right.
21:44 Speaker 03 It's available now.
21:45 Speaker 04 That's right. I won't be giving out my number on the show, but we do have an email that I do read. So please send any correspondence direct to that email.
21:53 Speaker 03 Encrypted or otherwise.
21:54 Speaker 04 That's right.
22:02 Speaker 03 We're putting together another Q and A episode. So if you've got questions about anything we've covered on the show, or even how we make If You're Listening, send them to ifyou'[email protected] . You can send us a written question, or even better, record your question as a voice memo so we can play it on the show. And on Thursday, we're looking at Trump's new White House ballroom and the extraordinary history of presidential renovations. Donald Trump isn't the first president to alter the White House. One 20th century president basically demolished the entire building. So why does this renovation feel so different? We'll find out on Thursday. I'll catch you then.
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