America's Gamble: Regime Change, Retreat, or State Collapse in Iran | Hamidreza Azizi

In Episode 469 https://hiddenforces.io/podcasts/iran-war-regime-change-retreat-or-state-collapse-in-iran-hamidreza-azizi of Hidden Forces, Demetri Kofinas speaks with Hamidreza Azizi — Iranian scholar, visiting fellow at the German Institute for International Security Affairs, nonresident fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, and author of the forthcoming The Axis of Resistance: Iran, Israel, and the Struggle for the Middle East — about how the US and Israeli military campaign against Iran has evolved over its first three weeks, and what the conflict's trajectory reveals about the competing strategic objectives driving it. The conversation opens with an assessment of how the war has unfolded since its start, examining where US and Israeli objectives align, where they diverge, and what those divergences mean for the conflict's direction. Azizi and Kofinas discuss the significance of the targeted killing of Ali Larijani — secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council — as part of a broader campaign to decapitate the Islamic Republic's leadership structure, and what the systematic elimination of senior Iranian officials means for Tehran's ability to manage both the military and political dimensions of the war simultaneously. The conversation then turns to the nuclear question — specifically whether the war has made a nuclear-armed Iran more likely rather than less — before examining the divergent responses of the Gulf states and the key variables Azizi believes are most important for understanding where this conflict goes from here. Subscribe to our premium content—including our premium feed, episode transcripts, and Intelligence Reports—by visiting HiddenForces.io/subscribe https://hiddenforces.io/subscribe. If you'd like to join the conversation and become a member of the Hidden Forces Genius community—with benefits like Q&A calls with guests, exclusive research and analysis, in-person events, and dinners—you can also sign up on our subscriber page at HiddenForces.io/subscribe https://hiddenforces.io/subscribe. If you enjoyed today's episode of Hidden Forces, please support the show by: Subscribing on Apple Podcasts https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/hidden-forces/id1205359334, YouTube https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC8URhgYos5fjHqFSO4RSIEg, Spotify https://open.spotify.com/show/0TK6u251zGSlMgJKH6cOaP, Stitcher https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/demetri-kofinas/hidden-forces, SoundCloud https://soundcloud.com/hiddenforces, CastBox https://castbox.fm/channel/2629539, or via our RSS Feed http://hiddenforces.libsyn.com/rss Writing us a review on Apple Podcasts https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/hidden-forces/id1205359334 & Spotify https://open.spotify.com/show/0TK6u251zGSlMgJKH6cOaP Join our mailing list at https://hiddenforces.io/newsletter/ Producer & Host: Demetri Kofinas Editor & Engineer: Stylianos Nicolaou Subscribe and support the podcast at https://hiddenforces.io https://hiddenforces.io/. Join the conversation on Facebook https://www.facebook.com/hiddenforcespod/, Instagram https://www.instagram.com/hiddenforcespod/, and Twitter https://twitter.com/hiddenforcespod at @hiddenforcespod Follow Demetri on Twitter at @Kofinas https://twitter.com/kofinas Episode Recorded on 03/17/2026

Speaker names marked ? are inferred from speaking time and the show’s known hosts — they are not voice-verified.

• 0:00Demetri Kofinas?

  What's up everybody? My name is Demetri Kofinas and you're listening to Hidden Forces, a podcast that inspires investors, entrepreneurs, and everyday citizens to challenge consensus narratives and learn how to think critically about the systems of power shaping our world. My guest in this episode of Hidden Forces is Hamid Reza Azizi, an Iranian scholar based in Europe with a PhD in Religious Studies from the University of Tehran, who has lectured at several Iranian universities and serves as a visiting fellow at the German Institute for International Security Affairs and as a non-resident fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs in Doha. He is also the author of a forthcoming book titled "The Axis of Resistance: Iran, Israel,

• 0:44Demetri Kofinas?

  and the Struggle for the Middle East." This is the third episode in an ongoing series of conversations I've been hosting to track the US and Israeli military campaign against Iran as it unfolds in real time. In this conversation, Hamid Reza and I discuss how the war has evolved over the first three weeks, examining the competing objectives driving US and Israeli strategy, where those objectives may be incompatible, and what the continued assassinations of large swathes of the Iranian leadership structure, including the most recent killing of Ali Al-Arjani, the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, means for the Islamic Republic's ability to manage both the military and political dimensions of the conflict.

• 1:26Demetri Kofinas?

  We also discuss the nuclear question, specifically whether the war has now made a nuclear-armed Iran more likely rather than less, the divergent positions of the Gulf states, and what Hamid Reza sees as the key variables to watch if you want to understand where this conflict goes from here. If you want access to the transcripts and intelligence reports for this and other episodes, which includes summary sections with key takeaways, you can access those by subscribing to our Super Nerd tier at hiddenforces.io/subscribe, where you can also join in on the conversation by becoming a member of the Hidden Forces Genius Community, which includes Q&A calls with guests, discounted access to third-party research and analysis, and in-person events like our

• 2:10Demetri Kofinas?

  dinners and weekend retreats. And if you still have questions, feel free to send an email to [email protected] and I or someone from our team will get right back to you. And with that, please enjoy this extremely timely and highly informative conversation about the unfolding war in the Greater Middle East with my guest, Hamid Reza Azizi.

• 2:36Demetri Kofinas?

  Hamid Reza Azizi, welcome to Hidden Forces.

• 2:40Speaker 01

  Thank you for having me. It's a pleasure.

• 2:42Demetri Kofinas?

  The pleasure is all mine. I mentioned this to the audience last week in our episodes with Bruno Massai and Joshua Landis, that I'm doing something very unusual these days, which is I'm hosting these one hour long conversations or shorter that are meant essentially to update myself and keep the audience updated as this conflict between the US, Israel and Iran keeps rolling along. And so this is the third in those series of ongoing conversations. You've actually never been on the podcast before, so this is different in that sense. So why don't we begin first just with a basic sense of your background? Tell us who you are, what your background is and what your expertise is as it relates to Iran and the Middle East.

• 3:26Speaker 01

  Well, I'm Iranian myself, living in Germany, working with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, or SWP as the German acronym goes. As a visiting fellow, I also work with the Kringendal Institute in the Netherlands and also as a non-resident fellow with the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, which is based in Doha. So my work focuses primarily on Iran's regional policy, but also Iran's foreign and security decision making. I have a book coming out in May on the Axis of Resistance, the network of Iran's non-state allies and partners.

• 4:08Speaker 01

  So it is called The Axis of Resistance: Iran, Israel and the Struggle for the Middle East, which was the project I've been working on in the past four years, actually. But before moving to Germany in Two thousand nineteen, I was assistant professor at Shahid Behsthi University or the Iranian National University in Tehran. I did my PhD there in Eurasian studies. Back then, my work was primarily on Iran, Russia, Iran, China, and Iran-Central Asia relations. I have a book in Persian on China and Central Asia, which was based on my PhD dissertation. So this is the sort of a in a compact way, if I want to say about my background, actually.

• 4:51Demetri Kofinas?

  So we're recording this on Tuesday, March seventeenth. The episode will come out either the day after or two days after. The conflict will have, by that point, been going on for almost three weeks. What is important for us to understand about how it's evolved in the last two and a half weeks?

• 5:08Speaker 01

  Well, of course, as you know, there have been a lot of developments and a lot of dimensions, also a lot of surprises in this war. I think the single most important factor to analyze this war from my point of view is that it probably has not gone the way that especially President Trump expected and planned in the beginning. Because all indications, like the type of military reinforcement that the United States brought to the region on one hand, so the facts on the ground. Also, on the other hand, the statements by US officials, especially President Trump himself, suggested that

• 5:49Speaker 01

  it was supposed to be a short-term, like a very limited campaign, maybe aimed at a decapitation to, you know, initiate either some sort of a Venezuela-style regime transformation in Iran and to bring to power some factions or people from within the system that would be more accommodative of the US demands and be willing and open to giving some concessions on different issues, especially the nuclear, which has been the main focus of the United States, or And to incentivize people to force to the streets and bring the regime down, especially because this war is happening two months after

• 6:32Speaker 01

  widespread the mass protest, public protest in Iran, which resulted in the killing of thousands of people by the regime's security forces. So there was this expectation that even if the kind of short decapitation leading to regime transformation scenario doesn't happen, there is the potential of regime weakening incentivizing people to come to the streets. But as we are in the third week of the war, none of these have happened, as some people, myself included, had expected. And it has to do with a lot of dynamics that we can delve into further. But I think it has already become some sort of a war of attrition,

• 7:12Speaker 01

  which was, to my view, something that the Iranian special military planners, or better to say, strategic planners, wanted and had planned for after the 12-day war last June that they had. So what I hear, what I see coming out from Iran, from official statements and also between the lines, as well as expert commentary and so on, is that Iran had prepared itself for a longer war, like I hear things like at least two to three months. And if we look at the pattern of like evolution of the operational strategy of Iran in this war, it also somehow confirms that. Because they started by targeting US interests and assets in the region.

• 7:57Speaker 01

  They went for energy infrastructure in the region. Then they started disrupting the Strait of Hormuz. And now they are already talking about the potential next phase, which can involve the Houthis joining in, disrupting the bubble of the Strait and the Red Sea as well. So that's the way we can explain what has happened so far in these past 17, 18 days.

• 8:20Demetri Kofinas?

  So the US has given many different, the White House has given many different reasons for this war. As you mentioned, one of those was Iran's nuclear program. Another was regime change. Yet another was to protect Israel, which derives from impromptu comments made by the Secretary of State a few days into the conflict, that he immediately walked back. What is your sense of what the actual reasons are that explain the decision by the US to escalate its war with Iran so dramatically?

• 8:49Speaker 01

  Well, honestly, I really don't think that there was any clear objective. There were a set of optimum options that were discussed, as you mentioned, but none of them constituted something that would be considered as a strategic goal from this campaign, you know. There were some hopes, it seems, that, as I said, either a regime change or a regime transformation would lead to, I think, less influence of China and, on that matter, also Russia in Iran. So China being the single most important issue for President Trump, connecting each and every foreign policy move to that, given what happened in Venezuela

• 9:33Speaker 01

  in terms of, kind of, how to say, a shrinking Chinese sphere of influence. So that logic applied to some extent to Iran as well. But that was very vague and, kind of, ill-informed in terms of the actual dynamics in Iran, because the Islamic Republic, although relied on China significantly, and China, actually, in the past several years, has become the economic lifeline of the Islamic Republic system, but it was never as an ally, for example, for China. So that's one thing to keep in mind. The argument that, I really don't believe this was the US war. This was very much Israelism. And Israel had and still has clear plans, not only for Iran,

• 10:18Speaker 01

  but for the broader Middle East, in which Iran is only one piece, maybe the biggest and most important piece, but one piece of a puzzle of the Israeli attempts to reshape the regional order after the October 7 Hamas attack and the war that came in the aftermath. So for the Israeli leaders... As much as a catastrophe and the human disaster the October 7th was, which I think everybody admits it was a human catastrophe, but it provided a strategic opportunity for Israel to go step by step. First, to weaken what they saw as the regional arms of the Islamic Republic,

• 11:02Speaker 01

  Hezbollah, Hamas, I don't know, also to some extent in a different way Iraqi militias and so on. And then to hit the, as they call it, the head of the snake, which is the Islamic Republic itself. And it happened in the June war. So the June war, to some extent, I think, dealt with the most immediate threat that Israel felt from the Islamic Republic, which was its nuclear program. So it was deactivated effectively afterwards. But it didn't end the threats from the Islamic Republic in the sense that Israel wanted, especially given the missile program and also the continuation of its regional influence. So they wanted to get rid of this. And this brings me to the point

• 11:44Speaker 01

  that this war was very much based on an opportunity assessment, not a threat assessment by Israel, which was also somehow related to President Trump and the Trump administration, which led to this campaign, in the sense that, okay, the Islamic Republic is in its weakest state in decades, since its establishment, external pressure, domestic pressure. So now is the time to get the job done. So that was how, I think, Israel managed to bring Trump on board. But they do have different objectives, I think. As much as President Trump wants to end this war maybe in a kind of, in a manner that wouldn't disrupt global economy

• 12:27Speaker 01

  and also, more importantly, of course, for him, the US economy, Israel is ready to go as far as it takes in order to initiate either some regime change or, maybe better for Israel, a state collapse. A chaos, a long chaos that would, you know, guarantee that Iran is in the foreseeable future, maybe for decades, is not going to be able to pose any threat to Israel.

• 12:51Demetri Kofinas?

  Okay, this is great. Let's dig in here. So do you think that Israel communicated what the range of objectives that it would be satisfied with, honestly, to the White House? That in other words, the possibility that Iran could turn into Syria post 2012 is something that the White House would be okay with? Or was this war sold, do you think, in a way that was more amenable to what you would consider to be valid US strategic objectives in the Middle East?

• 13:22Speaker 01

  Well, I don't know, and I think there's no way to know that. But we can, of course, have some informed guesses, right? And my informed guess would be that maybe the objective of a state collapse or chaos was not something that was presented as an option to, as a possibility, better to say, to President Trump, because that is certainly not something that President Trump wants. Because if we assume that what President Trump wants in a kind of bigger picture and in the broader perspective is a stable Iran allied with the United States out of Chinese orbit that can help the United States in a longer term to contain the growing influence

• 14:06Speaker 01

  of China, that is not something that would be achievable with a fragmented Iran and the way that may satisfy Israel. This is one thing. Second, just yesterday, I saw the comments by President Trump himself basically saying that nobody would expect Iran to target its Gulf neighbors. So in a way, as if he's rather surprised by the turn of events, which really surprises me, because many experts, myself included, of course, I'm based in Europe. I don't expect my work to impact as much the US policymaking, but there were a lot of people, very well informed, very well positioned to comment on these issues, who

• 14:50Speaker 01

  had warned that because the moment is seen by the Islamic Republic as existential and the threat is felt beyond whatever they have felt over these past decades, they may really go to the extreme, which would include closing the strait, as they did, targeting their neighbors, as they did. So I would really... Let's put it like this, I have a difficult time imagining that President Trump would endorse this military operation if he knew that it's going to lead to the kind of regional chaos that it has already led to, especially that, I mean, one that involves its Gulf allies. So I'm really doubtful that the actual objectives, or better to say, maybe the whole

• 15:35Speaker 01

  range of consequences, possible consequences, was relayed to President Trump to make a better and more informed decision.

• 15:43Demetri Kofinas?

  Yeah. So, again, I mentioned at the start that we're recording this on Tuesday, March 17th. Israel reported this morning that it killed Ali Larijani, who was the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran. He's someone who has spent decades at the center of the Islamic Republic's power structure and up until now has played an important role in helping to manage the political and strategic dimensions of the war with the US and Israel. What significance, if any, does this have on the conflict? And more importantly, who is in charge of Iran right now? Do we know?

• 16:18Speaker 01

  Well, that's the million-dollar question, because there's two layers. One is the public one, of which Larijani and also Mohammad Baghr Gali Gaf, the Speaker of Parliament, the faces. And on the other hand, there is a deeper layer, which also consists of military and security elites, but the actual composition of those who are right now in charge, we don't know exactly. And we should keep in mind that the capitation operations continue as we speak, so we don't know when this episode is finished, whether some other officials have been targeted, right? But let's just start with the significance of Larijani.

• 17:02Speaker 01

  He was a true insider of the Islamic Republic.

• 17:07Speaker 01

  And not just any insider, one that had kind of the experience of working at the core decision, strategic decision-making circles at both military and political levels. So he was high-ranking commander in the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He was, for a long time, the chief of the state TV. He was for some time the secretary of the National Security Council before he was reappointed recently. And at the time, he was also the chief nuclear negotiator of the country. So he was, in a sense, also a diplomat. And he also comes from a very powerful family.

• 17:51Speaker 01

  His brother, Sadeq Amalil Arrijani, is senior cleric and the former chief justice of the country. And also, his brother is an influential political figure. So I would say, nobody currently has the same background in terms of, you know, familial connection to the security operatives, military operatives, diplomatic, you know, structure of the country, everything. So and by the way, what made his role even more significant was that he was reappointed by Khomeini as the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. So this is the main body in charge of coordinating strategic decision-making, especially at the security and foreign policy issues, but also domestic. So

• 18:36Speaker 01

  after the 12-day war, he was appointed as the head of that council. And then there was another council which was established, which was Defence Council, the head of which was Ali Shampani, who was also killed on the very first day of the US and Israeli strikes recently. And so these councils are supposed to be in charge of decision-making, sure that there's going to be regime continuity, even if decapitation happens at the top. And they did actually, because we saw that after Khomeini, the system continued to function and still continues to function. But here's an important distinction we need to make. Some people, and I saw that Israeli officials also referred to Larijani as the

• 19:21Speaker 01

  factual leader of the country after Ali Khamenei. So this was not entirely correct, because he was in charge of, I mean, he was taking care mostly of the political strategic side of things, but the military side of things was very much in the hands of Mohammad Baghr al-Ghaliwaf. So officially, he is the Speaker of Parliament, but he's a former IRGC commander, was also the police chief for some time. He's a very powerful figure within the IRGC. So Ghaliwaf, together with Ahmad Wahidi, who's an ultra hardline figure currently working as the acting chief of the IRGC. So these guys have been in charge of military planning.

• 20:04Speaker 01

  So in that sense, the short-term impact is, especially on, when we speak about the war planning and war strategy, I think the short-term impact is going to be limited. The actual impact would be on how to end the war, because Larijani also had a very significant, I mean, kind of a unique characteristic, that he was able to connect the military side of the Islamic Republic to the political. So that would be essential if and then the Islamic Republic would decide to go for negotiate a settlement, negotiate an end of this war. So now what has happened, I think immediately after his death, if it is confirmed, is that

• 20:48Speaker 01

  the military elite, the hardline military elite, take charge of the politics of the war as well. And that's going to make things much more complicated. So this is a short-term impact. In the longer term, of course, it's more difficult to say, given the pace of the developments, but one can imagine that, I mean, two scenarios. One would be the consolidation of the military elites to continue further and lead to a full-fledged military security state in Iran in the aftermath of the war. The other one would be some sort of fragmentation, especially this second scenario would be more probable if the capitation continues to include also people like Khalibov, those who are primarily military oriented,

• 21:32Speaker 01

  but at the same time have played political roles as well. So at some point, we may end up with only military commanders, those who are only capable of, and those who only know how to fight, not how to, you know, make peace or go for settlement. So that's going to complicate, I think, the end of the war. And also, as I said, in the longer term, that that might lead to some more elite fragmentation, especially a divide somehow maybe between the political and the military elites after.

• 22:07Demetri Kofinas?

  So there's been an, there's an ongoing massacre of the leadership within the IRGC. And of course, now they're targeting Ali Hamani's son, who is the new supreme leader. Apparently, in recent reports, he almost escaped death. Again, I don't know how credible all this stuff that's coming out is. What do you interpret the objective of the US and Israel? As we already established, there may be competing objectives here. But to the extent that the United States is coming along for this ride, what do you interpret the objective of the United States to be in continuing to degrade its leadership? Does that suggest that they're not really interested in a final negotiated settlement? Do they think that eventually there'll be so much attrition

• 22:50Demetri Kofinas?

  that whatever remaining elements are in Iran, they will just come to the bargaining table? Because they'll, they'll just cry uncle that they cannot continue to take any more pain? What is the operating logic here that's informing these policymaking decisions?

• 23:05Speaker 01

  I think the Trump administration and President Trump himself absolutely wants a negotiating settlement. But what they see as a negotiating settlement and agreements to end the war, I think, looks very different than what the Iranian leaders have in mind and can see as an acceptable outcome. So that can explain why we see the continuation strategy. Because, look. It happened on the very first day of war, right? Something like forty key military and political figures, Ali Khamenei, the former Supreme Leader included, they were targeted and eliminated.

• 23:47Speaker 01

  And yes, that's what I also understand, that his son escaped death. His condition is unknown, but in any case. So that happened on the first day. We didn't have that until today. Even when people like Larijani himself, like Masood Peshchyan, the president, like Abbas Arahchi, the foreign minister, just on Friday, they went to this Quds Force rally in Tehran among the supporters. So they went out in the public, but nothing happened. So I think here, again, the distinction that we have to make between the goals and objectives of the United States and Israel matters.

• 24:30Speaker 01

  Because for Israel, I think decapitation and removing these layers and layers of leadership in Iran has been the objective all along. But maybe for President Trump, again, if we assume that his primary objective, as he has indicated a few times actually, was for the current leadership, or now we can say former leadership, to be eliminated in order for the path to be paved, for more pragmatic people to come and take over and make a settlement with the United States. So that didn't happen. So maybe President Trump expected someone like Larijani, who's known to be pragmatic, of course, by the Islamic Republic's standards,

• 25:15Speaker 01

  but more pragmatic, of course, than various figures within the IRGC. So maybe President Trump expected him to kind of facilitate some sort of a negotiated agreement, and he waited for that. When that didn't happen, maybe he simply gave the green lights to Israel to do what they wanted to do all along. And so this is the way I understand it at the moment.

• 25:38Demetri Kofinas?

  Do you think there's a factional distinction between factual as in factions, not factual as in facts? Distinction between the regular armed forces, the Artesh and the IRGC? Because much of what I'm seeing in terms of news stories is that they're targeting members of the IRGC. Is there a possibility that that's intentional? And that they're trying to somehow leave what they would perceive to be more moderate elements within the leadership structure that they can negotiate with?

• 26:07Speaker 01

  Look, the army or Artesh, as the Persian name goes, has been traditionally seen, but I would say not correctly, as more being on the side of the people, let's say, than than the IRGC. Because IRGC, as the name suggests, is a revolutionary, like back to the, I mean, derived from this Islamic Revolution of 1979. So Islamic Revolutionary Guard Force. And actually, the actual translation of the Persian name is not Islamic Revolutionary Guard Force. It is the Guardians of the Revolution. The corpse of the Guardians of the Revolution. So the name is quite clear. They are there, and they are designed to protect this system. But the army is seen more as nationalist.

• 26:51Speaker 01

  But over the years, this distinction has, to a great extent, you know, been eroded, I would say. Because I know for a fact that, especially at the higher command levels in the army, the, how to say, requirements in terms of ideological purity, let's say, ideological commitment to the system are as strict, if not more, as those within the IRGC. And now, although of course we see more reports of IRGC headquarters and bases, et cetera, being targeted. But on the other side, the army is very much involved, actually, in targeting Israel and also the Gulf of Suez.

• 27:35Speaker 01

  Just a couple hours before this episode, I read the statement by the army, by Artesh, that they had conducted drone attacks. Against different, you know, positions in Israel. So it's still very difficult. There has been this idea of, how to say, eroding, undermining the IRGC in order to pave the way for a more nationalist force to come. As an Iranian, I hope, but as an expert, I'm skeptical.

• 28:04Demetri Kofinas?

  Actually, this was not a planned question, but since you did raise it again, you are Iranian. What does this feel like for you?

• 28:12Speaker 01

  Well, that's the most difficult question, honestly, because I always need to make a compromise, let's say, between me being an Iran expert, which requires me to stay neutral in my analysis to the extent possible, and me as an Iranian who see my country, my fellow countrymen and women, suffering as a result of first the regime suppression and now from a war. So it's been very difficult. And I must say that within the Iranian communities, both inside the country and especially abroad. I mean, the situation is very much polarized, you know, because there are people who

• 28:54Speaker 01

  supported this war and still support to some extent because especially after the massacre on 8th and 9th of January. Again, as I said, thousands of people were killed. There was a sense of frustration that any change from within the country would be possible. So that effectively led many people to look to outside for help. And this is still the case, but the longer this conflict goes on and the more kind of civilian casualties that we see every day, basically also civilian targets being hit. The more disillusioned people in the country are getting, as far as I can see.

• 29:36Speaker 01

  So, in a sense, I don't know if it is majority-minority, but many people now feel that they are somehow between a rock and a hard place, between a regime that has been suppressive all along and is expected to be even more so if it stays in power after such a big security and existential crisis. On the other hand, foreign power, especially in this case, the United States, and of course, Israel as well. These foreign powers, which claimed to be coming to Iran's Iranian people's aid and to help them liberate themselves from the Islamic Republic, now apparently pursuing other aims.

• 30:19Speaker 01

  And so this has led to, as I said, some level at least of disillusionment. And especially something that I must say, because again, as an Iranian, look, we grow up and we go to school with this very strong sense of nationalism, which is very much attached to the territorial integrity of the country. As a school kid, you read the history books, History of Iran, and you see the maps, starting with Akhmedid Empire, and then the Parthians, Ashfani, then Sassanid, everything. And then comes a turning point, the invasion of the Arabs

• 31:04Speaker 01

  and the Islamization of the country, right? Then you have another attempt, era, like hundreds of years, the country trying to re-establish itself, and then we have the invasion of the Mongols. So there's a trauma, deep trauma, in generations and generations of Iranians of foreign invasion, which has resulted in that big territory of the Akhmedid Empire, which we saw the maps in our school books, shrinking and shrinking and shrinking. And now with President Trump hinting at a potential occupation, for example, of the Khark Island, or discussions about the potential occupation of the three islands in the Persian

• 31:47Speaker 01

  Gulf, which is disputed by the UAE. So these can really lead to some rally around the flag, even among the people who resent the Islamic Republic to the bone. So this is actually the way I can explain the current mood. It's very contradictory, it's very frustrated, but it is what it is as I see it.

• 32:10Demetri Kofinas?

  How do you feel when you see reports of the US and Israel bombing UNESCO World Heritage sites or desalination plants?

• 32:20Speaker 01

  Let me make it a little bit more personal. I saw the first reports of Golestan Palace being hit, being damaged as a result of the strikes. So that was very personal to me, because that was the place where me and my wife had our first date. This is the sense of attachment that we have to these places. And again, as an Iranian, I know that many people share this. We are very much concerned about, for example, Persipolis, also about the tomb of Cyrus the Great, these places also being hit. I've been to Isfahan, I have a clear memory of all those beautiful places, and then I

• 33:05Speaker 01

  saw the videos of the destructions, not destructions or damage, fortunately it's not destruction yet, and it really hurts me, you know? And I know that this is the feeling that other Iranians have. So this also kind of acts to that sense of traumatized nationalism, let's say, among many Iranians. So it's a difficult time, of course.

• 33:30Demetri Kofinas?

  I mean, the Middle East is the cradle of civilization, of human civilization. And I do feel like this is the most underappreciated aspect of this war. It was true also in Iraq. I think because the US is a Western nation and people, generally speaking, are not very historically educated, not many people seem to really appreciate how much of our past we're really destroying in these wars and have been destroying. We don't seem to value it. So I just wanted to raise that as something that people should at least be aware of. Just a few more questions for you, Hamed. What's most important for us to understand about how the incentives and constraints of the various parties involved in this conflict are now evolving?

• 34:12Demetri Kofinas?

  What are those for the US and Israel? And what are those for the Iranians, do you think? I mean, we've kind of touched on these a little bit, but I want you to be explicit here.

• 34:21Speaker 01

  Well, what I can tell from the evolution of the Iranian thinking, they already seem to be satisfied what they perceive as their achievements in the war, which, at top of which is survival. So the fact that they have not only survived in terms of the regime, being there, the political system capable of governing, also providing public services and basic goods, of course, in a very higher price than before the war. So this, they already see this as a sign of resilience on which they build on to continue this war. And they even clear about their objective, actually. Their objective is not just for this war to stop, but for them to make sure that it's

• 35:06Speaker 01

  not going to happen again. And this has to do with a sense of suspension, if you may say, that was there after the 12-day war and up until this ongoing war started. So everybody, every single strategic thinker that I listened to or read in this period kind of was of the idea that this is only a matter of time, because it was just a pause. There was no formal ceasefire. There were no arrangements. There were no agreements. And the basic sort of reasons for which Israel and then the United States actually attacked Iran in June, they remain unresolved.

• 35:48Speaker 01

  You know, the nuclear program stops, but still there. It can function again. The stockpile of highly enriched uranium is still there. And missile production continues, everything. So at this moment, what they want is to end the war in a way that it wouldn't lead to the same outcome, like after six or seven months, for the conflict to resume. And they have seen this as a pattern. Actually, the other day, Ghalibov mentioned it clearly that we are not going to allow Israel to use a pause, to regroup, to refill its stockpile and so on, and then attack us again. Because they saw this in Gaza, they saw this in Lebanon, and then they saw it in their

• 36:33Speaker 01

  own experience of the 12-Day War. So every time ceasefire works, basically in their view, ceasefire has always worked in the past two, three years as opportunities for Israel to get prepared for the next war. So now, what they want is to continue it to the point and to increase the costs to the point that they can make sure that it's not going to happen again. And one way of doing that, as they do, is to globalize the war by kind of moves like closing the Strait of Hormuz. Because in the mindset of the Iranian leadership, Israel wouldn't attack Iran, or wouldn't

• 37:12Speaker 01

  at least do it in this way overtly and comprehensively, if they didn't make sure that the US is fully on board. So they need the United States to be on board. So if they can make sure that no US president in the foreseeable future is going to onboard with Israel, they can make sure that this war is not going to happen again. And this is what they are doing. On the side of Israel, as I said, the strategy seems to be to continue this. And one advantage that Israel has, the Islamic Republic lacks, is public support for this war. There's a lot of polls and surveys suggesting that majority of the Jewish Israelis support this war, because they see Iran as an existential threat, and they want to get rid of this.

• 37:53Speaker 01

  So at least for some time, the Israeli leaders and Israeli society seem to be ready to pay the costs of this war. And as long as Israeli government has that support, they continue to the point that either These scenarios that I mentioned is materialized either regime change that would lead to something. And even a regime change per se, I really don't think that is going to satisfy Israel. It has to be a regime change that would lead to a regime that would agree to not develop kind of strategic weapons, not pursue nuclear program, et cetera, et cetera. So I really don't buy those arguments that it is because of the ideology of the Islamic Republic.

• 38:34Speaker 01

  Ideology of the Islamic Republic is of course very important in cultivating ties with those non-state actors that have threatened Israel, that's for sure. But in a broader perspective, Iran is a big country and with geography that it has, which gives it a very important geopolitical position, I think is always a potential threat for Israel. And they want to make sure that there's either a weak regime or a state in Iran or there's going to be a prolonged chaos in the country. That would, as I said, guarantee that the country is not going to be a threat for Israel and for civil future.

• 39:10Demetri Kofinas?

  So I'm still confused about the nuclear dimensions of this conflict and where concerns about Iran's nuclear weapons programs fit in the sort of objectives of both the US and Israel, because from what I understand, Iran still possesses highly enriched uranium for multiple weapons. Nobody knows exactly where that material is. At least when Hamidi was alive, we had his fatwa prohibiting weaponization. That's died with him now. And the war itself, by destroying Iran's conventional deterrence, has given whatever regime remains its strongest incentive to dash for a bomb.

• 39:50Demetri Kofinas?

  Should we expect to see a nuclear armed Iran by the time we reach a new equilibrium? And is the only way that that doesn't happen collapsing the country into chaos? I mean, is it one of those two outcomes at this point?

• 40:06Speaker 01

  It can be, it can be. And I must say that already in the aftermath, even before this world day war, but especially in its aftermath. There was, especially within the strategic experts community, there was this idea that had we possessed nuclear weapons, the war wouldn't have happened. So at least not in the sense that it would be an existential threat for first the regime and also to some extent also to the continent.

• 40:38Demetri Kofinas?

  I mean, that's the obvious irony of all of this. Everyone knows that Israel and the United States would not have attacked Iran if Iran had a nuclear weapon. Iran knows that, which is why it wants a nuclear weapon. And so like everything we do to try and prevent them from getting one makes them more determined to get one. That doesn't mean necessarily that if the US and Israel didn't attack them, that they wouldn't get one. I mean, it just, it just seems like an intractable wicked problem that and dynamic that these two, you know, blocks of countries have been caught in.

• 41:09Speaker 01

  Yeah, sure, you're right. I mean, look, I'm not an expert on the technical side of the nuclear program. Okay. But what I know about the political side of it, Iran did have a nuclear weapons research program up until 2003. But ironically enough, they stopped it out of the fear that when it was exposed, out of the fear that, or no, actually it was before it was exposed. Because they were worried that after the US and coalition operations in Afghanistan and then Iraq, Iran would be next. And the nuclear weapons or the nuclear weapons research would be used as a, and it was still in the nascent stages.

• 41:54Speaker 01

  They couldn't still rush for the bomb at that moment. So they were really worried that it could lead to, it could invite attacks. Afterwards, as all we know, and that's history already. They were engaged in intensive talks first with the three, the three European countries. And then there was an agreement, the agreements broke. And then we had the JCPI after 10 years. President Trump, you know, withdrew from that. So I would say after 2003, the idea within the Islamic Republic leadership was that, okay, it's too dangerous and also technically not possible for us in the short term to, you know, go for a weaponization.

• 42:39Speaker 01

  But let's use this threshold, the status, you know, that's right? Like they do have the capacity to like to enrich domestically and also like the circle by everything. So theoretically, in a short period of time, theoretically, you can, you know, increase the enrichment level to the 90%, which is required for a bomb. So to use that threshold, the status as a deterrence. All these years, there was this argument that if the US or Israel attacks, we are going to weaponize. So what happened in the 12 day war was that the attack happened, they didn't go for it.

• 43:18Speaker 01

  And it turned out that it had to do with the one hand, the technical difficulties of producing. So look, what I hear from those with technical knowledge is that even now, they are capable of producing some rudimentary nuclear weapon, something like what the United States used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the Second World War. But the thing is that they don't have the means to deliver it. They don't have the bombers, et cetera. So they need to, if they want to weaponize, they need to work on something that be small enough to be able to be installed on missile warheads. And so they don't have that capacity yet.

• 44:00Speaker 01

  And on the other hand, there was this fear that the main nuclear facility is now destroyed after the 12 day war. And the system in terms of intelligence being so penetrated, any move toward that direction would lead to a bigger attack. So they didn't do that, but the attack happened again. So I very much think that if the regime stays one way or another, especially with this hardline hardcore, security-oriented elites, and with Khamenei no longer there, and if they manage to preserve the stockpile of highly enriched uranium that they have, it is more likely than ever that they may go for weaponizing, because they have already paid the costs, as simple as that.

• 44:45Demetri Kofinas?

  So the Gulf states are obviously not happy with how the war is impacting their economies, but there have also been leaked reports that Saudi Arabia, specifically Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has privately encouraged the US to continue aggressive military actions in Iran. I think the quote that's circulating is "keep hitting them hard." I don't know how truthful these reports are, and more to the point, if they are even relevant to the larger question of whether or not MBS would have been on board with this latest escalation had he been informed of it prior to February 28th. What is your understanding of the position of the various Gulf states at this time?

• 45:28Speaker 01

  Well, first of all, it's important to note that on the issue of Iran, and more broadly, on kind of all sorts of strategic issues, there is no single Gulf position. So we have the GCC, but it's not like European Union that would decide on a consensual basis on foreign policy matters. And even within the European Union, there's a lot of disagreements on very important issues like the war in Ukraine and so on and so forth. Within the Gulf, not only there are divergences in terms of strategic priorities, but increasingly competitions, intra-GCC competition. So one stark example was the Qatar crisis in 2017, when GCC countries, severe day ties with Qatar,

• 46:11Speaker 01

  or the ties with Iran, and also like Muslim Brotherhood ties and so on. So they managed to resolve that, but in the past few months since last year, there was an increasing competition between Saudi Arabia and UAE on all sorts of issues and all sorts of... Geographies from Yemen to Sudan, everywhere. And they also are competitors when it comes to some investments in high-tech, AI, etc. But of course, now they are facing a common challenge, and this has led to GCC countries to close ranks, but I'm not sure it's going to remain as such. And even now, and despite the kind of indiscriminate strikes by Iran and all Gulf countries, we see that,

• 46:56Speaker 01

  I mean Oman has been to great extent spared from that, given its ties with Iran's traditional role as a mediator, but more importantly, because it doesn't pass any major US space in its soil. That's also important to understand. So Oman is one thing. Then we have Qatar, which is somewhere in the middle. The Qataris really don't want like this war to go on. They have been also trying to mediate, but they have been targeted as well. And on the other hand, we have Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which more rival, let's say, with Iran. So what I know was the case before the war.

• 47:37Speaker 01

  Saudi Arabia especially, I'm not sure about UAE, but Saudi Arabia especially was not really pushing for the war. They wanted also to risk, because you know, at the end of the day, Mohammed bin Salman has his own 2030 plan, and it was already somehow jeopardized by the geopolitical developments of the post-October 7 and so on. So they really need stability. But I read the recent reports as, okay, the United States, now that you have started this, don't leave us with this kind of, how is injured tiger? Because you will leave, it's us who have to deal with this. Now that you are halfway through, let's go ahead and finish the job. So still, I'm not sure about how exact those reports are, but I would interpret this in this line.

• 48:22Speaker 01

  And UAE, a very important difference is that UAE has developed a close partnership with Israel. It is a signatory together with Bahrain of the Abraham Accords. So that's actually one of the reasons why the UAE is being hit most by Iran these days, you know? And this is rather surprising to me too, I must say, because The UAE has for years tried to, or had better to say, for years tried to pursue a balance for a policy in the sense of, you know, they worked with Israel on one hand, but at the same time, it was one of the main centers through which Iran could circumvent sanctions, launder money, and bring the money back to the country.

• 49:02Speaker 01

  So Iran is 100% shooting itself in the foot as well, but I think that's because they felt that somebody is shooting to their head, so shooting in their foot, if it means that somebody else is going to hurt more, it's not going to be as consequential as it was in the past.

• 49:23Demetri Kofinas?

  So last question in closing, Hamid, what are the most important things that people should be paying attention to if they want to forecast where this conflict proceeds to next? And whether or not we achieve some kind of resolution?

• 49:37Speaker 01

  Well, I think first and foremost, and this is something that I've been saying from day one and even before the conflicts, the single most important factor here is the person of President Trump. And we know that he can be very unpredictable. So Donald Trump's statements and positions, I think, is very essential in understanding how the US is handling this. And I'm not saying that, you know, every single position, every single statement by President Trump has to be kind of, people should take it at face value, because some of it also has to do with trying to, for example, reassure the markets and so on. But how the person of President Trump decides to proceed or not is very essential. This is one.

• 50:22Speaker 01

  And second is, to what extent the capitation campaign is going to continue? And which officials it's going to involve? Like if we see it's spilling over to people like Wadi Ba'af, like Ahmad Vaidi and so on, it can have a range of effects. On one hand, bringing to power even more hardliners from the, from what I call the young guard. But on the other hand, it may theoretically Also paved the way for some more moderate factions who are not at the moment within the system and are kind of former insiders somehow.

• 51:03Speaker 01

  So where this decapitation campaign goes and how it evolves also matters a lot. And then there's something kind of in terms of military technical side of things and that has to do with the material capacity of each side to sustain this war because on one hand we have a stockpile of ballistic missiles that Iran has which is not infinite. At some points they may have no more missiles to strike. We don't know the exact number. And then on the other hand, we have Israel and the United States who is stockpile of of intercepting missiles also is limited.

• 51:42Speaker 01

  Yeah, so these are the main factors, I think, at the political level and operational level that matters.

• 51:50Demetri Kofinas?

  So shortly before we got on the air, Joe Kent, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, issued a statement that he was resigning as head of counterterrorism. We didn't have a chance to talk about this, but it seems to me that the Iranians, if they did have the capability to strike the United States, and I'm specifically talking about the US homeland, not US interests in the Gulf, that they wouldn't necessarily have followed through with it up until now. But it seems at this point that if they have the capability to do it, they may go ahead and do that. And I'm just curious what you think. Is this something that we should be concerned about here? That there could be terrorist attacks against civilian infrastructure and civilians in

• 52:35Demetri Kofinas?

  the US?

• 52:36Speaker 01

  Look, in terms of actual capabilities, there is no way Iran can do any substantial damage to the United States. They don't have intercontinental ballistic missiles. They don't have anything basically that can reach the US soil. The only option would be, of course, as you mentioned, the kind of terrorist attacks. I think not necessarily, I'm not saying it's not going to be the case, the disclaimer, not necessarily ordered by Iran, but we shouldn't forget that Ali Khamenei was not just the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic. He was the supreme leader of this whole range of Iraqi Shia militias who are not loyal

• 53:17Speaker 01

  to Sistani or very loyal to Khamenei. He's the supreme leader of Hezbollah. He's also considered as a religious figure among the Shias in Pakistan, in Bahrain, and we saw already unrests in those countries as well. So two things. Of course, one can be some organized ways of attacks like terrorists, et cetera, by the Islamic Republic. But the other one would be lone wolves, trying to take matter in their own hands. And there's really no way to understand if this is the plan or to what extent. What I know is that at this moment, the whole system, the Islamic Republic is very much, has to very much concentrate

• 53:59Speaker 01

  on the home front. But afterwards, depending on how this war ends. So if it ends in a kind of settlement that would satisfy both sides, as difficult as it may appear at this moment, then it would reduce the chances for that, at least in an organized way. If not, then maybe in terms of probability.

• 54:18Demetri Kofinas?

  Hamid, thank you so much for coming on. This was really educational for me, and I highly encourage people to follow your work. You put out, every day, you've been doing this since the first day of the war. You've been putting out these daily updates on how things are going. Is that the best way for people to follow your work, to follow you on Twitter? Or are there other areas where they can get early access to your publications?

• 54:39Speaker 01

  I have my Twitter, of course, and since the start of the war, I am trying to have these daily updates as much as I can, physically and mentally, to be honest with you, focusing on the Iranian strategic narratives, how things are perceived there. But I also have my online platform, Substack-based platform, Iran Analytica, where I publish longer-form articles and analysis. So these are the two main places where I share my work, and of course, my LinkedIn also. But it's more or less similar to the content that I share on Twitter.

• 55:14Demetri Kofinas?

  Thank you so much for coming on and speaking with us.

• 55:16Speaker 01

  It was a pleasure. Thank you so much.

• 55:19Demetri Kofinas?

  If you want to listen in on the rest of today's conversation, head over to hiddenforces.io/subscribe and join our premium feed. If you want to join in on the conversation and become a member of the Hidden Forces Genius Community, you can also do that through our subscriber page. Today's episode was produced by me and edited by Stylianos Nicolaou. For more episodes, you can check out our website at hiddenforces.io. You can follow me on Twitter @Kofinas, and you can email me at [email protected]. As always, thanks for listening. We'll see you next time.