409. JFK: The Cuban Missile Crisis (Part 3)

After facing Nixon in America’s first televised electoral debate, JFK charms the nation. As president, he soon faces what could be the end of the world – the Cuban Missile Crisis. Anita Anand is joined by historian Frederik Logevall to discuss the presidency of John F. Kennedy. Join the Empire Club: Unlock the full Empire experience – with bonus episodes, ad-free listening, early access to miniseries and live show tickets, exclusive book discounts, a members-only newsletter, and access to our private Discord chatroom. Sign up directly at empirepoduk.com. Email: [email protected] Instagram: @empirepoduk Blue Sky: @empirepoduk X: @empirepoduk Assistant Producer: Imogen Marriott Editors: Bruno Di Castri and Josh Smith Social Producer: Charlie Johnson Producer: Anouska Lewis Executive Producer: Dom Johnson Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

• 0:10Speaker 00

  Hello and welcome to Empire with me, Anita Arndt. Now, if you have listened to the first two episodes of our John F Kennedy mini-series, then you'll know we've covered quite a lot of ground, haven't we? I mean, we left you with a young Jack Kennedy who has been read his last rites. He's been revived from a coma that actually many thought he wouldn't make it out of. He gets to the National Convention where he is put up in this beauty parade for Vice President. It creates a huge stir. He doesn't win, but do you know what? The not winning and the way in which he conducts himself at that convention and afterwards puts him on the fast track to the presidency. And the man telling us all about this is the wonderful Pulitzer Prize winning historian Frederick

• 0:54Speaker 00

  Logavard. Thank you again, Frederick, for being with us.

• 0:57Speaker 01

  Oh, I'm so, so pleased to see you. It's good to be back.

• 1:00Speaker 00

  And it's such a good story. And I thought, you know, we packed an awful lot into the last episode. Nothing compared to what we're going to get through this episode. So, look, I mean, we should first of all point out that volume one of your fabulous now three-part series on JFK is out. And this period that we're going to be talking about today is in volume two, which Frederick, where is it? Come on, where is it? When am I going to be able to hold it, see it, and when are people going to be able to read it?

• 1:27Speaker 01

  You're going to be able to hold it in your hands in about...

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• 3:29Speaker 01

  Well, in a few months. So it's deep in production, all set. It's just the final stages. And then we will have volume two out in the world.

• 3:37Speaker 00

  Well, I'm thrilled about this, and I'm sure Netflix will be thrilled about this because if you did miss our first two episodes, just know this, Frederick is a friend of the stars now because his first volume is coming to a screen near you. He's hanging out with Fassbender. Anyway, look, back to JFK. So, you know, we left this with Jack Kennedy and his dad rolling up their sleeves going right to work. And this is off the back of losing the brother who was being groomed to be president, but also on the back of this adulation that JFK, even though he hasn't won, seems to garner wherever he goes.

• 4:14Speaker 01

  No, it's true. I mean, I think it's a remarkable moment at the 1956 Convention, when he almost becomes the vice presidential nominee. Millions of Americans get to see him for the first time. And it's in some ways a kind of perfect outcome for him because he's become a bright young star in the party. And yet he's not saddled with being the actual running mate because of course they're going to go down to a catastrophic defeat in November. And it's his emergence, I guess you'd say, as a national political figure.

• 4:45Speaker 00

  And what kind of America is he emerging into? I think we ought to paint a picture of America as it was, as he's climbing this ladder.

• 4:53Speaker 01

  Yeah, it's something that I deal with in volume two, because as you know, Anita, I'm trying to contextualize this life. I think we write better biography if we place the person in his or her time and place. It's an America that is changing, a rapid growth in population, the growth of suburbia, which has important political implications. Civil rights is becoming more and more of an issue, the fight for black equality. While in the world, the United States, of course, is the most powerful entity on the global stage. It's the leader of the Western Alliance. There's a whole range of issues confronting the Alliance, not least the nationalist ferment in the former colonial world. So Kennedy

• 5:34Speaker 01

  as a senator, and then ultimately, of course, as a presidential candidate, has to navigate this both domestic and this international reality.

• 5:44Speaker 00

  Yeah. And like the United States, this is a man who has memories of the Depression, of the post-war era. This is a man who's lived it and sort of walked lockstep with the history of the country that is changing so very quickly.

• 5:58Speaker 01

  Yeah, it's true. And, you know, he makes a candid admission that I find quite revealing. He basically acknowledges in interviews that he didn't experience the Depression personally because of course his father was one of the wealthiest people in the country. And JFK was candid about that. He says, I don't really know the Depression in that sense, but I know war. I served in the Second World War. I can talk to you about that. But of course, even though he didn't experience the Depression, he came of age in the Roosevelt era. He saw what the domestic problems did both for the Democratic Party and to the country at large. And you're quite right, this is the world in which he is now emerging.

• 6:38Speaker 00

  Well, let's now fast forward to the moment when he is making his bid for the presidency. So we are now in September 1960, having not chosen him as a vice presidential candidate. He is chosen now for all of the reasons that we've discussed as the presidential candidate. And this is going to be what is extraordinary about this September 1960 debate, is that it is the very first that is to be televised. And that is going to be enormously important, isn't it?

• 7:08Speaker 01

  It's a watershed moment. And we should just pause and say that a lot of leaders in the party, a lot of leading Democrats, did not give Kennedy much of a chance. Even though he had this star turn in 1956, many of them said to him, bide your time, Jack. You're too young. What they didn't want to say is, you're also Catholic. And so it's an extraordinary story that I tell in the second volume about how he nevertheless wins this nomination. But he does. And as you say, now he's facing Richard Nixon in the first of four televised debates, September 26. This is something the networks have been clamoring for, for years. They see this as a ratings bonanza, but nobody, nobody

• 7:49Speaker 01

  saw, just, I think foresaw just how monumental these encounters would be. Any one of the four, by the way, would have been the largest television audience in history to that point.

• 8:02Speaker 00

  Seventy million people, Frederick. Seventy million. I mean, you know, anyone working in television at the moment now, this is a fever dream for them. And also, you know, cometh the man, cometh the moment. This is the most televisual man that America has seen for a very long time, vying for that top job.

• 8:20Speaker 01

  Well, yes. And, you know, it's easy to see why Kennedy would agree to the debates. He was the underdog. He was less well-known than the Vice President, Richard Nixon. He had everything to gain and very little to lose. Whereas for Nixon, I guess the puzzle for historians, although I think there's an answer to this, is why he agreed. And I think after the last debate, the fourth debate, an honest Nixon, looking himself in the mirror, would have said, I probably shouldn't have done that.

• 8:47Speaker 00

  Shouldn't have done that.

• 8:48Speaker 01

  Because it gave Kennedy an opportunity to really present himself to the American people. We should note, though, I think that, you know, the race was close before the first debate, and it was still close after the last debate. So as significant as these debates were, showing again Kennedy to the country and the world, it's possible to exaggerate, I guess, the impact of these encounters.

• 9:15Speaker 00

  Okay. But they do set the template for our politics today, that, you know, you have to be able to perform in public. And in a debate, you not only have to sound convincing, you have to look convincing. And there is a huge, I mean, a huge amount made of the things not to do, all of which Nixon seemed to do. So let me just run through as far as television folklore is concerned. And I come from a background of working in political TV. He did not take any makeup. He was not feeling very well. He was sweaty. He was wearing a suit that didn't fit him properly. And on the other side, you've got Kennedy, who's tanned and lean and rested. And sort of almost the moment they walk in front of

• 9:57Speaker 00

  those cameras, you have the impression of the new age versus the sweaty, slightly, you know, he's tricky-dicky, laid-up, but shifty Nixon, because he's so sweaty.

• 10:07Speaker 01

  Yeah. And, you know, he's only four years older than Kennedy. People forget that these guys are basically contemporaries. They come out of the war together and so on. But it's exactly, as you say, that's the stark difference that every television viewer, and by the way, many Republican strategists saw right away. Oh my goodness, look at the comparison between the two. And of course, the other thing that's so interesting is that Kennedy had been reared by his father, the former Hollywood mogul, to be comfortable in front of the camera, to know how to look at the camera, to know, you know, how not to look. And I think what's striking is that Kennedy is really speaking to the country. In these debates, whereas Nixon is speaking to his opponent and speaking to the journalists

• 10:52Speaker 01

  who are in the room, trying to score debating points, he doesn't understand the way Kennedy does, what these debates in that regard represent. Really fascinating.

• 11:03Speaker 00

  And also, you know, the number of journalists who now are part of your pantheon of TV gods, I'm thinking Dan Rather and is it Chris Matthews and who else was there? Chris Martin, you know, all of these people cut their teeth on this debate. And thanks to them, we've got all of these sort of little asides and anecdotes. And there's, there's one that I, I think is extraordinary, which is Nixon had a real problem that he sprouted a beard. I mean, he did get five o'clock shadow and Kennedy didn't. And even that sort of Fred Flintstoned him for the cameras and, and, you know, there was just, there was not enough beard covering in the world, this stuff called lazy shave, to put on his face to make him look, well, just nicer.

• 11:49Speaker 01

  Well, it's true. And I mean, we could talk about this, this, especially the first debate, we could go on about this. And as I always do, Anita, I do recommend that people check out this debate on YouTube. It's totally fascinating. Pat Nixon, the wife of, of Richard, had one piece of advice for him before that first debate. She said, Dick, don't cross your legs. And so I learned this and then I paid attention. His feet are shifting sort of aimlessly under his chair throughout, as though he's not comfortable. Kennedy does have his legs crossed and he just looks, he looks much more composed. He looks ready for this in a way that Nixon doesn't do. If you look at substance, not as much difference

• 12:34Speaker 01

  if you read the transcript, although it is striking how much Nixon agrees with Kennedy. Time and again, he says, I agree with Senator Kennedy. And of course, his handlers did not like this. And so they told him for the second debate, you got to come out hitting much harder. And sure enough, he did.

• 12:50Speaker 00

  As you say, four debates down and it hasn't really moved the dial as much as, you know, now we think it would have done with this disparity in performance. But there's something else that happens, which I'm sure Richard Nixon's handlers would not have liked, is that they shared a sleeper car, going back to, to Washington DC. This is insane. I mean, they, they drew straws to see who'd get the lower berth. This is mad. Tell us a bit more about this.

• 13:14Speaker 01

  Well, so, so yes, this is going back now to 1947. So they are newbies in Washington. And what happened in those days occasionally is that politicians would go on the road, a rather lovely practice, if you ask me. Often, one member of each party would take the message on the road and they would go to some place and have a discussion in front of an audience, a debate, if you will, but a friendly, friendly debate. And in this case, they were in Pennsylvania. The two of them were assigned to this task and they were friendly with each other, as I write about in the first volume. And then have this discussion, they go to dinner and talk about baseball and talk about inconsequential things, shall we say. And then they do share this sleeper car on the way back to Washington.

• 13:58Speaker 01

  It's just cinematic to imagine the two of them in this car, future presidential opponents. Neither of them knew that at the time, although maybe some part of them thought, yeah, this could be a, a, a relationship that lasts in political terms.

• 14:15Speaker 00

  But I mean, it's sort of unthinkable today where you've got such polarized politics that, you know.

• 14:20Speaker 01

  Well, polarized politics and huge entourages, the idea that, that two, there are no aides, no handlers, they just head off into Pennsylvania and do this together, and then they come back together. It's, it's stunning and quite lovely, actually.

• 14:37Speaker 00

  I think so too. I think it's a play. It's the, you know, that sleeper car in 47 is a play that needs to be written.

• 14:43Speaker 01

  Somebody actually wrote a novel about it.

• 14:45Speaker 00

  Oh, they did? Okay. Damn. All my best ideas have happened already. But the, the point of this is that they have these four, you know, quite robust debates. They've got this background of civility with each other. And what happens on election night is that they bite their nails down to the quick because it is one of the longest election nights in history.

• 15:04Speaker 01

  Yeah. I mean, it's an extraordinary, an extraordinary day. And I think there was a sense, certainly on the part of Kennedy, but I also think Nixon, that this is going to go right down to the wire. That's what their aides said. That's what the polls indicated. A very interesting subplot here is the importance of polling in the 1960 election and how it's really coming into his own. And I think that that shows what's going to happen. And sure enough, this goes right to the wire around midnight. It looks like Kennedy's going to win pretty comfortably. And then the margin gets narrower and narrower and narrower. And it ends up being one of the closest elections in, in, in the popular vote. A hundred and

• 15:47Speaker 01

  12,000 votes separate these two men and Kennedy ekes out this win. Remarkable.

• 15:53Speaker 00

  I mean, if, again, if that would have happened these days, you would have lawyers crawling all over ballot boxes and things, saying, you know, actually recount, recount. That doesn't happen.

• 16:02Speaker 01

  Well, it's, it's interesting. To an extent it does. To a degree, we've forgotten, the Republicans actually began a campaign. A large question is whether Nixon supported this effort. I believe he did quietly.

• 16:16Speaker 00

  Right.

• 16:16Speaker 01

  But to contest the vote. Several close states, they looked at obviously Illinois, most importantly, where the margin was really close. They looked at Texas. They looked at New Jersey. So a few states where Republicans said, we're not convinced that this is a fair vote. Let's challenge this.

• 16:36Speaker 00

  Oh, that's interesting.

• 16:38Speaker 01

  So that effort actually began.

• 16:40Speaker 00

  Yeah.

• 16:40Speaker 01

  It ultimately didn't yield anything. But it was even headline news for a time, this GOP, if not campaign, at least effort to see if this could be challenged.

• 16:53Speaker 00

  See, I'm fascinated by that because the, the received wisdom is that Nixon took the high ground.

• 16:58Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 16:58Speaker 00

  And that, you know, NBC took, you know, the, the full night to declare Kennedy as winner and that happened in the morning. But it was at midday that Nixon officially conceded the election.

• 17:10Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 17:11Speaker 00

  And what he told his, his friend, the journalist Earl Matso, we're told is our country cannot afford the agony of a constitutional crisis. I've always understood that actually Tricky Dicky was quite decent about that, but you're saying, no, behind the scenes, not so much.

• 17:24Speaker 01

  Well, there's, there's an opportunity. I mean, it's, it's hard to know exactly what happened. And I think one can have both. Ultimately, Richard Nixon did take that high road. And he did not pursue this to the nth degree as he might have. I just find it hard to believe that he would not have been aware and would not have tacitly approved the early efforts that were undertaken to, you know, they sent teams out to these states to look into what actually happened.

• 17:51Speaker 00

  Hmm.

• 17:52Speaker 01

  I don't think that would have happened had the standard bearer not said, okay, I don't want my fingerprints, but let's at least look into this. But he still comes in the end, decides, no, we can't have this. It's going to ruin my own political career if I contest this, if I'm seen as a sore loser and the country can't have an extended crisis. I think there's some of both here.

• 18:16Speaker 00

  Hmm. Well, um, fast forward, President-elect Kennedy, the inauguration is in January 1961. And we get that extraordinary piece of rhetoric. Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country. I mean, do you Americans remember this speech off by heart? Is it sort of one of those things that you're taught at school?

• 18:37Speaker 01

  Well, I, being Swedish, I, I was not taught this in school. I don't know. I think kids, at least up until recently, were taught this in schools in the country. And, you know, let's just talk about this briefly. It is one of the extraordinary speeches, certainly in the 20th century in the United States. I would say it's one of the three or four best inaugural addresses in the nation's history. It's about 1,360 words as delivered. That means there's not a word, Anita, in my view, not a word wasted. And it is beautifully put together by Ted Sorensen, Kennedy's most important speechwriter. Kennedy himself is absolutely crucial to the address. That's an important thing to establish. And then

• 19:21Speaker 01

  they have input from various others. And there is that line, as you say.

• 19:28Speaker 01

  For you, ask what you can do for your country. But beyond that, I commend the speech to people because it is worth reading in our own day for what it says about leadership, what it says about government, what it says about the importance of civility in our political discourse. An absolute gem, I would say.

• 19:50Speaker 00

  We actually have a little bonus episode with somebody you know who has analyzed the speeches of JFK and how much they take from Churchill. Apparently, Jack Kennedy was a real fanboy of Churchill, and that's Joel Nelson, who's done a deep dive on the kind of language. If you want to hear that, just join the club. It's empirepoduk.com, empirepoduk.com, and you'll hear us talking in great detail about that. But this, to me, if you're borrowing from Churchill or you're sort of modeling on Churchill, then you do think you are a man of destiny. You know, you're emulating one of the, you know, the greatest Britons. Every time there is any kind of vote on this, this is the man who comes top Winston Churchill.

• 20:34Speaker 01

  Yeah, I'm, by the way, glad that you've spoken to Joel. I first encountered him at Harvard in a class of mine, and now he's got this wonderful book out. Yeah, I mean, look, as you and I discussed, I think in our last encounter, Kennedy grew up reading about the great statesmen of the world. He grew up reading diplomatic history, military history. I think he dreamt, as young boys will do and young girls will do, of perhaps being one of these people. When he then encounters Churchill, including in person, you know, in the gallery, when Churchill is speaking in the 1930s, I think he sees, wow, this is somebody who I want to emulate in some way. I think he becomes fascinated

• 21:15Speaker 01

  by Churchill. He then reads Churchill's work, and then little by little, as he himself enters politics, I think he does look to Churchill as a kind of lodestar, if you will, somebody who he wants to be like. You know, we famously say that Churchill, what is it, marshaled the English language and took it into battle. That is something that appeals to Jack Kennedy, and he thinks, maybe presumptuous, maybe I can be that kind of leader. That's a very fascinating relationship.

• 21:46Speaker 00

  Well, again, I urge you to listen to this bonus episode because there are two or three stories I guarantee are going to knock you off your feet, including when they first meet, it doesn't go well, does not go well. I felt for him. So tell me, you know, what is America like when he takes office? Because it is, this is a country that, can we call it a superpower when he takes office?

• 22:10Speaker 01

  Oh, it's the great superpower, I would argue, even though we speak of two superpowers, and rightly so. The United States is infinitely superior to the Soviet Union in most dimensions of power, which, by the way, the Soviets knew as well as anybody. The Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was all too aware of the degree to which the Americans were mightier than the Soviet Union. So that's part of what Kennedy is encountering. He understands now that he's not just leader of the free world, he is leader of the most important power in the world. There are Cold War tensions, notably over Berlin, and that's looming large as he takes office. In the domestic sphere, a growing demand for black equality,

• 22:54Speaker 01

  civil rights, is going to be an important challenge for him. We'll talk about that. But I think the other point to make is that it's a country that is largely satisfied with itself. It has seen tremendous economic growth. The middle class has grown very substantially in the 1950s. Kennedy and Nixon, if you look at their policy positions in the campaign, really not that far apart. And the, what should we call it, the turmoil of the 1960s, which of course becomes tremendous. The conflict, including on the streets of America, is not yet, I think, widely in evidence. That is still to come when Kennedy takes office.

• 23:35Speaker 00

  Okay, so I mean, let's get into one aspect of that, because I do want to talk about foreign policy, because that seems to define Kennedy's presidency, and we'll come to that in just a moment. But you mentioned he is the leader of the free world. How does he reconcile that with the fact that, you know, so many in his own country are living under racial segregation, they are marching for greater rights? This is the mood music all around the country that black people have suffered for long enough, and you, we expect you, this young president of the Democrats, to do something about it?

• 24:10Speaker 01

  No, it's a really good question, a big question, which I grapple with in the book. I think Kennedy gets what you're saying. He said to aides and to others, you know, racial prejudice is irrational. And I believe, based on my reading of the record, that he has a pretty solid record on voting rights and on civil rights as a member of the House, and then as a member of the Senate. However, he does not understand this on a personal level. It's a kind of intellectual thing for him. He's not engaged yet. It'll happen later in his presidency, especially in the last year. But he's not engaged on this issue in the way that some people are.

• 24:49Speaker 00

  Well, like his own brother, like Bobby Kennedy is much more, I mean, it seems to me.

• 24:53Speaker 01

  I think Bobby comes to it earlier than Jack, but even Bobby in, say, 1960 during the campaign, even into 61, when he's the Attorney General under his brother, doesn't see the sort of moral dimension of this in a deep way. And we should acknowledge, I suppose, from JFK's perspective, that there's a huge dilemma here, not just for him, but for anyone who would have been the Democratic nominee in 1960. And the dilemma is this: I need the South in order to win the presidency, and I need the support of Southern Democrats in Congress in order to win the presidency. Therefore, I should tread very lightly on civil rights, because of course Southerners do not want the civil rights agenda to advance.

• 25:35Speaker 01

  On the other hand, here's the dilemma. Black voters are more and more important with each presidential election. They can make the difference between me winning in November and losing in November. So he's got, he's got to think about not alienating Southerners, if he can help it, while at the same time appealing to black voters. He threads that needle in order to win a very narrow election against Richard Nixon. But in a way, the dilemma has not gone away as he takes office. This is, again, seeing it from his perspective. It's a problematic outlook in a way, but that's, I think, how he sees it.

• 26:11Speaker 00

  Well, sure. I mean, and I think it's deeply problematic. I mean, you know, when you look back, the mythology of now seems to project, you know, that this was a man who wanted to do the right thing for his people and move the dial a lot. But actually, when you look at it, not so much. I mean, he feels like much more of a Cold War president than he was a civil rights president. I think that's sort of a straightforward thing to say, isn't it?

• 26:35Speaker 01

  Yeah, I think that, as he often said, a mistake in the domestic sphere can harm the Democratic Party or harm the country. A mistake in foreign policy could end it all, could kill all of us. And so I think he attaches more importance to foreign policy, no question. And he's also, just by nature, more interested in international affairs.

• 26:59Speaker 00

  Since he was a kid.

• 27:00Speaker 01

  Since he was a kid. I think he finds domestic stuff, I don't know.

• 27:04Speaker 00

  Boring. He finds it boring.

• 27:06Speaker 01

  I was about to say boring, but certainly matters much less. And I think he also gets what subsequent presidents, maybe including our current one, understands, which is, I have more chance to influence things internationally than I do domestically. To leave my mark in diplomacy and statecraft, that's something a president can do, given the American constitutional system and given Congress, the congressional role. For all of these reasons, you're absolutely right. The Cold War and international affairs is where he's going to focus his attention.

• 27:41Speaker 00

  Well, he doesn't have long to wait, does he? I mean, it's barely three months, and then he's facing, you know, a catastrophe. Have you ever seen this death clock? How close we are to Armageddon. And within three months of his presidency, we are knocking on the door of Armageddon. Because, just to remind people, this is 1,400 CIA-trained Cuban exiles land at the Bay of Pigs. They've got completely the wrong intelligence, the United States, that there's going to be this uprising to meet them, and it's going to be all over for Castro. It is a disaster. Can you just sum up what happens and what his part in all of this is?

• 28:16Speaker 01

  Well, his part is huge. Defenders of Kennedy will say that, oh, well, he just inherited this plan from Eisenhower, which is true. They'll say, you know, the momentum was too great when he took office, when Kennedy took office, to stop the plan. I'm not sure about that. It's true that this was Eisenhower's plan. It's true that the military and the CIA were telling JFK, you should proceed. This is going to work. Trust us on this.

• 28:42Speaker 00

  We should remind people why. It's because there was this existential fear that the Soviets were going to put missiles in Cuba, which were pointing at the Americans, and could hit them with barely any warning. I mean, that was the existential threat.

• 28:55Speaker 01

  Well, the threat was that you do not want a communist foothold 90 miles from the coast of Cuba. Correct. But I think there was also the argument from the military and the CIA, which was, look, we know how to do this. Look back at our success with covert action in Guatemala, in Iran. We're going to be able to spur an internal rebellion against Castro. So this evading force will come in, it'll kick off this internal tumult, and Castro will be toppled. That was the argument they made. Kennedy was always skeptical, which is interesting. And he had a few advisers around him who said, this is craziness. Do

• 29:34Speaker 01

  not do this. And yet, this is why he's ultimately responsible. He approves this ill-fated, indeed catastrophic mission, which ends in a complete and total failure. He rules out what the military wants, which is to use US air power to try to salvage the situation. I personally think he made the right call there, because proceeding with the introduction of American military power, we don't know what would have happened in the medium term or long term. I think it's the right call by Kennedy. Shows his maturity. But nevertheless, as you say, a terrible failure right at the start of his presidency.

• 30:18Speaker 00

  Well, let's take a break now, after this huge miscalculation and the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. One person's looking very keenly at what the United States has done and not achieved, and that is one Nikita Khrushchev in the Soviet Union. Join us after the break.

• 30:41Speaker 03

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• 32:52Speaker 00

  Welcome back. So just before the break, we were talking about the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. And two months after that, Kennedy gets a chance to meet Khrushchev in Vienna. And by his own account, Frederick is pretty roughed up by the Soviet leader. Tell us what happens.

• 33:12Speaker 01

  I think Kennedy enters that meeting under the impression that they can compromise, that they can have a reasoned discussion as the leader, leaders of the two most powerful nations in the world, the two leaders in this Cold War, and that they can make progress on some very difficult, pesky issues. It's sometimes suggested that Kennedy was unprepared for the meeting. I don't think that's true at all. That's not how Jack Kennedy operated. He studied like a student for an exam prior to these kinds of sessions. So he was fully prepared for a meeting. What he didn't expect was that Khrushchev would have the kind of belligerent posture that he adopted in the meeting, that he would basically bully Kennedy.

• 33:57Speaker 01

  This really took Kennedy aback. And it's fair to say that he, and he was critical himself of his performance. But he didn't really parry, he didn't really respond in the way that he should have. Maybe he should have been more prepared for this kind of Khrushchev. That's what we encounter in this Vienna session.

• 34:17Speaker 00

  Yeah, I mean, it sort of feels to me when I look back at the way in which that those peace talks were hardly peaceful at all. I mean, the way they went. Khrushchev really acted like he was dealing with a child. I mean, he gave him no respect whatsoever. It was kind of like, you know, big daddy patting this silly boy on the head.

• 34:36Speaker 01

  Yeah. And I think, you know, in the campaign, I write a little bit about this. I think Khrushchev came to prefer Kennedy over Nixon. He really thought Nixon was a champion red baiter. Nixon is going to be much more aggressive against my country, the Soviet Union. And so I'm going to put my, my hope in John F. Kennedy. He had really wanted Adlai Stevenson. That was his preferred candidate for the Democratic side. But since he couldn't have Stevenson, he was going with Kennedy. So he was happy, I think fundamentally about the outcome of the election. But as you say, he thought this whippersnapper is somebody that I can boss around, or at least I'm going to test him. I want to see what he's really

• 35:17Speaker 01

  made of. And so he goes into the meeting with this kind of an attitude, also because of his own desperate or his own difficult situation, both internally in the Soviet Union, but also with respect to East Germany, where there's a, where there is a continuing of exodus of East Germans heading for the West. So he, Khrushchev is feeling his own pressures. But I do think he wants to test Kennedy, no question.

• 35:41Speaker 00

  Well, and boy, does he. So that, that meeting in Vienna is in June 1961. It's in August 1961 that Khrushchev decides to do something about this exodus of East Germans and the wall begins. Now, what kind of impact does that have on Kennedy, on Camelot?

• 36:00Speaker 01

  Well, I think that Kennedy in July and August, I mean, the record is fascinating on this. I think he and his advisors and journalists and others who are knowledgeable about what's happening are deeply worried about the potential for a massive escalation in the struggle. So I mean, the Berlin crisis is, is real in those summer months. I think Kennedy's reaction to the wall, which again is constructed because the East Germans and the Soviets don't have another option. It's acutely embarrassing that the talent is, is fleeing for the West as fast as possible. I think Kennedy comes to see the wall as okay from his perspective.

• 36:44Speaker 00

  Oh, really?

• 36:44Speaker 01

  A wall is better than a war, as he, as he is said to have said. And I think he said, he understands that it diffuses the crisis for the moment, which is important. Kennedy always has this ability, it seems to me, to take, if not the long term, at least the medium term. And in the medium term, this is better than a continued ratcheting up of the tensions between the superpowers. So he's prepared, I think, to live with this wall. And he also sees that in PR terms, the wall is a terrible blow to Soviet prestige. If, if this is what you have to do to keep your people in, what does that say about your system?

• 37:22Speaker 00

  Well, I mean, any complacency of, of wall, not war evaporates by October 1962.

• 37:28Speaker 01

  Sure does. Yes.

• 37:29Speaker 00

  Because you have a U2 plane comes back with photographs of Soviet nuclear missiles under construction in Cuba. And this is what I mean about that sort of the existential, you know, the extinction of man, the clock starts, I mean, lurches forward. Do we have accounts of what happens when he's shown these photographs? I think it's on the, on the morning of the 16th of October, where somebody comes in and says, boss, you've got to look at these.

• 37:55Speaker 01

  Yeah. George Bundy comes in and shows him the photographs. I don't think Kennedy or anybody else in his orbit was completely shocked. Because if we look at the record over the summer of 62, there's growing evidence that there is activity by the Soviets. The CIA is reporting this. Nevertheless, now you're confronted on this morning in his bedroom in the White House with stark evidence that this is happening and Kennedy needs to fashion a response. He puts together the so-called EXCOM, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, so that they can really consider, the best people in his government can consider how to respond to this threat. Let's remember, you know,

• 38:38Speaker 01

  just off the coast of Florida, this is happening. This is new for Americans. Because of their geographic advantages, being separated, you know, by two giant oceans from potential adversaries, this is something new. He's got to figure out how to respond.

• 38:55Speaker 00

  I want to know what you think about this because it does feel, looking at this or listening to those EXCOM tapes or seeing the transcripts from them. A lot of the room is very alarmed and wants to do something. And, and Kennedy is sort of holding back thinking, well, actually, are we sure Khrushchev isn't playing chess here? And that this, there's some bargaining to be done because the Soviet Union is worried, and they would say legitimately worried, that there are American missiles in Turkey, which is alarmingly close to their borders. First of all, just tell me, you know, his, him versus the room, is that a right way of portraying what that realization was?

• 39:31Speaker 01

  I think it is, at least after the third or fourth day. I think in the first few days of the crisis, Kennedy, I think, is at least half convinced that some kind of military strike by the United States will be necessary. This is what he's being urged to do by the military, indeed by most of his civilian advisors. And I think early on, he says, yeah, I guess maybe we do have to do this. But it's fascinating. Little by little, he shifts and starts to think.

• 40:04Speaker 01

  This is too dangerous. Any kind of military action, whether it's by an invasion or air power, risks too much. And so let's really see if there's a political solution to all of this. That ultimately yields to the blockade, the kind of quarantine that they adopt ultimately. But Kennedy comes to that position relatively early, but maybe not right off the bat.

• 40:31Speaker 00

  Interesting. And also, we should remind ourselves, you know, the childhood maketh the man, of course. And he grows up in a time where kids are learning how to duck and cover under their, under their desks because of, you know, the threat of nuclear Armageddon.

• 40:45Speaker 01

  Yeah, absolutely. And I think the other thing that's so fascinating about his World War II experience and why we can draw a pretty straight line from his experience in the Solomons in 1944 in particular, and this Cuban Missile Crisis is I think he comes out of the war, as I argue in the first volume, skeptical about the military instrument, skeptical about the utility of military force to, to resolve questions that are ultimately political. And so I think there's a part of him, based on his own experience, and I think his own reading, his reading, I think, is really important to, to making him who he is, as it is for all of us. I think he's inclined pretty early in this Cuban Missile Crisis in October to be leery

• 41:30Speaker 01

  of what he's being told by the so-called hawkish, to use the later Vietnam era term, by his hawkish advisors, and more inclined to at least give the dovish ones their say.

• 41:43Speaker 00

  Yeah, all that, though, goes out of the window on the 27th of October, which Americans know as Black Saturday. And this is because a U-2 plane is shot down over Cuba and the pilot, Major Rudolph Anderson, is killed. Now, what does that do to that kind of, you know, thoughtful, let's step back, let's see what can be negotiated? It must all just go out of the window, no?

• 42:06Speaker 01

  It's a very dramatic day, hence, hence the fact that we call it, as you say, Black Saturday. And I think there's a sense, you know, the day prior, the couple of days prior, I think Kennedy, at least, if not some of his people around him, I think it's more and more confident that we will be able to resolve this peacefully and that Khrushchev, we're going to be able to reason with him. He, he's, he ultimately understands what the stakes are. And then on the 27th, as you say, the crisis really builds. And for a time, it looks like maybe this thing is going to explode after all. It is indeed, it is indeed Black Saturday.

• 42:50Speaker 00

  I mean, when we say explode, we mean, you know, sort of a nuclear strike in response. I mean, it could, that's what some people were saying, like, teach them a lesson, we've got bigger missiles than they have.

• 43:00Speaker 01

  Yeah, I mean, a, a U-2 is shot down, its pilot, Major Rudolph Anderson, is killed. It is a moment in which many people around Kennedy say, that's it, you have now got to, to, to respond militarily to this. The generals are saying this. And I don't think Kennedy was ever that close. I think he has determined by this point that he's not going to let really anything keep him from trying to get a political solution. Doesn't mean there won't be a US invasion eventually. If this thing falls apart, I think Kennedy is, of course, prepared to, to, to take the military option, but I don't think he's going to do it on the 27th of October if he can help it.

• 43:39Speaker 00

  There is this story of the two letters from Khrushchev.

• 43:43Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 43:44Speaker 00

  Tell us what's the importance of two letters being sent to the President of the United States?

• 43:48Speaker 01

  So on the evening of the 26th of October, Khrushchev sends a letter to Kennedy, quite emotional in tone, but in essence, the letter is saying that if you promise not to invade Cuba, President Kennedy, we'll take the missiles out. So that's the first letter, in essence. Before Kennedy can answer that letter, a second letter arrives from Moscow. Now we're on the morning of the 27th. Suddenly, Khrushchev has raised the, raised the price, I guess you could say, because now he wants the Americans to remove their missiles from Turkey as well. So two things, no invasion, and you need to remove your missiles in Turkey in exchange for this.

• 44:32Speaker 01

  So it's a, it's a more belligerent, it's a harsher letter, this second one.

• 44:37Speaker 00

  So effectively, I mean, there, there are now two, one is a howler, Harry Potter howler, which is screaming on his desk, the other one is sort of much more reasonable. He chooses to ignore the more difficult one. He, well, does he pretend he didn't get it? Is that what happens?

• 44:54Speaker 01

  Well, there's, there is, there is this common view of what happened, which is that it's the so-called trollop ploy. You answer the first more attractive letter and you ignore the second. I don't think in the end it's true, because I think what we see in the final resolution of this crisis is that in fact, in de facto terms, Kennedy accepts even the demands in the second letter. That is at the heart of the, the secret deal. But there's also something to this, this notion. He does give more emphasis, if you will, in, in some ways, in his response to the tone or to the, to the, to the, to the basics of the first letter.

• 45:38Speaker 00

  And it also, I guess, allows him to give a public answer, which is to the nice letter, and a private answer, which averts war with Khrushchev.

• 45:46Speaker 01

  Yeah, I think that's a very important point. He's, they're able to give not only the American public, but the international public, the impression that basically the Soviets backed down here. And, you know, there's no, no reference at all to any kind of secret deal involving missiles in Turkey.

• 46:05Speaker 00

  While they're having these conversations, private and public, Khrushchev and Kennedy, it does feel as if both countries' military machines are beginning to behave almost independently of them. Take us under the Atlantic to Soviet submarine B-59. And again, how, how close we got to going pop as a planet?

• 46:28Speaker 01

  It's a very dramatic, to say the least, moment on the 27th of October, again, Black Saturday. The Americans are dropping depth charges. American surface ships are dropping depth charges on Soviet submarines. One of these submarines is B-59, under Commander Savitsky. And Savitsky gets in his head, quite understandably maybe, that World War III has already started. And so he orders his crew to prepare a nuclear torpedo, a 15-kiloton nuclear torpedo, which would be fired at US targets, US ships. And what's fascinating about this is that according to Soviet doctrine, three officers

• 47:13Speaker 01

  on board need to support this action. Two of them do, including himself. The third officer, Arkhipov, refuses. And talk about a what if, Anita, in, in history. What if Arkhipov had been on, had been assigned to a different ship that morning or a different sub?

• 47:35Speaker 00

  Or had been a weak man, or bullied, or locked in a cupboard in the gardeners, yeah.

• 47:39Speaker 01

  Or had the measles and was laid up in some infirmary or whatever. But I think all of us would have to say a kind of heroic, a heroic figure in this. But it's points, it points to the, to what you're saying. How much contingency there is throughout this crisis? How many opportunities there were for things to go awry? And I think what, in the end, it points to for me is that both leaders, and we can be eternally grateful for this, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, they had the capacity for empathy here at the key moment. That is to say, they could put themselves in the shoes of their counterpart. Kennedy did this frequently, we hear this on the tapes, where he's basically saying, why is Khrushchev doing this? We need to try to put ourselves in his shoes, that's empathy.

• 48:24Speaker 01

  But I think Khrushchev too deserves credit. I think they realized that they were maybe going to lose control of this process. And the B-59 sub incident sort of demonstrates this. And they pulled back. And thus we're here to still talk about it.

• 48:40Speaker 00

  Yeah, I mean, and thank God, thank God. I mean, just being on a razor's edge, that's what's so terrifying, that it could have gone a different way. But while they're backing away, you know, you still have Fidel Castro in Cuba, who's making very bellicose noises as well. At that time, describe what the world felt like? Did the world feel frightened at that time?

• 49:04Speaker 01

  Oh, I think the world felt very frightened. I was not yet in this world, but my parents in Sweden, you know, which is about as far away as you can probably get from, from, from Cuba, or certainly very far away from Cuba. My parents later told me that many Swedes went to bed not knowing if they would wake up the next day. So I think the, the world felt this crisis. Somebody who didn't, in a funny way, is Fidel Castro, or at least, you know, and this is something that my friend Max Hastings brings out in his book on the Missile Crisis, a very fine book, which I recommend to people. But Max, Sir Max, I should say, brings out the degree to which Fidel Castro basically was saying to the Soviet Union, you should consider striking first.

• 49:49Speaker 01

  He is belligerent, never, I think, fully quite understands the, the dimensions of what's happening to his country and is, baying for blood is maybe too, too strong a word for it, but, but Castro is not, one would expect perhaps for Castro to say, hold on a minute, let's, you know, back off here, cooler heads should prevail. That's not how Castro behaves at all.

• 50:13Speaker 00

  Is it true to say that Kennedy, even though he's managed to dodge this nuclear bullet, becomes quite obsessed with Castro and the killing of Castro? I mean, Operation Mongoose is something that, I mean, I don't know how much of it is true, but all of these mad plans to put poison in his shoes and things like that. I mean, what is true and what is just hype about this period?

• 50:38Speaker 01

  No, I think it's, I think you make a very good point and we should back up and say that. You know, if the missile crisis is arguably Kennedy's finest hour, he bears significant responsibility for the crisis happening in the first place. And that's partly mongoose. mongoose coming into operation under the general supervision of his brother, Robert Kennedy, is a plan to oust the Castro government. And it includes, as you say, assassination schemes, poisoned cigars was another effort.

• 51:10Speaker 00

  That's right. Yeah.

• 51:11Speaker 01

  And they were gonna harpoon Castro, if you can imagine, when he went diving. And so there is a kind of obsession. I think you're right to use that word. I think it continues after the missile crisis. And I think it is, as I see it, a black mark on Kennedy's presidency. There are tantalizing hints that right at the end, toward the end of his life, before Dallas, he's beginning to rethink this US policy toward Castro. But certainly for the bulk of his presidency, it's about trying, if possible, to rid Havana of Castro's leadership.

• 51:52Speaker 00

  Yeah, but I mean, let's not let him off the hook too quickly.

• 51:54Speaker 01

  Not at all.

• 51:55Speaker 00

  Because I'm just trying to understand this position of his. Because as a young man, you know, when he was traveling through Asia, he spent time in China, you know, he openly doubted that France could or should hold it by force.

• 52:09Speaker 01

  That's right.

• 52:09Speaker 00

  I mean, he wasn't, no, he was no friend of France, even though France was an American ally over its war in Algeria. He called for Algerian independence. And yet, when it comes to Castro, when it comes to Cuba, he has no problem with meddling in the foreign affairs of a sovereign state.

• 52:26Speaker 01

  Yeah, or at least, I think you're so right about this. And it's interesting to compare precisely how he saw into China, including, as you say, as a congressman, we can come back to this.

• 52:36Speaker 00

  The reason we're not going deeply into Vietnam is because Fred has been with us before. Go back and look at the back catalog as we discuss this in depth.

• 52:44Speaker 01

  I think that even here, some part of Kennedy is skeptical, that you are in fact going to be able to do this, or that it's as important as he is saying publicly. And what I mean by that is, I think Kennedy is by and large a realist in foreign policy terms. He believes you have to accept the world as it is, to some degree. I think part of this Castro obsession that he has with his brother is rooted in domestic politics. I think there's a feeling, they're both savvy politicians. They're used to Republicans hitting Democrats over the head with the soft on communism club. And he feels that he needs to avoid that fate.

• 53:26Speaker 01

  And Cuba is just gonna be a point of attack for Republicans. And so he has to, in order to try to secure reelection in 1964, which of course he wants, like most any president would want to be reelected. I think he feels that for that reason, he's got to do something about Castro, even though some part of him intellectually doubts, I think it's important.

• 53:51Speaker 00

  That's depressing, isn't it? You know, that for the sake of winning an election, he can put all of his principles on a shelf somewhere.

• 53:59Speaker 01

  Well, not only is it a bit depressing, it's ironic because his book Profiles in Courage is precisely about the need for leaders to do what they think is in the national interest, even if it costs them politically at home. So he's going against the very, it seems to me sensible, eternally important advice in that book for Americans. One of the reasons I still recommend the book is because I think it still has much to teach us about political courage. He's not really showing it here. Tantalizing what if, as you know, Anita, I like to ask what if questions. If he wins reelection, is he gonna change Cuba policy and move away from this, you know, harsh anti-Castro position?

• 54:44Speaker 01

  I suspect he probably would have, for the reasons that, you know, that I've just suggested, but we'll never know.

• 54:49Speaker 00

  I mean, we'll never know for sure, but you've done more reading into this than anyone, I think. But does he at any point, deep down, as well as being an intellectual about this, believe that America has manifest destiny, that it has every right to ensure its primacy in the world, no matter what it costs? I mean, we're empire after all, that's what we talk about. At his core, is he just like all the others?

• 55:16Speaker 01

  Oh, you're asking good questions, tough questions. But it's good, because, you know, in volume three, I can really think about how to really address this. On some level, yes. I think he does, at his core, believe that this is America's right. Or maybe, as he would say, it's America's obligation. When you are the leader of the free world and you're facing not one but two communist giants, Soviet Union and an emerging China, you have to not only proclaim leadership, but you have to show it. And this is America's obligation to do, but also perhaps on some level, America's right. I don't think he would have put it in religious terms.

• 55:57Speaker 01

  Manifest destiny, by some accounts, would have a kind of, you know, providential or religious dimension. That wasn't Kennedy's way. But no, we've got the power. And our allies are looking, both in Europe and elsewhere, are looking to us to exercise that power. And we're gonna do so.

• 56:18Speaker 00

  Hmm. If you thought that was a hard question, I'm gonna take you very briefly, before we end this episode, back to the civil rights movement, because sort of in tandem with all of this bubbling that's going on on the international scene, it is getting more and more dramatic. Civil rights movement, the attacks on the civil rights movement, the kind of confrontations that are taking place on the streets of America. By 1962, 1963, we are seeing a real turning point, aren't we? Where he can't just say, you know what, it's really awkward for me. I'm thinking about reelection, can you all just simmer down? Because nothing is simmering down. How does he respond to that? The fact that actually, you know, no matter what he wishes,

• 57:02Speaker 00

  this is not going away and it's gaining momentum, the demand for civil rights?

• 57:07Speaker 01

  No, I think you're absolutely right. Simmering down is what he would have preferred. In fact, he tries in 61 and even into 62 to basically impart that message to civil rights leaders. I'm on your side, it's crazy what's happening.

• 57:20Speaker 00

  I don't like it, but I'm not doing anything about it, but I don't like it.

• 57:23Speaker 01

  We're gonna make progress, just you watch, we're gonna have legislation, this is gonna happen. But, you know, the wheels of democracy turn slowly, blah, blah, blah. Please be patient. And of course, these leaders are saying, we're done being patient.

• 57:35Speaker 00

  Yeah.

• 57:36Speaker 01

  You promised in the campaign, we voted for you in the campaign on the basis of that promise, which was, we're gonna use the powers of the presidency to bring about substantial lasting change. I think what happens in 62 and 63 is that he comes, he comes to see that he cannot take this kind of standoffish approach, that he's actually got to use his office here for real change. I think his brother is quite important. Robert, the Attorney General, is quite important in educating, or at least causing Jack, President Kennedy, to shift in this direction. And it culminates in what I think is a remarkable speech

• 58:21Speaker 01

  in June of 1963, from the Oval Office, in which he, for the first time, I think, calls, this is the first time a president does this, calls civil rights a moral issue. And I think this is out of conviction. Again, this is a part of the story I haven't written yet, but based on my research, I think he believes this and intends to act on this to introduce legislation, to get a civil rights act, a meaningful, meaty civil rights bill passed soon.

• 58:52Speaker 00

  Yeah, I mean, I think, you know, sort of also, actions speak so much louder than pretty words. And he does, I mean, he does shift. Things start to happen. I mean, there's that famous case with James Meredith, who has, a black man who has a place at the University of Mississippi. And again, you know, they won't let him in, they won't let him through. And so Kennedy sends federal marshals to enforce it. And you have all of this, this is nighttime news time. You know, this is the time when the whole country sits down to these pictures. And you have then, you know, this stream of pictures of government versus, you know, the locals of Mississippi, and then later Birmingham, Alabama. And then, you know, this, this is now unfolding and he has had to take a side

• 59:36Speaker 00

  and he's had to send men out to enforce his will.

• 59:38Speaker 01

  Yeah, and the Meredith case, Mississippi, is telling because what Kennedy is saying is, this shouldn't be happening on intellectual grounds and moral grounds. He's opposed to what's happening, but he's also thinking about this in terms of foreign policy. The world is seeing these images in Mississippi. This is very harmful to our power. Kennedy, by the way, I would say, is an early, early believer in what my colleague, my late colleague Joe Nye called soft power. And this is an expression of soft power. How do we treat people here at home? And this is harming our image abroad.

• 1:00:20Speaker 01

  We're trying to win over people, especially in the, in the developing world. This doesn't help us. And I think that part of the, the sort of foreign policy dimension of all of this is always there, and it becomes more important to Kennedy as time passes.

• 1:00:37Speaker 00

  Well, we will leave it there. But just, just remember, this is, you know, a period in office where he has dealt with Vietnam, that we've spoken about before in this series, the Cuban Missile Crisis and almost the end of the world, which we've just talked about, civil rights, and navigating, you know, the rise of the Berlin Wall and the muscle flexing of the Soviet Union under Krischev. So this is what is his reality as he is also JFK, planning his reelection. And we should mention as well, in the autumn of 1963, when reelection is the thing that's most on his mind,

• 1:01:16Speaker 00

  he's also broken because his newborn son has died at the age of, which was five and a half weeks. He was just a very little, little baby.

• 1:01:27Speaker 01

  Patrick.

• 1:01:28Speaker 00

  And, yeah, and, but that grief, I mean, I suppose with the world looking as though it's flying apart, the grief of that death does at least do one thing, which is it brings Jackie and him close together. Because they were almost living parallel lives. And we spent a lot of time in the last episode talking about Jackie. But they now come together and they're coming together right at the time of the reelection campaign, which is gonna be important.

• 1:01:51Speaker 01

  Yeah, that's exactly right. And those weeks in the fall of 1963, Anita, they just loom so large for so many different reasons. And I look forward to talking about that with you.

• 1:02:03Speaker 00

  Yeah, we're going to Dallas, folks, it's happening. Anyway, Frederick, thank you very much indeed, as always. That's all we have time for right now. See you next time.

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• 1:03:11Speaker 06

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• 1:03:14Speaker 07

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