Pod Insights Empire: World History 347. The Six Day War (Part 2) About this episode **Listen to the first 4 episodes of the series today by joining the Empire Club at empirepoduk.com.**
How did Israel defeat the armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria in just six days in 1967? Why did Egyptian media report victory whilst their army was retreating? How did the war replace Palestinian hopes of liberation with the tragedy of a ‘second exodus’?
William and Anita are joined by Eugene Rogan, Oxford Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History and author of The Arabs: A History, to explore how Israel won the Six-Day War of 1967.
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Transcript 8,953 words · 11 speakers
0:00 Speaker 00 Stonefire Naan is made with real buttermilk and ghee. It's the perfect flatbread for any occasion.
0:05 Speaker 01 I put out Stonefire Naan with dips at every dinner party.
0:08 Speaker 02 I make Naan grilled cheese when my daughter has friends over.
0:11 Speaker 03 I use Stonefire Naan to reward the humans who do my bidding.
0:15 Speaker 01 Right, it's perfect for camping trips.
0:18 Speaker 03 Dance for it, feeble mortal.
0:20 Speaker 01 Sorry, is he talking to me or?
0:22 Speaker 03 Dance.
0:25 Speaker 00 From our tradition to yours, Stonefire.
0:28 Speaker 04 Together we Naan.
0:30 Speaker 05 When you spend enough time around great companies, you notice that the best ones treat trust as a growth strategy, not a box to check. Vanta helps companies build and prove trust from day one. Its Agentic Trust Platform connects compliance, risk, and trust at enterprise scale. Vanta delivers a 526% return on investment over three years and pays for itself in just three months. Learn why over 16,000 of the fastest growing companies use Vanta at vanta.com.
1:02 Speaker 06 If you're building AI agents, you should check out Strands Agents. It's an open source SDK for Python and TypeScript. The idea is simple. Give a model some tools, let it decide what to call and when, and loop until it's done. No chain convicts, no graph orchestration, and works with any model provider. It's also open source and built and tested for production agents. Get started at strandsagents.com.
1:39 Speaker 07 Hello and welcome to Empire with me, Anita Arnon.
1:42 Speaker 08 And me, William Dalrymple. Now, last time, our number one friend of the show, Eugene Rogan, the great Oxford historian and author of The Arabs, my favorite book on the modern Middle East, took us through the world in the lead up to the June 1967 war that changed the Middle East forever. NASA's impossible position after Suez, the Palestinian refugees, the Arab Cold War, the United Arab Republic. Its failure, the dysfunction within the heart of the Egyptian military and political establishment, the Yemen quagmire and the spiraling crisis of May nineteen sixty seven, driven by the Syrian Baathis, a bizarre piece of false Soviet intelligence.
2:24 Speaker 08 And finally, the closure of the Straits of Tehran. So today, we're actually going to take it into the war itself.
2:32 Speaker 07 Yeah, and there's no one better to lead us through this very difficult terrain than Eugene. Because you're going to be taking us, Eugene, through six days of war. And I would love you in this episode to talk us through what this looks like from Cairo, from Amman, from Damascus, from the Palestinian villages when the Israeli army arrives at the doors there. So where shall we even begin? First of all, thank you and welcome back. Take us to the morning of June the fifth nineteen sixty seven. Because from the Arab perspective, what exactly is happening? Particularly, you know, the Egyptian air bases, first thing in the morning, because that's really interesting.
3:10 Speaker 09 Well, first off, Anita, well, thank you so much for your invitation. As you know, I can't resist coming on to this podcast and we get the best conversation in the world of history right here. Right, so what is happening in the Arab world on the fifth of June? It's a strange moment of normalcy before normal becomes absolutely lost. The Egyptian Air Force has gone on its usual rounds and is coming in to land at about seven thirty AM, as it always does, having reassured the skies over Egypt from any outside threat and in time for the pilots to go and get their breakfast. But of course, their neighbors in Israel have been following the maneuvers of the Egyptians
3:52 Speaker 09 long enough to know of this pattern of behavior, and they've made their war plan accordingly. So no sooner do our Egyptian pilots land their aircraft and make their way to the canteen than I think the world blows up beneath their feet.
4:07 Speaker 08 Literally.
4:08 Speaker 07 When you say blows up beneath their feet, I mean, you're talking about basically Israeli aircraft arriving over these Egyptian air bases and opening their payload doors.
4:18 Speaker 09 And the thing is. There were early warning systems in place. We have from Jordanian accounts the fact that their radar had picked up the movement of large numbers of Israeli jets first thing in the morning, flying along the Mediterranean coastline towards Egypt. They put the call through immediately to the hotline in Cairo to alert their Egyptian allies of what they were seeing, and no one answers the phone.
4:46 Speaker 08 Literally, no one picks up the phone?
4:48 Speaker 09 According to Jordanian sources, no one picked up the phone.
4:51 Speaker 08 Cracking.
4:51 Speaker 09 So there was a sense of an emergency, and yet no one seemed to be on alert. So the Egyptians are caught completely by surprise as Israeli airplanes begin to sweep low over their airfields and bomb all their aircraft sitting on the tarmac.
5:09 Speaker 08 How come the Egyptians don't have their own early warning system?
5:13 Speaker 07 Yeah, I mean, you would have thought, this is the 1960s after all.
5:16 Speaker 09 It's true, but the Israelis had planned for that as well. And so I think one reason why the Israelis were able to elude detection by the Egyptians was that after takeoff, reaching high enough in the air that the Jordanian radar picked up on flight movements, they immediately came right down and hugged the deck. They flew literally feet above the water in a very sort of bold formation to evade Egyptian radar and enjoy the total surprise. And it was successful. They they literally swooped down on Egyptian airfields and are able to strike Egyptian aircraft on the ground before the Egyptians are in any position to scramble.
5:52 Speaker 07 Well, we're talking 300 Egyptian aircraft as well. I mean, this is not, this isn't, I mean, this is pretty much the entire air force, isn't it, of Egypt? It's an astonishing number.
6:04 Speaker 09 A vast part of the Egyptian air force was now based in and around the Sinai and Cairo. There were still units in Upper Egypt, and of course, there were units in Yemen supporting The losing conflict that the Egyptians were waging at that moment in Yemen. But no, you're right. I mean, I would say it's probably 90% of the Egyptian air force is based within striking distance of that first wave of Israeli planes.
6:28 Speaker 08 I have a small personal connection to this story. In 1994, I was sent by Andrew Neil, Anita's old colleague, to interview Hosni Mubarak, then president of Egypt, for the Sunday Times magazine. And he told me his firsthand account of that morning. And he was the only Egyptian pilot to get off the ground on the airport and to get his fighter jet out, which is how he started his political career. He became a national hero, as the only, literally the only pilot on that airfield to save his plane.
6:59 Speaker 09 So what did he see, Willie? I mean, he gets up into the air. What does he see?
7:02 Speaker 08 So he's having his breakfast and the bombs start going off. And he runs out and he gets into his plane. And, you know, things are blowing up all around. It's one of the most dramatic moments of modern warfare. And there are explosions happening and they're trying to break the runway. And he manages, he alone manages to get his plane to take off and elude the jets and escape. And he parks it in an airfield in Upper Egypt. But no one else does. None of his colleagues succeed in doing that.
7:29 Speaker 07 Can we just for a moment pause and just think, you know, what an extraordinary piece of intelligence gathering this is for Israel. I mean, they know when those pilots are going to be there. They know how many jets are going to be on the ground. I mean, it is pretty bonkers how much they know.
7:45 Speaker 09 I think the Israelis were serious that they could never afford to lose a war. You know, the Arab side had lost wars. They realized that it didn't ultimately overturn their worlds. I mean, obviously, there was turmoil after each of the major wars in the region, certainly after 1948.
8:05 Speaker 08 And it overturned the lives of the Palestinians in 1948. I mean, 85% are expelled.
8:10 Speaker 09 Obviously, obviously. But the point is for Nasser, for the leadership in Jordan, in Syria, in Lebanon, defeated in the Arab Israeli war had not been as consequential for them. And so they didn't have the seriousness of purpose that the Israelis had because they knew if they lost one war, then all survivors could be expected to be rounded up, put on boats and sent away. They would lose their country. And so they did not leave anything to chance. They planned meticulously. And in so doing, they were able to execute a strategy that gave them supremacy of the air from the opening moments of the war. They were able to take the Egyptian air force out of the formula in the opening hours of the very first day of the war, from which
8:55 Speaker 09 point onwards, there wouldn't be a force that could really stop the Israelis.
8:59 Speaker 07 Yeah, I mean, first of all, that image of Hosni Mubarak up in the air, just watching everything exploding around him is hard to understand what that might have felt like. What did it feel like to the Egyptian command structure? Because they too are sort of watching their prospects, their defence explode around them.
9:17 Speaker 09 You know, we have a number of accounts from memoirs of the political figures who lived through this time, Anwar Sadat, Haikal himself, and they capture a sense of surrealism that, in a sense, the Egyptians go into shock. They might have anticipated hostilities, but they didn't imagine such sweeping strikes in the opening moments of the war that would prove so devastating to them on the ground. And stunned, they seemed almost to have lost their grip on reality because what they do for the next few days shows no signs of a strategic assessment of the realities on the ground. In the way they prosecute the
10:00 Speaker 09 war and in the way they conduct the communications war, the messaging they put out about their war effort, just suggests the leadership out of touch with reality and really lying to each other as well as to their fellow citizens.
10:15 Speaker 07 So Field Marshal Ammar, who we spoke about at the end of the last episode, who is, just to remind people, the bromance that is between Nasser and Ammar. He's actually in an aircraft when this Israeli attack begins.
10:27 Speaker 09 He was actually flying a group of people over the Sinai to give them an aerial view of the situation and realised The panorama they were getting was critical and one he needed to address immediately. They landed and immediately he found himself caught up in a war that was out of his control. And and Amr actually goes quite quiet from this point on. His voice is lost in that of the Egyptian state as a whole. And the Egyptian state is in damage control mode, trying to preserve morale among the Egyptian soldiers and populace at large by essentially feeding a distorted narrative of Egyptian
11:09 Speaker 09 victories in the air and on the ground, when the Egyptians were already on retreat on all fronts.
11:15 Speaker 08 And he issues a an order of general withdrawal on hearing of the loss of the aircraft. So you have these soldiers who are up in forward positions in the Sinai, miles from the main centers of Egyptian population and with the whole desert around them, that begin sort of packing up and just and and sort of straggling home.
11:35 Speaker 09 Well, in a sense, well, there's very little that the Egyptian government could do to protect them in their advanced positions. The moment you lose air control, then infantry units are sitting ducks. And tanks, columns of soldiers, were targets for an Israeli air force that had no constraints. They they did not have the surface-to-air missiles that might have given them the protection they would enjoy, let's say, in 1973.
12:01 Speaker 08 I've always thought about that, is that I didn't realise that, because they presumably they had their cat guns and stuff like that, didn't they?
12:07 Speaker 09 I know, but you try using that against supersonic jets and it's just not an effective deterrent.
12:11 Speaker 07 Right, yeah, stuff that's strafing you from the sky. The sky always wins, doesn't it? I mean, it's why the RAF was so effective during during the war. So so I mean, do you have a situation, Eugene, where in Egypt, people are looking at images of their soldiers abandoned pretty much in the desert?
12:27 Speaker 09 No.
12:27 Speaker 07 They have no protection, they have no, you know, supply lines, I guess, are obliterated as well, because you can wipe those out from the skies. And in the desert, those things are really, it's, they're important, they're not just important, they're vital. You die without them.
12:38 Speaker 09 So that's the reality on the ground. And of course, you have the phenomenon of Egyptian troops trying to retreat back to a point of safety without any of their material needs, right down to the fact they don't have enough water. And there are images taken of soldiers who abandoned their boots because their swollen feet were so uncomfortable in their shoes. You know, it was it was a rout. And with that, the Egyptians don't have an army on the ground capable of confronting the Israelis. They don't have an air force to protect them. The strongest military in the Arab world is beaten, I would say, in the in the first forty eight hours of this war. All the while, their government broadcast in Duol and Sumbri
13:22 Speaker 09 that victorious columns of Egyptian soldiers are marching on Tel Aviv. And that hundreds of Israeli airplanes are being shot down when it's exactly the opposite that's taking place.
13:31 Speaker 08 So take us now, Eugene, to Jordan. King Hussein is thirty two years old. He got to the throne when he was eighteen, he went to Sandhurst, come back. Um, under pressure from nationalists and from revolutionaries. He's joined this pact with NASA, and so he's now committed to war.
13:52 Speaker 09 Yes, Hussein felt himself very vulnerable in the lead up to war. Decided that his greater security and the security of his throne was to be aligned with Egypt, even if that meant taking his country into a war that could cost him territory. And he faces the same fate as as as the Egyptians do. As soon as the Israelis have eliminated the Egyptian air force, they turn next to the Jordanians. So on the afternoon of the first day of the war, the Israelis then turned to Jordanian airspace. The Jordanians are aware of the strikes on Egyptian air bases. They do have enough knowledge to scramble some planes. They do engage the Israelis.
14:33 Speaker 09 But as soon as the Jordanians are forced to put down to refuel, their airplanes were vulnerable to attack, and they were eliminated as well. Indeed, the Israelis will go from wiping out the smaller Jordanian air force to taking on the Syrian air force by the late afternoon and evening of the first day, just to confirm Israel's air superiority on all fronts. For the Jordanians, they found themselves then trying to defend East Jerusalem, territory that they knew Israel had been absolutely determined to win already in nineteen forty eight and would be the first target of an Israeli infantry thrust. And then the territory on the West Bank,
15:12 Speaker 09 one of the last bits of mandate Palestine still in Palestinian hands and under Arab rule, under Jordanian rule. So they begin to think of how best to withdraw their troops from. Lines they can no longer defend from the air and will be vulnerable to a predictable Israeli invasion.
15:31 Speaker 07 I just wanted to think about King Hossein of Jordan just for a moment longer because ex Sandhurst, he knows the military strength and weakness of his position. He knows, you know, without any kind of air cover, his troops are done for. But I guess he's also facing a situation that if he decides to high tail it out of there, if he decides not to stand with Nasser, you know, to defy the defence pact, he's going to be the king who abandoned his brothers. That's the truth, isn't it? So almost it's like a slow motion car crash that he has to go through with.
15:59 Speaker 09 Yeah, Anita, I think that that's all part of the very difficult calculus that the king has to make. But he knows one thing, which is that what has saved him from revolution so far is the support of his military. Were he to lose his army, then he would be extremely vulnerable to an overthrow from within Jordanian society. So just as he took the risk of siding with Egypt to protect himself from attack for not having supported the common Arab cause of war, he's going to protect his army for all he's worth. He's lost his air force, but he can keep his army. And so getting a measured retreat and allowing his soldiers to come back across to the east bank of the Jordan, to defensible lines, is going to be his only strategy to uphold the monarchy.
16:43 Speaker 09 And he'll take that risk, even if he knows it means surrendering the last of Palestinian territory to Israel.
16:49 Speaker 08 I don't understand why these Arab armies, or particularly the Arab air forces, are collapsing so quickly. We're used today to a world where Israel is, you know, got an almost blank cheque from America and has also got its own military technology, which is very, very up to the minute and, you know, in drone and in electronic warfare, you know, some of the very best in the world. But that's not the situation. Ninety sixty seven, sixty seven, America is not fully militarily committed to Israel in the way it is now. I believe most of the Israeli air force comes from France, doesn't it? Its mirages from France, which are not, you know, necessarily any better than what the Jordanians have. There's no massive sluice of money coming from America at this period. How can we explain this extraordinary?
17:35 Speaker 08 You know, winning of the war effectively in the first day.
17:39 Speaker 09 Well, you raise good points, Will, and I think the first one I would want to emphasize is that Israel's ally at this moment really is France. The United States has been warming to Israel under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, but there's nowhere near that special relationship that we associate with Israel and the United States today. And you're right, I mean, the mirages that Israel's flying came up against talker hunters that the British had given to the Jordanians, which were planes that were well matched.
18:09 Speaker 08 Comparable, huh?
18:10 Speaker 09 They were up for the fight, but you know, I think that it was the element of surprise in taking out the Egyptians.
18:16 Speaker 08 But that's not the case with with Jordan, with Jordan, that it's an equal match, isn't it?
18:21 Speaker 09 You know, I was acquainted with one of the Jordanian pilots, since you raised your Mubarak story.
18:27 Speaker 08 I'm not going to try and take you on for context there, Will, Eugene, I'm proud of my Mubarak story.
18:33 Speaker 09 Listen, I never I never got to President Mubarak, so, you know, all credit to you, Will. No, I mean, but Sam Shirdam was one of the officers who actually managed to scramble against the Israelis. And I believe he is actually counted as the only Arab ace, the only Arab pilot to shoot down five Israeli aircraft in the course of his career. But he did fly in June sixty seven, but his is the story of someone who, having engaged with the Israeli air force and having, you know, fired on their plane successfully, was forced to land when he ran low on fuel. And it was while his plane was on the ground that it was destroyed by the Israelis. And they just didn't have the numbers of aircraft to match the Israeli air force. And so it was not that they were surprised, but they had never really anticipated
19:17 Speaker 09 taking on Israel single handed without the support of other Arab air forces.
19:21 Speaker 08 And the Egyptians did have the numbers of aircraft, but they're knocked out at the beginning. I mean, there could have been a very different ending to this story if that initial strike had not succeeded.
19:29 Speaker 09 Absolutely.
19:30 Speaker 07 Just on that, I mean, is it is it true that actually NASA does a bit of a barefaced lie to Jordan, saying, you know, we're actually winning? We're fine, we're taking them out over the desert. And, you know, the infrastructure and communications, the comms are so bad that there is no way that the Jordanians know that in that breakfast window, the cream of the Egyptian air force has been wiped out.
19:53 Speaker 09 Well, I think Nasser had to eventually come clean with King Hussein. The two of them actually, after many years of adversity, come quite close in the moment of defeat in June sixty seven and afterwards. So you're going to see a kind of rapprochement between Nasser and King Hussein. And beginning, you know, the first communications, they definitely lie about the extent of Egyptian losses.
20:15 Speaker 07 Right.
20:16 Speaker 09 So the Jordanians are aware that the Arab world is under attack. And that's why they're primed and ready to respond and scramble their air force when the Israelis come for them.
20:26 Speaker 07 Okay.
20:27 Speaker 09 But ultimately, Nasser will confide in Hussein that things have gone very badly.
20:33 Speaker 07 Eventually, eventually.
20:34 Speaker 09 And will get Hussein's collusion to maintain the fiction that the Arabs' side is winning.
20:39 Speaker 07 Okay, that's interesting.
20:41 Speaker 09 It's quite a complex exchange of phone calls between Amman and Cairo about how they manage the communications of a war that's going desperately badly for the Arab side.
20:51 Speaker 07 So I mean, I just, I just, we're going to take a break. But just before we get to the break, is it with eyes wide open then that King Hussein of Jordan decides the thing that we are going to do is open fire on West Jerusalem? Because in the second half, we're going to talk about how consequential that decision is. Does he do it knowing how weak the position is of the Arabs? Or does he do it thinking, actually, you know, we've got, we've got a chance?
21:17 Speaker 09 I think you're going to find that as he launches the first artillery salvos, he believed he was engaging in a war that the Arabs' side still intended to win. It would only be subsequently that Hussein would realise how fateful that decision would prove and how high the cost would prove.
21:39 Speaker 00 Stonefire Naan is made with real buttermilk and ghee. It's the perfect flatbread for any occasion.
21:44 Speaker 01 I put out Stonefire Naan with dips at every dinner party.
21:47 Speaker 02 I make naan grilled cheese when my daughter has friends over.
21:50 Speaker 03 I use Stonefire Naan to reward the humans who do my bidding.
21:54 Speaker 01 Right, it's perfect for camping trips.
21:57 Speaker 03 Dance for it, feeble mortal.
21:59 Speaker 01 Sorry, is he talking to me or?
22:02 Speaker 03 Dance.
22:04 Speaker 00 From our tradition to yours, Stonefire.
22:07 Speaker 04 Together we Naan.
22:10 Speaker 05 When you spend enough time around great companies, you notice that the best ones treat trust as a growth strategy, not a box to check. Vanta helps companies build and prove trust from day one. Its Agentic Trust Platform connects compliance, risk, and trust at enterprise scale. Vanta delivers a 526% return on investment over three years and pays for itself in just three months. Learn why over 16,000 of the fastest-growing companies use Vanta at vanta.com.
22:41 Speaker 06 If you're building AI agents, you should check out Strands Agents. It's an open-source SDK for Python and TypeScript. The idea is simple. Give a model some tools, let it decide what to call and when, and loop until it's done. No chain convicts, no graph orchestration, and works with any model provider. It's also open-source and built and tested for production agents. Get started at strandsagents.com.
23:10 Speaker 07 Welcome back. So just before the break, Eugene, I was asking you whether it was with eyes wide open that King Hussein of Jordan decides to, you know, send the artillery to open fire on West Jerusalem. And you say, actually, he thought it was a war that the Arab world could still win. The impact of that is so consequential because within hours, doesn't Israel have a justification to take the West Bank now and East Jerusalem?
23:36 Speaker 09 I think that the Israelis had always looked on Jordan as a country they could live with. And we have, through the work of my colleague Avi Shleim and others... Real evidence of the collusion that had taken place between Jordanian Israelis to strike a modus vivendi.
23:52 Speaker 08 That being the title of his famous book, Collusion Across the Jordan.
23:56 Speaker 09 Collusion Across the Jordan, absolutely. So, good to get a plug in for Avi. You know, Hussein could not afford to stay out of what was going to be the total Arab effort to achieve the liberation of Palestine, not least because the majority of his own population was Palestinian. He had integrated all of the West Bank into Transjordan. It becomes a Kingdom of Jordan. And even on the East Bank, you have large concentrations of Palestinians who have lived in Jordan since 1948 as refugees. So, he is aware that if the Arab world is engaging in total war with Israel, he cannot afford to stay out. And in that sense, that roll of the dice was taken very consciously, knowing his fate
24:40 Speaker 09 was linked to the collective Arab war effort, no matter what he did.
24:44 Speaker 08 We think today of Israel as this incredibly competent military that sort of breaks all before it. But at this point, is there a sense of amazement among Israeli troops when they break through into East Jerusalem? Is there a sense of amazement? Or is this something that they've been planning and waiting for?
25:04 Speaker 09 It's so hard to know what was going through the minds of Israelis. We talked in the last episode about the high anxieties that accompanied the lead up to war. So, we know that Israelis were themselves very fearful that their Arab neighbors could prove more than a paper tiger, that they could, through a collective effort of several countries making war against Israel on, let's say, three fronts at once, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, that it would be more than the forces of the IDF could handle. And I think the speed and magnitude of victory caught Israelis by surprise as well. We have all those amazing photographs of the first paratroopers who actually enter the old city of Jerusalem.
25:49 Speaker 08 At the Western Wall.
25:50 Speaker 09 At the Western Wall.
25:51 Speaker 08 One of the most famous photographs of the nineteen sixties.
25:53 Speaker 09 They have succeeded where Israel failed in nineteen forty eight and they have secured the Jewish quarters of the old city of Jerusalem. They're standing at the foot of the Western Wall and and they look completely astonished to be there. And I think that might actually be a photograph that captures a public mood. It's, I can't say I wasn't there, but I have the sense that the Israelis were just astonished by the degree of success that they achieved in taking on and defeating all their neighbors in quick order in so little time.
26:27 Speaker 07 And what about the Palestinian experience? Because, you know, we're talking about people who have now, you know, been driven from one home, who have thought this will be their next home. And now this happens.
26:38 Speaker 09 Well, I think that for Palestinians in diaspora, you have this kind of bipolar experience of having all their hopes raised by the broadcasts of Egypt and its allies that the Arabs were achieving a historic victory against Israel that was crumbling in the face of the Arab onslaught and that the total liberation of Palestine was at hand. And we have all these accounts by Palestinian guerrillas who are looking for ways that they can volunteer for this war effort and get to the front to be part of the liberation of their country. And they're listening to the radio as they're driving across the desert from Baghdad and Kuwait and Damascus, heading towards the front.
27:22 Speaker 09 But of course, the closer they get as the days pass by, the
27:26 Speaker 08 More obvious is that this is rubbish, yeah.
27:29 Speaker 09 Soon they come to the moment of reckoning where eventually the defeated Arab governments have to own up. To the Arab world, that far from having delivered the liberation of Palestine, they have suffered total defeat. And not only have they lost all their air forces, not only have all their armies been defeated, not only do they have tens of thousands of their soldiers Israeli prisoner of war, but they've lost the Golan Heights, they've lost the West Bank and East Jerusalem, they've lost all the Gaza Strip, and they've lost all the Sinai Peninsula. A loss on this order of magnitude, coming on the very high expectations of the imminent delivery of Palestine to the Palestinian people, was a shock from which I believe the Palestinians never recovered.
28:13 Speaker 08 And explain for those who don't understand the significance of East Jerusalem and the Haram El Sharif and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. What does this mean for those who see it as the centre of their world?
28:26 Speaker 09 Well, already in mandate times, Palestine was a city divided by, between a sort of modern British and Jewish quarter, and the old city and Arab quarters that were in Arab hand. And that line was reinforced in the course of the 1948 June War, when the city was left divided between Israeli and Jordanian forces. With the holy sites of the old city, the walled city of Jerusalem, spanning back the millennia, were left in Arab hands. And the neighborhoods in the West integrated into the Jewish state. And it was quite a hard division line of armies shooting at each other in a way not dissimilar, let's say, the division of Berlin between East and West Quarters.
29:06 Speaker 09 So, you know, overcoming that division and allowing Israelis access to the holiest sites associated with Judaism in Jerusalem. In Jerusalem, the site of the temple, you talk about the Haram El Sharif for observant Jews. This is the Temple Mount. The Western Wall are the same stones that had been the retainer wall of the temple enclosure. This is why the Western Wall holds such important spiritual and historic value to Jews, observant and secular alike.
29:39 Speaker 08 Sure.
29:40 Speaker 09 So, the symbolism of the Jewish state securing control over all of Jerusalem.
29:46 Speaker 09 Was massive for Israelis and was arguably the largest single prize of the of the June War, bigger than Golan in Sinai, as important as they were strategically for Israel, and bigger than gaining the West Bank, which filled in what was seen as the narrow waist of Israel, where the bulge of Arab territory narrowed Israel to, you know, ten or twelve miles at points. But Jerusalem, to which Jews had been vowing next year at every Passover Seder for millennia.
30:16 Speaker 08 And talk now about Gaza, because Gaza was where many of the Palestinians who were driven off their land and expelled from Palestine in 1948. Many had taken refuge in the refugee camps of Gaza, on the sand dunes of Gaza. They had been under Egyptian rule, which wasn't wonderful, because they were not allowed political activity. The Egyptians, please, kept a very close eye on what was going on in Gaza. But what happens to these people now?
30:43 Speaker 09 Well, as you say, Will, it's not as though Gaza had been a particularly prosperous or happy place.
30:49 Speaker 08 Holiday camp.
30:50 Speaker 09 It was basically the world's largest refugee camp. The Gaza as a strip is a product of the 1948 War. It didn't exist before then. You had a Gaza province.
30:59 Speaker 08 And an ancient Gaza town.
31:01 Speaker 09 And the ancient city of Gaza and other old towns. But, you know, that geography that we know so well today is a product of 1948. It's the territory that Israel didn't occupy. And the reason why the Israelis were not so interested in occupying that territory is because it had become the catchment area of Palestinian refugees, particularly from towns and cities from Jaffa southwards or from Berchav westwards. And as Israel conquered those territories, townsmen and villagers fled into an area under, still under Egyptian army control, around the city of Gaza that becomes the Gaza Strip. And there they had been enclosed with very little communication with Egypt.
31:44 Speaker 09 As a kind of self-governing refugee camp.
31:46 Speaker 08 And also no communication with their old homes in what has now become Israel. Totally cut off from that too.
31:53 Speaker 09 Or with the West Bank. I mean, really, an area quite cut off from the rest of the Palestinian diaspora.
31:57 Speaker 08 So many families who fled in one direction, had cousins who'd flee in another, and they haven't seen them now for 20 years.
32:05 Speaker 09 Unless they were able to go through Egypt and then make their way to Jordan for family reunions, which would have been one way to do it. You could cross from Gaza to Cairo with a permit, you know, so family unifications were conceivable. But the isolation of Gaza was pretty intense nonetheless. And now they find themselves, after, you know, what are we talking, 19 years since the establishment of this refugee community flooding into the established towns of places like Rafah, Khan Yunis, Gaza City itself, now coming under Israeli occupation.
32:38 Speaker 08 And there is great fear, isn't there? Because in the Suez War, Israel had also seized Gaza briefly and committed a number of massacres. The secret police had arrived, there'd been people put up against the wall, the machine gun. And so people are extremely anxious now in Gaza.
32:52 Speaker 09 With good reason. As you say, the experience of occupation in the 1956 war had been deeply traumatic. I believe Israel's actions were explained in terms of securing the rear before moving on to the Sinai. So the concerns for the Israelis was not to have hostile forces behind their lines that might in some way interact with Egyptian troops as Israel went down towards the Suez Canal as planned by their collusion with the French and the British. But yes, I mean, I think that for the people of Gaza, the invasion of 1967 was met with fear and trepidation, and there was no one there to protect them. Basically, they fell, Egypt was in retreat, and their fate was now very much in Israeli hands.
33:36 Speaker 08 And on the West Bank, what is the scale of the second displacement? Because we all talk about 1948 and the 750,000 Palestinians who flee what becomes Israel at the Nakba. But tell me what happens in 1967. There's a whole second displacement from Jerusalem, from Nablus, from Ramallah, and so on, over the bridge into Jordan.
34:00 Speaker 09 So you will see a displacement into Jordan, but...
34:05 Speaker 09 Interestingly, the majority of Palestinians living in the West Bank opt to remain in the West Bank. Their witnessing of what happened to Palestinians who left their homes in 1948 gave them pause. And so Israel was not driving the population out in a way that would have emptied the West Bank of its populations. Instead, they found themselves coming under the occupation of a very large Palestinian population, which would pose all kinds of problems for Israel's future as it looked to extend its grasp over the West Bank. This was strategic territory. It was all historically land associated with
34:50 Speaker 09 the Kingdom of Israel, as Judea and Samaria.
34:52 Speaker 08 Where the whole Israelite identity developed at the end of the Bronze Age.
34:57 Speaker 09 Absolutely. The Kingdom of Israel. You know, if you read the Book of Kings or the Books of Samuel, this is the territory we're talking about. But as the Jordanian saw, if you keep the land, you get the people.
35:08 Speaker 08 I believe that in 1967, between 280,000 and 325,000 Palestinians flee the West Bank over the bridge at this point. It's not quite the scale of the Nakba, but it's kind of half the Nakba.
35:21 Speaker 09 Oh, it's definitely a massive displacement of people and a new wave of misery for Palestinians who already have known practically two decades of exile from their homeland. And here again, you see hundreds of thousands displaced into Jordan to once again overfill the refugee camps of Jordan, which themselves had not been particularly, you know, comfortable places to live. So places like the Baka Camp, you know, on the road north of Amman, whole quarters of Amman, Jabal Hussein, you know, the areas around Hashemi and all. Become reception areas for people dispossessed. In many cases, for the second time, because many of the West Bank were people from places
36:03 Speaker 09 like Ramla and Liddah, when they were taken over by Israel in 1948, to take refuge in the West Bank and now for a second time being displaced. So the human misery is intense, but my point is you have far more who choose to stay. And that will become a problem for the Israelis, because you keep the land, you keep the people.
36:21 Speaker 08 So Eugene, take us now to the Syrian front, because there's a real paradox here, isn't there? Syria has done a great deal to provoke this crisis in the first place. There's a lot of sponsorship of Fatah raids that understandably angers the Israelis and the Israeli casualties from these. There's a lot of radical rhetoric, but when the attack actually happens, when the Egyptian air force is wiped out, when the paratroopers head into East Jerusalem on that first day and the second day and the third day, nothing at all happens on the Syrian front. Why is that?
36:54 Speaker 09 In a sense, the Israelis were preoccupied first and foremost with taking down the biggest threats that they faced. And so in the opening days of the war, their first priority was to secure their front with Egypt. And they sweep straight through and secure the whole of the Sinai Peninsula right up to the Suez Canal.
37:12 Speaker 08 This is Ariel Sharon and his tank regiments, isn't it? Am I right about that?
37:15 Speaker 09 You are. And in that sense, they're able to eliminate a threat from their Egypt from their southern flank.
37:20 Speaker 08 But what I'm asking is why the Syrians don't preemptively?
37:25 Speaker 09 We're getting there. We're getting there. Because if you think about what are the biggest borders that Israel has with its Arab neighbors? Once you've secured the southern flank with Egypt, which is the biggest threat, you turn to Jordan, which is your next longest border, which goes the whole of the length of the West Bank. And Jordan had a very disciplined army, had a very disciplined air force.
37:45 Speaker 08 The Arab Legion, which in many ways was one of the winners in 1948. Its defence of the Old City and it beats back Rabin, doesn't it, in the early days of 1948?
37:55 Speaker 09 Absolutely. So the Israelis did not wish to have an army with the discipline and the experience of the Arab Legion on its eastern flank threatening. So they turn all their effort to the Jordanians as soon as the Egyptians are concerned. I think they were emboldened by the success that they'd enjoyed against Egypt. And Jordan to then deal with the last of the strategic risks, which is the way in which the frontier land of Israel, as it borders Syria, goes up into the highlands of the Golan. And here, if they were to secure the Golan Heights and be able to secure their territory with Syria from the high ground. Syria had long used the position
38:39 Speaker 09 of the Heights to take potshots on Israeli positions and the Galilee Panhandle, that would all end now. And the Israelis saw that their success on the ground and their control of the air meant that they could actually probably secure their territory beyond their wildest dreams on the eve of war in 67 by securing the Golan Heights as well. And so they turned their full force against a Syria that's very ill-prepared to take on the full might of Israel, single-handed.
39:04 Speaker 08 And this again is Ariel Sharon, isn't it? The same tank regiments that have now come back from the Sinai and now heading right through Israel, heading for the north to the Golan Heights. But what I want to know, Eugene, is why we're not seeing columns of Syrian tanks pouring down from the Golan on day one and day two? Why? Are they just sitting in, they want to keep their defensive positions tight? Do they? They know that how powerful the Golan Heights is as a fortified position? Is that the reason they don't advance?
39:35 Speaker 09 I think there is a sense of panic that sweeps through Damascus and that the Damascenes prematurely announce defeat. So there is a broadcast announcing that the Israelis have actually managed to secure the Golan city of Knetra and that Knetra has fallen while it was actually still in Syrian hands.
39:54 Speaker 08 Knetra is still there, kept as a sort of museum of war, isn't it?
40:00 Speaker 09 Totally abandoned, a cash and settlement from the 19th century that, yes, has never been resettled, except by Syrian army units overlooking the frontier zone with Israel as it was to be after 67. But the effect of this broadcast on troop morale meant that Syrian soldiers, one presumes, were better informed about the fate of Egyptian units and Jordanian units. Felt that they were no longer protected if if Kneutra had fallen and they began to retreat. And so I think where the Israelis, you know, fighting what is arguably the most difficult of wars to be trying to go up high terrain against well entrenched defending defensive
40:44 Speaker 09 positions, found themselves marching through undefended land and able to claim the Golan Heights almost without resistance.
40:52 Speaker 08 But there is some very bitter fighting up there nonetheless, isn't there? I mean, I remember as a child seeing pictures of Syrian troops in the aftermath of Napalm attack, for example. There's a lot of Napalm being used up on the Golan Heights at this point.
41:06 Speaker 09 It was a total war for Syrians, you know, who were confronting the Israelis, of course. They would have fought with all of their disposal, which would then drive, you know, Israeli uses of weapons like napalm to get out the well entrenched defenders. I mean, I think what it points to really was the way in which soldiers across all Arab fronts had been failed by their governments and were left vulnerable to Israeli attack.
41:34 Speaker 08 Yeah.
41:35 Speaker 09 Where Israel had the benefit of air defence and total supremacy of the sky and where, you know, the governments were failing in supporting their troops in the field. And the Syrians were the last who fall victim to the failings of their government, but it cost them the Golan Heights at the end of the war.
41:50 Speaker 08 Give us a brief picture of of the two Israeli heroes of 1967, Moshe Dayan and Ariel Sharon.
41:58 Speaker 09 I mean, both were flamboyant characters who had established their reputations as successful military commanders, very different outlooks on the the neighbourhood that Israel finds itself in. Dayan having always advocated, you know, respect for Palestinian neighbours, spoke with Palestinian villagers in Arabic.
42:21 Speaker 08 Acknowledged the fact that so many Arab villages had been destroyed and kibbutzes built built on them. And there's this famous quote, isn't there, which he tells he tells the Israeli classrooms, every single settlement we have is built on top of an Arab village, which is much quoted on the internet these days.
42:37 Speaker 09 Yeah, I think that Dayan really was someone who actually believed in the the possibility of cohabitation between Israelis and Palestinians as as the best outcome. Sharon, on the other hand, was was very much aligned with a kind of right wing revisionist. Politics in Israel, those influenced by Ziv Jabotinsky and his acolytes.
42:59 Speaker 08 The idea of the iron wall.
43:01 Speaker 09 The whole notion that any rational people will fight against occupiers with all they've got. And so out of respect for Palestinian, you know, rational claims to their own country, you had to just fight until they were all gone. They will never willingly surrender their land. So, you know, Jabotinsky ironically comes across as at least respecting Palestinian claims to nationhood, even though his solutions were to use absolute force. And, and I think that Sharon, in that sense, really represents the military face of revisionist Zionism, where you had to deal such blows against Israel's Arab neighbors that they would retreat, leave the terrain to Israel, and then strike peace with your
43:46 Speaker 09 Arab neighbors only when you have secured your iron walls. And the Palestinians were in many ways the biggest impediment to that. Because how do you square getting Palestinian buy into the Israeli project under occupation? And that would be something that would bedevil Sharon's approach to the Palestinian movement, you know, right through his career.
44:08 Speaker 08 So Diane and Sharon are being acclaimed as great war heroes. At the same time, Nasser resigns and then reverses the decision. Tell us about that.
44:18 Speaker 09 Well, we talked a little bit about the way in which the Arab world has been deluded. And Nasser leads the lying campaign of promising everyone total victory and then having to come clean to his countrymen and to the Arab world at large that it had been total defeat. And so I think his resignation was him taking responsibility for leading total Arab failure.
44:47 Speaker 09 But for the Arab world, already, the shock of defeat is a trauma that I really wish to stress. I think it does something to Arabs' confidence in their leaders that they will never recover from.
45:00 Speaker 08 Even now, absolutely.
45:02 Speaker 09 Even now. There's just a notion that there is a kind of Alice in Wonderland world that the political people live in and that real people are victims of.
45:11 Speaker 08 And their confidence that they're being told the truth by their leaders takes an incredible blow.
45:16 Speaker 09 It makes you very conspiratorial. You don't believe what people are telling you at face value and you look for the meaning under the truth.
45:22 Speaker 08 And plots, constantly plots and conspiracies.
45:24 Speaker 09 And plots and conspiracies and it's encouraged because, you know, the leaders, instead of saying, we messed up, will blame defeat on conspiracies with the Europeans or conspiracies with the Americans. And so you have all of that. Nasser's resignation, however, was something that I think the Egyptian people and the Arab at large simply wasn't ready for yet. He was still their hero. He was still their champion. And having lost war, they didn't want to lose him. Now, he came out of this war so discredited. He will be openly scorned by his fellow Arab leaders in the years after sixty-seven until his death in September of nineteen seventy.
46:06 Speaker 08 A bit like Nehru after losing great chunks of the Himalayas to China in nineteen sixty-two, five years before this.
46:12 Speaker 09 It's a good parallel, but even worse.
46:14 Speaker 08 These great heroes of an earlier generation. When he resigns, however, people pour out in the streets weeping, begging him to reconsider. I mean, there are crowds in Cairo and...
46:24 Speaker 09 Yeah, yeah, yeah. They weren't ready to lose him. They'd just begun to integrate the magnitude of their loss in the war. They weren't ready to lose him. And so they reject his resignation. They demand that he stay on. And in a sense... It was responsible for Nasser to stay on. This was a mess of his making. And he needed to use the credibility that he had left to try and clean up the mess. So, you know, I feel like his resignation was the right thing to do. But in a sense, his acceptance of people's demands that he not resign showed a sense of responsibility because it was no picnic for Nasser coming back to power after the defeat of sixty seven.
47:04 Speaker 08 The cultural response in the Arab world.
47:08 Speaker 08 The poets respond to this in a particular way, don't they? I interviewed Dawish in Ramallah a few years ago before he died. And he keeps coming back to the defeat of nineteen sixty seven as the moment that kind of breaks Arab nationalism and Arab hopes, that there's still hopes after the Nakba, after forty eight, that people can still reclaim their homes, that these keys that they've got hanging around of their old houses in Galilee and so on, you know, can still be put into a lock and turned and somehow all this nightmare will end. But in nineteen sixty seven, that hope really just shatters. A second defeat, a second exodus.
47:38 Speaker 09 It does, but it actually liberates Palestinians in a new way because in Arab defeat, the PLO will emerge as the most legitimate representative of Palestinian aspirations. And they're no longer shackled to the Arab states they had to rely on previously or were controlled by previously because they were so discredited by their own failure in the war. So terrible defeat, as Dawish says, but maybe also the opportunity for the Palestinian liberation movement to emerge like the phoenix from the ashes of Arab defeat in sixty seven.
48:07 Speaker 08 And what do we see the PLO do in this war? I mean, have they had a good war? Have they fought any better than the Egyptians or Syrians?
48:15 Speaker 09 No, the PLO were actually kept out of this war. And in that sense, we're not discredited by it.
48:20 Speaker 08 Right.
48:20 Speaker 09 So the PLO and all of the factions underneath it, all the militias underneath it, are going to be able to present themselves as the clean pair of hands to pick up the baton dropped by the Arab leaders.
48:32 Speaker 08 Got it.
48:32 Speaker 09 And finally lead to the Palestinians liberating their own territory.
48:37 Speaker 08 But the other thing that happens, and I think this is crucially important for where we are now, is that this gives a death blow to secular Arab left-leaning nationalism, which has been very much the guiding force in the Arab world since the end of colonialism, since nineteen forty seven, forty eight.
48:54 Speaker 09 All I'd say is that big ideas like that take a longer time to die than you might think. So I'm going to give Arab nationalism another ten or fifteen years, even after sixty seven, before it's going to really be overtaken by alternatives.
49:06 Speaker 08 But this is the moment, isn't it, when Saad Kuttub and the Muslim Brotherhood and this whole world of Islamist thought, which obviously is such a huge thing in the years to come, in the decades to come, the rise of the Brotherhood, then Al Qaeda, then ISIS, this egg is laid at this point, if you like, isn't it, wouldn't you say?
49:23 Speaker 09 Perhaps, but it really won't hatch until you have the example of the Iranian revolution overturning a secular leader like the Shah of Iran, to make people aware that Islamist groups and their politics could actually achieve more than Arab nationalist groups could. And that'll come after 1979, really the 1980s, in the fine Saad Kutt and his ideologies, a roadmap for their revolution.
49:46 Speaker 07 Eugene, once again, thank you so very much. Absolutely fascinating. You're such a master storyteller.
49:51 Speaker 08 Thank you so, so much for coming back on the show.
49:54 Speaker 09 Thank you, Will.
49:54 Speaker 07 That's it from us. If you can't wait for the next episode, you know you don't have to. You just become a member of our club and it's very easy to do. EmpirePodUK.com, that's EmpirePodUK.com. And if you are a member of the club, you get these mini-series all in one go and lots more besides. Till the next time we meet. It's goodbye from me, Anita Aron.
50:14 Speaker 08 And goodbye from me, William Derimpel.
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