Pod Insights Decoder Recode Decode: Bart Gellman About this episode Journalist and author Bart Gellman talks with Recode's Kara Swisher about his newest book, Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the American Surveillance State. Gellman discusses how he got connected with Snowden ahead of his whistleblowing disclosures in 2013; how he reacted to the staggering size of the US government's digital surveillance apparatus; and the different waves of impact of the Snowden leaks on the government and tech industry. He also talks about why people should still be concerned about the amount of data the tech industry has amassed, and why debating whether Snowden is a traitor is a "silly" distraction.
Featuring:
Bart Gellman (@bartongellman), author, Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the American Surveillance State
Host:
Kara Swisher (@karaswisher), Recode co-founder and editor-at-large
More to explore:
On Reset, Arielle Duhaime-Ross explores why — and how — tech is changing everything.
On Recode Media, Peter Kafka interviews business titans, journalists, comedians and podcasters about the collision of tech and media.
On Pivot, Kara Swisher and Scott Galloway talk about the big tech news stories of the week, who's winning, who's failing, and what comes next.
And on Land of the Giants, Jason Del Rey chronicled the rise of Amazon. Season 2 will focus on Netflix and is coming soon!
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Transcript 10,634 words · 9 speakers
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0:54 Speaker 02 Hi, I'm Kara Swisher, editor-at-large at Recode. You may know me as someone who wants to ask Edward Snowden for advice on how never to travel anywhere these days, but in my spare time, I'm just a reporter and you're listening to Recode Decode, a podcast about power, change, and the people you need to know. We're part of the Vox Media Podcast Network. Today in the red chair, I'm thrilled to have Bart Gellman, the Pulitzer Prize-winning and Emmy-winning journalist and author who writes for The Atlantic. He previously wrote a book about Dick Cheney's vice presidency called Angler, and his brand new book is called Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the American Surveillance State. Bart was very involved when those first stories were reported, and he's going to talk about that and more. We're recording this on May 13th, less than a week before the book comes out, and there's
1:36 Speaker 02 all kinds of issues around surveillance and other issues that I'm excited to talk to him about. Bart, welcome to Recode Decode.
1:42 Speaker 03 Pleasure to be here.
1:43 Speaker 02 So let's talk a little bit about your background, because I think I'd love for people to get sort of a setup of how you got to be writing about Edward Snowden and that story. It's in the book and everything, but I think a lot of people don't know it. So it'd be great if you could sort of give us the sort of short version of how you got to where you got to write this book.
2:01 Speaker 03 Well, I joined The Washington Post when I was a baby. I covered courthouse, State Department, and I was a foreign correspondent in the Middle East.
2:09 Speaker 02 I remember. I was even smaller. I was delivering mail at the time, but go ahead, keep going.
2:14 Speaker 03 I remember you in the Middle East. I came back, I covered... The Pentagon and diplomacy and moved into a kind of investigative seat where I did nothing but long-term projects in the newsroom. And after nine eleven, it became pretty much nothing but national security all the time. My series on Dick Cheney and my book on Cheney focused heavily on the national security issues and had two chapters on the warrantless surveillance of Americans that was disclosed during the Bush administration. It was known internally as the Vice President's Special Program.
2:55 Speaker 03 And it turned out to be one of the four programs of domestic surveillance that Snowden helped to disclose. Because I'd written about that, Laura Poitras approached me in 2013, just after an anonymous source named Virax made contact with her.
3:16 Speaker 02 Explain who she is. She is a she works for.
3:19 Speaker 03 Laura Poitras is a fantastic independent filmmaker who has made a number of documentaries that she shoots by herself, produces by herself, and she's done them on Gitmo, on Iraq, and the very good Citizen Four, which is a kind of real-time look at several days in a Hong Kong hotel room with Snowden.
3:49 Speaker 02 When he was revealing, when he was bringing these documents to their attention, her and Glenn Greenwald.
3:54 Speaker 03 Right. It's with Glenn Greenwald in the room. Laura and I had been fellows together at NYU. She knew me. I had given her advice on encryption and that sort of thing. She came to me one day in January of 2013 and asked me to meet in some very private place, and she didn't like the first one I picked, so we picked another one. She didn't want me to take notes. She wanted to tell me about this anonymous source who had made contact with her claiming to be someone from the intelligence community, claiming to have a big scandal. And she wanted to know if this looked like it was for real.
4:35 Speaker 03 And that started a long collaboration with Laura that brought us to the first story in June about the PRISM program of the NSA.
4:44 Speaker 02 All right, so PRISM, explain for me, because what happened was that Edward Snowden, and I, we did an interview earlier this year when his book came out, about, it was a program that the government had that was a surveillance program, that it was doing different things, and Edward was working in for the NSA as a contractor, and he had moved different places, including Hawaii, I think is where he was the last part of his career, is that correct?
5:08 Speaker 03 Right, Hawaii.
5:09 Speaker 02 Yeah, and so he then became disturbed, and he's a really interesting personality, I want to get into this later with you, because I think you depict him rather well. Sort of a righteous person, and also arrogant, very typical of the techies, he was so, he reminded me so much of people I cover all the time, except he's living in Russia and is considered a traitor. Talk a little bit about what you thought, because you probably get these kind of tips all the time, because you work in intelligence.
5:35 Speaker 03 Well, to be honest, my very first thought was, oh, no, not this again, because after I wrote about surveillance in the Washington Post and in my book, I was getting an inbox full of crazy people who imagined conspiracies by the intelligence community. It's a subject that has unusual power over disturbed minds.
6:01 Speaker 02 Right, it does.
6:02 Speaker 03 And there would be people who were just fakers, or who thought they had a scandal, but it wasn't for real, or they didn't understand the subject at all. And so the noise to signal ratio on tips of this kind is terrible.
6:17 Speaker 02 Yeah, I remember in the Washington Post newsroom where I worked, when I was there at night, people would call and say that the CIA was invading their brain, and they needed to wear, all kinds of stuff, but you'd get all that, that was one of the biggest series of tips that came in, was the intelligence agency is spying on me, really, that, essentially, and most people were mentally disturbed, but you just never know, correct? That's the kind of thing that you have to deal with when you're in this. Line of reporting.
6:40 Speaker 03 You'd never know. There are some times when I feel like I can discard something after the first communication.
6:47 Speaker 02 Uh huh.
6:47 Speaker 03 This one showed some intellect.
6:50 Speaker 02 Uh huh.
6:51 Speaker 03 And had a veneer of plausibility to it. And so we tested it. And that went back and forth for quite a while. In fact, there was a mutual vetting going on with Snowden trying to decide whether he could trust a representative of the mainstream media, of which I was a card carrying member, and me trying to figure out whether he really actually knew anything and whether he could provide evidence for the claims he made.
7:17 Speaker 02 All right. So you're doing this. And he was, that was one part of the book is you, him deciding whether he trusted you. He did trust Laura and Glenn, but you were something different. Explain that. Because it's a really interesting question of where he wanted this to go out to, where he wanted this information to be revealed in. Because he wanted the, he wanted the stature of a mainstream media organization so it would have some heft, presumably.
7:43 Speaker 03 Well, it was lucky for me that he chose three journalists because I was not his first choice or his second choice. He wanted strong advocates of his position. He wanted strong skeptics of the national security state. Glenn Greenwald had already made his reputation like that. He was a combatant from the left in public opinion. Laura had been personally picked on by the surveillance state because she was, after making one of her films, she was stopped at the US border. Every time she passed through for special secondary inspection, they would copy her computer, they would copy the files off of
8:27 Speaker 03 her SD cards and her, her, her video files and so forth.
8:34 Speaker 03 And she was getting sick of it. That was actually how we first met when she came to me for advice about how she could protect herself during inspections like that. And she vouched for me with Snowden. But Snowden decided ultimately that having someone from a sort of brand name mainstream news organization would be helpful if it worked out. He wasn't sure whether The Washington Post or I would have the nerve to publish stories that the government didn't want published. I thought that was a profound misunderstanding of who we are and what we do, but that was his belief. His belief was that we would be intimidated. But he figured if it worked, it would work. And if not, he had the other two.
9:13 Speaker 02 Right. And so, talk about sort of what happened then, because these are these questions, because one of the things he did was you, talk about what he unveiled and from your perspective, what it meant at the time, because you had been writing about this, this idea of the government doing much more domestic surveillance than you thought. Was this surprising to you when you finally saw the documents that he that he put out?
9:34 Speaker 03 Oh, yeah. So much of it was a surprise. Some of it was long feared or suspected or believed. And there were tech people for years who said, well, a sufficiently well-resourced adversary could do the following kinds of things on the internet if it wanted to listen in on everyone. And so, and there were people who built tools like the Tor anonymity network to get around that sort of thing. But there was granular detail here that went beyond anything that had been publicly known before, and certainly that had been publicly confirmed.
10:15 Speaker 03 I frankly had kind of a freak out when I first understood how big and broad and sensitive the archive was that Snowden had given me.
10:26 Speaker 02 Explain for people who don't. I still think, you know, the noise around Snowden is less about what he revealed and more about what he did and how he did it. But please, talk about what you what you thought was the most profound parts of that.
10:39 Speaker 03 Well, you're saying you'd like to know about? The content.
10:43 Speaker 02 Yeah.
10:43 Speaker 03 What are the...
10:43 Speaker 02 Yeah, exactly. I think that got lost in a lot of the drama around Snowden himself.
10:48 Speaker 03 It did get lost.
10:49 Speaker 02 So talk a little bit about that because I know Silicon Valley was super freaked out and they should... I can never tell whether they were surprised or not really surprised and were feigning sort of shock and disgust at what the government was doing.
11:04 Speaker 03 I have a view on that.
11:05 Speaker 02 Okay.
11:06 Speaker 03 I'll get to it pretty quickly. There are two things that dominated the debate in terms of Snowden's disclosures. The first was the monitoring of call data records, the metadata of US telephone calls. Every call in the country that it could reach. The NSA, with the help of the FBI and the help of the phone companies, was collecting who you called, who called you, what time, how long you talked, and other metadata like that. And you put that together in sufficiently large quantities and you have a social network.
11:41 Speaker 02 Yeah.
11:41 Speaker 03 You are able to find out everyone's relationship to everyone else in the country. That was the first of the disclosures made about Snowden, and that was by Glenn Greenwald in The Guardian. And it was a very big deal. And it dominated the conversation because it was very clearly and unambiguously domestic surveillance. It was US calls. It didn't matter whether you called overseas or called your next door neighbor. That was all being taken down.
12:09 Speaker 02 Right.
12:10 Speaker 03 The second big one was a program called PRISM, which... And this one collected content. This one was the NSA asking large US internet providers like Google, Apple, Yahoo, Microsoft, and so on, for the content of accounts that they would name. And unlike previous lawful programs, which required individual warrants in every case, in which the NSA would have to go to a FISA judge, a special foreign intelligence...
12:42 Speaker 02 These are secret courts that determine these things for people who aren't as familiar.
12:47 Speaker 03 Right. Foreign intelligence surveillance judges who operated in closed session under classified rules with only the government as a party. In the past, the government had to get an individual warrant every time it did one of these things. The rules had changed in secret ways that no one knew about publicly, which enabled the government to give just a giant list of tens of thousands of what they call selectors, which is mostly email addresses. And they would all get sent at once to Google and Microsoft, and they would have to produce en masse the contents of a high-volume of accounts. That was known as PRISM. That also became famous.
13:29 Speaker 03 The thing that did not get as much attention, to my frustration, was the became the bulk of my work writing this for the Washington Post, and especially once I started partnering with Ashkan Soltani, who's an independent security and privacy consultant. And this was the bulk collection of content and metadata overseas. And it worked like this. They would go to a foreign access point, and they'd say, "Give us everything that looks like a cellphone location. Give us everything that looks like a computer address book," and so on down the line.
14:09 Speaker 03 And the problem with that is they were allowed to presume that if they collected it overseas, the people they were collecting on were foreign. Well, that's just not true anymore. When I send an email from me to you, and we're both in the United States, there's a near 100% chance that a copy of that is going to either travel overseas or be backed up overseas. Right. Because Google and so on are global networks. And so the biggest story about this, and the one that I think made the greatest impact on Silicon Valley, was when Ashkan and I wrote that the NSA was breaking into Right. the Google and Yahoo and Microsoft clouds.
14:54 Speaker 03 So they were already encrypting a great deal of what traveled across the Internet. But eventually, it would get to a data center, and maybe it's in Singapore. And at the data center, inside the private fiber that is bought or leased by a large company like Google, the data was traveling around unencrypted. It was naked. It was in the clear. The NSA figured that out, and the NSA started breaking into those cloud infrastructures. And it was able to read data as it traveled from data center to data center. This is the same information that it was allowed to get with a warrant
15:36 Speaker 03 under quite easy circumstances, using the Prism program in the United States, and yet it was breaking in and doing it overseas. The important thing about these overseas operations was that they were capturing a huge amount of American data. They were capturing American accounts by at least the tens of millions, because they can't help it. If you're sweeping in bulk, you're going to get a bunch of stuff that you want and a bunch of stuff that you didn't aim for on purpose. They weren't allowed to aim for Americans, but they were allowed to catch them. And once they had us in their net, they could use that information. So it was as though there was a rule that says, you can't fish out in the ocean for a fish named Bart. But you could just take a gigantic
16:21 Speaker 03 net and sweep in huge schools of fish. And then, once you have those in your tank, you're allowed to look for Bart inside there.
16:28 Speaker 02 Okay, we're going to talk about what happens to fish like Bart. When we get back, we're here with Bart Gellman, the author of Dark Mirror, Edward Snowden, and the American Surveillance State. We're going to take a quick break now. We'll be back after this.
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17:41 Speaker 02 Okay, we're back with Bart Gelman. He is a well-known journalist, award-winning, and he's also the author of a new book called Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the American Surveillance State. Bart, we were talking about schools of fish and what they're allowed. Let's be clear, they're not supposed to be taking surveilling Americans. But the internet has provided the opportunity to do so, given that Americans are giving up all kinds of information to social networks or to Google or anybody else that they have relationships with. Talk a little bit about the impact on tech of what happened here, because I've always felt like the Edward Snowden moment was the moment that the relationship, which has been close, closer than people realize, was quite hurt. And people in Silicon Valley, depending on which company it was, Twitter was more loud
18:26 Speaker 02 about it, but others, they all reacted with sort of shock. I was sort of surprised they didn't realize, why wouldn't the government come fishing in their pond?
18:36 Speaker 03 So the tech companies all knew that the rules had changed and that the NSA could come to them and give them 10,000 accounts and say, give me all the content of these accounts under authority of a federal judge. And they were comfortable enough with that. It was the force of law and they were doing it. And I have no reason to think that they were especially disturbed by it. But when they found out that the NSA was breaking in... To another door of their house overseas and not telling them about it and just helping itself, that really pissed them off and it took them aback. And I think that was a
19:16 Speaker 03 big, big moment for tech. In fact, there were a number of top tech executives that were gathered, I'm told, at a conference in China at the time that this story broke. And it was the talk of the conference and it was a defining moment. It was the moment that, first of all, they decided to take defensive countermeasures. And this was an extraordinary thing. You had, for the first time, American companies treating the American government as an adversary and spending millions and millions of dollars to defend against US government surveillance.
19:54 Speaker 02 Okay.
19:55 Speaker 03 That was a big moment and it had not happened before Edward Snowden.
19:59 Speaker 02 Now, it was also facing China, it was facing Iran, it was facing other countries which were already doing this to them in many states. Google had its tussle in China earlier. Talk a little bit about that because they were used to doing, to having this, but not the US government, correct?
20:14 Speaker 03 Right. They were used to defending themselves in China and in infrastructure that touched China. They were not used to the idea of a global adversary that could intercept data on the private fiber that's going between their data centers. This is not the open internet. This is fiber optic cable that these companies buy or lease themselves. No other traffic travels on them. They were not used to those as being targets and it changed the way they operated.
20:43 Speaker 02 So what do you think the impact was? I think it did. I think it led to them not paying as much attention to different things, not cooperating with the government on things like election interference and things like that. I don't know if you think that was the case, but the relationship was not irretrievably broken, but it was pretty broken at that time, as I recall.
21:00 Speaker 03 It was badly hurt and some of it may have been principle, some of it may have just been outraged that, you know, your own locks have been picked. And a big chunk of it, let's be honest, had to do with market imperatives. There was a lot of global outrage about NSA surveillance when these stories started breaking. And the question was, can we trust Microsoft anymore to host our company cloud infrastructure? Can we trust Amazon? Can we trust Yahoo, Google, and so forth? They were at very real risk of losing the biggest market they had for growth.
21:43 Speaker 03 I mean, their presence in the US market for email, for cloud storage, for data infrastructure, they were pretty well saturated in this market. All their growth was going to be overseas. And you had Europeans, for example, starting to say, well, we're not going to allow use of American infrastructure if that's just going to be on the menu for the NSA. And so the companies had to make very strong indications, not just with words, but with deeds of their independence.
22:12 Speaker 02 And what do you think the impact of that was, of them doing that, moving into encryption, moving into stronger encryption and different things they were doing? Because, again, there is, there does need to be some cooperative relationship between tech companies and the government, or maybe you don't think that at all?
22:28 Speaker 03 I think that some surveillance, a substantial amount of US intelligence collection is justified and necessary. And so you need to have the means of doing that. What especially bothered me, and then what I tried to explore in the book, is the idea of bulk surveillance, of collecting everything in order that you can find anything, rather than targeting surveillance at specific intelligence targets to begin with. Let me be clear about the reason. There is an important legal and operational concept in intelligence gathering that's called incidental collection. If you pull in a big bucket of information and it happens that there are Americans in there, that's not an accident, because you know there are Americans swimming in that
23:13 Speaker 03 sea. It's not unexpected, it's not even undesired. But it has to be called incidental, which means you weren't aiming for them. But once you collect them and you weren't aiming for them, you collected them incidentally, you get to keep that data. And in some cases, for example, the FBI can sort through it. Look for Kara, look for Bart, inside that-
23:35 Speaker 02 And other things that might, other crimes, other things that you, that might be suspect, correct? Or to them suspect.
23:41 Speaker 03 And they can do that for criminal investigative purposes. So then you have a situation in which information has been collected without the normal Fourth Amendment protections and without the benefit of a warrant. And yet, if they find evidence of a crime, they can use it. This is the kind of information that would be suppressed if they did this with the usual sort of domestic law enforcement means.
24:06 Speaker 02 Right. So one of the terms you, that was used in the book, you were quoting someone, which was "database of ruin". It's creating a data, could you talk about that? Because, and then I would love your shift that, you know, the government was doing this, but the tech companies themselves all have this information, even if it's been sort of served up by consumers who know they're doing it, who know they're giving all this information. So talk a little bit about this idea of a database of ruin, because I think people don't realize how much you can put together information to create, you know, to create a really problematic situation for a lot of people, secrets and different things that they want to keep confidential.
24:42 Speaker 03 Well, it was Paul Oma, I believe, in an article, if I remember correctly, in a Harvard Journal, who coined the term "database of ruin", to describe a situation in which any sufficiently large collection of information is bound to have data in it, which if revealed, could destroy lives. It could put people in danger, it could expose victims of crimes to their victimizers, it could expose personal secrets that would destroy marriages, it could expose trade secrets that would destroy jobs, that if you put together enough information, there are going to be connections in there that are terribly damaging.
25:27 Speaker 03 And although it's true that private companies, private internet companies have enormous amounts of data about us, it's different, first of all, when the government has it. Because the government has compulsory power over our lives. And it's also true that the government has a breadth of access to information that even the Facebooks of the world don't have. If you can actually stand at the crossroads of the internet and take whatever you like in bulk-
25:59 Speaker 03 And put it through systems that cost billions of dollars. You could do things that no private company can reproduce, even a giant like Google or Facebook.
26:08 Speaker 02 Are you worried at all that these companies like Google and Facebook and Amazon increasingly have all this information and no accountability in some ways? Is that where you are? Is that a concern of yours?
26:20 Speaker 03 Oh, God, yeah.
26:21 Speaker 02 So, talk about that a little bit because they don't, they may not be able to arrest you, but they certainly, you know, at one point I was talking to the founders of Google and they, I was giving them a hard time about trying to control all of search. And I said, what if a bad person, you know, took over your company? And they were like, we're good people. And I said, yeah, but what if a bad person? They wouldn't even conceive of the idea of it. And I was like, your information in the hands of a really bad person is really bad. And this was a decade or more ago.
26:48 Speaker 03 It's such a good scenario to put to people. Imagine that someone you don't trust as much as yourself has access to that power. And I tried that with US government officials too, by the way, who refused to conceive of it until Trump came along.
27:04 Speaker 02 Right.
27:04 Speaker 03 And then they saw someone take control of the arms government who actually did have bad intentions and actually did have disrespect for the rules and norms. And they started changing their tune. That was one of the most interesting parts of the book, in my view, is the conversations I was able to have with people like James Clapper and Jim Comey about what it's like to look at these extraordinarily intrusive arms of government through the lens of their control by a guy like Trump.
27:37 Speaker 02 Right, so talk about that because you, when you, right after, in the wake of doing these stories, you had been, you're not close to the intelligence, but you had sources there and you were covering it from a mainstream media organization. It wasn't, it wasn't sort of, you weren't at odds with them necessarily doing reporting. And sometimes you were at odds, but in this case, you became at odds with them. Talk about that reaction. And especially to, even to this day, the reaction to Snowden is visceral from many intelligence people I talked to or government officials in the State Department. Susan Rice, for example, almost turned blue when I said his name. When I didn't interview, I had done an interview with him and then I heard right after and it was really fascinating. It was years and years later. So talk a little bit
28:18 Speaker 02 about the reaction and then how, what happens now that they've changed in the idea that it could be abused? I'm amazed that they can't believe that it can't be abused.
28:27 Speaker 03 Well, the state of my relationship with US government officials is not especially concerning to anyone but me, but the fact is that from the moment the first Snowden story appeared under my byline, I was absolutely persona non grata among sources and acquaintances and even friends I had known in the national security community over the years.
28:53 Speaker 02 Right.
28:53 Speaker 03 I was scheduled at a place called the Aspen Security Forum, which is almost like a
29:00 Speaker 02 Yep.
29:00 Speaker 03 summer camp for the national security establishment out in Colorado for four days a year. I'd been there, been going there for years. I would get on stage. I would interview people, moderate a conversation. It's all done at arm's length, but it's ultimately a friendly enterprise. It just happened that I was scheduled to be moderating onstage a conversation between Denny Blair and John Decreponte, both of them former directors of national intelligence. We were supposed to talk about something else, but six weeks after the Snowden stories broke, there was no doubt we were going to talk about this.
29:38 Speaker 03 And I lost the room in five minutes. I mean, they just hated me. There were this visceral sense of betrayal and that this kid Snowden, who was 29 at the time the first stories appeared, that this kid should take it upon himself to disclose their secrets and they're disposed to believe in the early days that the damage is greater even than it is. Well, I mean, the sense of betrayal, the sense of feeling that there could be no possible justification for this conversation. There could be no possible justification for not trusting them. Why didn't everyone understand that what they were doing was on our behalf to protect us?
30:23 Speaker 02 Right. Which I think was Cheney. Cheney would talk about that. If you knew the darkness that I see, you would know you would not hate me as much, that kind of thing.
30:32 Speaker 03 Right, very much so.
30:33 Speaker 02 You hear that a lot from those groups. And then it was sort of like, we'd like to see it, so we could see whether we should hate you or not. But it was sort of the idea that we're doing this in your best interests. This is good for you, whether you know it or not. And you don't even know what we've stopped, essentially, all the different attacks that you didn't know were happening, which is also the staple of movies and things like that. But, or Homeland.
30:53 Speaker 03 They couldn't see any good in it.
30:55 Speaker 02 Yeah, yeah, yeah.
30:56 Speaker 03 And they were missing that.
30:57 Speaker 02 So, talk about how that's changed now. How do you perceive how it's changed? Do you think there is a rethinking of Snowden? And then in the next section, I'd like to talk a little bit about your relationship with him, because I think, and what he represents from your perspective, as you depict him in this book. But talk a little bit about what's changed. How has, it's just because Trump disdains national security, that he's more interested in surveillance, or is he not interested in surveillance? Because he's, right now, he's accusing Obama Gate as his, whatever that crime is that he seems to be talking about. It has to do with this idea of surveillance.
31:29 Speaker 03 So, like, the members of this club, the members of the national security establishment, people who grew up and spent careers in it, and did their best and had honest motives, and believed that what they were doing was critical to the survival of the country, they recognized the power, and the potential, and the intrusiveness of what they do. They understood that in the wrong hands, bad things could happen. But they believed in the system. They believed in the values of the workforce. They believed in the potential of rules to constrain behavior. They thought the system was working just as it should be. Everyone knew what the Fourth Amendment was. Everyone knew what the regulations were. There were
32:14 Speaker 03 well-developed levels of oversight inside the system. And so the fact that the public couldn't oversee what was happening was of no consequence.
32:22 Speaker 02 Right.
32:23 Speaker 03 Well, then comes Trump.
32:26 Speaker 03 And it's not that he disdains national security, although he does. It is, and it's not just that he disdains their advice, although he does. It's this fundamental sense that he is not constrained by rules, that the law and the regulations and the traditions that they rely on are of no value to him. And that he has demonstrated a remarkable ability to suborn people, to lure them across lines that they did not think that they would cross. And this is one of Trump's superpowers, is that he manages to taint people. He manages to get them to do things they thought they would never do.
33:11 Speaker 03 And suddenly, they find themselves, without quite understanding how they got there, saying things and doing things that would have been out of the question a year or two earlier.
33:23 Speaker 02 So where does that put us right now? Where does that put us right now in the national intelligence? What is the, that you keep reading through sources said in this, that they're fighting back, that they're trying to keep their standards up. But where are they actually, from your perception? Where is this, given how far we've traveled since Edward Snowden? Where do you put them right now?
33:46 Speaker 03 Well, there's a huge struggle inside the institutional arms of government to maintain standards, to maintain rules and norms. And it's an ongoing battle, and I don't think we have seen the end of it yet. It's most obvious and most in the public eye in the Justice Department. But let's take an example. A year and a half ago, the US intelligence community gave its annual assessment of the world. It's a public testimony in which the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of some of the large intelligence agencies come to both houses of Congress and explain the state of the world.
34:28 Speaker 03 It's what's the threat landscape facing Americans? And they talk in detail about terrorism and regional disputes and nuclear proliferation and hacking and cybersecurity and so on.
34:42 Speaker 03 Well, they gave that talk and their honest assessment, using the best intelligence and the best analysis they could bring to bear, was different than what Trump said about Iran, was different than what Trump said about North Korea. And he freaked out and he reamed people out and he fired people. And this year, when it came time for this annual threat assessment, the intelligence community said, "We're not going to make one. We're not going to give public testimony. We're going to give it only in classified form, in a written form, to Congress. So there won't be any public disclosure," which is a huge damage to the ability of this democracy
35:26 Speaker 03 to understand and debate its own national security priorities. And they did it solely for the reason that they were afraid of the president.
35:33 Speaker 02 Right. So how do you change that? You don't, or you just let it happen until he's gone? Or do you push back and get fired? Because they all do get fired if they continue to do this.
35:45 Speaker 03 Well, I mean, look, I think if you are at a certain level of government and you go to work for a guy like Donald Trump, you have to be prepared to be fired. It's the only defense you have against being entirely corrupted if things go in that direction. The intelligence community likes to talk about speaking truth to power. That is one of many ways in which they actually resemble journalism. They gather information, they sift it, they analyze it, they publish it for whatever publishing means in their world. And they feel a very strong norm of speaking truth to power, of telling people what is happening, whether or not it's what their consumers want to be happening. And they have to live up to those words. And if they can't live up to those words, they have to resign. That's my view.
36:29 Speaker 03 As a citizen, that's what I would want my public servants to be doing.
36:34 Speaker 02 Right. So what will happen now from your perspective of this? And then when we get back after the break, I want to talk about what is the American surveillance state right now? But the impact being, is they're going to wait it out? Or what do you imagine?
36:48 Speaker 03 I think the intelligence community is trying to wait it out and is doing the best it can. But every time someone sticks his head up or her head up, you've had a decapitation of some of the finest intelligence officers and managers in the government. And you've had people fired for...
37:10 Speaker 03 Either speaking their minds or being suspected of being the kinds of people who will speak their minds. And you have nakedly political and unqualified people at the top of the intelligence community now, who are just obvious cronies of the president without experience in the intelligence world, the kind of people who would never have been appointed by any other president, Republican or Democrat, to these jobs. So, yeah, they're trying to wait it out and keep their head down and avoid any further damage if they can. It's really, it's really what the cyber experts would call security by obscurity. They're trying not to be noticed.
37:46 Speaker 02 Ha, that's great. Anyway, we're going to take another break now. We'll be back after this with Bart Gellman, the author of Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the American Surveillance State.
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38:55 Speaker 02 We're back with Bart Gellman, the author of Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the American Surveillance State. Talk a little bit about your relationship with Edward Snowden, because now, you know, he's, it seems, he seems so far away, given the stakes now. But what, I want to hear what you think, why you think he did it, and how you ended your relationship, or do you still have an ongoing relationship with him?
39:17 Speaker 03 We still talk from time to time, although there can be long, long gaps between. And the truth is, I spent so much time with my hometown writing this book, that I wasn't much good company for anyone for a while there. The relationship has ebbed and flowed. It was always fraught. It began with suspicion. I didn't know who this guy was, whether he knew what he was talking about. He didn't know whether he could believe in me to do what I said I would do to publish over government pressure. And we did have government pressure. There were there were government efforts to dissuade us, at least, from publishing certain parts of the story. And there are certain parts of the story we didn't publish.
39:57 Speaker 03 We were suspicious of each other, but we came to build a considerable amount of trust. I found him to be very reliable about things that he could state as facts. He had opinions. He had sort of grand frameworks for surveillance. But if he told me this widget attaches to that widget, or this system collects from that collection point, I found those things to be remarkably accurate over time.
40:29 Speaker 02 So what do you think his motivation is? How would you describe for what he was doing? Because he's a complex person. And again, I don't mean to make it seem small, but he reminds me of a lot of the people I cover. He has the same sort of attitudes, same level of arrogance, some righteousness. Do you consider him a traitor?
40:47 Speaker 03 No, I think it's a silly debate, honestly, but
40:50 Speaker 02 Tell me why.
40:52 Speaker 03 Sorry, literally, traitor means that you have changed your allegiance from the United States to an enemy state, and that you do what you do with an effort to harm your own government and society. That's literally the opposite of what Snowden did. He, whether you agree with it or not, Snowden believes that he was acting on our behalf. Snowden believes that he was acting on behalf of democracy and on behalf of the citizen's right to understand what was being done in their name and done to them. And he explicitly
41:26 Speaker 03 Was looking to create reform in our own side, not to harm it.
41:30 Speaker 02 Right, which did happen, of course, which did happen in the wake of it.
41:33 Speaker 03 Right. Snowden does not like to talk about harms. I concede that there must have been some. But you have two very fundamental priorities of society that are colliding here as they often collide. I mean, sometimes, for example, maybe the economy and public health in this, in the time of coronavirus may pull you in opposite directions. It's also true that self-government and self-defense can pull you in opposite directions. If we know, then our enemies know. If we don't know, then we can't make basic decisions about how we want to run ourselves as a society. We can't make basic decisions about what we're willing to grant in terms of power to our government.
42:16 Speaker 03 And if the government is spying on us in secret, it is changing the nature of the relationship between governed and government in ways that citizens can't accept. And so government, I mean, I guess you could say Snowden did some harm to intelligence gathering, and he did some good, I think a great deal of good, to democracy. Snowden also did a great deal of good for internet security. Because, because of him, you have a vast transition from an unsecured internet to a secured internet.
42:57 Speaker 03 So that today, almost every website, you know, starts off with HTTPS, secure socket layers, encryption that makes it much safer to do your banking and your shopping and to secure your personal information and also to secure yourself against surveillance by any government.
43:19 Speaker 02 All right, well, let's talk about the risk. I would love you to. What harm do you think it did? I'm curious. You talked about it in the book, but some harms to intelligence gathering, but not to democracy. That's a very good way of putting it. What has changed in the gathering of information by intelligence agencies?
43:34 Speaker 03 Well, I think Snowden's disclosures and the countermeasures taken by large players on the internet, primarily the hardening of communication links, make it much harder for the NSA to collect everything now. It still has the ability to crack into just about any target in the world. It has the best hackers and an extraordinary infrastructure, extraordinary resources. And if the NSA says, "I'm going to come and surveil Kara," they're going to do it. There's almost no stopping them. There's hardly anyone in the world who can protect against a targeted attack.
44:16 Speaker 03 What Snowden made hard was collecting the whole bulk. And there is therefore going to be, there's going to be some intelligence that they could have gathered in the past that is harder for them to gather now.
44:28 Speaker 02 Right.
44:29 Speaker 03 There's just no, there's no getting around that. It's impossible for me to know what the harm is because the harm would itself be classified. And I don't have access to that now. It's impossible for the government to know itself what it, what it doesn't get.
44:42 Speaker 02 Yeah.
44:43 Speaker 03 That it might have got otherwise. So there has to be some harm there. I still would maintain that there is no intelligence official who would trade the access to information they have right now in the post Snowden era with what they had access to 10 years ago, 20 years ago, 30 years ago, or any other time in American history. The landscape of digital data is so vast, the ability to home in on any conversation or any database remotely from around the world is so great that they've never had anything like it.
45:23 Speaker 02 No, it's like a party. It's a party for them. It's an intelligence party in a lot of ways. So what is the current American surveillance state? Obviously, we've read a lot about China and the use of facial recognition and AI and what they're doing to the Uyghurs and everything. What is it here? How do you look at the American surveillance state in the United States? We are probably the, I mean, I've written this, we're the most surveilled people on the planet, and not just Americans, but across the globe because of cell phones. And, and a lot of it is, we decide to let that happen. But talk about what you consider to be the dangers of what's coming up, given this vast trove of data that people now have, intelligence officials especially have, to follow us and track us.
46:03 Speaker 03 Look, the American surveillance establishment is bound by law and under a legal structure. The problems have been that we didn't know what the law was. There is such a thing as secret law in this country, and that's a scary and dangerous thing. When I would write stories for the Washington Post about one or another's disclosure about the NSA, you would have people like Bob Litt come out, and he was the general counsel for the Director of National Intelligence. I'd say, every single thing in this story you describe, everything you describe here is lawful. It's done under color of law.
46:43 Speaker 03 And there is a great saying by an author named Michael Kinsley, that sometimes the scandal is what's legal, especially if you didn't know it was legal, especially if you had been led to believe by public statements that it wasn't legal. I mean, look, here's an example. The problem was dissimulation by the government. There was a famous provision of the USA Patriot Act, Section 215. People called it the library proviso, because people imagined that the government would be getting copies of people's library borrowing records and spy on them that way. But what it really said was, the government with a warrant could get access to any business
47:28 Speaker 03 record, any tangible thing. And the FBI, which made use of this power, would report every year, "Look, we only used this 21 times. We're doing it discreetly, proportionately, narrowly, and you don't have to worry about us abusing this power." Now, they're all secret, because they're all classified, but we're telling you the number. It was only 21 times this year. And then you find out, by inference from the documentation provided by Edward Snowden, that with 12 of those 21 warrants, they were obtaining a trillion telephone records. Right. You know, not a million or a billion, a trillion. That's with 12 out of the 21. And then you start to feel like you've been lied to. I mean, if your teenage daughter told you she had a party while you were out of town,
48:13 Speaker 03 but she only invited 12 people, no problem. You would be distressed and pissed off to find out that she actually had a trillion people attend.
48:22 Speaker 02 Right.
48:22 Speaker 03 You would feel you were lied to, and we were lied to.
48:25 Speaker 02 So what are you most worried about going forward? A lot of you talk about your own worries about being surveilled, about you being hacked. Is anybody safe? Or what are the big worries you have? Not just as a reporter, because you have a, you're operating in an area where you would become a target, I would assume. What do you think most people should be worried about? What are the top issues for the average citizen who is active on Facebook, active on Twitter, or any of these social networks, uses Amazon? Especially now during coronavirus, we're giving, we're using these digital services so heavily and yielding up so much information about ourselves.
49:04 Speaker 03 Well, you said earlier, and a lot of people say this, and I know you understand the nuances, but you said that we give so much information freely to these big companies just by carrying our phones around, or shopping, or making a posting on Facebook. And what hardly anyone understands is how much information is taken from us without our knowing it. What Facebook knows about you, only a small percentage of it is what you tell Facebook deliberately. Facebook collects thousands of different signals about you that come from your machine, that come from your behavior around the internet, that is surveilled by Facebook,
49:48 Speaker 03 Java applets that are placed on websites around the world, that come from your friends. I, for example, would never give Facebook my cellphone number.
49:58 Speaker 03 But I'm sure Facebook has, you know, 100 copies of it because they've persuaded... People who don't understand what they're doing to upload their address books to Facebook. So any number of my friends who know my cellphone number clicked the button without paying much attention that said, sure, take all my contacts, Facebook. And so now they know my cellphone number. I can't protect myself against that.
50:20 Speaker 02 So what is one to do? How do you look at the state of American surveillance? Is it just a continuous say? Because what I say is, I say, I agree with you that on the second point is that people don't realize quite how much they're taking, along with the stuff you know that they're taking. But we become these sort of cheap dates to internet companies in that we get a map or an app or a dating thing and they get everything else and including making money off of it. What should people be worried about from a government level and a consumer level?
50:51 Speaker 03 You know, there are a lot of people who say, first of all, I've got nothing to hide. Those people never really mean it. And if you can show them in any sort of granular way, how much is known about them, they are mortified and humiliated.
51:10 Speaker 02 Yep.
51:11 Speaker 03 And even if you think, even if you think that you have nothing to hide, and you're wrong about that, your friends and family have something to hide. Someone has told you that she's thinking of leaving her boyfriend. Someone's told you he's about to quit his job. Someone's told you that their kid has a drug problem. You are the keeper of other people's secrets in your digital space. And you're not entitled to behave as though you don't care about the privacy of those things. And it's very unclear what we can do about it. I mean, people have to care more. People have to demand more in terms of privacy. But I think there would actually have to be a huge change in the
51:52 Speaker 03 legal regime of information and property for our relationship with these companies to change. We don't own our data. And that's a legal construct. Someone decided we don't own our data.
52:05 Speaker 02 Right.
52:06 Speaker 03 But if someone decided that I own the data about me and no one can take it and sell it and And aggregate it without my permission. And if permission didn't just mean clicking a 15,000-word privacy policy, then this could all change very substantially. There's a gigantic, you know, multi-billion-dollar industry that depends on that not changing. So it would be, it's a heavy lift if we're going to make any progress here. But I don't know what else could do it.
52:37 Speaker 02 Well, there isn't going to be a privacy bill this year, for sure. At least, there's not going to be any kind of legislation to protect consumers. And then, lastly, what about our relation with government? How should we feel about that? We're already sort of ensconced with these tech companies as consumers who know so much about us. What should we worry about from government, from our own government and from other governments?
52:58 Speaker 03 We should worry about slippery slopes, I think. And we should worry about bad actors. So the slippery slope part is, you say, "We're going to collect information only about terrorists to stop terrorism episodes, to catch terrorist networks, for terrorism networks." And next thing you know, you're collecting every phone number from every American. That's literally what happened. You had what the Bush administration called the terrorist surveillance program, which really became a program to collect-
53:30 Speaker 02 The everybody.
53:31 Speaker 03 All the metadata on everybody. And then, it turns out that they don't just use it for counterterrorism operations. Or the Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act allows something called the PRISM program. And it turns out that they're collecting a lot of American data that way. And it turns out that they're allowed to use it for ordinary criminal investigations. Or what if they start using it for drug investigations?
53:54 Speaker 02 Mm-hmm.
53:55 Speaker 03 Or what if they start using it for any other investigation? This tends to be a one-way valve.
54:00 Speaker 02 Right.
54:01 Speaker 03 Somebody says, "Well, we have this big pile of data. It would be very valuable in order to stop this or that, or improve this or that."
54:06 Speaker 02 Yeah, they always find a reason.
54:07 Speaker 03 They find a reason. And especially when it happens in secret. There's no defense.
54:12 Speaker 02 Mm-hmm.
54:13 Speaker 03 That's one thing, the slippery slope. The other part is the bad actors. You have, within living memory, you know, President Nixon, who used the resources of the state for domestic espionage, for political espionage, and to punish political enemies. You have, you have plenty of examples of things that Donald Trump has at least tried to do. You have- NYPD spying on mosques. You have the FBI spying on the private life of Martin Luther King because he is a dangerous and effective Negro. That was their words, and inviting him to commit suicide if he wanted to prevent the disclosure of tapes of his affairs with other women.
54:58 Speaker 03 Bad people sometimes get their hands on the levers of power. It happens in this country, just as it does somewhere else. And so you have to worry about the potential of certain kinds of surveillance machinery of being misused. There are some machines that are so dangerous that maybe we shouldn't build them.
55:15 Speaker 02 Okay. Unless, I'd be remiss on our last question. What about in the age of coronavirus, where they want to do contact tracing, where there's going to be, that they're looking to collect a lot of data, although that seems mostly to be not working out so well due to incompetence. But would you worry about that idea of Apple and Google building a contact tracing app? The government having all this information about you, it leaking elsewhere? How do you look at, do you think people will be more willing to give up information?
55:42 Speaker 03 So contact tracing is really important. It's one of the fundamental ways that we defend ourselves against a highly transmissible disease. Testing, tracing, quarantine, and so on. And contact tracing has always been done, and it's been done by hand, by interviews. Apple and Google have come into this project with admirable openness, I think. And they have designed their API to be privacy protecting. So it does not send data about individuals back to some central server. It does not track location. It tracks proximity using Bluetooth of devices.
56:26 Speaker 03 And so the design of it is intended to protect privacy. I think it is nonetheless open to all kinds of abuse and of unclear actual value. I mean, this strikes me as being a tech project that tech people initiated, saying, we have a cool idea for something that we can do that would help you. It's not clear to me that public health people actually want or need this tool. And it may very well be that to make it more effective would make it much more privacy invading. It's also Easy to come up with scenarios in which someone could game or troll the system in very damaging ways.
57:07 Speaker 02 Yeah.
57:07 Speaker 03 For example, it relies on self-reporting.
57:11 Speaker 03 So of course you have people who who will refuse to report themselves to be positive, or refuse to use the thing at all. But you could also have people who would pretend to be positive. In order to, let's suppose you go into a meeting or an encounter with your competitors.
57:30 Speaker 03 Your competitors are all gathered together in one place. And you report yourself to be positive. Now all those people have to be quarantined. There are worse ways that I've heard of that I'm not going to broadcast here, that the system could be could be abused. That sound to me is that they'd be very damaging.
57:49 Speaker 02 Absolutely. All right, so finishing up, it's seven years, I guess it's 2013 when the when this information was leaked out, since this has been leaked out. If you had to pick one thing that you think good came out of this, of what he did, and one thing that you are worried about, the thing that that you are focused on going forward, what would those two things be?
58:12 Speaker 03 I think the good thing was just far greater consciousness of and a far greater investment in electronic security. The Internet was an open book, not only to governments, but also to hackers and criminals in 2013 in ways that it just is not nearly so much today. The average person has a great deal more digital security now than they had then, and they have that because of Snowden, because of the the forces he set in motion. And I think the same goes for the public debate about the the boundaries of intelligence in a free society. The thing that I worry about is that
58:55 Speaker 03 there is so much economic momentum and power in the private sector side that is in favor of greater and greater and more granular surveillance, that it is
59:10 Speaker 03 I don't know. I don't know what kind of society we're moving into, but I worry about it a lot. I worry a lot about the capacity to be tracked at all times in my behavior, in my location, in my associations. I think it is dystopic in its implications, and I don't know how to stop it.
59:31 Speaker 02 And unaccountable, unaccountable.
59:34 Speaker 03 It is absolutely unaccountable. And you're right, week after week, I listen to your pod.
59:38 Speaker 02 I go on.
59:39 Speaker 03 You are absolutely right to hold people's feet to the fire on this, and I hope you keep doing it.
59:43 Speaker 02 Yeah, it's not going to matter. Elon Musk just broke rules in Alameda County. His factory's opening. Memo to everybody, they have as much power as they want, and we have to figure out a way.
59:52 Speaker 03 They're scared of you, Kara.
59:55 Speaker 02 Not really. Me and Elizabeth Warren, yeah, we're a tough pair. The only thing I can think of that scares them is Vice President Elizabeth Warren, but we'll see how that goes. Anyway, Bart, thank you so much. It's a really terrific book. It's very important. I urge you to read it. It's an important issue. Edward Snowden is a lot more complex than people realize, and I think Bart's done a great job. It's also a very funny book. I think you'll find it. I find a lot of your going back and forth really funny. And it's a really important thing to think about going forward and to think about what it meant without moving into our partisan sides on these issues, because it's super complex. And Bart does a great job in breaking it down. His book is called Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the American Surveillance State. Bart, thanks for coming on the show.
1:00:38 Speaker 03 Thank you so much for having me.
1:00:39 Speaker 02 All right. You can follow me on Twitter at Kara Swisher. My executive producer, Erica Anderson, is at Erica America. My producer, Eric Johnson, is at HeyHeyESJ. Bart, where can people find you online?
1:00:49 Speaker 03 Twitter, at BartonGelman, and BartonGelman.com.
1:00:53 Speaker 02 All right. And if you'd like to, how is the online book tour going?
1:00:57 Speaker 03 It's very interesting. It's about to start, but there are all kinds of bookstores and public events, like New York Public Library, that we're going to have in-person events. They're now switching to virtual, and they're expecting to have actually more people attend on the virtual side than would have come in person. I wish I could sign the books that way, but I can't.
1:01:20 Speaker 02 Yeah, well, that's all right. You can someday, someday.
1:01:23 Speaker 03 I'm hoping, I'm hoping we really can get some reach with this.
1:01:25 Speaker 02 Well, cool. Anyway, thank you so much for coming on. If you liked this episode, we really appreciate if you shared it with a friend and make sure to check out our other podcasts, Pivot, Reset, Recode Media, and Land of the Giants. Just search them in your podcasting app of choice or tap a link in the show notes. Thanks also to our editor, Joel Robey. Special thanks to Squadcast.fm. Thanks for listening to this episode of Recode Decode. I'll be back here on Wednesday. Tune in then.
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