Pod Insights Decoder Inside the global battle over chip manufacturing About this episode A few weeks ago, President Biden was in the Netherlands, where he asked the Dutch government to restrict export from a company called ASML to China. ASML is the only company in the world that makes a specific machine needed to make the most advanced chips. Apple couldn’t make iPhone chips without this one machine from the Netherlands’ biggest company. ASML doesn’t just shape the Dutch economy—it shapes the entire world economy. How did that happen?
Chris Miller, Tufts professor and author of Chip War: The Fight For The World’s Most Critical Technology walked me through a lot of this, along with some deep dives into geopolitics and the absolutely fascinating chip manufacturing process. This one has everything: foreign policy, high powered lasers, hotshot executives, monopolies, the fundamental limits of physics, and, of course, Texas. Here we go.
Links:
US issues sweeping restrictions on chip sales to China
Japan and the Netherlands join US with tough chip controls on China
Pat Gelsinger came back to turn Intel around — here’s how it’s going
Transcript:
https://www.theverge.com/e/23342471
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Decoder is a production of The Verge and part of the Vox Media Podcast Network.
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1:02 Speaker 02 Hello and welcome to Decoder. I'm Neil Appetel, editor in chief of The Verge, and Decoder is my show about big ideas and other problems. Today, I'm talking to Chris Miller. He's an associate professor at Tufts University and the author of the book Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology. Now, I read Chris's book on the recommendation of a good friend. I gotta say, I was floored by it. It traces the history of the chip industry through the lens of international relations. On a show like Decoder, we often think of companies like Intel and AMD and Nvidia as individual competitors. But Chris's book describes the chip industry as a massively complex global manufacturing system with intricate dependencies, major centralized points of control, and significant implications for how great powers
1:46 Speaker 02 like the United States and China maintain relations. It's no accident that the most advanced chip fabs on the planet are in Taiwan. The government there specifically invested in chips to guarantee economic and military support from the United States. But there are other weirder aspects to the global nature of the chip business. For example, a few weeks ago, President Biden was in the Netherlands, where he asked the Dutch government to restrict exports from a company called ASML to China. ASML makes advanced chip lithography. It's the only company in the world that makes a specific machine you need to make the most advanced chips. ASML is also the biggest company in the Netherlands. Did you know that? It's not just that Apple couldn't make iPhone chips without this one machine from ASML.
2:30 Speaker 02 The entire Dutch economy is shaped by this one machine from ASML. The entire world economy is shaped by this one machine from ASML. How did that happen? On the flip side, here in the United States, Intel just posted one of its worst quarters ever with plunging sales and a dire forecast for next quarter. We've talked to Intel CEO Pat Gelsinger on Decoder before. He was brought in to reset the company and in particular, compete with Taiwan's TSMC, which is a manufacturing powerhouse. Intel's very existence and ability to compete with TSMC is a big deal for the United States, which just passed the Chips and Science Act and desperately wants to bring more of the chip supply chain back into the country and away from China.
3:15 Speaker 02 So how did we get to a place where Intel is the country's main strategic option and also failing? Chris walked me through a lot of this, along with some deep dives into the absolutely fascinating chip manufacturing process. This episode has everything: foreign policy, high-powered lasers, hotshot executives, monopolies, the fundamental limits of physics, and of course, Texas. Okay, Chris Miller, author of the book Chip War. Here we go. Chris Miller, you're a professor at the Fletcher School at Tufts University.
3:57 Speaker 02 You're also the author of Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology. Welcome to Decoder.
4:02 Speaker 03 Thanks for having me.
4:03 Speaker 02 So we're here because of a news story recently that struck me as indicative of all kinds of things happening in the tech world and in the chip industry writ large, which is that President Biden is trying to pressure the Dutch government into... Not shipping chip making equipment to China. And that seems at first glance, a very surprising geopolitical situation to be in. Can you explain what's going on there?
4:29 Speaker 03 So right now, the US is trying to cut off China's ability to make advanced semiconductors. On the judgment that advanced semiconductors are critical to training AI systems. And so if you can't get access to the most advanced chips, you can't make meaningful advances in AI. And to make an advanced semiconductor, you need to buy machine tools from just a handful of companies around the world that have the precision capabilities to manufacture these tools. And one of the most important of these companies is a firm called ASML, which is based in the Netherlands and which has unique capabilities that no one else in the world can replicate to produce a type of machine called a EUV lithography tool, without which making an advanced chip is simply impossible.
5:10 Speaker 02 Well, just looking into this, I had no idea that ASML was the biggest company in the Netherlands. In many ways, it's critical to the economy of the Netherlands, which again, I think most people don't realize that chip making is that central to the economy of that country. And then reading your book, the process of developing EUV started here in the United States at Intel, and then it got completely away from Intel. How did it end up that a Dutch company owns this piece of critical chip making technology?
5:42 Speaker 03 The concept of lithography, which is the process of using light to create patterns on silicon wafers, was invented in the US in the late 1950s and deployed in the chip industry from the earliest days of the first semiconductors. And the chip industry was founded in the US, in Texas and Silicon Valley. And so the early users of lithography were largely American firms. And in the 1980s and 1990s, the industry was trying to move to a more advanced type of lithography called EUV lithography, extreme ultraviolet, referring to the type of light that's in these systems. A lot of the research was funded by Intel and a couple of other US chip firms and done in US national labs, which had the types of equipment and testing capabilities that
6:25 Speaker 03 were needed to actually make EUV light at the requis- Wavelength possible, but there was no US firm that could commercialize this equipment. And so even though the science and technology was largely done in California, ASML was a company that already made older generation lithography tools and had the capabilities to turn the science into a mass manufactured device. And so that set ASML on the trajectory where it is today, the only producer in the world of machine tools that can produce EUV light and use it to produce semiconductors.
6:57 Speaker 02 Can you walk us through the basics of EUV and how that makes chips?
7:01 Speaker 03 So first off, on what is lithography? If you want to make patterns on silicon wafers, you do so by shining light through masks. And so the mask will block light in certain areas, let it through another areas. And that's how you get a pattern in a miniaturized version on a chip. And advanced chips today have millions or often billions of tiny circuits carved into them. They're often the size of a virus or even smaller. So you really need ultra precise carving capabilities. EUV lithography uses light at a wavelength of 13.5 nanometers, ultra small light, far smaller than the wavelength of visible light. And you need really small wavelength light because the circuits you're carving are very, very tiny. They themselves measure just a couple of nanometers, often in dimension.
7:46 Speaker 03 So producing this type of light is really hard because it's right next to the X-ray spectrum. And so production of it is complicated. And then the development of mirrors to reflect it is also very difficult. So here's how the process works. A ball of tin falls at a rate of several hundred miles an hour through a vacuum. It measures around 30 millionths of a meter in diameter. It's pulverized by two shots from one of the most powerful lasers ever deployed in a commercial device. It explodes into a plasma measuring several times hotter than the surface of the sun, several hundred thousand degrees Fahrenheit. This plasma emits EUV light at exactly the right wavelength, 13.5 nanometers, which
8:27 Speaker 03 is then collected via a series of about a dozen mirrors, which themselves are the flattest mirrors humans have ever produced. The mirrors reflect the light at just the right angle so that it hits the silicon wafer and carves the circuits on the chips that make your iPhone possible.
8:43 Speaker 02 And that's how you get to an A13 chip?
8:45 Speaker 03 That's right.
8:46 Speaker 02 TSMC has to buy this machine from ASML, which has to assemble all these components from the flattest mirrors ever produced to the most powerful lasers ever deployed in a commercial setting. To balls of tin. I imagine the balls of tin are somewhat easy to acquire. It has and then has to make that machines and then it sells it to TSMC, which then uses it to make iPhone chips or whatever else. Does ASML just like wash its hands of this machine when it sells it to TSMC? It this sounds like a very complicated thing to operate.
9:17 Speaker 03 It's extraordinarily complicated. Just shipping the machine alone takes multiple 747s to move. They cost $150 million apiece and there are ASML staff onsite next to the machine for the entire lifespan of these tools. ASML is the only company that knows how to service them when something goes wrong. They're the only company with the spare parts in case something breaks. You just can't operate them without ASML staff and they're so sophisticated and so precise that learning how to operate them in a mass production facility requires not only the semiconductor companies like TSMC to have done a lot of research into using them, but it requires a deep partnership with ASML because they've got really unique knowledge about how the optics work, how the light reflects and refracts and
9:59 Speaker 03 in different contexts. So you need to partner very, very deeply with ASML to understand how to actually use these machines in mass manufacturing.
10:07 Speaker 02 It sounds like ASML has a monopoly on this fab equipment. Do they sell to other vendors? Can Intel buy these machines? Can other foundries, can Samsung buy these machines?
10:19 Speaker 03 Yes, ASML sells to customers all over the world, except in China, which we can discuss, but there's only a couple of companies that can really plausibly use an UV machine. So it's TSMC, Samsung, Intel, and a couple of memory chip makers as well, SK, Hynek, Micron. But there's very few other potential customers out there because the price tag is so high and the level of precision manufacturing skill needed to actually make use of them is really so niche and unique that ASML knows it will only ever have a customer base measuring a half dozen or maybe at most a dozen firms.
10:52 Speaker 02 Why doesn't ASML just make the chips itself?
10:55 Speaker 03 Well, ASML has no idea how to make chips.
10:59 Speaker 03 They're an extraordinary firm, but one company can only do so much. And this machine is just one of multiple ultra-complex machines needed to make chips. So in addition to shining light at exactly the right wavelength through this really complicated optics, you also need different machines that can lay down thin films of material, just a couple of atoms thick, or etch canyons in the silicon just a couple of atoms wide. And these machines are produced by different companies that have themselves unique capabilities about which ASML knows nothing and these companies know a little about lithography. And the chipmakers themselves also have unique capabilities. TSMC is better than anyone, including its suppliers, at using the machines to actually effectively make chips. You really need a partnership of all of these different firms, the toolmakers like ASML,
11:44 Speaker 03 the chipmakers like TSMC, to actually produce effective semiconductors.
11:49 Speaker 02 Yeah, it feels like people can argue about whether Milwaukee or DeWalt makes the best power tools, but they don't make you a carpenter. It's like, is that kind of the vibe here? Like, you can buy the tool, but you actually have to know how to use it?
12:01 Speaker 03 That's absolutely right. And knowing how to use it is a process that not only requires, starting with a PhD in electrical engineering or materials science, but really requires years of working with the tools. The process of developing an EUV tool took 30 years. And that just gives you a sense of the scale of precision that was needed to actually harness it.
12:21 Speaker 02 I want to come to that because that history with Intel is really interesting. We actually had Pat Gelsinger, the CEO of Intel, on the show recently. I asked him about EUV. We can get to his answer and why he thinks it was dumb that Intel didn't win this race. But I want to just come back to where we started, which is President Biden is in the Netherlands and he's pressuring the prime minister to restrict exports of ASML devices to China. You said there's only a handful of companies in the world that can use these machines. None of the companies you named are Chinese companies. Why is this a concern that the Dutch government will allow exports to China?
12:56 Speaker 03 If you have access to advanced chip making tools, like those produced by ASML and this small number of other advanced toolmakers in the world, you've got a reasonably good shot at making advanced chips. Now, it's still not guaranteed you can do it, but the tools are one of the key choke points that only a couple of companies can produce and that none of them are produced in China. And so the US is thinking about next generation military and intelligence systems, which will rely increasingly on artificial intelligence. And AI systems are trained in vast data centers, which are full of sophisticated chips like GPUs, which are the type of chips that are used to train AI systems. And if you can't mass manufacture cutting-edge chips, you can't get the data center capacity that you need to train AI systems. And so that's what the US is ultimately trying to accomplish,
13:41 Speaker 03 trying to stop China from developing advanced data centers. But it's using the machine tools as the choke point, preventing US firms, but also trying to prevent Japanese and Dutch firms from transferring this equipment to China. There are a number of Chinese firms that have tried to become advanced enough to buy ASML's EUV tools. SMIC, China's leading foundry, is the best example of this. But the Dutch have been imposing controls on EUV exports for a couple of years, not letting ASML ship these tools to China. Now, the US wants the Dutch to impose controls on a broader set of lithography tools, not only the most advanced, but also the second most advanced set of tools. And that's something that is a new ask of the US government
14:26 Speaker 03 and is requiring pretty extensive negotiations and discussions between the US and the Netherlands about whether this will be allowed or not.
14:33 Speaker 02 What's the argument for and what's the argument against?
14:35 Speaker 03 The argument for is that even the second generation most advanced tools can be used to produce some pretty sophisticated chips, which is certainly true. The argument against is that it will be expensive for ASML and other companies to lose market share because Chinese customers have been investing very, very heavily in chip making capacity subsidized very heavily by the Chinese government over the past decade. And for many chip toolmakers, China's become a really important market for non-cutting-edge tools. And so this will be a costly stop if the Netherlands implements these types of export controls that restrict not only the most cutting-edge, but also the second generation most cutting-edge tools. The cost will be in the billions of dollars and euros for leading toolmakers.
15:18 Speaker 02 You're describing kind of an escalating regime of sanctions against China in terms of making chips, in terms of technology transfer from United States companies to Chinese companies, in terms of other national companies to Chinese companies. Is that all of a piece? Is that a strategy? Or is that the Trump administration was mad at China, so they imposed sanctions against Huawei? And now the Biden administration has woken up to the chip shortage because of the pandemic? And they're like, we need a national chip foundry. Okay, it's Intel, do something in Ohio. Here's some other stuff. Is there coherence to all of these moves? Or is it just reactive?
15:54 Speaker 03 No, I think there really is a coherent strategy. And I would differentiate what's happening now from Trump's trade war on the tariffs. It's really a separate track of discussions. I would also differentiate it from the semiconductor shortages. The shortages were not about which country is capable of producing the most advanced chips. And what you find is that inside the national security bureaucracy, on the NSC and the intelligence agencies, over the past seven or so years, there's been an increasing concern that China's making real advances in chip-making capabilities, just as it's becoming clearer and clearer the ways in which advanced chip capabilities, and especially the types of chips that go into data centers, will be critical in training next-generation AI systems.
16:37 Speaker 03 And because of that, from the late Obama administration all the way up to the present, including the Trump administration, there's been a fair amount of coherence in terms of the policy with regard to restricting China's access to advanced chip technologies. And it's something that's been done not only by the US, but Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, a number of different countries have taken steps to impose new investment screening mechanisms or restrict technology or knowledge transfer to China when it comes to advanced semiconductors.
17:03 Speaker 02 Does China have the ability to catch up on its own? Or does it actually need the technology transfer, the equipment that would otherwise be sold to them?
17:12 Speaker 03 Well, this is the big question. US strategy will succeed if China can't catch up on its own. And the US is betting that the answer is China can't catch up, or at least can't catch up anytime soon. But there's some uncertainty around this. It's just hard to predict whether China will find ways to produce some of the necessary technology domestically, or find ways to split apart the Western coalition and acquire some pieces of tech from countries that are unwilling to follow US lead on export controls. My best guess would be that the controls that the US and also Japan are pretty clearly going to impose will be really problematic for China over the next couple of years, and potentially over the next 10 years or so in terms of making advanced semiconductors. But the more countries that are on board with these controls, and that's why the Dutch
17:57 Speaker 03 are so important, the more likely these controls are to work.
18:00 Speaker 02 How do we even end up in a situation where there's one Dutch company that we have to get a hold of in order to make sure China doesn't gain these capabilities? Again, in a functional market, there'd be, especially for something like chips, which are so important to everything, there'd be multiple companies with multiple different approaches to making chips at the scale that modern chips are required to be made at the process nodes that we operate at now. But instead, there's just one, and it's in the Netherlands. How did that happen?
18:29 Speaker 03 Well, across the chip industry, what you've found over the last couple of years is that there's been a real trend to concentration with, in many cases, just a handful, and in some cases, just one company capable of producing the types of software, the types of machinery involved. And there's two reasons for that. One is that many parts of the chip making process are just brutally capital intensive. It's extraordinarily expensive to make this machinery, and that really disincentivizes competition, because a new entrant has to spend billions of dollars before they can see if their product even works. That's one reason. A second reason is that the types of knowledge and expertise you need to produce these types of tools is something you can't study in the abstract. You've got to hone it over the course of your manufacturing.
19:12 Speaker 03 There's no amount of training in a PhD program that's going to let you understand how these systems work when they're actually manufactured. You've got to have your hands in the machine. Tweaking it over time. And that means that people who are working on these tools in companies have really unique knowledge that it's hard for anyone else to acquire. And that provides a really strong moat around those companies because there's no straightforward way for anyone who's not working at these companies to develop the requisite knowledge. So the combination of capital intensivity plus really unique knowledge makes it very difficult to set up any sort of competing firms.
19:46 Speaker 02 So I'm going to quote to you from Pat Gelsinger when he was on Decoder a few months ago. I asked him about EUV because Intel famously bet against EUV and now they're gonna buy machines from ASML, put them in the United States in Ohio and try to build next generation chips. So I said, what happened with EUV? And here's his answer. He said,
20:05 Speaker 04 We were betting against it because of some of the other, you know, we had taken a lot of risk in Intel 10, you know, and we were, you know, hey, we don't need EUV. We'll go to advanced quad patterning of the lithography. We were doing other things to avoid needing EUV. Those things were panning out. You know, at a minimum, we should have had a parallel program on a UV. I says, huh, if we get this wrong, you know, if we get some of this quad patterning and some of the other techniques that we were doing, you know, and self aligning wrong, hey, we should have had a program, but we didn't. You know, we were betting against it. How stupid could we be?
20:38 Speaker 02 Now, in hindsight, the answer is you were extremely stupid. And he's the new guy and he's fixing it. And I think that's why he's allowed to say that they were being stupid. Were they actually stupid in that moment? Was it correct to say, oh, you can bet against EUV and maybe something else will pan out? Or is that just Intel being run by a series of accountants instead of engineers and now they have an engineer?
20:59 Speaker 03 Well, in defense of the accounts, I think you could say the following.
21:04 Speaker 02 I think that's the first time anyone has ever said in defense of accounts. But by all means.
21:09 Speaker 03 So EUV was a technology that was supposed to be production ready a decade before it actually emerged. The development process had repeated delays, billion dollar cost overruns. And for a long time in the late 2000s and early 2010s, it seemed like something that might completely fail. And so up until 2015, it was really very uncertain whether or not this would ever work. And if it did work, whether it would be remotely cost competitive. And so in that context of uncertainty, you can understand why there are people at Intel who wanted to bet against the EUV and bet instead on what they called quad patterning, which means using existing lithography machines that everyone knows works and just do more lithography
21:52 Speaker 03 runs to carve ever more precise circuits. That was obviously going to be more expensive than doing fewer runs of lithography because you have more steps. But everyone knew the machines worked. And so that was the low risk option in some ways was to try that. In hindsight, it didn't work. It was a terrible bet, but you can understand why they took that bet. I think there was, though, to point some blame back at the accountants, I think there was too much risk aversion and an unwillingness to, as Gelsinger said, to prepare multiple pathways to the R and D and see which one worked. And that was probably a bit of cost cutting that seemed wise at the time in terms of spending resources efficiently. But in hindsight, it had a tremendous cost for Intel because it left them unprepared when quad
22:35 Speaker 03 patterning turned out to be inefficient and in some cases completely incapable of producing the precision that Intel needed.
22:42 Speaker 02 And that's why Intel has been delayed behind TSMC at every successive process node is because their techniques just weren't working out?
22:49 Speaker 03 That's part of the reason. I think it's a complicated answer, but certainly the delay in EUV is an important part.
22:55 Speaker 02 And so now Intel is saying, okay, we'll do EUV. Just walk me through that process. They've got a big competitor at TSMC that is obviously embedded with ASML, is very good because its business model is just manufacturing chips. All of its energy, it's focused at manufacturing chips. Intel is at a place now where, you know, I even asked Pat about this. I said, are you, do you think of yourself as a national champion of the United States? You're it. You're what the Biden administration has in this moment in terms of a large chip making concern that can Insulate the United States from the global supply chain. And he was like, yeah, I don't know about that, but he's got to step it up and become a foundry. That's what he wants to do. He said he would put AMD, an AMD logo on the side of an Intel fab if AMD wants to manufacture chips there. But he's got to go and buy an EUV machine from ASML.
23:40 Speaker 02 He's got to learn how to make ARM chips, all while developing the next generation of Intel's own x86 chips. Is that possible? Does that seem like we're putting too much pressure on this one company?
23:52 Speaker 03 Well, I think there's no doubt he's got a challenging job. Now he's, now we see an impressive guy. So if anyone can do it, he can do it.
23:59 Speaker 02 Yeah, he was, no lack of confidence from Pat on that.
24:03 Speaker 03 Well, no, I think there's, there's no doubt that he's turned the culture around at Intel. But I think you're right to outline the challenges that, that Intel faces on the process technology manufacturing side, on the design side, and on the business model side with creating this new foundry business. It's going to be hard. I think tackling each of these three challenges simultaneously is the only choice he's got because Intel has to deal with all of them. But you're right to say that it's, it's a tall order ahead of them. And I think a lot depends for the United States on whether or not Intel succeeds.
24:35 Speaker 02 The reason I ask about Intel specifically is because it is the only choice. There's not another scaled American producer of chips. There's a little bit of TSMC activity here. There's a little bit of Samsung activity here, but it's not their leading edge process nodes. TSMC actually hasn't even really started at scale yet. I think they're going to start in Arizona. Intel's what we got. And it feels like if they were much more successful, the national security conversation, the supply chain conversation, the export control conversation might be very different. But because Intel is where it's at in this moment of pretty dramatic transformation. It has downstream impacts on how we're dealing with China.
25:18 Speaker 03 I think that's right. I think Intel is of the three leading firms in producing processor chips, Intel is the one that would naturally invest in the US because it's home based in the US. I think it's also worth noting, though, that Intel doesn't have an existing foundry business in the US. And so in terms of building up foundry capacity in the US, we're starting from a pretty low base across the board. Samsung has a facility, Global Foundries has facilities that are not the most leading edge, but have some impressive capabilities and some meaningful scale as well. But in terms of building up scale and foundry, everyone is starting from a pretty basic starting point. And so in some ways, that's why the US is probably going to end up betting not solely on one firm, but actually
25:59 Speaker 03 on all three, on Intel, on TSMC, and on Samsung, trying to get all of them to invest more in the US and see which one is able to develop the biggest facilities, the most functional business model in the US, see who wins the race.
26:12 Speaker 02 And that's like a very American way of doing it, right? It's like we're to subsidize the creation of a market and then whoever wins, wins. But don't you kind of just end up it, someone's going to win the race and then we have another weird monopoly in the United States? Is there any thought to actually what you need is diversification at every level of the supply chain?
26:30 Speaker 03 Well, the challenge is that diversification is very expensive. If you want to pay for additional capacity that you're not going to use in the chip industry, you're going to spend a ton of money. Just a single new cutting edge chip making facility costs 20 or 25 billion dollars and it's cutting edges for a couple of years. I don't think there's really a lot of appetite in the US for undertaking the tremendous capital expenditure that you need to build surplus capacity. At the margin, we're going to get some through the CHIPS Act, but we're not going to get a ton of surplus capacity. And so we need companies that are going to have functional business models after we help them get off the ground with their foundry businesses in the US. And that's why I think it does make sense to bet on multiple companies and see which ones are able to produce that. I don't think
27:13 Speaker 03 it's necessarily the case so that we're going to end up with one company winning and the others losing. It could well be that we end up with multiple commercially viable foundries with capacity in the US and that would be a great outcome. There's no necessary reason why this particular market has to end up with one dominant firm and others far behind.
27:34 Speaker 02 We need to take a break, but when we come back, we talk about Moore's Law in an episode about chips. It's bound to come up.
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28:44 Speaker 02 Before the break, we were talking about the CHIPS and Science Act helping to boost foundry operations in the United States. Is there any thought to investment beyond the foundry players? Hey, we should fund a competitor to ASML. Hey, we should look for the next technology beyond EUV and have the government subsidize that so we can diversify that layer. Because again, right now, we're having this conversation and President Biden is like walking around in clogs being like, please don't sell this machine to China.
29:11 Speaker 03 Well, I think when it comes to should we have a competitor to ASML and advanced lithography? I think the answer is that the cost benefit there just doesn't play out. I think we're likely to get the Dutch implementing controls that are pretty similar to US controls. Over the next couple of months, I think we'll see that be the result of these conversations. I think there's not much supply risk with the Netherlands. Nobody's worried about the Netherlands not shipping to US firms. And I think the cost of setting up a alternative lithography firm would be very expensive. Because again, ASML has unique capabilities that they've built up over 30 years. It would be very hard to replicate that or to build a competitor. So I think our production and our R and D dollars are much better spent elsewhere. But I think when you talk about Next generation lithography and next generation tools.
29:56 Speaker 03 That's a great place to invest. And I think if you look at the way the Commerce Department is planning to spend the CHIPS Act money. What you'll find is that three quarters of the funds are going to go to incentivizing more manufacturing. But an additional 25% is going to go to funding R and D. And part of that will go to the next generation tools, including potentially next generation lithography systems, which will be needed in five or 10 years' time.
30:19 Speaker 02 What are those next generation lithography systems?
30:22 Speaker 03 Well, ASML itself is planning two further generations of EUV tools. Right now, they've got basic EUV. In three or so years, they're going to have what they call
30:32 Speaker 02 Wait, the thing you described with the ball of tin falling down the thing and being hit with the lasers and producing plasma hotter than the sun? And then the flattish, that's basic EUV.
30:41 Speaker 03 That's basic. More is to come. So the next generation is going to be called high numerical aperture EUV, which is going to have more sophisticated optics. That will let you carve more precise chips. So those machines are supposed to be available in three or so years. They're going to cost twice as much as the the basic, if you will, EUV tools. And then beyond that, there's R and D underway for what ASML calls hyper numerical aperture. So even more specific optics, which it's unclear if it'll work. It's a decade away from production, but that's where R and D already is happening. And that's what we need if we're going to make smaller and smaller transistors on more and more sophisticated chips.
31:21 Speaker 02 So that smaller and smaller transistors, you have a chapter in this in the book. I'm sure actually Decoder listeners are very familiar with this concept of Moore's law, which is just a prediction that the chip industry will double the density of transistors on a chip every year. We are already talking about having to fire lasers at a ball of tin through the world's flattish mirrors and then building hyper specific optics to make them even smaller. Is there a limit? Like, it feels I feel dumb being like, is there a limit to Moore's Law? Because anyone could have said that at any time in the past 40 years and been proven a fool. But we are talking now on the level of atoms. Is there a limit that the chip industry sees? Okay, we're not going to get past the level of individual atoms.
32:03 Speaker 03 So at some point, the answer is yes, but we're not talking about individual atoms yet. We're talking about layers of materials measured in individual atoms. But transistors themselves have lots of atoms in them, even at their current microscopic scale. And I think we've got a pretty clear line of sight, at least through 2030 or so, in the existing plans of firms like TSMC and Intel, as to how they're going to keep shrinking transistors, stacking them on top of each other, using more tricks to get more of them on chips. Beyond 2030 or so, it's harder to say, but it's always been hard to look too far into the future. So I don't know how meaningful.
32:38 Speaker 02 History says the appropriate prediction is they'll figure it out, right? I mean, that is why it's called Moore's Law. It's just at some point, you're you're running out of things to even measure. You're running out of units, like Intel had to move to angstroms instead of nanometers. Maybe that was some branding, but they definitely did it. The reason I ask in this context is we're talking about limiting advanced chip making equipment to China. We're talking about the next generation of GPUs or other AI acceleration chips. 2030 is tomorrow on the scale of industrial policy, on the scale of foreign policy. If the roadmaps of advancements in chip making, and even in 2040, that's still kind of tomorrow on the scale of industrial policy.
33:20 Speaker 02 Isn't it inevitable that China will catch up, even if they're restricted in all these ways? Are we just buying time? Or are we actually creating a durable, sustaining advantage?
33:30 Speaker 03 Well, I think it's inevitable that China catches up to the current status quo at some point. When that happens, whether that's in 2027 or 2035, I don't know. But I think it's it's not going to be in 2024. It's it's it's multiple years out. Will China ever catch up to the cutting edge? You know, I'm not sure that the answer to that question is yes, even if Moore's
33:52 Speaker 02 But I'm saying if the cutting, yeah, if Moore's law expires, right? If the cutting edge becomes fixed.
33:57 Speaker 03 Well, it depends on what we mean when we say Moore's law expires. So at some point, it will be impossible to shrink transistors further. But that doesn't necessarily mean that the computing power you can get out of an individual chip will necessarily come to a halt because you can package them in different ways. You can put memory closer to the processing power. You can improve your interconnects. You can put photonics on a chip. There's lots of different techniques that are, in many cases, just in their infancy, that are creating new ways to get more computing power out of chips. And all of those will require both creative design and really precise machine tools to make. So even if you were to tell me transistors won't shrink by a single nanometer after 2030, I would still say that we're going to get more computing power out of a square
34:39 Speaker 03 inch of silicon well throughout the 2030s and beyond, using all of these other techniques. And so if you take this kind of most expansive view of Moore's law and say all the different things you can do to tweak a chip to get more out of it, I think there's a really long runway that goes well beyond 2040 in terms of the things we can do to produce more computing power. And so for that reason, I would be pretty skeptical of the thesis that we're ever going to hit a brick wall.
35:02 Speaker 02 When I think about the three companies that are doing their best at pushing computing power forward for a given chip, it's Apple, it's Nvidia, to some extent AMD, maybe it's three and a half companies, and then it's TSMC, which is the manufacturer for those two and a half companies there. Apple's really good at packaging, they're really good at optimizing their software for their own hardware, they're really good at pushing the limits of ARM, Nvidia, obviously the leader in GPUs, AMD, less of a jump, I think, over the average Intel chip, but doing better, just because they're using TSMC's manufacturing capabilities to improve their battery life to performance ratio. I look at those three companies, three and a half companies, and I think, okay, what
35:47 Speaker 02 they're dependent on is TSMC. If TSMC was not able to push forward manufacturing, their techniques for building, designing better chips would actually be for naught, right? They're wholly dependent on TSMC, which is in turn wholly dependent on ASML. What is that relationship like? Does Tim Cook wake up in the morning worried about Dutch restrictions on ASML exports? Or is he a TSMC customer? Or is that just an API where he places an order and the chips comes out?
36:17 Speaker 03 You know, I think most of TSMC's customers have gotten used to the fact that TSMC has an extraordinary track record in managing their own supply chain and making sure that problems are solved before they actually happen. And so one of the reasons customers love working with TSMC is that they don't have to wake up in the morning worried about what's going to happen upstream of TSMC's production. Are people thinking more about the upstream supply chain than they ever have before because of these restrictions? Absolutely. But if you're, if you're Apple or you're Nvidia, they don't really apply to you because all of the inputs that TSMC relies on for its production are produced in the US, Europe, or Japan. And there's no chance that those countries are going to control their transfer to Taiwan anytime soon.
37:01 Speaker 03 So you're actually pretty secure in terms of your upstream. It's your downstream. It's where your assembly of chips, which is often taking place in China, and then you're assembling the final goods. That's where you've got the most political risk, both in terms of what Beijing does and also in terms of what Washington does.
37:15 Speaker 02 Well, there's real political risk because the T in TSMC is Taiwan. The fabs are in Taiwan, especially the leading edge fabs. If there's strangeness between the United States, China, and Taiwan, the iPhone economy grinds to a halt, right? Like the chips just go away. The Nvidia GPU economy grinds to a halt. Is that something that we should be more worried about?
37:37 Speaker 03 Yes. In terms of a war or a blockade between China and Taiwan, the impact on not just the tech sector, but all manufacturing would be close to catastrophic. The TSMC produces 90% of the world's most advanced processors, but more than that, it produces over one third of the new computing power the world adds each year. If you add up all the transistors produced on processor chips, over a third of them are produced in Taiwan. And so it's, it certainly would be catastrophic to Apple or to AMD if we were to lose access to TSMC's facilities. But it's also dishwashers and microwaves and autos that would face tremendous disruptions. I mean, we'd be Back to a manufacturing crisis that would be feel equivalent to 1929 in terms of its shock.
38:19 Speaker 03 You wouldn't be able to buy a car for a year or two in the same level of disruption for all sorts of manufactured goods. It's a huge problem. It's such a big problem that companies really struggle to get their heads around. How do you insure against it? Because the costs of finding alternative solution are tremendous. There's no other alternative to TSMC in many cases. But obviously, the downside risk is substantial and arguably growing every day.
38:43 Speaker 02 We have to take another break, but when we get back, we go a little deeper on TSMC.
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39:54 Speaker 02 TSMC has come up a lot in this conversation. How do we end up in a position where the world's most important chip fabs are in Taiwan? How do we end up with TSMC?
40:02 Speaker 03 TSMC emerged thanks to Morris Chang, who was the founder of the company in 1987. He actually spent his career at Texas Instruments, Loden, Texas for most of his life before that point. And was the person who had the visionary idea to create a foundry business that didn't design any chips, only manufactured them, which at the time seemed like a crazy concept since there were no. Chip design firms. He had no customers when he started, but he began convincing companies that he'd do all the manufacturing for them. He'd take all the production risk. All they had to do was give him chip designs and he'd return functional chips. And that model proved extraordinarily successful because it let TSMC scale by serving lots of different customers. And that scale in
40:43 Speaker 03 turn let TSMC hone its production processes because the more chips they produce, the more they learn from the the process of actually manufacturing each ship. And so there's a direct relationship between the fact that TSMC is both the world's largest chipmaker and the world's most advanced. And both of those stem from the foundry model that Morris Chang invented.
41:02 Speaker 02 You said to us before we started recording that Morris Chang is your favorite character in this entire book. There's a line in the book where you say he's arguably more Texan than Taiwanese. Why is he your favorite character?
41:12 Speaker 03 Well, he's, I think, the most underrated business person of the last 100 years. Most people have never heard of him, even though we all rely on products that his company produces every single day. And his life, I think, is a fascinating microcosm of the chip industry as a whole. Born in mainland China, moved to the US right after the revolution, enrolled in Harvard, when he was the only Chinese-American student in his class, and then personally built the chip industry, working on production lines at Texas Instruments before founding TSMC. So all of the big shifts in the chip industry and in computing technology over the last 75 years are shifts that not only he doesn't only illustrate, he actually made them happen. And so we all owe
41:56 Speaker 03 a lot to Morris Chang. And I wish more people had heard of him because I think his importance is really profoundly underrated.
42:01 Speaker 02 I think TSMC is profoundly underrated. It is a very opaque company. They're very proud of themselves and they're very opaque. It's hard to know how they work. What's your sense of TSMC? I mean, Morris Chang isn't there anymore. How does the culture persist? What are its new leaders
42:17 Speaker 03 Well, you know, Morris Chang is officially retired, but in fact, he regularly shows up in TSMC's offices and in TSMC's events. So I'm not sure if we should really say that he's no longer there. But I think the culture he put in place does endure in terms of the willingness to take big bets in terms of R and D decisions and in terms of capital expenditure decisions, in terms of the relentlessness with which TSMC hones its manufacturing processes, which Morris Chang's coworkers in the 1950s would talk about, the ferocity with which he would find inefficiencies in the manufacturing process and then push them out of the assembly lines as fast as he could. I think that commitment to manufacturing excellence is what made TSMC to where it is today.
43:00 Speaker 03 And that stems in no small part to Morris Chang and the culture that he instilled.
43:05 Speaker 02 Why put it in such a perilous geopolitical reason? When I think about TSMC now, I'm like, they have to employ as many foreign policy experts, as many lobbyists as they do people who are relentlessly focused on manufacturing inefficiency, just because of their location, more than anything else, their location. Why choose Taiwan?
43:25 Speaker 03 Well, in hindsight, it would have been great if it established it in New Zealand or in Switzerland, but Morris Chang had spent some time in Taiwan as a Texas Instruments executive. He'd helped TI set up a facility there in the late 1960s. And so he'd gotten to know some of the Taiwanese government officials. And they wanted more US investment. They wanted to be more plugged into US supply chains as a way of guaranteeing their security. They bet that integration was the best way to ensure that the US would help defend Taiwan. And today, we're seeing the fruits of that strategy borne out because Taiwan's important, not only because of its geopolitical significance, but also because if there were a war, it would be catastrophic for the world's tech sector and all of the world's manufacturing, too.
44:08 Speaker 02 Just to state that clearly, you're saying the decision to put it in Taiwan was incentivized by the Taiwanese government in order to guarantee the United States' defense support.
44:19 Speaker 03 That's right. There was a direct linkage in the Taiwanese government's mind between more US investment, more criticality in US supply chains, and more credible US security guarantees. And that's why the Taiwanese government put up over half the capital in TSMC when it was founded. It was a direct project of the Taiwanese government to make Taiwan more indispensable in electronic supply chains. And it's worked.
44:43 Speaker 02 Clearly, it's worked. I mean, we should talk about Russia and Ukraine. I think that's there's a parallel there to potential conflicts with China and Taiwan. But I just want to finish the thought here. When you say the Taiwanese government was like, "We need this. We're going to spend the money on having a chip industry." Earlier, you said you need to build the next generation of chip manufacturing companies. You need an enormous amount of capital, a long-term vision, and you have to subsidize a bunch of stuff. That's what the Chinese government does, right? They will just happily build oversupply. Here's 95 bridges, an economy will arrive here one day. The United States does not do that. We're horrible at that, almost at every level. We're successful, maybe despite it. I think
45:25 Speaker 02 there are some people who will tell you we're successful because of it, but we don't do that. Is that what is absolutely necessary, though, for the United States to say, "We are going to build a chip-making industry. It has strategic purposes that we realized decades from now, the way the Taiwanese government did, and we're picking a handful of firms to become national extensions of an industry that we think is strategically important for years to come?"
45:47 Speaker 03 If you want to attract chip-making firms to your country, you've got to make it cost-competitive. And for the US, cost has been higher for a variety of reasons. Land is more expensive. Environmental regulations are more strict. The tax regime is less generous. And so if the US wants more chip-making, it's got to spend the money to make it more attractive for chip firms to invest. But I think capital expenditure is necessary, but it's not sufficient, because in addition to the capex, you need the expertise. And that's something that the Taiwanese realized very early. Wasn't just that they put forward a lot of money. They also made sure that hundreds of Taiwanese engineers were doing PhDs in electrical engineering at Berkeley and Stanford from the 1950s. And so although Taiwan seems a long way from Silicon Valley, in fact, there were very few places
46:32 Speaker 03 in the world that had so many deep personal connections to Silicon Valley as Taiwan. And when Morris Chang moved to Taiwan in the 1980s, he found former classmates, former colleagues, who he'd worked with in the US or studied with at Stanford, who were there in Taiwan, working in the chip industry. So that deep interconnection was absolutely critical to Taiwan's success. If you look at other companies that have caught up in chip making, Samsung, for example, it's a similar story of a lot of CapEx, but also a lot of integration into supply chains. The challenge China faces today is that there's no doubt it's got the willingness to spend money, but it's being cut out of the exchanges of information, components, expertise, that have made catch-up possible in Taiwan and South Korea.
47:14 Speaker 03 That's the big risk that China faces, but that's also the explicit US strategy, is to cut them out of those relationships and therefore make it harder to catch up.
47:22 Speaker 02 Just to wrap this up, make the comparison to Russia and Ukraine for me. I know this is also an area of your expertise. We've seen this now, right? No one would ever invade Ukraine. Here's this, it's always on the precipice, and then they just did it. And it's a disaster for them on many levels. We kind of feel the same way about Taiwan. This would be a disaster on many levels. Is there a chance that China is looking at Russia and Ukraine and saying, oh, we could probably do that too?
47:45 Speaker 03 Well, I think on the one hand, you'd say the Russians overestimated their military capabilities. Surely the Chinese are now wondering if they're overestimating their capabilities too. That's one lesson you could draw. But there are other lessons that China might be drawing that are less reassuring. One example is that nuclear weapons work. You can threaten nuclear use and keep out outside powers from intervening. The Russians showed that very clearly. Biden has made very explicit that he's not going to do anything close to what would trigger Russia from escalating the war. So nuclear threats work. That's a lesson that is directly relevant to a China-Taiwan scenario. A second is that in Ukraine, it's been absolutely critical that Ukraine borders Poland because you can very straightforwardly ship arms, equipment, supplies over a land border
48:29 Speaker 03 to a neutral country. Taiwan has no such land borders. You need to find ships that would go into Taiwan to resupply them. That's a very, very different proposition, not impossible, but very difficult. And so I think if you're China looking at Ukraine, on the one hand, you think the Russians screwed things up militarily. On the other hand, it's not obvious that a lot of the other lessons you are drawing might not make you a bit more optimistic. You could keep the US out in a meaningful way. So I'm not confident that China's looking at Russia and Ukraine and saying, this makes us less confident about Taiwan. And I worry that actually some of the key lessons that China is drawing are making it more capable of structuring an intervention in Taiwan that would keep the US out. And if everyone
49:11 Speaker 03 else knew that the US wasn't going to intervene on Taiwan's behalf, it'd be very hard for Taiwan to put up a serious defense. And that's why I think you see China rapidly expanding its nuclear forces to make those nuclear threats more credible and to try to keep the US out if there were a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. So I remain quite worried despite the fact that Russia's military has profoundly underperformed in Ukraine.
49:33 Speaker 02 All right. I feel like we could do an entire other episode on that question alone. We'll have to have you back. Chris, you've been great. The book is Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology. Thank you so much for being on the show.
49:43 Speaker 03 Thanks for having me.
49:48 Speaker 02 Thanks again to Chris Miller for taking the time to talk today. Thank you for listening to Decoder. I hope you enjoyed it. As always, I'd love to hear what you think of the show. You can email us at [email protected] . You can hit us up directly. We're at DecoderPod on Twitter. I'm at Reckless on Twitter. If you like the show, please share it with your friends. Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. If you really like the show, hit us with that five star review. And as many of you have noticed, if you tweet at me about Decoder, I will almost always retweet you, even if I'm not tweeting so much. Decoder is a production of The Verge and part of the Vox Media Podcast Network. It was produced by Creighton DeSimone and Jackie McDermott. It was edited by Callie Wright. The Decoder music is by Breakmaster Cylinder. Our editorial director is Brooke Minter, and our executive director is Eleanor Donovan. We'll see you next time.
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