Pod Insights Bankless Why North Korea Is Winning Crypto Crime and How to Fight Back | Ari Redbord, TRM Labs About this episode North Korea isn’t just hacking crypto anymore, it’s studying it, infiltrating it, and turning DeFi’s weakest links into a state-run revenue machine. This time around, Ryan and David sit down with Ari Redbord of TRM Labs to unpack the Drift hack, the $6B DPRK crypto crime machine, how stolen funds move through THORChain, Bitcoin, OTC desks, and Chinese laundering networks, and why the fightback may require everything from better DeFi security to real-time Beacon alerts and offensive cyber.
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🎬 DEBRIEF | RYAN & DAVID BREAKDOWN THE EPISODE
https://www.bankless.com/podcast/debrief-why-north-korea-is-winning-crypto-crime-and-how-to-fight-back-ari-redbord-trm-labs
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TIMESTAMPS
0:00 Intro
2:16 The Drift Hack
5:15 Human Weak Points
11:16 The DPRK Hacker Network
14:56 The $6B Machine
20:32 Fighting Back
28:11 Seizures and Victims
38:58 Inside TRM Labs
47:01 Laundering Rails
52:51 The Beacon Network
58:06 Privacy vs Security
1:10:20 Code and Crime
1:14:49 Iran on Tron
1:22:55 Bitcoin and Power
1:28:49 Hardening DeFi
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RESOURCES
Ari Redbord
https://x.com/ARedbord
TRM Labs
https://www.trmlabs.com/
TRM’s DPRK Report
https://www.trmlabs.com/resources/blog/north-korea-stole-76-of-all-crypto-hack-value-in-2026-with-just-two-attacks
Ari’s Homeland Security Testimony
https://www.congress.gov/119/meeting/house/119126/witnesses/HHRG-119-HM11-Wstate-RedbordA-20260421.pdf
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Not financial or tax advice. See our investment disclosures here:
https://www.bankless.com/disclosures
Transcript 16,940 words · 3 speakers
0:00 Speaker 00 I've kind of rejected this idea that these are North Korea state sponsored, right? I would never use that term in our writing or the way we talked about these things. These are state actors, hard stop. When I talk about the enemies of the United States and our allies, I think about China and Russia and Iran. And I put North Korea in there as well, which is crazy, right? This is a country with absolutely no economy whatsoever. And yet they're competing on the global stage because they've professionalized cybercrime essentially. There is absolutely no economy. So it's always been, how do we steal and then ultimately launder funds? And crypto is just the latest iteration of that.
0:43 Speaker 01 Welcome to Bankless, where today we explore why North Korea is winning crypto crime and how we fight back. This is Ryan Sean Adams. I'm here with David Hoffman and we're here to help you become more bankless.
0:55 Speaker 02 Big topic today. It seems to be that every single day there is a hack in DeFi. At least there was almost one every single day for the month of April. And this is all North Korea and a Lazarus group. But over in the world of Operation Economic Fury, we also have the IRGC getting their assets frozen on Tron. And just a few months ago, there was $15 billion in Bitcoin seized out of the pig butchering scam out of Cambodia. So there's just a lot to talk about when it comes to crypto crime and what all the worst people in the world and how they're using crypto and what we're doing to fight back against them. So this is the subject today for Arie Redbord from TRM Labs. Let's go ahead and get right into that conversation with Arie.
1:34 Speaker 01 Bankless station, excited to introduce you to Arie Redbord. He is the Global Head of Policy at TRM Labs. This is a blockchain analytics firm. It's used by governments, major exchanges. Their goal is really to trace illicit crypto. He's an expert in all of these things. He's had 11 years prosecuting national security money laundering cases at the DOJ. He's been a senior advisor at the Treasury. He's probably the single most authoritative voice that we found in the world on illicit finance and crypto. So we are here to learn a few things. Arie, welcome to Bankless.
2:10 Speaker 00 Hey, Ryan, thank you so much for having me. Really, really looking for the conversation and honored to be on the show.
2:15 Speaker 01 I almost don't know where to start. So in April, it was the highest ever purported DeFi cases of hacks. Let's actually start with the Drift hack, okay? So to give some context to listeners, on April 1st, North Korea drained $285 million from a protocol. This is a Perps protocol called Drift. They did this in 12 minutes. Last week, your team published a report saying these two accounts, this is Drift Report account, and then the Kelp Dow one that we saw two weeks ago, accounted for 76% of all the 2026 hack value so far. And what was eerie about the Drift hack to me as I was reading about this was it seemed like North Korea, who we'll talk about more,
2:59 Speaker 01 their groups, their hacking groups are hunting and stalking high-value targets. So again, 76% of the value from two hard targets, they were hunting the Drift protocol for months. Can we talk about the means that they went through in order to pick out the Drift protocol? Like, it seems like North Korea is hunting and assassinating almost individual high-value targets in a very methodical, sophisticated way. Tell us about this case.
3:33 Speaker 00 Yeah, it's really extraordinary, and I think it is a watershed here. Although I think it's important to go back a little bit. I mean, North Korea has a centralized, has essentially professionalized crypto hacking and cybercrime. You know, when I was a prosecutor for years with DOJ, we'd look at North Korea cases involving counterfeit $100 bills and counterfeit cigarettes. They hacked Sony Pictures and tried to steal a billion dollars from the Bank of Bangladesh. So this is, this is something that has been going on for a really long time. I think what North Korea has realized, say, over the last five, six, seven years, is that, you know, they could hack Sony or some type of business and steal PII, essentially usernames and passwords. But in the age of crypto, this
4:18 Speaker 00 is bank robbery at the speed of the internet, right? So what they've now done over the last five or six years is stolen, essentially averaging about a billion dollars a year. So we're talking $6, $7 billion to use for weapons proliferation and destabilizing activity. So when you talk about the targeting, it's moved from sort of targeting the technology.
4:39 Speaker 00 To really social engineering at scale. And that's what you saw in the Drift case where they're meeting developers at conferences, right? Using other people that they sort of bring in to play that role. They're getting access to private keys to those who have the ability to validate transactions on these exchanges. So what we've really moved from is sort of just going after the technology to going after the people in its really social engineering at scale.
5:10 Speaker 01 That's what's so unnerving about this case, actually, is because many of the people listening, many people in crypto, they go to conferences, they think they know people in the crypto space in real life. And you wrote this, this was a line from CoinDesk, "North Korean proxies sitting across a table from protocol employees over a period of months." We're talking about the Drift hack. That is, to my knowledge, unprecedented. So they met some of the Drift team members at conferences?
5:37 Speaker 00 Apparently, like right after this, I was at Paris Blockchain Week, right? Standing around, sort of chatting with people. You get paranoid, but that's apparently really what was happening here. They sent proxies to these conferences to meet individuals who were building these protocols. I think the other scary piece to this is if this happened to Drift, this obviously was happening to many, many more teams of developers out there who are building in DeFi. And I'm very concerned that this is sort of the tip of the iceberg and we really need to take action.
6:09 Speaker 01 So, okay, so they met, I just can't get over meeting them in person because I always think of North Korea Lazarus group as just their offshore, the actual shadowy supercoders out there. They don't manifest in real life. But you're saying they were hiring proxies? I guess paid actors, individuals who didn't seem like they were from North Korea, maybe seemed westernized in some way?
6:38 Speaker 00 Essentially, yeah, I was gonna say essentially, essentially it had to be, right? I mean, this was something, to be honest, when I read, and I think it was a report that Drift themselves put out that described actually their investigation. And that was that was the chilling part for me too, right? Because there's this whole idea that like you basically have folks sitting in, you know, in military type offices within North Korea who are dealing with this, maybe some in China, but but that's about it. And here what you had was clearly proxies, right? No one's going to engage with with someone from North Korea directly. So there's obviously proxies being used here. There's a couple of examples of this over the years. We saw an arrest of a US person for facilitating the IT workers that were ultimately infiltrating
7:23 Speaker 00 a number of different crypto and tech projects who were US persons that were kind of supporting this effort. So there are examples of this, but to me, this was was pretty extraordinary and really chilling that North Korea could get Westerners essentially to do their bidding.
7:37 Speaker 02 Can you talk about how the social engineering actually led to one of the largest hacks? I think the largest hack on Solana in the Drift case. So what were the further details there in that story?
7:49 Speaker 00 Ultimately, what they were able to do was gain access to the protocol itself. And that's where you took that social engineering piece to then have to have that really sort of technical attack. On March 27th, Drift migrated its security council to a new two out of five threshold configuration, which meaning you only needed access to two of the five validators on that platform. And North Korea was able to get access and breach there. And what was also so extraordinary is this was programmatic. On April 1st, these pre there were pre-signed transactions were deployed with resulted, which resulted in 31 withdrawals in 12 minutes. And then those funds start moving.
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11:06 Speaker 01 So this turned into a hack of $285 million, I believe. And this was a drain that lasted just for 12 minutes and then it was kind of over. A pretty incredible hack and I suppose a big win, maybe for the hackers. I'm curious to learn a bit more about them. So oftentimes we hear about, it's just like North Korea. Sometimes we hear about a subgroup called Lazarus. I've also heard about Trader, Trader, Bureau 121, like all of these different subgroups. And when I've heard people talk about this previously, it almost seems like there are these like decentralized groups
11:47 Speaker 01 within the North Korean government that maybe operate somewhat autonomously, but sometimes in a coordinated way. Can you give us a lay of the land for all of these various groups in North Korea? How they're incented, how they're structured, like what do we know about them?
12:06 Speaker 00 Absolutely. And it's interesting. I think my own views of this have evolved over time, particularly recently. You know, going back even a few years, I've just always thought to myself, this is North Korea. And I've kind of rejected this idea that these are North Korea state sponsored, right? I would never use that term in our writing or the way we talked about these things. These are state actors, hard stop, right? This is the North Korea government who's realized that, you know, stepping back for a moment, right? Like when I talk about the enemies of the United States and our allies, I think about China and Russia and Iran. And I put North Korea in there as well, which is crazy, right? This is a country with absolutely no economy whatsoever.
12:45 Speaker 00 And yet they're competing on the global stage because they've professionalized cybercrime, essentially. There is absolutely no economy. So it's always been, how do we steal and then ultimately launder funds? And crypto is just the latest iteration of that. So what they've done is they've built a cyber army, essentially. And it has different names and you're right, that it's becoming more and more decentralized, where these groups are acting on their own. They have a certain signatures of the way they ultimately launder funds, the way they steal funds. But I think that the easiest way to understand this is this is just North Korea. You know, I, people ask me all the time, how have they done this? There's an amazing podcast called Lazarus Heist on the BBC,
13:29 Speaker 00 which walks through two seasons of how essentially they've built this capacity. But essentially what it is, is like, they raise kids from a really young age to be hackers, to be cyber warriors. You know, think Russian gymnast, right, in the 1980s. They take you, if you show the abilities in STEM, and they, you have access to the internet, which most North Koreans don't have. Maybe they'll send you to China to compete or for education. And they are building this essentially army of cyber warriors that now are attacking crypto exchanges, right? You know, a couple of years ago, they were involved in other types of activity. And, and it's, it's really, it's really crazy.
14:10 Speaker 00 And I think the, the most troubling part is unlike the hacks that occur from time to time, right, in sort of more of the private way, you know, the money stealing that we see in crypto, the scams, this is to fund weapons proliferation, right? This is to destabilize the Korean Peninsula. So this is, this is, this is North Korea. This is not a situation where you have China or Russia, where there are maybe groups where the, the government turns the, turns the other way. This is the, actually the government, this is the army.
14:39 Speaker 02 How much of this behavior out of North Korea just comes from the fact that they just like, don't economically, they don't really have any other options? Like, if you ask me what North Korea's biggest exports are, I have no clue. I have no clue how North Korea makes money, except for the fact that they steal hundreds of millions of dollars all the time from the crypto industry. And so like, maybe this is just like born out of necessity from North Korea. They just didn't have any other options. And so they learned that like, there's money on the internet that they can go steal. How much of this just came out of the fact that like, this is just what they need to do to survive?
15:13 Speaker 00 That's so much what it all has come out of. But what's interesting is you just watch the sort of progress of this. And I mentioned, you know, in, we've looked back at North Korea. You know, people ask me all the time, hey, how did you get into crypto, right? And I wish I had the better origin story where I like, you know, bought in 2011 or, or whatever. You know, I would be driving around in my Lambo, like. Everybody else, but for me, it was actually North Korea. I was a national security prosecutor at the US Attorney's Office in DC. And we started to look at money laundering cases involving North Korea. And we started to see Bitcoin in those cases. And this was way before these sort of really, you know, attacks at scale, certainly before DeFi. And I said to myself, wow, this is really cool technology. Where you can move funds cross border at the speed of the internet.
15:58 Speaker 00 And tried to start to understand like, wait, wow, how could we use this for good? But also at the same time, realizing this is really a technology we need to keep out of the hands of bad actors. So North Korea has really been early here, but you're absolutely right. It's it's born out of necessity.
16:12 Speaker 02 Just going back and just labeling some quick hacks. 1.5 billion dollars in February 2025 from Bybit. The 300 million dollars recently from from Kelp Dow. I think that sounded 200 million dollars. There's the Ronin Bridge. I think that was also North Korea. It's substantial numbers, multi billions of dollars. I don't know. I don't know if you have off the top of the head, like a total amount of some.
16:31 Speaker 01 6 billion is what you said, right?
16:33 Speaker 02 Yeah. 6 billion.
16:34 Speaker 00 We just put out a report, I think last week, that said 6 billion over the last, you know, five years, something around that.
16:41 Speaker 02 What and how do they do with their money? How what happens next with 6 billion dollars in crypto assets held by North Korea? Like what? How do they turn that into something productive?
16:53 Speaker 00 So that that becomes the challenge. And for for TRM, at least the most interesting piece of the puzzle where we're focused on, right? So the attack happens and we can get into maybe how we can stop those at some level. But then the laundering begins. And North Korea launders differently than certain actors. They want to move the funds as fast as they can. They're going to use services, mixers and other types of services to obfuscate the transactions. But they're actually less worried. They're well, they're not worried at all about getting caught. What they were worried about is getting those funds off ramped as fast as they can in order to use them. You know, and it's hard to say what exactly they're being used for, but everything in North Korea is being used for weapons research, for missiles.
17:35 Speaker 00 Who knows, for Crown Royal, for the regime, or you know, it's, it's, it is, it is being used to prop up a rogue regime, essentially. But that is really the sort of the interesting laundering piece. North Korea needs to move the funds as fast as they can to get them to off-ramp, so to use them. And they're going to lose some of that. We see that in the Bybit case. We see that in the Ronin Bridge case. But they'll get enough off where this certainly becomes very, very valuable.
18:01 Speaker 02 Was there like a before, after moment in the just power and capabilities of North Korea after crypto? So like, once they started hacking hundreds of millions of dollars, I would imagine, as we kind of discussed, this prowess, this capacity for, for, you know, hacking the internet and stealing the funds came out of crypto and came out of necessity because they didn't really have any other economic engine for themselves. Has North Korea become substantially more powerful and their, their military, their weapons, whatever? Is this more capable because they have all of these billions of dollars coming in for it? Like, what can we say about like how crypto has impacted the arc of North Korea?
18:40 Speaker 00 Certainly hard to say, but I don't know that there's been any economy within North Korea over the last, you know, couple of decades that could have done, you know, a billion dollars a year on, on average for, for the regime. And I think what we're really concerned about right now in this moment, right, why we're having this conversation is that, you know, this, this year, now North Korea is the vast majority of hacks. And the drift hack feels like a playbook. And how many of these are, are, are in line, essentially in tow right now in order to try to go after? So my concern is that there have been a number of really key moments when it comes to North Korea. You mentioned the Ronin Bridge, and it was a $600 million hack, which at the time was absolute game changer.
19:24 Speaker 00 And I actually think it got the US government at least very focused on the issue. We had a number of meetings with US, Korean and Japanese leaders in order to figure out how we can come together as sort of a trilateral to go after these guys. That was a huge. Huge moment. You mentioned the Bybit hack in February of 2025. That was the largest bank robbery in human history, and it wasn't even close, right? 1.5 billion just walking out the door. And then I think we're in this moment right now where DeFi is the target, where we're seeing them move slightly differently. The social engineering piece has always been there, but now it's more pronounced. So I think that now we're seeing another one of these moments, and we gotta stop this.
20:04 Speaker 01 Yeah, this was so scary about that Drift hack. Keep coming back to that. It's almost like the idea of you could have sleeper cells out there, like infiltrated in in your company. I mean, they waited months to pull this off. It almost had the sophistication of like you read about massage, Mossad, and what they're doing, what they did with kind of the, you know, the pager attack, for instance. It's that level of of nation state sophistication and patience. Like, they they set up a fake partnership, like a shell company with all of these, you just like fake.
20:31 Speaker 00 They made an investment in the company. They made an investment in the project.
20:34 Speaker 01 Yeah, just like incredible.
20:35 Speaker 00 And a significant investment. I want to say they said it was about a million dollars or something.
20:39 Speaker 01 Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay, so a few other things. I wanted another way to ask the question David was asking is, is like, is $6 billion a lot of money for North Korea?
20:48 Speaker 00 $6 billion is a huge amount of money for North Korea. There are many countries in the world where that might not be true. That is a huge amount of money for North Korea.
20:56 Speaker 01 Okay, okay, that's, that's what I thought. So this is a major funder of their weapons program then. So they're not stopping anytime soon?
21:04 Speaker 00 They're not stopping. In fact, I think they're very bullish after this last, this last month.
21:08 Speaker 01 Oh, my God, very bullish, yeah. Okay, so what does national security at the US think about this? So, under a less crypto favorable administration, we used to hear murmurings that, you know, the White House National Security wanted to sort of shut DeFi down, shut crypto down, partially because of these types of hacks, right? It's just like, look, if you guys can't secure your programs, your your DeFi and your crypto assets, like, this is becoming a national security threat to the US. And like, we might have to just come in and shut you down. Like, I don't think
21:48 Speaker 01 I ever heard that kind of statement exactly, but you almost felt that sentiment or there was rumors possibly. What about that is, what is, what about that is true? I guess, what does national security think about the, the state of crypto right now? Are they kind of pissed that this is happening?
22:04 Speaker 00 Look, look, the, the folks that I've been talking to on this are very much like, well, how do we stop this from happening essentially? And it's not so much, hey, we're going to shut down these services. I think the reality is, and I kind of went through this, right? Like North Korea has attacked every sector. You know, they have attacked banks, they have attacked tech companies, they've stolen PII. We're not going to shut down hospitals because they're victims of ransomware attacks at scale, right? Hospitals are the number one target. I think it's like 50% of all targets are hospitals for ransomware attacks. So I think the question really becomes, and the questions we've had with the White House, the Treasury Department, the national security community is, how do we stop it? And I at least advocate for sort of two ways to think about that.
22:48 Speaker 00 The first is hardening cyber defenses, which we all know needs to happen. I think the deep AI community is having a conversation over the last couple of weeks in a pretty meaningful way about, we might not have standards, but as a community, we need to come together and at least come up with best practices, you know, for protecting these platforms. So I think that's, that's a really critical piece. Cybersecurity should be built in to a protocol. But the second is the one I'm more focused on, and it's, it's like, we got to stop blaming the victims here, right? You know, essentially, North Korea is attacking these projects at scale. We got to attack North Korea.
23:20 Speaker 01 Yeah.
23:20 Speaker 00 So, you know, to me, if North Korea steals 285 million from Drift, we need to go steal it back. And what does that, what does that look like? It looks like offensive cyber and we have the capabilities within the national security community. I, I believe we're using some of those, but we need to be doing it in a much more meaningful way. I felt this after the Bybit hack, right? They could steal 1.5 billion from an exchange. Let's go get it back. Let's target the bad actors. And that's mostly what we're kind of hearing out there. Just like, again, like backing up for one moment. I, I think about this all the time. I think we're in this really interesting moment in human history, where the private sector has all of the data, right?
24:01 Speaker 00 Like we have this rich data set of blockchain data, AI, and the government has all of the authorities. And what we need to do at TRM is we try to ensure that the government has all the data they need. But we also need some of these authorities, the private sector moves very, very quickly, give us the opportunity, give SEAL, give some of these other, give Zach XBT, give us some of the authorities to actually go after these bad actors ourselves. And I think we could really make a dent in this issue. Well, I love how badass that sounds and definitely what I want. My reservation is that it feels somewhat asymmetric where the Lazarus group is attacking our DeFi
24:45 Speaker 00 protocols, which are complex. They have attackable surface areas. There's ways to penetrate them. And then once North Korea gets their hands on the crypto assets, what do they do? They just hold it in raw Ether or raw Bitcoin. Like, how do we, how do we attack that? And so it seems somewhat asymmetric. So while I love the notion, I think I will need further convincing that that's even like a feasible thing to do. I love that. I think there's probably a ton of ways around this. And it's, it's not easy and I don't, I don't want to make it seem easy. But let me give you an example, right? After the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack, which is probably the most famous ransomware attack ever, right? I don't know about you guys, but I was having trouble getting gas in DC for, for a couple
25:29 Speaker 00 of days, right? It was, it was, it was pretty significant. I think it moved the cyber crime, cyber attack conversation to a very mainstream conversation. But ultimately, what we were able to do is track and trace the ransom payment and law enforcement and national security agencies were actually able to use tools to take them back. Essentially, you know, and I don't have access to those tools, but essentially crack private keys. Did they beat them out of someone? Did they, did they actually have access to them through, through a hack on a computer system? You know? These same bad actors, China and others, are attacking our computer systems for our government agencies, right? The US Treasury Department, recently a victim there.
26:14 Speaker 00 So I think there are things that we can do that aren't necessarily like, hey, we're going to breach a DeFi protocol that North Korea is using in some way. But I do think we could breach their computer systems that are potentially holding at least information that can allow us to do some of that. This is a little outside of my area of expertise, but I really want to empower the private sector and the public sector to work together on this.
26:36 Speaker 01 I love that idea. Even the idea of empowering the private sector is like, what is that? Commissioned bounty hunters or something?
26:42 Speaker 00 Exactly. So letters of marque, right? So this is what I'm advocating for.
26:47 Speaker 01 Letters of marque?
26:49 Speaker 00 During the US Revolution and about a war of 1812, what we would do is we would actually commission privateers to go after pirates on the high seas. Okay. Why? Because we can move faster. Because, you know, private individuals with boats can just go get them.
27:09 Speaker 01 Also with incentives, you know?
27:11 Speaker 00 With incentives.
27:12 Speaker 01 You get a 5% cut of that.
27:14 Speaker 00 With incentives. So think cyber letters of marque. Pirates today are on blockchains and in cyberspace. Let us, with the tools and the training and the expertise, go after those guys where they live.
27:28 Speaker 01 Hell, yeah. I love that idea, actually. And in fact, maybe I'm most excited about that versus all of the other defense, you know, which we need to do.
27:36 Speaker 00 It's like basketball, right? Like, defense wins championships. I get that. That's how we're going to stop this in the long term. But we got to also play offense here.
27:45 Speaker 01 Did we do some of that? So actually, I wasn't aware that the Colonial Pipeline ransomware had kind of a happy ending and some of the funds were recovered. But I did see a story, I think this was back in October of 2015. David and I talked about it on a Bankless show. This was FBI, DOJ successfully seized 15 billion in Bitcoin from a massive international pig butchering ring. That was the very famous Chen Zai pig butchering ring, I believe.
28:14 Speaker 00 Yep.
28:15 Speaker 01 And somehow... Mysteriously, assets were recovered, 127,000 Bitcoin was recovered, $15 billion. That's got to be one of the largest asset seizures by the DOJ and FBI in history. And it's like mysterious as to how they actually recovered those funds. I I saw blockchain forensic analysts being like, huh, this is weird. It's almost like they somehow got their hands on the private keys. I wonder how they did that. Do you know anything about this?
28:47 Speaker 00 Yeah, you know, look, I I I talk about this case a lot. I think it's really a great example of so many of the things that we're calling for. First, first and foremost, we we need a whole of government approach, right? This is scams and fraud are now a national security issue. We're seeing transnational criminal organizations. You mentioned Shen Zhi and the Prince Group, which is out of Cambodia. It was running these massive scam compounds that were stealing billions of dollars from from Americans.
29:15 Speaker 01 When you say massive, you're talking about thousands of employees, almost in like call center data center.
29:21 Speaker 00 Thousands of employees, many of whom are human trafficking victims themselves. Who are lured to these places. This is the fair, this is like the worst financial crime scourge that we've seen, certainly in my lifetime. And I've been doing this stuff for a really long time. And and you talk about things we need to use every national security tool. But we really did in the Prince Group case. And when people ask me what we should do, I'm like, actually, we have the playbook, right? DOJ indicted Shen Zhi, who was the ringleader here, who actually operated at the highest levels of the Cambodian government. We did the largest forfeiture action in human history, $15 billion, right? That you mentioned, I mean, unbelievable. But then OFAC also sanctioned Prince Group. We saw FinCEN actually take down their primary money laundering facilitator called We1.
30:05 Speaker 00 And it was really this whole of government interact agency approach to go after these bad actors. And it's a win. The problem is there's like 10, 15 more Prince Groups out there throughout Southeast Asia and the world. But in terms of the the the taking the 15 billion itself, you know, it's hard to say how exactly we we we did that. I will say. I highly recommend reading the the forfeiture action and the indictment in the case.
30:32 Speaker 01 Okay.
30:32 Speaker 00 There's a really interesting paragraph in there that talks about an insider who had access to some of these funds and and Shenzi at one point getting very upset with this person and kind of wondering, you know, how that maybe dovetails into some of how we were ultimately able to to seize and then forfeit these funds. But I think there's a lot of lot of nuance there, a lot going on. But I think it's a playbook for how we can go after these scam compounds.
30:59 Speaker 01 I love that. And that, you know, part of that is something that only another nation state can actually do is to actually just, I don't know, I saw pictures of the guy, what's his name again?
31:09 Speaker 00 Shenzi.
31:10 Speaker 01 Shenzi being arrested. I mean, you got the sense that there was cooperation with the government, the special forces kind of like came in and just like picked this guy up and brought him to justice.
31:20 Speaker 00 Well, what's interesting about that case, so just to be just to be clear, so he was not arrested.
31:25 Speaker 01 Oh, he wasn't?
31:25 Speaker 00 So he was indicted. I'll tell you what you saw. He was indicted by the US.
31:30 Speaker 01 I saw like a bag over his head.
31:32 Speaker 00 Maybe.
31:32 Speaker 01 And it was, you're just like, was it China actually arresting him?
31:36 Speaker 00 Yes.
31:36 Speaker 01 Okay.
31:36 Speaker 00 So he was, and we can talk about this a little bit. So he was indicted by the US. And then ultimately China swooped in in and brought him to China. And I think this is kind of the China narrative in my mind. And that is, if you read the indictment, you read the forfeiture order, you there's reference throughout to Chinese national security agencies in there and how they were connected to Cambodian government, how they were connected to the Prince group. And I think the reality is that for China's taste, Shenzi just flew flew too close to the sun. You know, it's one thing, it's one thing to operate this way, likely sending funds back to China, but you can't get caught and you definitely cannot
32:17 Speaker 00 get, you definitely cannot get indicted and brought back to the US. So before we had any chance.
32:22 Speaker 01 Parts of China were complicit here. And so then.
32:25 Speaker 00 Very likely, or at a minimum, certainly looking the other way.
32:28 Speaker 01 Too or too close or just something that's a bad look for China.
32:32 Speaker 00 It's a bad look for China.
32:33 Speaker 01 They grabbed him.
32:34 Speaker 00 So we couldn't was essentially how I, that's my interpretation of what happened. And since this is bankless, we can, you know, we'll take it a little further than. That I might, that I might normally, but I think that, I think that is essentially what, what happened there in terms of the arrest. But I do want to point one thing out that's important. We are seeing a shift, and I think it's a really good shift. We TRM held our public sector summit last week where I got out in front of about 250, mostly US federal law enforcement and national security agencies. And we actually talked about this point. And there's, we're finally seeing a shift to the way we go about our business. It's always been from a, from a, from a law enforcement perspective, you've got to arrest someone, right? Handcuffs on people, prosecutions, you know, potentially going to jail. I think
33:19 Speaker 00 we've seen a shift to asset seizure and forfeiture, which to me is really important because you're not going to get your hands on the Drift Protocol hackers. They're in North Korea, they're in China, it's never happening. You're not going to get your hands on Russian cyber criminal groups that are doing ransomware attacks in dark net markets. You're not going to get your hands on, you know, Cambodians running scam compounds likely because they're in countries that are just not going to extradite to the United States. But what you can do is you can take the money. And that is a huge impact, right? I mean, ask any drug dealer on the street who had their Escalade taken. They're probably more concerned with that than doing the time in jail. And I think that's a really powerful tool.
33:59 Speaker 01 You can take the money. That's right. I do think that's a powerful tool. That's, that's part of the offense that you were talking about. But can we talk about the victims here? Because it's always been unclear to me where that $15 billion goes, right? Does the US government just seize it and take it and, hey, now it's part of the strategic Bitcoin reserve? Like, you're welcome, everybody. The reality is that $15 billion was taken from hundreds of thousands of individuals, US citizens, other citizens of the world, through these like intricate pig butchering campaigns. For those not familiar with that, it's like, I think it's the idea that you sort of, you fatten up the victim by treating them nicely, socially engineering them, catfishing them, pretending to be an interested
34:42 Speaker 01 party, business relationship girlfriend, something like this. And then you sort of milk them for their funds, right? Socially engineered. So people are losing their, their money. And it's hard to kind of trace that back to individual victims. I'm wondering, in these types of cases with the seized assets, do victims ever get some of that remuneration, some of their money back? Or is it just too impossible to handle something at that scale?
35:09 Speaker 00 It's the most important question, and I'm so glad you're asking it. Like, when I think about these cases, and I've testified really recently, once about a week or so ago, before the House Homeland Security Committee, on just this, on how transnational criminal networks are stealing billions of dollars from Americans. And then prior to that, actually, I testified before the New York State Senate on how New Yorkers specifically were being attacked. And I said the same thing, essentially, it's like, we need to build a victim compensation fund. We need to have a way where we can do this and do it at scale. I think the biggest challenge right now is how do you associate, even with blockchain tracing, how do you associate a specific individual victim with a specific compound? Right? Hey, we took down KK Park, so we know that you're,
35:54 Speaker 00 this is part of your funds, or we took down Prince Group, so we know these are part of your funds. So what I advocate for, and one of the recommendations I made in that testimony, I would encourage folks to read it, it's on our site. It's like a very detailed perspective to include letters of marque, to include other types of legislation that I think could be helpful. But I think we need a victim restoration fund. And it's contemplated by the executive order that came out recently on scams. The Trump administration put out an executive order on cyber-enabled scams. And one of the recommendations, or one of the call for a victim restitution fund. So people ask me, how does this work? Because you're absolutely right, Ryan, like, this is tough. It's funny enough, when I was a baby lawyer, it was after my first year of law school, so this was like 30 years ago.
36:39 Speaker 00 I couldn't get a job anywhere in the Justice Department, but I really wanted to work there. And I finally found this really, really random office called the Office of Vaccine Restoration. And essentially, what it was, was like, there was a public good of not allowing people to sue vaccine companies in tort. Right? So if you're hurt from a vaccine, we don't want you to be able to sue the company and put them out of business, because we need vaccine. So instead, for every vaccine that's sold, I think 76 cents went to this went to this fund. Okay. And ultimately, a victim, you know, child with an encephalopathy, some type of other damages, would petition the Department of Justice that ran the fund.
37:21 Speaker 00 And ultimately, lawyers there would decide whether this claim was valid and pay out the fund. I see a victim restoration fund like that as the future for this. It's for everybody. Any victim, US person who's a victim of a scam, can submit to this fund and try to get restitution there. So that I think is the vision. I love that the executive order talks about it because I think that that makes it very real. I think we'll get some legislation from Congress on this, and I think we'll start to move. But it's so important, and I don't know that, well, it is not happening fast enough now.
37:58 Speaker 02 Can we take a step back and just paint for the listener and myself, what it actually looks like to work with law enforcement? So TRM Labs, just to kind of like speedrun, correct me whatever I get wrong, but just to speedrun like what you guys do. You guys just take in all of the blockchain data. You guys have mapped out who are the illicit actors with some degree of certainty. You guys do like risk scoring. So like, these addresses are likely North Korea. These addresses are likely some sanctioned actor. You give that data out to exchanges so they can know what's up. But then also, you guys work with like law enforcement and the FBI. Can you just like paint a picture of what working with law enforcement looks like?
38:35 Speaker 00 Absolutely. Let me just back you up for one second because there's one part of that you nailed it. But it's so interesting. How do we do that attributing addresses? We have a team of threat hunters. We have someone who focuses full time on ransomware. She's a former FBI analyst. We have someone who focuses full time on Iran. I would say he's the foremost expert on Iran and the use of crypto today. We have a guy named Nick Carlson, who is former FBI analyst I worked with when I was a prosecutor, who is the foremost expert in my mind in the world in North Korea and money laundering. And what they're doing is they're out there attributing illicit crypto addresses. So for example, we have someone who focuses full time on terror financing. He is
39:16 Speaker 00 actually communicating on password protected Telegram channels and Rocket Chat with Mujahideen, with ISIS fighters, trying to get them to send him crypto addresses so we can attribute them in our tool terror financing. We then provide that data to basically three main buckets, to law enforcement, and I'll kind of get into your question in a moment, who use it in that sort of like, to me, like the sexy use case, right? The tracking, the tracing, the building, the investigations, the going after bad guys, to regulators who use it to make licensing determinations, right? Places like the Monetary Authority of Singapore, or, you know, or New York Department of Financial Services. We then also provide that information to compliance
39:59 Speaker 00 teams at large financial institutions, at crypto businesses. So that's, that's kind of the secret sauce. In terms of working with law enforcement, it's a couple of ways. First, we're providing them the software. So first and foremost, we're a software company. So we're selling that data with a cool UI that allows for the tracking and tracing on top of it. But we also have a really cool global investigations team that's sourced from some of the finest crypto investigators, you know, of all time. I think a lot of people know Chris Chincheski. He and I were in a very cool Netflix documentary together called The Biggest Heist Ever. He was the protagonist in Andy Greenberg's book Tracers in the Dark. Chris is our head of global investigations, and he has a team of former global law enforcement
40:42 Speaker 00 from Met Police and Korean National Police, who are working side by side with our law enforcement partners to track and trace illicit proceeds and help them build investigations.
40:52 Speaker 02 This question is a little bit squishy, but how dominant is crypto and therefore like TRM Labs, and then, you know, maybe also Chainalysis, a company that's very similar to yours? How dominant is that when it comes to just international, transnational financial crime? So like, maybe one scenario is like, there is transnational financial crime, and I don't know what it looks like for it to not be in crypto, but like, maybe, maybe that is like some amount of the cases? Or is it like, oh, if there is transnational financial crime, it's probably some component at the very least is in crypto? And so you guys are always involved, or very frequently involved in some of the highest level cases? Like, how big is this world?
41:33 Speaker 00 Yeah, it's a, it's a, it's a great question. It's funny. I usually start with this, but I think Ryan just got into drift so fast, we were just rocking and rolling. But you know, we put out a crypto crime report a couple of months ago. It basically said, we saw 158 billion in crypto crime in 2025. That is a record-setting year. Okay. And that's always the headline, right? 158 billion, record year in crypto crime. That only makes up about 1.3% of all activity within the crypto ecosystem. So we're still talking about 98, 99% of activity within crypto is lawful. To give you a sense of that, it's much harder to tell this in fiat. But normal numbers are somewhere between 3% and 6% is kind of what you see out there. But right.
42:18 Speaker 00 So there's that piece of just like the pure data piece. The other piece is, look, when I was a prosecutor, I wasn't investigating crypto cases. It just wasn't what was happening at the time. I was investigating cases involving networks of shell companies and howalas and bulk cash smuggling and high-value art and real estate, right? ISIS was stealing antiquities in Syria and elsewhere.
42:40 Speaker 02 We might call that trad money laundering, huh?
42:42 Speaker 00 Yes. I just call it money laundering. I just call it money laundering. And I'll tell you, there's no TRM to track and trace those things. And I think that
42:54 Speaker 02 There's no trad TRM?
42:56 Speaker 00 What we now are able to do here, because every transaction is logged and immutable and traceable and trackable on a public ledger. I'm sure you've discussed this before over the years. We can do this much better in my mind.
43:11 Speaker 02 So when there is a big transnational crime case and it does touch crypto, are, is like organizations like the CIA or the FBI, are they like stoked? It's like, oh, yes, this one has a crypto footprint. That means we have extra tools to go get these guys that we otherwise wouldn't had it been trad crime.
43:31 Speaker 00 I think they absolutely are with this sort of caveat, right? We don't live in a world yet, and who knows if we will, where all activity occurs on chain. Every case is a mix of on and off-chain activity. And what we are really good at at TRM is enabling law enforcement and others to see every transaction that occurs on chain. Where we lose visibility is where funds move off-chain through networks of OTC brokers in China, through howalas, crypto-like howalas. When it's, when you can move it to cash. And I think one thing I've always really tried to to to explain is that like these tools are not a silver bullet.
44:15 Speaker 00 They're one tool in a toolbox that a great investigator has, right? So if funds are moving through an exchange, what law enforcement does is serves a subpoena on that cryptocurrency exchange to get that underlying user information. And once they have it, then they reach out to Google for their Gmail, they reach out to, you know, their cell phone provider. Maybe they're able to actually figure out their location by triangulating cell tower data, right? They're using all the tools that law enforcement has used, used for a really long time. I mean, one example of this, and it hasn't played out sadly, but I got asked a lot when there was a Bitcoin ransom demand in the Nancy Guthrie letter about how essentially this would work, right?
44:58 Speaker 00 The most mainstream case that we've seen probably in a decade in terms of people really wanting to understand how this worked. And what I would explain was like, yes, there's a Bitcoin demand. Yes, if funds move, we can track and trace them, but law enforcement is going to need to use their entire toolbox. You know, because so far these funds aren't moving and there's got to be other means in order to investigate this case.
45:24 Speaker 01 But by the way, I'm just curious, the, did the Nancy Guthrie case get resolved? That that was kind of in my feed and it was big news and then I never followed that through to resolution.
45:33 Speaker 00 Yeah, I think sadly it hasn't at all been resolved. And my sense is that that folks don't know where she is or what's what's going on with the case.
45:41 Speaker 01 Wow, chilling. Can we go back to what you were talking about with respect to on-chain money laundering and how this process, this flow works? So North Korea has hacked and stolen $6 billion. We've seen a few cases in in April, the Lyft case, the Kelp Dow case, some other details we'll get into. What do they do after they acquire the cryptocurrency? So just like one thing that we often see is they will move to the highest security, most decentralized chain possible, it seems like. So if they're on, you know, something like Tron, they might move to Ethereum.
46:25 Speaker 01 And then later, possibly even to Bitcoin. So that seems to be something that happens, at least that I've seen. They also seem to use some of the on-chain privacy type tools. So tornado cash is often cited. So if they have Ether on Ethereum, then they'll try to move some of that through tornado cash. Oftentimes, it also seems like they then move some funds to Bitcoin and they use something called Thorchain in order to move across kind of that bridge. Can you just talk? And then, and then I'm not sure what happens after that. Is it just like tainted Bitcoin somewhere? Or is it, you know, cleaned Ether if it's on the other side of tornado cash? Like, what happens?
47:07 Speaker 01 And how do they get that into the kind of the real economy in order to purchase weapons and nuclear capabilities? And that sort of thing? Can you take us through that flow?
47:16 Speaker 00 Absolutely. I mean, Ryan, you nailed it on the laundering piece for sure. And that's exactly what is going on today. Thinking of it like slightly broadly here, North Korea is trying to move funds as fast as they can. And they have a different playbook. You mentioned the Thorchain is a service that's being used quite frequently right now. And I think part of this is with Bitcoin being a completely decent Bitcoin. Bitcoin comes with benefits and, and, and issues when it comes to laundering funds. Right? It's historically volatile and bad actors want to move their funds into more stable assets, just like the rest of us, to use them. But at the same time, stablecoin issuers like Tether, like Circle,
47:55 Speaker 00 have unique capabilities when it comes to essentially what I refer to as burning and reissuing their native token, what some people call freezing or blocking. Essentially, you know, Tether is able to essentially freeze, burn, which means take the token out of your wallet and move it into an inaccessible wallet and then ultimately reissue to the government or to a victim or something like that.
48:19 Speaker 01 Right. It would be insane for North Korea to keep those funds in USDT.
48:22 Speaker 00 That's exactly right. So, but what's interesting is for years, that's the narrative, right? Like, hey, all bad actors are using USDT.
48:28 Speaker 01 Right.
48:28 Speaker 00 It's certainly still happening because of, I think, for two main reasons, liquidity. And the and the stability issue, right? Bad guys want to move their funds, but they need to off ramp those funds to more usable currencies quickly to so that they're not getting blocked. And we're seeing Tether really act at scale more and more now on these on these types of cases. So we are seeing, you know, look at the buy bit hacks, a great example. I think that that changed a lot for us in terms of how we were watching laundering. Essentially, North Korea stole 1.5 billion in Ethereum. And within the first 72 hours, converted almost all of that to Bitcoin. And then started using the services that North Korea typically uses.
49:09 Speaker 00 One thing that's really important to note is oftentimes, North Korea, the pig butchering networks that David was talking about earlier, cartels are actually transferring their funds at one point, at some point, to professional money launderers. And that is how they're ultimately off ramping those funds. They're using networks of casinos, of OTC brokers. They're getting them into the Chinese money laundering networks that have essentially professionalized money laundering prior to crypto. And now we're getting more and more involved in crypto. If you look, and this is to me like, this is the most startling thing. If you look on-chain at cartel activity, North Korea hacks,
49:55 Speaker 00 and these pig butchering networks, you see wallet addresses that are being used in all three of those laundering typologies or or those threat categories that that we associate with Chinese money laundering networks. These professional organizations run by the Triads and other types of like Chinese organized crime. So oftentimes, like, North Korea will steal the money, but ultimately turn it over, essentially sell the funds to one of these networks.
50:25 Speaker 01 Okay, so in the Bybit hack as an example, 1.5 billion Ether were stolen. Within 72 hours, most of that was on, in Bitcoin, on the Bitcoin blockchain by route of, what, Thorchain?
50:38 Speaker 00 I believe Thorchain was right, was in that case, yes. And honestly, and we've seen that playbook play out in Kelp as well in this recent, in this most recent heist.
50:47 Speaker 01 And they prefer Bitcoin just because of what, versus raw Ether? Because it's, it's got more connections into the kind of the, the OTC Chinese crime money laundering type world?
51:00 Speaker 00 That's one piece of it, that's one piece of it. The other piece, that North Korea over the years has been used to using some of the services that are on Bitcoin to launder funds, some, some of the more centralized mixing services. Obviously, we saw North Korea use tornado cash for years. We see that less so today on Ethereum. So we see, we see them, we see them do a lot of different types of, use a lot of different services.
51:22 Speaker 01 But then ultimately, this ends up off-chain. So they're not keeping the Bitcoin in Bitcoin. They are moving this off-chain through, you know, various nefarious actors, Chinese criminals.
51:33 Speaker 00 That's right, and sometimes it takes days to get some amount off-chain. Sometimes it takes weeks, but we've seen it in cases where it takes months or even years where North Korea, right? The, to me, the, one of the ways we can solve the money laundering problem when it comes to North Korea is doing everything we can to create a really strong perimeter, right? Because the challenge for North Korea is always, it's not just North Korea, these big butchering networks and cartels and others is, how do you off-ramp the funds? And they're looking to the weakest points to do that. Think Russia-based exchanges that do no KYC, that do know, that don't use tools like TRM to monitor transactions or don't care. We've seen Treasury actually sanction a whole host of these services.
52:17 Speaker 00 Think Chatex and Guarantex and BitsLotto and so, so many others.
52:23 Speaker 00 So we see that. We see Chinese-based OTC brokers where they're trying to off-ramp those funds. But to me, the real question becomes, how do we build that perimeter around crypto to stop these bad actors from being able to off-ramp those funds? Can I give you like a cool example?
52:40 Speaker 02 Yeah.
52:41 Speaker 00 So after Bybit, just exactly to your question, we saw the laundering, we saw North Korea move faster than ever before. It was clear to us that they had more access to liquidity than ever before. And I think that's a result of these Chinese criminal networks that are laundering the funds. And we basically said, how can we move as fast as they are? Because they were moving faster than compliance teams. That's the reality. We were seeing them move at unprecedented speed. We're seeing them do programmatic money laundering. So we reached out to Coinbase and Binance, to me, the most significant exchanges in the world, and said, how are we going to keep funds on-chain? How are we going to stop bad actors from using these platforms? And we formed something called the Beacon Network. And the Beacon Network accounts for about 85% of all centralized
53:26 Speaker 00 crypto today. So think Kraken, OKX, HTX, PoloniX, blockchain.com, crypto.com, Ripple, host of other services. But then we also added fintechs like Stripe and Robinhood and PayPal, DeFi protocols, RhinoFi, One Inch. And what we're doing is, and we married that group with about 70 global law enforcement agencies. And those law enforcement agencies are flaggers. So when illicit proceeds are moving in real time, they're flagging that address. And an alert, think Lighthouse, think Beacon, goes out to those exchanges. And when they get that beacon alert, they're required, as part of their membership, to
54:07 Speaker 00 block and ultimately work with law enforcement to seize those funds back. So, you know, we're definitely laying out a lot of the issues, like the problems today. But I think that like, we could do things differently and better. And, you know, you start to combine that with some of these other ideas, right? The offensive cyber, protect the perimeter, you know, use AI in our own workflows to stop bad actors. I think you start to have like a tech-driven response to some of this.
54:33 Speaker 02 With this perimeter concept that you bring up, how does ThorChain fit into that perimeter or break open that perimeter? What do you think about ThorChain?
54:44 Speaker 00 Yeah, I think it's a challenge that, I mean, part of what works on this network like this is that you have buy-in, that You know, no matter what your views are on centralization or your role in the ecosystem, that when it comes to really bad actors, we need to stop funds from, from moving off chain. We need to stop bad actors from using these services. I think Thor Chain has clearly taken a different view of all of that. That said, I think there's probably things that we could all work on together there. You're always going to be as, you're only going to be as strong as your weakest link. And I think those weak links have always been sort of like, for lack of better, like the non-compliant pieces of all of this. But I will say one thing when it comes to that, I was like, there is no one who's been
55:29 Speaker 00 sort of a more, no community of people that have been more supportive of Beacon than the DeFi community. You know, DeFi Education Fund and others, you know, I've briefed members of Congress with, with those guys, talking about how we can do better when it comes to sort of, you know, compliance and anti-money laundering than, than we can in the traditional world. Right? If you're a, if you're a DeFi service, that's a member of Beacon, and we have a whole bunch today, they're not working with law enforcement, right? Like, that, that's not the nature of how DeFi works. But what they are able to do is block funds that are going to hit that platform. And, and the bad actor might go elsewhere. But then what we want to do is we want to follow the money and then onboard that next service where the bad actors go.
56:13 Speaker 00 So my hope is that like, we could get as many people onboard here as possible to really build the most solid perimeter. But I think the DeFi community, like, look, I think, I think at the end of the day, it's like, you want to solve problems using the technology, not over-regulating the space.
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58:02 Speaker 01 Eric, this is where I sort of don't have it settled in my own mind. And I'm just curious kind of what you think here, right? So I don't think anyone listening wants North Korea or bad guys or theft to happen on-chain. They want to see the bad guys get prosecuted. And yet, oftentimes, I mean, you mentioned like things like Ethereum and Bitcoin being a double-edged sword. You know, if you take something like privacy, that also seems to be a double-edged sword and cut against some of those things that you mentioned, which is being able to track and identify the bad guys. You take something like Thorchain, and your response seemed to indicate,
58:43 Speaker 01 you know, what you wish was that Thorchain would actually participate in kind of the beacon group and help stop some of this nefarious activity, right? And that implies maybe that Thorchain has some centralization vectors in their protocol in which humans can intervene or inject code or kind of do that. And I'm not actually sure if they do or not. That's kind of, take that as another entire podcast that we could talk about. I do know that there are some protocols where you absolutely do not have that ability, you know, one of which is tornado cash, for instance, which is a privacy protocol on Ethereum. Right now, we have a developer who's in a criminal case in the US about this, RunStorm. We've talked about that often. Then you also have entire networks, like, say, the Zcash network,
59:27 Speaker 01 which they sort of exist to be an encrypted version of. Bitcoin. And there is this move that like, I, you know, if you are a crypto user, don't you deserve, don't you want some level of privacy on top of your transactions? And by the way, this is a safety mechanism for legitimate use cases, too. It keeps out the corporate surveilers. It keeps out the possibility of, you know, people hacking you or even wrench attacks in real life. I mean, there's some real civil liberties at stake here when it comes to, you know, moving all of your funds being transparent and available for the whole world to see. Like, that's not, that's not a good steady state either. And so I'm wondering how you feel about some of these, we'll leave Thorchain aside,
1:00:11 Speaker 01 but some of these much more decentralized solutions to just encrypting all of the stuff that, you know, is on chain in a way that you can't see it, you can't track. I mean, is this just in your mind, giving a gift to the bad guys? Do you see some upside here? Like, what would be your take specifically on something like Tornado Cash or Zcash?
1:00:31 Speaker 00 I, you know, it's, I love the question. And honestly, I think it's the most important question that we've been grappling with as an industry over the last, let's say, three or four years. It's interesting. I think the sanctions against Tornado Cash really got this conversation started in a meaningful way years ago. Those sanctions have since been lifted, but 2021, somewhere in that timeframe. Look, I mean, post 9/11, we had this conversation right on city streets and in airports. And I think today we're having it across blockchains. I fundamentally believe that in a open financial system, people are going to need and demand privacy in order to transact. None of this works without privacy. I'm not sure I'd say I'm a privacy maxi, but there are very few people who believe more in being,
1:01:16 Speaker 00 being able to transact privately than I do or we do at TRM. Couple of months ago, we put out a 70-page white paper on privacy, which I've encouraged folks to read. It's awesome. And it really goes into like, how to leverage this technology. So I'll tell you just really quickly, sort of how I think about this. First, at TRM, we don't associate individuals with their alphanumeric address. We would never say, hey, that's Ryan's address. That's David's address. We associate addresses with really two categories. Entities, so lawful entities like Coinbase or Tornado Cash or Uniswap, and illicit activity, terror financing, sanctions, North Korea. In order to get the underlying user information,
1:02:00 Speaker 00 That individual would have to transact with some type of centralized service and law enforcement would be able to serve a subpoena lawful process in order to get that underlying user information. So that's that's sort of one way I think about this. I don't think we should ever be in a world where we're associating individuals with their alphanumeric crypto addresses. I think it becomes dangerous when people are associating those addresses with themselves on social media and other places. And I think that's when you talk about ranch attacks, that's sometime someplace I preach about being very, very careful on. The other pieces I think we need to leverage the technology, right? I think the challenge for regulators and policymakers and all of us is how do we stop bad actors from using services like tornado cash, but allowing lawful users to use them
1:02:45 Speaker 00 for the privacy they need for all the things that you mentioned, right? Dissidents, you know, corporate surveillance, you know, humanitarian aid. Quite frankly, the US government sending funds to informants in in war zones, right? We need that level of privacy. I think the technology is the solution and I really lean into beacon. Beacon is just about tracking illicit proceeds and blocking them and then allowing for lawful process to play itself out. And when it comes to DeFi, beacon's a great example of there's of how you can maintain privacy, right? That transaction is just blocked if it's illicit. Don't let it hit our platform. And then they've got to move to the next place in order to transact.
1:03:28 Speaker 00 So I think the technology is a big piece of this. I think the Canton network chains like it's just it's just one example now. And I know there's all kinds of interesting conversations around that. That's probably been a show or will be another show too. But it's not just Canton. It's like, hey, should we be building privacy chains that we allow that we build in tools like TRM? Should we be doing private transactions on permission on permissionless open blockchains? But that we allow some visibility into from from for money laundering purpose. So I say all of this to say, we're thinking a lot about zero knowledge proofs. I think could be such an important part of the puzzle. Just give enough information. To let a decision be made about whether an actor is good or bad without giving up
1:04:13 Speaker 00 all of your PII. So I think there's a lot, like, I really lean in hard to the technology and definitely not over, over, over regulating the space.
1:04:23 Speaker 01 I do think there are a lot of technical solutions that can get a lot of people what they want, right? Zero knowledge proofs. There's a riff on something like tornado cache, you know, people like Amin Soleimani, I think Privacy Pool, Xerox, Bao, I believe, is what it's called. And what they're doing is they use a ZK proof to prove that the funds actually aren't OFAC sanctioned, right? So they don't identify an individual user, but they prove any of the funds that go into this pool.
1:04:52 Speaker 00 To great example.
1:04:52 Speaker 01 Aren't from, you know, and that's a good compromise. But I still want to push you on this.
1:04:57 Speaker 00 Love it.
1:04:57 Speaker 01 A little bit, which is just like, let's say you no longer have the ability at all to see any data. No government agents do nothing. Let's say it's a version of Ethereum and privacy maxis actually win on that. And everything on Ethereum has the ability to be completely encrypted without any, what, you know, privacy maxis would say, government surveillance or backdoors. All right. You lose this ability completely. It's, it's just like Bitcoin or Ethereum, except everything is encrypted. In fact, Zcash is kind of this model when they move into sort of shielded transactions. What do you think about that? Is that a net good? Is that a net bad?
1:05:42 Speaker 00 It's an interesting world, you know, I, you know, I think when, when we first started TRM or start thinking about TRM, I think one thing we knew fundamentally was that we have more visibility than we're ever going to have. You know, we, we used to talk about like how it was sort of one of these old Western towns where the, where you could see completely from one end of the town to the other, right? With that. And I think the vision is that we're going to have more cities. And I think we're starting to see that play out, although it's still early. And by cities, I mean where there's actually infrastructure being built in a meaningful way on chain, where you can't see around every corner, where it's going to be harder to have that full visibility. Is that a good thing or a bad thing? I ultimately like, am a big believer in the technology
1:06:26 Speaker 00 and sort of this thing playing itself out. I can't imagine a world where we've built this incredible technology where every transaction is trackable, traceable and immutable. And we can't add enough privacy for individual users to feel like they're not putting their credit card statement on chain. And yet, at the same time, ensuring that governments can stop North Korea, can stop terror financing. I'll say this, I mean, I think that this has been such a cool conversation, by the way, you know, and just thinking about the ground we've covered. We started talking about North Korea and attacking the DeFi ecosystem. I don't know that any of this works. I don't know that any user is going to put their funds on a service, you know, staking,
1:07:11 Speaker 00 investing, you know, their mortgage on chain. If we believe that North Korea can attack this ecosystem at scale and steal billions of dollars.
1:07:20 Speaker 01 Agreed.
1:07:20 Speaker 00 So I think that there's gotta be a compromise and the compromise might, it's not about privacy or security. I fundamentally believe you could have both. But the compromise is like, we need to be ensuring that we're using the tools to keep North Korea off these platforms, both. And it's not just North Korea, it's any criminal element. But North Korea is, is, I think, is the biggest threat right now when it comes to DeFi. But so my view is just like, from a pure market perspective, people aren't going to engage with an ecosystem where they can lose all their money, you know, at the click of a button. And I think we're gonna have to figure out how to sort of balance that. But I don't, but to be really clear, I don't think it's a security versus privacy balance. To me, you could have absolutely both of those things. You know, we've never had a financial system that is anonymous.
1:08:05 Speaker 00 And I don't, I don't believe we should, but we should have a financial system that's suit anonymous. And I think that's why crypto works so well in order to sort of like balance that privacy and security piece.
1:08:15 Speaker 01 One last question on this, which is respect with maybe a question with respect to, you know, who's responsible for this or where does the liability lie? It's been really interesting to observe the tornado cash from a storm case. And it seems like the prosecutors, DOJ, Southern District of New York are making the case that he actually, you know, was involved with this and partially responsible for money laundering due to North Korea's actions because he partook in developing this protocol. Then you had Last week, the acting Attorney General go to Bitcoin, a Bitcoin conference and say, "Code is not a crime. Non-custodial software developers shouldn't have to sleep with one
1:08:55 Speaker 01 eye open." And there's a question of like, if North Korea uses a protocol like Tornado Cash, or if they use DeFi, or if they use Ethereum, or if they use Bitcoin, are the developers who made these tools responsible in any way when bad guys use their tools? Have you thought about this? I'm not sure. Does your privacy 70-page paper like cover this? And what do you think the government actually thinks about this? Because on the one hand, they're saying things like "code is not a crime." But on the other hand, they're also prosecuting Roman Storm. And so I think the community is somewhat confused as to what the US government's perspective on this is.
1:09:36 Speaker 00 I think there's a range, clearly. There's really clearly a range. And I've been actually surprised with Attorney General Blanch's statements. And not just this one. When he was Deputy Attorney General, he also, he made a similar statement several, maybe a couple of years ago now. And I thought that would have a huge impact on the prosecution. It clearly has not. And I think they're gonna have to sort of work out where they're really, if they're really landing on, is this a policy position? And to what extent are US Attorney's Offices going to sort of need to heed it? My own personal view, I'm pretty aligned with the Attorney General with this caveat. And that is, we need to make sure the developers aren't conspiring with bad actors in order to launder funds. Okay?
1:10:22 Speaker 00 So if you're building a decentralized service, non-custodial, for people to use for lawful reasons, then no, you should not be prosecuted if bad actors are using your platform. Okay? But, you know, there are great examples of this. Helix, which was a Bitcoin mixer that was being advertised by a guy named Larry Harmon on AlphaBay, saying, "Hey, this is the perfect place to launder all these drug proceeds that you have on this darknet market." No. Like, no, that is...
1:10:55 Speaker 01 Like Kim Jong-un can't be your target user.
1:10:57 Speaker 00 Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's exactly right. You know, people may disagree with this, but Bitcoin FOG, similar circumstances. Okay? That, that, that service was actually conspiring on darknet markets with bad actors in order to launder funds.
1:11:12 Speaker 00 This is tornado cash is different. And that's what and that that's what's always been such an why this has been the most interesting question in my mind, maybe for you guys, too, in my entire time in this space. Because I think there's a challenge. How do regulators stop North Korea from using a service to launder billions of dollars? And yet, at the same time, allow lawful users the opportunity to do it? I don't think we go after builders who are literally just building tech or just building or just writing code. But at the same time, you know, I think a strong prosecution in this case, there would there could potentially be emails saying, hey, we don't care. We're going to keep doing this. We see the funds going through. We want our our service to be a place that is known for this.
1:11:56 Speaker 00 I haven't seen any of that type of evidence come out. But to me, that's the type of evidence you would need to really prosecute a case like this in a meaningful way. Intent, criminal intent. I mean, that's, that's, you know, that's, that's what our system demands. So if you have criminal intent, I don't care what you're developing. You shouldn't, you should be potentially prosecuted for money laundering conspiracy. That's different than some of these other money transmitter laws that I think also have folks concerned. But as a just a pure from a pure criminal standpoint, I'm most concerned with the money laundering conspiracy piece.
1:12:30 Speaker 02 We'd be remiss to not talk about some of the the biggest current events that are happening at the time of the recording, which is
1:12:35 Speaker 00 Have we not been?
1:12:37 Speaker 02 What? Even even more recent.
1:12:39 Speaker 00 There's a lot going on, guys.
1:12:40 Speaker 02 Even more recent. There is a lot going on. I'm sure I'm sure you've probably been the most busy that you've ever been with with just like North Korea, the Lazarus Group, always being persistently active. But with Operation Economic Fury out of the White House, I think there's probably also something to talk about with Iran's use of just crypto in illicit ways. Just two weeks ago, $344 million of USCT on Tron was frozen. We mentioned that we're, I think we're all kind of confused about why they were using Tether on Tron, but maybe that's a different question for a different day. One of the big things that happened here was OFAC directly named the Iranian Central Bank, a central bank controlled wallet on the SDN list. And so like, just in the same way that like, you know, North Korea's Lazarus Group, these
1:13:23 Speaker 02 aren't like, you know, proxies, this is North Korea itself. We actually like sanctioned an Iranian central bank crypto wallet. So unprecedented. Can you talk about what it was just like to be in your shoes during a lot of this activity? I think you guys are on just the front lines here. You guys have a lot of the data. What's Operation Economic Fury like from TRM's perspective?
1:13:45 Speaker 00 Yeah, no, absolutely. You know, it's interesting. It goes to sort of what Ryan and I were just talking about to some extent in that this isn't only in crypto story. Right? You're not seizing 344 billion, 344 million of fiat from Iran. You may sanction the central bank, which has been sanctioned for years. Their entire financial sector is sanctioned, but actually enforcing those sanctions and getting back funds? That's an only in crypto type story. And, you know, it's interesting that you mentioned like that we're particularly busy. You know, over the last bunch of years, you know, every geopolitical issue, every major geopolitical issue in the world. Everyone's want to know what is the crypto nexus? So Russia invades Ukraine. It's how is Russia going to use crypto to evade sanctions?
1:14:29 Speaker 00 Hamas attacked Israel on October 7th. It was how is Hamas funding its operations using crypto? And this is the most recent example, but I think there's a fair amount to say. And that is a couple of years ago, you would see IRGC sort of one-off transactions, right? Hey, we have some funds. We want to send them. We want to try to off-ramp them. Israel actually seized about 100 addresses associated with IRGC a year or so ago. We've seen a shift and we wrote a piece on two UK-registered exchanges, ZX and ZX Ion, which actually ultimately were sanctioned after we wrote our report by the US Treasury Department. And essentially, to me, that actually showed a bit of a playbook.
1:15:15 Speaker 00 And that is, instead of just one-off transactions, Iran was using crypto infrastructure at scale. They basically were using these two exchanges to launder a billion dollars through them. So it wasn't just like, hey, we're going to send money. It's we're going to actually essentially use these as shell companies. At one point, you know, I want to say almost 80% of all transactions through these exchanges were IRGC related. So I think we see that. And then the Central Bank of Iran is sort of just the latest example where we see essentially Iran's central bank. You know, spinning up crypto addresses and trying to move funds that way in order to circumvent the US financial system. There's a couple other examples like this recently,
1:16:00 Speaker 00 where we're seeing with this with Iran, this reporting, which I struggle with a little bit around the Strait of Hormuz, is Iran going to collect tolls in crypto?
1:16:11 Speaker 02 Bitcoin, yeah.
1:16:12 Speaker 00 I haven't seen any really significant evidence of that, and we've been looking everywhere we possibly can on chain. But the fact that Iran is trying to experiment with that just shows that like, they're trying to do anything they possibly can. There was a report, there was a report today in the Wall Street Journal about the financial facilitator, a guy named Larr Johnny, that we actually name in our Z Sex report, who actually was released from a death sentence, I think, in prison 10 years ago or something in Iran, because he's so good at money laundering. And he has essentially discovered crypto. So he was the one behind Z Sex, possibly behind these central bank transactions. And
1:16:53 Speaker 00 he's the go to money laundering launderer for IRGC. So I say all that to say that I think, like, you know, we started with Iran, I'm sorry, we started with North Korea, we could go just as deep on Russia, to be honest. And now with Iran, we're seeing nation state actors really think through how to build crypto infrastructure, not just like, hey, we're going to send some funds to this wallet address that we spun up.
1:17:14 Speaker 02 The tension that I feel might be there is that crypto offers the good guys, you guys, the State Department, the FBI, a lot of capabilities and information and power to get some funds back. And you know, as you've been underscoring this entire podcast, like, only in crypto do we actually recover funds so directly from any of these state actors that stole it from innocent people. And I remember one of the reasons why the whole CZ Binance versus Department of Justice story was such a big story was because CZ was looking a blind eye, I think, towards IRGC and Iranian money laundering through Binance. Well, now Binance has been brought to heel. You know, now Binance is kind of like inside the fold of.
1:18:00 Speaker 02 The people who are providing data to the good guys, to the government. And so crypto seems to be like, as you've been saying, establishing a pretty strong perimeter around these state actors. But nonetheless, the state actors continue to use them. And so clearly crypto is benefiting the state actors in some particular way, despite how strong our capabilities are, the good guy side of things. Square this for me, like why if crypto is being such a good tool for information for, you know, the FBI and OFAC and all this. How come, you know, Iran and North Korea and China and Russia and all them? How come they're still using them? It seems like it's not actually good territory for them to do their operations in.
1:18:40 Speaker 00 Yeah, look, I think it's interesting, right? You know, the promise of cryptocurrency is cross border value transfer at the speed of the internet. And the reality is that like, for all the reasons it's such a transformative technology for remittances, for humanitarian aid, for payments at scale. Bad actors all too want to use it to move funds faster and in larger amounts than ever before. The difference is that we now can track and trace those funds. So the reality is that it's always going to be this cat and mouse game that has always existed between law enforcement, right? Bad guys can now move funds faster and in larger amounts than ever before. And and law enforcement now is going to need to to to track them.
1:19:20 Speaker 00 I mean, I think bad guys have always been early adopters of transformative technology. And I think we're in that moment right now with crypto and maybe even more recently AI. One of my favorite stories is that in 1908, the Model T rolled off the assembly line. And in that same year, we created the Bureau of Investigation, which is the modern FBI. Because policing had always been a local issue, right? But all of a sudden, bad actors could move cross border, cross state lines at unprecedented speed and scale. Think Al Capone and Machine Gun Kelly and Bonnie and Clyde. And we need to create a national police force in order to run them down. I think we're seeing that now, right?
1:20:04 Speaker 00 It's just a new technology that bad guys can now move funds faster than ever before. And it's it's a bit of this cat and mouse game, this whack a mole that prosecutors talk about. But at the same time, I think that bad guys are going to improve their technology and and so are the good guys.
1:20:19 Speaker 01 One thing I just want to clarify is, you know, David's framing in terms of bad guys and good guys, you know? It may not always be the case that your government is the good guy. And this is the entire reason we have the Bill of Rights and the Constitution and civil liberties and things like decentralized technology, like Ethereum and Bitcoin, is because when the government actually becomes the bad guys, you need freedom tools to resist their badness. And so far, we've talked in terms of good guys and bad guys. I just want to make it clear that the entire purpose of this technology and this movement
1:21:00 Speaker 01 is to have the freedom to escape centralized authorities when, as they become bad guys and as they move across that spectrum. One question I wanted to ask you about the Iran case and the IRGC specifically is why in the world they were using Tether and Tron? Because it seemed incredibly obvious in 2026 that they're just asking to get their assets frozen. And if their next maneuver is just going to be to do the thing that North Korea does, which is move their assets to something like Bitcoin. And then if they move their assets to Bitcoin and they accept the volatility, I mean, less
1:21:42 Speaker 01 volatile than their local currency, we might point out, much less volatile. What do nation-states do as a reaction to that? So the US government is the most powerful nation-state in the world. I was very interested in this exchange between a Texas Republican who asked the Secretary of War Pete Hegseth about Bitcoin, framing it as kind of a matter of national security, does he think so? And Hegseth said, yes, I do think so. And then he added this, "A lot of things we are doing, enabling it or defeating it," he was referring to Bitcoin, "are classified efforts that are ongoing inside our department."
1:22:23 Speaker 01 This is kind of interesting to me, the idea of defeating something like Bitcoin. And it just struck me last week that this could be the moment that cryptocurrency networks like a Bitcoin or an Ethereum Are tested in ways that they haven't been tested. I mean, part of the purported value of this technology is that they have sovereignty and decentralization and nation-state grade level security. And I kind of wonder if they will actually pass this test or not. And what Hegseth might mean when he's talking about defeating something like Bitcoin. So say the IRGC keeps their next $350 million in assets in Bitcoin on the Bitcoin network instead.
1:23:08 Speaker 01 Does the Department of War have a way to defeat that, to access that? Is that maybe what we were talking about earlier in our conversation? Like, what do you think about this?
1:23:19 Speaker 00 Yeah, that's interesting. I quite frankly, don't know what he would have been talking about necessarily with that statement in terms of the defeating piece. You know, when someone says something like that to me, and like, I am not an expert on quantum and I do not play one on TV. So like, that might be a really cool conversation for the show at some point. But I would say that's where my head goes immediately to that type of technology as opposed to the way I think about it. And I think about how do we harness the technology? How do we use open permissionless blockchains in order to do, you know, to go after bad actors? How do we create that perimeter to keep the funds from going off-chain for the use of weapons proliferation?
1:24:02 Speaker 00 How do we go after Chinese money laundering networks, right? So that's an interesting to me, that's an interesting one to me in terms of beating the technology. And I am not sure where I, I'm not sure the origins of that.
1:24:16 Speaker 01 So you're not aware of any kind of classified, super-secret way that the US government has to defeat Bitcoin in some way?
1:24:23 Speaker 00 I don't think I'm, these days, I am not privy to any. Of that type of information.
1:24:28 Speaker 01 If he told you, he'd have to kill you.
1:24:30 Speaker 00 If I told you, I would have still been in the government. I think that I'm long done with that life. But I would say that like, to me, it's always just like, hey, how do we harness the technology? And quite frankly, it's more and more AI, too. You know, I think AI plays a huge role in the way we can supercharge a lot of these operations. But in terms of like defeating the tech itself, it's like, no, we need to defeat the adversary. And that's what I just like, I always come back to that. Right? Like, what are we doing to go after the central bank of Iran? Right? I mean, literally, I mentioned North Korea hacked the Bank of Bangladesh years ago. Like, let's hack the central bank of Iran. Let's take the money. Right? So I think that that's really how I'm thinking about it always is going after the bad actors.
1:25:13 Speaker 00 And I was actually, I was a little discouraged, even on Twitter, which I should not spend as much time on or X. You know, there was a lot of, the conversation was entirely around what Drift should have or could have done, or Kelp could have, should have done. And there's plenty, right? And I think bringing in cyber from day one is absolutely critical. But my focus was was immediately on, let's go after North Korea. Let's go after Iran. Let's go after Russian cyber criminals.
1:25:38 Speaker 01 That would be so cool. I gotta tell you, that would be so cool.
1:25:41 Speaker 00 So if it happens, you know, or you keep hearing about Cyber Letters of Mark. Chris Perkins is awesome on this. Chris Giancarlo's written on this. This is not me being a crazy person talking about pirates. Like, I think there's some real, I know Tavano, there's a whole handful of other folks that are very supportive of this idea. And yeah, I'm excited about the prospect of it.
1:25:59 Speaker 01 Okay, so as we wrap this up and bring this to a close. So as I mentioned at the outset, April was DeFi's worst month ever, maybe over 600 million in hacks. I don't know about total volume size, but just in the number, there was one hack every 27 hours. Okay, so basically a daily occurrence. And one has to think AI is just speeding up and accelerating the efforts of these incredibly talented North Korean hackers, it seems like. I mean, they are winning right now. So what does DeFi do? Just maybe summarize this. If you're addressing everybody in the crypto space, who cares about it? We just had a DeFi. DeFi United campaign and it was fantastic. It was a coming together of all of decentralized finance and they were trying to make the Kelp Dow
1:26:45 Speaker 01 asset whole RS ETH and they did that. They raised 300 million in commitments. That was fantastic. And I just couldn't help but think like as great as this is and as fantastic as this is, if this happens every month, like we're not going to last. Okay, like this can't happen again, can't happen many more times. And so in addition to DeFi United being about kind of getting RS ETH claimants whole, we also have to have a DeFi United for securing our space. What recommendations do you have? Like, how does this get better? And if there is a happy case here, what do you think it looks like?
1:27:25 Speaker 00 Yeah, no, it's a great question. I'm not familiar with DeFi United, but I love this concept because I think that's where we have to go. And it should be more than kind of paying back lost funds. You know, I'm not naive enough to think we're going to have standards anytime soon for sort of DeFi protocols or developers. But I do believe that we could come together as a community and agree to best practices. You know, years ago, after Colonial Pipeline, the White House actually brought together community of businesses, the largest businesses in the world, and started talking about here are 10 bullets for what good cyber hygiene, cyber controls can look like. I think we need to do that for DeFi today, whether that's through this group or whether it's through something else.
1:28:07 Speaker 00 So it's not, it's best practices, but agree and align to them. I hope part of that is being involved in an information sharing, interdiction, disruption tight network like Beacon. So on the defensive side, I think it's a combo of like building out Beacon plus really, really getting granular on what DeFi protocols can build from the ground up.
1:28:31 Speaker 00 From a cyber defense perspective.
1:28:34 Speaker 02 I know crypto in some ways has presented challenges towards the State Department investigators just because of the way that it is. But as we've underscored throughout this entire podcast, it also gives them some tools and some assets and information that they didn't, that they don't have in the trad financial world. Do you think these, the state, FBI, CIA, OFAC, Treasury, do you think they are actually kind of pro moving on chain in the sense that like, you know, let's get all the people on chain because it's actually a better substrate for us to do our job if more of global finance moves on chain? Do you think they think that?
1:29:13 Speaker 00 I do. I also think there's a certain inevitability around it, right? Like what's interesting to me, and I think that this is a very this moment state, every major law enforcement agency, many in the world, but certainly every US federal law enforcement agency, think FBI, IRS, CI, DEA, Secret Service, Homeland Security Investigations, they all have a cadre of investigators who are sort of power users of TRM, who have all the tools and the training and the true experts. I think there's, I believe, I think you guys do too, that there's inevitability about this space, right? Just in the last year with institutional adoption and so much happening, and we see more activity moving on chain, that means like, it can't just be a cadre anymore. It has to be like, every investigator has to have the capabilities
1:29:56 Speaker 00 because every crime is a financial crime, and that means every crime is going to involve crypto in one way or another. So my view is that like, yes, but they don't have the resourcing necessarily today that they need if that's the direction we're headed in.
1:30:09 Speaker 01 As much as I don't like North Korea, and I appreciate the work that you guys are doing to catch the bad guys, I gotta say, I don't know how encouraged I feel that the CIA and FBI wants us all to come on chain.
1:30:22 Speaker 01 So I will voice that at the end of this podcast that trust definitely needs to be earned there. But Ari, thank you so much for joining us today and telling us all about what is going on in crypto and for your work to catch the bad guys. We appreciate it.
1:30:36 Speaker 00 Hey, love joining you. Thank you for the conversation.
1:30:37 Speaker 01 Got to let you know, Bankless Nation, of course, none of this has been financial advice. Crypto is risky. You could lose what you put in, but we are headed west. This is the frontier. It's not for everyone, but we're glad you're with us on the Bankless journey. Thanks a lot.
Previous ROLLUP: Crypto’s Nasdaq Problem | The CLARITY Act | Saylor Selling? | ETH L1 Scaling Next How Long Will the AI Boom Continue? The #1 Question for Crypto Investors | Michael Nadeau Page updated October 26, 2026 · transcript and summary are machine-generated