The Lean Startup and the Long-Term Stock Exchange (with Eric Ries)

Season 5, Episode 10: The Lean Startup and the Long-Term Stock Exchange (with Eric Ries) Acquired closes out Season 5 and 2019 with a radical look into both the past and future decades of startup company building, investing and - yes, exiting - in conversation with legendary Lean Startup author Eric Ries. Nine years on from pioneering the now-canonical concepts of product-market fit, minimum viable products, and pivots during the aftermath of the financial crisis, Eric’s new venture at the Long-Term Stock Exchange represents an equally ambitious attempt to rewrite the orthodoxy of how companies and their investors manage liquidity, governance and alignment around longterm value creation. Like Lean Startup a decade before it, can LTSE help address some of the endemic problems in this generation’s startup ecosystem — excessive capital raising, stay-private-longer, dual-class founder hegemony, extreme illiquidity and quarterly earnings myopia? Tune in to find out! Sponsors: Vanta: https://bit.ly/acquiredvantaServiceNow: https://bit.ly/acquiredservicenow26Legora: https://bit.ly/acquiredlegoraStatsig: https://bit.ly/acquiredstatsig26 More Acquired! Get email updates https://www.acquired.fm/email with hints on next episode and follow-ups from recent episodesJoin the Slack http://acquired.fm/slackSubscribe to ACQ2 https://pod.link/acquiredlpMerch Store https://www.acquired.fm/store! © Copyright 2015-2026 ACQ, LLC

Speaker names marked ? are inferred from speaking time and the show’s known hosts — they are not voice-verified.

• 0:00Ben Gilbert?

  Before we start, Eric, I did have to say, did you intentionally pick a building with gigantic stone pillars and a marble lobby to start your stock exchange in?

• 0:10Speaker 01

  Obviously. I was like, what building is he talking about? Do we have, I'm completely blind to that stuff. No, I have not. I did not weigh in on the decor of the place.

• 0:33Ben Gilbert?

  Welcome to season five, episode 10 of Acquired, the podcast about great technology companies and the stories behind them. I'm Ben Gilbert and I'm the co-founder of Pioneer Square Labs, a startup studio and early-stage venture fund in Seattle.

• 0:46David Rosenthal?

  And I'm David Rosenthal and I'm a general partner at Wave Capital, an early-stage venture firm focused on marketplaces based in San Francisco.

• 0:54Ben Gilbert?

  And we are your hosts. Today, we tell the story of an incredibly ambitious undertaking, creating a new stock exchange, a long-term stock exchange, that is. Earlier this year, the LTSE was approved by the SEC as only the fifth body with such a license. And we have with us today, none other than the founder and CEO, Eric Ries, to talk about it. Welcome, Eric.

• 1:18Speaker 01

  Thanks, guys. Thanks for having me on.

• 1:19Ben Gilbert?

  Yeah, yeah, yeah. Listeners, you may know Eric's name from his popular 2011 book, The Lean Startup. The LTSE was actually started from an idea that Eric had while writing the book, and there are a couple paragraphs at the end that explore it. And eight years later, here we are with the LTSE as an approved national securities exchange and having raised $68 million from venture funds, including Andreessen Horowitz, Founders Fund, Floodgate, and many other top investors.

• 1:49David Rosenthal?

  It was super fun. I was on the plane on the way back from visiting my family for Thanksgiving. Pulled out my copy of a digital copy of Lean Startup, went through, and there it was, about a page and a half, right at the end.

• 2:03Speaker 01

  Right at the end, the very last idea in the book, practically.

• 2:05David Rosenthal?

  Yeah.

• 2:06Speaker 01

  Yeah, and you know, I knew it was going to be polarizing from the start. When I was writing the book, so this is now, go back to 2010, before the book even came out. This is, you know, when the idea hatched for me. And part of writing the Lean Startup, you can imagine, I felt a lot of pressure to eat my own dog food and use the techniques of Lean Startup in writing the book. So it was a very iterative process and I had a ton of testing and experimentation and A/B testing. And one of the final stages was I sent the full manuscript out to a lot of test readers from different audience archetypes of people I wanted to influence. And I'll never forget, one of the test readers wrote me back, he said, "The book is fine, except that there's one thing you have to take out. There's this idea at the end of the book about this stock exchange thing.

• 2:48Speaker 01

  And listen, you basically piss away the credibility you've carefully built up over 299 preceding pages. You just, you flush it all away in one, in one page. It's that bad, you must take it out of the manuscript." So that was its auspicious, its auspicious first reaction from a test reader. So that's when I knew I was on to something.

• 3:05David Rosenthal?

  Yeah, that reminds me of the, um, the Google story where Larry and Sergey were working out of the Rujikis garage and an investor came by, like a friend of the Rujikis to meet them. And they said, "Hey, we got this like company working out of the garage. You want to meet them?" He's like, "No, sneak me out the back. I don't want to talk to them."

• 3:24Speaker 01

  Oh, man. Yeah, yeah, every once in a while, you know, the conventional wisdom really serves you very, very poorly. And, and it's funny now because it's always been very polarizing, but what people don't remember is that Lean Startup was very polarizing in the early years. Now, everyone's like, "Oh, obviously, of course, we're going to, we're at least pay lip service to it, whether people actually do it or not, it's for a different conversation."

• 3:45Ben Gilbert?

  Yeah, Eric, did your, did your book coin the phrase "minimum viable product"?

• 3:49Speaker 01

  You know, I had never heard that phrase before, but in the years since, people every once in a while will dig up like an academic paper from 1984 or whatever, or somebody used it. Apparently it has been used, has been used before. But I think I am primarily the one to blame for the overuse of the phrase. MVP, so I apologize. Anyone who's sick and tired about hearing about pivots or whatever, that's also my fault.

• 4:09David Rosenthal?

  Mostly wave portfolio companies.

• 4:11Speaker 01

  Yeah, so to all your portfolio companies, I apologize.

• 4:14Ben Gilbert?

  Well, listeners, it's worth knowing before we dive in, the LTSE has an ambitious vision to fix many of the problems that they see in the public markets today, from short-termism, abrupt changes in governance from so-called tourist investors, and visibility into who a public company's shareholders really are. So we're excited to explore some of the company's disruptive, and as Eric, as you pointed out, controversial ideas today, and discuss sort of will it be a decade from now as widely accepted as the lean startup has. So listeners, we had an awesome LP episode with Vlad Magdalene, the founder and CEO of Webflow this past week. As with many of our LP shows, we went deep with him on the nitty-gritty of company building and what he's learned on his journey from building

• 4:59Ben Gilbert?

  the no-code website builder that has taken the industry by storm. You can become an acquired limited partner to get access by clicking the link in the show notes or going to glow.fm/acquired. And if you stick around after this episode, you can hear an excerpt from that show. All right, listeners, now is a great time to tell you about a longtime friend of the show, Vanta. AI has scrambled the whole security picture. It used to be that you proved that you were secure once a year on audit or a static PDF, then everyone would nod and you're done. But in an AI-first world, that doesn't hold up anymore.

• 5:34David Rosenthal?

  Yep, your risk surface changes every week now. A vendor turns on an AI feature, or someone writes in a new model without telling IT, and your posture is different than it was last week, let alone at your last audit. Vanta's own research found that around 70% of companies have this quote-unquote "shadow AI" running with no security review at all.

• 5:55Ben Gilbert?

  Right, and that's where Vanta comes in. They're the leading agentic trust platform, meaning they've built the thing that closes the gap. And the way that they close that gap is Vanta Agent. Think of it as a GRC engineer, that's governance, risk, and compliance, except that it's software and it doesn't sleep. It finds the issues, drafts the fixes, and cuts the time that you'd spend on vendor assessments in half.

• 6:17Speaker 01

  In half?

• 6:18David Rosenthal?

  Which is exactly why more than 16,000 companies today run on Vanta. Companies like Ramp, Cursor and Snowflake all stay audit ready and catch the risks that crop up between audits across every vendor, every AI tool, the whole environment.

• 6:35Ben Gilbert?

  And that's the real value. Trust has to be continuous now, which is why Vanta automates your security, your compliance and the work to earn and prove trust. We're huge fans of Vanta over here and literally hundreds of acquired listeners have become Vanta customers at their companies over the years. So you can get $1,000 off Vanta at vanta.com/acquired. That's V A N T A dot com slash acquired for $1,000 off and just tell them that Ben and David sent you.

• 7:03David Rosenthal?

  And now on to the long-term stock exchange. But before that, before the lean startup, you worked at a couple pretty fat startups.

• 7:11Speaker 01

  Oh, yeah.

• 7:12David Rosenthal?

  Much has been written and said, of course, about your history and how the lean startup movement got started. But when you studied CS at Yale, right?

• 7:21Speaker 01

  Yep.

• 7:21David Rosenthal?

  And then you graduated and you joined a startup at the time called there.com, which was an early virtual world.

• 7:29Speaker 01

  Oh, yeah.

• 7:29David Rosenthal?

  And I believe if I'm getting my history right, operated for three or four years without launching a product, just hiring tons of people, raising tons of cash and then burst out into the world. Like, how did you, you know, you're a senior at Yale. How did you decide, oh, I'm going to go join this crazy thing?

• 7:47Speaker 01

  So first of all, you got to go back in your time machine. I was originally in the class of 2000. So the dot com bubble swept through the world while I was an undergrad. But New Haven, Connecticut was like basically the last stop on the train before the whole thing imploded. So I did it. I dropped out of school and I did a startup from my dorm room, which, you know, could have, would have, should have been Facebook, but we didn't exactly know what we were doing. So we had kind of like the first half of the movie, The Social Network experience.

• 8:15David Rosenthal?

  Was it actually a social network?

• 8:17Speaker 01

  Was that, I'll tell you what I did. Tell you, think this is a good idea. We thought that college students from top universities, you know, Ivy League universities should create online profiles for the purpose of sharing.

• 8:28David Rosenthal?

  Sounds like a terrible idea.

• 8:29Speaker 01

  Which, which, that wasn't so bad. What was so funny about it, I mean, now I can joke about, of course, at the time, this is horrible, but we thought that they should use those profile for something serious, you know, a real business. So we thought they should create profiles for getting a job.

• 8:42David Rosenthal?

  Yeah.

• 8:43Speaker 01

  And we should create a resume database and share the profiles with employers who wanted to hire them. So we were very focused on-

• 8:48Ben Gilbert?

  Sort of like an evergreenmonster.com type work.

• 8:50Speaker 01

  Well, it wasn't job postings, but resume database. It was weird, like, in some ways, it was not like, it's really not a crazy idea. Like, we could then do analytics on to fit to match the right people to the right jobs. And, you know, like, there was certain, like, sensibleness to it. But first of all, if we had actually understood the concept of a pivot, and if someone had even suggested to us the idea that we could pivot into being Facebook, we would have been totally dismissive. Because we were like, no, no, we're trying to build a real business.

• 9:13David Rosenthal?

  Yeah.

• 9:13Speaker 01

  And we didn't really understand what a real business was. So we had no concept, like, the idea that there's like, the idea of a digital marketplace, or that, you know, then a tension-based product would be valuable. We had none of that, none of that insight. And, you know, it was very, very much of a, of a moment when people were building digital technology without a clear purpose as to why.

• 9:31David Rosenthal?

  Yeah.

• 9:31Speaker 01

  We just saw that everyone was doing it, and it's just, that's what we wanted to do. And so, so we did it.

• 9:35David Rosenthal?

  This is a total aside, but it fits right into that. Were, were you at Yale at the same time as Matt Kohler?

• 9:40Speaker 01

  Was that, I was, yeah.

• 9:41David Rosenthal?

  Yeah.

• 9:41Speaker 01

  I remember, I remember when he was a McKinsey consultant, trying to talk, we, we had, we had coffee one day. He's like, should I, do you think I should join the technology industry? And he was thinking about some things he could work on. So yeah, it's, it's a small club of people from that, from that world who went on to, to do good things.

• 9:56David Rosenthal?

  And Matt would, of course, be one of the first employees at LinkedIn, and then first employees at Facebook.

• 10:00Speaker 01

  Yeah, one of the most important Facebook early employees on the business side, really. And is a great VC now.

• 10:06David Rosenthal?

  Yeah. But anyway, that's, that's funny. You were building a social network for college students focused on recruitment, and he would go to LinkedIn.

• 10:15Speaker 01

  Yeah, yeah, exactly right. We could, if we'd had any sense at all, we would have called Matt and been like, what should, what should we do? What should we do? But yeah, I remember when he went to work, when he first went to work at LinkedIn, too. And I was like, I, what's, and I was like, well, I already know about the social networks, and it's never going to be anything, right? Like, the biggest problem in a being in, in entrepreneurship is you, you learn what's not going to work. That's not something that can ever be learned.

• 10:34David Rosenthal?

  Yeah.

• 10:35Speaker 01

  Because just because it didn't work before, doesn't necessarily mean it won't work the next time. And that's what

• 10:38Ben Gilbert?

  It's the hardest thing in venture investing.

• 10:40Speaker 01

  That drives us all crazy. You overfit on the data that you have access to. Anyway, long story short, I went back and my startup failed. So I, unlike the Facebook founders, I went back to school and finished my degree. If you've ever watched one of those movies about entrepreneurship where like the plucky protagonist goes back to the people who said it would never work. And they were like, you were wrong. I was right. You know, rah rah rah. In real life, you get to be the one to go back and be like, remember when you said I should not drop out of school because I think we'll have a come of it? You were right. I'm back.

• 11:09Speaker 01

  Thanks for that advice.

• 11:11Ben Gilbert?

  What's my homework?

• 11:11Speaker 01

  Yeah, it's a totally brutal and awful experience. But I love the process of being able to translate ideas into products like so quickly and the rapid pace iteration of a startup. So when I graduated, I was thinking about what to do next and I, you know, I was just applying to jobs. I didn't know if I would do a startup or I would go to a big company. I looked at, looked at a lot of stuff and my resume came across the desk of this crazy virtual reality startup in Menlo Park. And they flew me out and you know, we'd all read Snow Crash and the same sci fi books and they

• 11:42Ben Gilbert?

  It's coming. It's coming next year for sure.

• 11:44Speaker 01

  It's been coming for a long time and they sold me on this incredible vision, you know, with a pretty small company at the time that I joined. They had really high quality venture capital backers and I wanted to apprentice myself to the best entrepreneurs I could find. So I was like, this is an incredible management team. These people really know what they're talking about.

• 11:58David Rosenthal?

  You're going to learn exactly.

• 11:59Speaker 01

  I'm going to learn exactly what to do. All the things I did wrong, I'm going to learn how to do it right. And what's, what's quaint about the story now is that by modern standards, it wasn't even that big of a disaster. We raised so much more money now.

• 12:12David Rosenthal?

  The company actually chugged along for like 15 years, right?

• 12:15Speaker 01

  Like, yeah, it didn't, you know, it didn't, didn't die right away. But like, you know, I remember I used to tell people in my, like when I first talked about lean startup, I'd be like, the joke of their dot com is that raised $50 million with no customers. So, and people would be like, ooh. And now it's like, what was that, the seed round?

• 12:30David Rosenthal?

  Yeah.

• 12:31Speaker 01

  Right? Like, oh, was that, why is that a lot? I talked to like students now and they're like, they don't get the joke. They're just like, right? Then what happened? I'm like, no, that's, that's a lot of money that we set on fire. And they're like, what? So, you know, it's a very different era. But unlike today, we did not have any of the vocabulary or So we had no concept of minimum about product pivots, you know, continuous deployment, none of that stuff. So it was self consciously waterfall style development. By the time the product launched, I remember we had almost 200 employees. We had a whole warehouse full of customer service reps to handle the anticipated demand.

• 13:05David Rosenthal?

  This is a consumer.

• 13:07Speaker 01

  Virtual world startup. Product, you know, big nationwide launch TV and everything. And the only problem was that the customers never read the business plan. So they didn't know what to do. Other than that, it was a brilliant thing and it was an incredible team. That team has gone on to found an incredible array of startups and they've created, generated so much value in the world. So it was really a very talented group of people, but.

• 13:29Ben Gilbert?

  What companies came out of it?

• 13:30Speaker 01

  Arista, the.

• 13:32David Rosenthal?

  Oh, yeah, yeah.

• 13:33Speaker 01

  Network equipment company, the CTO there and founder was the CTO of their. Well, I shouldn't be name dropping, a lot of cool people.

• 13:41Ben Gilbert?

  Yeah.

• 13:41Speaker 01

  And I'm like, everyone I don't mention will be met by a bunch of the very early Asana people were there folks. Actually, and then a lot of their people were early Google employees because as, as there did rounds of layoffs, the earlier you got laid off from there, the earlier you wound up at Google. So the, the first people to get laid off made the most money by far. So it's just funny, funny how this, how this world works and no one should ever take investment advice from me. Because I had many friends that who went to go work at pre-IPO Google, they're like, hey, you should come check this thing out. It's can't tell you exactly why, but you should come and I'm like, ah, Google, what's it? Yeah. And I met my Matt Kohler told us like, I do this LinkedIn thing. Ah, what is that? Facebook, is that really going to be a thing? So I have turned down all the big, all the big opportunities in this era.

• 14:24David Rosenthal?

  And now you can pitch them to come list with you.

• 14:26Speaker 01

  Yeah. So and it's actually, but it turned out to be for the best because, because I wound up on a path that I wouldn't, I wouldn't trade for anything. But it's certainly, I mean, you know, if you're going to work in this business and especially if you're going to be in Silicon Valley, you will have to confront like the financial costs of the road not taken like every day, every year, all the time. And if you're motive, if you, if you get ego attached and you're motivated by the financial, it is a really horrible way, way to live. So it kind of forces you to.

• 14:53Ben Gilbert?

  Only look forward.

• 14:54Speaker 01

  Well, you can do that, although I think that can be pretty stressful too, or, or try to develop actual equanimity about the outcomes here. You don't really have control over what's going to happen and the uncertainty is so high, you can't predict and you have to come to accept that. That's a, if you're going to make entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurial ecosystem a career, which is really like, that's a new thing that's possible in history. Like that wasn't, that was

• 15:15David Rosenthal?

  It's even really new in the last 10 years.

• 15:17Speaker 01

  Yeah, very, very new.

• 15:18David Rosenthal?

  The time you're talking about, like you were the crazy one to come out here.

• 15:21Ben Gilbert?

  No, no parent is proud, you know, until 10 years ago that their kid is leaving a great education, turning down the job at the big company and making no money and starting a company. That's a new phenomenon.

• 15:32Speaker 01

  Yeah, yeah, it can be hard for the family and others to, to understand. But I think now we're starting to build up this idea that it can be a valid career and therefore it can have a certain kind of job security attached to it, even though the individual companies may fail. So I do think that's a very exciting, a very exciting development.

• 15:49David Rosenthal?

  So you leave there as it's all imploding around you and you start another company. I am the U and one of your investors is Steve Blank. How did you meet Steve?

• 16:01Speaker 01

  He was a there investor. So I was very lucky. I mean, honestly, I don't deserve any of this. I was very, very fortunate. The refugees from there, you know, a couple of them picked me to be a co-founder of another company and they were the ones that had the prestige and the relationships. I was just a junior guy on the engineering team, you know, what, what did I know? And so they recruited Steve and a bunch of other investors like, hi, this is a very Silicon Valley thing. It's like, I know we just lost you a ton of money, but how about you give us some more money and this time we'll actually make you some money. And, you know, most of the investors, like if you're going to be a good investor and you have an entrepreneur that you like, you can't let the fact that they lost your money deter you from making the next investment. They did that. He was one of them, but he, Steve's

• 16:43Speaker 01

  idea was, hey, guys, I don't mind setting some more money on fire here, but how about you guys audit my class that I'm just starting to teach at Berkeley?

• 16:50David Rosenthal?

  He was teaching at Berkeley at the time, right?

• 16:51Speaker 01

  Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. We were in the very first or second year, he was teaching what was he called customer development at Berkeley and, and my co-founder and I, which slept down from Palo Alto.

• 17:00Ben Gilbert?

  And that was a new phrase at the time. I mean, now.

• 17:02Speaker 01

  No one ever heard that phrase.

• 17:03Ben Gilbert?

  It's a whole discipline, but.

• 17:04Speaker 01

  I was in the room when a room full of Berkeley MBA students, every class session would like argue with him and push back and be like, this is the stupidest thing I've ever heard.

• 17:14David Rosenthal?

  I can so imagine that happening.

• 17:16Speaker 01

  And what was funny is that he came from an enterprise background. People don't remember Epiphany now, but it was a big enterprise software, you know, dot com phenomenon. And he would be presenting stories from Epiphany and the MBAs, like whatever you present to MBAs, they'll be like, sure, it would work for X, but it'll never work for Y, like whatever X and Y is, doesn't matter. So they'd be like, sure, old man, that works for enterprise, but how would it ever work for consumer? And of course, we then did it at Inview and then I would be teaching in business class. He would often have invite me to guest lecture in his class or whatever. And if I meet with MBAs, they're like, well, sure, of course it's going to work for consumer, but how would it ever work in the difficult world of enterprise? And just like, everyone could just pick a lane, pick a criticism that you want to have. No, that's not how it is. But it was considered completely crazy.

• 17:58Speaker 01

  Steve, I know even among Silicon Valley people, they thought he was nuts.

• 18:02Ben Gilbert?

  And the crazy notion at that time for him was that you need to aggressively listen to your customers and that it's not about your vision, it's about what they tell you. And then you need to inform your product roadmap based on customer discovery.

• 18:15Speaker 01

  He was arguing for a parallel discipline to product development. He'd had his like really raw thinking about what do you do if you're the head of marketing for a waterfall style engineering company? That is absolutely convinced that their product is going to work after they set all the money on fire and do the big launch. Like, what can you do about that? I remember reading it and I was being in his class, like you're being very derogatory towards engineers. This is not, Steve, this is not how engineers behave. And of course, he's like, oh, yeah, it is. I was like, no, but there's like a new generation and we're do agile and do this. And you know, he had never heard of that stuff. He was from a different, a different time. So it was a cool, it was a very cool meeting of the minds eventually where he was coming at this from a marketing view where you should have these customer conversations in a very disciplined way.

• 18:56Speaker 01

  And he was trying to get, bring some rigor to that marketing activity so that engineers will take it seriously. That's, I mean, that was really the whole point of it is like, how do you sit down with a very technical team and tell them, listen, with all due respect, we're building the wrong product.

• 19:09David Rosenthal?

  Yeah.

• 19:09Speaker 01

  You're doing, you might, it might be technically excellent, but it's the wrong product. And you know, Now we have much better terminology in theory and we've come a long way since those original frameworks.

• 19:18David Rosenthal?

  Was Steve in his thinking about this, was he influenced by crossing the chasm?

• 19:22Speaker 01

  Yeah, yeah, yeah. He was very into crossing the chasm and the innovator's dilemma.

• 19:27David Rosenthal?

  Yeah. You think about Jeff Moore and of course Steve and like I didn't think about this till now. They're marketers, like they're coming out of from a marketing background and like I wanted to ask you how you got inspired and I presume worked with Steve to then write the lean startup after like four steps to the epiphany was already out there. What was the insight of, hey, this can be bigger and brought to a broader audience?

• 19:49Speaker 01

  You know, I was just frustrated that I had never had a master plan to do this. I just like, I remember buying copies of four steps to the epiphany for like everyone on my team and be like, well, everyone read this on Friday, come into the office on Monday and we're doing it starting Monday. That was my like theory of change. When I was at Inview, it was my job to try to explain why we did things the crazy way that we did them. I came up from that during practice. So I was focused on speed of deployment, right? Continuous deployment, like what we would call now single piece flow from lean manufacturing applied to software development itself, viewing designed but undeployed features as work in progress inventory and therefore a liability. Untested, unvalidated assumptions are inventory and are bad,

• 20:34Speaker 01

  not good. So you don't want to build that stuff up. You want to flush it out as soon as you. So I would try to explain and I make up theories and I was constantly trying to come up with a language and a theory for why. But yeah, I certainly have been advocating for kind of like somewhat dubious and unpopular ideas. Like I have the staying power for that. And it took me a long time to even give it a name. Lean startup isn't even the first try, by the way. It took me a long time to find a way to talk about this that I could get civilians interested in, like process junkies and people who are into man, like those people are easy.

• 21:06Ben Gilbert?

  Academics.

• 21:07Speaker 01

  Academics, you know, whatever, but like actual work, people who work for a living, who are like, I'm just trying to get my job done today. I don't really want to hear about your 92 step process to whatever.

• 21:18Ben Gilbert?

  I don't want this thing to fail, but I do have a job to do.

• 21:20Speaker 01

  Yeah. And so it took me a long time. First, I ran the like employee orientation at Inview, like just explain to our own employees, why do we do things in such a crazy way? Why? So I've been in Inview for like, Five-ish years and you know, they brought us like very old like classics. They brought a professional CEO. We didn't totally get along. I was like, you know what? I'm not going to be the founder who has to be kicked out. I'm just gonna voluntarily transition out. So I was thinking about what do I do next? And all these VCs were calling me, hey, you should come be an EIR. Yeah, you know, I didn't like this is, you know, I didn't know what the career path in Silicon Valley was like. And so I was like, this is all very interesting. And I was thinking about what to do next. And this funny thing started happening where VCs would ask me to come meet with portfolio companies

• 22:02Speaker 01

  that were going too slow because I had this reputation because of Inview's engineering prowess that I could magically make engineering teams work faster.

• 22:11David Rosenthal?

  This is totally how the mind of a, you know, circa mid 2000s era VC worked, which is just like, oh, like these guys, they got some fairy dust. I don't know what I do. I don't know how this thing works, but like you just go sprinkle that over there.

• 22:25Speaker 01

  You got it. You got it exactly right. And I would be like, no, no, no, actually I'm not special at all. I just have this superior theory. And they'd be like, sure, sure, sure. But could you just do the dust anyway? So I go and have these meetings and meetings would go like this. The VC would tell the company, this guy can really help you. You should invite him for a meeting.

• 22:41David Rosenthal?

  A friend of the firm.

• 22:42Speaker 01

  Yeah, a friend of the firm, the worst. So then they have to do it. So they invite, call me, would you do us a favor and come have a meeting? Sure. Come meet the whole management team assembled for me. And I would start telling them stories about what had worked for us at Inview. And I would say, we ship software to production 40 times a day on average. And they'd be like, that, sure, that could work for like three, a three person team, but it could never work for a six person team or whatever, like whatever size N they were. It could never work for size N times two. And I'd be like, no, no, no, we doubled the amount we're doing. And they would start to get angry and they would yell. I would get yelled at in these meetings. They'd be like, that's crazy. That could never work.

• 23:16Ben Gilbert?

  Because they didn't ask you for the meeting in the first place. So I'm sure it starts in this.

• 23:19Speaker 01

  I didn't know what was going on. I thought I was just really bad at having these meetings. They would go so badly and the people would hate my guts and I'd be basically be like ejected.

• 23:27Ben Gilbert?

  You're like, you know what I need to do? I need to write a book about this because it's going so well.

• 23:30Speaker 01

  So I wish I had that. So at the end of the meeting, I'd be like, listen, you called me for this meeting. You asked me here as a favor and now you're mad at me and you just like, I'm not telling you a theory. I'm just telling you a story of what I witnessed with my own eyes. You think I'm lying like what? So that kept happening to me and I had this great idea. If I write some of these stories down. Then the next time somebody calls me for one of these meetings, I can say, hey, why don't you read this first? And if you think I'm crazy, maybe let's not have the meeting and then I don't get yelled at. This was my genius plan. Okay, that's how far ahead I was thinking. So the other thing you don't understand about that time is startup people didn't blog.

• 24:06David Rosenthal?

  Yeah, blogging was.

• 24:07Speaker 01

  Nobody had a blog. I was one of those, I can tell you all the bloggers who were writing in Silicon Valley at that time. Because when I started blogging, they all reached out to me. Because I showed up in their HTTP refer logs and these blogs were so low traffic. They could tell when a new person entered the scene. Dave McClure, Sean Ellis and Andrew Chen all called me within a month of my starting to blog. To be like, what's up? Who are you? And of course, they were asking, who are you? Because I did not put my name on my blog because I was embarrassed about it. It was anonymous.

• 24:37Ben Gilbert?

  What was your blog called?

• 24:38Speaker 01

  It was called Startup Lessons Learned in the Passive Voice, not by anybody. They had been learned. The startup had learned its own lesson somehow mysteriously. And, uh, and that's how it started. And then people wanted to know who I was and they wanted to hear what I had to say. And I was like, well, I better give this theory a name. And I started talking about it just lean startup and.

• 24:57David Rosenthal?

  And what were the concepts of MVPs and pivots? Had you already started to crystallize those at this point or did that come through?

• 25:05Speaker 01

  Yeah, yeah, I did. But it wasn't like crystal clear. It was like I had this constellation of concepts, some of which have been long since, you know, left behind. Like I was every bit as excited about teaching people about engagement loops, which is the retention flip side of viral loops, which nobody wanted to hear about that. Viral loops were too complicated. And I was like, but that's just as important. And so, you know, the concept that really landed for people.

• 25:25Ben Gilbert?

  Is actually still a failing of startups today is everyone focuses on getting your CAC down. So few people focus on retention and even less people focus on like revisiting pricing strategy. Like you have all these different levers.

• 25:37Speaker 01

  These things are unbelievably mispriced. I've never worked at a startup where a very simple set of experiments around pricing hasn't revealed dramatic differently economics. That's, uh, it's embarrassing. You know, it was just a very special time where there was an incredible hunger for new ideas about entrepreneurship and this thing wound up taking over my life.

• 25:53David Rosenthal?

  Wow.

• 25:54Speaker 01

  It was a wild experience.

• 25:55David Rosenthal?

  I know we're spending a bunch of time with it, like this, like this really changed the fabric of the ecosystem. Like in reflecting back on it, can you identify like what were some of the winds that were in the air at that point in time? That like people were hungry for this different way of thinking about startups?

• 26:13Speaker 01

  Yeah, it's hard to remember now, but 10 years ago was the financial crisis.

• 26:16David Rosenthal?

  Yeah.

• 26:17Speaker 01

  Remember RIP good times and the whole thing? So first of all, it was very convenient to be known as the lean startup guy at a time when Sequoia Capital telling everyone to cut costs. And I got a lot of phone calls from founders who would be like, hey, I heard you can help me get out of my office lease.

• 26:31David Rosenthal?

  That's not the point.

• 26:32Speaker 01

  Can you help me with repo on furniture? Like, how do I get rid of these Aaron chairs to lower my burn rate?

• 26:37Ben Gilbert?

  Different lean, buddy.

• 26:37Speaker 01

  Yeah. And what's funny is I would tell people, he would call me for these for advice on on burn. I say, listen, the build measure to learn feedback loop, the reason it's important is we can analyze every dollar you spend and we can ask ourselves, is that dollar helping us learn critical things that you need to know right now about your company or not? If it is, it's worth spending on. And if it's not, you should cut it, whether it's a crisis or not. It's pure waste, so just don't do it. And you can imagine the furniture guys would be like, uh, thanks. Thanks for that really helpful advice, buddy. Like, anyway, but my office, Lee, right? Like, I don't want this, like, there are people not very theory oriented. So it took me a long, long time to figure out how to make this practical for folks that they could actually do it. And I know, I mean, I really never dreamed that it would have the kind of impact that it did. It's quite a moving thing, actually.

• 27:22Ben Gilbert?

  All right, listeners. Now is a great time to thank our longtime friend of the show, ServiceNow. If you are running a large enterprise, AI agents are likely spread across every team and deploying them is no longer the hard part.

• 27:36David Rosenthal?

  Yeah. The hard part is knowing what permissions they have, what employees are using them for, or what decisions AI is making. AI security for an enterprise at scale is not a small concern. Like, the risks are real.

• 27:50Ben Gilbert?

  Exactly. And the challenge with AI is governing it, securing it, measuring it, and making sure that it actually delivers value. That is why ServiceNow built the AI Control Tower.

• 28:00David Rosenthal?

  Yep. AI Control Tower gives enterprises a single place to see, manage, govern, and optimize AI across the entire business. And it works with any AI, not just theirs. Every device on your network, every permission across every system, every AI agent, visible and secure in one place.

• 28:18Ben Gilbert?

  And ServiceNow can do this because they've spent more than 20 years building the operational backbone of the enterprise, the workflows, governance, approvals, security controls, and institutional knowledge that power how work actually gets done across IT, HR, customer service, finance, and security.

• 28:34David Rosenthal?

  ServiceNow already runs more than 100 billion workflows annually and trillions of transactions for more than 85% of the Fortune 500. So when companies need a place to govern AI at enterprise scale, they're building on a platform at the center of how their business already operates.

• 28:51Ben Gilbert?

  And in a future that isn't going to be one AI, it's going to be thousands of AI agents working across every function of the company. But the question is, who's managing them all?

• 29:00David Rosenthal?

  So if you're trying to turn AI ambition into real business outcomes and make it work safely, securely, at scale, go check out servicenow.com/acquired and tell them that Ben and David sent you.

• 29:11Ben Gilbert?

  I want to tell this story in medias res a little bit. So the natural next question would be, how did this lead to starting LTSE? But I think to set the stage for listeners, Eric, can you give us a high level overview of what on earth are you doing? And then let's get to how did you get here and why?

• 29:27Speaker 01

  Oh, so what am I doing now?

• 29:28Ben Gilbert?

  Yeah, what is the LTSE?

• 29:29Speaker 01

  So one of the privileges of getting to work with so many companies, I mean, I have, you name an order of magnitude of company, from like two founders in a garage up to the biggest multinationals and governments in the world. And I've had the privilege over the last 10 years of working with all of them.

• 29:46David Rosenthal?

  Because once the lean startup hits and becomes a thing, it's not just startups that want to talk to you, right?

• 29:51Speaker 01

  No, I mean, it's huge, huge companies and nonprofits and NGOs. Like, we can talk about, there's a whole community of people that study lean startup for national defense within the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance across nations. I mean, it's crazy how many places this thing has gone. And in particular, many of the early startups, who were just two people in a garage when they first heard about lean startup, they grew and got to product market fit. So I mean, I was really a privilege to get to work with some of these companies as they scaled up and then yet to be called into these much bigger companies. And it's like, there are some things that are different at 10 people, 100, 1,000, 10,000, 100,000, 300,000, you know, a million or more. But there's some things that are very consistent. And so I had had this experience. And to me,

• 30:32Speaker 01

  it felt like being issued a backstage pass to capitalism. Like, I get to see how business, I have lived in California, practically my whole life. And now here I am traveling the world and getting to see all these Problems and no matter where you go, no matter who you talk to, if you say like, what are the problems that afflict your organization? Like be everyone's like a short termism. We're living quarter to quarter. You know, we can't make the right investments. We're not really focused on the long term. We have bad ownership. They don't have constancy of purpose. Like it's just a epidemic problem.

• 31:05David Rosenthal?

  Could read Elon Musk's Twitter feed here.

• 31:07Speaker 01

  Or wherever. I mean, it's just, it's something, it's like one of the very few things that pretty much everyone in business agrees on. And yet, if you ask people, what are we going to do about it? It's like asking, what are we going to do about gravity? You're not going to do anything about it. It's just a fact of life. It's like, you know, it's like, who do I complain to about gravity? Nobody. You just fall down when you fall down. Like, that's just how it goes. And so like, we've attributed, especially in Silicon Valley. We treat the facts of our capital markets and the infrastructure of our financial reality as facts of nature when they are in fact, human creations and they're changeable. And for whatever reason, this always struck me as wrong. So LTSC is our attempt to fix that problem.

• 31:50Speaker 01

  By aligning ourselves with the next generation of leaders of companies. Who have a very different value system than what's come before and their employees are activists. They care a lot about sustainability, diversity and equality. They genuinely believe, deluded or not, you know, like they genuinely believe that companies can be a force to change the world for the better. And they want financial infrastructure that supports that vision. And there isn't any.

• 32:17Ben Gilbert?

  Yeah. And so this is a

• 32:19Speaker 01

  Just crazy.

• 32:20Ben Gilbert?

  I know that the LTSC as a regulated body is very flexible in the type of guidelines. They defer to the entrepreneur. You let the company sort of pick a lot of the mechanics that they want to bring in. But what are some example ideas that you've had of mechanics that can change these things for the better? That companies who list on the LTSC versus the NASDAQ or in conjunction with the NASDAQ or New York Stock Exchange. What mechanics could fix this stuff?

• 32:46Speaker 01

  Yeah, so this is a very careful balance. And I've learned this over many years now of testing and testing and testing and refining this.

• 32:53Ben Gilbert?

  Really, you?

• 32:53Speaker 01

  Yeah, of all people, without which we would definitely be dead, that we need to have a principles-based approach here. So we need companies to say, I'm willing to sign up to these principles. For example, that the long-term investors are my valued partners and should be rewarded accordingly. That I'm going to treat all of my stakeholders as first-class members of my decision-making process, my employees, my community, my vendors and suppliers, my customers. You know, the acid test of certain companies in recent years is when you discover that there's scientific research that shows that your product is unhealthy and addictive for your customers. Are you going to do anything about it? Or are you going to bury the research? And like, think how different our world would be if

• 33:38Speaker 01

  certain companies have made certain choices that are different than they did make. Versus, like, think about an older generation of leaders, like when, you know, Tylenol famously had to recall all the pills off every shelf in America and how like, the short-term pain of doing the right thing.

• 33:50Ben Gilbert?

  And they didn't even need to, but they did.

• 33:52Speaker 01

  They did it because they might have been necessary.

• 33:54David Rosenthal?

  Yeah.

• 33:54Speaker 01

  Because they understood that earning the public's trust over the long run is far more important than the short term.

• 33:58Ben Gilbert?

  Is value-creative for all shareholders.

• 34:01Speaker 01

  Exactly right. So you can just pledge those principles, like, and be like, rah-rah.

• 34:07Ben Gilbert?

  Put it in your values.

• 34:08Speaker 01

  Whatever, put it in your S1 and be like, we're going to be so great and all this stuff.

• 34:11David Rosenthal?

  Which, every S1 of the last two years.

• 34:14Speaker 01

  It's unbelievable, right?

• 34:15David Rosenthal?

  When we worked.

• 34:16Speaker 01

  Right, and that's the problem. Investors take those aspirations and then they just put it in the shredder.

• 34:21David Rosenthal?

  Yeah.

• 34:21Speaker 01

  So like, this isn't even worth the paper you printed on, because how do I know that you're serious about it? So the idea of LTSC is companies should commit to these principles by making a binding pledge to operationalize each one. And the flexibility that we have created is so that it doesn't have to be one-size-fits-all, every company does exactly the same thing, but every company has to do something real, and we act as the certifying body to say, yeah, that's real, or it's not.

• 34:45Ben Gilbert?

  So you make it by sort of registering the implementation of such a pledge with you, it then becomes like a securities violation to break it?

• 34:55Speaker 01

  You got it exactly right. So there's real enforcement penalties if you don't do it. And therefore, only the good companies would do it. The bad companies would be crazy to do this. So you have like the perfect self-selection. That's what you want. So for example, one of my favorites is public companies today, generally speaking, don't know who their owners are. Which you can't run a private company this way, right? We obsessed about getting the smart money on the cap table. And the idea that when you go public and just give it up like, well, whoever happens to buy it, I guess it's fine. And I've met so many companies who like, they literally pay for a service. I love this. This is my favorite like euphemism.

• 35:28Ben Gilbert?

  Surveillance.

• 35:29Speaker 01

  Stock surveillance, like you're hiring the CIA to go suss out who owns your, cause like, no, you need to know who your investors are. Therefore know what they want, make sure that you're actually aligned. So we believe that every company has the right to know who its long-term investors are. But in exchange for that transparency, should reward them, should give them additional voting rights, should give them additional economics, additional superior capital raising opportunities, that, that kind of thing. So that's like, that's a principle that's like very high level, but we drive it down into the market microstructure and make it, make it real.

• 35:57Ben Gilbert?

  And so let's dive into those. What, what could superior economics mean? So if I hold the stock longer, my stock could become more valuable?

• 36:04Speaker 01

  Yeah, you could have a progressive dividend that's paid out preferentially to those who have held longer. You know, especially.

• 36:09David Rosenthal?

  There's no, I mean, for, well, as far as I know, all of history of equity securities, there's, there's this concept of preferred equity and common equity. There could be other classes of equity.

• 36:20Speaker 01

  That's correct.

• 36:21David Rosenthal?

  And those different classes can have different economic terms.

• 36:24Speaker 01

  Yeah, it's actually, it's actually a very old idea. And when you talk to like old timers in securities law and, and you know, corporate structure, they're like, yeah, sure. This isn't that like, this isn't like impossible to do. It's just practically speaking, we don't do it because there's so many forces that pressure people into conformity. And yet how ironic that we as the industry of innovation are hyper conformist and conservative about how we structure companies and how we make them, bring them to the public. And then now we've kind of stopped doing it. So now we're, we're so unhappy about the public markets. We're taking our ball and going home and we're not taking companies public until very, very late in their life.

• 37:00Ben Gilbert?

  Yeah.

• 37:00Speaker 01

  And how antisocial is that?

• 37:02Ben Gilbert?

  I mean, these companies don't go public for 15 years.

• 37:05David Rosenthal?

  When you were saying a minute ago about, I hadn't put two and two together either, which is funny because we bring up the financial crisis so many times on this show, you know, whether it's

• 37:14Speaker 01

  It really shapes everything that's happening in our era.

• 37:16David Rosenthal?

  Everything of this era. I think it's so right to say that shaped the desire for the lean startup movement. There also are like a bunch of trends, similar, huge trends in the financial world that have kind of led, I think, to LTSE. So I'll throw them out there and feel free to agree. I'd love to hear your thoughts. One, so first you have the rise of algorithmic trading in the public markets. So you went from, whether you were a value investor, a growth investor, like whatever, it was like people were hitting buttons to make trades.

• 37:46Speaker 01

  Yeah, no longer.

• 37:46David Rosenthal?

  Not that long ago. And now most, most trading and most ownership in the public markets are not people hitting buttons. It's machines hitting buttons and they hit them a lot faster and they care a lot less about the long term. Two, you have the rise of index funds, right? So now you have a whole nother class, which is a huge portion of the public equity market, which isn't even anybody making a decision. It's just a passive, you know, this fund is going to track the market.

• 38:11Speaker 01

  Oh, now we have the rise of passive funds. We have competing index providers who have different index formulas for what tracking the market is. So the active decision making has just been moved from the fund manager to the algorithm of the index provider.

• 38:25Ben Gilbert?

  Yeah, abstraction on abstraction.

• 38:27Speaker 01

  It's, it's getting wild.

• 38:28David Rosenthal?

  So now you have a situation, I think, in the public markets where what used to be a loud cacophony of voices in the marketplace voting on buying and selling shares, the number of active human voices has been reduced hugely.

• 38:42Ben Gilbert?

  So a lot less information flowing into the market.

• 38:44David Rosenthal?

  Less information flowing. And so you can be, if you're a loud activist shareholder, dissenting voice or whatever, you can now be heard in a lot. And if you move the stock, all these passive index and algorithmic trading is going to move with you.

• 38:56Speaker 01

  Yeah, automatically.

• 38:57David Rosenthal?

  You can have a huge impact on a stock.

• 38:59Ben Gilbert?

  And importantly, right now, governance is tied one to one with ownership. And so, you know, you could have these very short-term investors who just arrived who can vote and change control of the company, which makes sense. They own it. But Eric, LTSE allows for a different view on that. So can you talk a little bit about separating economics?

• 39:17Speaker 01

  Yeah, sure.

• 39:17David Rosenthal?

  Well, there was actually one thing real quick before that. So then you have Snapchat go public, right? Or you have all these companies going public now with these dual-class, multi-class share structures. Snap was like the most egregious of like, no, you guys get no votes. And I understand it as a founder. You're like, screw this. Like,

• 39:31Speaker 01

  Yeah, right.

• 39:31David Rosenthal?

  But yeah, what, okay. So what's the other path?

• 39:34Speaker 01

  Well, yeah, I mean, like, I get the view that if you can be emperor for life, why not? Pretty good gig. But I think it, first of all, I think it's really important that people should see the fact that founders are taking these extreme measures is a reflection of an extreme problem. Like, these are extreme reactions to an extreme problem. And I would, I would point to two of them. First of all, in the old days, when I first got into this business, founders were in the biggest rush to go public because their billion dollars about to become fully liquid and they would make a ton of money. The idea that you would put off becoming a liquid billionaire for 10 extra years. Like, that's not an act of greed.

• 40:11David Rosenthal?

  Yeah.

• 40:11Speaker 01

  There's something else is going on here, right? People are putting off their own mega payday. Now, you know, of course, there are secondary transactions and people, it's like, they're not starving or anything, but like, generally speaking, highly capitalistic and competitive people would rather have $1 billion than like $50 million, and they're choosing not to do that.

• 40:28David Rosenthal?

  And, you know, the founders are one thing, right? But like, the venture investors, right? Like, you're a venture-

• 40:34Speaker 01

  Who would have thought?

• 40:35David Rosenthal?

  Ben and I run funds, you know? Man, we would really like to distribute returns to RLPs so that we can raise new funds, but like-

• 40:43Speaker 01

  And that, and that would actually be better for the ecosystem as a whole. Like, one of the problems we're having is all these early returns are frozen, they're not being recirculated like they used to be. And so, there's not as much, even though we have a lot of seed stage activity right now, we could have exponentially more if we would unfreeze all these, all these transactions. And similarly, like, very few founders can actually justify perpetual dual-class control of a company, right? Even if you're like, I'm the greatest CEO that could ever happen. And it's supposed to like, well, even if you like, develop dementia, or like, even if your children aren't as good a CEO as you, they should inherit the company from you? Like, that's called feudalism. Like, we have, we have, like, a lot of political experience with these systems, and we know they're-

• 41:22David Rosenthal?

  It doesn't go well.

• 41:23Speaker 01

  It does not go well, and most founders, you know, if you really press them in private, they'll say, I don't think this makes that much sense. But that's how bad standard governance is.

• 41:32Ben Gilbert?

  So Eric, what's an example mechanic then where, David, I like the way you painted it, that for a long time, economics and governance were really tightly coupled, except for companies like media companies where, you know, there was a reasonable argument of why a dual class structure should exist.

• 41:46David Rosenthal?

  You needed to be independent from the subjects you were covering.

• 41:48Ben Gilbert?

  Exactly.

• 41:49David Rosenthal?

  Yeah.

• 41:49Ben Gilbert?

  And so then the last five, eight years, we see this incredible rise in massive, massively separated classes where the founders own everything. There's no way to ever change that. Sometimes the common gets no votes. It's crazy. And what's a way that you could sort of have a middle ground here?

• 42:05Speaker 01

  Yeah, I think the compromise that I personally think is best is if you're going to be dual class organized, I think that's okay. But then you have to have a way for the long-term investors to join you in that privileged class. They have to be able to earn their way into the better class so they can join you in co-determination of the company. That's really in the company's long-term interest because except for the very few of these founders that are investing in immortality, everyone else is planning to die. So there will be another CEO of this company one day and your dual class protections will not protect them. So what's the plan for the next CEO? If you're really thinking about, I want to create a lasting institution. What's the plan? Why would the next CEO care at all about your ethos of multi-stakeholder development? Well, of your ethos of long-termism, like why they, right?

• 42:50Speaker 01

  They could easily be as good as you do of vetting them. They could just be like, you know what? My incentives are to run quarter to quarter. Screw this. So we have to rely on all of the long-term stakeholders in the company, including the long-tenured employees. And hopefully this next CEO is himself a long-tenured employee. But also the long-term investors should all have a superior voting opportunity, just like you do as a founder.

• 43:11Ben Gilbert?

  So you could imagine like every quarter that you hold the stock at adding some multiplier to the amount of votes you get or something like that?

• 43:17Speaker 01

  Exactly. Like the LTSE software makes it possible for companies to design programs like this because they can track the long-term ownership in real time. And if you trade out, you automatically...

• 43:27David Rosenthal?

  And if you know who the investors are, whereas today, like you don't know.

• 43:30Speaker 01

  Yeah. Okay. So like, we don't mandate this specific voting system because, you know, it's controversial. And there are some people who they think like one share, two votes. It's like, there was a big Wall Street Journal article about this one called One Share, Two Votes, basically. Like how hedge funds, they borrow extra money like right at the last second before a proxy contest to get extra votes like that day. And then get her, it's just like, I think that's indefensible, but I, but that's currently allowed under the rules. So there's kind of a, a big debate about like, what's the best system? And I kind of feel like, because none of these systems is exactly right, we should just, we should have more experimentation with different models till we find the right one. I happen to like this particular one, but it, you know, that would make sense for like a Google type company that really has

• 44:09Speaker 01

  control and, you know, is founder owned and I could see that making sense. I could imagine different, different scenarios for other companies. And I could imagine a smaller cap company saying, you know, we don't want to mess around with vote. Voting control isn't even really our issue. The issue is just creating an incentive for people to be long-term investors and so let's do something like a progressive dividend. So, so I'm not ideological about it. I just think like neither side can really justify what it's advocating for. And we like this, you see this a lot in ideological battles where everyone's like drawn to more extreme positions because

• 44:38Ben Gilbert?

  No.

• 44:39Speaker 01

  They, they don't, they feel like if you give those people an inch, they'll take the whole thing. Right? And so now not to make any meta-commentary here.

• 44:46Ben Gilbert?

  It's interesting. I mean, let's just say what it is. Like we're making sort of interesting political allegories. And I, I've heard you describe this before as allowing your long-term shareholders to become citizens of the republic with you. And sort of, let's get away from this sort of feudalism mentality and let's say, look, if you want to go on a 20-year journey with us where you continue buying up your position in the company, you know, you help us make good decisions, you own this thing for the long, like, of course you should be more participatory in helping us figure out where it's going next.

• 45:14Speaker 01

  I think it's actually very logical and really a genuine win-win. So it's even a win for the quantitative guys. This was a surprise to me.

• 45:22Ben Gilbert?

  Whoa.

• 45:23Speaker 01

  A bunch of these quantitative traders, like they're, they're not immoral, they're amoral from the point of view of companies.

• 45:29Ben Gilbert?

  Yeah.

• 45:30Speaker 01

  It's not that they're trying to do something harmful. They just don't care.

• 45:33Ben Gilbert?

  Yeah.

• 45:33Speaker 01

  So I'll tell you a story. I was sitting with a quantitative trader once and I was like trying to explain the system to him and he was just like, I don't get it. Who cares? Why? He just was like, I don't, why is this important? And I was like, great. Imagine a hypothetical with me. Imagine one day in the future, you've engineered an artificial short against a company. And today the stock is down 10%. So you just made a lot of money and he was like. Yeah, you could just like see on his face.

• 45:53Ben Gilbert?

  I watch billions.

• 45:54Speaker 01

  Yeah, yeah. He's like, this is, this is an awesome story. Tell me more. I'm like, okay, do you realize that the next day, like 3,000 middle managers who work at that company are running around because there's a crisis. It's time to change the company's strategy.

• 46:07Ben Gilbert?

  Because the stock price.

• 46:08Speaker 01

  Because the stock price just tanked.

• 46:09David Rosenthal?

  We just saw this on the Disney Plus episode, like when Disney was, they had their earnings call in August 2015. And they were like, we're seeing disruption in the cable industry. Cord cutting is happening. ESPN is down. And they had plans for Disney Plus. Stock dropped 10%. They were like, we are accelerating the plans for Disney Plus. Now, in that case, it was the right decision, but like,

• 46:28Speaker 01

  But a lot of times.

• 46:29David Rosenthal?

  Even a company like Disney, stock price makes a lot of impact.

• 46:33Speaker 01

  So, so, and so the guy was like, he was like, it's like, why? He couldn't understand why anyone would care. He's like, it's just a short. It doesn't have anything to do with them. It's just, you know.

• 46:43Ben Gilbert?

  Their intrinsic value is identical to what it was yesterday.

• 46:45Speaker 01

  It was just as valuable and the strategy was, he's like, and I was like, so, so you are approving of your role in governance here and changing the company's strategy? He was like, this makes no sense. When I short cattle futures, the cows don't care. I was like, right. This, this guy is not someone who cares about governance.

• 47:00David Rosenthal?

  He's not trying to wreak havoc.

• 47:01Speaker 01

  His average holding period in a security is 10 minutes. So he was describing to me, when he, his firm had this policy that he hated, that if they get a proxy, they must vote the proxy. A lot of, a lot of mutual funds, a lot of firms have this view that you get a proxy, you have an obligation to vote. And it to him, that was like, I held it for 10 minutes and I was so unlucky. I was fishing and I pulled up a boot, right? It's like, oh man, now I have to vote this stupid proxy. I have no clue.

• 47:25David Rosenthal?

  He's trying to get his book down to zero when proxies, you know.

• 47:29Speaker 01

  He would love, he would love it. And so I was like, would you prefer, he's like, he's genuinely a tourist in the best sense of the word. He does not care. He's just passing through. He just wants to get the money in it. Like he's doing a technical thing. And so he would love for governance to be somebody else's problem. He would love to have that be completely divided. It actually makes sense to him. And then we talked to a lot of long-term investors, especially the, the big asset owners. We have built the world's most efficient trading system in history for trading 100 share lots. If you want to trade 100 shares of stock, it's awesome.

• 48:00Ben Gilbert?

  Yep.

• 48:00Speaker 01

  You want to trade 3 million shares? Oh, now you got huge problems.

• 48:04David Rosenthal?

  That's why stuff you gotta go, yeah, you wanna do that, you gotta go to a big investment bank and you gotta engineer a block trade.

• 48:09Speaker 01

  It's extremely difficult.

• 48:10David Rosenthal?

  That's happening off market when the market is closed, like all this kinda stuff.

• 48:12Speaker 01

  Yeah, it's really, it's very expensive and, and hard and, and for a lot of technical reasons that I don't know that would be of interest to your listeners. Most long-term investors are chronically underweight the companies they really believe in, cuz they cannot get the allocation they want. They can't get into the good venture funds, they can't get onto a roadshow, they don't trade enough, and then once a company is public, they can't do the large block transactions they wanna do. The stock price starts to go up, now they, they've like missed their target, so they're under, like normally in the old, old days, you would buy a big position, it would go up, you would take the gains from that position to buy more. But if you miss the train, now your target is behind and so you can't do it. So, so they, they actually can't get the ownership they want.

• 48:50Speaker 01

  And so companies, even in, even in some of these direct listings, we're seeing lots and lots of really good companies who just, they have too few long-term investors on the cap table. And it's not, it's not actually a good situation for anybody, and this is the craziest part.

• 49:04Ben Gilbert?

  Not to mention, those guys aren't setting the price, cuz the price is set by the trades that are being executed.

• 49:08Speaker 01

  Sure, and your employees-

• 49:08Ben Gilbert?

  And if you're a long-term holder, then you're not making trades, so you're not helping push the information into the market about what's-

• 49:15Speaker 01

  That's exactly right. So that, that drives way more volatility, way more confusion for employees. Your employees are generally your longest-term shareholders, and so they're watching the ticker every day.

• 49:23David Rosenthal?

  Every day.

• 49:23Speaker 01

  And I mean, it's just, I ask CEOs who've taken their company public, biggest change you noticed afterwards? They're always like, everyone's on Yahoo Finance every day now.

• 49:30Ben Gilbert?

  Is it still true that employees are the longest-term holders? I always felt like when I was at Microsoft, that like everyone was dumping their stock all the time, just like, I mean, if you're-

• 49:37David Rosenthal?

  Well, you're locked in because of your-

• 49:38Speaker 01

  It says a lot about the era that you were there. I could probably guess what years it was.

• 49:41David Rosenthal?

  You should've held that stock then. But, but you, you are by necessity because of your grant period, like you get a grant-

• 49:47Speaker 01

  Right.

• 49:47David Rosenthal?

  And then you vest into that over four years, so.

• 49:49Speaker 01

  Yeah. Well, and if you think about the concept of career equity, which is like, the really, the thing that, the financial term that dominates most employees of most organizations' compensation is their perception of future promotion opportunities. People that are trying to make a career out of place are very long that place's survival. And so for them to, I think it's actually like toxic for them to be on Yahoo Finance. Finance. So like if you use longer term compensation instruments, we obviously we sell software to companies to provide the information to employees in a better way. But if you know, for example, if you know in real time, what the long term investors are doing as a class, then you can report to your own employees, here's the, here's the price as perceived by our long term investors with all noise removed. And you'll realize that like

• 50:34Speaker 01

  most days, nothing happened. The fundamental of the company. So like my dream one day is to have a big ticker somewhere where the same number just goes by, no doubt industrial average. And it's just the same number going by because most days, nothing happened. All this noise is just that. It's, it's just noise. And when something does happen, it's news.

• 50:50David Rosenthal?

  The private markets have gotten so perverted now that like what I'm about to say is very much idealist versus reality, but it's kind of like the private markets and venture investing, right? Like an evaluation is assigned to a company, a venture firm invests at that valuation.

• 51:06Speaker 01

  You go work for a while, 12, 18 months later.

• 51:09David Rosenthal?

  Months go by before there's another step change in valuation.

• 51:12Speaker 01

  Yeah. I mean, I know a lot of founders that no one in DC and a lot of people in New York can't believe this, but I know a lot of founders who don't think there should be continuous trading, right? Like you think about like how Elon Musk runs SpaceX. There's a regularly scheduled, company driven auction where people can buy in or a sell. The company sets the price. It's extremely restrictive as a regime. And there's a reason like he's so unhappy in the public markets. He also has this thing in the private market. He's in complete.

• 51:36Ben Gilbert?

  Talk about a company that'll probably never go public.

• 51:38Speaker 01

  Yes, that's what he, that's what he said.

• 51:40David Rosenthal?

  Well, so that's, so this is the other trend I wanted to get your thoughts on. Really, I think probably since you've started LTSE, this whole massive expansion of the private markets, staying private longer, you know, people, we've talked about on the show before, I remember when, when Dave Goldberg was CEO of Survey Monkey and he said, I'm never taking this company public. We're going to be private for life. And obviously now they're a public company. So that's different, but Dave sadly no longer with us. How have you guys learned through all of this change that's happened as you've been building LTSE?

• 52:12Speaker 01

  I was talking to a VC five years ago and he said to me, Eric, I just don't get it. If private companies can raise unlimited capital on whatever terms they want, whenever they want, with no disclosure requirements, no accountability, no publicity, why would they go public? And I was like, great, let's let us interpret your sentence as a bit field. And let's make each clause of those a bit. I agree, but when all the switches are set to true, you're right. Like really, like there's a thermostatic equilibrium that exists at all times between the private and public markets. And if you make being private relatively more attractive or being public relatively less attractive, you will cause more gas to stay in one side of the chamber than the other. So companies will be private long.

• 52:57Speaker 01

  It's like a very, very predictable consequence of policy choices that we've made as a society. I was like, do you honestly believe that all those bits will be true forever? And he was like, I'm not sure. I was like, well, why don't you call me back? When the, when the bleep hits the fan, because this is coming. And the time to have invested in a solution to this problem is not the day that everything crumbles, but five years ahead of time. So you should really be investing in LTSE and it didn't work. But, but other far sighted investors saw it that way. And now here we are. And all, every one of those things is under, under threat, right? We have seen all kinds of mismanagement.

• 53:32David Rosenthal?

  We've covered WeWork, you know?

• 53:33Speaker 01

  You know?

• 53:33David Rosenthal?

  And it was.

• 53:34Speaker 01

  Not to name any names, but we have seen horrible mismanagement in the private markets. We've seen valuations that are totally out of control. And, and my personal pet peeve that I don't think enough attention is being spent to is we're seeing a large number of secondary transactions with relatively high volumes, at high valuations with no disclosure and information asymmetry. And like my grandparents lived through the depression and they told me, like, these were like spooky stories for me growing up as a kid. For my, I was like, well, did everyone else not have grandparents that lived through the depression? And they not tell them these stories? I look around and I think, I have heard these stories before. This isn't right. There's a reason that our grandparents worked out the system the hard way. That, you know, large block transactions should come with account, with accountability and transparency. And that's how you prevent fraud.

• 54:16Speaker 01

  And I think as more and more of these stories come out, it's going to be, it's going to be pretty grim.

• 54:21David Rosenthal?

  I think for, for LTSE, what's really the most interesting piece of the WeWork saga is the last gasp, you know, save that they tried.

• 54:32Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 54:32David Rosenthal?

  Was an IPO.

• 54:34Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 54:35David Rosenthal?

  Yeah, when you're scraping the bottom of the barrel of options.

• 54:38Ben Gilbert?

  Like, wow, we can't, yeah, all those, or many of those bits seem to have flipped the other way. And so now we need to, you know, jam it out the door.

• 54:44David Rosenthal?

  Yeah, yeah, exactly.

• 54:46Speaker 01

  Yeah, no, that's not, that's not the way to go. And a big, big part of our mission at LTSE is to get companies to adopt good governance from a very early age.

• 54:53David Rosenthal?

  Yeah.

• 54:53Speaker 01

  So we run by far the largest corporate governance platform for startups. But we don't call it that, right? Because you can't sell startups on corporate governance. Corporate governance is extremely poorly marketed.

• 55:03David Rosenthal?

  I cannot wait.

• 55:04Speaker 01

  Give me, give me some corporate governance, but let me tell you like.

• 55:06Ben Gilbert?

  What is that, the, the largest?

• 55:08Speaker 01

  So, so we go to market under a variety of brand names for distinct problems that founders face. So like for RNA evaluations and cap table management, runway planning. I can't tell you how many startups I meet with, don't know how much runway they have. It's like cardinal sin number one. Don't guess, don't have some finance person.

• 55:23Ben Gilbert?

  Especially before you have a board.

• 55:24Speaker 01

  You better, you better know, but most founders don't. We do option planning and hiring planning, which again, most founders don't, don't.

• 55:32Ben Gilbert?

  And so these are all individual SaaS.

• 55:33Speaker 01

  Individual tools, yeah. So you can go to captable.io, fast4na.io, hiringplan.io, startuprunway.io. And.

• 55:41Ben Gilbert?

  Sensing a trend.

• 55:42Speaker 01

  Yeah, they're like, we're very, very straightforward naming and very consistent. And then, you know, the tools are part of a common, a common platform. And, you know, we build them for founders to use themselves. So it's a high focus on usability and design. And you don't have to have a GC or a CFO to use them for you. It's just, we're just trying to take as much cost out of the ecosystem as we can. But then while we have you there, it's like while you're, I'll give you an example. Our hiring plan product has completely free compensation data for market data for startups. So you can figure out for every job, your every job offer you're giving, we can tell you exactly what the 25th, 50th and 70th percentile cash and equity grants are for your stage, your geography, your industry.

• 56:17Ben Gilbert?

  Is that just open or do you require like?

• 56:19Speaker 01

  It's completely free. You just go to hiringplan.io, you can just sign up for it right now. It doesn't cost you nothing.

• 56:23David Rosenthal?

  That's such a like Zillow type thing where like all that data exists. Right now startups are paying a lot of money for that data.

• 56:29Speaker 01

  It's like, no, that's not needed. So we just, we get it and we, we do it free. And then while you're there. Wouldn't you like to know if your offer letters that you give are at market or not? Sure you would. Well, while you're checking that, would you also like to split it up by demographics? Wouldn't you like to know if you have bias in your offer letters? Now, most founders are like, of course, I don't have bias. I run a perfect meritocracy. It's like, well, then, great. The analysis will show what a great meritocracy you are, and then you'll feel good about yourself. But if it doesn't, wouldn't it be a lot cheaper to solve the problem now versus when you're reading about it in the Wall Street Journal five years from now? And think how expensive these problems get when they're allowed to fester. So we really try to help people find their way to ethics and good governance.

• 57:14Speaker 01

  Because a lot of these mistakes are inadvertent. It's just ignorance. It's not malice. It's just people don't know better, because a lot of times, it's the first time they're doing it.

• 57:21Ben Gilbert?

  Yep. Well, this is a really good time to talk about, so where is the company now? You've got this license with the SEC. You have, I assume, a revenue generating business with all of these SaaS tools that are going to kind of help people prepare. No one has listed yet. What could it look like when people list? When could that happen? Is that allowed to happen right now?

• 57:39Speaker 01

  Not yet. So yeah, your listeners should think of us as having acquired the world's most expensive taxi medallion, but we are not yet driving the car around. So we got approved by the SEC in May. The bigger deal, actually, is we got our principles-based differentiated listing standards approved, I think, in August. So we're just starting to work our way through the technical filings now to actually stand up the exchange. It's quite an involved process to do this in a regulated way.

• 58:03Ben Gilbert?

  And this is a superset of the requirements to list on any other exchange, right?

• 58:06Speaker 01

  So much so that you can even do a list. So if you still want to go ring the bell at NICE, God bless you. This can be, we're happy to be the secondary listing venue.

• 58:14Ben Gilbert?

  So people could trade, investors could choose which of the exchanges they'd like to trade.

• 58:17Speaker 01

  And when people do an IPO with LTSE, whether we're the primary or the secondary venue, you get the same level of liquidity and access to liquid options for your employees. So there's no liquidity penalty.

• 58:29Ben Gilbert?

  So you could buy shares that were previously on the NASDAQ, if that company's listed on NASDAQ, and then own them through the long-term stock exchange?

• 58:38Speaker 01

  The literal words you just said to describe how that works are not 100% correct. But not in any way that...

• 58:45Speaker 01

  Actually, that's that's exactly the right idea. The protections at LTSC embodies are enacted through the company's charter and they follow the security wherever it trades.

• 58:54David Rosenthal?

  Cool.

• 58:54Speaker 01

  So it's a pretty, I think the hardest thing, the reason this company took me more than five years to figure out how to start is just the technical and legal challenge of combining full liquidity with those protections was quite the intellectual challenge, but we got there. So anyway, to make a long story short, we should begin operations in 2020. And then this is, we put long term right in the name of the company. So our employees and investors are like, you know, we warned everybody, but once we start operations.

• 59:21David Rosenthal?

  It's a good thing you chose lean startup instead of fast startup.

• 59:25Speaker 01

  Well, that's right. That's exactly right. We've been trying to make this point for a long time that that lean doesn't mean fast in an absolute sense, but just fast compared to the industry that you're in. So we are actually, even though it took us almost three years to get this exchange approved, we're actually the fastest Form one approval in history. So we're faster than it has ever been done before. It's just really pretty slow. So anyway, but.

• 59:47Ben Gilbert?

  Senators used to travel to Washington by horse and buggy like it.

• 59:49Speaker 01

  Yeah. Yeah, that's exactly right. So, so, you know, we're trying to move the industry in, in a good direction. But the thing I wanted to say was, so we will go live in 2020 and then we will be legally authorized to begin the process of soliciting companies to list on LTSC.

• 1:00:05Ben Gilbert?

  I see, which is why captable.io is so important.

• 1:00:07David Rosenthal?

  Fundraising for funds, like you can't, oh.

• 1:00:10Speaker 01

  Yeah. So it'll be, it'll be a little while before, you know, lots of companies are listed.

• 1:00:13Ben Gilbert?

  Series A, series B, that's when they should be thinking about, hey, like four years, you know, two, three years from now.

• 1:00:18David Rosenthal?

  But companies could, existing public companies could also adopt.

• 1:00:21Speaker 01

  That's right. And listen, and if someone in the class of 2020 IPOs wanted to list an LTSC, you know, we would be delighted and thrilled and that would be wonderful if that should happen. We'll work very hard to support them, but you know, just as an expectation setting exercise, we don't really know how long this is going to take. And that's okay. That's why we raise a lot of money. And even by modern standards.

• 1:00:40Ben Gilbert?

  So this is a show where we sort of analyze and grade businesses. So like, I want to make sure we understand the business model here. Traditionally, a stock exchange would be, they make money every time a trade happens. So they're incentivized to have lots and lots of transactions, which in part is why we see the lots and lots of transactions that we have today. Your business model is different. Tell us about that.

• 1:01:00Speaker 01

  We believe that one of the most powerful things you can say when you're selling to a customer, like when we sit down with a CEO, we want to be able to say to them, look, we are the only stock exchange you will ever meet where you're the customer. We make our money by selling you products and services that you believe are value add. And we sell some products and services to your long-term investors. We have trading on our platform, but our goal is not to serve traders primarily. We're not anti-traders, don't think traders are bad, but we have enough financial institutions who primarily serve traders. We'd like there to be at least one whose main job is to serve its actual customers.

• 1:01:36Ben Gilbert?

  So your marketplace without a take rate business model?

• 1:01:39Speaker 01

  Yeah, that's right.

• 1:01:40David Rosenthal?

  Yeah, I mean, well, it's like a marketplace, like, you know, you're subsidizing either supplier demand, right? Like, and if you're an investment bank or you're an exchange, the supply is companies and equity securities. The demand are the investors. So who do you think they're serving? You know, you guys are flipping that on.

• 1:01:58Speaker 01

  Yeah, that's exactly right. And in fact, they don't call them companies. They call them issuers.

• 1:02:01David Rosenthal?

  Yeah, right.

• 1:02:02Speaker 01

  Which is one of my favorite euphemisms of financial services, like the ATM machines that print out the sort of like, the real customers trade, the issuers just issue. That's what their job is to do the issuing. So, so that's, that's a big part of what we do. Now, we do have a stock trading platform and we want to be the premier stock trading venue for infrequent traders, for long-term investors. So we've built up.

• 1:02:21David Rosenthal?

  And to what you said earlier, like, a very valuable service you could offer is like, you want to buy $500 million worth of stock?

• 1:02:27Speaker 01

  Right.

• 1:02:27David Rosenthal?

  We can facilitate you buying 500 million dollars.

• 1:02:29Speaker 01

  So yes, we have a number of things that we offer to companies where they can do those kinds of capital raises without, you know, and, and still consummate the transaction after market close where their investors can't be front run, but where the company can have a say in the kinds of investors that can acquire the stock. So they can basically place the stock with their existing long-term investors.

• 1:02:47Ben Gilbert?

  And is that the sort of service that you would charge for?

• 1:02:49Speaker 01

  Yeah, exactly right.

• 1:02:50Ben Gilbert?

  Got it.

• 1:02:50Speaker 01

  We try to build services that are valuable for companies at every stage of their life to and through the IPO. So we're very strong in the seed, series A, B, C stage with these are kind of early stage tools we've been talking about. We have a separate product suite, which is not yet publicly announced, but where we have customers that are in the late stage, you know, pre-IPO stage. And then, you know, we'll eventually take those companies public, we hope, and, and maintain, you know, maintain a software relationship with them as well as a listings relationship. That's our, that's our long-term goal.

• 1:03:15Ben Gilbert?

  Got it.

• 1:03:16David Rosenthal?

  Cool.

• 1:03:17Ben Gilbert?

  All right, listeners. Now is a great time to talk about a new partner of ours here on Acquired, Logora, the agentic operating system that is redefining how the world's best legal teams work.

• 1:03:30David Rosenthal?

  Yep. It's sort of obvious that AI is going to completely change the legal industry. I bet most of you listening have dropped a contract into some sort of AI chatbot out there. Logora took that insight and asked the question, what if you really built something with that power from the ground up for the legal industry?

• 1:03:47Ben Gilbert?

  So the founders did exactly what great founders do, operate with obsessive customer focus. They embedded inside a massive law firm for months. They sat with the lawyers just watching how the work really gets done.

• 1:04:02David Rosenthal?

  And that's how you get features that customers love, like Tabular Review, where you drop in a folder of hundreds of contracts and it pulls every key term into a grid a lawyer can actually work with. Logora's bet here is interesting. Since it lets each lawyer handle more complexity, any given person can increase the quality of their work and do higher value work. And this means that the pie can grow even as each individual task takes less time.

• 1:04:26Ben Gilbert?

  And they recently launched Logora Agent, offering greater intelligence and performance. The agent lets lawyers set an objective. Then it can handle the planning and the execution and delivery of the final product. Legal teams get to maintain full control and transparency since they're still involved where judgment is required.

• 1:04:45David Rosenthal?

  And Logora works where you already work. You can use it within Microsoft Word while redlining or drafting. The early Logora numbers essentially speak for themselves. When they have a head-to-head pilot with their top competitor, they win 70% of the time. Logora now has over 100,000 lawyers on the platform from 1,200 legal teams in 50 countries. And crazily, they went from 1 million to 100 million in ARR in about 18 months.

• 1:05:15Ben Gilbert?

  Truly insane numbers. And that is the real test. Plenty of things demo well, but the question is whether a busy associate actually reaches for it during crunch time, or whether a partner trusts it before going into a conversation with a major client. If your legal team wants to check it out, whether you're a law firm or you're in-house at a company, you can learn more at logora.com/acquired and just tell them that Ben and David sent you. So we're going to move to grading now. And obviously, this is so speculative that it's difficult to grade. We have a mechanism for doing this because lots of times we talk about things that just happened. So let's talk about the A+ case. So what would it look like a decade from now if this has gone phenomenally well? And then let's talk about the F case where, you know, hey, this was a great experiment.

• 1:06:00Ben Gilbert?

  I'm glad we tried it, but why did it fail? Or why could it have failed? And I'll start with that A+ case by throwing out the idea that this might enable a whole bunch of goodness in the world and new innovation, but actually be a way worse business than any of the other stock exchanges ever have been. It's interesting that that could be an A+ for the world, but apples to apples, if you bought shares of LTSE today, or if you had bought shares of NASDAQ in 1973, like buying NASDAQ in 1973 may have been a much better bet.

• 1:06:32Speaker 01

  I mean, that's totally possible. I've learned a lot about what it means to build a long-term oriented, mission oriented company, which I had paid lip service to that stuff before, but like I worked in consumer internet, you know?

• 1:06:45Speaker 01

  It's not the same. It's just not the same.

• 1:06:47David Rosenthal?

  The look on Eric's face is priceless.

• 1:06:48Speaker 01

  So every person who comes to work here and every investor we allow to invest in the company, we have to have a serious conversation with them about risks and downsides. And in particular, we say, we are trying to fix a trillion dollar problem in capitalism itself. Tim O'Reilly has that famous adage about create more value than you capture. We're going to create that order of magnitude of value or die trying. That's what we know for sure. Whether we capture any of it for ourselves, I don't know. Probably it's going to be fine. I'm pretty sure if you create trillion dollars of value, like you don't have to create sideways. You have to capture a very high percentage to make an awful lot of money, but we don't know. And frankly, we don't care. Now, our investors care because they want returns, but like, but we have a fair candidate

• 1:07:33Speaker 01

  who's like, look, if you have an IRR target in your fund for like the next seven years, like please don't invest in this company. You're not going to be happy.

• 1:07:38David Rosenthal?

  Well, I have to imagine too to what we were just talking about, you know, you don't have to speculate or, or, you know, say percentages or numbers or anything, but like if you just think about what the problems are with the current system, I think a lot of it does hinge around.

• 1:07:50David Rosenthal?

  These large dollar sized transactions, whether that's, you know, a soft bank style round of a private, currently private company where you're raising a billion dollars at once with no governance and no, you know, rights and preferences, or you're in the public markets and you're a long-term holder and you're trying in a publicly traded security to get a $500 million position. You know, those are hard right now. And like, if you could solve those and you could probably like, make some money on those transactions.

• 1:08:18Speaker 01

  You know, I just, that's of all the things to worry about with this, it's honestly the thing I worry about the least. Like, you know, because people are always like, well, what if the incumbent exchanges just copy your reforms? And put you out of business. I'm like, you mean if we change the world?

• 1:08:30Ben Gilbert?

  Well, also, there's like an innovator's dilemma there. Like, I don't.

• 1:08:33Speaker 01

  Yeah, right. Like, I mean, wouldn't that be great? I tried really hard. In the early years of this, I tried very hard to give this idea away for free to the incumbent exchanges. I begged them to build it so I wouldn't have to. And, you know, here we are. So I'm not.

• 1:08:45Ben Gilbert?

  But they're not going to cannibalize their revenue stream either. Like, they're not going to, they're not going to get rid of the trading.

• 1:08:49Speaker 01

  Listen, I wish, I wish they would copy us. That would be great. So, so it's, but it is important for us, like, especially in recruiting, just to be really clear eyed about this. We don't exactly know what the rewards for us will be. But, but we hire people who are going to sleep really well at night, knowing we solved this problem, whether we get paid or not. It's just, that's not the most important thing. And that, I think that's how you build truly great companies, is you have people who are in it for the mission. You have an understanding that business model is important and economics are important in the same way, you know, that oxygen is important, but like, you don't live for oxygen. It's the other way around. And that's become kind of a cliche idea in our world today, but I think it's still, it's even still underappreciated how powerful it is.

• 1:09:28Ben Gilbert?

  Yeah. Okay. Well, real quick, if it completely fails, what are the most likely reasons?

• 1:09:33Speaker 01

  Oh, how can we count the ways? I mean, and listen, I, we go through this with every employee. So, so I'm happy to be very open about it. The first and most obvious thing is we are dealing with a very conservative system where change is really hard and people resist change. And it's not just in like a lot of enterprise software situations, you have the generalized resistance to change that like, people are used to, they're all crappy enterprise software and they don't really want to get the new stuff and be trained on a new thing. Like, all that usual stuff. But here we compound that with the fact that this is a reform that is actively opposed by people who are making astronomical amounts of money from the status quo.

• 1:10:08David Rosenthal?

  And the government's involved.

• 1:10:09Speaker 01

  You said it, not me. So.

• 1:10:13Speaker 01

  It ain't gonna be pretty. And like, a lot of people think it's a suicide mission to go up against those entrenched forces and win. And it may yet be. Though those people thought we'd be dead long before now. So at least we've gotten something right. And like,

• 1:10:26Ben Gilbert?

  Is there any reason why the why it would you would fail to be able to get companies to list? Is there something?

• 1:10:31Speaker 01

  We'll get to that next. Sure. So yeah, that's like the general, you know, like, people didn't even think we could get this approved by the regulators. That was a huge accomplishment in itself. That was very, very unlikely. And we were sabotaged multiple times, and we almost died. Many, I could tell you all kinds of crazy stories of what that looked like behind the scenes. But also, even if we get everything right, and we survive our political problems, and we fight off the forces of darkness, and, and, and, and, and customers might still walk up to the precipice of this and say, you know what, I'd like to go second. Maybe, and maybe everybody would like to go second.

• 1:11:00Ben Gilbert?

  How do you, how do you lean startup your way to knowing if customers will buy?

• 1:11:04Speaker 01

  We have spent a lot of our time on that, on that question. But and, you know, I think I have, you know, we, we use every trick in the book. So if your listeners have studied any lean startup, you'll know about how to build a concierge MVP, you'll know how to build the, you know, non binding letters of intent as proxies for, I mean, like, you name it, you name it, we've tried everything. And, you know, we have significant companies who have, who have signed up as much as they're allowed to sign up. So sign up so far. We obviously have all this software, and we've built all these relationships. So like, I have a lot of confidence in this. But like, at the end of the day, until customers do it, you don't know. Now, whoever goes first will reap unbelievable rewards, I think, of the kind of messaging and positioning that that will win for them as being seen as a leader who's changing capitalism itself. But maybe that's not enough to overcome.

• 1:11:50David Rosenthal?

  And also demand from the long term investor community, right? Like,

• 1:11:54Speaker 01

  Yeah, very significant. And, and, and they feed off each other. So like, when we, you know, when companies want to know more about why they should do this, they often say, well, how do I know what investors will think of this? And we're like, well, would you like to talk to some of them? That's like, like a radical idea, like, what?

• 1:12:09Ben Gilbert?

  Market making, imagine that.

• 1:12:11Speaker 01

  It's like, well, yeah, would you like, I can put you in touch with the CEO of some of the world's largest asset owners, and they'll take your call, and you guys could talk. And they're like, really? And when I talk to asset owners, I'm like, they're Like, well, how do I know it's really true that the next generation of companies wants XYZ? I'm like, would you like to talk to them? Because we have become so intermediated. It's unbelievable, even like, I won't name any names, but you can imagine some of these next gen companies that have severe political problems all over the world with like unions and local governments and right? I always ask them, so have you talked to any public pension funds? About investing in your company or IPO? They're like, no, do you think I should?

• 1:12:52Ben Gilbert?

  Oh, you will on your roadshow.

• 1:12:54Speaker 01

  Right. Well, no, you won't because those funds don't get invited to.

• 1:12:57Ben Gilbert?

  Oh, right, right, right.

• 1:12:58Speaker 01

  Because they don't trade enough.

• 1:12:59Ben Gilbert?

  Only the allocators will be there.

• 1:13:00Speaker 01

  Only the allocators will be there. So, so it's actually like this wild situation where two of the most logical partners, like, being a, being a good owner is one of the most underrated skills in our world today. Like you see this in sports, you see it in corporations, right? Like, like having good ownership, like really is a source of competitive advantage. And people who are investing for multi-generational timelines are excellent owners. So you would think that companies that have a long-term perspective and excellent owners who have a long-term requirement, that they would naturally want to spend time together. And whenever we do get them together, it's amazing because they have such a bond. And yet it's so hard to do because there's so many intermediaries in the way and the intermediaries have no incentive

• 1:13:42Speaker 01

  to drive connection between investors and companies directly. That, that's how they get paid. So part of it is just having the willingness to, to build those relationships. So if that, if that's not enough, then it won't work. And then we haven't gotten into all the technical ways it could fail. Like that's like a hundred of them.

• 1:13:57Ben Gilbert?

  We will catch you with that one another time. I think this is a fantastic place to leave this. Eric, where can listeners find you and the LTSE?

• 1:14:04Speaker 01

  Sure. LTSE.com for everything exchange related. I am still using the leanstartup.com for my, my personal domain if you want to learn about me. And obviously we're all on, on Twitter and everywhere else.

• 1:14:16David Rosenthal?

  And for, for the tools for early-stage companies.

• 1:14:18Speaker 01

  Yeah, you can go to LTSE.com slash tools, or you can try any of our individual tools, captable.io, hiringplan.io, startuprunway.io. If any of your listeners are in a venture capital firm and you'd like to extend the suite as a whole to your portfolio companies, we do all that kind of stuff too. So we do all, and everything we do on the early-stage size is free or freemium. So we're not extracting fees from anybody. We don't think that's right. And we also are the only provider in the space who actually believes that you own your own data, not we, so we have.

• 1:14:48Ben Gilbert?

  I was gonna ask you about competitors, but that says, you've said all you need to say.

• 1:14:52Speaker 01

  You got it. So anyway, so please, anyone who's interested, please do give us your feedback and try those out. Thank you.

• 1:14:57Ben Gilbert?

  Awesome. Well, listeners, that is all we have for today. If you like this or any other episode, please don't be shy about sharing it on social media or leaving us a review on iTunes. If you want to go deeper on company building topics, you should consider becoming an Acquired Limited Partner, and you can click the link in the show notes or go to glow.fm/acquired, and all new listeners get a seven-day free trial. And starting right now, here's an excerpt of our latest episode with Vlad Magdalene, the founder and CEO of Webflow. With that, we will see you next time.

• 1:15:36Ben Gilbert?

  Welcome, LPs. Today, we are doing an episode I have been excited about for a long time with Vlad Magdalene, the co-founder and CEO of Webflow. Well, Webflow is a company I am personally very passionate about since I grew up as a web developer, always fighting between building websites from scratch in PHP and hand coding HTML and CSS.

• 1:15:57David Rosenthal?

  PHP, dude, Facebook days.

• 1:15:59Ben Gilbert?

  The Lampstack, baby.

• 1:16:01David Rosenthal?

  Oh, boy.

• 1:16:02Ben Gilbert?

  There were WYSIWYG editors out there.

• 1:16:04David Rosenthal?

  You're dating yourself, Ben.

• 1:16:04Ben Gilbert?

  I know, like Dreamweaver, but they always required you to do all the hosting yourself. They, I don't know the state of the product today. This is like, you know, 12-year-old data, but generated garbage code, and Webflow has been an amazing answer to provide the ease of use of a graphical user interface while still being an enormously powerful tool. And we personally use the site for Acquired, we use it for PSL, and basically all of our portfolio companies use it as well. So Vlad.

• 1:16:33David Rosenthal?

  It's, it's so powerful that even, you know, I can now update the website and add, which is, you know, the last time I wrote a line of code, I think I was probably maybe 20 years old, so.

• 1:16:46Ben Gilbert?

  Yeah, Vlad, I have the designer creds.

• 1:16:48Speaker 01

  So one year ago.

• 1:16:49Ben Gilbert?

  David has, David has an editor login.

• 1:16:51David Rosenthal?

  Thank you, Vlad.

• 1:16:52Speaker 01

  Got it.

• 1:16:55Ben Gilbert?

  So listeners, who is Vlad? Well, Webflow, you know, while most of you may know this company only from the last year or two, it is a at least decade-old company that I believe, Vlad, you started as a side project in 2005?

• 1:17:09Speaker 03

  Yep, it was actually something that started when I was still in college. When I was working at an agency part-time as an intern. And then turned into my senior project, then turned into a couple failed attempts at starting it as a business. Then I joined Intuit, sort of worked there for a while, then had another failed attempt at turning into a business during sort of the web 2.0 heyday. And then finally started it, hopefully for the last time in 2012.

• 1:17:38David Rosenthal?

  Wow, all attempts to start the same business.

• 1:17:41Speaker 03

  Same business, same name, different co-founders every time. Two of those attempts just by myself, sort of looking for a co-founder. The third attempt actually was with two Intuit buddies, one of which, so that attempt didn't work out and can go into sort of like the history behind that. But sort of fizzled out and over time, one of those co-founders ended up starting his own company, got into YC, got acquired by Stripe, and then came back as a senior product manager here. So now he is one of our product leaders.

• 1:18:10Ben Gilbert?

  Circle of life.

• 1:18:11Speaker 03

  Exactly. So I sort of worked on it in many different iterations with multiple people and finally something worked.

• 1:18:19David Rosenthal?

  Wow.

• 1:18:20Ben Gilbert?

  That's so cool. Well, we'll get into all of that. So it's the 2012 version that was the start of the company.

• 1:18:25Speaker 03

  That's the best vintage so far.

• 1:18:27Ben Gilbert?

  We know it today.

• 1:18:28Speaker 03

  Exactly.

• 1:18:29Ben Gilbert?

  Wow. And you, I think it only raised maybe a few million dollars between then and now when you did the.

• 1:18:35Speaker 03

  Yeah, so we started in 2012, started that with my brother and then one of my buddies from Intuit joined a few months later. Bryant ended up being the third co-founder. And then we, about a year later, we got into YC and then did a seed round, which at the time seemed huge. It was 1.4 million dollars, even though other companies were, you know, closing their seed rounds much faster or they were bigger. And then we ended up doing a small, well, small relative to today, extension of another 1.5 about a year later. And then got to profitability and sort of didn't worry about funding for a long time.

• 1:19:12Ben Gilbert?

  And that was what, 2015 you get to profitability?

• 1:19:15Speaker 03

  Late 2015, yeah.

• 1:19:16Ben Gilbert?

  Awesome. Listeners, you should know, the company then, for the last four years, has raised no money, as Vlad said, and then this year raised a $72 million Series A from Excel that is coinciding today with sort of this no-code movement. So I think we'll get in a little bit of that. So this notion isn't brand new. WYSIWYG web editors had existed before, and it's kind of like the right ones run anywhere, it'll finally be good this time. Like, it's still not good this time. So why is it that Webflow has really found product-market fit and created this nice product with a web-based WYSIWYG editor when it's failed so many times before?

• 1:19:55Speaker 03

  So two things. One, I think if we tried the same exact thing in 2007, it would have failed, and I'll tell you why. Like, the reason direct manipulation works in Webflow is that we can actually, not emulate, we have the real thing inside of the browser itself. So Webflow is built in a browser. You can sort of think of Webflow as DevTools or Webinspector with a lot more visual tools on top, right? A lot of other WYSIWYG tools, what they try to do is like, hey, we're going to take a graphic design tool like Photoshop or Illustrator or Sketch or whatever, and we're going to try to randomly guess, or best guess, what the generated code should be. It's the approach that doesn't respect the core principles, the core foundations of what the web is. And the web is like, you know, you have these

• 1:20:39Speaker 03

  DOM nodes, and they're essentially boxes on top of boxes, inside of boxes, et cetera. And everything's a box, right? You want to make a circle, you have to make a box with rounded corners, right? That's a circle. Or you have like a, you know, an SVG or something like that. I think Webflow is the very first application that said, okay, here are the core primitives. You know, you have styles, you have classes, you have like CSS abstractions, and what we're going to do is create a pretty shallow abstraction that still forces you to understand those core principles, not necessarily the core syntax. So for example, when you're doing layout in Webflow, it's Flexbox or CSS Grid. You just don't know it. The visual tools built on top of it are a representation of those same like constraints

• 1:21:22Speaker 03

  and limitations. They're not like, draw anything, and then we'll try to guess what the code is, right?

• 1:21:27Ben Gilbert?

  Like adjust the margin and the padding.

• 1:21:29Speaker 03

  Exactly. You're almost like one to one making code changes. You're just doing it through a different language. It's almost like if you're using software to create music, you have to understand the core principles of of music. You might not, you know, have a piano in front of you, right? But you don't get to cheat by by saying I'm going to create like a masterpiece by not understanding like good rhythm and etc. So that's the same thing with Webflow. Like you, it does have a a more, you know, advanced learning curve because you have to understand the box model. Because you have to understand, you don't just draw a box and then go like drag it anywhere. You have to think, OK, when the screen resizes, I have to think of this box as being 50% of the width of the current viewport, not 500 pixels, right?

• 1:22:12Speaker 03

  And then when I resize, I change it to 495 pixels or whatever. I sort of had to think in a more like relative, the way that a front end developer would think. But we're erasing like 95% of the complexity and like knowing how to glue all these things together, etc. And the other thing that made it possible was that when we first started building it in 2012, was the first time that browsers were getting good enough. There's like Chrome 1.0 days. Safari and WebKit were kind of like on the same, they were using the same engine. Firefox and Internet Explorer were sort of like the old guard in terms of like, hey, this is like a way to like view documents or whatever. But Google's really pushing Chrome as like a an application platform. Like they were like Google Maps at sort of the standard of like, what's what's possible as an interactive type of thing in the browser.

• 1:22:56Speaker 03

  That was impossible in 2007, 2008, etc. So you, in in order to create that full abstraction of like, I'm previewing exactly what's going to ship. You have to actually show that in the browser in an iframe or something. And browsers just didn't support that until like 2011, 2012, 2013, to be to be really like, that's when when browsers like were kind of kicked into gear of like, holy crap, this is the next wave of

• 1:23:21Ben Gilbert?

  An application platform.

• 1:23:22Speaker 03

  Exactly.

• 1:23:22Ben Gilbert?

  Yeah.

• 1:23:22Speaker 03

  Exactly.

• 1:23:24David Rosenthal?

  All right, listeners. Now is a great time to talk about one of our favorite companies, Statsig.

• 1:23:30Ben Gilbert?

  Yes, there is a reason why the best product teams rely on Statsig, whether they are iterating on their core product features or shipping AI-powered experiences at scale.

• 1:23:41David Rosenthal?

  Yep. In the crazy speed of today's AI world, shipping fast is just table stakes now. It's basically trivial to build and deploy your app constantly. The real advantage is how quickly you learn what changes actually created value for customers and how fast you can use that signal to guide what you ship next.

• 1:24:01Ben Gilbert?

  This is where Statsig comes in. It brings experimentation, feature flags, and product analytics into one unified system so teams can ship safely, test rigorously, and directly link what they changed to how users actually behaved.

• 1:24:14David Rosenthal?

  So if you want to make learning your competitive advantage, whether you're building new AI experiences or just evolving your existing core product, go to statsig.com/acquired to get started.