Pod Insights a16z Podcast 16 Minutes on the News #9: All the Recent Phone Hacks About this episode News and trends covered this week include:
* FBI's latest note on social engineering of two-factor authentication
* Simjacker spyware via SMS
* Google Project Zero vs. Apple, and Apple's year in security
* what can we do to secure ourselves?
…with @martin_casado joeldelgarza and host @smc90.
Transcript Speaker names marked ? are inferred from speaking time and the show’s known hosts — they are not voice-verified.
0:00 Sonal? Hi, everyone. Welcome to the A6 and Z Podcast. I'm Sonal and I'm here today with the ninth episode of our short form news show, 16 Minutes, where we cover recent headlines the A6 and Z way. Why they're in the news from our vantage point in tech. Sometimes we cover multiple items. Sometimes we go deep on just one or two topics. So this week, we're doing one of our deep dives connected to one huge topic, which is what the heck is going on with all the recent news around phone fraud happening lately. But first, you can subscribe to 16 Minutes separately wherever you like to get your podcasts. And also a reminder that after next week or so, we will no longer publish 16 Minutes here along with the regular A6 and Z Podcast. So be sure to go and subscribe to it separately if you
0:42 Sonal? still want the weekly take on news and tech. As a reminder, none of this is investment advice or intended for investors. Please be sure to see a6andz.com/disclosures for important information. Also, the show notes include links to the articles cited or other relevant background. You can find those at a6andz.com/16minutes. Thank you. Okay, so let me quickly summarize the news and then I'll welcome our A6 and Z experts. One, just this week, the FBI's Cyber Division released a note headlined "Cyber Criminals Use Social Engineering and Technical Attacks to Circumvent Multi-Factor Authentication." And this matters in this context because phones are frequently used for second factor authentication. Two, the next piece of news is that just last week, a telecom security firm reported
1:25 Sonal? on a vulnerability called SIMJacker that involves a SMS containing a spiral-like code being sent to a mobile phone, which then instructs the SIM card within the phone to take over, literally, that phone in order to retrieve and perform sensitive commands. And the key here is that it's platform agnostic, which means it works across a wide range of mobile devices regardless of the hardware or software. And then finally, another big piece of news is that Google's Project Zero team, which is focused on finding zero-day vulnerabilities, and just to quickly define that, those are unintended flaws in a system, kind of like a tumor in the human body that hasn't been detected yet, that can be targeted and exploited by cyber criminals, resulting in zero-day exploits or zero-day attacks. And that team released a post titled "A Very Deep Dive Into iOS Exploits."
2:10 Sonal? Chain found in the wild, sharing that they had discovered a small collection of hacked websites using iPhone zero days. And just to make this more concrete, those sites were targeting China's oppressed Muslim community, though Google is not the one who revealed the specific sites. Apple did confirm that, though, in their response a week later, where they also shared that the attack was, I quote, narrowly focused, not a broad-based exploitive iPhones en masse as described. And they also disputed that the sites were out there in the wild for the estimated two years and that they were in the process of fixing the exploited bugs. So that's a high level summary of what's been going on lately. I'd like to now welcome our A6 and Z experts, General Partner Martine Casado and Joel de la Garza, our Chief Security Officer, to help us tease apart the FUD from the facts and what to pay attention to.
2:55 Sonal? Let's first begin by talking about the scope of the phone hacking problem overall. Can you break it down for us, Martine?
3:00 Martin Casado? There's two pretty significant topics that are worth taking in. The first one is we've been relying on the phone system, which isn't a secure system, in order to secure ourselves. But the second one is the most predominant device maker for phones is Apple. And this has been the worst year for them, probably on record, when it comes to problems, right? So we all know that there's this FaceTime bug. I could call you on FaceTime and you didn't even have to pick up and I could hear what was going on. And that happened in January. And then, of course, this Project Zero stuff out of Google. Who knows who else was using it? And so you've got these two pretty significant topics that reduce to the same implication, which is we've trusted our phones for security and now we're paying the price.
3:44 Sonal? Let's address the first one and then we can go deep on the second one. So you've actually said, in fact, on a previous episode of 16 Minutes, we should absolutely have two factor, just don't use your phone as a second factor. And so can you talk a little bit more about this trend of the phone being used in authentication?
4:00 Martin Casado? So unfortunately, this is actually a fairly complicated topic. What does two factor mean? Two factor means that you don't just use a password, because somebody could steal your password or fish your password, but you use some other factor, whether it's I use an authenticator on my phone.
4:14 Sonal? So it's not just something you know, the password, it's something you have, that you uniquely have?
4:18 Martin Casado? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Now, there are many options for a second factor. One of the most popular has been texting. That text will go to whoever has the phone number on record. And that phone number.
4:31 Martin Casado? Who receives it is dictated by the phone companies and phone companies have lots of employees. And so anybody that can trick any employee in the entirety of T-Mobile or Sprint or AT&T, anybody at all, to move that phone number to their phone will get that message.
4:46 Sonal? Let me just quickly pause on that because I until now had understood the vulnerability of it being me losing my phone and someone getting that text. But you're actually saying the entire surface area of attack is all those employees to transport that phone information to you, the attacker.
5:02 Martin Casado? That's right.
5:03 Sonal? That's huge.
5:03 Martin Casado? Yes.
5:03 Sonal? Can you actually break down the details of SIM porting and specifically? And then we can talk about the other variations of this.
5:09 Martin Casado? Yeah, so SIMs, it comes by many names, SIM swapping, SIM porting. The way to think about it is someone's able to get your phone number on their phone, normally by social engineering someone in the phone company. You don't need a SIM card, you don't need the phone, you don't need anything. This happens every day, all the time. And the way you think about it, this like there's some rural T-Mobile store where they have the ability to change the phone number because people get new phones. Somebody walks in there, convinces a store representative who doesn't know better, maybe using like fake credentials or a fake ID to get the phone number ported. They reset your passwords, they have access to your accounts, this is financial accounts, this is crypto accounts, and then they have access to whatever you have.
5:44 Speaker 02 And they don't even have to go into the store, right? You can use the data that you buy on the black market that's been taken from the credit rating agencies. So I can call your cell phone provider, I can say, I'm you, here's my address. And they're going to say, well, we need to authenticate you. What's the first car you bought, right? I look at your credit report. Or they ask for the last four of your social and I've got your whole number for you and I can authenticate myself.
6:04 Sonal? Which is a Capital One breach.
6:05 Speaker 02 Absolutely.
6:06 Sonal? Because we talked about that, how they actually had like, what, like 100,000 social security numbers in there.
6:09 Speaker 02 Absolutely. I mean, we should just assume that all American social security numbers are out there being sold. And there's clearly evidence based on the FBI alert that came out today that criminals are using social engineering techniques as well as technical methods to steal phone numbers and port them to new handsets. There are large criminal organizations that are doing this at scale.
6:28 Sonal? And by the way, just to be clear, this is really about having convenience. Because the only reason these people would give up that information is because you could legitimately lose your phone and want that number back because you can't live without your phone. So it's not like they're trying to aid abusers. They're actually trying to be helpful.
6:43 Martin Casado? There's a phenomenal Medium post from someone that lost, I think $100,000 in cryptocurrency due to SIM porting. He does a very good job of detailing and breaking down the attack. And I think it's important that everyone listening to this realizes how common this is. But like, you don't actually have to SIM port to pull this off. So there's a whole nother type of attack called active phishing, where you social engineer somebody with a phone number to tell you what the passcode is.
7:10 Sonal? Can you give me an example of how that actually works?
7:12 Martin Casado? Sure, I want to get into Joel's account. And so I'm like, oh, I need to know whatever passcode that it sent me because I got his password somehow, I fished it. So what I do is, I text Joel and I'm like, hey, listen, I used to have your phone number. It's been a while. It's the number that's registered with my account. I'm trying to reset my account. Can you tell me the passcode that came in?
7:29 Sonal? I feel like that's kind of dumb that people would fall for that.
7:31 Martin Casado? Right. However, it turns out this is a very effective attack for people that aren't educated on cybersecurity. You could try and educate everybody, but the reality is that because you're all connected and anybody can reach anybody, every sociopath on the planet is somehow your next door neighbor.
7:45 Sonal? So PIN porting, is that the same thing as this or is that something different?
7:48 Speaker 02 So, a number of the carriers in response to some of these activities have set the ability for you to establish a PIN on your SIM card. And so this means that if I want to change my phone number to a new handset, I have to provide this PIN. What we've actually found is that the cell phone carriers aren't honoring those PINs. They'll actually just ask you for the last four of your social in place of that PIN and then switch the number over.
8:09 Sonal? Ah, because as a best practice, they're just looking for a way to know that it's you, or they think it's you, and in fact, they really need to be asking for this additional layer of the actual PIN.
8:17 Speaker 02 Well, even then, because consumers legitimately forget their PIN.
8:19 Sonal? Yeah, I do too all the time.
8:21 Martin Casado? But even, yeah, and just remember, like, even if you're required to show up with a driver's license or whatever, that is not a hard thing to do, given how much money's at stake. And like, how much does it cost to get a fake ID?
8:32 Sonal? Hundred dollars. And you can get $100,000 like in that Medium post.
8:35 Speaker 02 And the reason why we've gotten here is because consumers... Numbers are just so averse to the friction created by security, right? Like, in the past, we've generally had very horrible two-factor authentication experiences, right? You had to, you had a bunch of dongles.
8:48 Martin Casado? RSA five.
8:49 Speaker 02 Yeah, right? And even then, the Chinese managed to reach them.
8:52 Sonal? I remember that RSA was like the VPN tokens, right? Where you'd get them constantly reset. Yeah, I remember those.
8:56 Speaker 02 And you probably had five of them. Instead of a ring full of keys, you had a ring full of tokens for that. And that was a problem. And so what companies did was, rather than roll out more tokens, they decided, well, let's use phone numbers as an authenticator, which then pulled everything to the cellphone. The cellphone became this really core anchor of trust. Now that phone numbers are starting to fall away and becoming problematic, they're saying, well, let's start to use authenticated software on a cellphone to get you into your account. Well, now the attackers are just breaking the cellphones, right?
9:24 Sonal? You're making the observation that the phone connects us and it makes it convenient, but it also connects us sociopaths. What is the way out of this?
9:31 Martin Casado? So what we like to advocate for a second factor is to reduce the trust to a set of atoms, something physical as opposed to bits, right? There's no way you could be social engineered out of, from somebody that's in a separate country, because they would have to have physical access to those bits.
9:49 Sonal? But a phone is physical.
9:50 Martin Casado? So if it requires the physical hardware to be there of a phone, that's not just knowing the number that showed up on your SMS or a certain phone number, which is not physical. These are logical entities. So for example, you know, most phone devices have secure hardware and that secure hardware can be verified that it exists. There's also, of course, security keys, which is a very similar thing that you plug in, which is hardware. So we like the idea of reducing security to something physical that you have as opposed to something logical, which you can be social engineered out of.
10:22 Speaker 02 I think there's another kind of meta-issue here at the higher level, which is that you don't want the thing that you're using to log in be the thing that also authenticates you, right? You want to have a delineation of responsibilities and putting that kind of a load on one single device, especially a device that, based on the news that we've heard recently, is going to be heavily targeted, means that you're probably blending two different threat surfaces together that you don't want to have intermixed.
10:46 Martin Casado? Joe's exactly right. And I do think this is kind of the second reason this topic's so interesting is, okay, so it's important to have something physical if you really care about security on the internet. But what we've learned recently... Is one of the most major players in device manufacturing has this terrible track record this year with device security. So Android exploits right now are more expensive than iPhone exploits. So it's like 1.5 million to one. Apple's basically their posture on security has been to say there's no problem. Therefore, there's no third party ecosystem around them to actually patch the problem. And so like a very direct result of this is like, actually now it's cheaper to buy an exploit for iPhone than it is for Android.
11:27 Sonal? Yeah. And by cheaper to buy an exploit, you mean that it's essentially the market of ways
11:30 Martin Casado? You go to an open market. Yeah. I actually got this quote from a Wired article where the guy was like, we see so many exploits in like iMessage and iPhone, we're starting to turn them away now.
11:39 Sonal? I get that this is a tension between open and closed and like sort of all the innovation that that provides, but I still don't quite get why Apple may be particularly vulnerable here.
11:48 Speaker 02 Apple's design philosophy has been to bundle as much stuff into the platform as possible and to sit it at the center of so many ecosystems. So not only does it hold your personal data, it also accesses your authenticator, it accesses your communications device. And whenever you have any kind of concentration like that, it really just sort of makes it a really ripe target.
12:06 Sonal? Not to mention being the center of this ecosystem of all the new services they just announced. Like we just did a podcast on 60 Minutes last week where we talked about the fact that you're now also connecting in card and TV and games. I mean, you're essentially living your life on your phone.
12:19 Speaker 02 And every new sort of spoke you add to the hub of your life is basically another way where people can get at you. Now, Apple does a really good job in isolation, designing specific features that are highly secure. So like parts of Apple Pay are actually really admirable. They've done a really great job in figuring out how to do e-payment and e-commerce in that regard. But when they combine it into this multifaceted ecosystem and you get increasing complexity, you get increasing risk. So what we're seeing with phones and what we were talking about earlier with the PIN porting is they'll go after things like your email account, they'll go after your phone number to try to take over those, those things as you work your way up the stack. So you have to think of this in terms of the sophistication of your adversaries. Fraudsters, people that are just trying to steal money, they're gonna just go through
13:03 Speaker 02 the window that gets left open. They're not going to deconstruct your house. Nation states will because they have the kind of money that they can spend on doing that. And so what we've seen recently is that nation states have been obviously spending a lot of money finding ways to deconstruct the iPhone. You can visit a community action website for a cause that you're interested in, and I can infect your phone with malware that will listen to everything you do, take all of your data, and surveil you in real time.
13:27 Martin Casado? Yeah, they built pretty secure things, for sure, to give them credit. But here's what, to me, is so worrisome about about Apple's general demeanor around security. They don't want to admit that you require third parties. It's part of their design ethos, per Joel's point. Their posture in the past has been to deny any security issues because they thought it would kind of tarnish the reputation of whatever it was, like macOS, et cetera. So now, here we are. We have two startling examples. And yet, there's very little actual mature ecosystem around Apple products to provide solutions to it.
14:00 Sonal? OK, so let me just push back because if I were in Apple's shoes, when you have this very vertically-integrated, top-down approach to design, that's actually the thing that makes you more secure. It would seem that letting third-party players into this is actually the thing that makes you more vulnerable. Or why is a third-party ecosystem the thing? Like, is that really the thing they need to do? Or just do they need to do a better job at security?
14:19 Martin Casado? So maybe I'll just use an instance, and then we'll back into it. So it's broadly understood, and I certainly believe, that the most secure way of acting on the Internet and authenticating is having a hardware key. It doesn't matter who makes the hardware key. And you use that in conjunction with whatever device you're using, right? So I can store it in separate places. So if I lose my phone, you know, somebody else doesn't have access to it. I can put it in a safe. It's a single-purpose device with not a big attack surface.
14:49 Sonal? It's like a real key.
14:50 Martin Casado? It's like a real key, right? We understand the security properties of physical things. So that's the most secure way, which is broadly recognized. So Apple, because of its closed design philosophy, has been very resistant to interoperating, even though it costs them nothing, to allowing Be able to use security keys. And it's just part of their ethos. We have seen some positive movements in Safari. We have seen some positive movements in NFC, which is the protocol that they use to kind of connect with.
15:21 Sonal? Near field communication. Didn't they just announce this week that you can actually now use UBI keys and NFCs with them?
15:26 Martin Casado? Yeah, so they changed it so you can read and write, which allows you to implement Vito and U2F, which are protocols needed for this stronger authentication. So we're seeing good movement. But, boy, it can't come soon enough.
15:37 Sonal? OK, so before we go back to the whole hacking and securing phones in general topic, I wanted to actually ask you guys what you made of the whole Google Project Zero, which I summarized at the very beginning. I mean, we have one company that's professing to be helping everyone in the ecosystem, but then they also have their own stake in it. And then you have Apple responding that Google was being alarmist. And so I want your guys' quick take on this whole exchange that played out over the last few weeks between them and help me tease apart the facts from their interests.
16:05 Speaker 02 I respect that Google has taken the initiative to try to up-level the security of the ecosystem. I think it's a really important thing to do. I have issues with going after competitors and finding security vulnerabilities in their products.
16:17 Sonal? There's something very performative about that, isn't there?
16:19 Martin Casado? So I'll do the counterpoint to that. I think Apple's history of security is so atrocious because they have not been open that you need real muscle and a real public display to shame them into doing something right. And so I am so glad for Project Zero. I think it was a great thing for all of us.
16:34 Sonal? OK, so just to sum up, we've covered U-type supporting SIMs and phone numbers and PINs. But now let's go back to SIMjacker, which I described earlier in the intro. Why is that one news? And why is the carrier side of that in particular something to pay attention to? I mean, that's what really felt different and new to me in thinking through what were the interesting news headlines for this episode.
16:53 Martin Casado? This is unbelievable. SIMjacker is an attack, it's a legend attack, which involves me sending an SMS to you with some spyware. And with that, I can basically take over your mobile phone. And the reason I can do that is because the SIM cards, I think the firmware for the SIM cards has an old browser with an exploit in it. So the more software that the telcos install on your phones, they're not security companies.
17:19 Speaker 02 The interesting thing about. Cell phones is that ultimately your device is controlled by someone else, right? Your carrier, they have to have the ability to access it. They have to update carrier settings. They have to be able to push baseband software and other software unbeknownst to you, to your devices. Wherever you have backdoors or God keys, that's where attackers target. And I think there's a whole surface area of carrier tools and baseband tools that we don't even talk about that are probably where, you know, really sophisticated adversaries are spending some time right now. Once we figure out the SIM porting and once we figure out some of the software stuff, carrier tools is where this goes next.
17:55 Sonal? Okay, so guys, bottom line it for me.
17:57 Speaker 02 So from my perspective as a security geek, the thing that's really interesting to me is thinking about this in terms of what we call the kill chain. So where an attacker goes from targeting who they're going to get to getting and acting on the intent and getting the information they want. And for me, the really important thing is understanding and figuring out the quickest way an attacker can go from deciding who they want to target to achieving their outcome. We have this concept called defense in depth. So we want to have a lot of little walls that you have to get through before you can actually get to where you want to act on your intent. And the entire security industry is predicated on building these little walls along that kill chain, finding ways to force the disclosure of an attacker. What we've seen with some of these device makers in the last year has been a way to short circuit a lot of that kill chain.
18:41 Speaker 02 These attacks that we've seen in the last year are direct. They're to the point, they're immediately acting on their intent, and they don't have any of those little checks that we want to have in place. And generally, this is where nation states kind of focus on applying the gasoline.
18:54 Sonal? Honestly, my takeaway is like, I should just throw my phone into the water.
18:57 Speaker 02 It's not that bad. I think we know the answer and unfortunately, it's kind of our human nature that we don't want to pursue it, right? Like, we know that the key to health is eating right, exercising, not smoking, doing things in moderation, right? When it comes to online behavior, we actually know the answer. Let's use a valid, strong factor of second factor authentication. And if we have to like engage with someone on the internet, let's trust but verify, right?
19:20 Martin Casado? The good news is it's actually not very hard to be incredibly secure on the internet. And it's just following best practice, things like use a password manager. We believe it's good to use a Security key. Use a Chromebook. If you have a physical thing you want to protect, use a safe to protect it in. Have good physical security. Don't ever click on links that come in SMS and so forth. So there's a very small list of things that if you follow, we think that you're in a good spot.
19:46 Sonal? Well, thank you for joining this week's episode of 16 Minutes.
19:49 Martin Casado? Thank you.
19:50 Sonal? Thank you.
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