Pod Insights The Ezra Klein Show The Teen Mental Health Crisis, Part 1 About this episode We’re in the midst of a serious teen mental health crisis. The number of teenagers and young adults with clinical depression more than doubled between 2011 and 2021. The suicide rate for teenagers nearly doubled from 2007 to 2019, and tripled for 10- to 14-year- olds in particular. According to the C. D. C., nearly 25 percent of teenage girls made a suicide plan in 2021. What’s going on in the lives of teenagers that has produced such a startling uptick?
Jean Twenge, a research psychologist and author of the books “iGen” and “Generations,” has spent years poring over mental health statistics and survey data trying to answer this question. In her view, the story in the data is clear: Our teenage mental health crisis is the direct product of the rise of smartphones and social media.
So I wanted to have Twenge on the show to elicit and interrogate her argument. What is the actual evidence for the smartphone thesis? How do we account for the fact that teenage girls and liberals are having far worse outcomes than boys and conservatives? What about alternate explanations for this crisis, like meritocratic pressure, the economy, school shootings and climate change? And if Twenge is right that the culprit is smartphones, then what can we do to address that problem?
If you are having thoughts of suicide, call or text 988 to reach the 988 Suicide and Crisis Lifeline or go to SpeakingOfSuicide.com/resources for a list of additional resources.
Listen to this podcast in New York Times Audio, our new iOS app for news subscribers. Download now at nytimes.com/audioapp
Mentioned:
“We’re Missing a Key Driver of Teen Anxiety” by Derek Thompson
“The Paradox of Wealthy Nations’ Low Adolescent Life Satisfaction” by Robert Rudolf and Dirk Bethmann
“Our Epidemic of Loneliness and Isolation” by the U. S. Surgeon General’s Advisory
Book Recommendations:
The Problem With Everything by Meghan Daum
What’s Our Problem? by Tim Urban
Nine Ladies by Heather Moll
Thoughts? Guest suggestions? Email us at [email protected] .
You can find transcripts (posted midday) and more episodes of “The Ezra Klein Show” at nytimes.com/ezra-klein-podcast, and you can find Ezra on Twitter @ezraklein. Book recommendations from all our guests are listed at https://www.nytimes.com/article/ezra-klein-show-book-recs.
This episode of “The Ezra Klein Show” was produced by Annie Galvin. Fact checking by Michelle Harris and Mary Marge Locker. Mixing by Jeff Geld. Our production team is Emefa Agawu, Annie Galvin, Jeff Geld, Roge Karma and Kristin Lin. Original music by Isaac Jones. Audience strategy by Shannon Busta. The executive producer of New York Times Opinion Audio is Annie-Rose Strasser. And special thanks to Efim Shapiro and Kristina Samulewski.
Transcript 13,585 words · 2 speakers
Speaker names marked ? are inferred from speaking time and the show’s known hosts — they are not voice-verified.
0:22 Ezra Klein? So before we jump in today, I want to tell you about something The New York Times has been working on for a while. And I'm going to level with you that when they started telling me about this project, I was very skeptical of it, which made for a couple of awkward internal conversations. Because what I understood them to be working on was a podcast app. And I thought to myself, who needs another podcast app? There are plenty of them on the market already. None of them are great, but they're fine. And then they gave me the new app as a beta tester. And I realized that I was wrong about what they're building, at least partly wrong. Because what they actually built is something nobody has created yet, which is a portal to the world of audio journalism. There are podcasts,
1:04 Ezra Klein? including this one, but also stories, essays, profiles. You can listen to digest of the news and to full news stories and to full magazine stories. You don't have to choose anymore between listening to a podcast and actually getting the news. You can get the news you used to read, but done in a really, really strong, really professional audio format, and not just from The New York Times. Our stories are from other publishers, too. So the app, again, is called New York Times Audio. It's an iOS app. You get it from the App Store. And it is for New York Times news subscribers, which, come on, if you're listening to this show, I hope you're a subscriber for that by now. So check it out. It really is something new. It really is something worth trying.
1:51 Ezra Klein? I'm going to start today's show with some numbers. Between 2011 and 2021, the number of teens and young adults with clinical depression, it more than doubled, more than doubled. Between 2007 and 2019, the suicide rate for those in their early twenties rose by 41%, and the suicide rate for 10 to 14-year-olds, 10 to 14-year-olds, think about how young that is, it tripled and it nearly quadrupled for girls. A CDC survey found that in 2021, almost 60% of high school girls experienced persistent feelings of sadness or hopelessness during the past year. And nearly 25%,
2:32 Ezra Klein? I just, this number, man, nearly 25% made a suicide plan. Something is going terribly wrong for teenagers. Whatever it is started well before the pandemic. And this is important enough and big enough. They were going to do a couple of episodes exploring it. But I wanted our first one to really try to dig into these numbers. What do we know is happening here? Why is it happening? You can't begin to solve a problem like this. At least you have a theory of what has been causing it. Jean Twenge is a research psychologist who has been deep in this data for years. She's one of the earliest to see something going wrong with teen mental health. And then in her 2017 book, I Gen, and her new book, Generations, she's put together reams of charts and graphs and theories and tests
3:17 Ezra Klein? to try to understand what it is, what has happened here. And the leading candidate, in her view, is smartphones and social media. And if that's true, if they really are doing this level of damage to kids today, then we need to be thinking about interventions here on a whole different scale than most policymakers have been willing to touch. And I want to say this episode obviously deals a lot with suicide. And if you or someone you know or love is struggling here, get help, there is a lot of help out there. So call or text 988 to reach the suicide and crisis lifeline. As always, my email, [email protected] .
3:59 Ezra Klein? Jean Twenge, welcome to the show.
4:01 Speaker 01 Thank you.
4:03 Ezra Klein? So in your new book, Generations, you write, quote, "that there's a full-blown mental health crisis among young people, and it was building long before the COVID-19 pandemic." So walk me through some of the data, and your book is really chock full of data and graphs, which I really appreciated about it. Walk me through some of the data that persuaded you of that.
4:23 Speaker 01 Yeah, so I work with these large national surveys, often of teens, and I've been doing that for a number of years. So when I first started to see these trends, they were surprising because they were so sudden. So around 2012, more and more teens started to say they felt lonely and left out, and more started to say they felt like they couldn't do anything right or that they didn't enjoy life. Those last two are classic symptoms of depression. Then other data started to pop up. Clinical level depression that requires treatment started to rise. Emergency room admissions for self-harm started to rise in CDC data.
5:04 Speaker 01 Same thing for suicide attempts and completed suicides.
5:11 Speaker 01 So at first, I thought it might be a blip, a year or two of data, but it kept going. So for example, between 2011 and 2019, well before the pandemic, clinical level depression among teens doubled. Emergency room admissions for self-harm tripled in 10- to 14-year-old girls. So this is why I say we know it's not just the pandemic.
5:39 Ezra Klein? And those objective measures of behavior, is that one of the ways we know? Because I think this is a common suspicion at about this point in the conversation, that we're not just dealing with a rise in reporting or a decrease in stigma. You know, maybe it's much easier to say and admit that you're depressed than it was in 1985.
5:58 Speaker 01 So exactly, that's how we know it's not just about more willingness to report, is that these objective measures like the emergency room admissions, not just for self-harm, but also for suicidal thoughts and suicide attempts, have gone up and the pattern is extremely similar to the self-reports. I mean, the other thing that has to be kept in mind about these self-reports is these surveys are anonymous. Many of them also ask about drug and alcohol use, all of which is illegal in these age groups. So these surveys, better than anybody, you know, know how to make sure to get across to young people how confidential it is.
6:34 Ezra Klein? What are we seeing in terms of the demographic differences here between boys and girls, among races, classes, geographies? Are there patterns being picked up there that are worth noting?
6:46 Speaker 01 So the biggest difference is boys versus girls. And it varies a little bit from one measure to another. So for clinical level depression, it's doubled for both girls and boys. But because teen girls' rates of depression are and were always higher, the number of people that this affects is larger for girls. And then in many of the other measures we've been discussing, the changes are considerably larger for girls than for boys. So self-harm behaviors is one of those, where there's not as much change for boys as there is for girls. Same is true for the suicide rate, that it has changed for both, but it has changed
7:28 Speaker 01 more and increased more among girls than among boys.
7:33 Ezra Klein? I want to zoom in here on suicide itself. You compare the actual suicide rate increases between 2007, not that long ago, and 2019. And you say of the increase, quote, "It's a total of 17,677 additional young lives lost, averaging more than 1,300 a year, enough to fill nine planes." Imagine if nine airline flights filled with 10 to 24-year-olds crashed every single year, killing everyone on board.
8:04 Ezra Klein? That's a really profound and shocking rise. So how do you understand the rise in suicide itself?
8:12 Speaker 01 So I think we have to look at the pattern across all of the measures. So not just suicide, but also those ER admissions for self-harm, the rise in depression, the rise in anxiety, the rise in unhappiness. And across the board, all of these indicators have gotten worse, you know, in terms of mental health. And the pattern is fairly similar. That around 2010 or so, these indicators start to get worse. Now, the exact time when they start to increase varies a little bit from one measure to another sometime between 2009 and 2013.
8:56 Speaker 01 It's right in that time period. So you have to ask, what happened during that time period? Because we're not trying to explain all of the causes of mental health issues among teens. We want to know why it increased so much over such a short period of time. So it has to be something that changed around that time and then kept going in the same direction over the next decade or so. So when I first started to see these changes, I had absolutely no idea what the cause could be. It was pretty clear it was not economics because the US economy finally started to improve after about 2011, after the Great Recession. It was difficult to think of any major event that occurred around that time and then reverberated throughout the decade.
9:41 Speaker 01 And then one day I came across the results of a poll from the Pew Center for Research. And it showed that the end of 2012 was the first time that the majority of Americans owned a smartphone. And in these same surveys of teens, that time period was also when social media use moved from something that about half of teens were doing every day, it was in 2009, to by 2015, 2016, about 80% of them were doing it every day. So then, basically, what happened is social media use moved from optional to almost mandatory among teens. So that's when I started to think, maybe that had something to do with it,
10:24 Speaker 01 that teens were spending so much more time online, also because this lined up with other things. Like, they were also sleeping less. The trend isn't exactly the same pattern. That started to increase after 2011 or 2012. And they also started spending less time with their friends in person. So that had started to decline just a little bit after about 2000, and then it really falls off a cliff after 2010. So you put this together, there was a fundamental change in the way teens spent their time outside of school, starting in that same time period, early 2010s. And that coincides with pretty good precision with when mental health started to suffer.
11:08 Ezra Klein? So before we go deep into the smartphone thesis, I want to zoom in on something you said there about the data, which is that we're trying to explain a change in the time series, right? There's this very sharp, just the line goes almost straight up, starting, you say, around like 2011, 2012. But something that was striking when we were doing prep for this was I saw this figure from the researchers Will Reinhardt and Taylor Barkley. And they found that if you go back to the late 1960s and you graph the teen suicide rate, it looks more cyclical, rather than a trend just going upward. So it's higher in the 80s than now, then it falls for a long time, until about 2008, and then it picks up again, getting us to where we are now.
11:52 Ezra Klein? So if we're kind of explaining the rise, how do we also explain the fall that preceded it? I mean, there are no smartphones in, you know, the 1980s. So what do you understand as having gone on in the 80s, it led to such a high suicide rate, and then stopped happening such that it went down to what we're now thinking of as a more normal baseline?
12:11 Speaker 01 So it is true that the suicide rate for teens in the late 80s and early 90s was very high. It was much higher than it was, say, for boomer teens in 1970. So one thing we have to keep in mind here is just the greater cultural context that there was a big rise in violent crime around this time. It was kind of a disordered time in the culture. So this, there was a recession. This is around the time that, you know, Bill Clinton's 1992 campaign kept talking about change because it was such a pessimistic, you know, time in the country. And for teens in particular, and we're talking about suicides in particular,
12:53 Speaker 01 there's another element. So there was a huge availability of inexpensive guns around that time. So they were called Saturday night specials. And when you break it down for firearm suicides versus non, non-firearm suicides went down or didn't change a whole lot during that time period when it was the Gen Xers who were teens. It was really that increase in the firearm suicides. So it may have had a fair amount to do with the preponderance of cheap guns.
13:27 Ezra Klein? So one of your, your big theses throughout generations is that generations are technologically mediated, that more than they're defined by cultural events, they're defined by the technologies they have accessible to them. So your thinking on this is that technology that was mediating that was guns. But then why would it fall?
13:47 Speaker 01 Well, the folks that looked at this concluded that there were more restrictions starting in the mid 90s. And what I do know for sure, the violent crime rate definitely started to go down after about 1993 was the peak. And then things started to improve and they kept improving for a really long time. So I still think that, that general atmosphere of that time, which was really a tough time to be a teen, particularly if, you know, depending on the neighborhood you were in, but particularly if you were in, you know, a place that was impacted by this very, very high level of violent crime.
14:25 Ezra Klein? Violent crime actually gets at why I wanted to ask this before we got into smartphones. Because I'm much more familiar with the debate over crime than I am over the debate over suicide trend lines. And the thing that is always striking to me, and I think really underplayed in our national discourse over crime, is that we don't really understand it. That if you go into the 80s and the 90s, you see crime goes way, way up in the 70s, way, way up in all kinds of different jurisdictions, more or less all at the same time. And then it begins going way, way down in all kinds of different places, all at the same time. So you have stories that people know, like there's New York with Rudy Giuliani and broken windows policing and stop and frisk. But it also goes down in all these places that didn't do what New York City did.
15:09 Ezra Klein? It's so widespread, both the rise and the fall, that you end up having researchers trying to think of even broader explanations, like whether or not lead and the amount of lead in young kids' bloodstream, and thus the effect on their executive function when they got older, maybe that's the causal mechanism. And it made me wonder, if there isn't a chance that suicide and teen mental health is like that, that it has this kind of all the way up, all the way down, in all places, and we don't really understand why, pattern to it.
15:38 Speaker 01 Well, I think, and I think, I mean, your point is very well taken about crime rates, that they are a little bit of a mystery. It's also true, sure, that for mental health, we can't randomly assign people to be born at different times and then see what their mental health looks like. That would be the gold standard of a random assignment experiment, and it's literally impossible. So we have to go on the data that we have. But I think for the recent rise in mental health issues, we can look at it this way, that this is a generation where violent crime is a lot lower than it was in the early 90s. Teen pregnancy was lower. They're even less likely to get into car accidents or get into physical fights at school.
16:23 Speaker 01 Incomes were up for that period. You know, there's all these things that were going right, yet still, mental health among teens suffered. So there must have been some big mechanism. The reason why I think the smartphones and social media explanation has held up...
16:42 Speaker 01 Is because that is what had the biggest impact on the day to day lives of teens. It wasn't something that happened to their parents. It wasn't a single thing they read about in the news. It completely restructured their time outside of school. Because social media is social, it impacts even people who don't use it. And it had a huge impact on the way teens spent time with their friends. That they started spending a lot less time with each other face to face. And you think about what's important for mental health overall, it's relationships. And you think about teens in particular. That is what makes or breaks mental health for a teen is their relationships, particularly their friendships.
17:23 Speaker 01 And the way those friendships were conducted changed completely.
17:30 Ezra Klein? So I want to dig into this piece of it more because smartphones sound like a singular cause. But when I read you on this and when I read others, it decomposes into into something very multi causal. So tell me the different mechanisms. You talk about time displacement and social effects and time spent with friends and sleep. What are the different mechanisms that you understand smartphones as triggering that contribute to this for you?
17:58 Speaker 01 There are a lot of different mechanisms. It's another reason why it is such a plausible explanation. So as we've already talked about, there's the time displacement, not just with in person interactions with friends, but also with sleep. Sleep is absolutely crucial for mental health. Not sleeping enough is a huge risk factor for depression and suicidal thoughts. And sleep deprivation among teens in two different surveys, so it's exactly the same pattern as the mental health issues. Which is around 2012 or so, it starts going up. So that's our first couple of mechanisms.
18:36 Ezra Klein? And just hold on on that one for a minute. What makes you certain that that isn't just correlation with the takeoff in smartphones? What makes you think that smartphones are directly leading to less sleep for teens?
18:48 Speaker 01 So there's many correlational and experimental studies, say in sleep labs. Showing that, for example, if people have their phones in their bedrooms overnight, that that disrupts sleep.
19:02 Speaker 01 That looking at a device before bedtime leads to less sleep and less quality sleep. So because for a number of reasons. First, they're psychologically stimulating. Pretty much everything people do on the phone is psychologically stimulating, particularly for teens, where the number of likes they got on their Instagram post, or whether their crush texted them back is very important. These are not relaxing thoughts, yet many, many, many teens are looking at their phones right up until they go to sleep. Plus, there's a physiological element. The blue light on those devices shines into your eyes, tricks your brain into thinking it's still daytime, and then you don't make as much melatonin, the sleep hormone that
19:46 Speaker 01 you need to fall asleep quickly and get a good night's sleep. And, you know, this is correlational experimental. We've that that piece of the research literature is extremely solid on that connection between spending time on on the devices and not sleeping enough.
20:03 Ezra Klein? All right, so that is smartphones and sleep. What are the other mechanisms?
20:06 Speaker 01 So there's all of the things that happen, you know, when a teen uses social media. So we can start with things like social comparison and body image issues. So this is what Facebook's own research shows, as well as plenty of external academic research as well, that looking at, say, these ideal bodies on Instagram, or even the people you go to high school with, and they look more glamorous, and you're comparing your body to theirs and your appearance to theirs and coming up short. So that's the social comparison piece. And lots of studies on this, that people who spend more time, and especially those
20:49 Speaker 01 who spend more time looking at those images on Instagram, if they have that tendency towards social comparison, that's where you get the body image issues, appearance issues, and then those mediated, those can then lead to depression. And in Facebook's research, they had a bunch of focus groups, as well as large surveys, and they found this over and over. And the focus group quotes, some of them are really stunning. They would talk about a grief spiral, and they start looking at these images, feel inadequate, then get depressed.
21:24 Speaker 01 Then there's all of the other things that people have discussed, you know, about the influence of social media, that it means popularity becomes a number. How many likes do you have? How many followers do you have? And it's never enough. Then cyberbullying, some of the rabbit holes that people end up going down that has been documented. If you start looking for healthy eating, you might end up on pro anorexia sites and there's no way to reset that and that negative material keeps showing up. Same thing for a lot of things around mental health. And again, it just becomes a spiral.
21:59 Ezra Klein? One thing about smartphones is they're an international phenomenon, so is social media. So what do you see in the international data here?
22:07 Speaker 01 So in the international data, we see exactly the same pattern as we see in the US for teen mental health. That in 36 countries around the world, adolescent loneliness began to increase after 2012, just like it does in the US data. We have solid data on depression and on happiness. In English-speaking countries, again, exact same pattern. So in the UK, in Australia, in Canada, exact same pattern for teens for anxiety and depression, self-harm, unhappiness. It's just very, very consistent.
22:44 Speaker 01 And that also suggests some cause that was worldwide. That helps us rule out more US-based explanations like worries around school shootings, which tend not to happen in other countries, and certain, you know, political events.
23:06 Ezra Klein? How does the smartphone thesis map on to the, not just the observation, the reality, that this has been much worse among girls and boys?
23:18 Speaker 01 Well, girls spend more time on social media. And time on social media is more strongly linked to depression than time spent on, say, gaming, which is where boys spend more of their screen time. So those two factors, they spend more time on it, and it's more strongly linked to depression for them, might explain the gender difference.
23:38 Ezra Klein? I find that pretty striking. Why do you think gaming is not as linked to some of these negative outcomes?
23:46 Speaker 01 These days, the way most teens and adults game, it's often interactive. So they'll play games with their friends, they aren't there face to face, but it's often in real time, and they'll often talk to each other as they're playing the game. So, you know, not the same as running around outside playing football, say, but still in real time and still interaction with friends, where on social media, only some of it is interaction with friends. A good amount of it is, you know, watching TikTok videos from people you've never met or scanning through the pages of Instagram influencers.
24:22 Ezra Klein? This is one thing I was trying to sit with as I read the book and thought about this data, that gaming has this tendency to be not just a directive, but it's you doing it, it's you doing something, where social media has this weird tendency to put you outside yourself looking in. I mean, you've talked about it as comparative, but it's also you're posting pictures, you're writing things, and then seeing how people respond, you're always putting yourself out for judgment, and you begin to inhabit the judger in a weird way. I mean, I certainly felt this myself, and I did not get social media when I was a 13 year old. Is there something to that, the way that gaming keeps you in yourself and social media takes you outside yourself?
25:08 Speaker 01 I think so. It reminds me of some of the research on what's called self-objectification in terms of appearance, that particularly for women, there's the pressure to focus on how your body looks to others, rather than what your body can do, say, in terms of sports or other things. And it's somewhat of the same element, because in gaming, you can do things, and maybe you're going to fail, and maybe your friends will make fun of you. But still, you're doing something. You have at least some perceived level of control. And in social media, there is that same perceived level of control.
25:49 Speaker 01 However, there's only so far you can go to modify your appearance and try to measure up to all the perfect people who you see online. And you're right, it's about so much more about the judgment of others than it is about what you're doing.
26:04 Ezra Klein? How much is social media also simply a vector for contagion of antisocial behaviors themselves, or depressive and anxious and self-harming thoughts and patterns themselves? And I mean something very specific here. So, back in the day when I covered more school shootings, there was an argument not to use in names of school shooters, sometimes not even, you would actually get the argument not to cover them, because there is a well-known copycat effect. There's also a well-known effect like that around suicide. People know that the more they hear about suicide, the likelier suicide is to occur to others. There's a Netflix show about the suicide of a teen called Thirteen Reasons Why, and there was a big debate, including some research, about whether or not that itself increased
26:48 Ezra Klein? suicide among teens. And so, there's an argument out there, that as people are exposed to simply the knowledge that other people are doing these things, killing themselves, killing others, hurting themselves, hurting others, that that itself is enough for more people to do it. And, you know, anybody who's spent time on social media also sees a lot more just discussion of anxiety, discussion of depression, those feelings, those interpretive frameworks for your own feelings becomes more at hand. So, how much is it just possible here, that you're seeing contagion as a force gathering its own momentum, that people are more connected to others having these kinds of experiences, and so they're having more of them themselves?
27:32 Speaker 01 I think that might explain some of the acceleration in the trend or part of it. I don't think it can explain why it started to begin with. So, yeah, I think we have to consider that there was an origin to this because, you know, why couldn't it be that people were talking about how optimistic or happy they are online and that that becomes contagious? So it had to start somewhere because there was that very sudden shift, you know, from millennials being self-confident and optimistic as teens to Gen Z being not. And it happened very quickly. It was a much more stark generational difference than I'd really documented in my whole career.
28:11 Ezra Klein? So I want to note that there are some studies that have looked at this and found very little effect or no effect or reverse effect. There was a 2019 study in Nature Human Behavior that found, quote, "The association we find between digital technology use and adolescent well-being is negative but small, explaining almost 0.4% of the variation in well-being." There was a 2018 study in Psychiatry Quarterly that also found very unremarkable results. You've kept, along with John Height and some others, this online compendium of studies on teen mental health. So when you see these studies, and there are a good number of them, that come out and say, "We checked into this and we just can't find anything significant or big here," how do you interpret what's happening in them? And if they do, how do they change your priors?
28:56 Speaker 01 So that 2019 Nature Human Behavior study has been pretty thoroughly debunked because three other research groups analyzed the same data and found there was actually a very strong link between social media and depression, especially among girls, in that same data. It was very interesting. The same month that that study came out, another research group in the UK used the same data set and found that three times as many heavy
29:29 Speaker 01 Users of social media were depressed as non-users among girls. That's not small. So then I and then another research group from Spain, who I have no connection to, later used the same more sophisticated statistical technique that those authors did in the Nature Human Behavior paper. And we both independently came to the same conclusion that first, there was some very strange mythological choices in that 2019 paper. And also that if you zero in on social media, and if you zero in on girls, there are definitely significant and impactful differences. If I know the 2018 psychiatric quarterly paper that you're discussing, I reanalyzed
30:12 Speaker 01 that data for a paper recently, same thing. And it also turns out if you take that data and look at it in a more intuitive way of, let's just look at the percentage who are depressed at every level of social media use. It's extremely common to find that pattern that those who don't use social media or use it only lightly, compared to those who use it heavily, that there's twice as many in the heavy use group, particularly among girls, who are depressed compared to the light or no use group. So these papers that say, you know, oh, there's nothing here, often are just looking at screen time overall. That 2019 paper included owning a computer. It also included watching TV.
30:57 Speaker 01 So they often don't zero in on social media. They often don't break down the data by boys versus girls. And they take correlations that translate to that doubling of depression and say, oh, that's small. And I just don't see how you could consider that small, to have twice as many who are depressed.
31:14 Ezra Klein? Tell me a bit more, actually, about that that screen time question, because one thing you'll hear in this conversation is we had a big moral panic about television. And it turns out that a lot of us grew up watching a lot of television and many of us at least think we are fine, maybe we are not.
31:30 Speaker 01 I would argue that point, actually, but that may be a whole other discussion.
31:34 Ezra Klein? I sort of agree with you that I think actually a bunch of the TV people were right about this, but tell me about that because there is nevertheless in the data, as I understand it, a finding at this point that television does not seem to have the level of significant negative effects on mental health that social media does. But so I'd first like to hear your point on maybe we're not fine because television messed with our brains and then I'd like to hear the difference between what you see in the data on using a screen for television and using it for social media.
32:01 Speaker 01 So the impacts of television, it's not quite as much for mental health, per se, as it is for things like the feeling of community, materialism, the amount people read, the national discourse and how tolerant it is of more complex arguments. These are all a lot of the things that I think we lost to television. Social skills, I mean, you can go on. Robert Putnam's book Bowling Alone basically says, yes, it's television. That's why we don't have all these community groups like we used to. But for mental health, for the moment, yes, if you spend a lot of time watching TV, you are more likely to be depressed. That is still true. It's just that that link is considerably smaller.
32:44 Speaker 01 So spending three hours watching TV is not as linked to depression as spending three hours on social media, for example.
32:53 Ezra Klein? So there's an observation here, as you just mentioned, that how much people use is very highly correlated to what the effect of the use seems to be. But something you'll hear about that is that maybe that goes the other way. Maybe you watch a lot of TV because you're depressed, because you don't have other good options. Maybe you're on social media all the time because you don't have other friends. Maybe the causal arrow is going in the other direction and practically social media in this case, though, TV in another era and for some people even now, that you're on there a lot because things are not going well for you already. It's not that things are not going well for you because you're on there a lot. How do you think about that?
33:32 Speaker 01 So there's two different questions here. So one is that overall pattern of, say, teen depression increasing so much after 2012. So there, it seems pretty clear that it's technology leading to depression rather than the other way around. Because if it was depression causing technology use, you'd have to say this. You'd have to say, OK, teen depression started to increase for some completely unknown reason. Nobody's been able to figure out yet. And that's why teens started to buy smartphones and spend a lot of time on social media. Like, it just, it doesn't work. So it seems pretty clear that at the generational level, we're not getting reverse causation. Now, at the individual level, sure, that's a more plausible explanation.
34:13 Speaker 01 But we have a good amount of experimental data now to suggest that at least some and probably most of the causation is going from the technology use to depression. So a couple of examples. There's been several studies that have asked people to either give up or cut back on their social media use. Those who gave up social media are happier and less depressed than those who continued their normal use. There's also a really cool study that takes advantage of, basically, a natural experiment that Facebook rolled out at different times on different college campuses.
34:57 Speaker 01 And they documented that as a campus got Facebook, the mental health among the students on that campus started to suffer.
35:26 Ezra Klein? So I want to look at some of the other broad theories because you can buy the smartphone thesis broadly, and I do, and still, you know, wonder if there's not other causal mechanisms happening here. One you will hear a lot is that we're not seeing a mental health crisis. We're seeing, let's call it, a reality crisis. You know, one version of this is that teens today are upset and depressed and anxious because of economic prospects, because they're coming of age in an era when capitalism is going awry, because they're coming of age in an era of climate crisis and wars and Donald Trump. Tell me how you take that, that argument, that this is, in some ways, a rational response to a declining reality.
36:13 Speaker 01 So first, I think we have to take a step back and look at the broad picture. Is living right now in 2023 really worse than it was, say, in March 2020 at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic? Is it really worse than, say, the millennials graduating from college during the Great Recession? Is it worse than 1992 or '93 during the height of the violent crime wave? Is it worse than in the '80s, when we thought Russia would drop the bomb tomorrow and the whole world would end? Is it worse than rumors of getting drafted into Vietnam? A lot of people would say, "Well, you can think about it that way." No, it's not. And then we can take kind of the specific explanations. And I, you know, I want to be clear.
36:56 Speaker 01 It is, I completely agree, important to consider these alternative explanations and see if they fit the data. So wars, well, if that were the case, wouldn't you expect teen depression to have been the highest, well, especially during World War II? No, it was lower by the measures we have then. And then more recently, then you'd expect teen depression to be the highest when we were at war in Iraq and Afghanistan. And instead, that's when we had some of the lowest rates of depression and suicide among teens. Climate change. So one of the things that is in the Gen X chapter of generations is the high school
37:38 Speaker 01 student surveys that ask about concern for the environment. Things like, "Government should change or ban products to help the environment." "They should increase prices and taxes to help the environment." "People are going to have to change their way of life to help the environment." So we have data on that between 1976 and 2021, and the peak of those attitudes was in the '90s, not recently. So that, I think, argues away from the idea that it would be worries around climate change. Plus, if it was climate change, what you would expect is that you'd see the biggest increases in depression.
38:19 Speaker 01 Among older adolescents and young adults, where these are issues that they're talking about at school. They might be reading news. Instead, where we see the biggest increases is among 10 to 14 year olds. It's less likely to fall into that category of placing a lot of importance on issues that affect the nation and the world. All right, so that's two of them. What were some of the others? Economics, median incomes that are all time highs adjusted for inflation. The US economy was on a tear between 2011 and 2019. And we see the biggest increase in teen depression. So most of these other things don't fit the data all that well.
38:58 Ezra Klein? So if we look closer, though, at a kind of an individual issue here, you know, you mentioned gun violence. And there, I think if you look at that on school shooting incidents, you know, at times when a gun was was brandished or fired on school property, those graphs really do begin to accelerate around your key date of 2012. And yeah, so smartphone use also rises in, but it's when Sandy Hook happens. And I certainly remember Sandy Hook as a as a real horrifyingly watershed moment in this. And you begin having more of these active shooter drills in elementary schools. So, I mean, Gen Z, kind of this generation is having a lot more safety focus and safety issues is coming of age, you know, routinely often drilling what will happen
39:41 Ezra Klein? if somebody's there in their own school with a gun. So I could actually imagine maybe this ricocheting back into social media as these issues are being picked up on smartphones and platforms and becoming sort of more in the water. But it does feel to me like there is a different political dynamic that younger millennials and certainly Gen Z years are swimming in that might make politics more salient. And then, of course, the Trump era, but might make politics more salient and fear more salient, you know, starting in the smartphone era in a way that matches the data. I'm curious how you think about that interplay.
40:18 Speaker 01 I think it's really clear that it's not school shootings because if it were, then we wouldn't see the increases in depression and self-harm in countries where school shootings don't exist or are much, much less common than the horrific rate that we experienced in the United States. Yet, we do see that. We see the increases happening around 2012 around the world. So I think that does a pretty good job of ruling out that explanation. Plus, even though maybe if there was a turning point in 2012, well, school shootings were a really big deal in the late 90s, too, and teen mental health issues were improving at that time. So I think that also argues against that as an explanation.
40:59 Ezra Klein? While we're on politics for a minute, one interesting wrinkle in the data here is that liberal teens are quite a bit more unhappy, have more mental health issues than conservative teens. In 2019 to 2021, liberal teens were nearly twice as likely to be depressed as conservative teens. You see this even swamping some of the gender data. So you see liberal boys being more depressed than conservative girls, if I remember this number correctly. So why are liberal teens less happy?
41:32 Speaker 01 Well, and that is, it's a very, very interesting finding. So I dig into that in the book. And I think there's a couple of possibilities, but the one that I ended up realizing fit the data the best, liberal teens spend more time on social media, and they have increasingly spent less time with each other face to face. And there's a bigger change among liberals in spending time with friends face to face. So back in the 70s and 80s, liberal teens actually spent more time with their friends face to face than conservative teens. And right around 2012, that flipped.
42:13 Speaker 01 So there's a bigger decrease among the liberal girls, for example. So in the end, a good amount of that also is probably due to social media. Because some of the other explanations don't really fit quite as well. Because you do still see an increase of depression among conservative teens. It's just not as large as the increase among liberal teens. So some of the other explanations around politics don't fit all that well. So here's two things in that department. One is that if you look at the teens who say that they are interested in government and current affairs, so those are going to be people who are paying attention, you really don't see a whole lot of difference based on those who are paying attention and those
42:58 Speaker 01 who aren't, if you break it down by that and by liberal versus conservative. The other piece is that you see the exact same pattern in loneliness. So loneliness isn't really something you would expect to be that influenced by political ideology per se, but it's probably going to be influenced by how much time you spend with your friends versus on social media. And the pattern for loneliness and the pattern for depression look pretty much exactly the same if you look at it by gender and by political ideology in terms of it increasing, starting around 2010, 2011, and the increase being larger among liberals than among conservatives.
43:38 Ezra Klein? So why would liberal teens be more likely to use social media more than conservative teens? If liberal and conservative are basically picking up some other attribute leading to a disparate use of social media, what do you think is hiding in the correlation there?
43:55 Speaker 01 Well, liberals, sometimes called progressives, are by definition more comfortable with social change. So liberal teens tend to have liberal parents, conservative teens tend to have conservative parents. And this is a guess, but perhaps liberal teens and their parents said, hey, you know, social media, spending time online, that's just what kids do now. And that's cool. That's just the change. It's just what people do now. And conservative parents might have been more skeptical and might have had more restrictions on their kids with social media. And that same thing could have interacted with the face-to-face social interaction because once teens start, as a group anyway, start spending a lot more time online, then the norm shifts to doing that instead of getting together in person.
44:39 Ezra Klein? This gets to a set of broader ideas around parenting, which I associate not only, but substantially with your co-author on some of this work, John Height, who's made the point that we live in a parenting culture that's increasingly oriented towards safety. And you have quite a lot of data about this in the new book, that parents today, much more so than parents, you know, a couple of decades ago, are trying to mow any obstacles out of their kids' way. You have a great line where you talk about how, you know, it used to be that 13-year-old was a babysitter and now a 13-year-old needs a babysitter. What do you see in both the data and the changes around parenting itself? How do you see that playing into this?
45:21 Speaker 01 So I think it's important in this case to start with the broader picture that, you know, the theory that I really start with in the book is that technology is at the root of so much generational and cultural change. And that one of the outcomes of technology, because we have better medical care, is longer lives. When people live longer, you tend to get something that psychologists call the slow life strategy, that the entire developmental trajectory slows down from infancy to old age. Kids are less independent. Teenagers are less likely to get their driver's license, to go out with their friends, to drink alcohol,
46:01 Speaker 01 to have sex, to have a paid job. Young adults take longer to get married and have kids and settle into a career. Middle-aged people look and feel younger than their parents and grandparents did at the same age. So 60 is the new 50, this type of idea, because lives last longer. So that trajectory slows down. And that's not all bad or all good. I mean, let's focus on teens for a minute. Most parents are pretty thrilled that not as many teens are having sex or drinking alcohol. But it's not all good, because if they also don't go out of the house that much without their parents, don't have a driver's license, have never had a job, that transition to college or the workplace can
46:43 Speaker 01 be challenging. They just haven't had as much experience with independence and decision-making. So there's trade-offs. The slow life strategy is not all good, it's not all bad. It doesn't mean kids are more responsible or less mature. It just means they're taking longer, you know, to do these adult activities. But looking more at the edges, we can see some issues.
47:05 Speaker 01 If we have a shift in parenting, that's not just, okay, they're going to take longer to grow up, but that's in the mix and we want to protect them from not just physical dangers, but experiences, then we're starting to run into trouble. This is the observation that John Height and Lenore Skenazy have made with their organization, Let Grow, that parents who want to give their kids more experience with independence often run afoul of laws and norms that say, oh, a nine-year-old can't walk a mile by themselves. Or Lenore's nine-year-old, she let take the subway in New York.
47:47 Speaker 01 Her kid loved it, and then she wrote about it and got all kinds of grief from people that that was dangerous and so on. And this was a good 10, 15 years ago. So this is where you do run into trouble when kids developing independence can be good and can be safe, but we have a parenting culture now that says you cannot let your kid out of your sight for one second. And that, I think that many people have argued and I would agree, takes things too far and does a real disservice to children.
48:18 Ezra Klein? Well, there's a weird disconnect here between you can't let your kid out of your sight, so there's a lot less of independence out in the real world, but then this really expansive independence for fairly young kids in the digital world, in part because it's just harder over long periods of time, you know, to keep all the kind of parental blockers and not let them be talking to their friends on, you know, Facebook Messenger or whatever. And so there is this distinction between the real world, which does have dangers, but I think it's fair to say in most of the data, they're overstated in our culture, and the digital world, which the dangers are, if anything, understated, it seems, for teens in our culture.
49:00 Ezra Klein? But teens have a lot more freedom to traverse the digital world for hours and hours and hours a day with no supervision, while being out in the real world is much more heavily regulated.
49:12 Speaker 01 I think that's exactly right. And in my previous book, I Gen, which is all about Gen Z, there's one graph that I made which illustrates this, and again, it's at the extremes, but that about 2011, the teen suicide rate exceeded the teen homicide rate.
49:31 Speaker 01 For, and it wasn't the first time, but it was the first time I did it for years on end where the two crossed. And that mirrors other trends that we see, that this generation is physically safer. You know, they don't get in car accidents as much, or fistfights as much, or drink alcohol as much. But perhaps because they are so unregulated in their time online, that's why we have these record levels of depression and suicide and self-harm.
49:58 Ezra Klein? But there is something narratively weird about this. I mean, I grew up in, you know, the 90s, and to some degree in the early aughts. And I remember the panics of that period as I was, I became a professional journalist in 2005. I still remember that there was a lot of debate over teen pregnancy, and abstinence-only education, and teen drug use, and there was a dumb panic over rainbow parties, which you can look it up if you would like to know what those were, or what they were purported to be at the very least. And we got all these numbers down. I mean, you know, drug use is down, and age of sex is up, and teen pregnancy is down,
50:40 Ezra Klein? and alcohol use is down, and smoking is down, and you would have thought, I think, from the discourse of the time, that that would have led to an overall improvement in teen well-being. And it seems like there's been a very real be careful what you wish for here, that if you, if you go back, I think, to the panics of, you know, the, the why are the kids not all right of, you know, 1999, a lot of that reversed, and now the kids are even worse shape. So what do you make of why so many things that we thought were a big problem for kids have, have gone down, and yet it turns out those were maybe correlates of things we actually wanted from them in the real world?
51:22 Speaker 01 Yeah, and, you know, this is not at all the discount. Teen pregnancy, and alcohol abuse, and physical dangers, homicide, obviously, big problems. Not that these are small problems.
51:35 Ezra Klein? Yeah, homicide is bad. Let's put that on the table.
51:37 Speaker 01 Yes, let's just make sure, you know, we're being clear about this. These, these physical dangers are definitely bad, but they are correlates of teens getting together with each other in person. And yet, sometimes, when teens get together with each other in person, trouble follows. That does happen. But the vast majority of the time when teens get together face to face, That's good for mental health. They're spending time together. They're sharing about their experiences. They're making sometimes lifelong friendships. At the very least, you know, they're having companionship through the journey of adolescence in high school, which is not always an easy time, usually is not an easy time. And trying to do that online is a pale shadow. It is not the same.
52:22 Speaker 01 And so, yeah, we have a lot more kids or her at home not getting into these other types of teenage trouble. But that's probably why they're depressed, because they're at home, in their bedrooms, on their phones, instead of being with each other in person.
52:37 Ezra Klein? I want to look at another theory here. So Derek Thompson had a piece in The Atlantic where he was looking at a 2022 paper by Dirk Bethman and Robert Rudolf that found, quote, "Higher standardized test scores in student assessments of academic competition were strongly correlated with teen anxiety. If you take two countries that are equivalent in almost every way, same GDP, inequality, life expectancy, air pollution, the nation with higher test scores and more student competition will have more anxious and depressed teens." What do you make of that?
53:07 Speaker 01 Well, to really apply that principle to the stats in teen depression, we'd want to look at something that looked at academic pressure over time. And we can do that in these big surveys. So we can look at time spent on homework, for example. Did time spent on homework suddenly increase around 2012, right as teen depression started to increase? And did it keep increasing? In fact, the opposite is true. Eighth and 10th graders spend less time on homework in recent years compared to previously. The pattern for eighth graders is particularly linear, and that's the group where you see
53:51 Speaker 01 the biggest increases in depression and self-harm. Other measures of academic pressure. So there's a question on the big, one of the big teen surveys. How much competition is there for grades at your school? That's also gone down. Goes up and down a little bit. It's not as linear, but the overall pattern is teens reporting less academic pressure in recent years. Then you could say, okay, well, let's look at who's doing the worst. And this is among individuals instead of countries. So that's one difference from that other study. So which group is most likely to be depressed? Is it the high achievers, say, those who have an A average and are planning to go straight to a four-year college?
54:35 Speaker 01 Or is it those who do not have a stellar of a record and are not planning to go to a four-year college? It's the low achievers who have higher rates of depression, particularly the low achieving girls. So I think that theory falls apart pretty quickly, at least when you look at the US data over time.
54:54 Ezra Klein? Well, let me try to steal, man, at least the back half of that because I take your point that a lot of things fall apart because they don't explain the time series change. But they could be part of the background radiation of this. It could be good if you change them. It's possible that what we're versus is not exactly what caused it. So, so I don't want to, I don't want to hang literally everything on whether or not it explains 2012. And I think on the, the flip of that, you know, you could imagine an explanation and I'd be curious how you think about testing this or absorbing it. We're in a world where there is a lot of competition and where, you know, particularly post 2008 recession and a much broader societal sense of economic insecurity and precarity
55:39 Ezra Klein? that, yeah, if you're a teenager who's not doing great, that it's actually getting scarier and scarier for you. And that, you know, to be in that position and particularly to be in that position in a place where there's a lot of pressure on it, right? You know, you're in a school that does send a lot of kids to four-year colleges to say nothing of, you know, really highly competitive ones. And you're one of the kids not doing well, that the sense that you might just be screwed forever. Is going to be a lot heavier than it would have been at other times because the literal structure of the American economy is making it more likely now that if you don't have a four-year college education from a pretty good school, you're at a much
56:20 Ezra Klein? higher likelihood of being in real economic despair over time. I mean, it does feel to me when you look at the American economy overall, that the sense of education is structuring your entire life is reasonably going up because it reasonably does in fact seem to structure a lot of your future earning potential. And so, you know, the fact that you're not seeing the worst of the effect among the highest achieving kids would, I think, be natural there.
56:46 Speaker 01 Yeah, and you can definitely see it that way. And there's probably multiple confounding factors, too, that the kids who aren't doing well could have, you know, terrible life at home, you know, not have any friends. That could also lead to depression. So there's all kinds of possible things going on there. But the general idea is, you know, absolutely worth considering. And it is true. You know, you look at median incomes of those who have a college degree, it's considerably higher than those who don't. I'm not as convinced, for a couple of reasons, that Gen Z teens are really feeling that, though. I saw a poll the other day. There's been a decline in the number of young people who think a college education is completely necessary for doing well. That may be because of labor
57:29 Speaker 01 shortages out there right now. It could be because they see, you know, other potential opportunities in other types of careers. You know, I also think it is really important to keep in mind what the reality is for college admissions because I think there's a really common perception that things are so impossibly competitive now. Well, you know what? That is true. For the Ivy Leagues and Ivy-adjacent schools, it's a very small percentage of kids who are aiming to go to those schools. So if we're talking about changes in averages, it's not really the group that we're going to want to focus on. What we're going to want to focus on is the kids who maybe do OK in high school. Well, I can't completely speak to other areas of the country, but where I live in California, the high school
58:14 Speaker 01 my daughter goes to, my oldest daughter, if you get a 2.5, you're pretty much guaranteed admission to Cal State San Marcos, which is a perfectly good, even really good, school to get your undergraduate degree. So if you get some mix of Bs and Cs...
58:34 Speaker 01 You can go there. And then, let's say you don't. You can go to community college. There are opportunities. It's not that it completely shuts off.
58:44 Ezra Klein? Is there any evidence of downward contagion here? So, you know, Generations has a lot of data on each of the different generations. And I'm curious if you're seeing rises in, because I think there is some evidence of this, rises in anxiety and depression among Gen Xers, among, you know, elder millennials. I'm an elder millennial. I have young kids now. I definitely think that I am part of the cultural dynamic where ideas and structures and frameworks of things like anxiety are more easily at hand. And I worry sometimes when I talk to my four-year-old that because I am practiced at recognizing something like anxiety in myself, I'm, if anything, too practiced
59:26 Ezra Klein? at offering it as an explanation to him, which will make it easier for him to grasp that. Is there any concern or evidence that something happening here is that the parents are in worse mental health or have more of these ideas or just have culturally been taught to be that much more responsive to kids' feelings and as such are beginning to create more contagion? And again, recognizing maybe that doesn't explain the 2012 turn. But if you imagine that you could have a 2012 turn coming from smartphones and then different cultural dynamics amplifying it, if, you know, kids are getting a bit more depressed and then parents who are more depressed are freaking out about their kid's depression much more quickly and then embedding that idea, that story into them, like you could see something like a feedback loop kicking off.
1:00:10 Speaker 01 Or the alternative explanation would be if they're more sensitive to it, they might be more likely to get their kids' mental health treatment. And then the depression should be lower because mental health treatment does usually work. So, yeah, there is a generational story here to mental health, but it's a little bit of a different one from what you're telling. So. When I first started looking at the data and saying, let's just take clinical level depression, it was showing up for teens. It began to show up for young adults a couple of years after, so 2013, 2014. You're seeing it up to the age of about 25. For a while, it was not appearing among those ages 26 and over. Then it did.
1:00:55 Speaker 01 So after about 2015 or 2016, then you also start to see a rise in clinical level depression among 26 to 34 year olds. It doesn't really appear among those 35 and older. Just basically not a whole lot going on in terms of rates of clinical level depression between 2005 and 2021. But there's a pronounced increase among 26 to 34 year olds. Doesn't equal the increase among teens and young adults, but it's still there and it's still very striking. This is in the millennial chapter of Generations.
1:01:33 Speaker 01 And this is a little bit of a mystery because why would it be just these cohorts? Why are we seeing this primarily among those younger than 35? And in another data set, it's more that we see it more among those 39 and younger. And why does it start to increase the most after 2015? So I go through a few explanations in the book, but when I posted some of this on Substack, I asked people for their ideas because it's very hard to figure out exactly what's going on. It doesn't look like it's Trump's election because you see the same pattern in, for
1:02:15 Speaker 01 example, the blue state of California versus the red state of Texas. And it happens right before he's elected, not after.
1:02:25 Speaker 01 My kind of pet theory was that millennials are disappointed by adulthood, given their childhood of optimism and confidence. And I think that may have some validity here. But if that were true, what you'd expect is pretty much all millennials say, let's take the first group born in the early 80s, that they would be depressed pretty much as soon as they hit 30. And that's not really what happens. You see that much more with those born in the late 80s and especially the early 90s. So that made me think it had something more to do with what was happening in the overall culture around that time. And I think if you really look back on it,
1:03:06 Speaker 01 that was the time when social media and the culture at large really started to turn much more negative. And the negative news was getting more clicks and it was spreading more and misinformation was starting to gain hold. And it just wasn't, I don't know. I think if you look at the kind of critical mass of pessimism in the country, the mid 2000s is where that seems to have begun.
1:03:56 Ezra Klein? One set of solutions you often hear have to do with individual or even parental restraint around smartphone use. So grayscale your phone or set limits on the screen time app or utility or no phones after 7:00 PM, that kind of thing. How do you think about that set of individual, either hacks or constraints as an answer to this?
1:04:25 Speaker 01 Well, I'm of two minds about this. I think on the one hand, there are things individuals can do. On the other, it'd be even better if we had more regulation, particularly around social media. So, there are things that we can each at least try to do. So, no phones in the bedroom overnight is my favorite one. And that's not just for teens, it's for adults too. Tons of sleep lab studies, as we talked about, that you're not going to sleep as well if that phone is in your bedroom. People have a tendency, when they wake up in the middle of the night, look at it, and then that whole process starts over again with poor sleep. And many people's protest to this is, yes, but I have to have my phone in my bedroom overnight because it's my alarm clock. I have some advice for you, buy an
1:05:08 Speaker 01 alarm clock. They're cheap. You can buy two or three if you're worried. Then, there's other things, say, so I have three kids. We have tried to delay the smartphone as long as possible, and to delay social media even further. And I do think that is a good idea. If the kid really needs a phone, give him a flip phone. Get him a pared-down smartphone, like a Gab phone, where you can text, talk, and take pictures, and that's it. There's no ability to download social media or access the internet. So, there are some things that we can try. The difficulty is parental permission isn't needed to get a social media account. And kids are supposed to be 13, but age isn't actually verified. School laptops have YouTube
1:05:52 Speaker 01 on them, at least ours do. So, there's only so much that individuals can do. Social media is extremely unregulated, and I think the time has come to regulate it more, so we can have more of these solutions that are at a group level. So, just as one example, if we raised the minimum age for social media to 16, and required age actually being verified and enforced that, social media would be out of middle schools.
1:06:23 Speaker 01 That's already a time developmentally that's very difficult. Social media makes it worse. And then kids would not be able to make the argument, which so often happens. But everybody I know has Snapchat, Mom. Then they wouldn't.
1:06:35 Ezra Klein? So Republican Senator Josh Hawley has actually called for a ban on social media use for kids under 16. You cited your research partially in calling for that ban. It hasn't gotten, I think, a ton of momentum, but your view is that's actually worth it? That this is bad enough that we should just lock it out for kids under 16?
1:06:56 Speaker 01 Yeah, I do think that. There are safer ways, better ways for kids 15 and under to communicate with each other than social media, which is not designed for children. It's not even designed for teens. It's designed for adults. Plus, then there's the whole element of why does social media exist? It exists because it makes money. We think it's free. It's free in terms of money. But us and our children are paying with our time, we're paying with our attention, and might even be paying with our mental health.
1:07:32 Ezra Klein? We've also seen some interesting policies now in the states. So Utah's been, I think, particularly aggressive here. In late March, Governor Spencer Cox, he's a Republican there, he signed two bills. So when you put them together, Utah now requires parental consent before kids can sign up for sites like TikTok and Instagram. It prohibits kids under 18 from using social media between the hours of 10:30 PM and 6:30 AM, requires age verification for anyone who wants to use social media in the state, tries to prevent tech companies from attracting kids to their apps using addictive features. What did you think of that? And if you're following it, how is implementation going on that?
1:08:05 Speaker 01 Yeah, so I think these are the types of things we need to be doing. Just common sense solutions that, no, we don't want to eliminate social media. It certainly has some benefits, particularly for adults. But there are some steps that we can take to try to make it safer for kids and teens.
1:08:24 Ezra Klein? I was genuinely struck when we began looking at who has proposed what here. Arkansas, Texas, Ohio, and Louisiana have sort of similar bills that they're thinking about to Utah, and so I should say for this point, does New Jersey. But it really is, I think it is fair to say at this moment, red states and Republican members of Congress who are willing to be, to use the old term, more paternalistic on this, which goes back, I think, a little bit to our conversation about parenting styles, where there is possibly a tendency for conservative parents to be more willing to say, no, I have a rule here, and you are a kid, and you don't get to decide. I'm sure you get a lot of incoming from politicians, from governors.
1:09:06 Ezra Klein? I'm curious what differences in style, in quantity of interest, you've seen among Republicans and Democrats here.
1:09:13 Speaker 01 Well, it's interesting. At least in the Senate, it's been pretty bipartisan. So Richard Blumenthal, say, has done a lot of work on this. There's some other Democratic politicians who have done the same. For states, it's true, it seems to have broken down that way more commonly than not. But, I mean, how much do we have right now where there is bipartisan support? This is one of the few things that falls under that.
1:09:38 Ezra Klein? One thing you're seeing in a bunch of states, California, where I'm from, is one, is an approach that's less about, I would call parental rights or paternalism, and more about this idea of holding tech companies accountable, focusing on the collection and use of data, on privacy. How do you think about that?
1:09:56 Speaker 01 I think it's long overdue, that we have to start thinking a lot more about this business model, where on social media, you're the product, and your data is the product. And is that really how we want to be doing things? Plus, then, there's all the other issues of how is social media and the internet environment overall affecting politics? How is it affecting the national mood? I mean, we were discussing this pessimism, which seems to be so pervasive now. Which, you know, I think is fairly out of step with objective reality. And why is it so negative? It's all of these things that that's what gets traction on social media and online
1:10:40 Speaker 01 about any kind of political discussion, regardless of any facts about positive things.
1:10:45 Ezra Klein? Are there other major policies you would want to put into place for mental health? And here, putting social media to the side, let's say we banned it for everybody under 16 and kind of did everything else on the list that you would be interested in. What other things do you think we could do that would be good for teen mental health?
1:11:02 Speaker 01 Well, I mean, that would be a huge step. And who knows if it'll ever happen, but I have my hopes. I think that would make an enormous difference. You know, I think a lot of the other solutions are less straightforward. But if there are ways to combat the pervasive negativity that we've been discussing, I think that would make a big difference, too. Because obviously, the mental health of young people is an enormous concern. But in doing further analyses for this new book, the other thing that started to really concern me was the extremely high levels of pessimism among young adults, not just
1:11:45 Speaker 01 about their own prospects, but about the world. It was really stunning to me. There was a poll that asked about, you know, do you think America is a fair society or an unfair society? And the majority of young adults said unfair. And do we need to make fundamental changes to American government? Again, the majority of young adults said yes. And then there was a question, do you believe that the founders of the United States are better described as heroes or as villains? And four out of 10 Gen Z young adults said villains, and only 10% of Boomers said villains.
1:12:19 Ezra Klein? This is a conversation I've had at different times with John Height. And something I sometimes hear in data like that is a way of thinking that while harder for the individual to bear may in some ways be better for a society. So to take the other side of that argument, I mean, American society isn't fair. It'd be, I think, ridiculous to look at American society with these levels of inequality, these levels of intergenerational, you know, racial dynamics, and call the society here fair. How you think of the founders, I think people can differ on that, and I probably wouldn't call them villains. But I don't know, I think you could say that there's been, you know, in America,
1:12:59 Ezra Klein? like in a lot of countries, a pressure to sign on to various societal myths that make change more difficult. Because, you know, if you have to agree that everything is good, then, you know, why change anything? And so maybe in the same way that trends that looked bad when I was a kid, like, you know, teen pregnancy, ended up having correlates that later on, we sort of felt a little bit better about, like, kids spending time together in person. I wonder if some of the pessimism that you're talking about there doesn't, in the more optimistic take, lead to a generation that, when it gets to the crucible of teenagerdom, is actually a little bit more open to changing or addressing pretty
1:13:42 Ezra Klein? long entrenched inequalities that have been hard to change, you know, exactly in part because we've been pushed into, you know, the idea that to say something like, America's not fair, is to, in some way, you know, insult America as opposed to, you know, observe something true about America.
1:14:01 Speaker 01 First of all, that one item is probably, you know, a little less distressing than than the others. The one about the fundamental changes, depends on how you interpret that. I think this is the fork in the road. There's arguably two ways that this could play out. So first, yes, we have a generation of young adults who want to change things. So if they do that by, relatively speaking, working within the system, we could have very positive outcomes here. And so far, there's some signs of this. So Gen Z young adults are voting at a higher rate than millennials and Gen Xers did at the same age. So if they are going to the voting booth and trying to change things to make it more fair.
1:14:46 Speaker 01 That can be a very positive outcome because yeah, if you see things as negative, then you take the steps to get things changed. Where I think a lot of people have more concern is if this ends up being more nihilism, just almost negativity for negativity's sake and there's nothing we can do. And there's some signs of that, too. So, say, one of the big surveys of high school seniors has an item, "Every time I try to get ahead, something or somebody stops me." So that's even more about individuals rather than politics. But the percentage who agree with that have gone up. So that's an external locus of control.
1:15:27 Speaker 01 So whether you're talking about individual prospects or politics, having that kind of defeatist attitude doesn't tend to bode well. It is linked to all kinds of bad outcomes, you know, poor performance at work and school being one example. And you can see that in the political arena, too. If everybody just throws up their hands and says, "Nothing we can really do. It's just the way it is. Things are just terrible and they're getting worse." That may not be good.
1:15:58 Ezra Klein? But one thing I noticed there that I think is interesting, and I wonder if it points towards any other policies, is that when we started talking about social media, we talked a lot about time displacement more than negativity, right? That people aren't seeing friends as much in person, their social connections are weakening, they're not sleeping as much. Sort of here at the end, we're talking more about the stew of negativity. And I agree on the stew of negativity. I think it's bad. But I'm curious on those other things. I mean, if we think those are powerful, it does feel to me like maybe there is more we can do on them. I don't exactly know what it would be like, what a national program to help people sleep better would actually look like. But I wonder if you're beginning to see this creep up the age scale, if it doesn't have some of the same effects.
1:16:42 Ezra Klein? I mean, we've covered loneliness among adults on other episodes of the show, and that seems to be pretty bad. I mean, is that where you would begin to look?
1:16:49 Speaker 01 Yes. Depression is starting to creep up the age scale. So one thing I did in the book is look at time spent in person. In a survey of adults, because I started looking at this in teens. And there has been a decline in in-person socializing among millennials. So in this case, like 27 to 41 year olds. And there's a little bit of a decline among those over the age of 50, for example, but not as much. So older generations, even though they also use social media, seem to have not cut back as much on their in-person socializing as young adults and teens have. So that might be one of the reasons why we're not seeing as many increases in the mental
1:17:34 Speaker 01 health issues among those ages 40 and over, or 50 and over, depending on the, on the measure. But as an overall issue, yes, you know, loneliness is huge. The Surgeon General recently released a report on, on loneliness with a number of solutions. And I think that, that would be a place to go to, to start thinking about this. But it's very difficult because there's not a whole lot of low hanging fruit, I think, in this area, in the way that there is around social media and teens. It's a lot harder to solve loneliness in the society overall.
1:18:07 Ezra Klein? I think it's a good place to end. So always our final question. What are three books that have influenced you that we'd recommend to the audience?
1:18:14 Speaker 01 All right. So my first two, um, get to a lot, some of the issues that we've been talking about. They both have problem in their title. The first is The Problem with Everything by Megan Dom. So I quote that a lot in Generations. She's a Gen Xer like myself. And her observations about the changes in culture, particularly online culture, starting in the mid 2010s was very insightful and helped me codify some things that I had been noticing in terms of the split between Gen Xers and millennials, particularly the Gen Xers pride themselves on being tough and resilient. And that that is not as prized by later generations.
1:18:57 Speaker 01 Then the second is called What's Our Problem by Tim Urban. This is one of the best nonfiction books I have read in a very long time. It has a really amazing structure for understanding some of the polarization and division that we are really observing right now in American politics and culture. So it has the really interesting rubric that's not just right and left in politics, that there's upper in terms of talking about ideas and lower in terms of just kind of beating people over the head. That was a very fascinating way to think about the the structure of American politics.
1:19:41 Speaker 01 And it goes much broader than that into all the issues. So the third is for fun. It's a fiction book called Nine Ladies, and it is Pride and Prejudice meets Outlander. And a great plot and great consideration of what would happen if a 1987 born Elizabeth Bennet ended up in Mr. Darcy's time. And then the author takes it from there.
1:20:08 Ezra Klein? Jean Twenge, your new book is called Generations. Thank you very much.
1:20:13 Speaker 01 Thank you.
1:20:25 Ezra Klein? This episode of the Ezra Klanshows produced by Annie Galvin, fact checking by Michelle Harris and Mary Marge Locker, mixing by Jeff Geld. Our production team is Emma Bogau, Annie Galvin, Jeff Geld, Roja Karma, and Kristin Lynn. Original music by Isaac Jones. Audience strategy by Shannon Busta. The executive producer of New York Times Opinion Audio is Annie Roethstrasser, and special thanks to Afim Shapiro and Christina Samueluski.
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