E81: All-In Summit: Bill Gurley & Brad Gerstner on markets, downturns & investment cycles

This conversation was recorded LIVE at the All-In Summit in Miami and included slides. To watch on YouTube, check out our All-In Summit playlist: https://bit.ly/aisytplaylist 0:00 Bill Gurley & Brad Gerstner break down the state and historical significance of 2022's market downturn 12:27 How VCs will handle capital commitments from LPs, underwriting startups in the new reality 24:14 Bull run mistakes, why VCs don't underwrite lower valuations, handling distributions 33:52 Gurley's take on WeCrashed & Super Pumped TV series, how sophisticated investors got "gaslit" by the market, influx of capital creating consumer-surplus businesses 47:54 Brad predicts the market for next year, Bill gives post-Benchmark plans Follow the besties: https://twitter.com/chamath https://linktr.ee/calacanis https://twitter.com/DavidSacks https://twitter.com/friedberg Follow the pod: https://twitter.com/theallinpod https://linktr.ee/allinpodcast Intro Music Credit: https://rb.gy/tppkzl https://twitter.com/yung_spielburg Intro Video Credit: https://twitter.com/TheZachEffect

Speaker names marked ? are inferred from speaking time and the show’s known hosts — they are not voice-verified.

• 0:00Jason Calacanis?

  BG squared. This is our BG squared panel. Everybody knows Friends of the Pod. Brad Gerstner and Bill Gurley. Give it up for our guests.

• 0:26Jason Calacanis?

  Bill, you predicted five of the last three recessions.

• 0:35Chamath Palihapitiya?

  A broken clock is still right twice a day.

• 0:38Jason Calacanis?

  I mean, here we are again. You've sounded the alarm bell and of course you're right. And you've seen this movie before for all of us younger capital allocators who are experiencing it for the second or third time. But you've experienced it a couple more times.

• 0:56Jason Calacanis?

  How, I mean, it's pretty old.

• 0:59Jason Calacanis?

  How does it, how does this one measure up to Great Recession, dot com bust, you know, 87 and the many ones we've seen in between?

• 1:08Bill Gurley?

  You know, one thing that I think is super important to put this into context. Now, I'll try and tell this quick. I had a meeting once with Howard Marks, who I'd wanted to meet for a long period of time. He's a famous bond investor that does a lot of writing. And for 15 minutes, he asked me questions about the venture industry, a lot of structural questions. And I told him, by answering as best I could. And he said, man, that's a really shitty industry. And I said, well, why do you say that? What do you mean? He says, he says, you know, cyclical collapse is built into the structure. And so we have funds that, you know, are taken, you know, committed to that have 10 to 15 year lives.

• 1:50Bill Gurley?

  So you have low barriers to entry, but you have very high barriers to exit. And so he felt that it was just systematically set up to, to rise and crash, rise and crash. And one thing that, that I realized coming out of that is that It doesn't happen like a sine curve, which is what we all imagine when we think of a cyclical business. It's more like a sawtooth. Risk on is a very slow process. And it's reflexive, so it grows and grows and grows and grows. And then risk off tends to be very abrupt. And we've seen that here, right? This cycle, risk on was from 09

• 2:31Jason Calacanis?

  That's well said.

• 2:31Bill Gurley?

  To five months ago.

• 2:33Jason Calacanis?

  That's really well said.

• 2:33Bill Gurley?

  And risk off is five months. And the thing that's really tough about that is it requires mental adjustment very quickly. Like, because it didn't gradually change, it abruptly changed. And so, you know, cap charts might have, you know, systematic issues that are stuck. Because too much lick pref relative to the new reality. Valuations have shifted. Cost of capital is radically different. You may have, you know, on the way up as risk got, people took more risk. You tried crazier things. You're willing to take, make investments in businesses you might not if the cost of capital is a lot lower.

• 3:17Jason Calacanis?

  You'd name a stadium for five years as a crypto company?

• 3:19Bill Gurley?

  You might do that. And then, but then all of a sudden, it's gone.

• 3:23Jason Calacanis?

  And now the commitment to naming the stadium is greater

• 3:29Bill Gurley?

  Than your market can?

• 3:30Jason Calacanis?

  Than the market can.

• 3:30Bill Gurley?

  Yeah, well, I assume you're referring to so far.

• 3:33Jason Calacanis?

  Well, that may not be true for FTX, but... Well, I mean, just as an example, it might be a disproportionate value of your, yeah.

• 3:40Bill Gurley?

  Yeah, so anyway, it's tough. And in this particular case, because that's what you asked. So it turns out 09 wasn't that bad. If we have an 09, that'll be pretty good. Things got turned around pretty quickly. 01 was very abrupt and we didn't, you know, really start to see liquidity again until, with a few exceptions. Elon mentioned PayPal, but like 05, 06.

• 4:03Jason Calacanis?

  It was a long walk in the desert. I mean, a lot of great companies were started, but a lot of founders gave up at that time, right?

• 4:08Bill Gurley?

  Yeah, and look, I mean, I think to the, if you're an early-stage investor, or if you're an early-stage founder that's just getting going, or even an early-stage company, because if you haven't scaled out yet, this probably hasn't affected you. It could be, it could be wonderful. Like, your access to talent's gonna be a lot easier. People are gonna be more pragmatic and rational. But it's usually a long window on the other side. The other, the other challenge you have here is, in 20, I mean, we basically had a mini pullback in March of 2020, but then the Fed hit so hard that things just blasted off again. And now, and now, you guys have talked about this, but that tool's not in the toolbox anymore.

• 4:51Brad Gerstner?

  Brad? So, one of the things, I was talking to somebody last night, and this audience is amazing. I was talking to somebody last night, and they said, you know, so how does it work? You just get together and talk? And I said, you know, what I'm, what I love about this group is there are hundreds of hours of like data and research that we're constantly challenged with. We all know where we are. We know what just happened. And I think grounding ourselves in just a few facts to try to figure out what the next six months are going to be, because we have founders here trying to run their businesses. Can I raise capital? Are we bouncing straight back from where we were? So, very quickly, this chart just tells us, you know, the iron law of investing is interest rates.

• 5:33Brad Gerstner?

  A 1% change in rates leads to a 15% or 20% change in a multiple. And so, the reason multiples have collapsed here for all these businesses is because expectations as to inflation and rates has changed dramatically. I hear a lot of talk about 1999, 2000. So, if it's all about rates, let's just look at those two things. We plotted them here together. This is 19 to 22 on the bottom. It shows what rates did. We took them to zero. The Fed is now saying our neutral rate is 2% to 3%. People are hyperventilating.

• 6:10Brad Gerstner?

  Look at where we were in 2000. Look at what the cost of capital was in 2000. Crazy, right? Right? And so this, this idea, and by the way, the delta there, right? We went from just above five up to six and a half, right? So we're talking about going from two and a half back to two and a half or three. But the big question is, are we going back to two and a half or three? Or are they behind the curve, lost in the weeds? And we're gonna have to go to four to five to kill inflation? Well, everybody was saying inflation, you know, inflation is here to stay forever. Remember, when, when we report on core CPI, it's what happened last month. It is not a forward-looking indicator. So we peaked in core CPI. Consumer Price Index, explain what it is.

• 6:55Brad Gerstner?

  Consumer Price, it is the basket of goods and services that we all go out and spend money on. So the Fed is focused on the demand side of the equation. They know they hopped us up on a bunch of Red Bull and cocaine to survive the pandemic. And now... I thought you were talking about last night for Saks, but you're done.

• 7:12Chamath Palihapitiya?

  You still haven't said a word all day. Look at you.

• 7:15Brad Gerstner?

  You're okay, buddy?

• 7:17Chamath Palihapitiya?

  You are so gassed.

• 7:18Brad Gerstner?

  We're gonna get through it, Saks. We're gonna get through it together, okay?

• 7:21Chamath Palihapitiya?

  You are so wrecked.

• 7:22Brad Gerstner?

  So, so this chart, this chart, we deconstructed 20 bank models to say, what are the components of CPI? How do they differ? The red line's where Goldman thinks we're going. The green line is UBS. I just told you the Fed thinks we'll exit the year at four. We just decelerated significantly. And when they look at eight, or when they look at May, in June, it's gonna be down yet further. And here's why it's going to be down. When the Fed stimulated the economy, all the prices we pay for everything went haywire. Okay, the price for a used car was 20,000 bucks for 10 years. And then just coincidentally, they give us a bunch of Red Bull and the price goes to $29,000.

• 8:05Brad Gerstner?

  For two months in a row, we've had sequential declines. You tell me, is the price of the used car this time next year higher than 29 or lower than 29? It's going to be lower because we're destroying demand by raising... Interest rates, same for home prices. So what's plotted here is the home affordability index. Somebody who can afford to pay $1,200 a month in December could afford a $350,000 home. Today can afford a $240,000 home. You tell me, are the number of new home searches on Zillow going up or down? Go run your Google Trends, they're going down because people's ability to buy homes is going down. And then finally airline tickets, same deal, right?

• 8:50Brad Gerstner?

  And so when you put that all together, you say, okay, sequentially, month over month, forward looking, this stuff's starting to tip over. If you look at what consumer confidence is, it's the lowest in 10 years. Right? Consumer confidence is a leading indicator of slowing down. So again, everybody on television is telling us about what just happened. It's like the nightly news, big red arrows, inflation going up. This is what's going to happen and what we all care about is what's going to happen. We destroyed 15 trillion, you said this on Pod 80. We destroyed 15 trillion of household net worth in the last five months. So the expected path of household net worth would have taken us from 110 trillion

• 9:34Brad Gerstner?

  to 125 trillion over the course of the last two years. That was the trend we were on. Instead, we got all hopped up and went from 110 to 142. But now we're all the way back to 127. That's what I call on path, on trend. So the Fed has done exactly what it wanted to do. It ruined all the Sacks, it ruined every, it took all the ju- sorry, sorry. I did one too. Okay. So it took the juice out of the system. That and consumer confidence tells me forward looking, inflation is rolling. Finally, Bernanke says this morning or over the weekend, he said, ignore what you, everybody else is saying, follow the tips.

• 10:18Chamath Palihapitiya?

  No, we've been saying this since May of last year.

• 10:20Brad Gerstner?

  So this is the break even, this is the bond market. When that goes positive, that means the bond market is saying that inflation is rolling over because this is the 10-year less inflation. And so now we have anecdotal information about cars, about houses, about airline. We have our common sense. We know that those prices are not sustainable and we have the bond market telling us the same thing. That's why I don't think you should believe the hyperinflation narrative.

• 10:48Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Got it.

• 10:49Jason Calacanis?

  Any thoughts on NFTs?

• 10:52Jason Calacanis?

  What about my Bored Ape? What will happen to that? And when you're going through this and you start to understand the logic of it, you realize what a mirage we were in that certain assets that had no underlying value, you know, they weren't cars, airline tickets, or homes, were also being exacerbated during all of this. And I think that was probably one of the things that made this less fun in this cycle. Bill, you're a fundamental investor. You really think about consumers. You think about the total addressable market. You give a lot of thoughts to that. What was the last couple of years like when, because you were saying three or four years ago, hey, this is kind of disconnecting from reality?

• 11:30Bill Gurley?

  You know, back when, back when I had that conversation with Howard, I started doing some more research. I went back and I talked to some of our fund of funds that have data over a very long period of time. And I mean, it sounds ridiculous, but what I realized was that the IRR numbers and ROI numbers on the venture capital category were heavily dependent on performance in the hottest part of the cycle. And so in the tip of that sawtooth. And that's when we came up with this phrase that the best way to protect yourself against the downside is to enjoy every last bit of the upside.

• 12:10Bill Gurley?

  So while you get anxious about the rollover, you actually can't afford, as a venture capital firm, and maybe this contributes to the, to the collapse as fast as it does, you can't afford not to play the game because it's too hard to predict when it's going to change.

• 12:27Jason Calacanis?

  Bill, there's $250 billion of committed capital unallocated into companies. What happens in the cycle over the next five years if there is this expectation that we're not going to be in the good part of the risk on?

• 12:39David Friedberg?

  Part of the curve, that capital needs to be deployed at this point in the cycle. And do we end up having these like crazy bifurcations in the market? Where high quality companies get 10x evaluation of the mean? And all the money plows into a few companies that are kind of outperforming?

• 12:54Bill Gurley?

  I'll give you some quick thoughts, and I know Brad has some too, because we were talking about this this morning. First of all, I've never ever felt as a venture investor that I have to invest money. And if you remember, most of it's committed but not drawn down. And so you're gonna have to go ask for it. If you deployed 2/3 of your fund into crypto assets with no board seat in the past 12 months, are you gonna call Harvard and Penn and say, "Hey, I need some more right now"? I don't think you're gonna make that call.

• 13:32Brad Gerstner?

  I wouldn't know.

• 13:33David Friedberg?

  You're saying they let the capital sit there and never call it?

• 13:35Bill Gurley?

  Well, you guys were talking about this on one of the recent pods. You know, in 01, a lot of people actually returned the commitment. And it was actually an act of greed, not an act... It came across like they were being nice. But they were getting out, I call it the burnt waffle theory. They were killing the fund and getting out of the overhang and starting fresh. Just like, I guess it was Melvin that attempted to do, it was a version of that.

• 14:00David Friedberg?

  It's like a recap in a way.

• 14:01Bill Gurley?

  Yeah, well, they just wanna get started without the overhang of the look back.

• 14:05David Friedberg?

  They deployed 200 or 300 million.

• 14:07Brad Gerstner?

  I think one thing, you know, Bill, not to interrupt. You know, the assumption of the question was, will they be forced to deploy capital into a really bad vintage? Right? I actually think the upcoming vintage is gonna start getting real. It's gonna be a good vintage. I think that was Bill's point, I think we both feel that way. I think the vintage of the last 18 months will be lousy. So the capital deployed over the last 18 months won't have a lot of return. All of our LPs know it, right? I was just sitting with an LP, you know, one of my investors at lunch today, right? Imagine this, they have 50 investments like Benchmark and Altimeter, right? All of them are going down.

• 14:52Brad Gerstner?

  And now you're gonna call them up and say, "I want all this money, right now, to go invest in a bunch of stuff that still may not yet have corrected enough." These are partnerships. Partnership means a partnership with me and my partners, all of the people who gave me the money. We're not gonna put our partners in a headlock and drag their money into the market and put it into things that we don't think accurately reflect the new world order. If you go back to that first chart, you can underwrite to the five-year average, the 10-year average, where we've been. I think we're going back to trend. But you cannot underwrite to where we were last year. Disabuse yourself. One of the... Bill tweeted this last week. It's spot on.

• 15:37Brad Gerstner?

  The biggest mistake we will all make is to anchor ourselves to prices that we saw in the world over the last 18 months. Pretend you never saw them, not in venture, not in the stock market, because that is a delusional place to think we're getting back there. We're not, unless we have another pandemic or a nuclear war and rates go to zero, and then we have bigger problems. So, re-underwrite and underwrite to the five-year average de novo for all your businesses. That's how you survive through this and ultimately come out winning.

• 16:11Bill Gurley?

  And the other point I would make, David, is that the the new reality is apparent to all of us because of public comps. So, like, you just have a new world order. And so, it's very hard... I don't think... I mean, there might be someone so sloppy that they just keep investing headstrong, but I think most of them look at where things are and the type of business that you're investing in, and then they feel like they want to make a return.

• 16:35Chamath Palihapitiya?

  I think you're using the right word. It is borderline... Well, it's definitely unprofessional and it's borderline idiotic for anybody with organized capital right now to be ripping money in, because you don't know what the terminal valuation of a business is. Like, at the end of the day, investing is like a line. It starts here with guys like Jason, and it ends here with guys like me and Brad, say. And in the middle are these guys that are helping along the way, and it's all hot potato. But by the time the hot potato gets to us, there is a price, and that price has alternatives. Meaning, if you come to me and say, "This thing is worth $10," and I say, "Actually, no, it's worth $2,

• 17:17Chamath Palihapitiya?

  because that other thing, which is better than you, is actually worth $5." And that's what's happened in the stock markets. By the time you get the potato, you put it on the scale. There is a terminal endpoint to valuation. Right? At the end of the day, there's a buyer of last resort, and that is the public market investor. And he and she has said, "No mas." That's what this chart says. "No mas." You don't tell me that your thing is worth 50 times, 80 times, 90 times. It's worth 5.6 times. I saw something this morning from Morgan Stanley that said, "If, however, you're a massive grower, 50% plus grower, there's 30 companies in the SaaS index that grow, but only 30 in the entire world

• 18:01Chamath Palihapitiya?

  that grow above 50%." You know what that multiple is? Just take a wild guess. 8.5. I mean, we're not talking 50 times. We're talking 5.6 or 8.6. So all of a sudden, the band is this. Time sales, to be clear. So those games, to your point, are over. I mean, growing by 50% a year, for those of you guys that built businesses that do it, that is still very hard. You know, that's massive compounding. So the game is over. And the idea that there's a quarter trillion, I think that that's a fallacy. What do you think ultimately gets deployed to the quarter trillion? Just pick a number. What do you say?

• 18:37Brad Gerstner?

  Over the next three years, of the quarter trillion, I think you're probably counting 50% of that as private equity or more. Maybe 70% is traditional private equity. Leverage buyout firms are going to have a field day.

• 18:53Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Field day.

• 18:53Brad Gerstner?

  I mean, so Tomo Bravo and all these guys, they will spend all of that. So you tell me what percentage of that...

• 18:59Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Okay, so let's... Over three years... 100 billion of VC? How much goes in? 20 billion goes in in the next three years?

• 19:06Brad Gerstner?

  25 or 30%. Depends on price adjustment.

• 19:09Bill Gurley?

  I wish we had the numbers from O1, because you had similar things where the raising was going up.

• 19:13Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Because that's friggin' tiny, right? I mean, if you're saying 25 billion over three years, that's like 8 billion of total VC dollars deployed a year?

• 19:21Bill Gurley?

  Which, you know, to your trend line thing.

• 19:23David Friedberg?

  It's tiny.

• 19:24Bill Gurley?

  I wonder if you went back six years where that number was.

• 19:27Jason Calacanis?

  Let's be candid. What number of people at these companies is necessary to run them? We're looking at a Twitter with 8,000, you're looking at a Google, and even some of the startups, they got fat.

• 19:37Chamath Palihapitiya?

  I think, I think it's less that...

• 19:39Jason Calacanis?

  And they had huge salaries and there was no essentialism or discipline.

• 19:42David Friedberg?

  We just talked about a whole capex cycle and a need for hardware and a need for capital equipment. There's a whole semiconductor space, there's biotech. I mean, a huge segment of that venture market, Jason, is not software. It's very capital-intensive businesses, which by the way are really critical in this economic cycle.

• 19:57Jason Calacanis?

  People have been living high on the hog. Let's be honest.

• 19:59Bill Gurley?

  Yep.

• 20:00Chamath Palihapitiya?

  No, but like, for example, like our investing focus, we've moved in the last 18 months to focus a lot on these things. Lithium mines, I mean, the stuff that we're doing seems insane. If you had asked me, would you be sweating a mine in India, you know, and sending our CFO and a partner to go and make sure the mine exists? I never would have thought that it's possible. But the reason is because of this chart. Because those trade-offs on dollars make so much more sense. To put money into an overgrowth, like an overbloated software business, comes with a lot of baggage. Valuation baggage, team baggage, technical cruff. All of these things have to get balanced. And so, if you get a really cheap deal, you do it.

• 20:38David Friedberg?

  Super interesting. Bill, I mean, you're like the software guru. I mean, like, do you feel the same way? I mean, yeah, we'll call it, yeah.

• 20:45Bill Gurley?

  Actually, I want to make a quick comment on, especially with this slide on SaaS multiples. So, obviously, it's a price-to-revenue multiple slide. And price-to-revenue is like this really crude valuation tool. It's like the crudest you could possibly have. I published a blog post once where I took all the internet stocks and laid them beginning to end on a price-to-revenue multiple. And it was like just a massive diversion. There is no such thing. And so, what really values companies? You know, it's typically discounted cash flows. And so now, all of a sudden, the buy-side's asking SaaS companies about net dollar retention, about long-term operating margin, about whether their free cash flow is greater or less than their net income,

• 21:28Bill Gurley?

  about SBC as a percentage of free cash flow.

• 21:31Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Stock-based comp.

• 21:32Bill Gurley?

  Yeah, and so all of a sudden, the, you know, everyone's brought out the microscope on how they're evaluating these companies and these crude tools that maybe the only, like, there are entrepreneurs who probably think the only way you measure is that.

• 21:46Chamath Palihapitiya?

  By the way, you're, you know, the companies that, you know, in your example, were all of a sudden run away with it and get all the money, think about the problem they have. Their growth is going to slow. Right, yeah. Nobody grows at 500% when you're at a billion dollars. Right. You're lucky to grow at 25, 30%. Right. Okay, so when your growth is slowing, and your valuation is outsized, like you're working to get to 5 billion dollars, how do they attract more capital? This is, this is why this whole game is very complicated right now.

• 22:16Brad Gerstner?

  There was also something that, that took hold over the course of the last two years, specifically with respect to software, that this was an easy business, you just send us your data, I pop out a term sheet, it's formulaic, as though all software companies are created equal. And you guys asked a question last week on the pod, how many software companies are actually over a billion dollars in revenue? How many are over 2 billion? Well, we actually went and counted.

• 22:40Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Oh, good.

• 22:40Brad Gerstner?

  Right, and public software companies over 2 billion in revenue, we got to 21. Okay? There are only 21 that are worth more than 25 billion dollars in all the public markets of all the millions of software companies that have been started. But what happened last year was you could be making dog-walking software, okay? And somebody looked at your multiple and slapped 100X on it and said you were worth that, as though that was the equivalent of building a database that would disrupt the entire database market. So the thing that is returning to markets is something that we all do for a living called dispersion.

• 23:22Brad Gerstner?

  Some shit's gonna be really great, and the rest is going to be below the mean. And if you look at software, the history of software, right, is that there are very, very few companies that ever get to a billion dollars in revenue. And so if you were slapping 100x ARR revenue, or multiple, on a company doing 50 million in revenue, it's highly likely that they will never see that price again, whatever you paid for that asset. Because the dilution and the deceleration in their growth rate will absolutely eviscerate any return you have as an investor. And so when you're looking at this, back to your point, you know, not only are we looking

• 24:04Brad Gerstner?

  at revenue multiples, but we're also looking at something like Snowflake and saying, now they're doing 15% free cash flow and expanding those multiples. All that stuff is critical.

• 24:14David Friedberg?

  Gurly, Gurly, do you think it's weird that VCs don't try to underwrite lower valuations? Like, the incentive is always to up your valuation. Even if the company's performing plan, you don't generally do these, like, market-driven valuations. It's like, oh, you're worth 500 million last round, we'll give you a billion dollars this round. And are we gonna see more VCs do down rounds?

• 24:33Bill Gurley?

  I just think that...

• 24:34David Friedberg?

  In companies that they're in?

• 24:35Bill Gurley?

  There's no, there's no VC club where they get together and discuss how we're all gonna behave.

• 24:39David Friedberg?

  Yeah. You're looking at it.

• 24:41Bill Gurley?

  Thursday night at Chivas. The price fixing. But keep in mind, as that, as that risk on goes slowly up and up and up, you know, and especially in Silicon Valley, we've had a systematic shift of power from the investor to the founder over a very long period of time. People are friendly, because they want deal flow. So nobody, nobody does it. Nobody.

• 25:03Jason Calacanis?

  Well, let's talk about that.

• 25:04David Friedberg?

  So interesting.

• 25:05Jason Calacanis?

  You've seen deals happen where, you know, one term sheet seems great for all shareholders, and then this term sheet includes some secondary for the founders, and no governance seems pretty great for the founders, and somehow this one magically wins, and then somebody wins the deal by not taking a board seat. You know, in the three decades you've been doing this now, I think it's three or four? Going into the fourth? It might be going into the fourth. Wow. Well, I'm saying it as well. He's in the fourth decade, yes. He's in the fourth decade. You know, when you, when you look at governance, what, what is the mistake we've made over this last bull run?

• 25:41Bill Gurley?

  Well, once again.

• 25:41Jason Calacanis?

  And what should it be?

• 25:42Bill Gurley?

  I think, well, I think, I mean.

• 25:44Jason Calacanis?

  What's the right partnership?

• 25:45Bill Gurley?

  I think what it should be is that the market gets to decide. So if, you know, if someone wants, if someone can raise, you know, 100 million with no board seat, no rights, and they want that, I think they should be able to do that.

• 26:00Jason Calacanis?

  Right, but what's in the best interest of our industry, of all shareholders, the employees, the, the industry writ large?

• 26:07Bill Gurley?

  I'm not dodging the question, it's just super complicated. We, we put money behind Rich Barton, and so both of us did. And he had super voting. And, but he also, I think, is very honorable about his duty to shareholders. And so.

• 26:23Jason Calacanis?

  There was a track record there.

• 26:25Bill Gurley?

  Yeah, and, and it wasn't, it never, it never was an issue in the entire history of the company. And so, you know, but, you know, if there's a first time founder that's doing that, like, you know, it, it, who knows? Who knows what the motivation is? And, but, but once again, it's a market. It's a free market. And I think that there are certain people or founders that decide, hey, you bring something to the table that I want, and I understand there's a government's requirement to it, and we'll opt into that. And, you know, willing buyer meets willing seller.

• 26:58Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Gurley, what do you guys, Brett? What is your attitude when you guys actually have a win? You do the job, company goes public, and you have the chance to distribute to your LPs. There's been a movement in Silicon Valley where some firms have said, you know what, guys? I'm going to hold this forever. I'm going to create permanent capital structures, evergreen funds. You know, if, you know, you, foundation, want a distribution from me, just tell me and I'll give you money magically somehow, et cetera, et cetera. What do you guys think about that versus just distributing and walking away, booking the win? If you want to hold the stock, you just hold it in your own private equity.

• 27:40Bill Gurley?

  Let me just start by saying that investing is really fucking hard. And there's a lot of ways you can lose, you know? And when you guys started the podcast, I was listening to one of the episodes today and it really hit me. In the song that you put together, David says, "Let your renters ride."

• 28:01Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Let what? I remember that. I remember that.

• 28:05Bill Gurley?

  So from the brief history of the podcast, you've gone from talking about that as a strategy to this question that you posed to me, which is on the opposite end.

• 28:15David Sacks?

  In my defense.

• 28:16Bill Gurley?

  He's here. He talks. He's appeared. He's awake. Yes. He's alive. He lives.

• 28:23David Sacks?

  We have all these great minds here, so I feel like I give them a chance to talk. Like some of the people on the pod who like to hear themselves talk a little bit too much.

• 28:36Bill Gurley?

  He was resting his eyes. He was resting his eyes.

• 28:38David Sacks?

  All right, now, in fairness, when we had that conversation, as I recall, the context was that way back when, like for example, when I got, when I had Facebook and Facebook went public, the urge was just to sell it all. And so I think where we landed on that was, don't sell 100%, keep 20%, keep 50%.

• 28:59Chamath Palihapitiya?

  But that was you personally.

• 29:00David Sacks?

  It was schmuck insurance, basically.

• 29:01Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Yeah, but that was for you personally as an investment. What about you as a fund manager?

• 29:04David Sacks?

  Yeah, I think for me as a fund manager, so I think we, I think we did a pretty good job over the last six months distributing out some gains, some realizations. We actually paid back our whole first fund. But in our second fund, we had about $120 million of a firm stock and we were sitting on it because we believe in the company and still do, and we're still sitting on it. And that was, that was like a $100 million mistake. So I think, you know, what's my attitude going to be from now on? Honestly, my attitude from now on is probably going to be distributed.

• 29:36Chamath Palihapitiya?

  So my first chance to actually return any real money to our LPs? was when Slack did our direct listing. And it was like, you know, there are three or four of us on the board. Me, Andrew Broach at Excel, John O'Farrell from Andreessen, two independents and Stewart. And they had gone through a couple of direct listings before. Bring in our bankers and they go through this whole rigmarole. And I remember being so amped up in the whole thing. And I thought, oh, I believe in this company. I believe in all of this, blah, blah, blah. Long story short, the point is, I held the stock. I didn't distribute it. The pandemic hit. I then distributed in sheer panic.

• 30:18Chamath Palihapitiya?

  And we left a lot of money on the table that I could have just booked the win for the LPs. And then from that point, I said, never again. I'll hold it for myself. But the minute that I get a distribution, if I'm in the business of managing money for other people, it's out the door when it's liquid. And I'm not going to take a, I'll be happy to take a point of view for my own shares. But God, I felt so, I felt so stupid. I took a 50% loss trying to be a hero.

• 30:43Jason Calacanis?

  Well, I mean, and then also we have the issue of selling in secondary when those opportunities arise. And we all just watched the We Crashed documentary, which one of your partners plays a role in. I don't know. Obviously, it's probably 5% reality. But Benchmark did make a pretty amazing trade in selling WeWork shares early and booking an enormous win. Correct, Bill?

• 31:08Bill Gurley?

  Correct.

• 31:14Brad Gerstner?

  Okay. So, so just an alternative.

• 31:17Jason Calacanis?

  Wait, what's the answer to the question? What, do you distribute or not distribute?

• 31:21Brad Gerstner?

  Yeah, so I was going to give you, it's going to actually answer.

• 31:23Jason Calacanis?

  Secondary options.

• 31:23Brad Gerstner?

  So, so the, to me, the most important thing is tell your partners what you're going to do.

• 31:30Jason Calacanis?

  And then do it.

• 31:31Brad Gerstner?

  Because you're making a deal upfront. So for us, the deal was if we invest in something in our venture fund and it's real, and it's realized, it goes public. If we see venture-like returns, which we define and with them, as 2 to 3X over a three-year time horizon, we will hold. If we don't, we distribute it. Last year, we distributed over $6 billion, which was more than all the venture we raised in our first five funds. Why? Not because I didn't like Unity, or I didn't like Snowflake. Everybody knows how we feel about these businesses. But because we realized that according to the deal we had made with our partners, the framework was triggered.

• 32:15Brad Gerstner?

  And the second thing I would argue is because people are talking about permanent funds now and all this, that, I'm not sure that's the deal people made.

• 32:22Jason Calacanis?

  Yeah.

• 32:22Brad Gerstner?

  For me, if you're an investor or limited partner in our fund, and you want to hold on to it, then also invest in my hedge fund. Because there, we haven't sold a share of Snowflake. But that is a different liquidity profile.

• 32:36Jason Calacanis?

  But what I was getting to, Bill, and just let's put your work on the side. Just in general, when the opportunities for a firm to do a secondary arises, what's the right thing to do?

• 32:47Bill Gurley?

  That's rare. I mean, that's rare for, I mean, for an angel, I think it's very different. But it's rare for a venture firm to meet a secondary that has the firepower to absorb the type. That was Masah. I mean, that was a very, you know, unique situation. We typically distribute over three to six quarters following the lockup release, unless there's some exception.

• 33:08Jason Calacanis?

  Just systematically?

• 33:09Bill Gurley?

  Yeah, yeah.

• 33:11Jason Calacanis?

  Dollar-cost average, basically.

• 33:12Bill Gurley?

  Yeah. There have been a few exceptions. We took OpenTable Republican '09 at a very low val- knowingly at a low valuation, and I held that until we sold it to Booking. But, because I felt the network effect was there, and it was going to keep compounding and that kind of thing. And, look, if you, I mean, look, clearly, you know, with Bezos has done, or Zuckerberg, like, if you think you're sitting on one of those, and you, I mean, you have to ask yourself.

• 33:38Jason Calacanis?

  Well, those are two.

• 33:39Bill Gurley?

  Yeah, well, I know, I know. But if you think you are, like, you know, maybe, maybe the Colson Brothers are another one. If it's going to play out the way those did, you're going to want to hold it.

• 33:51Jason Calacanis?

  Google it.

• 33:51Bill Gurley?

  But they're very rare.

• 33:52Brad Gerstner?

  Have you and your partners watched both We Crashed and The Drop Up?

• 33:57Bill Gurley?

  I can't speak for all of them. I've watched both of them.

• 34:00Brad Gerstner?

  You watched both of them?

• 34:00Jason Calacanis?

  What was more accurate?

• 34:04Bill Gurley?

  I think that, well, I don't know about accurate, because I only, I don't, the, we, Super Pump was not accurate, just because they made up a lot of scenes. Like Drummond wasn't very active at all, but he's in a lot of the scenes. So, a lot of them were made up. I think Lito did a better job of showing you who Adam Newman is. And really got into the character.

• 34:27Chamath Palihapitiya?

  He was incredible as Adam Newman.

• 34:28David Friedberg?

  He was so good as an actor, yeah.

• 34:30Jason Calacanis?

  And accurate.

• 34:31Bill Gurley?

  Yeah.

• 34:32Jason Calacanis?

  To your meaning, having met.

• 34:33Bill Gurley?

  Yeah, and equally on the other side, I think that Travis, and you know him well, is, is way more nuanced. He's, he's one of the grittiest, hardest-working investors, I mean, founders I've ever worked with. He's super intelligent, he can be really charming. And those dimensions weren't explored in the characters.

• 34:51Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Right.

• 34:52Bill Gurley?

  Which I think is unfortunate.

• 34:53Chamath Palihapitiya?

  I remember you telling me, this was, I don't know, in the height of WeWork, you said, "Chamath, this is the single greatest salesman I've ever met in my life."

• 35:01David Friedberg?

  You told me, you said, you told me also, about Adam Newman. You said the first time Adam Newman came in, you and your partner, he left the room, and you guys looked at each other, and you guys were like, "We just have to invest in this guy, because he can just..."

• 35:11Bill Gurley?

  I said, "We should never invest in real estate, and we have to do this deal."

• 35:15David Friedberg?

  Yeah. What, what, what?

• 35:19Bill Gurley?

  Let's, um, let's ask Brad a question.

• 35:21David Sacks?

  Oh, wow.

• 35:22Jason Calacanis?

  Well, I watched the first, Jay and I were watching, we crashed, we watched the first two episodes, and the only thing I could think of, Bill, was, what's Adam Newman's next company, and where do I send the check? Because...

• 35:35Bill Gurley?

  I think he already, well, I don't know.

• 35:36Jason Calacanis?

  Yeah, he's got something brewing.

• 35:38David Sacks?

  I have a question for Brad. So, so let's, I wanted to go back to...

• 35:42Jason Calacanis?

  Good morning.

• 35:43David Sacks?

  You know, I've been up here for like, eight hours today, Jake Al. I don't know how much more you want me to do. I'm exhausted after an hour of these things. I honestly don't know how you do it. Have a round of...

• 35:54Bill Gurley?

  True.

• 35:55David Sacks?

  True.

• 35:59David Sacks?

  He's been interviewing people for like 10 hours. I'm like done after an hour and a half. Anyway, Brad, so let's go back to the 100x ARR multiples that people were paying last year. Because these investors, you know, with the benefit of 2020 hindsight, they may look kind of sheepish. But we know these investors and the pace car setting the valuations for the whole industry. You know, it was these big giant hedge funds. We all know who I'm talking about. They're super sophisticated people. I mean, you know, they've been very successful investors for a long period of time. You know, what's the word used when we talked about it privately was gaslight.

• 36:39David Sacks?

  We gaslighted that, you know, the market was sort of gaslighting all of us into thinking that the public comps for these companies were much higher than they were. Is that why, is that behind the psychology of why these very sophisticated investors made these big mistakes? Or how do you explain it?

• 37:00Brad Gerstner?

  Yeah, well, I think there's a massive amount of research that's been done that Buffett and Marx and many others have quoted. That your ability to calculate risk goes down when you see a bunch of other people doing that thing. Right? Because your body, your mind's telling you, well, I won't die because I'm just doing what those other 100 people are. That's why there's herd mentality. That's why the lemming effect. Confirmation bias. Confirmation bias. And so it's not that, I mean, you know, you didn't name them, but Tiger, right? We know them. They're great investors, etc. But you had to understand they were playing a different game, right?

• 37:42Brad Gerstner?

  And so when people who were building portfolios of 20 names were trying to play the same game as a firm building a portfolio of 400 names, right? It was like trying to follow, you know, SoftBank in 2017. So I'm not, I mean, listen, we all thought Masa SoftBank was going to be a wipeout in Vision 1. It wasn't, right? Now, I know he just had a huge recent mark. We'll see where it ultimately settles out. So I mean, I think from my perspective, you know, like Bill said, you get forced onto the field. There's a certain amount you have to do to stay in the game, to have the conversation. But listen. As far back as, you know, last April, we were sitting around the table on Thursday,

• 38:27Brad Gerstner?

  Thursday at your place saying, "This can't continue," right? And then in the fall, it was Bezos is selling, Musk is selling, like, all the signals were going off. Right? And so, I think you have to know the game that you're playing. If you're a seed investor, an early-stage investor, it doesn't matter what everybody else is doing. You have an obligation to play a differentiated game. And what I would say today is, if somebody calls me up tomorrow and says, "Hey, Tiger's doing this deal at 75x ARR, do you want to do it?" They would have to pry the dollar out of my fucking hand with a crowbar. I'm not risking my money or my partner's money doing something that we're not underwriting, you know, to...

• 39:11Brad Gerstner?

  No, I'm willing to underwrite, David, to that five-year average. I think what you have in the market now is a huge opportunity, because people are in a fetal position, under their desks, scared that the world is forever changed, because the CEOs of big banks go on CNBC and start hyperventilating about deglobalization and hyperinflation and all this stuff. And not one of them has actually built a model and, you know, deconstructed the components of CPI. I think the much more likely explanation is that the trends that existed for 20 years still exist. They were interrupted temporarily by us saving ourselves from a catastrophe with COVID. The transient thing that everybody has come to make fun of, right?

• 39:55Brad Gerstner?

  Transient can be a year, two years, three years. We will look back at this graph, and that inflation will roll over, and I suspect that those trends will continue. So I'm willing to underwrite to that. But if you told me you thought inflation was going to be 5% for the next decade, and the 10-year was going to 7%, I would say, "Sure, every tech company in the market..."

• 40:19Chamath Palihapitiya?

  No, no, no, "Sure, everything."

• 40:20Brad Gerstner?

  "Sure, everything in the market, and don't invest a dollar in venture until you have line of sight and the market has repriced it." That's what the market is wrestling with right now. We have some people who are saying, you know, it's... Markets abhor uncertainty. And you have peak uncertainty. We have a war. We have... This is the hardest forecasting job in my career. I'll shut up. You have filibustering. But, you know, like, that is, you know, I think that is ultimately the question. If you're a founder or you're an investor, what are you willing to underwrite to?

• 40:51Jason Calacanis?

  Yeah. And Bill, what are your thoughts in terms of early-stage and series A?

• 40:57Bill Gurley?

  Exactly what I was thinking. Like, he said, "Don't take it..." Like, if... We love to invest in two people and a PowerPoint. Like, if that investment can happen today, and all...

• 41:09Jason Calacanis?

  And every day.

• 41:09Bill Gurley?

  It doesn't matter if the inflation pops or interest rates go up. It won't affect them. It might help. It might help, actually.

• 41:17Jason Calacanis?

  Yes, because you're hiring people at half-price.

• 41:20Bill Gurley?

  Right. And there's less competition. I mean, my biggest problem of the past six years was hyper-competition.

• 41:29Jason Calacanis?

  Finding a CFO.

• 41:30Bill Gurley?

  No, just not just talent. I'm talking about like...

• 41:33Jason Calacanis?

  Oh, yeah.

• 41:33Bill Gurley?

  I'm talking about Uber and Lyft and like hundreds of billions of dollars of money raised in the private market and shot onto the playing field out of a cannon. That's brutal. And that's not happening if inflation's going up.

• 41:48Chamath Palihapitiya?

  It doesn't allow the market to really sort out the winners and losers properly. Because the companies that should contract get propped up for a little bit longer. There's some talented people in those companies that don't then end up in the right home. You know, I said this last week, the most transformational moment in our company's history, at Facebook's history, was during the GFC because of the fact that there weren't any other alternatives to go and work.

• 42:13Bill Gurley?

  By the way, I found, and I shared this with my partners the other day, I've found through my career, which wasn't four decades, but, okay.

• 42:21Jason Calacanis?

  Over three.

• 42:21Bill Gurley?

  That the window after the correction is the calmest, where there's least anxiety, for me at least. Like, everything slows down. People talk rationally. People aren't doing silly things.

• 42:35Jason Calacanis?

  It's nice, like a walk on the beach.

• 42:36Bill Gurley?

  There's a lot more, there's a lot more communication that seems rational and pragmatic.

• 42:40Jason Calacanis?

  And you can also maybe get to know a founder, understand the business.

• 42:44Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Business over three, four, five weeks and make a decision as opposed to three, four, five hours and they tell you, hey, term sheets.

• 42:49Bill Gurley?

  Well, and people think more unit, like, think about unit economics in a more reasonable way and you're not, you know.

• 42:57Brad Gerstner?

  This is, this is why, I mean, the two of you invested in Uber. I know because we've had this conversation.

• 43:03Bill Gurley?

  Well, he mentions it.

• 43:04Brad Gerstner?

  You're too, you're too humble to take credit.

• 43:08Chamath Palihapitiya?

  I do get in for 25 million dollars.

• 43:11Brad Gerstner?

  But, you know, Bill's talked about, you know, benchmarks legendary for investing in eBay and it was winner take all.

• 43:19Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Oh, winner take all.

• 43:20Brad Gerstner?

  Yeah. And I suspect that when you invested in Uber, you saw similar network effects. You said, oh my God. An even bigger market. This is gonna, this is gonna be winner take all. Unfortunately, what you didn't plan on was Masa raiding Saudi Arabia, getting a hundred billion dollars of free money and then blowing it out of a cannon into the market. So Lyft and everybody else could do diseconomic things and literally for.

• 43:50Bill Gurley?

  I did not foresee that.

• 43:51Brad Gerstner?

  For seven years.

• 43:53Chamath Palihapitiya?

  The confetti cannon is not a prediction.

• 43:55Brad Gerstner?

  So the entire profit margin of Uber was competed away by stupidity. And you tweeted last week, and I noticed it because Jason and I may have a little something on the line here. You know, with respect to Uber, for the first time you tweeted after their quarterly earnings, maybe we're starting to see network effects show up at Uber because if you listen to the Lyft call, it was a train ride.

• 44:19Chamath Palihapitiya?

  For a decade, what, what that money did was it made those businesses what we call the consumer surplus business. Meaning what is a consumer surplus business? It's when all you win. Nobody else wins. The employees don't win. The shareholders don't win. The investors don't win. Consumers win. You're getting subsidized rides. You're getting subsidized food delivery. You're getting some subsidized form of content. And there are these consumer surplus businesses that abound right now that still exist, which are propped up. By dollars that aren't being, that they're not being allocated because they're competitive. It's just because they had to.

• 44:54David Friedberg?

  Negative unit economics to drive growth.

• 44:57Brad Gerstner?

  I mean, Lyft said on their call that they were going to continue subsidizing. In fact, they're going to increase their coupons. I have a question for you guys.

• 45:07David Friedberg?

  While the plane is about to hit the mountain. Sorry, Bill, I just want to ask you. The negative unit economics to drive growth trend was a big one for the last eight years. And it certainly seemed to have played out at Uber, but a lot of other delivery companies. Do you think that as a strategy of seeming capital availability, negative unit economics to drive growth? And then, once you have the network and once you grab the market, you make money is a reasonable strategy?

• 45:30Bill Gurley?

  It all depends on whether you can rein it back in or not. And, you know, I think DoorDash did an incredible job. I think Jeff Bezos did an incredible job back in 01. I think if 50 entrepreneurs try that trick, 49 are going to augur in.

• 45:46David Friedberg?

  By the way, that's the best, I think that's such a key takeaway.

• 45:50Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Well, there's another, there's another part about it. You can only pull it off as well as if in that moment, you have an effective monopoly, which Bezos effectively did and Tony did in those markets where he was operating. Nobody else was competing in Palo Alto, California and, you know.

• 46:04Bill Gurley?

  Well, they weren't competing the way he was, for sure.

• 46:08Chamath Palihapitiya?

  I have a question for the two of you guys. What do you guys think about something like Instacart in a moment like this? So 40-odd billion dollar valuation, maybe gets reset to 24, who knows?

• 46:19David Friedberg?

  They filed to go public.

• 46:20Chamath Palihapitiya?

  They filed to go public confidentially.

• 46:22David Friedberg?

  Are you guys investors?

• 46:24Bill Gurley?

  I'm not.

• 46:24Brad Gerstner?

  I'm not, no. So candidly, what are you, what's going on here?

• 46:28Bill Gurley?

  I mean, I think it's a provocative question because you have a business that's raised a ton of capital that was born of the air that we're talking about, that probably did things that were.

• 46:40Brad Gerstner?

  Unnatural.

• 46:40Bill Gurley?

  If they weren't negative unit economics, they were close. And they talked about it because they would say publicly, we're going to roll in advertising and then that's going to bring us.

• 46:50Chamath Palihapitiya?

  I got in trouble once. I was, it says on Bloomberg, so I think you can find this clip. But I was talking to Emily Chang and she said something to the effect of.

• 47:02Jason Calacanis?

  What did you just see this latest Sequoia round? And I said, and I made this joke, it was a complete joke, it's not true, I was like, yeah. I went to Instacart, I bought one mango, had it delivered for free. Then I bought a second mango, I sent an email to Doug Leone, thanks for the second mango.

• 47:17Chamath Palihapitiya?

  What a douche.

• 47:19Jason Calacanis?

  I bought four grapes and I said... Consumer surplus. I mean, you can get four grapes whenever you want.

• 47:27Bill Gurley?

  It's hard to judge a company from the outside because you can't look at the financials. But from, the product experience has evolved over a very long period of time. It's actually pretty good and I suspect there's an asset value there. And whether that can match up with what someone can afford to pay it.

• 47:42Jason Calacanis?

  All right, we got a wrap. Bill, just a final question here.

• 47:47Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Wait, wait, wait, why do you have to ask the final question?

• 47:49Jason Calacanis?

  We want to know where the markets are going.

• 47:52Chamath Palihapitiya?

  It's about feeling sincere.

• 47:53Jason Calacanis?

  All right, Brad, where's the market going to be at this time next year? Answer that question.

• 48:01Brad Gerstner?

  We will be higher for growth stocks this time next year, but we may very well get there by way of lower and potentially meaningfully lower. Because the counterfactual to the hyperinflation argument is not, you can't deliver the counterfactual for at least four to five months. The facts don't exist until we actually see the facts play out. But my suspicion is we return to trend, things become more predictable and investable again, and we bounce back up to the five-year average.

• 48:35Jason Calacanis?

  All right, back now for you, Bill, final question.

• 48:38Bill Gurley?

  Oh, don't get that one?

• 48:39Jason Calacanis?

  No, too easy. You can answer it if you like, but I got a more important one.

• 48:42Bill Gurley?

  6.385% higher.

• 48:45Jason Calacanis?

  Okay. I know you're not going to answer it, so I got a better one for you. You're not in the next benchmark fund. Essentially, that means retirement of the Spurs. Now the market's down. You seem like you're a little bit bored. Are you going to get back into early-stage investing, yes or no? And are you missing it?

• 49:07Bill Gurley?

  I think, I don't know what that was. I think I could, I might get intrigued with doing angel stuff the way Bezos did. I don't think I want to practice the art, taking board seats. I'm still on 10 that I'm serving dutifully, and I've played that game, you know? Maybe similar to what David said about operating a business.

• 49:29Jason Calacanis?

  You meet a great founder, they got a good idea, you vibe, you put in a 500K check.

• 49:33Bill Gurley?

  Yeah, I'd be open to that.

• 49:35Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Do you want to tell?

• 49:35Bill Gurley?

  And I'm very excited about public stocks here, actually.

• 49:39Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Really?

• 49:39Bill Gurley?

  Yeah.

• 49:40Jason Calacanis?

  Continue.

• 49:40Bill Gurley?

  You're excited about what? Public stocks, like the valuations are getting super interesting.

• 49:45Chamath Palihapitiya?

  Such good deals out there.

• 49:46Jason Calacanis?

  Super interesting.

• 49:47Chamath Palihapitiya?

  You want to do your Bill Gurley imitation?

• 49:49Jason Calacanis?

  Oh, yeah.

• 49:50Bill Gurley?

  You guys got to hear this.

• 49:50Chamath Palihapitiya?

  At the poker, at the poker table.

• 49:52Jason Calacanis?

  J Cal, you know, it's a great question.

• 49:54Bill Gurley?

  Do I have to stay out here for this?

• 49:55Jason Calacanis?

  Yes. I've been, I've been investing for the better part of three or four decades, quarter to four, and 10 boards I dutifully served on.

• 50:07Jason Calacanis?

  Every time I shove it all in with kings, your mouth sucks out on me with a 9, 10 suited, and that's just my luck right now, so maybe I'll just look at the public market card.

• 50:22Jason Calacanis?

  I'll just have, be liquid, I'll be liquid.

• 50:28Jason Calacanis?

  All right, ladies and gentlemen, BG squared.

• 50:32Jason Calacanis?

  BG squared, babies.

• 51:19Jason Calacanis?

  We need to get merch.