Boeing's Nosedive: The 737-MAX

Boeing used to be one of the most respected engineering firms in the world. Then it changed its focus from making great airplanes to increasing its stock value. The result was the 737-MAX, a plane that took the lives of 346 people in two avoidable crashes. See omnystudio.com/listener https://omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Speaker names marked ? are inferred from speaking time and the show’s known hosts — they are not voice-verified.

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• 1:41Speaker 00

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• 1:50Josh Clark?

  Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh, and there's Chuck, and we are just flying the friendly skies with our co-pilot, Jerry, and our other co-pilot, God, and this is Stuff You Should Know. I thought it was Dog. Uh, yeah. Yeah. Okay.

• 2:08Speaker 02

  Well, before we get going, there is kind of an exciting thing we need to mention, and we're gonna mention this, you know, you're probably getting sick of us talking about it, but Stuff You Should Know is going on a cruise.

• 2:20Josh Clark?

  Yeah, a sea cruise.

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  And not just like, so long suckers, we're going on vacation.

• 2:25Josh Clark?

  Right.

• 2:26Speaker 02

  It's like a stuff cruise with other, like, stuff they don't want you to know is gonna be there. We're doing our live podcast onboard, and it's like, hey, Stuff You Should Know listeners, come cruise with us.

• 2:36Josh Clark?

  Yeah, come cruise with us. I think that's the message that we're sending out right now. Is on Virgin Voyages, which is pretty swank, and it's October 2nd to the 7th. It's a five-day cruise from New York City to Bermuda and back even. They bring you back to your car.

• 2:55Speaker 02

  I think that's kind of key. Yeah, it's an adults-only thing.

• 2:58Josh Clark?

  Yep.

• 2:59Speaker 02

  And I think the name of it is the Big Apple to Bermuda Cruise. And yeah, it's gonna be a lot of fun. So, you know, like I said, we're doing our live podcast, and we're gonna be doing some other fun events that they haven't told us about yet. The feeling of be like trivia and stuff like that, but Jerry is going, and that's reason enough to sign up, I think.

• 3:18Josh Clark?

  Yeah, you can verify in person that Jerry exists.

• 3:20Speaker 02

  That's right. Might be able to rub some suntan lotion on her back, too.

• 3:24Josh Clark?

  So where do people go to sign up for this sea cruise?

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  Yeah, you know what I would do? I think we're gonna have some, like, super-specific information coming, but just get on your search engine and check out Stuff at Sea, Virgin Voyages, and that'll direct you. I can't wait.

• 3:39Josh Clark?

  Yeah, I can't wait either. We'll see all of you in October on the high seas.

• 3:43Speaker 02

  That's right. This episode is not about ships, actually. It's about a plane.

• 3:48Josh Clark?

  Which is technically a ship. It's an airship.

• 3:51Speaker 02

  An airship, yeah, yeah. That's a good way to say it.

• 3:55Josh Clark?

  Yeah, that's how most people say it.

• 3:57Speaker 02

  I'm trying to watch what I say about this one, because it's pretty touchy.

• 4:00Josh Clark?

  It is touchy, but it's just such a shameful chapter in the history of what was long regarded, one of the best engineering firms in the world, the Boeing Corporation. They made great airplanes. They were very innovative. They made very safe airplanes. They cared about the details. They put engineering standards before profit. And all of that just got wiped out in the course of a few years from about 2018 to 19. All of it just went bloop when it came to light that they had flip flopped that a few years before and profits now came before standards.

• 4:39Speaker 02

  Yeah. And, you know, we'll talk about in more detail, but you know, the end result is everybody knows at this point is two, two of their 737 MAX planes crashed, fell out of the sky and killed a lot of people. Super sad. And it's very sort of anger inducing when you know the story behind it all. So we're going to detail that now, starting, I guess we should say that the 737 MAX airplane that we're talking about was a brand new fleet that was going to replace the old 737s and compete with their rival Airbus, the Airbus A320neo.

• 5:16Josh Clark?

  Yeah. And Airbus has long been Boeing's rival since Boeing bought McDonnell Douglas back in, I think, the 90s. And so it's just been Boeing, Airbus, head to head to supply the world with their airplanes. And the 737 MAX, the reason that they were updating the 737s is one, like you said, these were old 737s that needed to be replaced, but also that Airbus A320neo, it was like a step up. Like it was the same kind of body, like I think a narrow body is what it's called, narrow body, midsize plane as the 737. So companies now had an option. They could be like, well, we're going to go with this Airbus instead of replacing the Boeings with Boeings. So Boeing said, good God, we've

• 6:01Josh Clark?

  got to get out there and give them something that they're going to want besides this A320neo.

• 6:07Speaker 02

  Yeah, for sure. I think, should we, should we save talk of the actual incidents till later?

• 6:13Josh Clark?

  I think just mentioning that they happened was enough for now.

• 6:16Speaker 02

  All right, well, what you're gonna hear is gonna infuriate you a little bit. It's also gonna shine a bit of a light on some of the, which will also infuriate you. Just some of the systemic problems with the airline industry as a whole and how these planes are approved for being safe to fly in the sky. And the FAA is gonna take some hits deservedly. But we should probably start out by talking about Boeing. You know, you mentioned that they were, you know, dedicated to the top-notch engineering for decades and decades, but starting in the 90s, that started to change, right?

• 6:53Josh Clark?

  Yeah, there was a CEO that kind of kicked it all off. His name was Philip Condit. And in 1997, he said, "We're going to acquire McDonnell Douglas," like I said. Up to that point, McDonnell Douglas was also a neck and neck competitor with Boeing. But rather than making their, their name as also like a great engineering firm with innovation and a mind to safety, McDonnell Douglas is like, "No, we're just gonna cut costs."

• 7:21Speaker 02

  Yeah.

• 7:21Josh Clark?

  Whereas Boeing, if they were gonna design a new plane, or if they were gonna come up with a new plane, they would start from scratch and design a new plane and probably set all the industry standards for decades to follow. What McDonnell Douglas did was they would design a plane and then they would go back to it over decade and decade and decade after decade and just kind of revamp it and update it. That is essentially what you call kluge. It can be done, obviously, because they were doing it, but it is so much worse than designing a new plane from scratch. It's just it costs a lot less and it takes a lot less time.

• 7:58Speaker 02

  Yeah, because over those decades, over those 30 to 40 years, there have been so many innovations in flight technology that like you could build a really great airplane from the ground up if that's what you wanted to do.

• 8:10Josh Clark?

  Right.

• 8:11Speaker 02

  We should mention that all of that, did you name the first CEO from 97?

• 8:15Josh Clark?

  Yeah, Philip Condit.

• 8:17Speaker 02

  Okay, so he was the first guy. The other thing that he did, and this was a little bit later, this was, I think, four years after he was named CEO. He didn't split up Boeing like a breakup, but he split them up physically in that he moved their headquarters from their longtime home in Seattle to Chicago. And he did this for a lousy three million bucks a year. It was $60 million in state and local tax credit over a 20-year period. Three million bucks a year for a company like this is like chicken scratch.

• 8:51Josh Clark?

  Yeah.

• 8:51Speaker 02

  So it was a bit of a head-scratcher move because you had a company that had everything under one roof in Seattle, and now you had these Seattle-based engineers working there, and you had the C-suite in Chicago. And that's, anytime that happens, that, I mean, I know people can work remotely and stuff like that, but it seemed like a great idea to have everything there in Seattle.

• 9:12Josh Clark?

  Yeah, and plus, up to that point, with the executives and the decision-makers working very closely with like the engineers and product division, those engineers knew the executives. They had a working relationship with them, so they felt comfortable saying like, "I don't really think we should do that because it's going to make the plane fall out of the sky." And the executives would listen. This is like, they didn't know these people anymore. It just got separated. And this transition really kind of became complete when a guy named Harry Stonecypher took over from Philip Condit in 2003. He became CEO. He used to be with General Electric, but he was most recently with McDonnell Douglas. And even though that Boeing acquired McDonnell Douglas, McDonnell Douglas influenced Boeing's culture.

• 9:57Josh Clark?

  Boeing's culture became that same cost-cutting, like, focus shareholder.

• 10:03Speaker 02

  Shareholder first.

• 10:04Josh Clark?

  Yes, exactly. That kind of focus, that became what Boeing adopted after guys like Harry Stonecypher took over Boeing.

• 10:13Speaker 02

  Yeah, he has a quote even. He said, "When people say, 'I changed the culture of Boeing,' that was the intent, so that it is run like a business rather than a great engineering firm." And that's one of those quotes where I was like, "Bro, he just said that out loud to the press."

• 10:28Josh Clark?

  Right.

• 10:29Speaker 02

  No one wants to hear that.

• 10:30Josh Clark?

  Yeah, well-

• 10:31Speaker 02

  I guess shareholders did, but-

• 10:32Josh Clark?

  Exactly.

• 10:33Speaker 02

  Everyone else, the public at large, wants safe planes that don't fall out of the sky.

• 10:36Josh Clark?

  Yeah, but he was putting a signal out, a bat signal of sorts, saying like, "Hey, investors, come invest in Boeing. We're gonna make a bunch of money for you." And they started to. The next CEO was Jim McNerney, and he was the one who you can really put the most, most of the blame for the design of the 737 MAX. From him onward, essentially, every single CEO had some sort of direct, personal blame for what happened, but he was the one who was like, "We need to get this plane out. We need to get it out fast. We need to cut every corner we possibly can to save time and money. Go."

• 11:17Speaker 02

  Yeah, so he ran the company until 2015. So he oversaw sort of all of that planning and development, basically. And then after that, the CEO, man, I just hate saying that CEO over and over. I had a bad taste in my mouth. The new guy's name was Dennis Mullenberg, and he, you know, obviously inherited quite a mess after what we're about to talk about.

• 11:40Josh Clark?

  Right. So, like I said, like, these guys were saying, like, "Come on, we gotta get going." Like Airbus is already several steps ahead, and we need to get this thing out so people can start ordering before Airbus just sucks all of the market share out of us. I saw that they put countdown clocks for different deadlines all throughout the office, in meeting rooms, conference rooms. There was constantly a clock counting down while you were at work. Engineers got the impression, and sometimes were told directly, like, "Keep your mouth shut." The head of the project for the 737 MAX, people didn't report directly to him anymore. They reported to their heads, and their heads may or may not have told that project manager about any problems that came up.

• 12:23Josh Clark?

  So this whole rushed project also had like an aura of, "Just keep your mouth shut. Do not do anything to delay this."

• 12:32Speaker 02

  Yeah, for sure. And you know, as we'll see later, there were whistleblowers. But when it takes a like, somebody requesting whistleblower protection to come forward, especially with, I mean, in any corporation, but especially when it's something that's dealing with like, public safety, that's not how it should be. You know, you should be able to, to say, hey, at your work, this is, without fear of being of reprisal, you know, like, we're not doing the right thing here.

• 12:56Josh Clark?

  Right. And it used to be, you didn't even need a whistleblower. You would go to the executives and be like, hey, this is a real problem. This is not safe. And they would listen to you. That wasn't the case anymore.

• 13:07Speaker 02

  Should we take a break?

• 13:08Josh Clark?

  Sure.

• 13:09Speaker 02

  All right, let's take a break and we'll, we'll come back with the design phase right after this.

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• 16:31Speaker 02

  All right, we're back. I know we talked a little bit at first about how they decided to sort of revamp this decades-old fleet, design-wise, instead of starting from scratch with all this great new technology, but that's what they did. They took that 737 body, they made a lot of changes, they added bigger engines, and one of the things that was the result, and they knew this by 2012, basically, was that they had created a problem, a balance problem, whereas at certain speeds, you could potentially go into a stall because the airplane's nose drifted upward.

• 17:05Josh Clark?

  Yeah, because they basically took the same plane and just put giant engines that the plane was never designed for, and it just knocked it out of balance, right? And you would say, well, why didn't they just move the wings? There was a good reason they didn't move the wings, because the more changes you make to an airplane, the more likely it is that all the pilots at all the different airlines that fly that plane are going to need updated training, right? The FAA will require it. Airlines don't like that, that's an added cost to the plane you're selling them. So they bent themselves into pretzels, trying to avoid making actual big changes.

• 17:46Josh Clark?

  They were playing whack-a-mole with all the problems that came up, with an eye toward not actually doing the one thing that would solve the problem, which is redesign the wings. So what they came up with instead was some software that would take over and make the nose go back level, whenever it got out of a suitable angle of attack, it's called.

• 18:09Speaker 02

  Yeah, and this is the real villain, but the real villains were the humans behind this decision. But we're talking about the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, the MCAS. And this thing, like you said, I don't know if it was clear, but it literally takes over controls of the plane, and supposedly takes care of the issue for the pilot, instead of saying, hey, let's redesign this plane, or at least train these pilots to rectify this on their own with their hands on the wheel? No, what's that thing called?

• 18:45Josh Clark?

  The stick, I think they call it.

• 18:47Speaker 02

  The stick? Is it the stick in big planes, too?

• 18:49Josh Clark?

  Probably. I'm pretty sure.

• 18:51Speaker 02

  Just a larger stick.

• 18:51Josh Clark?

  Yeah. The big stick.

• 18:53Speaker 02

  The big stick. They said, we designed this whiz bang software that's gonna do that for you. And when they went around to test flight mode, I think it was like 2016. The MCAS was still a pretty small part of this whole thing, but it was part of the aircraft.

• 19:12Josh Clark?

  Yeah, and then they started testing this new design in simulators. And I know at least once, I think in 2012, they, um, the, the, I think the head test pilot for Boeing took 10 seconds to override the MCAS and crashed. And they were like, oh, okay, we need to keep working on this. So again, they're back to playing whack a mole. Like the, the Band-Aid that they put on the issue of the imbalance, which was the software, now has its own bugs. So now they're fixing those and then that would bring up more bugs and more bugs. So they had to fix those and those and those. And this was where the design for the Boeing 737 MAX like really started to get out of hand.

• 19:54Speaker 02

  Yeah, for sure. Because like I said, it was a pretty small part of the system at first. It had kind of that one function, I think initially, or was supposed to. But by the time you're playing whack a mole, it keeps growing and growing. And you're like, well, then the software will solve this problem and then the software should solve this problem. And all of a sudden, as it's interacting with these plane systems, it's a huge part of flying this plane.

• 20:18Josh Clark?

  Yeah, and they had to integrate it with the existing software. They couldn't redo the software or the, the flight controls or else again, you have pilot training that you've just triggered. Right? So they were just basically hammering this thing into place as best they could. The way that it finally worked was there were two sensors on the nose that sense the angle of the plane. Right? And when the sensors sent information saying, hey, this plane's at way too steep of an angle, it could stall out if it goes any further in, if it goes any further up. The MCAS system, literally like you said, took over the flight controls and then leveled the plane back out, right?

• 21:01Josh Clark?

  There was a huge issue that they made it, they designed it, which still befuddles engineers, aerospace engineers today. So that only one of those sensors saying the plane's angle was wrong could trigger the MCAS. Like, there was no redundancy. So if one of those sensors was faulty and the other was fine, it didn't matter. The faulty one was going to tell the MCAS to level out, even if the plane's angle wasn't actually an issue.

• 21:29Speaker 02

  Yeah, like, the whole idea there is if one sensor goes off, you want to have that other sensor that aligns with it and says, "Yeah, we're getting the same readings," or whatever, which is, you know, it's that backup, it's that redundancy that you need. You need that matching data before that thing engages itself. So they said, "You know what? We've done our calculations, and we think it's much simpler this way, and the risk of catastrophic failure is, quote, 'almost inconceivable.'"

• 21:59Josh Clark?

  Yeah.

• 22:00Speaker 02

  I think they figured the probability was one per 223 trillion hours of flight. So they said, "You know what? We don't need this redundancy. It's not necessary."

• 22:09Josh Clark?

  Which is still, it's just insane. Like, that is a basic principle. Redundancy is a basic principle of any engineering, right? And it just, I don't, I still couldn't find why they made that decision, why it was so much harder for that, to have the sensors have to match. It's just nuts. But as we'll see, somebody clearly forgot to carry the one because that, that calculation they came up with for that probability was not

• 22:32Speaker 02

  Yeah.

• 22:33Josh Clark?

  Correct. So there was another thing that they did. They didn't tell anybody about the MCAS.

• 22:40Speaker 02

  Yeah, this is the one that really gets me.

• 22:42Josh Clark?

  They created, this was brand new. No one had ever created something like the MCAS before. It wasn't like they took an existing software and just kind of redesigned it. They made new software to do a brand new thing that hadn't been done before, and then they didn't tell anyone about it. And again, just want to reiterate, the MCAS took over the controls from the pilot. If you were the pilot, you were no longer in control of the plane while the MCAS was bringing the nose back down to a more suitable angle of attack. Imagine that happening and you having no idea what's going on because you don't know the MCAS exists.

• 23:20Speaker 02

  Yeah, and all of this is because they don't want to make the, again, make the plane less appealing to buyers, to airlines, because they're gonna have to invest a lot of money in like pilot retraining and even as simple things as like, you know, flight manuals and stuff like that.

• 23:35Josh Clark?

  Yeah.

• 23:36Speaker 02

  Supposedly, I mean, it was reported at least that Boeing made a deal with Southwest Air that said, hey, if you buy enough planes from us, and if you don't require your special training for the pilots, like save yourself some money, we'll give you a discount on these planes. And Boeing lobbied the FAA, like actively lobbied them to allow them not to make any mention of the MCAS in the manual, like, we don't even want this in the flight manual. And the FAA said, sure.

• 24:03Josh Clark?

  Yeah, they said, okay. Boeing told them that it was such a minor part of an already existing system, I think the existing airspeed sensor system, that it was not worth mentioning. And the FAA, like you said, they were like, sure, that's fine. They also didn't even put an indicator light for it in there. That's how secret they kept this thing. So you would have no idea it was on, right? So this was like, that was, you might be stunned that the FAA just went along with that. It also shows you that they didn't, they had no idea what the MCAS was. They didn't go and look and say, well, let us see if it's actually important or not. Tell us what this thing is.

• 24:45Josh Clark?

  Later on FAA officials, some of them would testify, they didn't get the MCAS, they didn't understand what it was, and they really were encouraged not to ask too many questions. So they just said, sure, if you guys don't think that it's worth mentioning, we won't make you.

• 24:59Speaker 02

  Yeah, for sure. And, you know, this is all, you know, how I mentioned in the beginning, part of the systemic failures of just how things work. So we should talk a little bit about that as far as the FAA is concerned, because when they were formed in 1958, It was pretty clear right out of the gate that their their kind of co mandates could often be in conflict with one another, which was to promote the interest of the aviation industry and, very important, to promote the safety of the flying public. So they knew pretty quickly that like those, like I said, those don't always align. So Congress in, I think, 1967 said, all right, maybe we should have a new agency that really guides the safety side. So they created the National Transportation Safety Board.

• 25:42Speaker 02

  And they're like, they'll, they'll keep everybody safe and recommend regulations to the FAA to enforce, but they can't demand that. The FAA has never like had to do the things that they're suggested to do.

• 25:55Josh Clark?

  Right. It's just the NTSB is looking out for the safety, but the FAA doesn't have to enact it because again, that might conflict with the interests of the aviation industry. And that stuck out to me, Chuck, that, that the safety of the flying public isn't always in the interests of the aviation industry. It should 100% of the time be in the interests of the aviation industry.

• 26:18Speaker 02

  Yeah.

• 26:19Josh Clark?

  That's just my take, hot take.

• 26:22Speaker 02

  But what, what ended up happening was the FAA said, all right, well, you know, we're good at the industry stuff. So why don't we just let Boeing, like they know planes? Why don't we let them handle their own certification process? And it wasn't, I mean, that's seems to be sort of standard practice. It wasn't like some big exception was made, right?

• 26:39Josh Clark?

  Yeah, no, they have a name for it. Organizational Designation Authorization. The FAA can say, like you just said, you know, a lot about what we want and what we require. We're just going to let you go through and verify that all this stuff adheres to FAA requirements and guidelines. And then you come back and tell us, if it does, you, plane maker, certify your own plane and tell us if we should certify it in turn. And that's exactly what it is. It's that's that process.

• 27:10Speaker 02

  Yeah. They were like, hey, here's what you do. Just do it all, then send me an email that just says all good.

• 27:15Josh Clark?

  Right. Write an email to the president, but like it's from me and then I'll sign it.

• 27:22Speaker 02

  So this is part of a bigger problem that actually has a name. It's called regulatory capture and it's this idea that when people are working closely together, like the FAA works closely with the airline industry and Boeing, that they, you know, they know these people and they end up, I don't want to necessarily say siding, but they end up more sympathetic to the industry side than the public that they're supposed to be protecting because they don't work with the public at large every day. They work with these people every day.

• 27:57Josh Clark?

  Exactly. That's the same reason why you should avoid ever agreeing to mediation instead of a lawsuit. Because the mediators typically, even though they won't say they do, they will typically work for the people paying them. And the chances of your company that say you're going into mediation with, hiring them again are far greater than you ever hiring them. It's not exactly the same thing, but it's, they have a working relationship that just can't be avoided. And that also is supported by another issue called the revolving door. Regulatory capture is very much supported by the revolving door and vice versa,

• 28:37Josh Clark?

  which is you are a friendly regulator and the company you're regulating later on is like, hey, we want to hire you. We think you've done a great job and we want you to come work for us for gobs of money. And it can go the other way too. A friendly colleague can go become a regulator and, you know, you just kind of expect them to turn a blind eye when you need them to. That's, that's just a huge problem, especially when you're talking about huge, like life and death stuff, like designing and certifying airplanes or, you know, pharmaceutical makers and the FDA, they're frequently talked about as regulatory capture and a revolving door.

• 29:18Speaker 02

  Yeah, I mean, I'm just a dummy podcaster, so I don't know how any of this stuff works, but it seems to me like there should be like a rule or a law that says, you know, choose your path. Like, you can't go work for the FAA for 10 years and then go work for Boeing right after that with some plum job, or some pharmaceutical company, and then you go work for the FDA. Like, it's just such an obvious conflict, you know?

• 29:42Josh Clark?

  Yeah, I don't remember if you and I recorded the episode on it or not. I feel like we did years back. I definitely wrote an article about this, and people have proposed that over the years. And I think three years is typically the average, which makes sense. Like, a lot of, a lot of people change at a company in three years, so that would probably actually do it. But it's just like, just add it to the pile of problems that we have to solve to get things on track around here.

• 30:11Speaker 02

  I propose we take a sort of a quicker break here than we normally would, because we've got the crashes coming up. And after that, it's, you know, what do you think?

• 30:22Josh Clark?

  I agree.

• 30:23Speaker 02

  Okay. I'm not quite sure what I was trying to say there, but we'll be right back and, and we'll talk about what happened with these planes right after this.

• 30:42Josh Clark?

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• 30:52Speaker 02

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• 31:05Josh Clark?

  Or discover Toyota's off-road lineup, including the iconic 4Runner and Land Cruiser, designed to go beyond the everyday. And with Toyota's proven reputation for quality and reliability, plus hybrid power on many models, you can get more for every mile and drive for less along the way.

• 31:20Speaker 02

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• 31:42Speaker 02

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• 32:17Speaker 02

  Hey, everyone. Let's play a quick game. When I say Carnival Cruise, what are the first things that come to mind? Maybe a buffet, maybe a lively Lido deck, or maybe you've already decided cruising just isn't for you. But hear us out, because the Carnival Cruise isn't what you think.

• 32:31Josh Clark?

  Let's start with the dining. From casual favorites at Guy Fieri's Burgers to elevated cuisine at Fahrenheit 555 Steakhouse. There's something for every craving.

• 32:41Speaker 02

  That's right. Then there's their comedy club, featuring real comedians, real laughs, and shows people rave about the whole vacation. Or if you're looking to unwind, Carnival has a spa that'll transport you to another dimension.

• 32:52Josh Clark?

  Yeah. Are you feeling adventurous? Explore one of Carnival's shore excursions. Carnival has everything you could ever want in a vacation. So if you've been guilty of overlooking cruises, it might be time to take another look. Book your next getaway at carnival.com. Ships registry, the Bahamas and Panama.

• 33:20Josh Clark?

  Okay, Chuck. So we're back and we're going to go back to March 2017. And I guess this month is when the FAA certified the 737 MAX 8 to fly. A few months later, the MAX 9 was certified to fly. And both of these planes, I think they were the first 737 MAXs to hit the skies. And one thing you want to point out is when the FAA certifies a new plane to fly, They and the European, the EU Aviation Authority, they're basically, their stamps tell the rest of the world, like, these planes are fine. You can buy them, you can fly them, you can put them into your airline fleet.

• 34:04Josh Clark?

  Other countries have their own aviation authorities, sure, but they do not have the resources that like the FAA or the EU's Aviation Authority have. And so they're relied upon, like, their credibility is important worldwide. So this is why, one reason also, it was such a big deal that, that the FAA just completely fell down on the job.

• 34:25Speaker 02

  Yeah, because they're supposed to be the gold standard worldwide, like you said. So on October 29th, 2018, Lion Air Flight, it was the 737 MAX 8, crashed into the Java Sea very shortly after takeoff from Indonesia. And the flight crew communicated with air traffic control that basically they were having trouble with flight control. They were having trouble with their altitude. And then the plane just disappears from radar. And I think it was about 13 minutes later, it plunged into the Java Sea at about 400 miles an hour and killed all 189 people on board.

• 35:04Josh Clark?

  Yeah, yeah. And all of this was, I think, like you said, 13 minutes after the plane took off. So that angle of attack thing, we know enough now to know what was going on. At the time, no one had any idea what was going on. And so Boeing said, oh, there's this thing called the MCAS that we put in. Here's some, just here's some information about it. And if anything like this ever happens to you, here's the procedure to override it and you'll be all good. Just, it was still, it was pilot error, everybody. That's, that's what the problem was. That's what Boeing blamed it on.

• 35:40Speaker 02

  Yeah, so that was crash number one. Then Guess about five months later, in March of 2019, an Ethiopian Airlines flight crashed near Egeer, Ethiopia. This was six minutes after takeoff. And all 157 passengers and crew, obviously, onboard died.

• 35:59Josh Clark?

  And that, what made that crash even worse, Chuck, is that those airline pilots followed that procedure that Boeing had told the world about after the Lion Air flight a few months before. And it still didn't work because there was a software glitch with the MCAS and it kept reactivating and reactivating and they couldn't override it and that's when it crashed. So even with this workaround that Boeing came up with, it still wasn't fixing the problem. And after that second crash, it was quite clear that Boeing had screwed up royally and also that the FAA had let them do that and still certified these planes that were way too dangerous to carry human beings.

• 36:44Speaker 02

  Yeah, the whole 737 MAX fleet was grounded at that point for 20 months. It was the biggest sort of grounding like that in aviation history. It took out 450 planes from the sky and, you know, its tendrils ran all throughout the airline industry, like travel, stock prices, obviously. Southwest, you know, I mentioned, like supposedly having that, that better deal. They had to ground, I think, 30 of their 58 plane stock.

• 37:14Josh Clark?

  Yeah, fleet.

• 37:14Speaker 02

  Fleet, that's the word.

• 37:16Josh Clark?

  The fleet with the sticks.

• 37:17Speaker 02

  That's right. I mean, it's clear I'm not an aviator, you guys. I'm sure that's not a surprise to anyone. But governing bodies really kind of came in quickly after that point. They launched investigations, not just into Boeing, but also into the FAA. And, you know, they, they did the thing you do, which you start issuing statements like that are really angry. And then there are press releases and there are denials and then CEOs come and go. Obviously lawsuits and at least one criminal charge would come and, and regulatory actions. But while this is going on, there's still like problems with this plane.

• 37:54Josh Clark?

  Yeah, and the reason they grounded all 737 MAXes everywhere in the world for 20 months, it was supposed to be a very short time, but it turned out to be 20 months, is because these were brand-new planes that dropped out of the sky. Remember that one in 232 trillion chance of the malfunction?

• 38:13Speaker 02

  This is two.

• 38:14Josh Clark?

  Yeah, the Lyon airplane had 800 hours of flight time. The Ethiopian air had just 1,330 hours. So this happened two times in just 2,130 flight hours.

• 38:27Speaker 02

  Yeah.

• 38:28Josh Clark?

  Boy, there's some Josh Clark math in there that we just edited out, Chuck.

• 38:31Speaker 02

  Right. So in October 2019, this is a year after that Lyon air crash. The CEO, who I mentioned earlier at the time, Dennis Mullenberg, was called before Congress, which is what you do. You gotta take your lumps and go in there and get yelled at, basically. And the whole time, he's insisting the plane is safe. And in that hearing, and I remember watching some of this stuff, Connecticut Senator Richard Blumenthal said, after that second crash, he met with Boeing reps in his office and they said, what Josh Clark would say one day is that it was pilot error, which like, that's just complete fabrication.

• 39:10Josh Clark?

  Yeah, I mean, yeah, that's just so scummy, you know? To be that responsible for the deaths of hundreds of people, terrible deaths, and then just to blame two people who were, or four people, I guess, who were blameless in it. That's just, I just think that's terrible. And you might say, well, okay, what's wrong with Mullenberg? He was the one who inherited the problem. He's to blame because he didn't ground the 737 MAXes. The FAA made Boeing do that. So he had the option to do this. He had the opportunity to, and he didn't.

• 39:42Speaker 02

  Yeah, for sure. You know, obviously, the FAA, we've been pretty hard on here, and they were found responsible for good reason. There was a 2020 congressional report that said Boeing and the FAA jointly were responsible for these two plane crashes. And the FAA this whole time is insisting that it did the right thing. It's like, we, you know, did everything like we were supposed to as far as certification goes. But it seems to be a systemic thing where no one stepped forward before this and said...

• 40:16Speaker 02

  You can't allow them to certify themselves because they may have been telling the truth when they said they follow procedure, but the procedure was wrong.

• 40:22Josh Clark?

  Exactly. Yeah. So when that report came out, the shares of Boeing plummeted. As far as fines go and actual money that they had to shell out from this.

• 40:36Speaker 02

  Yeah.

• 40:36Josh Clark?

  The FAA fined Boeing $17 million in 2021. 17 million with an M.

• 40:43Speaker 02

  Yeah.

• 40:44Josh Clark?

  For using unapproved or non-conforming parts or mislabeling the parts. Neither of these, those things had anything to do with the crashes. So Boeing was never fined for those two crashes by the FAA.

• 40:58Speaker 02

  Yeah. Was that just them trying to be like, hey, let's slap them with something so the public sees the headline?

• 41:03Josh Clark?

  That's my interpretation, yes. And that's the little pussycat bite that they came up with.

• 41:12Speaker 02

  Right.

• 41:13Josh Clark?

  Is that a thing?

• 41:14Speaker 02

  Wow. Sure.

• 41:15Josh Clark?

  The other thing is, is the FAA didn't start issuing penalties like that until the Justice Department filed suit against Boeing for defrauding the United States government by saying, this thing is fine. You can go ahead and certify it FAA. And there was actually a criminal misconduct facet to the whole thing as well. And I think Boeing negotiated a $2.5 billion payment or fine to the United States to basically say like, just here, make this go away. Here's some money. They also had to pay $8.3 billion to the airlines. And then, man, the victims' families, all, I think, 345 victims' families, there was $100 million

• 42:00Josh Clark?

  pot set aside for them as part of this negotiated agreement with the Justice Department.

• 42:07Josh Clark?

  The thing that I saw, though, when I was looking that up, Chuck, on like a Google search or whatever, the reporting on it said that Boeing is dedicating $100 million to victims' families almost across the board, all of the reporting.

• 42:23Speaker 02

  Like they weren't forced to?

• 42:24Josh Clark?

  Yes. It's disgusting because it also shows that all of these outlets were basically just copying the Boeing press release.

• 42:31Speaker 02

  Yeah. Yeah, for sure. You did mention a criminal charge. There was one. There was one individual that faced criminal charges. It was a former lead technical pilot named Mark Forkner, and he is the guy who convinced the FAA that the MCAS was not something worthy of including in the flight manual. I think it was exposed later on in internal emails. He was frustrated about MCAS in the email, and he said, quote, "I basically lied to the FAA," end quote. And he was found not guilty of defrauding federal regulators, and that was the only person to be brought up on criminal charges.

• 43:11Josh Clark?

  Yeah. After that, the DOJ said, okay, we're closing this case. It's done. As you can imagine, the families of the victims were not at all happy with any of this.

• 43:23Speaker 02

  Yeah.

• 43:23Josh Clark?

  So the whole thing put to rest. Everybody's moving on. This is, what was that, 2021, I think, when that whole thing got settled?

• 43:33Speaker 02

  Yeah.

• 43:34Josh Clark?

  And then, three years later, less than three years later, there was another catastrophic incident with another Boeing 737 MAX.

• 43:44Speaker 02

  Yeah, and I remember when this would happen, after all the other stuff, it was just like, what is... Because, I mean, I feel like there was this weird certain amount of national pride with Boeing even at one point. Like, I remember growing up, hearing about Boeing, like this great company of engineers, like these brilliant people. And then, by the time this happened in 2024, I'm not even in, like, a planehead, and I was like, what is happening with this, like, once great company? And that's when Alaska Airlines flight depressurized rapidly at 16,000 feet because a door plug blew out, and there was a hole in the side of the plane.

• 44:20Josh Clark?

  Yeah, a door plug is essentially a panel that covers an unused emergency exit. And that panel came off, blew off, and just by total luck, or the grace of God, depending on your view of what's going on behind the universe, there was nobody seated right there.

• 44:40Speaker 02

  Yeah.

• 44:41Josh Clark?

  And the reason why this was lucky is because parts of the seats were sucked out, and there would be a good chance that a human sitting in one of those seats would have been sucked out at 16,000 feet. It's mind boggling that nobody was killed, or I think seriously injured even in that. It's just, it was, it could have been so bad, and lucky for Boeing, it wasn't.

• 45:05Speaker 02

  Yeah, initial reports indicated that they couldn't find the bolts that were to hold that plug in place, and then apparently there were signs that they'd never, maybe there were never bolts in place to begin with, and that a Boeing worker removed that door plug for some maintenance, routine maintenance, didn't put the bolts back in. At this point, the FAA is like, alright, we, this can't, you know, this is such a public thing after the disaster of the two crashes. They grounded the planes again. They said, quote, "This should never have happened, and it cannot happen again." And when they did follow up investigations, it, I mean, it seemed kind of like a clown show going on at Spirit Aero Systems, that like the factory where these things were

• 45:50Speaker 02

  being put together, one of their suppliers.

• 45:52Josh Clark?

  Yeah, this was not good, a good look. There were assemblers who were in charge of putting plane stuff together, they would jump up and down on airplane parts and like kick it into place to make the drill holes line up the way that they should. A part like that for something like an airplane in the Boeing of yesteryear would have immediately been sent back, and supplier would have been sweating that they were going to get dropped for somebody else. That's not the case, or that certainly wasn't the case with their vendor, Spirit. There were other problems that also came up with the MAX, too, that were, didn't even have anything to do with the MCAS, but were still both potentially catastrophic themselves.

• 46:34Speaker 02

  Yeah, there was an air pressure sensor that seems pretty vital to me as a non-pilot that would ensure that pilots had enough air to not lose consciousness, I guess, in the event of something bad.

• 46:45Josh Clark?

  That should be important to you as a passenger, too.

• 46:47Speaker 02

  Yeah, it is. They also found loose bolts in the rudder system. And by this point, like, it's pretty obvious that the FAA was complicit in this whole sort of shoddy operation going down with the 737 MAX. They were non-compliant with FAA regulations, and if the FAA is saying they don't know about that, then that's on them.

• 47:11Josh Clark?

  Yeah, there was no argument or justification that FAA could put forward that exonerated them even a little bit, you know?

• 47:19Speaker 02

  Yeah, and here's the thing, before that door plug blew out, just before that, the FAA had gone to Congress and said, hey, I think it's all good now. Can we go back to letting Boeing certify their own planes? And then after that door blowout, or plug blowout, they withdrew that request.

• 47:36Josh Clark?

  And this is the last CEO, Dave Calhoun. The reason he was a problem or an issue as well is because he didn't change Boeing enough for this door plug incident to not happen. So, there were two high-profile whistleblower deaths. Thirty-two people came forward to seek whistleblower federal protection, to complain against Boeing. Two of them died, and it turns out both of them died, well, one died by suicide, another one died of MRSA, so I guess natural causes or disease. But the guy who died by suicide, of course, there was a conspiracy theory that he was actually murdered.

• 48:19Speaker 02

  Right.

• 48:20Josh Clark?

  He had just given a deposition in Charleston when he was found dead of a gunshot wound in his truck in a Holiday Inn parking lot, where he was staying after giving that deposition. And apparently, there's all sorts of evidence, including CCTV or security camera footage that show that this was suicide. The point is that doesn't exonerate Boeing. In his suicide note, he actually named Boeing as a huge reason for this, because they ruined his life, he said.

• 48:49Speaker 02

  Yeah, he requested to be buried face down so they could, quote, kiss his ass.

• 48:53Josh Clark?

  Yeah.

• 48:54Speaker 02

  So, uh, yeah, it's very, very sad, obviously. So they are identifying all these issues with the 737 MAX. The, um, the, the most scathing stuff obviously would come from the NTSB because they're separate from the AAA. And they basically have taken to bypassing the FAA. Like by issuing their own safety notices directly and not like going through them.

• 49:18Josh Clark?

  Yeah.

• 49:19Speaker 02

  And I think in June 2025, just last year, uh, they issued a bulletin of a possible engine problem on the 737 MAX.

• 49:28Josh Clark?

  Yeah. Yeah, I feel like airlines should, should alert you. I know they're not going to, but I feel like they should give you a choice. Like this is a 737 MAX.

• 49:38Speaker 02

  Well, you can see what plane it is, like when you book the flight.

• 49:42Josh Clark?

  Yeah, that they switch them sometimes too.

• 49:45Speaker 02

  Yeah, I'm gonna start looking though, man, after this.

• 49:47Josh Clark?

  Oh, I do, I do. I, I don't think I've ever been on board a MAX, but I feel like it's just a roll of the dice every time, you know?

• 49:55Speaker 02

  Yeah, I mean, yeah, it's, uh, something I'm paying a lot more attention to now, obviously.

• 50:00Josh Clark?

  Uh, we also can't not mention another thing that happened, um, after the Alaska airline blowout. That had nothing to do with their, um, airline division or airplane division, but still was Boeing and it was a terrible look. It was an aerospace thing. Um, when the, the Starliner test flight to the ISS did not go very well.

• 50:23Speaker 02

  Yeah, they, uh, I mean, there were a lot of failures there. Uh, we're not going to get into all of them, but it was a test flight. Uh, carrying a couple of astronauts to the ISS and they ended up stuck there. I think it was supposed to be a, a little more than a week and it turned into nine months and SpaceX had to go get them.

• 50:41Josh Clark?

  That's just not a good look, right?

• 50:43Speaker 02

  It's not.

• 50:44Josh Clark?

  I mean, luckily, Wilmore and Williams, the two astronauts, made it back to Earth safely. And the Starliner, uncrewed, remotely controlled, made it back to Earth safely. But still, it's just like your stock price goes down every time. And the reason I mention that is because every step of the way with the 737 MAX, all of it followed that like psychopathic corporate logic where the shareholders return on investment is the most important thing. It is more important than morality, safety, practicality, sensibility, anything, right? And so the whole like sad trombone like twist, I guess, is that the 737 MAX

• 51:27Josh Clark?

  cost Boeing investors $87 billion

• 51:32Speaker 02

  Right.

• 51:32Josh Clark?

  over the six years from 2018 to 2024. It didn't make them money. It cost them money in share price drops over and over and over again because one thing after another just kept going. And Airbus was eating Boeing's lunch all of these years, too.

• 51:49Speaker 02

  Yeah, it's a, I mean, there's a lesson in there. No one will heat it, of course, but there's a lesson.

• 51:56Josh Clark?

  Yes, there is, Chuck.

• 51:59Josh Clark?

  You got anything else?

• 52:00Speaker 02

  I got nothing else. I mean, they're still out there, right? The 737 MAX?

• 52:04Josh Clark?

  Yeah, they got recertified by the FAA. I think the last one was towed out of Groundage. I don't know if that's the word or not, but you know what I'm saying? And it was declared ready for delivery to China on August 29th, 2025. So there is a very good chance that you will fly on a 737 MAX at some point in your life if you fly a lot.

• 52:26Speaker 02

  Yeah.

• 52:28Josh Clark?

  Oh, and also just real quick, they also have the MAX 7 and the MAX 9 are the newest ones. And they're having trouble getting those certified because they're having an issue that they are, can't figure out how to fix yet.

• 52:40Speaker 02

  Yeah, software is a great thing. So I'm not bagging on the software industry, but like, I have a car that has a, like, a lot of newer cars are like, very software-based, as a lot of people know.

• 52:53Josh Clark?

  Yeah.

• 52:54Speaker 02

  And sometimes it'll just do something.

• 52:55Josh Clark?

  Yeah. We had ours brick once.

• 52:58Speaker 02

  Yeah, it happens. I've seen it happen in my own car. And like, that's not a plane with hundreds of passengers, you know?

• 53:04Josh Clark?

  No, no. Thankfully, we were parked and couldn't get it back on. But yeah, I can't imagine how terrifying that would be if it happened while you were driving, you know?

• 53:13Speaker 02

  Yeah.

• 53:14Josh Clark?

  We should also say, talking about software, it was widely reported that Boeing had hired, had outsourced their software coding to Indian companies to curry favor with India, so they could sell more jets there. That's true. I think they were recent college graduates who were being paid $9 an hour.

• 53:32Speaker 02

  Yeah.

• 53:33Josh Clark?

  Who were entrusted with very important software stuff, but none of them worked on the MCAS.

• 53:37Speaker 02

  Right.

• 53:38Josh Clark?

  Which was the thing that caused those two crashes, obviously.

• 53:40Speaker 02

  That's right.

• 53:42Josh Clark?

  I think that's it for the 737 MAX. I gotta dedicate this one to my dad, because he's the one who gave me my interest in engineering.

• 53:52Speaker 02

  Oh, that's nice.

• 53:52Josh Clark?

  Because he was an engineer all these years.

• 53:54Speaker 02

  Yeah, I knew that. That's great.

• 53:55Josh Clark?

  Well, since Chuck said that was great, that I just dedicated this episode to my dad. As foretold, in 2008, we just opened listener mail here in 2026.

• 54:07Speaker 02

  All right. This is from Alexa from Seattle. It's a short and sweet. Hey, guys, just wanted to add to the topic of the cherry blossom trees. And I remember when we recorded this, I was like, I know there's some places that are known for their cherry blossoms that we're not going to mention. And luckily, Alexa wrote in, "Seattle loves their cherry blossoms, guys. The quad at UW is probably the most popular spot for cherry blossom viewing, and it's always packed with people. All over the city, you'll find cherry blossoms blooming and events themed around the cherry blossoms, including food items and anime conventions."

• 54:40Josh Clark?

  Nice.

• 54:40Speaker 02

  Cherry blossoms bloom in the spring when we get random breaks from the bleak winter weather, and it's absolutely beautiful. And Alexa, I can confirm, I think my first two trips to Seattle were in spring, and I got like, the best weather, and I think I saw cherry blossoms. And I was like, what's the deal with this? Place being gloomy like this place is incredible.

• 55:01Josh Clark?

  I remember that too. I think we've done at least five, maybe six shows there over the years and this past one in January was the first time it ever rained while I was in Seattle.

• 55:10Speaker 02

  Yeah, we got big time Seattle on this last trip.

• 55:14Josh Clark?

  We did, we did. That was smart to choose a Seattle one because that's where Boeing's from. So that fits this one very nicely.

• 55:21Speaker 02

  Oh, fantastic.

• 55:22Josh Clark?

  Uh, that was from Alexa.

• 55:24Speaker 02

  That's right.

• 55:25Josh Clark?

  Alexa, send email.

• 55:28Speaker 02

  No.

• 55:28Josh Clark?

  Thanks, Alexa.

• 55:29Speaker 02

  Oh, my God.

• 55:29Josh Clark?

  If you want to be like, if you want to be like Alexa and send us an email and have us thank you like you're a robot, we will do that. Uh, all you have to do is send your email off to [email protected].

• 55:47Speaker 00

  Stuff You Should Know is a production of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts, iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.

• 56:01Josh Clark?

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• 56:32Speaker 02

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• 57:06Josh Clark?

  Introducing Voices of Vivgard. Vivgard is also known as its generic name, Fgart Tigamod Alpha F Cab, and this new show features firsthand stories from people living with a rare disease. Hosted by Andrew Stratton, these perspectives highlight that life is more than a moment, a condition, or a tough day. Living with a rare disease can be challenging, but it does not define the Voices of Vivgard. In these episodes, they share their stories, from diagnosis to working with their care team on their treatment plan. Listen to Voices of Vivgard on the iHeart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts.

• 57:40Speaker 00

  This is an iHeart Podcast. Guaranteed Human.