188: USMC TACTICS PT.2: Every Moment is of Utmost Importance and Other Lessons from War

0:00:00 - Opening 0:00:43 - MCDP 1-3: Tactics 2:59:32 - Support: How to Stay on THE PATH 3:23:03 - Closing Gratitude Support this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/jocko-podcast/exclusive-content

Speaker names marked ? are inferred from speaking time and the show’s known hosts — they are not voice-verified.

• 0:00Jocko Willink?

  This is Jocko Podcast number 188 with David Burke and me Jocko Willink. Good evening, Dave. Good evening. And on the last podcast, number 187, Dave and I dug into the first two chapters. We tried to make it to three, we only made it to two of the Marine Corps doctrinal publication, MCDP1, TAC3 Tactics. So if you haven't listened to that podcast, that's 187, then go there and start because now we are going back to the book, starting with chapter three. Here we go.

• 0:45Jocko Willink?

  Chapter three is called gaining advantage. And like the other chapters, it starts with a couple quotes. The first quote, "In war, the power to use two fists is an incredible asset. To feint with one fist and strike with the other yields an advantage. But a still greater advantage lies in being able to interchange them to convert the feint into the real blow if the opponent uncovers himself." And that's B. H. Liddell Hart. It was kind of a controversial figure a little bit, but he was British officer wounded

• 1:30Jocko Willink?

  in World War I. Wounded in World War I, you know, last podcast, we were talking about how you made it through World War I and then you, and then you involved in World War II, right? Crazy. B. H. Liddell Hart's one of those guys who was wounded in World War I, took a couple of years to recover and then went back into World War I, battled a Somme, wounded again, gassed, wounded, gassed, taken off the line and his entire battalion was wiped out. So he ended up being a writer, a military theorist, and I'm sure I'll cover some of his books on here at some point. They're really interesting books and he had a very interesting perspective, very, very, I would say contrarian perspective on warfare, especially

• 2:14Jocko Willink?

  contrarian in regards to World War I. Hey, this doesn't seem like it was a great idea.

• 2:22Jocko Willink?

  When your battalion gets wiped out to battle the Somme, I think that's might be a thing to walk away with it with. And the other quote that this starts with is, "The challenge is to identify and adopt a concept of warfighting consistent with our understanding of the nature and theory of war and the realities of the modern battlefield." What exactly does this require? It requires a concept of warfighting that will function effectively in an uncertain, chaotic and fluid environment. In fact, one that will exploit these conditions to advantage. So you hear, they've mentioned that the uncertain, chaotic, they keep saying that over and over again. I think they're trying to tell us something.

• 3:02Jocko Willink?

  But isn't it interesting to look at those uncertain, chaotic things and say to yourself, "Good. We will exploit these things that are happening."

• 3:12Speaker 01

  Yeah, that's our opportunity.

• 3:14Jocko Willink?

  Yes.

• 3:14Speaker 01

  The chaos is what is our opportunity to overwhelm our opponent. That's what we want to take advantage of.

• 3:21Jocko Willink?

  And there are those of us that when we see that, I'm actually super excited. I'm saying those of us and I'm actually talking about myself. When I see chaos, I actually get excited and love it for some reason.

• 3:38Jocko Willink?

  So here we go, getting started, gaining an advantage. "A basic principle of martial arts is to use the opponent's strength and momentum against him to gain more leverage than one's own muscles alone can generate, thereby gaining an advantage."

• 3:52Jocko Willink?

  "The same concept applies to tactics. We strive to gain advantage over our adversary by exploiting every aspect of a situation to help us achieve victory, not by overpowering him with our own strength."

• 4:05Jocko Willink?

  "This chapter will discuss several different ways of generating leverage to gain advantage over the enemy." This is one of those things that when I saw it, when I read this, and when I read this for the first time, I wasn't training jujitsu. When I read it for the second time, I was, this had a whole nother meaning. This had a whole nother meaning when I read this and actually understood it. I was talking with one of the guys I trained with, I'm trying to think of who it was. It might have been Greg trained.

• 4:34Jocko Willink?

  When you, when you learn a move, so if, if I show you a move, Dave, and you've been training jujitsu for a year and a half, you're gonna pick up 12% of it, 20% of it, maybe the first time. I show it to Dean one time and he captures 90% of it. Because he has that, like you trying to explain some maneuver.

• 4:56Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 4:56Jocko Willink?

  We could do this drill, like you could explain to me the way that you would do a maneuver in a, in a jet plane, and I would understand 10% of it. Maybe 4% of it, I don't know. Whereas you explain it to one of your old teammates from Top Gun, and they're gonna, they're gonna understand 90% of that. Oh, yeah, yeah, okay, I understand all that other stuff, and now you're just telling me this little tiny detail that I didn't know. Cool, got it.

• 5:22Jocko Willink?

  That's what it was like reading, that's what it's like reading this book for me when I read it later, when I did jujitsu. Everything, when you, when you, when you know the way broadly, you see it in all things.

• 5:34Speaker 01

  We just had that conversation the other day.

• 5:36Jocko Willink?

  Yes, we did.

• 5:37Speaker 01

  I went back to, to look at this in my mind, I'm like, I'm gonna, I wanna review this. Cause I wanna kinda have it fresh in my mind. Cause I, I've read it. I've read it, actually read it a few times. I can't remember exactly the last time I read it. But it was well before any, any of this. And when I read it, it wasn't a review, it was, it was, it was like a whole new book, the way I was reading it. Because I was just seeing things in there that I couldn't make any connections to before, that I can make the connections now. Partial because it's so simple and straightforward, but because the things they're saying, they apply everywhere. And you can see what this is saying everywhere. And

• 6:15Speaker 01

  it's true throughout from the beginning to end. You, you see these things in there, it's, it's awesome to see it that way.

• 6:21Jocko Willink?

  Back to the book, "Consider the American Indian ambush technique. A small number of warriors could, would draw superior force of pursuing cavalry into, into a canyon or similar, similar closed terrain. Their larger force of warriors lying in wait would quickly surround and ambush the soldiers who thought they had been pursuing a retreating enemy. By exploiting the cavalry's initial advantages of strength and momentum, the American Indians were able to seize the initiative and gain advantage through the use of this classic ambush method."

• 6:53Jocko Willink?

  Fire sack. Are you familiar with that doctrinal term?

• 6:57Speaker 01

  Yes.

• 6:58Jocko Willink?

  That's basically what they're describing. Hey, we're gonna surround you completely and shoot you.

• 7:01Speaker 01

  Yep.

• 7:02Jocko Willink?

  I used to set that up where I would capture the the friendly seals that were going through my training, capture them in a fire sack. It would be a bloodbath.

• 7:14Jocko Willink?

  Combined arms, the use of combined arms is a key means of gaining advantage. It is based on the idea of presenting the enemy not merely with a problem, but with a dilemma, and they've got that italicized.

• 7:27Speaker 01

  Yes.

• 7:28Jocko Willink?

  It's, it's, it is based on the idea of presenting the enemy not merely with a problem, but with a dilemma. A no-win situation. We combine supporting arms, organic fires, and maneuver in such a way that any action the enemy takes to avoid one threat makes him more vulnerable to another. This is what we do in jiu-jitsu. We got the triangle, arm lock, sweep, combination happening, no matter which way they're caught in that dilemma. Which way are they gonna get tapped out or swept or end up in a worse position? For example, an entrenched enemy should discover that if he stays hunkered down in fighting holes, marine artillery and air will blast him out. If he comes out to attack, marine infantry will cut him down.

• 8:12Jocko Willink?

  If he tries to retreat, marine armor and air power will pursue him to his destruction. That is combined arms. The combined arms dilemma.

• 8:22Jocko Willink?

  A good example of the use of combined arms at the squad level would be the squad leader positioning squad automatic weapons and grenade launchers to provide support by fire while infantrymen with rifles assault the position. The firepower from the automatic weapons keeps the enemy in their fighting holes while grenades make those holes untenable. These supporting fires keep the enemy from reacting effectively to our maneuvering infantry force. The enemy forces are placed in a no-win situation.

• 8:52Jocko Willink?

  You know what I think of when I think of, one of the best examples that I can think of when I think of combined arms effectiveness, being used effectively, was when we were in Ramadi and the enemy would utilize combined arms attacks. So, for example, US and Iraqi forces, US and Iraqi friendly forces had outposts. We had checkpoints and what the enemy would do is they would start off from a very covered position. This is a low, a low threat for them way to attack is you get into a, you get a couple of buildings away. You can either start with mortars or you start with machine gunfire.

• 9:35Jocko Willink?

  So there's a, let's say there's an Iraqi checkpoint and there's a couple of Americans there, but it's mostly Iraqi checkpoint. First thing the enemy does is start lobbing mortars in. What does everyone do when mortars start? They all take, everyone takes cover because you have to take cover. If there's mortars going off, you have to take cover. Once you take cover, now the enemy gets up with their machine guns and gets good position. When you start to reveal yourself, they're there with machine guns. Now that they've got the machine guns rocking and rolling and you've got your head down even deeper, out come the RPGs and the RPGs are coming in and slamming direct fire into your position. And while that all is happening, in comes a vehicle borne IED that rolls all the way through the gates and detonates and blows up.

• 10:16Jocko Willink?

  So that is, that is a classic use of combined arms dilemma. You, you, doesn't matter what way you go, you're going to be in trouble.

• 10:24Speaker 01

  Yeah, for sure. And having lived through that scenario repeatedly and how often they would do that, I think that distinction of a problem versus a dilemma is, is the critical thing because with a dilemma, you actually have to react. One of your choices can't just be, hey, we're going to ride this thing out and let it play itself out. And you actually have to react because if you do nothing, that initial move that they're making, that by itself, if you don't react to indirect fire and you just stand there, that could be the problem that, that ends up being effective for them. So you actually have to respond in a way that then allows them to move down the road. And when the Marine Corps talks about doing this, they don't know if it's going to be the aircraft or the indirect fire or the machine guns. They don't know which one it's going to be.

• 11:07Speaker 01

  But the key is creating a situation that the enemy has to do something and if they choose to do nothing, good, then the first move is going to kill them.

• 11:14Jocko Willink?

  Yep.

• 11:15Speaker 01

  That isn't typically what happens, but it forces them to do something, which is what you're looking, that's the advantage you're looking to exploit and being on the receiving end of that, it sucks. It's awful feeling of what that feels like of, hey, we have to do something and then you start to play it out and in your mind like, if I do this, then this, and it could be actually paralyzing if you're not careful about it, it will paralyze you and doing nothing, which is every bit as bad.

• 11:38Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, there's a couple of things. Number one, obviously, we see this in jujitsu and you get stuck where the person's coming at with you with multiple attacks. Now, to your point, if I do a, if I attempt to sweep you, but I don't actually attempt to sweep you, I just faint at sweeping you, you don't have to really defend it because I didn't really do it. So therefore, if I try and sweep you, if I want to get a reaction from you, I actually have to try and do it. And like you just said, if you don't defend it, you're getting swept.

• 12:09Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 12:10Jocko Willink?

  So you have to actually do it. It can't just be, not that you can't faint, not that we don't, you know, do little feints and, and false moves to, to set people up because you do that all the time, you do it in combat. But if you really want to get a reaction from somebody, you've got to commit to that movement, it's got to be real. And it's the same thing when you're dealing with human beings.

• 12:30Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 12:30Jocko Willink?

  You know, when I say, if, if I deliver an ultimatum to you because the project wasn't done and I go, Dave, if you don't finish this project on time, you're fired.

• 12:42Jocko Willink?

  If I say that, I have to actually do it.

• 12:44Speaker 01

  Right.

• 12:45Jocko Willink?

  Otherwise, I lose, I lose all this respect. I can't just make these idle threats, they need to be real.

• 12:51Speaker 01

  And on the receiving end, I mean, that for me, and I talked about, I think, the last podcast about that, reckoning, hey, I'm so junior, I'm so novice at this. And I remember talking to you about it early on, I would come like, man, why am I so tired? Why do I get so? And one of the things I was doing is sort of overreacting to every single thing and exerting myself 100% all the time. And I remember one of the, the thinking about, okay, I'm not going to overreact to these things that were happening. And I remember one of the first times I'm consciously thinking about that on the mat and somebody was setting up an arm bar and I was aware, like, he's setting up an arm bar and I'm thinking, this is going to be awesome because I'm not going to overreact to this arm bar, I'm going to, and guess what happened? I got submitted in the arm bar. Yeah, and I was like.

• 13:36Speaker 01

  And it's like, it's like you said, it's, it has to be, the feint has to be real. And that was me in a complete novice move of, oh, I'm totally outmaneuvering this guy. He's going for that feint arm bar because what he really wants me to do is over commit to that so he can set up a choke. And I ignored the arm bar and he tapped me about five seconds in an arm bar. Because I did no reaction to it and it's, and that's really, that's what the dilemma is and on the, on the receiving end is recognizing that feint could be the death blow if you actually don't respond to it correctly. If he's not doing it just as a feint, he's actually doing it to reveal your weakness, which is the key to that. And the Marine Corps operates expecting they don't have some massive numeric advantage. Marine Corps doesn't go to war thinking they've got five to one manpower advantage.

• 14:18Speaker 01

  They go to war with a numerical disadvantage to create these points of friction so that limited resources create a problem that the enemy has to respond to. And if they don't respond, they kill them anyway.

• 14:28Jocko Willink?

  Yeah. And that's, that's the important thing. So the other part that you mentioned was you're, you're, you're in this dilemma. What, what are you gonna do? And you said, you've got to do something. And that is true. Because the best case scenario, if I'm, if I'm attempting to catch you in the combined arms dilemma or in an arm lock, the best case scenario for me is you don't react and then you just get, you just get crushed by whatever that first initial salvo is. The, what, what I would, the, the worst thing for me is when you attack me. I mean, to be straight up. I mean, I'm, I'm not saying this works every time.

• 15:04Speaker 01

  Right.

• 15:04Jocko Willink?

  But if I'm getting attacked, one of the most unexpected things that you can do back to me is you attack me. So, oh, you start shooting, shooting machine guns at me? Oh, guess what? You didn't know. I had claymores out in this surrounding area and as soon as I, that machine gun fires, I'm clacking off claymores. And in one second, like the SOG guys, they would have their claymore set up. And if they get attacked, the first thing they're doing is igniting claymore. So that, that immediately there, they get fire superiority from the claymore going off. So what can we do? And more important, how can we set ourselves up preemptively so that when these things unfold, we have an immediate action drill that puts us from the defensive to the offensive very, very quickly?

• 15:49Speaker 01

  Right.

• 15:50Jocko Willink?

  When we learned. Immediate action drills in the SEAL teams, we were learning from the Vietnam guys. When they got contacted in the jungle, the very first thing they did was hit the ground and everyone unloads a magazine into their field of fire. Period. End of story. That's what's gonna happen. You could, the SOG guys, it was the same thing. Oh, we get contacted and there was a great story that Tilt told was everyone dumps their mag and then there's silence because everyone dumped their mag on both sides. The, the, the NVA and the, the SOG guys, they all dumped their mags and then there's silence and then it's who can get reloaded the quickest. But what they did in that moment is take away the advantage of the enemy.

• 16:32Jocko Willink?

  Cause the enemy is attacking them and their immediate reaction is, oh, you're gonna shoot at us? You're gonna try and get us in some kind of a combined arm dilemma? Okay, cool, watch this. Cause they're waiting for the B-40 rockets. They're, that's what their goal is and they're gonna try and maneuver. But guess what? We're gonna immediately fire back at you. We're gonna fire back at you hard and then we're gonna, we're gonna see who wins that next little race to who can make the next move.

• 16:53Speaker 01

  Yeah. And even the idea of being, of anticipating and being prepared for that, expecting that to happen, which actually in Ramadi, we were. I wasn't, we weren't shocked that the enemy was attacking us. We actually did some preparation and some thought went into that. And some of the things on the combined, combined arm side, and I know this as an aviator, look, the enemy doesn't have an unlimited number of directions to attack us from all the time. There are actually places where they can attack, areas we control, areas we have dominance over. And so if you think about, they actually had a limited number of things they could do. And if we prepared enough, we could actually have pre-planned responses into the most likely areas that immediately we could respond with as we're ducking, getting our heads down as opposed to no preparation, no expectation that's happening. And actually then we can't respond well.

• 17:38Speaker 01

  But the idea of being attacked in combat, it's absolutely an eventuality we, we, we should prepare for. And there's things you can do to respond, just like you said, and we, we would do that. I mean, that's why we didn't get overwhelmed when they attacked us, cause we had a plan for how to respond to that.

• 17:52Jocko Willink?

  Yes.

• 17:56Jocko Willink?

  Back to the book. Modern tactics is combined armed tactics. That is, it combines the effects of various arms. Infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation to achieve the greatest possible effect against the enemy. Artillery and infantry, for example, are normally employed together because of their mutually reinforcing capabilities. The infantry provides close support to the artillery, protecting them from dismounted threats, while the artillery provides the infantry with timely, close, accurate, and continuous fire support. The strength of the arms complement and reinforce each other. At the same time, the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of each arm are protected or offset by the capabilities of the other.

• 18:41Jocko Willink?

  While the division commander in 1941, General Patton, had the following comments regarding combined arms. "There is a tendency in each separate unit to be a one-handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire. That is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music. To get harmony in music, each instrument must support the others. To get harmony in battle, each weapon must support the other.

• 19:24Jocko Willink?

  Team play wins." Cover and move.

• 19:30Speaker 01

  Yes, it's so huge. It's so important to think about that. And, look, that's one of the beautiful things about the ethos of the Marine Corps and why TBS is so important is, when we say every Marine's a rifleman, that's not just words. That's a real... Now, does that mean every Marine is as competent as an infantryman in the Marine Corps? No, it doesn't. If you're an infantryman, you're going to be more competent in those things. But at the basic school... For a Marine officer, I had exposure to virtually every single arms profession in the Marine Corps. And in business, we see this when we talk about, hey, if I'm on the sales team, do I need to be an expert in marketing? No. Do I need to have 100% understanding of what's going on with IT? No.

• 20:15Speaker 01

  But actually, what you need is a good understanding of that and a relationship strong enough to leverage what they're doing, not just because it's help, but because actually that can be the difference maker in you being successful. And the ones where we see them wall themselves off in their silo and don't have any basic understanding, they can't leverage that capability when they needed the most. And in the Marine Corps, I was not an expert in artillery. I was not an expert, but I understood it enough to be able to communicate with them and understand what they, A, could contribute and B, more importantly, how I could help them, which in turn let them do the exact same thing for me. And in business too, they wall themselves off, this is what I do, you do that, and they're on the opposite side of a fence inside the same company.

• 20:57Speaker 01

  It doesn't mean you have to be 100% of everything they do, but you have to understand it and how it contributes to what you're doing.

• 21:03Jocko Willink?

  Cover and move. You got to cover and move.

• 21:09Speaker 01

  Do it.

• 21:10Jocko Willink?

  First law of combat, cover and move. Why is it the first law of combat? Because that's what teamwork is, because you have to work together. If you're not working together, if you don't have a team that's working together, you don't, none of the other, they don't matter.

• 21:23Speaker 01

  I could give you this great, simple plan, and if you and I don't have a good relationship and it doesn't matter. It doesn't matter.

• 21:29Jocko Willink?

  What about prioritize next? Oh, but we're not working together as a team? Doesn't matter. Maneuver. Maneuver provides us a means to gain advantage over the enemy. In too many battles, one or both sides have sought to gain advantage in combat through firepower and attrition. In World War I, one side would rush across no man's land under murderous fire in an attempt to push an opponent off desired terrain. If the attack succeeded, and few did, the evicted forces counter-attacked in the same manner, usually reoccupying the same terrain they had before. These battles were firepower and attrition contests, and the advantage lay with the side that had the most personnel and equipment to expend.

• 22:13Jocko Willink?

  To the tune of 60,000 casualties in one day. The cost in casualties and equipment was high and often produced no decisive results. We want to avoid this type of engagement.

• 22:27Jocko Willink?

  We want to avoid this type of engagement. This type of engagement, okay, from a combat situation, obviously, we understand what that is. We don't want it. From an individual dealing with another individual, from a leadership perspective, if what I get out of my confrontation with you is that I've expended a bunch of leadership capital, I've damaged our relationship, I've made you feel insecure or like untrusted, but I got my way in the end. I gained like a, I gained a little bit of authority over you.

• 23:04Speaker 01

  You got your 10 yards of authority.

• 23:05Jocko Willink?

  Got my 10 yards of authority. It's a, it's a type of engagement that I see people do. And they don't understand how negative it is. All they're doing, they win. And this is the sad thing, like when you charge that German line and you take 4,000 casualties and you move 50 yards forward and you raise your hands and you say, I won. And you're actually standing up and saying, I won. You're standing on the backs of 4,000 dead men. And you, you're holding up your arms, saying, I won. So when you get in an argument with one of your subordinates or with one of your bosses

• 23:47Jocko Willink?

  or with one of your peers and you, you inflict damage and you expend ammunition and you expend leadership capital and then you stand up and you, you come through with a victory and you stand up and you raise your arms and you say, I won. Look underneath your feet and see what you're standing on. Cause you're standing upon your reputation, you're standing on your dead, your dying reputation. You're standing on your, your expended leadership capital. You're standing on top of a, of a wounded relationship.

• 24:17Jocko Willink?

  So don't do that.

• 24:21Jocko Willink?

  Back to the book. Traditionally maneuver is meant moving in a way that gains positional advantage. For example, we may maneuver by enveloping, by enveloping an exposed enemy flank, or by denying enemy terrain critical to his goals. We may maneuver by threatening the enemy's lines of communication and forcing them to withdraw. We may maneuver by seizing a position which allows us to bring effective fire to bear against the enemy, but which protests, protects us against enemy fires. We may maneuver in other dimensions as well. For instance, we may also maneuver in time by increasing relative speed and operating at a faster tempo than the enemy. Normally, we maneuver both in time and space to gain advantage and ultimately victory at the least possible cost. There are so many other ways

• 25:06Jocko Willink?

  to move forward towards your strategic goal. And people are just absolutely blind to these ways. And the only way that they feel, it's like they can't recognize anything other than I'm going to attack you. If I, if I'm not attacking you, then, then how can I win? They don't understand that there's so many other different ways to win. And again, I'm talking about a leadership, leadership up or down the chain of command, peer relationship, whatever. The only way I feel like I can beat Dave is by imposing my will upon him and that's how I'm gonna win. When the reality is, that's actually the worst way to win.

• 25:53Speaker 01

  If there is a tactic that is disconnected from the strategy, it's, it's virtually guaranteed to lose. And, and that's why there's a difference between being tactical and what the tactic is. The tactic might be, you come in from the north and I bring my forces up the middle and I use, that might be the tactic to do that. But if there's not a connection to what the strategic outcome is, it's guaranteed to not have the impact that you want. And what we see is all too often is There's no understanding of why we're doing the thing that we're doing, other than for the reason to do it. I was with a company a couple of weeks ago and I was, we were looking at personnel, the number of people that hadn't been, I'd gotten some feedback in a survey that a couple of folks at the company weren't real happy.

• 26:36Speaker 01

  They didn't really feel that they were well-used and that their contribution was marginal and they didn't feel like they were a big part of the team. And one of those feedbacks was to figure out what that is. And I'd asked the, it was a COO and I asked him, "Hey, there's a guy in this department and this is some of the feedback." And his answer was, "Well, he was actually a defensive hire. We hired this guy in because I was afraid of our competi-" he's a competent guy, but I was afraid my competition would get him first, so we brought him in." I'm like, "Okay, there's a reason to do that. And so what are you doing with him?" "Like, not much. We really just didn't want our competition to get him." I'm thinking, this person has met the threshold by which if he goes to your competition, he could be damaging, that's how competent and capable this person is.

• 27:19Speaker 01

  So you've made the mindset, like, "I need to bring this guy to my team because he's too good if the other person gets him." And then your answer was to do nothing with him. And just that idea of, and he was so stoked that they had gotten this guy before their competitor had gotten him. And so, you know what?

• 27:37Jocko Willink?

  Tactical big win.

• 27:38Speaker 01

  They won, they won. "I got this guy. I got Jaco onto my team before my competition does. What are you doing with him now?" Nothing. That was the move. That was the plan. And just kind of that missing of just, you've done nothing for the big picture and actually this person is going to be more motivated over time when he leaves your company to bulldoze you because of what you did to him in doing that. And you see that and you're like, "Man, this is-" and it's not a hard problem to solve. When you see it from the outside, but from the inside, it was, "We won. We got the win. We pulled this guy over."

• 28:09Jocko Willink?

  The reason, I took a note while you were talking, and it's a little, it's a disconnected subject, but I'm going to bring it up anyways, just to make sure it doesn't slip away. One of the things of dealing with another company-

• 28:25Jocko Willink?

  We pay people money, right? And people talk about, well, how do you, how do you, how do you make someone happy? Right? And what levers can you pull? Right? You can pay them more, you can give them less work, you can give them more rewarding, you can give them ownership of things, right? Like that's, so there's, there's like the money and then there's everything else, right? Everything else, give people ownership of things, but, and I wrote down the word fate. Because one of the best possible ways you can compensate a human being is by giving them more control over their own fate. And so often, this is not used as a lever. And it's a powerful lever. It's not like, it's not like, okay, you know what?

• 29:06Jocko Willink?

  I'm going to manipulate Dave into wanting to do good work by giving, by, by giving him this false sense that I'm going to give him some control over his own fate. That's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about actually giving the person control over their own fate. And all of a sudden, Dave looks up and goes, well, you know, I don't have to do this today, or I can. And if I do, I'll be rewarded and things will go better for me and I control my destiny and I control my future. Just a good way to, again, I guess the reason I thought of this is it's a maneuver that you can use as a leader. It's instead of me barking and crippling my relationship and wounding my subordinate, why not lift them up, improve the relationship and get them to do what I want them to do?

• 29:51Jocko Willink?

  By giving them more control over their own fate.

• 29:57Speaker 01

  What is really helpful as a leader to be able to understand to do those things is not, not just the strategically, is to what we talked about in the last podcast, which is actually care about them. Actually believe and care about them is, is one of the things that guides you to recognize that that would be so critical for them. And the return on that would be that the loyalty and all the things that that person, that you really, what you really want is for them to do it anyway. And that, that it's not a trick, it's, it's actually believing in that person's livelihood and happiness, the things that make that person's life better is to believe it, that's what, how you allow them to have that thing, which is, you know, I know you want more control over your fate, we all do. And I'm not doing it as, as a, as a play, I'm doing it because I care about you that much.

• 30:42Speaker 01

  And the irony is the return of that is I get what I want. I get this incredibly loyal person that's, that will do anything for me.

• 30:48Jocko Willink?

  It's one of the hardest things to explain about all this stuff is that.

• 30:54Jocko Willink?

  It works when you make a maneuver like that. When I say, Dave, you know, you take more control of your own fate. It works and the person will do, do step up and do better. But the, and it will be much, much, much better for Dave. But what you, well, the, the complete bonus is, is that it'll be much, much, much better for me. And I'm going to win because Dave is happy. And when Dave's happy, Dave does better work. And when Dave does better work, we do better as a team and we do better as a team. I win. Meanwhile, the contr- converse of that is me thinking, nope. This is me, I'm going to take care of me and Dave, Dave therefore needs to do what I say. And now guess what? Dave doesn't do as good a work.

• 31:37Jocko Willink?

  He doesn't put out as much effort and Dave and the team doesn't do as well. And now I look bad. Next section, exploiting the environment. The use of the efficient, the, the use of the environment offers tremendous opportunities to gain advantage over the enemy. We must understand the characteristics of any environment where we may have to operate. Jungle, desert, mountain, Arctic, riverine, urban. More importantly, we must understand how the effects of terrain, weather and periods of darkness or reduced visibility impact our own and our adversary's ability to fight. So this is another one of those statements like we heard on the last podcast where you wouldn't think that somebody needs to tell you, you must understand the characteristics

• 32:21Jocko Willink?

  of the environment where you're going to operate. Seems like that's super real, obvious. Yeah. And yet there it is in plain English, broken down for all of us idiots. Because so often we overlook the fact that we're in a different environment or a new environment or environments that's shifting or an environment that we never even took a good look at in the first place.

• 32:45Jocko Willink?

  Next, terrain. Our objective is to employ tactics that make terrain an advantage to us and a disadvantage to our opponent. Terrain impacts on our maneuver and influences our tactical dispositions. We must understand terrain and comprehend its effects as it may limit our movement, reduce our visibility, or restrict our fires. We must understand what effects it has on the enemy and on his abilities to detect or engage us. We must be aware that the enemy also seeks advantage from terrain. We must understand that terrain shapes the enemy's maneuver and dispositions as well as our own.

• 33:26Jocko Willink?

  This is for, you know how I'm always saying, hey, for the business world? This is not for the business world, I'm about to say. When you're a young leader and you're going to be on the ground fighting Army, Special Operations, Marine Corps, whatever unit you're with,

• 33:45Jocko Willink?

  the terrain is like the thing that brings you from sort of,

• 33:54Jocko Willink?

  it brings you to the next level. Understanding terrain brings you to the next level. If you don't understand terrain and how to use it and how the enemy's going to use it, you are a baby. This is like, this brings you into your teenage years. But without, and I, believe me, I met, I've met commanders or leaders at every level that were babies when it came to terrain. They didn't understand these incredible. You know, I'm saying it's like teenage, but at the same time, it's also like masters. If you are good at terrain, if you're good at understanding terrain, it's night and day.

• 34:32Speaker 01

  Yeah, and it's, it actually helps solve so many other problems. If you're deficient in resources and all, in combat or anywhere, if you don't have all the things that you think you need, enough guns, enough people, whatever. If you occupy the most critical terrain.

• 34:48Speaker 01

  It actually is a huge hedge against not having all the things you wish you had. More guns and bombs and, okay, we don't have those. But you can have all the resources in the world and if you're not in the right place to utilize them, it isn't gonna work. That's true in combat, that's true, that's true anywhere. And it isn't just, oh, the high ground, the biggest hill is the, not always. It's actually being able to just see what the terrain looks like and recognizing that is the best place to be, to recognize where the commenting event is gonna occur to bring my forces to bear. It's here and I see that and I've gotta get control of that, that terrain.

• 35:21Jocko Willink?

  And now when it comes, now when we do translate it back to the business side, there's a couple big key points here. Okay, and it's like what they say about counterinsurgency, right? The decisive terrain in a counterinsurgency is not an airfield and it's not a mountain and it's not a beachhead, it's the people. Well, guess what the decisive terrain is in an organization, in a business? It's the people, all day long. That's the decisive terrain. So what you have to do is you have to get those people on board with the program. So in a counterinsurgency, what you have to do is you have to get the local populace to support what you're doing. What do you have to do in a business? You have to get the local populace, the people that work for you, on board with what you're doing. That's the decisive terrain. So you've gotta know what that terrain consists of.

• 36:04Jocko Willink?

  And it is equally important as the terrain, the high ground that you might see on the battlefield. The other part of this is the moral terrain. Where are you at morally? And I had this conversation with a CEO that was complaining to me that there was bad, and actually this was two CEOs in a row. They were both complaining about competitors that were very good at lying about them and their products. So there's, there's, you know, this other company which is slightly bigger than ours and every time we do something, they're, they're putting out bad propaganda, they're lying about us and it, but it gets traction. And then I saw the same, another company, same thing. And, and you know, it gets brutal.

• 36:48Jocko Willink?

  It gets brutal. And you know, you can watch the news and you can watch politicians on, on the news. And you, you listen to what the two sides of, of, of the two different parties are saying. And they're completely like, there's no possible way that, that they, that there's, that they're even close to any middle ground, right? They're saying completely opposite things. And so that's what these companies deal with. Companies do the same things. They will straight up lie about what another company is doing. And what's the defense against that? Well, the defense is that you have the truth. And if you have the truth and you don't weaponize it, you need to weaponize it. Just right. I ended up telling both these CEOs, you need to weaponize

• 37:31Jocko Willink?

  the truth. You need to get the truth out there. You need to go on the offense with the truth. You have the high ground, but you're sitting there, wait, letting someone drop, drop lie bombs on you. That you're going to sit there and you're going to be in a combined armed dilemma because you're going to come out looking, looking bad because you're now backpedaling, trying to explain things that shouldn't need to be explained in the first place.

• 37:52Speaker 01

  And if you actually occupy that moral, if you actually do occupy the high ground there and, and you actually do have the truth, you can be transparent and honest about it. You don't have anything to hide because those things have been, those aren't, those are lies. And if you actually have that, then you actually have the weapon and you occupy that high ground because you're doing it the right way. You're not lying. You're not, you're not doing those things. And, and if you're actually covering some of those things up, if you actually are hiding some of that and you've advocated that moral piece of this, then you're going to lose again. This different, you're, you're going to lose. So you, you not only have to have.

• 38:26Jocko Willink?

  Oh, oh, wait a second. You might not lose, you might not lose immediately.

• 38:31Speaker 01

  Right.

• 38:31Jocko Willink?

  You might win the big, you might win the tactical battle.

• 38:33Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 38:33Jocko Willink?

  You might win that with some lies and some cover up for sure. You can win that way. That long-term.

• 38:38Speaker 01

  Long game.

• 38:39Jocko Willink?

  That strategy, you're, you're going to lose strategically.

• 38:41Speaker 01

  For sure.

• 38:43Jocko Willink?

  Gives a little example here. Lieutenant Harold Kaiser of First Battalion, Seventh Marine Regiment, knew how to use terrain to gain an advantage in November, 1950. His company was ordered to seize a key piece of terrain at Talk Tong Pass during the march out of the chosen reservoir area. Lieutenant Kaiser had only 20 Marines left in his platoon. And the pass was heavily defended by the Chinese. Using a flanking ridge line to conceal his approach, Lieutenant Kaiser skillfully enveloped the enemy from the rear and quickly routed the Chinese out of their well entrenched position. Today, as in Korea, the intelligent use of terrain has become a standard practice for Marines.

• 39:28Jocko Willink?

  Weather, adverse weather, heat, cold, rain impedes combat operations. Actually, I'll say this. You know what we used to say when it was raining? We'd say good operating weather because it is. Because guess what? When it's cold and it's raining, guess what your sentries are doing? The sentries that you're trying to sneak by, they're inside their little guard hut. They got their hood pulled over their head. So impedes combat operation. Sometimes you can use it to, you can often use it to your advantage. The military unit that is best prepared to operate in these conditions will gain advantage over its opponent. During the breakout from Trozen Reservoir in November 1950, Marines demonstrated time and time again, the ability to use harsh weather to their advantage

• 40:12Jocko Willink?

  over a determined enemy. The assault of Able Company, First Battalion, First Marine Regiment on Hill 1081 in a blinding snowstorm is such an example. Despite visibility of only 25 yards, the company was able to coordinate a combined arms attack and envelop this key piece of terrain that blocked the breakout of the First Marine Regiment. Using a snowstorm to mask its movement, Able Company surprised and annihilated the Chinese defenders, thereby opening a route for the rest of the division. If we are to use weather to our advantage, we must train and prepare rigorously to operate in all climatic conditions. We must be able to operate our equipment and employ our weapons effectively

• 40:57Jocko Willink?

  in hot, cold, and wet environments, literally in every climate and place. You know what I like about weather when it comes to comparing these leadership principles is that it's just unpredictable, unpredictable, and you can't control it. And it's this random thing that, you know, which, which, which hits every, you know, every company, every business, every leadership situation. There's things that you can't control. So what do you do? You figure out how to mitigate. You plan, you, you have contingencies for these situations. And as you can see here, you train to be prepared for them.

• 41:34Speaker 01

  This idea of control, you talked about, I've heard you talk about weather in the past. I use it as an example a lot because in aviation, weather makes a massive impact in what you do in an airplane. The reality is, is that when it comes to something like weather, this idea of a snowstorm, we're in 100% of control of how we react to it. We're 100% in control of what we choose to do based on this blinding snowstorm. And the reality is, you know what most people do in a blinding snowstorm? They button up. That's what, that's what most people do. And so, and I think it was really the point you were making at the very beginning is, you know, the, the best, I, I am praying for a snowstorm.

• 42:15Speaker 01

  I want, I want the worst possible environment because I know more than likely that other guy, that other company, they're going to wither in that and we're going to go on the attack. And, and this idea of, of most, it's, I'm a human being. I know what it feels like to be cold. I don't like being cold. It sucks. But to take that, to use that to your advantage and actually welcome this inclement weather, this giant blinding snowstorm, that's what good leaders do is they get people around them to, to, to do those things, you know? The guy who puts on an orange, guy who puts on an orange vest in a snowstorm.

• 42:51Jocko Willink?

  Kurt Lee.

• 42:52Speaker 01

  That's right. That's, that's an amazing situation to think about, given the environment where most people like, I'm just going to hole up here. I can't deal with this. It's too cold. It's too biting. It's too hard. And that's the vehicle used to actually, I want the weather to be bad. To be able to recognize that you are 100% in control of how you react to that is, is a huge differentiator that most people just completely overlook. I can't deal with the weather. It's not my, I can't do anything about this. Actually you can.

• 43:19Jocko Willink?

  Oh, yes, you can. Periods of darkness or reduced visibility. Units that can operate effectively during hours of darkness or periods of reduced visibility often gain significant advantage over their opponent. Reduced visibility can make the simplest of tasks difficult to accomplish. This obvious disadvantage can be turned on its head and used to our advantage by a commander whose forces are trained, equipped, able and willing to operate at night. Night operations can produce great gains against a force that cannot or will not operate at night. Operating during periods of reduced visibility creates tempo by adding another 10 to 12 hours to the day for fighting. The psychological impact of night fighting is also great and can produce significant rewards.

• 44:04Jocko Willink?

  So what does that translate to? That translates to look at what is hard for your competitor and what's hard for you and your competitor and then get good at it. Just get good at it. Suck it up and get good at it.

• 44:18Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 44:20Jocko Willink?

  A good example of tactical impact of night attacks was found in the battle for Okinawa during World War II. Marine forces were essentially stalemated by the presence of a strong Japanese defensive line in the coral ridges of southern Okinawa. After days of ineffective attacks by the 7th Marine Regiment, the regimental commander elected to attack under cover of darkness. At 0330 on 12 June 1945, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 7th Marines advanced using a road that intersected the ridge as a guide. Colonel Edward W. Snedeker, commanding officer of the 7th Marines at the time noted, "Two companies, one from each of the 1st and 2nd battalions, got across the valley during the night into position on the ridge.

• 45:03Jocko Willink?

  During the early morning when the Japanese came out to cook breakfast, they found themselves a little bit of a surprise." The Japanese defenders were not used to US forces attacking at night. The use of darkness allowed the Marines to occupy positions along the crest of Kunishi Ridge, literally without firing a shot.

• 45:25Jocko Willink?

  From these positions, the Marines dislodged the enemy from their entrenched positions and moved onward until the Japanese defenders were annihilated.

• 45:36Jocko Willink?

  So you train to get good at something that the competitor's not good at, and then you execute on it. Or you just sack up and execute on something that you, you know, they're not going to expect this one. So let's bring it.

• 45:51Speaker 01

  Yeah, and, and the, the, the feeling of the, the discomfort and the pain and all the negative things that you might associate with operating in those type of environments, which is the reason people aren't doing it.

• 46:08Speaker 01

  The feeling of winning, the satisfaction that comes from all that work and all that pain going into that when you are annihilating the enemy and they're not even aware of it, vastly outweighs whatever discomfort you might be feeling when they, hey, we're gonna suck it up and operate in bad weather, or we're gonna do things our competition doesn't want to do because it sort of sucks. It does suck. It's extra time, it's extra whatever it is. Winning makes all that go away. All those, all that, it just goes away. And you're, that feeling of being victorious in that environment makes all that worth it. And just the willingness to just do, like you said, we're just gonna do the work that they're not willing to do, and that's gonna be the difference.

• 46:49Jocko Willink?

  Check.

• 46:52Jocko Willink?

  Complementary forces, complementary forces, the idea of fix and flank are an important way of gaining an advantage. The idea behind complementary forces is to use our forces as a nutcracker. We seek to crush the enemy between two or more actions. Consider the case of an enemy rifleman firing from behind a tree. If one marine fires from the front, the enemy rifleman is protected by the tree. If the marine maneuvers and attempts to fire from behind, the enemy rifleman merely moves to the other side of the tree to maintain his protection. However, two marines can place our opponent in a dilemma. One can fire from the front while the other sneaks around and fires from the enemy, fires at the enemy from the flank or rear. The opponent is now vulnerable to one or the other of the two marines.

• 47:36Jocko Willink?

  He cannot use the tree for protection against both. Flank, flank, flank, flank. Cover and move. Cover and flank. The idea, the same idea applies to air-to-air tactics. Did you just get like a little chill up your spine? The same idea applies to air-to-air tactics. Upon detecting enemy aircraft, a flight of fighter, a flight of fighters splits into two or more elements beyond air-to-air missile range. They approach the enemy aircraft from multiple directions and varying altitudes. No matter how the enemy aircraft moves, dives, climbs, turns, or twists, it is exposed.

• 48:15Jocko Willink?

  How often I always, whenever I think of you and Top Gun, I always think of you one on one against one other person. That's not the way the game is played? Occasionally is it played that way?

• 48:27Speaker 01

  It is. It's a small part of it. It's definitely a part of it and those skills are important, but the preponderance of the time is multiple forces, large forces against large forces.

• 48:37Jocko Willink?

  Okay, large being how many aircraft on one side?

• 48:40Speaker 01

  The smallest would be four, the biggest would be maybe 25?

• 48:43Jocko Willink?

  Jeez, would you guys do drills with 25?

• 48:46Speaker 01

  The culminating events up at Fallon, you know, the final exercises at both Top Gun and the air wing training, which is carrier training for war would be 20, 25 airplanes.

• 48:54Jocko Willink?

  Would you guys be sitting up there? So you guys, every time that carrier, carrier air wing came through to do a deployment, they'd come through and flag against you guys?

• 49:02Speaker 01

  Every time. They'd come up through Fallon for three weeks.

• 49:05Jocko Willink?

  And how, what cycle were they on? Were you getting one a quarter? One air wing a quarter?

• 49:10Speaker 01

  Yeah, that's about right. Yeah, every three to four months, sometimes a little more, a little less, but about every three months an air wing, every two to three months an air wing would come through, the entire air wing.

• 49:18Jocko Willink?

  Did you guys psychologically let them start to do better at the end or would you just destroy them the whole time?

• 49:25Speaker 01

  They would get better. They absolutely would. And not, not the game of them, they would get better. Now, we would also, we would try to represent traditional enemy tactics. And so they were working through problem sets. But it got to the point that on air wing against air wing, they would get to a point that if they executed the tactics correctly, they would be successful on the air wing side, for sure.

• 49:48Jocko Willink?

  Wait, you say air wing against air wing?

• 49:51Speaker 01

  Yeah, so-

• 49:51Jocko Willink?

  Would they go against themselves?

• 49:53Speaker 01

  No, they would go against the trainers that would be representing an enemy air force.

• 49:57Jocko Willink?

  So that's you guys? That's the Top Gun instructors?

• 50:00Speaker 01

  It's the Top Gun and the, we, I'm complaining, it's actually called air wing training. That's the name up at Fallon. So there's Top Gun and air wing training, two separate entities. We would fly together to, to, in the same airplanes, at the same, sort of the same squadron, against the actual American air wing that would come in from whatever carrier coming through. And they'd bring their jets from their squadrons, getting ready to deploy against, that was called air wing training. So we would represent an enemy air wing.

• 50:25Jocko Willink?

  Got it. And-

• 50:28Jocko Willink?

  So this is, this is like the exact same thing that I ran, right? It's, hey, I've got some seals and we have some other role players that aren't quite in trade app, but they're just whatever and they're going to come and help out. And it's, it's our, and we simulate enemy tactics. And the, and exactly as you just said, if the seals that were going through the training, if they did what they were supposed to do and they executed the tactics, they would win.

• 50:52Speaker 01

  They'd be successful.

• 50:52Jocko Willink?

  They would, they would take casualties. It would be hard, but they would win. And as a matter of fact, if they were really good, they would dominate.

• 50:59Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 51:00Jocko Willink?

  Like if you had guys at decentralized command and prioritize and executing simple plans and people covering and moving for them, they would actually, they would actually dominate.

• 51:08Speaker 01

  For sure. And, and we wouldn't just roll over to let them win because we wanted them to go home with a victory. That's not how it worked. And actually what would happen by the end of their training, they understood the fundamental principles they needed to utilize. And, and if air wing came through and at the end, they weren't doing those things, not only would they not win, they sometimes wouldn't be qualified to go out to deploy. And I was, that's a, now that's a rare event, but there are times you said, I'm like, you did not actually.

• 51:37Jocko Willink?

  Completely, you didn't. Did you guys reload them?

• 51:39Speaker 01

  Yeah, they would, they would.

• 51:40Jocko Willink?

  So we would do that too. We'd reload them. You've got to do that block of training again. Sorry.

• 51:44Speaker 01

  Yeah, they're actually getting ready to go to war.

• 51:46Jocko Willink?

  Yeah.

• 51:46Speaker 01

  This isn't just a, hey, how do you feel? This is, you actually have to demonstrate the things, but if they did, which usually they did, these are smart guys. They started applying the tactics and, and understand what they're doing correctly and implement the, the principles we taught. They would be successful. It would work. Uh, and it worked most of the time and, and you know, you know, which units, which air wings came through that didn't do that? Those that had the commanders that said, I've got this figured out. I don't need, those are the ones that would, that would struggle the most.

• 52:16Jocko Willink?

  What a shocker.

• 52:17Speaker 01

  What a surprise.

• 52:19Jocko Willink?

  So, most of the air-to-air combat that you trained in was you were at least with the wingman, right?

• 52:28Speaker 01

  Yeah, and it's interesting you said that because we would do these big culminating exercises with this whole bunch of airplanes. But actually, being able to maneuver 20 airplanes, that actually led to flexibility where I could break off, you and I could just break away from the entire air wing if required and you and I would... Being solo was a bad idea. It's almost never a good idea to be by yourself. But if you had just one other airplane, just like that story with the guy with the tree, if you had just one other machine out there with you, you could maneuver in relationship to each other to put the enemy in a position that if they are active one, they get killed by the other and vice versa.

• 53:06Jocko Willink?

  This is, I'm actually a little bit disappointed that this is the first time you're hearing from this from you because this is like full-on cover and move. As I like, as I say when I talk about cover and move and I say, "Well, once the enemy's killed my partner, what are they gonna do to me?" Like, it's bad for me. Like, if it's you and me, and once they kill you, like, that really sucks for you, but guess what? It's gonna be just as bad for me because they're coming for me.

• 53:30Speaker 01

  Yes.

• 53:31Jocko Willink?

  And so that's cover and move in the air is 100% how you have to roll.

• 53:38Speaker 01

  100%. If you were out there, you know, we called it a raging single. There's Dave, and we'd have these giant screens and you could watch and all these computer screens, a little icon, and there's Dave by himself down and you'd see it. And what you could watch from the TV screen is all the enemy forces maneuvering on Dave, and there's Dave down there running by himself, and you just set your watch because Dave's... But if you had one other guy, and it's not always just one, sometimes it's more than one, but if you had just one other guy, you actually could maneuver with that other person and create real problems for the enemy. And as soon as you were alone, as soon as you were a raging single, people were setting their stopwatches because you're just, you're just gonna die. You're not gonna survive.

• 54:17Jocko Willink?

  Are you voluntarily, is that a guy that goes, oh, you know what? I can take this guy over here? Is that what creates the raging single?

• 54:23Speaker 01

  No, typically what it is, is a guy who's lost awareness. It's pretty uncommon, especially at that stage in your career to, to think.

• 54:30Jocko Willink?

  To voluntarily say, I got this.

• 54:32Speaker 01

  I've got this. It's actually not really realizing what's happening. And what that person would do, he'd have his face buried in the radar screen. He'd get locked into this one guy he thinks he's fighting against, thinking it's one against one. And he loses sight of the big picture. He goes down the wrong path. And he doesn't recognize that he's actually getting maneuvered on. And that one guy that he's looking to target is actually baiting him into moving into this place. Wasn't always another airplane. Sometimes it was a sand bush. We called it where pull himself over a train where there's surface air missiles. There's a whole bunch of things going on there. But it was typically someone who lost situational awareness.

• 55:07Jocko Willink?

  Did you hear Jim Kunkel talking about being his P38? And he calls break, break, which means, hey, we gotta break off and go attack. And, and there was loss of comms or whatever. So he just breaks by himself.

• 55:20Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 55:20Jocko Willink?

  And sure enough, I mean, he took out some bad guys, but then he got taken out. Yeah. Because he was, you know, got maneuvered on.

• 55:25Speaker 01

  Yep, for sure.

• 55:29Jocko Willink?

  Whole new, whole new like category I can talk about now. Back to the book. Sun Tzu described this concept as cheng and qi. Cheng is the more direct, obvious action. It fixes the enemy. The qi is the unexpected or extraordinary action. It is the bid for a decision or, as we call it today, the main effort. These two actions work together against the enemy. The two actions are inseparable and can be interchangeable in battle. The cheng may become the qi. The concept is basic, but it can, but it can be implemented in a variety of combinations. Limited only by our imagination.

• 56:09Speaker 01

  Creativity, yeah, totally.

• 56:11Jocko Willink?

  You know, it's like, limited only by our doctrine, limited only by our standard operating procedures, limited only by what you were taught in school. No, limited by your actual imagination.

• 56:23Jocko Willink?

  Surprise. Achieving surprise can greatly increase leverage. In fact, surprise can often prove decisive. We try to achieve surprise through deception, stealth, and ambiguity. I like that one. Never really thought too much about that. The fact that ambiguity can create surprise. You're not really sure what I'm gonna do. Kind of ambiguous. War is based on deception, stated Sun Tzu. We use deception to mislead our opponents with regard to our real intentions and capabilities. By employing deception, we try to cause our opponents to act in ways that will eventually prove prejudicial for them. We may use... You know what's awesome about these books, and this is very interesting. This is like the ultimate, um, the ultimate

• 57:08Jocko Willink?

  in lack of ego. So, you know who wrote this book? The United States Marine Corps. Some, a Marine, yeah. But you know what? There was probably four, seven, I don't know, there was something like that. There was a guy, and there was one of those guys that was really on it. There was one of those guys that he was the old dog, and he was like, hey, listen, let me, you know, you can write the chapter, but let me tell you what you need to hit. There was a guy that was like that. For sure. And, you know, we'll never know who he is. Because the Marine Corps, he was a Marine, we know that. And that's all we need to know.

• 57:43Jocko Willink?

  So, he wrote that line right there. This eminently qualified Marine wrote, eventually, that by employing deception, we try to cause our opponents to act in ways that will eventually prove prejudicial for them.

• 57:58Jocko Willink?

  We may use deception to mislead the enemy as to the time and location of our pending attack. We may use deception to create the impression that our forces are larger than they really are. We may, we hope the enemy will realize this deception only when it's too late for them to react. Marines have often relied on deception to mislead an enemy in regard to the location of amphibious landings. Marine used this deception to create the illusion of force where there was none in Operation Desert Storm. Lieutenant General Boomer stated that, stated the situation which necessitated an extensive deception operation. We're taking on 11 Iraqi divisions with two Marine divisions. Our force to ratio, our force to ratios are,

• 58:41Jocko Willink?

  our force ratios are horrible. We don't want him to know that. The Marines created Task Force Troy. 460 Marines imitated the activities of a 16,000 man division using loudspeakers, dummy tanks, and artillery and helicopters conducting simulated resupply. Surprise can be generated through stealth. Stealth is used to advantage when maneuvering against the enemy. It provides less chance of detection by the enemy, leaving him vulnerable to surprise action for which he may be unprepared. Marines may also employ stealth by lying in wait for an approaching enemy in ambush. The ambush is perhaps the most effective means of surprising opponents, especially

• 59:21Jocko Willink?

  at the lower tactical level where surprise through stealth is easiest to achieve. We also, we can also achieve surprise through ambiguity. It is usually difficult to conceal all our movements from the enemy, but we can sometimes confuse him as to the meaning of what he sees. Sun Tzu said, "The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle, for if he does not know where I intend to give battle, he must prepare in a great many places. When he prepares in a great many places, those I have to fight in any one place will be few." Ambiguity was central to the tactics of World War II German blitzkrieg.

• 1:00:06Jocko Willink?

  An attack in blitzkrieg involved multiple thrusts with reinforcements following whichever thrust were most successful. The multitude of thrusts created paralyzing uncertainty because the opponent could not determine which constituted the real attack. There was nothing secret about the German attack, but it was ambiguous on a massive scale. That's like, it starts off with the opposite of the concentration of effort, which is sort of one of the fundamental principles of war. Concentration of effort?

• 1:00:38Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:00:38Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, we're going to mass our efforts, we're going to concentrate our efforts, we're going to focus our efforts. Well, what we're doing with blitzkrieg is we're actually going to spread that out initially, and then once we see a gap.

• 1:00:47Speaker 01

  Yeah, to see where the gap is, and then you're, yeah, absolutely.

• 1:00:49Jocko Willink?

  Then we're coming in hot.

• 1:00:52Speaker 01

  And this idea, you were talking about stealth, you're talking about ambiguity. I got to live this in an airplane where I went from a regular airplane, like an F-18 and an F-16, I flew those for years. And then I got to fly a stealth airplane, I started flying the F-22, and it has all these attributes that the other airplanes didn't have. But you know what we never did in the F-22, no matter how powerful and invisible, all those things, we still didn't do the frontal assault. We still created maneuvers that created even more ambiguity and leveraged this thing. People think, if you get the advantage, that means you go straight at them and run them over. That's actually not what it means. It just allows you to create even more confusion, more ambiguity, and what that means is, the place and the opportunity to recognize where the weakness is, there's more of that.

• 1:01:37Speaker 01

  It gives you more opportunity to see where those gaps appear, but then you still look for those gaps, and you take even more advantage of what you're doing. And that's how an incredibly small number of stealth airplanes can wipe out a much bigger... So the force ratios are even less in an airplane, in a stealth airplane. So I only need four Raptors, who I might need 16 Hornets, because I can create even more ambiguity, and the opportunity for those, maybe it used to be one or two gaps, now there's gonna be four, five, or six that I create based on that exact same principle. And once that happens, we all go into that hole, and we fill that, and we exploit them, and wipe them out with a force ratio and a missile ratio that's even less than it was in an older machine.

• 1:02:19Speaker 01

  And when you see the reaction of an enemy who simply doesn't understand what's happening, man, that's a good feeling. Because in a Hornet, in a legacy machine, it was still you against me. I always saw you, you always saw me, if I outmaneuvered you, I would still win, but rarely were you surprised by it. You might have had a hard time reacting to it, there was things I had that you couldn't do, but you saw it coming. You were aware that, when you're having to react to something you don't understand, and you don't... Night attacks, ambushes, when you just simply don't know what's happening, the force multiplier of that is significantly higher than when they see you, and you're just outmaneuver them.

• 1:03:02Speaker 01

  Which is actually fairly rare in combat, when they see what's going on, it's usually kind of a stalemate.

• 1:03:07Jocko Willink?

  Delta Platoon tasking at Bruiser, Seth Stone, JP, the crew. They, it was like one of the early times that they did like a deception and then an Overwatch and then a flanking Overwatch. It was literally called like the flank Overwatch. So they had a main Overwatch and they had like a little flanker position. But I remember Seth calling me up and he was so happy because it, what happened was as they started killing bad guys, the other bad guys didn't know what was happening. They, they didn't understand and they literally like put down their weapons and like just

• 1:03:50Jocko Willink?

  walked away and they, they just left. Cause normally, as you know, when the guys would set up an Overwatch position and start killing people, then the bad guys would bring it. And eventually you'd get a, not really a clandestine Overwatch position, but a reinforced fighting position is what most of the Overwatches in the Battle of Ramadi turned into. But, but this, on this one, I remember the first time that they did this and it was, you know, Seth was all excited. He was like, they, they gave up. They didn't know what was happening. They didn't know where they were getting shot at from. It was just, they just left the dead and let them bleed out and just got away. Cause they were totally overwhelmed. As you just described, the, they did not know what was happening. And

• 1:04:32Jocko Willink?

  same thing with, with Charlie did it too. The first time, well, it wasn't, it was the first time, but when they started using boats where we're all of a sudden in areas, you know, Charlie Platoon showing up in areas where the enemy had no freaking idea that Americans would be in these spots and be able to engage them.

• 1:04:55Speaker 01

  Yeah. When they ruled out this location as a possible enemy advanced, meaning for us, when that was ruled out and then it happened, what the psychological impact of that is this cannot be happening. I simply do not understand what's happening around

• 1:05:10Jocko Willink?

  What can be happening?

• 1:05:11Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:05:11Jocko Willink?

  Why are my friends getting killed right now?

• 1:05:13Speaker 01

  Yes.

• 1:05:13Jocko Willink?

  How is this possible?

• 1:05:14Speaker 01

  Right.

• 1:05:16Jocko Willink?

  It's possible through the creative minds of T U Bruiser.

• 1:05:21Speaker 01

  That's right.

• 1:05:21Jocko Willink?

  Coming at you.

• 1:05:22Speaker 01

  Coming at those boats, man. That was, I remember that. I remember that.

• 1:05:25Jocko Willink?

  Yeah.

• 1:05:26Speaker 01

  That first one we did was awesome.

• 1:05:31Jocko Willink?

  Trapping the enemy. Modern tactics is based not on pushing the enemy, but on trapping him. Another excellent way of gaining advantage. Trapping is the desired result of the application of combined arms, fire maneuver, or complementary force tactics. Why do we want to trap the enemy instead of just push him? A pushing contest is seldom decisive. The side that is pushed out comes back the next day, still full in the fight. We have to fight him again and again. Unfortunately, in Vietnam, many of our battles were pushing battles. We were always able to push the enemy off the ground he held and to inflict casualties on him. He just withdrew, regrouped, replaced his losses, and came back to fight us again.

• 1:06:16Jocko Willink?

  The result was a series of indecisive actions and a seemingly endless war.

• 1:06:25Jocko Willink?

  However, if we can trap our enemy, we have a better opportunity to win decisively. No, this is, from a leadership perspective, what we're doing here is we're winning the tactical battle. Like, I made Dave do it. Like, you're damn right, Dave, you better do what I told you to do. And you're like, fine. Tactical win. And you go back, but you haven't, you don't still understand why you're doing what you're doing. And I don't do it very well. And you don't do it very well.

• 1:06:53Jocko Willink?

  Many of history's decisive battles have been trapping actions. Recall how Roman legions were trapped at Cannae or the German divisions at Stalingrad. Trapping gains advantage by disrupting the enemy's mental process while he attempts to think through the dilemma we have placed him in. Trapping allows us to gain and maintain our initiative as the enemy is forced to react to our actions. It can also temporarily undermine the enemy's will to resist

• 1:07:25Jocko Willink?

  when he is at his weakest, while we continue to press the attack and our initiative.

• 1:07:33Jocko Willink?

  So I would say this, when it comes to, because obviously trapping and destroying from a leadership perspective has a bad connotation. So what am I trying to do by trapping someone in a conversation? This is a very, very simple, very simple tactic that I use all the time. By trapping someone, if you and I are having a conversation about something and I trap you, when I trap you, my purpose isn't to prove that I'm right. The way I trap you and the way that I win in a leadership situation is when I trap you, what happens is I force you to come to the conclusion yourself and you see it. And that's when I win.

• 1:08:17Jocko Willink?

  So you end up walking away from me saying, you know, Jaco, this is the way we should do it. And what you're telling me is what I wanted you to say. I got you to come up with the idea that I wanted you to come up with.

• 1:08:31Speaker 01

  And if it's done correctly, I figure that out. Okay, I had this wrong. I recognize that.

• 1:08:38Jocko Willink?

  Yes.

• 1:08:38Speaker 01

  And where that actually comes from is you not wanting to win. It's you wanting me to win. It comes from you not wanting to beat me as like, because you could beat me and I won. And that's, but actually what you want is, you want me to figure that out. Not that I walked away and go, Jaco, beat me. It's that I feel like, oh, I see this differently. So next time I do it the right way. And it comes from you actually wanting to be successful. So when we're going at our folks and we, if we have these conversations and really what we're trying to get them to do is recognize it themselves, it's not for the satisfaction of being right. It's for them to get better and learn and evolve and feel like they can go do it better, which is what I really want. It's for them to go do it the right way.

• 1:09:18Jocko Willink?

  And by the way, the way that you approach that most effectively is to go in with that attitude yourself. I don't go in thinking, well, Dave's got a bad plan, so I'm going to get him to believe in my plan.

• 1:09:31Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:09:31Jocko Willink?

  Actually, I go in there thinking, maybe I have a bad plan. Maybe Dave's plan is better. Let's find out.

• 1:09:36Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:09:37Jocko Willink?

  And as we explore that, guess what? If we can have a civilized, ego-removed conversation, that plan will percolate, the good plan, the correct plan will percolate to the surface.

• 1:09:49Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:09:51Jocko Willink?

  And that is what we're looking for.

• 1:09:54Speaker 01

  And think of the power of the times where if you were in the leadership position, where you actually have that conversation and then, you know what?

• 1:10:02Speaker 01

  Their plan is actually better than mine. Because what you don't have is

• 1:10:07Speaker 01

  another conversation with Jaco, I don't know what's gonna happen, but eventually he's gonna win and I'm gonna be proved that he's smarter than me and sooner or later, it's actually not effective anymore either because I've just come to realize this guy, he's always got some answer, he's always got some final thing that makes him right and I almost kind of resign myself to that, but if if every, not by design, but because it actually, you actually are humble enough to see and go, you know what dude, I didn't, I didn't see that, that's a really interesting, let's do that, go, go, go down that road, go down that road and I'll back you up. And if that happens often enough that I feel like these conversations aren't a contest over right, the conversation is actually how we both get to the right place. And look, if you're more experienced, you've done it more, you probably are gonna be right more often. But not all the time.

• 1:10:51Speaker 01

  And you're not trying to break their will of, here comes another, guess what's gonna happen if I do, I'm gonna lose again.

• 1:10:57Jocko Willink?

  And all that, that idea of breaking someone's will, when I try and break your will, the, that, my, my,

• 1:11:08Jocko Willink?

  I'm being driven by my own insecurities. I want to prove to you that I'm right, that you're wrong, that my plan is better than your plan. I am completely being driven by my own insecurities. The person that is secure and is actually confident and understands that they're in a good spot and understands that it's okay. Like, if, if, if I make a mistake, that I'm not, it's not the end of the world and I'm a human and I'm not trying to portray the fact that I'm not a human. It's like, oh, okay, if we can get there, if I can get there, then guess what, if you come up with a better plan, that's awesome, I think their plan is better, let's go with it.

• 1:11:49Speaker 01

  Yeah, for the leaders out there listening to this, the humility that it requires to do that is actually your, your That's your biggest tool. Because more often than not, these situations are a superior and a subordinate. And you know who knows who's the superior? Everybody in the conversation. I write your performance review. I write your paycheck. I do all, I have all this organizational influence that I can exert over you. And I know that, and the subordinate knows that. And if I'm leveraging that to be right in the conversation, eventually, unless the subordinate just wants to get fired, he's gonna, he's gonna give in. But if I have all those positional advantages, and I still come in with the humility and reckon, oh, that's a really good idea. I didn't see that.

• 1:12:31Speaker 01

  And I push that down to you and we go run with your plan? The leadership capital, you, the deposit into the bank of leadership that you have, it's...

• 1:12:40Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, and if you think, if you think in the back of your head that you can effectively cover up your insecurities to your subordinates through punitive measures and through exalting your authority over other human beings. If that's a fantasy in your head, you're so wrong. Your insecurities stand out in fluorescent colors. They stand out like Kurt Lee's vest in The Chosen Reservoir Battle. Fluorescent orange. And you might as well put a label on your forehead that says,

• 1:13:25Jocko Willink?

  "I'm super insecure. That's why I'm trying to force my will upon you." Because I'm scared and I'm insecure.

• 1:13:36Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:13:36Jocko Willink?

  If you think that you can cover that up, you are so wrong. So don't.

• 1:13:44Jocko Willink?

  A good example of trapping from the Vietnam conflict occurred during Operation Dewey Canyon. North Vietnamese activity along the Loaian, South Vietnamese border increased dramatically in early January 1969. Large enemy convoys, including armored vehicles, regularly traveled from Laos into South Vietnam, threatening friendly units.

• 1:14:10Jocko Willink?

  And the SOG boys were up there tracking it. Colonel Robert H. Barrow and his Ninth Marines responded with Operation Dewey Canyon. Three battalions of Ninth Regiment crossed the Da Krong River. On February 11th and 12th, the Third and First battalions moved south southeast through the mountainous terrain towards Laos. Second Battalion to the west swung south southwest, turning east astride the Vietnam-Laus border. The North Vietnamese forces moving along Route 922 from Laos into the A Shaw Valley, you've heard that before, were trapped between the three battalions. The North Vietnamese were mauled as a result. Their equipment losses were staggering.

• 1:14:53Jocko Willink?

  More importantly, Operation Dewey Canyon destroyed a North Vietnamese base area and so disrupted their logistics that it forced them to abandon their planned spring offensive in Ikor area. Developing an ambush mentality. Perhaps the most common tactical tool for gaining advantage is the ambush. All Marines are familiar with an ambush as the type of combat patrol. In maneuver warfare, ambush takes on a much broader meaning and the development of ambush mentality is integral to maneuver warfare tactics. The ambush mentality is not new to most of us. We may have employed the ambush mentality in sports. In football, the trap block is an ambush. A player pulls an offensive lineman offline, leaving a hole. When a defender comes through the hole, another lineman suddenly blocks him from the side,

• 1:15:38Jocko Willink?

  usually knocking him down. The players have blindsided him. That is the ambush mentality. In basketball, setting a pick is an ambush. As one team member drives to the basket, another steps into the defender's path from behind, blocks the path, stops the defense, and momentarily clears the lane to the basket for the other team member. Again, that is the ambush mentality. In combat, we move our reinforced squad into position along a well-traveled trail. We position flank security to protect ourselves and give identification and warning of the enemy movements down the trail. We position our weapons so as to concentrate our fires into a kill zone and to seal off exits, forcing the enemy to remain subject to our fires. The squad waits in position until signaled, when they immediately respond with concentrated,

• 1:16:22Jocko Willink?

  sustained fires on enemy forces trapped in the kill zone. The enemy surprised into inaction, unsure of what to do or where to move is annihilated. Fires are maintained until all the enemy are killed or until signaled to stop. The, that is the ambush mentality. Pretty straightforward. Unless you're a SOG guy and then you set your claymores up in such a method and you put a, a block of C4 that will stun the person right in the ambush.

• 1:16:48Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:16:50Jocko Willink?

  Because, was it Lynn Black? I think it was Lynn Black that blew himself up over and over again until he found out how much C4 it took to knock him out.

• 1:16:59Speaker 01

  Right.

• 1:17:00Jocko Willink?

  Do you get any more legit than that?

• 1:17:02Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:17:02Jocko Willink?

  No, you don't. The ambush mentality tries to turn every situation into an ambush. I like that. The ambush mentality tries to turn every situation into an ambush. In this broader context, an ambush has several distinct fe- features. First, in an ambush, we try to surprise the enemy. Think of a patrol that we ambush. Our enemies are walking through the woods when suddenly out of nowhere, they are under fire from multiple directions. They are taking heavy casualties. The psychological impact of a surprise may paralyze their thoughts and actions, leaving them incapable of reacting effectively. To have an ambush mentality means we always try to surprise the enemy to do the unexpected. Surprise is the rule rather than the exception, rather than the exception. Second, we want to draw our enemy unknowingly into a trap.

• 1:17:46Jocko Willink?

  This will often involve deceiving him. We make one course of action appear inviting. When he takes that course of action, we are waiting for him. Third, an ambush is invisible. If the ambush is not invisible, it ceases to be an ambush and instead becomes a target for the enemy. Whether we are defending or attacking, the enemy must not detect us until it is too late for him to react. Surprise often depends upon invisibility. That invisibility may be provided through stealth and movement or in focusing the enemy's attention elsewhere to allow our forces to maneuver without detection.

• 1:18:22Jocko Willink?

  You know, the big, uh, coming home from Ramadi, what I.

• 1:18:27Jocko Willink?

  I broke this down into offensive versus defensive mentality. Like, hey, we want to be in offense. And I would ask these young junior officers that would be coming through the officer training course that Leif was running at the time, I'd say, hey, is a direct action mission an offensive mission? Of course, they'd all say, yeah. And I'd say, okay, it takes us, and this was a direct action mission, it takes us an hour to get to the target. And then we spend 20 minutes on the target. We blast the door open, we clear the target, and then it takes an hour to get back, you know, patrol, and then Humvees, and then we're back. How much of that time was offensive? And then the guys would think about it. The sharp ones would say, three minutes? And they'd be right, because while you're patrolling, guess what? You're waiting to get ambushed.

• 1:19:09Jocko Willink?

  And, and believe me, this is when we got to Ramadi, I did not like the idea of us waiting to get ambushed. And, well, of course, you can't avoid them. You have to go on patrol. You have to get out. You have to move through the city. But I couldn't, what I didn't like was the ratio of, hey, you know, two hours of patrolling, three minutes of offense. I didn't like that ratio. I like the ratio of an hour patrolling, 24 hours on offense, and then another hour patrolling. That's what I liked. And that's kind of what we shifted to.

• 1:19:43Speaker 01

  Yeah, because the hour of patrolling is, you have to get there. So you have to do that.

• 1:19:49Speaker 01

  That, that amount of time to get where you're going, whatever that amount of time is, you have to do that. And you are undeniably, especially in Ramadi, you're exposed. No matter how much firepower you're bringing, or how much you're bringing to that, and it requires very little of the enemy to disrupt and to do very little. It was easiest for them when we were doing that. And if you're going to make that investment in that time and that commitment to doing that, spend as much time as you possibly can taking advantage of whatever it is you've created by going through that work in doing that. And all this stuff I'm hearing, you know, stealth, there's all these things that I'm hearing.

• 1:20:25Speaker 01

  The ambush should be the goal every time. Your goal should be to keep the enemy from not understanding what's happening all the time. It would just get, why would you ever do the frontal assault? They see it's coming. Now, you still may win on the frontal assault, but it gives the enemy every possible thing it could have to defend itself against it. They see it's coming, they know it's coming, they're massing their firepower. The frontal assault, nine times out of 10, is a loser even if you actually win the engagement. It's just a loser. And you think like, the mindset should always be outmaneuver them.

• 1:21:01Jocko Willink?

  Yes.

• 1:21:03Speaker 01

  And, and it, it, it's, when you hear it, it sounds so simple.

• 1:21:08Jocko Willink?

  And when you hear it in a business context, in a leadership context, it, it sounds, it sounds, and people echo brings up this example of, well, that's just the way I am. It, you know, and what I hear from, from leaders, you know, you know, I gotta have a direct conversation with this person and tell them what's going on. Look, I get it that sometimes there's an occasional point, but most of the time, there's a way to maneuver that's gonna make that whole situation infinitely better than your direct assault on their brain.

• 1:21:42Speaker 01

  Totally. And, and probably the biggest thing that we need, that I talk about and I try to explain and dispel the myth. Look, when we're talking about flanking your enemies in combat, you are actually talking about maneuvering to destroy them, to get into position to wipe them out. And if you're taking the analogy of, I have someone I work with. This is a peer, this is my boss, this is a, this is somebody on my team. The flanking and the outmaneuvering isn't to destroy them. It's to get to a place for them to recognize there's a better way for me to do it that actually helps him, helps me, helps the team, and so my life gets better. And that frontal assault.

• 1:22:24Speaker 01

  Even if it's well intended, prevents that from happening because the recipient can't actually hear what you're trying to get across, which was the better way because he's defensive and, and you're putting him in a, so even if the frontal assault makes sense in your mind because you have this totally outsized, like all your information is right and he's, and it seems so clear, you're still dealing with another human being who most of the time simply doesn't want to hear it.

• 1:22:48Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, and is going to get defensive and is going to attack you back.

• 1:22:51Speaker 01

  Yes.

• 1:22:52Jocko Willink?

  And or dig in harder and make expend ammunition and we get a worse relationship. There's two, two things I kind of have to say because I just, I've said this before, but because I just got asked this, I was kind of talking through the exact scenario that we're talking through with the company and you know, isn't, you know, the hand went up in the back of the room, isn't that just manipulation? And, and it's like, well, let me tell you what I think the difference between leadership and manipulation is because they both use the same tools. Manipulation is when I'm doing what I'm doing to benefit me. Leadership is when I'm doing what I'm doing, I'm trying to get you to do what you're doing. I'm trying to get you to do what I want you to do because it's going to benefit you and it's going to benefit the team.

• 1:23:36Jocko Willink?

  And you, you threw this out there, you said, it's going to be, it's going to make my life better. But what you really mean is it's going to make our life better, the team's life better. And most important, I actually want, when I manipulate you, Dave Berke, I'm manipulating you and everything that I'm doing, every maneuver that I'm making happen to you, I'm doing it and it's going to benefit you.

• 1:24:00Speaker 01

  Your life.

• 1:24:01Jocko Willink?

  Way over me.

• 1:24:02Speaker 01

  For sure.

• 1:24:02Jocko Willink?

  Way over me.

• 1:24:03Speaker 01

  That's exactly right.

• 1:24:04Jocko Willink?

  And when you look up, you, in my, in my best, my best manipulation that I can do, you don't even realize that it happened and you're looking up going, well, I did a good job on that last, you know, project that I had to do. I did a super job and oh, and I got a fat, you know, paycheck and a bonus and, and oh, that's great. I did great. And that's exactly what I want you to be saying. I want you to be saying, I did great.

• 1:24:26Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:24:27Jocko Willink?

  And you know what, subconsciously in the back of that little freaking nugget of a brain you got in there, you're going to go on, that guy kind of helped me out, that boss man.

• 1:24:36Speaker 01

  A hundred percent.

• 1:24:37Jocko Willink?

  And that's what we want because then. They realize, our team realizes that we care about the team or that we care about ourselves. And then when we have that, that's, that's the trust and the relationship and that's what makes a team strong. That is the glue that makes a team strong. You, if you don't trust me and I don't trust you, we don't have a team. Period. There's no glue. As soon as that thing, as soon as that pressure comes along, we're going to fracture, we're going to fall apart. When we have a strong bond, we know what that pressure does to us. It makes it even stronger. Get some. Back to the book. The reverse slope defense is an example of using invisibility to spring an ambush. The enemy does not know where you are until he comes over the crest of a hill and is hit by our fires. His vehicles are

• 1:25:21Jocko Willink?

  hit on their soft underbellies. His troops are exposed to our weapons because he could not see us until the last moment. He could not call in artillery fire on our position. The reverse slope not only protects us from his direct fire, it protects us from his observation and thus his indirect fire. That is part of the ambush mentality. Do not let yourself be seen. Fourth, in an ambush, we want to shock the enemy. Instead of taking him under fire, gradually with a few weapons at long range, we wait until he is within easy range of us with every weapon. We then open up suddenly all at once with everything we have. He is paralyzed by the shock. He cannot react. Everything was going fine and

• 1:26:04Jocko Willink?

  suddenly he's in a firestorm with people falling all around him. Often he will panic, making his problem worse as he reacts rather than acts. Combined arms may be used to ambush the enemy. Artillery raids that reach deeper into his vital areas than expected can produce the same desired shock effect as ground-based ambush. We place him in a dilemma as he attempts to move from the effects of artillery and goes right into attack by the air. Finally, in the ambush mentality, we always focus on the enemy.

• 1:26:36Jocko Willink?

  The purpose of an ambush is not to hold a piece of terrain, it is to destroy the enemy. We used terrain to effect for the ambush, but the terrain itself is not what we're fighting for. Alright, next section, asymmetry. Fighting asymmetrically means gaining advantage through imbalance, applying strength against enemy weakness. Fighting asymmetrically means using dissimilar techniques and capabilities to maximize our own strengths, while exploiting enemy weaknesses. Fighting asymmetrically means fighting the enemy on your own terms, rather than on his. By fighting asymmetrically, we do not have to be numerically superior to defeat the enemy.

• 1:27:22Jocko Willink?

  We only have to be able to exploit his vulnerabilities. For example, using tanks to fight enemy tanks, infantry to fight enemy infantry, and air to fight enemy air is symmetrical. Using attack helicopters to fight tanks and close air support against enemy infantry are examples of fighting asymmetrically. In these examples, we gain advantage of the greater speed and mobility of the aircraft relative to the enemy. Ambushing tanks with attack helicopters in terrain which hampers tank maneuvers provides an even more effective, even more effect and generates even more advantage. This is the, the...

• 1:28:00Jocko Willink?

  So important for people to think about. Okay, jiu-jitsu. If we're going against a, or fighting, I should say, if you're going against a boxer, do you box him? No, you take him down. If you're going against a wrestler, what do you do? You strike with him, because they're not used to striking. If you're going against a jiu-jitsu person, what do you do? You punch him, you stay standing. You don't go into persons, what the person's good at. You don't want to fight them in their own game. If you watch the early UFC's, that's why everyone lost to jiu-jitsu. Because take down, you didn't see Horace Gracie standing in there and trading blows, no. He went asymmetrical.

• 1:28:36Jocko Willink?

  That's what you do. Obviously, it's what you do on the battlefield. When we get into leadership, when we get into relationships, if I've got someone that's got a strong, passionate idea about something, I am not going to attack that idea with my passion and my strong feeling.

• 1:29:00Jocko Willink?

  Because now all we're doing is creating conflict between us. This is not improving my position. It's actually strengthening their position because they're digging in deeper. So what do I do? I look for another thing that I can start to maneuver on. Get them thinking so often, so, so often, so, so many of my solutions for leadership is all I'm trying to do initially is create is like some, you've heard me say this, David, say blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, and now you've started a conversation. Cause that's what I want, right? Because if I'm not in a conversation with someone, then there's no possible way I can convince of anything. Right? If all I'm doing is attacking them, they're not going to be convinced of anything.

• 1:29:44Jocko Willink?

  So I, I do this, that, and the other thing, and I make a couple maneuvers. And now I'm in a conversation and the conversation probably has nothing to do with the subject that I'm eventually going to, going to change their mind on.

• 1:29:59Speaker 01

  You're just trying to build trust.

• 1:30:01Jocko Willink?

  Yes.

• 1:30:01Speaker 01

  Just get, just trying to build a relationship and build some trust. And you could be a hundred percent right. And they could be a hundred percent wrong. And if you attack them to prove that point, you, you get nothing, you get no trust. And if I,

• 1:30:17Jocko Willink?

  You do, you actually do get something. You go backwards in your relationship. You go backwards. That's what, that's what's happening.

• 1:30:23Speaker 01

  But if you completely out maneuver in a different direction, and I just come to find that I can talk to you, I can have a relationship with you, I can communicate with you. When you do eventually circle back to the thing that was sort of the initiation of the conflict, I'm actually going to listen to you. And that's what I'm gonna, okay, I'll, I'll hear you out and hear what you have to say. Um, and, and you know, people like, oh, conflict avoidance, like, the idea of conflict avoidance is what you're really trying to do is are, are you actually going to be able to convince the person of, of what's, what's the best thing in their world and the best outcome that, that you're trying to get to? It's the idea of conflict avoidance, it's more the idea of, is this person going to listen to me? And if, and if the person won't listen to me and I move backwards.

• 1:31:09Speaker 01

  Not, not, not only do I lose, they lose too. They lose and you, and we talked about what, what a really, what a leader really wants is they care about their people. They want their people, just what we said, you want their lives to be better. So do I need to take, maybe it's going to take longer than I'd like it to take. I'm not going to solve this today because I have nothing, no foundation to build on. I have to start with a conversation and go from there.

• 1:31:31Jocko Willink?

  Yeah. Where, where do we end up tactically when we engage in conflict? Sure, we're, we're beating this dead horse. Sure, we might win that conflict, but where do we end up strategically? Because we dove into that conflict head on. We've heard trust, we've heard a relationship. Don't do it.

• 1:31:50Speaker 01

  Part of the reason we're beating the dead horse though, is it happens all the time.

• 1:31:55Jocko Willink?

  Indeed, indeed. Here's the conclusion to that chapter. Combat is a test of wills where the object is to win. One way to win is to gain and exploit every possible advantage. This means using maneuver and surprise whenever possible. It means employing complementary forces and combined arms. It means exploiting the terrain, weather and times of darkness to our advantage. It means trapping our enemy by ambush or by some other means. It means fighting asymmetrically to gain added advantage. This is what Sun Tzu meant when he wrote, therefore, "A skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates."

• 1:32:40Jocko Willink?

  Yes.

• 1:32:43Jocko Willink?

  And I know you've heard me talk about dictating the situation as opposed as to letting the situation dictate. But what kind of ownership are you taking as a leader? If you say, you know what? I'm, I'm going to set this situation up in such a way that, that victory will come not from, not from my troops and what they do, but just by the situation I put them in, they are going to win. That's, that's, that's how much ownership I'm taking of this situation. We are going to win because of the situation I put you in will be guaranteed victory. That's a skilled commander.

• 1:33:28Jocko Willink?

  Chapter four, we're moving right along, almost two hours deep. Chapter four is called being faster.

• 1:33:37Jocko Willink?

  Hit quickly, hit hard and keep right on hitting. Give the enemy no rest, no opportunity to consolidate his forces and hit back at you. That's Holland M. Smith, Howlin' Mad. Four-star general. He's the guy that's called the father of amphibious warfare. Fought in World War I and led Task Force 56 in the Battle of, little battle called the Uojima. And, and again, what's scary about reading quotes like this? Hit quickly, hit hard and keep right on hitting. Give the enemy no rest, no opportunity to consolidate his forces and hit back at you.

• 1:34:19Jocko Willink?

  What does that say to someone that's predisposed to go on the attack? This is the quote they've been waiting to hear. You, you were just talking about conflict avoidance and the person that, that thinks, hey, you know what? You're just trying to avoid conflict, Dave. I'm gonna roll with Holland Smith, General Smith's outlook, which is I'm gonna hit hard and hit quickly. And I'm gonna keep right on hitting.

• 1:34:47Jocko Willink?

  You gotta not be predisposed for that.

• 1:34:50Speaker 01

  Yeah, it doesn't say, it's, it's not the frontal assault. That's not what he's saying.

• 1:34:58Jocko Willink?

  For the infantryman to be truly effective, he will have to be as light of foot as he is quick of thought. Mobility is needed most in all clash of arms. So there you go. There's the counter. There's the dichotomy to Holland Smith's. Mobility is needed most of all in a clash of arms. Swift and agile movement plus rapidity and intelligent tactical flexibility are its true essentials.

• 1:35:25Jocko Willink?

  Coming from John A. English, who is a Canadian, actually a Canadian Army Vet, known for his military writings, studies. So, here we go into the chapter, "Usually to think of weapons means to think of a personal rifle or pistol, the unit's machine guns and mortars, or the aircraft's missiles, bombs, or guns. A logistician may realize that weapons include trucks, bulldozers, and excavators. Some Marines overlook one of their most powerful weapons, one that creates advantage for infantrymen, aviators, and logisticians equally."

• 1:36:04Jocko Willink?

  That weapon is speed. Speed in combat. How is speed a weapon? Think of sports again. The breakaway in hockey uses speed as a weapon. By rapidly passing the puck down the ice, one team denies the other the chance to get set up on defense. Speed circumvents their opponent's ability to respond in an organized manner. The fast break in basketball seeks the same result. In two or three passes, the ball is down the court and the basket is scored, all before the opposition can react. The results of speed often reach beyond the immediate goal. How many times have we seen a score, a team score on a fast break, steal a ball as it comes in bounds, immediately score again, and even a third time? Unable to regain their composure,

• 1:36:46Jocko Willink?

  the victims of the fast break become the victims of a rally. The victims lose confidence. Passes go astray. Signals become crossed. Tempers flare. Arguments ensue. The rally becomes a rout. The beleaguered players see certain defeat. They virtually give up while still on the court. And you know, as I was thinking about that section, when you, if you watch basketball, and like a fast break and then another fast break, what does the coach do? Calls the timeout. Calls the timeout. We can't, yeah. Hey, we're gonna slow this thing down right now. We're gonna slow this thing down. The same thing can happen in combat. The battalion or fighter aircraft or logistics train can consistently move and act faster than its enemy.

• 1:37:29Jocko Willink?

  Has a powerful advantage. The in June of 1943, during the Battle of Saipan, the aggressive hard hitting tactics of General Holland Smith proved to be singularly successful in defeating the Japanese defenders. General Smith's tactical plan for Saipan called for applying unremitting pressure on the enemy and bypassing strong points of resistance by mopping up by reserve elements in order to press the attack to better ground. So there we have it. There we have it. General Smith, who we just quoted. General Smith, who we just quoted. And what's he doing in those hard points of resistance? He's bypassing.

• 1:38:06Speaker 01

  Get around him, yeah.

• 1:38:06Jocko Willink?

  He's bypassing them. Long indoctrinated with the value of speed in amphibious operations. General Smith's bypassing tactics placed the Japanese remaining. The Japanese remaining in their fixed defenses at an extreme tactical disadvantage. These tactics proved very effective in isolating and reducing the Japanese defense. General Smith's use of speed served as a force multiplier and it also reduced marine casualties. The British Royal Air Force bested the Germans during the Battle of Britain in World War II, in part because they were able to speedily recover, recover their down pilots, return them to base, place them in a new aircraft and have them fighting again in the afternoon.

• 1:38:49Jocko Willink?

  Down German pilots were less easily recovered and the Luftwaffe had fewer of the long range aircraft required for replacement. Eventually pilot and aircraft losses forced the Germans to end daylight bombing and resort strictly to relatively ineffective night attacks. Yeah, the Brits were getting shot down over Britain.

• 1:39:10Speaker 01

  Right.

• 1:39:11Jocko Willink?

  Or at least close to Britain.

• 1:39:12Speaker 01

  Yeah, and speed doesn't just mean my plane is faster than yours. In this case, it's that operational tempo speed of how quickly can I get my guys back into an airplane? And, and that was a huge advantage that they had because every time an airplane got shot down, they literally just got in a truck and drove back to base.

• 1:39:30Jocko Willink?

  That's kinda crazy, right? Like you get shot down and then they're just bringing you back to base, putting you in another aircraft. You're gonna go get some more. Yep. The Brits are a hard race of people. Resilient, man. Yeah, being out there on an island, getting attacked by the Nazi war machine. Whatever, bring it. Bring it. Great leaders have repeatedly stated the value of speed in combat. Napoleon said, I'm, Napoleon said, I may lose in battle, but I shall never lose a minute.

• 1:40:05Jocko Willink?

  I may lose in battle, but I shall never lose a minute. Nathan Bedford Forrest told his secret of many victories. Get there first with the most men. General Patton said in 1943, when the great day of battle comes, remember your training and remember above all else that speed and violence of attack are the sure road to success. History's great commander commanders differed in many ways, but one thing they shared was a sense of the importance of speed. In Operation Urgent Fury, 1983, the battalion, the Marines Battalion Landing Team 28 moved fast as their commander Lieutenant Colonel Ray Smith had trained them to do. When they captured the operations officer of the Grenadian Army,

• 1:40:47Jocko Willink?

  he said to them, you appeared so swiftly in so many places where we didn't expect you that it was clear that resistance was hopeless. So I recommended to my superiors that we lay down our arms and go into hiding.

• 1:40:59Jocko Willink?

  That is what speed used as a weapon can do for you. What is speed?

• 1:41:06Jocko Willink?

  What is speed would seem to have a simple answer. Speed is going fast. This is the speed we think of when driving a car, more miles per hour. That's part of the answer. That is part of the answer in tactics as well. We use speed to gain initiative and advantage over the enemy. Like you just talked about, your plane is faster. For example, when a tank battalion attacks, it goes over ground as fast as it can. General Balk asked whether the Russian tanks ever used terrain in their attacks against him during World War II. He replied that they had used terrain on occasion, but more often they used speed. The question followed up, which was harder to defend against? Balk answered, "Speed." "Physical speed, moving more miles per hour is a powerful weapon in itself. On our approach to the enemy, speed and movement reduces your reaction time.

• 1:41:51Jocko Willink?

  When we are going through him and around him, it changes the situation faster than he can react. Once we are past him, it makes his reaction irrelevant. In all three cases, speed impacts on the enemy, especially his mind, causing fear, indecision, and helplessness. Remember, attacking the enemy's mind is a central tenet of maneuver warfare." I might even call it the primary tenet. Yeah.

• 1:42:17Jocko Willink?

  "Speed and time. In a military sense, there is more to speed than simply going fast. And there is a vital difference between acting rapidly and acting recklessly." There's your dichotomy, coming at you live from Marine Corps 1 TAC 3. "With time, we must always consider the closely related factor of timing. Speed and time are closely related. In fact, speed is defined in terms of time, miles or kilometers per hour. In tactics, what this means is always of the utmost importance. Time cannot be spent in action, must be spent thinking about how to act effectively. Time that cannot be spent in action.

• 1:43:02Jocko Willink?

  So if you can't go, what you need to do is spend that time thinking about how you're going to act effectively."

• 1:43:09Jocko Willink?

  I wonder how much modern life has chewed up that idea? Because when we're not thinking, when we can't do something, I see people all the time, they're not, they're not being proactive. They're not doing anything. They're not doing anything productive. They're definitely not thinking about how to act. When they can't act, they're not thinking about how to act effectively. No, for sure. I see that all the time.

• 1:43:33Speaker 01

  I was on a flight coming home, a flight, six hour flight from McLean, New Jersey back to San Diego.

• 1:43:37Jocko Willink?

  Yeah.

• 1:43:38Speaker 01

  And, look, six hours in a plane for me is a godsend. Cause I got basically no distraction. I got my laptop and I'm, I'm

• 1:43:47Jocko Willink?

  Hammer.

• 1:43:47Speaker 01

  I'm, I'm working. I'm, I'm cranking out. I don't know who it was, cause I didn't see him, but the seat over and up one. Guy watched a movie on, on the plane and I kinda saw, and I saw the movie, I don't know what the movie was. When the movie ended, he replayed the same movie again.

• 1:44:01Jocko Willink?

  Yeah.

• 1:44:02Speaker 01

  And I'm thinking, man, I, I don't know what, what he's doing. And, and look, take a nap or something, kind of refresh and then get, get back in the game. But I see it in my kids. I mean, their natural state is to do nothing productive. And you actually have to, if you're not doing, if you're not physically doing something, you need to be mentally doing something right then to think about, what is my next move? What am I gonna do after this?

• 1:44:23Jocko Willink?

  Yeah. And like you just said, um, cause I'm sure there'll be pushback on that comment. Sometimes you do have to, and I've talked about this before. I've gone on a plane and been like, oh, I'm done.

• 1:44:33Speaker 01

  I'm done.

• 1:44:34Jocko Willink?

  I'm, my brain is fried. I need to watch the dumbest movie I can watch and rack out. And in fact, I sleep on planes beautifully. I, I can sleep on planes beautifully. If you see me on a plane, guess what? I probably got up at two o'clock in the morning to get a workout in before I got on that plane. And I'm gonna go to sleep.

• 1:44:54Jocko Willink?

  Come talk to me when we land. But, yes, how much time? So yeah, you might need a little break here and there.

• 1:45:02Speaker 01

  For sure.

• 1:45:02Jocko Willink?

  And by the way, how long does it take to mentally recover? Is this a five hour evolution? No, it's not. It's like, reset and take, you know, intentionally take a little bit of a breather and then get back in the game.

• 1:45:18Jocko Willink?

  Back to the book. Even when we are engaged with the enemy, we are not always moving fast. Some of the time we are not moving at all. Nonetheless, every moment, nonetheless, every moment is still of the utmost importance, even when we're sitting still.

• 1:45:34Jocko Willink?

  A battalion staff that takes a day to plan an action is obviously slower than one that takes an hour. A tank battalion that takes three hours to refuel is slower than one that takes two hours. Just as one that must refuel every hundred miles is slower than one that must refuel every 200. A company that sits down to eat once it has taken the objective is slower than the company that presses on deeper into the enemy. A fighter squadron that can fly only three sorties per aircraft per day is slower in terms of effect on the enemy than one that flies six. A maintenance repair team that can takes two days to fix a damaged vehicle and get it back into action is slower in terms of effect on the enemy than one that can do it overnight.

• 1:46:13Jocko Willink?

  Every moment is still of utmost importance. Making maximum use of every hour and every minute is as important to speed in combat as simply going fast when we are moving. It is important to remember every, is important to every member of a military force, whether serving on staffs, in units, aviation, combat, service support, ground, everyone. A good tactician has a constant sense of urgency. We feel guilty if we are idle. We never waste time and we are never content with the pace at which things are happening. We are always saying to ourselves and others, faster, faster. We know that if speed is a weapon, so is time.

• 1:47:02Speaker 01

  That is so legit. Think about a leader who can cultivate that mindset in all of his people. Think about how productive your people are if they all feel like every single thing they do, whether they're the, the, the most, uh, the, the person that seems like, okay, we're a sales based business, so I'm in sale. The people that are on the backend that, that get no publicity, that are working the logistics with the administration. Think about it, the leader that gets everybody in his organization to feel that same thing. That if I'm wasting time, the guilt of hurting the team, if you can cultivate that from everyone, not just your, your point of attack people, but everybody, think about what those organizations are able to do.

• 1:47:45Jocko Willink?

  You and I were with a client and we were talking about this and one of the problems that this particular client had was they felt like they couldn't create a sense of urgency in their organization. So, so, so, like you're saying, some people had it at the point. They said, "How do we create a sense of urgency?" So, for those of you that are wondering how to create a sense of urgency with your people, the way that you do it is by making sure they understand why they're doing what they're doing and why it's important. And the example that I gave was if you have a SEAL platoon and, and I would see this situation unfold in training exercise, you've got a SEAL platoon and they've got a perimeter set up, meaning

• 1:48:28Jocko Willink?

  they're stagnant, they're, maybe they're doing a reorganization of ammunition, maybe they're getting a head count, maybe they are working on a wounded guy or something like that. So, they're in a stagnant position, they've got their 360-degree security set up and all of a sudden, someone sees enemy maneuvering on them. And now, the leader wants to create a sense of urgency, he wants to leave. So, he says, "All right, everyone, hey, we're moving, we're leaving in one minute. Pack up your stuff, we're leaving in one minute." And guys, you know, so one guy's like, "Hey, man, we just got here, I'm tired, I'm just trying to sort out my ammunition." Someone's else saying, "Hey, we got this wounded guy, he's unstable, I need to get him stabilized." And someone else is saying, "Well, hey, we're, we're trying to still get a full head count over here, you know, let me, let me just get a, get a handle on my fire team." That's what they're all thinking. And, and maybe

• 1:49:12Jocko Willink?

  some of those priorities are actually really, really important. Certainly, we have a wounded guy, certainly, we want to know where our people are. But, and those people, so they don't really do anything, they don't react. His one-minute call gets blown off and you don't think this happens in the military? Oh, it happens, I see it happen over and over and over and over again. That SEAL platoon commander can't understand why no one will move. And so, he says it again, "Hey, everyone, we're leaving, we're leaving in 30 seconds." And what happens? Say, everyone thinks the same thing they just thought 30 seconds ago, which is, "I'm not going anywhere, I got the, I got my gear out, I'm sorting ammunition, calm down." The lieutenant's freaking out again.

• 1:49:47Jocko Willink?

  Why can't he create a sense of urgency? The reason he's not effectively creating a sense of urgency is because he's not explaining to his people why they need to move. So when he says, when a good leader says, "Hey, everyone, guess what? I know we're jumbled up right now. We have enemy maneuvering to the high ground on our flank. They're 200 meters away. We need to move right now or we're gonna get slaughtered." And you'll see people move. So when you want to create that sense of urgency, when you want to get people to understand the importance of time and that we never waste time and that we feel guilty if we're idle and that we have a constant sense of urgency. If you want to make that happen, explain to your people why they're doing what they're

• 1:50:32Jocko Willink?

  doing and why urgency and speed is important in that particular situation.

• 1:50:43Jocko Willink?

  Timing. We employ speed and use time to create tempo. Tempo is not merely a matter of acting fastest or acting at the earliest opportunity. It is also a matter of timing, acting at the right time. Timing requires an appreciation for the rhythm of combat so we can exploit that rhythm to our advantage. It is physically impossible to always operate at peak tempo like we just talked about. Sometimes you gotta take a breather. Sometimes you gotta watch the big Lebowski for the 174th time. Even though we can extend operating cycles through the economical use of resources, we cannot operate at top speed indefinitely. We must rest our people and replenish our supplies.

• 1:51:26Jocko Willink?

  The test of skill is to be able to generate and maintain a fast pace when the situation calls for it and to recover when it will not hurt us. Timing means knowing when to act and equally important, when not to act. You gotta know when you can take a little breather.

• 1:51:49Jocko Willink?

  Although speed is an important tactical weapon, there are situations in which it is better to bide our time. So here we go. Here's the dichotomy. Here's the dichotomy. Speed is an important tactical weapon. There are situations in which it is better to bide our time. If our concept of operation involves a diversion, we need to allow time for the diversion to take effect. If we have laid an ambush for the enemy, we need to give the enemy time to fall fully into the trap. If the situation is still forming, we may not, we may want to develop it further before we commit to a course of action. So this is a big one. And I'd see this happen with young SEALs where they would immediately make a decision before, and we would actually

• 1:52:33Jocko Willink?

  say it to them. Say, hey, you gotta let the situation develop. Those are the words that we would use. Let the situation develop. And sometimes you have to do that. And there's a dichotomy that you've go too far in one direction, you're going to get overrun. For example, an error commonly made by defenders is counterattacking too soon so that the enemy is merely pushed back rather than cut off and circled and destroyed. Decisive action is our goal and it must be timed to occur at the proper moment. There are times to act and there are times to set the stage and wait. So

• 1:53:06Speaker 01

  Strategic patience. We talk about that. Yeah, we talk about it all the time. And that strategic patience of, hey, you have to let the situation develop. So you actually get more understanding of what's happening. So the move that you do make is the right move. And when you're talking about your folks, not being able to run at the highest up tempo all the time, you know, especially if we work with these younger companies, startups that are, that are growing, and your folks aren't always going to tell you either. They're not going to say, hey, I think we need to take a knee, or I think we need to reevaluate. Sometimes they're going to put their heads down and go, and they're going to go and go and go. And, and actually, your job as a leader is to recognize when that is, when they're not telling you that we need

• 1:53:48Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, I mean, I always had that problem. But I personally always had that problem because no one wanted to tell me, hey, we need a break. Yeah. Like, you know how many times Leif Babin came up to me and said, hey, man, I could really use a breather? Or JP, JP D N L came up to me and said, hey, hey, boss, can I get some downtime? Zero. The amount of times JP said that to me is zero. It's zero. So

• 1:54:12Jocko Willink?

  And are there times when he absolutely needs downtime? Oh, yeah, because he would burn the candle at both end. He would, he will do it now. He doesn't care. He's gonna go get some. So, yes, as a leader, you need to be able to recognize those things because they're not always gonna say it to you.

• 1:54:30Jocko Willink?

  A benefit from a decision not to act is that it saves precious resources and energy for later commitment. Some leaders dissipate their unit's energy on constant, unprioritized activity. Not all, not all activities support the mission. A unit's energy is not easily replenished and should be treated as a precious resource to be expended only toward decisive goals.

• 1:54:55Jocko Willink?

  Relative speed. Going fast and making efficient use of time are both parts of the answer to the question, what is speed? However, something else must be considered. The enemy.

• 1:55:07Jocko Willink?

  As with all things in war, speed is relative. Speed is meaningful militarily only if we are acting faster than the enemy. We can do that either by slowing the enemy or by increasing our own speed.

• 1:55:20Jocko Willink?

  In the battle for the Falkland Islands in 1982, the British Army moved slowly. The terrain was difficult. The weather was abominable. And much of the material had to be moved on the men's backs, all of which slowed down the British. Nevertheless, the British still had the advantage in speed because they moved faster than the Argentines, who, once they had made their initial dispositions, essentially did not move. That superiority in relative speed allowed the British to maintain the initiative throughout the campaign. Covered that one on the podcast. Brutal. Continuing speed. To be consistent, superiority in relative speed must continue over time.

• 1:56:01Jocko Willink?

  It is not enough to move faster only, faster than the enemy only now and then, because when we're not moving faster, the advantage, the initiative, passive to it, passes to him. Most forces can manage an intermittent burst of speed, but must then halt for a considerable period to recover between bursts. During that halt, they are likely to lose their advantage. We realize that we cannot operate at full speed indefinitely, and the challenge is to be consistently faster than the enemy.

• 1:56:30Jocko Willink?

  One way to sustain speed is to use the effects of combined arms when the infantry or mounted troops must break contact temporarily to maneuver, resupply, or recover. Air and artillery can keep the pressure on. Maneuver cannot be sustained indefinitely, but the momentum can be maintained through skillful planning and combined armed effects, keeping the enemy always at a disadvantage. Here, the speed of logistics become critical, although physical exhaustion is a factor. Halt often are driven by logistics. Ground or aviation units must stop for equipment repair, maintenance, and resupply. Supporting forces can minimize loss of speed if they deliver the supplies and perform maintenance quickly. Thus, they enable combat units to move before the enemy gains the initiative. I get paranoid about the enemy.

• 1:57:17Jocko Willink?

  Like, I'm always thinking that if I'm not moving, they're maneuvering.

• 1:57:22Speaker 01

  For sure. And every company should think like that.

• 1:57:27Jocko Willink?

  Yes.

• 1:57:28Speaker 01

  And we're talking about sort of the differences between combat and the differences between, you know, the private sector and business. We've worked with companies that are, one of the challenges they're facing is they have competitors, you know, they have strong competitors and they're trying to carve out more market share, or they're trying to enter a geographic region that maybe they don't have a foothold in and they want to move into there and to expand their business. We talk about what they want with regards to the competition and the things that they say are things like, "We want to annihilate them." I mean, they're working, the competition in the private sector is, it is fierce. And when they're talking about, they want to run you out of business.

• 1:58:12Speaker 01

  I mean, it is legitimate competition that they're talking about here, not that we're going to find a natural way to share, they want to run you down. And I think the private, they recognize that. If you are not maneuvering into that space, your competition is, and their goal is to bury you. That's really what their goal is. And we, in the private sector, when we see companies that are slow on that and they want to wait and kind of see how this, and their enemy's maneuvering into that space, even if their first maneuver into that space isn't ideal, they're in there and they have the foothold, and your ability to get that back is almost zero if they get out in front of you there. And make no mistake, combat, they're trying to kill you, they're trying to run you over. And that is hardcore, to recognize that if you're not doing it, they are.

• 1:58:56Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, and we work with companies, what's interesting and what's cool is, you know, as American military people, we always were the biggest and the strongest and the most powerful, right? But what's cool about Echelon Front is that we work with, like, I'll be working with one company that's the insurgent, you know, and then well, the next day I'll be working with a company that is the absolute powerhouse.

• 1:59:23Speaker 01

  Yes.

• 1:59:23Jocko Willink?

  And guess what? There's advantages and disadvantages to those. That insurgent can maneuver quickly and make changes and disrupt. The big person can overpower and destroy. So you get, we get to see that all the time.

• 1:59:37Speaker 01

  Yeah, on both sides.

• 1:59:38Jocko Willink?

  But on both those sides, the one that is paranoid, the one that is thinking, you know what, I'm an insurgent, if I don't, if I don't attack that big company, they're gonna put me under. I'm not gonna let it happen. Those are the ones that step up. The big companies that say, oh, you know what, those insurgents right there, they could take a part of our business and that could turn into a total rout for us, and I will not allow that to happen. We will destroy them. We get to work with both those sides, and the ones that have that attitude are the ones that end up winning.

• 2:00:14Speaker 01

  A really big, really historically successful company that has done great work and had year after year of good work. That is paranoid of that, those companies are hard to take down because they've got all those tangible things and they had that mindset of what got us here doesn't guarantee that we get it tomorrow. And when you see a good company that wants to get better and they are paranoid of the uncertainty that they used to be five years, those are and the ones that fight off the complacency, that fight off the ego of, hey, we've arrived, we've accomplished our objective. And when you got a big company that doesn't, that is paranoid of losing, man, it's, it's awesome to see. And that requires humble leadership.

• 2:00:57Speaker 01

  Saying, hey, there are no guarantees tomorrow. These guys are out to get us. Yeah, that's legit.

• 2:01:04Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, that's a tough feeling. It's a, it's a tough feeling to live with. And I say that speaking from personal experience, like, you know, and I've know, I've told you and the team that's like, hey, you guys want to know why I don't sleep? Because I'm paranoid of what's gonna happen. We need to bring our A game every day, every day. The day that we take a step back, the day that we're not putting, putting forth absolute best is the day someone else out there is going to get a little foothold. I will not allow that to happen. It will not happen. Cause we're on the warpath over here.

• 2:01:39Speaker 01

  Amen. And forever, for every leader that has that feeling about their team, those leaders, you want that, for someone like me to come into echelon front, how about Dave Burks, the reason this company failed? How about we brought in this guy? He didn't, he didn't stay on the path to hold. How about Dave got complacent and I start that feeling of paranoia of there is no way I'm going to contribute to this company not being successful. And if you get those leaders that have created something and built something and they have that same feeling of ownership all the way down to the bottom, where the most junior person, the most new, the newest hires is paranoid and they are in the game. That's

• 2:02:21Speaker 01

  it. That force is so powerful. And it's the cult. And the way to do that if you're is to give them that same amount of, that same ownership you have of this is yours. And oh, by the way, that means we are, we can all lose here. You have to feel that same feeling of I, I, I could be the reason we fail and I am not going to let that happen. And that's a, that's a burden. That, that is, that, that, that's a burden.

• 2:02:49Jocko Willink?

  Yeah.

• 2:02:49Speaker 01

  That's a feeling that stays with you and it, it stays, and if you don't have that feeling,

• 2:02:54Speaker 01

  there's something wrong.

• 2:02:55Jocko Willink?

  You should get it.

• 2:02:55Speaker 01

  You're in the wrong, yeah. You're in the wrong, you're doing something wrong if you don't have that feeling, you know?

• 2:02:58Jocko Willink?

  Check.

• 2:03:01Jocko Willink?

  Speed and change. In order to act consistently faster than, consistently faster than the enemy, it is necessary to do more than move quickly. It is also necessary to make rapid transitions from one action to another. While there are many types of transitions in combat, it's important to remember that the transition, transitions produce friction. Reduction of friction minimizes the loss of tempo that the friction generates at the point of transition.

• 2:03:26Jocko Willink?

  A unit that can make transitions faster and more smoothly than another can be said to have greater relative speed.

• 2:03:36Jocko Willink?

  In jujitsu, I know that I learned, one of the, one of the really powerful lessons that I learned, I learned from watching my old coach, Fabio Santos. I was watching him train, this was when I was probably a white belt or a blue belt, but I was watching him train with one of the, you know, one of his purple belts, one of our purple belts that we had at the time. And I was watching him and like, for instance, as the guy mounted him, as the guy mounted him, he was escaping. As the guy put him to guard, he was passing the guard. So he did not allow, he was just ahead on tempo. He was just, just slightly ahead, like, I'm not waiting for you to settle in position. No, it's not happening. I'm actually going right now.

• 2:04:19Jocko Willink?

  So that is a good attitude to have in everything.

• 2:04:26Jocko Willink?

  In the 18th century, the importance of fast transitions, sometimes called agility, was displayed when shifting from column formation into line. If an army could not rapidly deploy into line and consequently, consequently was engaged while still in column, it was often beaten. Much drill is devoted to practicing this difficult transition so it could be accomplished rapidly in combat. Today, we develop proficiencies in battle drills and immediate action drills that allow units to rapidly transition from one formation to another without pausing.

• 2:05:01Jocko Willink?

  It is important to be, it is important to be able to affect rapid changes in organization as well. Being quick to effect required changes in task organization based on a rapidly changing battle situation increases agility and decreases reaction times. Battle drills and rehearsals can be conducted to smooth out procedures for changing organization rapidly. The faster these transitions can be made, the more effective the force becomes. The place in time and space where transitions occur can be called a friction point. Friction points commonly encountered in tactics include movement from an assembly area to attack, from patrol movement formation to ambush posture, from defensive posture to

• 2:05:44Jocko Willink?

  attack, from one maneuver to another, and so forth. The transition involves simply positional changes and drills, but also changes of attitude in the minds of Marines. We must shift our mental focus from one movement to another. So, here's, here's one of the things that I did with my platoons, with my task units that was super effective. When it came time to do an assault, and, and some guys would really set up a specialized assault formation. Okay, since we're doing assault, okay, we're gonna put the, they would make these changes to their formation.

• 2:06:25Jocko Willink?

  And I would minimize, really minimize, if not completely eliminate, this whole change in the way we're gonna form. So, we're gonna do an assault? Okay, cool. Charlie Platoon, you're on assault. And you got one squad from Delta. Everyone's in the same, same patrol formation, everything's the same, but you, but you're gonna do the assault. Okay, cool. I'm not saying, okay, we're gonna take these breachers, and we're gonna put these, we're gonna set up these special over, no, no, no, no. Everything's the same. And by the way, what happens when we get hit and, you know, things start falling apart? Everyone's with the unit, the little element that they're used to working with. And we're, we got unit integrity all the time.

• 2:07:02Jocko Willink?

  That being said, because you can't guarantee that, I would always rehearse and train like we would go out on the beach and do rattle battle drills where I'd call all these different maneuvers rapidly in succession on top of one another. Everyone be all confused and all jumbled up and you had to just figure it out and make it happen. So we got on the battlefield, we would never get as jumbled up on the battlefield as we would when I was running blender drills. What we call them blender drills on a, on my platoons. Like we'd run blender drills, no one, it'd be just every, it'd be every person would be in a different position. So everyone got used to, okay, what do you do? What's the protocol that you do when you're all jumbled up? Here's the protocol, you look around, if you look around and there's no one making a call, grab four guys, you're a fire team leader, make something happen. Go.

• 2:07:46Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 2:07:47Jocko Willink?

  So between those two things, between being ready for the chaos and the disorganization, because we train that way and always to the best of the, the best that I could possibly pull it off. Hey, we're gonna keep our normal formations. Like when this talks about patrol formation, ambush posture, defensive posture. All those postures for me, in my task unit, in my SEAL platoon, they were the same. There's no confusion, like this is what's happening. Occasionally would you have to, would you have to take a little sniper element and pull them out or you'd have to do something occasionally? Yes.

• 2:08:23Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 2:08:23Jocko Willink?

  But I would do that as little as possible.

• 2:08:28Jocko Willink?

  And I would train to the point that they could handle it if it happened. But the thing is, it just wouldn't happen when you're that, when you're that used to being in that position. So the weird thing about this is you might, is this gave us total freedom. Because we could assault from a totally different direction. I could say, oh yeah, by the way, that looks like it's a secure, uh, looks like there's a guard up there. So we're gonna go in from the other, we're gonna go in from the south. And nothing changes, everyone's, everyone's fine. We're still in platoon integrity, this is just, no changes. So that's a little trick that I used. It was, and I'm trying to think, imagine in my mind right now, what the driving force that makes people want to.

• 2:09:10Jocko Willink?

  Specialize for a particular part of an operation. The reason that I think we want to do it is because it seems from a broad perspective. No, no. From the opposite of a broad, from a granular perspective, if we've set up like this, that part of the operation will go smoother. And there's a chance that they're right in that particular smooth operation where nothing goes wrong. But in any other thing, when anything goes sideways, it's not the right answer.

• 2:09:42Speaker 01

  And if you actually take the mindset that nothing is ever going to happen the way that you plan it to happen, if you just accept that, which I think was verbatim out of the beginning of this, is your plan is not going to go the way that you think, you immediately recognize that that's, that's not a good plan. And it doesn't mean everybody needs to be an expert in every single thing. That's not what it means. But it means everybody, and you talked about the transitions, you, everybody has to have the flexibility and then recognize, you talked about a protocol. Okay, I can't answer what we're going to do and all, but I know there's a protocol. This is what we're going to do. The four of us, we're going to go, and we're going to go attack that problem. That problem will reveal itself as we move down it. But the, hey, I'm a, I'm a, I don't, I don't do that mission. I'm a this guy mission.

• 2:10:24Speaker 01

  Well, I'm, I'm really sorry that we haven't chosen to do this mission because the enemy is now doing something totally different. So the alternative is to sit here and do nothing, or that we can get up and actually transition out of this mindset, you know, the defense to offense, all those things. That's all mindset. People actually can get good at that. But through, through doing it over and over again, they can actually get, get good at that.

• 2:10:45Jocko Willink?

  You remember what you were saying earlier about the stealth fighter, about how you used, even though you had the stealth fighter and you had all this advantage, you still like did the fundamental things correctly. And that's exactly what I did. So I would have my guys trained up where it didn't matter what person from TU, you take four guys from TU Bruiser, five guys from TU Bruiser, one of them was going to step up as a fire team leader and start making something happen. That's the way it was going to be. And so I had the capability really to mix and match people and set up at a target assault however I wanted to. But even though I had that step, you know, that capability, that, that advanced capability that I could scramble everyone up and we could be effective, it didn't matter.

• 2:11:25Jocko Willink?

  I still used the fundamental principle to be as simple as possible because simplicity is, is paramount.

• 2:11:33Speaker 01

  Yes.

• 2:11:37Jocko Willink?

  Back to the book, a modern example of the importance of fast transitions comes from aerial combat.

• 2:11:43Jocko Willink?

  Good deal, Dave Berke is in the house. In the Korean War, American aviators achieved, this is the part of the book where you've just been waiting to get here. American aviators achieved a high kill ratio of about 10 to 1 over their North Korean and Chinese opponents. At first glance, this is somewhat surprising. The main enemy fighter, the MiG-15, was superior to the American F-86 in a number of key respects. It could climb and accelerate faster, and it had better sustained turn rate. The F-86, however, was superior to the MiG in two critical, though less obvious, respects. First, because it had high-powered hydraulic controls, the F-86 could shift from one maneuver to another faster than the MiG.

• 2:12:28Jocko Willink?

  Second, because of its bubble canopy, the F-86 had better visibility. The F-86's better field of view provided better situational awareness and also contributed to the fast transitions because it allowed its pilot to understand changing situations more quickly.

• 2:12:48Speaker 01

  So the beauty of this example is it's a literal example of those transitions we were just talking about. And I brief this, and I actually use this Korean War example of the F-86 and the MiG-15. I had totally forgotten it was in this book. Completely forgotten this example was used in the 1.3. And it says almost the exact same thing. The connection I've made from this story of my machine and your machine, what your machine does well and what my machine, my advantages and disadvantages. All too often, we see what people want to do with their disadvantages is, hey, we need another machine. This machine doesn't do this as well, so I want more resources and I want more equipment. And the answer is, hey, we can't do that. If we could, it's going to take us years to develop this.

• 2:13:32Speaker 01

  And they spend all this time thinking about, well, if I only had a machine that turned better. And if only had a thing that client and they spent all this time thinking about what it is that they can't do instead of recognizing, hey, all right, what were our strengths? What are our advantages here and what do we need to do to build a plan that leverages those strengths? You can actually outperform people in a way that doesn't seem to be evident to them. If they aren't the one, I got a better machine. Why do I need to worry about my transitions? I do this better than you. That's a huge disadvantage for them that they don't even realize. And if you spent less time worrying about, hey, what, what, what's wrong with the things that I haven't, I think, where are my advantages? Small companies, but I don't have the revenue. We don't have the market. We don't, but you know what you have? You've got 25 people.

• 2:14:16Speaker 01

  You know how quickly you can communicate? You know how fast you can get back? And they've got 1,500 people. They can't get, their communication. The strength of the story is a recognition of there were things at that airplane that you would not pay attention to that were vastly better than the, than the enemy. And instead of spending all this time thinking about what we don't do well is build a plan around your strengths and then outmaneuver them, meaning maneuver more quickly. Maybe you're not doing it. Maybe your turn isn't as fast, your climate is fast and watch them react. They're reacting to your first move when you're on move number three. When they're reacting to your second move, you're on move number seven. And all of a sudden, and 10 to one, by the way, just 10 to one is staggering.

• 2:14:59Speaker 01

  I mean, that is, it's crazy to think about what, for every hundred airplanes, the enemy lost, we lost 10. Think about that with an inferior machine. That story is my, is my favorite story to tell because we're used to having right now in the American military, our, our stuff is better. Our equipment's better. That's why when, that is not why we win. As a matter of fact, if your plan is to just leverage the better equipment, you're going to lose because you know what your enemy is doing right now?

• 2:15:29Jocko Willink?

  Figuring out what your weaknesses are, figuring out how you're going to maneuver, how they're going to maneuver on you.

• 2:15:33Speaker 01

  That's right. That's exactly what they're doing.

• 2:15:36Jocko Willink?

  Another important part of this, okay? Because of its bubble canopy, the F-86 pilot had better visibility.

• 2:15:46Jocko Willink?

  The better field of view provided better situational awareness and contributed to the fast transition because it allowed the pilot to understand changing situations more quickly. What the way that translates when you're not in a cockpit is it translates into detaching from the situation, taking a look at what's going on and actually being able to see what's happening.

• 2:16:05Speaker 01

  What do you see?

• 2:16:06Jocko Willink?

  What do you actually see? And if you see what's happening, then you can react faster. You can make those transitions happen quicker. That's this massive advantage that you can have. And the amount of people that I know that do a good job of detaching and taking a step back is a very small number. It's a very small number. And everyone that I know that can do it and do it well, they dominate.

• 2:16:33Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 2:16:33Jocko Willink?

  They dominate.

• 2:16:34Speaker 01

  They dominate. When you are not detached, the only thing that is in focus is the one thing you're looking at and everything else is blurry. It literally is, you don't see those other things. And those are all the other things happening around you that you actually need to be reacting to.

• 2:16:53Jocko Willink?

  Another thing, so the other thing that you had is these high-powered hydraulic controls, okay? Which allowed you to transition quicker. You know what stops people from transitioning mentally from one thing to something else? It's what it is, is it's their ego. It's their ego thinking, hey, I actually know what's happening and I'm not looking at, I'm not seeing anything else because I, what I think is happening is what's happening. I have so much confidence in myself and I think I'm right. So this is what, hey, I think the enemy's coming in from over there. Okay, cool. And I'm not thinking that I could be wrong. I'm not assessing what anyone else's input is. I'm not listening to what my subordinates are telling me, what my peers are telling me, what my boss is telling me. I think I'm right.

• 2:17:37Jocko Willink?

  So I'm not going to change anything that I'm doing right now. So those are the two kind of advantages that we can have in the F86. In our, you know, you might not be as smart as you're someone else. You might not, you might not have the cognitive capacity. You might not have the charisma that someone else has. But if you can detach and you can actually be humble enough to assess honestly what's going on, void of your own ego clouding your, your vision, you can do these two things. You can, you can see better and you can maneuver more quickly.

• 2:18:13Speaker 01

  That idea of seeing better, and I've spent a lot of my time thinking about what this means in the private sector now is even how you measure success. You talked about being paranoid just a minute ago about what a good leader in a good organization, what they're paranoid about. The way we measure success is revenue. There's a whole bunch of ways we have this objective measurement. We're making more money than we did. We're growing. What a really good leader is actually doing is

• 2:18:40Speaker 01

  what's happening, what, where are we going to be in three years? My vision isn't just the next quarter. My vision is the things that I'm doing and you have to actually pay attention to what your competition. Now you don't spend all your, a hundred percent of your time in your competition, but you're paying attention to, and your vision is actually the farthest down ranges it can possibly be. Because if we think quarter to quarter and sometimes we, we even sometimes think year to year. And these big companies we work with, this long game, this long plan is recognizing what we're doing now. This, it isn't going to work forever. We're going to have to change. We have to see where we're, where we're going and that is going to change all the time. And that requires as a leader to be looking up and out all the time. You asked that question to the muster, when should we be thinking strategically?

• 2:19:26Speaker 01

  People like, well, maybe.

• 2:19:27Jocko Willink?

  Actually, I got asked that.

• 2:19:30Speaker 01

  And the, and the answer is all the time, all the time. And it's that vision of looking of, if you don't have an idea of where you're going to be down the road, you're never going to get to where you need to be. And it's the same story of, hey, the, the win was, we took this hill.

• 2:19:47Speaker 01

  Okay, what did taking this hill allow us to do? And if you didn't have a vision of where we needed to go and why that hill is important, you should have just bypassed the hill altogether because it's not getting you where you need to be. And a leader, a good leader, has to be able to do that. And that's, that vision isn't, isn't always just literal vision. It's actually where, where is this organization going to go? Because when you're inside and you're a tactical guy, like most of your employees are doing tactical things, they don't see that. They don't see the vision and if you can't impart that on them and let them understand what the vision is, they're going to drive you in the wrong direction. Not, not because they're careless and not because they don't, because they simply don't see it. Um, and for a leader to be able to see it and articulate, that's really, very few leaders

• 2:20:31Speaker 01

  are able to do that really well and guide their organizations in that direction.

• 2:20:35Jocko Willink?

  Yes, that's a tough combo to come up with. The person that can, has the vision and then that can, can impart that division, that vision, but, and that means implicitly that you have to translate that vision to various types of people that are inside your organization. And it's definitely a challenge. And of course, the dichotomy to all of this is if, you know, strategically in jujitsu, we want to get the top position and we want to dominate that position, then we want to submit the person. If we don't defend the choke, we're getting choked. If you don't make it through this quarter, you're right, you, that's good. You, you had a good strategic vision and you, can you lose tactically and lose strategically in doing so?

• 2:21:19Jocko Willink?

  Yes, you absolutely can. You absolutely can. You can not pay attention to what's going on right in front of you and you can, you can end up getting destroyed.

• 2:21:29Speaker 01

  Yes.

• 2:21:30Jocko Willink?

  There was a 10 to 1 ratio. It wasn't a 10 to 0 ratio.

• 2:21:34Speaker 01

  No, that's right.

• 2:21:39Jocko Willink?

  Back to the book. American pilots developed new tactics based on these two advantages. When they engaged the MiGs, they sought to put them through a series of maneuvers. The F-86 faster transitions between maneuvers gave it time advantage. The pilot transformed into a position advantage. Often, when the MiG pilots realized what was happening, they panicked and thereby made the Americans' job even easier. These tactics illustrate the way fast transitions contribute to overall speed and to a time advantage. The importance of the time and speed in a broader sense has been brought out in the work of John Boyd, a former Colonel in the US Air Force. Boyd studied a wide variety of historic battles, campaigns, and wars. He noted that where numerically inferior forces had defeated their opponents, they

• 2:22:23Jocko Willink?

  often did so by presenting the other side with a sudden, unexpected change or series of changes. The superior forces fell victim because they could not adjust to the changes in a timely manner. Generally, defeat came at a relatively small cost to the victor. This research led to the Boyd Theory, which states that conflict may be viewed as time competitive cycles of observation, orientation, decision, action, the Oodle Loop. First, each party to a conflict enters the fray by observing himself, his surroundings, and his enemy. In tactics, this equates the adoption of a hunting instinct, searching, actively looking,

• 2:23:04Jocko Willink?

  hunting for the enemy, and seeing what he is doing or about to do. It also includes anticipating the enemy's next move, getting inside of his mind. Second, based upon these observations, the combatant orients to the situation, that is, produces a mental image of the situation and gains situational awareness. This awareness becomes the foundation of which to erect a plan. Generally, better the orientation, the better the plan. Next, based on this orientation, the combatant decides upon a course of action. The decision is developed into a plan that can be disseminated among subordinates for their planning and execution. Last, the combatant acts or puts the decision into effect. In tactics, this is the execution phase where the decision or plan is implemented.

• 2:23:49Jocko Willink?

  Since this action has changed the situation, the combatant again observes, beginning the cycle anew. This is called the Oodle Loop.

• 2:24:00Jocko Willink?

  Get some.

• 2:24:01Speaker 01

  There it is, the get some. And, you know, this thing came out of airplane against airplane. It's that MiG F-86 story. The Marine Corps saw this and the entire maneuver warfare concept for the Marine Corps came from this guy, which is incredible to think about, but it's that same, we're a numerically inferior force with relatively limited loss can outperform and overwhelm a massively inferior enemy or a massively superior sized enemy, which is, which is amazing just based on speed of maneuver.

• 2:24:38Jocko Willink?

  The Boyd theory helps to define the word maneuver. It means being consistently faster than our opponent. As our enemy observes and orients on our initial action, we must be observing, orienting, deciding and acting upon our second action. As we enact our third, fourth and fifth mood, by the time, by the time gap between our actions and our enemy actions increases, increasingly widens. The, our enemy falls behind in a panicked game of catch up. He tries to respond to our penetration. We attack his reserves and his command and control. He counter attacks with his mobile reserve. We bypass with helicopter borne forces. Everything he does is too late. That sounds like a lot like rolling with good jujitsu with someone that's better than you. That's exactly what it feels like.

• 2:25:20Speaker 01

  Same thing, man.

• 2:25:22Jocko Willink?

  Thus, the military answer to this question, what is speed is not simple. Nonetheless, it is central to every aspect of tactics. As General George Patton said, in small operations as in large, speed is the essential element of success. We should also exercise caution so as to not confuse. Here comes the dichotomy. We should also exercise caution so as to not confuse speed with haste. General Patton made this observation, haste and speed. There is a great difference between these two words. Haste exists when troops are committed without proper reconnaissance, without the arrangement for proper supporting fire and before every available man has been brought up.

• 2:26:04Jocko Willink?

  The result of such an attack will be to get the troops into early action, but to complete the action very slowly.

• 2:26:13Jocko Willink?

  Speed is acquired by making the necessary reconnaissance, providing the proper artillery support, bringing up every available man, and then launching the attack with a predetermined plan so that the time under fire will be reduced to a minimum.

• 2:26:31Jocko Willink?

  So there's a dichotomy. Always there's a dichotomy.

• 2:26:33Speaker 01

  Wow, with everything.

• 2:26:36Jocko Willink?

  Have to write a book about that. Check. Becoming Faster. Now we see clearly the importance of speed. We want to be fast. How do we do it? We start by recognizing the importance of time.

• 2:26:51Jocko Willink?

  As leaders of Marines, we have a responsibility to make things happen fast. Our sense of the importance of time, of urgency, must direct our actions. We must work to create and build that sense within ourselves. This is the kind of thing you read to yourself before you go to bed at night and when you wake up in the morning. We have a responsibility to make things happen fast.

• 2:27:20Jocko Willink?

  Once we have it, there are a number of things we can do to increase speed. First, we can keep everything simple.

• 2:27:32Jocko Willink?

  Simplicity promotes speed. Complexity slows things down. Simplicity should be central to our plans, our staffs. Large staffs may be one of war's greatest consumers of time, our command and control and our own actions.

• 2:27:50Jocko Willink?

  So this is why, if you saw my task unit going to assault something, they were in the same formation they were always in or damn close to it. Second, speed is increased through decentralization.

• 2:28:05Jocko Willink?

  Decentralization is an important concept in the execution of maneuver warfare. How do we achieve decentralization while still maintaining control? We use two main tools to provide that required, to provide the required control of the effort and the decentralization of its execution. These tools are mission tactics and commander's intent. Mission tactics is the assignment of a mission to a subordinate without specifying how the mission must be accomplished. It is a key tenet of maneuver warfare. In mission tactics, the higher commander describes the mission and explains its purpose. The subordinate commander determines the tactics needed to accomplish the task based

• 2:28:46Jocko Willink?

  on the way the mission, based on the mission and the higher commander's intent. In this way, each leader can act quickly as the situation changes without passing information up the chain of command and waiting for orders to come back down. Speed is greatly increased by this decentralization process. According to John A. English and his work on infantry, decentralization has been one of the most significant features of modern war. English wrote, "In the confused and often chaotic battlefield environment of today, only the smallest groups are likely to keep together, particularly during critical moments. In such circumstances, individuals rally around their leader, who, armed with the

• 2:29:27Jocko Willink?

  knowledge of the purpose or intent behind their task, can lead them toward success." And this is what we talk about all the time. Decentralized command, the fourth law of combat. And I often describe it, even though it's last, it's certainly not least. You need to have the others in place to effectively execute decentralized command. There has to be a simple plan. You have to have a team that's going to cover and move for each other. You have to know what the priorities are. But then you have to have decentralized command. And the way you get decentralized command is not by explicitly giving. You know, there's a, there's a, there's a book and the Germans, as we were, as we were implementing

• 2:30:14Jocko Willink?

  decentralized command and maneuver warfare in America. What we started doing was we started adding, adding the commander's intent to like the last slide of a brief. And so commander's intent, and going back to the book and then I'll wrap back to that. The commander's intent provides an overall purpose for accomplishing the task assigned through mission tactics. Although the situation may change, subordinates who clearly understand the purpose. That means why and act to accomplish that purpose can adapt to a changing circumstance on their own without risking diffusion or effort of, of effort or loss of tempo. Subordinate commanders will be able to carry on this mission on their own initiative and through lateral coordination

• 2:30:55Jocko Willink?

  with other subunits rather than running every decision through the higher command for approval.

• 2:31:03Jocko Willink?

  So in this, this German was looking at the way that we're planning and the Germans, you know, they're the ones that kind of pushed forward with this idea of mission, mission tactics and commander's intent and really decentralized command. But he, he would see the commander's intent at the end of a brief. There'd be a hundred slides, a hundred PowerPoint slides in a brief. And then the last slide would say, hey, the commander's intent of this operation is to blah, blah, blah. And this German said, that last slide can actually replace this entire brief. What is it that you want me to do? You just spent a hundred, you just spent an hour telling me all the different ways you want me to do something. All I need to know is what is it you want me to do? Why do you want me to do it?

• 2:31:48Jocko Willink?

  And I'll go make it happen.

• 2:31:52Speaker 01

  When we're working, the idea of decentralized command comes up all the time, as you might guess. And I know you know that because you've seen it over and over again. And initially, when we were talking about some of the frustration of junior leaders in the organization, mid-level managers, maybe supervisors, they get really frustrated that their senior leadership doesn't understand what's going on and they can't, they don't have what they need to solve the problems. And I say, "Hey, who here wants their leaders solving their problems for them?" And they all put their hand up initially, they're like, and that's their initial reaction because you can, they're frustrated and they... And I'm like, "Let's think about that for a second.

• 2:32:30Speaker 01

  Do you want your bosses coming down here to your world and actually applying solutions to your problems?" And they stop and they think and they look, "No, no, I don't, I don't want that." Like, "Why don't you want them doing that?" And inevitably, what they come down to is that, "Because they don't understand what I'm dealing with day to day." I'm like, "That's exactly right." Because if they did come down to your world, they don't have every single minute of every single day of all the context you have of the problem you're dealing with. And no matter what they do, it's gonna be wrong because they don't understand it as well as you do.

• 2:33:05Speaker 01

  And what, and on both sides, what people are thriving for in that is just tell me what you want me to accomplish and then leave me alone because I can actually do that better. And then if you reverse that with the senior leaders, like, the same thing is they don't want to be down there because it takes them away from all these other things. And really, all that's required is for the leader to have the vision and the subordinate leader to understand, "What are we trying to get done?"

• 2:33:31Jocko Willink?

  Yeah. You know, it's a good converse to that question when you ask the subordinates, "Hey, do you want your subordinate, do you want your boss to fix your problems for you?" And of course, they all say yes. Another way you could broach that question with an equally... Probably predictable answer is if you say to the leaders, "Hey, do you want your folks just to do what you tell them to do?" And of course, they're all gonna say, "Oh, yes, absolutely." And then it doesn't take very long into that conversation before you realize that they have no idea how to actually accomplish what it is that they envision. They have no idea how to operate that piece of equipment. They have no idea how to program that piece of software. They have no idea of any of those things. And so, same answer.

• 2:34:17Jocko Willink?

  It's like, "Yeah, that seems like a good, seems like what I want, but that's not what you want." What you want is subordinates. You want decentralized command where everybody leads, everyone solves problems, everyone's moving towards the unified vision that has been clearly stated by the boss of what the commander's intent is. That's what you want. That's how you run an organization.

• 2:34:38Jocko Willink?

  You would think that that would be what everyone would be striving for, and you would think that in striving for it, it would come to be clear how you actually do it and how you actually give people decentralized command is by actually letting go.

• 2:35:01Jocko Willink?

  Letting go. Let people, let Leif Babin go and run the operation. Let Seth Stone go and make it happen.

• 2:35:14Jocko Willink?

  And yes, do I train them to get ready for that? Absolutely. Do I build a relationship so I trust them? Yes. Do they understand where I stand, what the parameters are? Do they know how much they're allowed to maneuver? Do they know what line they should never cross? Yes, they do. And that allows me to say, "Yeah, go get some." You go, you know what you need to get done? Go make it happen.

• 2:35:38Jocko Willink?

  And by the way, it's not just Leif and Seth. There's other elements. It's Andrew Paul. Andrew Paul, go run operations. The other assistant platoon commanders, Mike Sorelli, go run, go make it happen. Can't run, how am I gonna run five operations at the same time? I can't. So that's what you do. That's decentralized command. Back to the book, a third way to become faster is through experience. Experience breeds speed. Experience gives units advantages over less experienced units. This is why veteran units are usually much faster than green, untried units. If we are familiar with a situation, or at least know generally what to expect, we can think, act, and move faster. Little overlay.

• 2:36:21Jocko Willink?

  In peacetime, our Marines are not likely to be combat veterans. Still, we can give them experience through tactical decision games and sandtable exercises, war games, field exercises, and rehearsals. These and other forms of training help reduce the stress and confusion of combat.

• 2:36:37Jocko Willink?

  Another way in which experience helps us become faster is through the use of implicit communications. Implicit communications are mutual understandings that require little or no actual talking or writing. For example, two company commanders know each other well. They think alike because their battalion commanders established standard operating procedures and has schooled subordinate commanders in approach to war. This is exactly what I was just talking about. Seth and Leif. Those guys know. There's implicit communication. They don't need to ask me. They know. Thus, the company commander of Company B, Company Bravo, does not need to talk with the company commander

• 2:37:21Jocko Willink?

  of Company Charlie very often in action because each knows from common past experiences and from daily observations how the other is likely to react in many different situations. If Bravo Company's commander creates an opportunity, Charlie Company's commander will take advantage of it. That is implicit communication. It is faster and more reliable. It is more reliable than explicit communication. Trying to pass words or messages back and forth over telephone radios. There are so many things that...

• 2:37:53Jocko Willink?

  I had that my guys knew the implicit, they implicit, it was implied they understood exactly where I was coming from. From the way that they behaved on the battlefield, the way they behaved on liberty, everything. It was like, okay, well, there's a lot, like when I just said, there's a line that they know, they knew what that line was.

• 2:38:13Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 2:38:14Jocko Willink?

  They knew what that line was.

• 2:38:15Speaker 01

  What also goes to show and prove why you can't do decentral, you can't do this thing, this fourth law of combat, if you don't have the beginning, if you, it's that implied communication, that's the strength of your relationship with these people. It's how well they know you, it's how much they trust you, it's how much you understand them and it's how strong that first rule is, is what allows you to do this thing that actually, if you kind of think about it in some, some terms, decentralized command, you could actually make an argument that it's the most important thing in combat in this particular case, because it's so required, because you as a leader can't be in 15 different places. But no matter what you do, if you don't have the beginning, if you don't have the foundation,

• 2:38:57Speaker 01

  if you don't have a good relationship, you can never do this. You can never have implied communication, because I'll never really understand what it means if I haven't, and, and you, and you, you can't skip this, you can't accelerate this again, I'm, I'm decentralized command guys, like, well, that's great, but if you don't have a good enough relationship with your people, it won't work.

• 2:39:21Jocko Willink?

  We were at one of the musters. We were done. I think it was the San Francisco muster. Maybe. But anyways, we were having our debrief and it was, people had to go, so it was a smaller debrief, not everyone was there. Jamie, who is our director of operations, who is the logistician behind the muster, who handles everything that's happening and it's completely decentralized. But we get done with the muster and of course, everything was just impeccably run from, you know, if someone has to wait in line for 15 seconds to register, we get, like that's a failure, right? So.

• 2:40:03Jocko Willink?

  So when we got done, we're in this room and I like, I could see and you know, people were coming up to me saying this, I've never been in an event that was run this smoothly. They're not even talking about what they learned. They're just saying, how is this thing run so smoothly? And how is everything so professional? And how is every little thing that that occurs?

• 2:40:24Jocko Willink?

  Perfect. You know, so we get in this debrief from and, and you know, and what I said was, I said, to Jamie and Jen, who and Lynn, the kind of the powerhouse of trio who run all these logistics. I said, you know, I should have said this before any of these musters. But everything that happens at the muster is a complete reflection of our company of Echelon Front. If we can't run a smooth check-in, then who are we to be advising people, you know, as to how to run an organization? And the fact of the matter is, so, so I never said that to them.

• 2:41:07Jocko Willink?

  And yet they, the, the team, the Echelon Front team, the volunteers as well, everyone that shows up, they go to the nth degree to make sure that everything is smooth, to make sure that everyone. And that, this is clear, Jamie never had to ever hear those words come from my mouth. Because Jamie knows me and Jamie knows that what, how I roll is like, oh, this will be the best thing that everyone, anyone ever goes to. That is the standard. Now, I never said that to her. She knew 100% in her soul, that's how we roll. If there was a question between, hey, you know what, we can, we can save, we can make this a little easier on the volunteers or we, or on the, on the employees. Or we can, we can adjust this a little bit and, and save a little bit of money here.

• 2:41:52Jocko Willink?

  Or, hey, it doesn't matter if the, if the people that are attending might not be able to see the whole, like whatever, whatever the case may be. Whatever it was, the, the thing that she knows, that the team knows, that the rest of her, which she implied that right down to her whole team. Cause you know, she's got 20 people there that are working for her and they're all have the same mindset, which is. We will do everything to the nth degree. Hey, will we, will we make mistakes? Absolutely. Will, will we drop the ball sometimes? Yes, we will. But when we drop that ball, we will pick it up. We will recover and we will run that thing for a touchdown. And, and make it up to the person that you, whoever was affected. So that's like a classic example of implied communication.

• 2:42:36Jocko Willink?

  I don't need to tell you, hey, we're going to show up early for the, for the people that we're working with tomorrow. Look, you don't need to hear that, right? Like this is just a known thing. That's the way it is. Like you said earlier, you're not showing up saying, you know what? I don't really have time to prepare, so I'm just kind of, kind of wing it today. Like, that's not happening. That's not what we're doing. And so those kind of implied thing. And Leif has great examples where he was making decisions and making calls and, and something I never said to. But you know, he'd come back and say, hey, this was happening. This is what I did. But I'd be like, yeah. And he'd say, yeah, I didn't need to call you and say, hey, what do you think we should do here? You know, and this is because the trust, the relationship, then you're right, that does take time to build.

• 2:43:21Jocko Willink?

  And what's really scary is when people, when the trust isn't there, when the relationship isn't there, and people start trying to guess what the implied communication was. I thought you would have wanted me to do that. And that's something that I did. So, so I would have guys that would come, let's say, roll through. When I was a platoon commander, I was a task unit commander, someone might roll through and go out on an operation here or there. And they didn't, they thought they knew me or they thought they knew Leif. And all of a sudden they'd make a move out there on the battlefield and you go,

• 2:43:55Jocko Willink?

  man, that was not a good move. And clearly I did a fail to, to let them know that, that this was not what we're doing. And because my, because my guys knew me and they, they knew what the implied communication was, they didn't, they, they did it. And I didn't have to make it. I didn't have to be verbal with it. But someone that just shows up for, you know, a week and all of a sudden they're out on an operation, they do something that's dumb. My fault, our fault as leaders, because we didn't make it explicitly clear, hey, here's what's going on. Here's how we, here's why we don't do that.

• 2:44:31Jocko Willink?

  Here's why we don't fire warning shots from, from a sniper Overwatch. This seems like a, this seems like a obvious thing. Yeah. You know, and Leif sitting in a platoon brief wouldn't say, hey, guys, we're not taking warning shots. It's implied that it's a clandestine situation as long as we can keep it that way. And if we, when we have to, when we have to go, we're going to start killing people, not firing warning shots. You're not, you're warning people that don't know we're there. This doesn't make sense. But you know what happens? And that particular thing happened. And again, we as leaders needed to understand, hey, we don't have that full relationship. We don't, people don't understand things as well. So you have to watch out when people start trying to guess what the implied communication is. I don't want you to guess.

• 2:45:17Jocko Willink?

  So I don't want you to guess at what I'm thinking. I want you, if you don't, if you're not sure, I want you to actually raise your hand and say, hey, Jaco, my guess is that you're doing this, but I don't want to guess. I want to actually know. So hey, if you're thinking something, that's my responsibility as a leader to say, hey, if you don't, if you're not sure, hit me up. Hit me up. Yeah.

• 2:45:39Jocko Willink?

  Back to the book, another way speed gains from experience is the development of lateral communications or coordination. If all communication is up and down the chain of command, action will move slowly. If commanders and leaders at every level, level communicate laterally, if we as leaders talk directly to other leaders, action moves much faster. Lateral communication is not a natural consequence of mission orders. It must be practiced in training. It results from the confidence of the higher commander who has through past experiences found that subordinates can exercise initiative based on the assigned mission and commanders stated intent. As you just said. Yeah.

• 2:46:24Jocko Willink?

  A good example of lateral communications comes from aviation.

• 2:46:30Jocko Willink?

  Dave Berke.

• 2:46:32Jocko Willink?

  In the air, the pilots of a flight of aircraft communicate laterally as a matter of course. A pilot who, who needs to talk to another does so. A message need not go through the mission commander and then be relayed to the other pilot. Events would quickly outpace communication if pilots tried to talk that way. The commute, the same procedures may be employed by ground combat and logistics as units as well.

• 2:46:59Jocko Willink?

  What, when, what parameters are you given where it's like, okay, you do need to run it through the chain of command? Is that like, hey, I'm going out of the AO?

• 2:47:07Speaker 01

  Man, yeah.

• 2:47:08Jocko Willink?

  Like, I'm, I'm leaving, I'm, I gotta depart the area, something like that?

• 2:47:13Speaker 01

  It's such a small list. It would really, it would really boil down to a deviation of what our main practices are, our overarching SOPs that, hey, these are just some big foundational things that we do. It would have to be something like, I'm leaving a location

• 2:47:34Speaker 01

  that everybody's probably thinks I shouldn't because I think something else is happening. And if I don't have the big picture, maybe I'm like, hey, look, this is what's happening. This is a critical decision, maybe then. But the reality is, is the question you're asking me, I'm thinking,

• 2:47:49Speaker 01

  I, I don't even know if I have a good example where I would have to defer to the chain of command, given how limited my time and how, you know, you're on minutes. You have, and so if I spend 10 minutes trying to work this answer out, that's probably all the time I actually really had to go execute anyway. So the answer to the question is, I could barely think of an example that I would have to stop what we're doing, ask the boss who's somewhere else, can I go do this?

• 2:48:15Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, and on the ground, it's really, it's real easy. Hey, we're gonna go across this line, this limit of advance. Do we have, can, can we do that?

• 2:48:23Speaker 01

  Can we do that? There's something else going on that would create risk if I did that.

• 2:48:26Jocko Willink?

  Can you tell someone else that I'm moving into their AO? I want to hit a building that wasn't on the target list. Can I do it? You know, so, and you know what's interesting is, again, Leif and Seth, they, they like, they just knew what, I don't think ever Leif did something where I came back and said, you should have asked, or Seth, where I said, hey, you should have told me what was going on, or you should have asked me what was going on. Those guys knew, again, implicit communications, hey, I'm leaving, I'm, I'm going across this limit of advance, I'm gonna call him Jocko and just let him know. Or, hey, I want to hit this building, I'm gonna go, or hey, I'm, I'm doing this different for the first time on an operation.

• 2:49:06Jocko Willink?

  I'm gonna check with Jaco and see like that's never did I say to myself, you should have told me. And there was and there was not a lot of times where they were telling me something where I was like, dude, come on, of course, go do it. Like, both those guys had such a good feel for, and they might err towards letting me know, of course, which I think is the good way to err. You know, hey, occasionally, maybe I'd be like, yeah, man, no problem, of course. But I would never say, dude, just do it. What's wrong with you? No. I'd rather you lean towards letting me know what's going on.

• 2:49:35Speaker 01

  And I think that's a that's a huge distinction. The difference between asking for permission and informing your leadership, those are very different things. So in that same question, I would let them know whoever they all the time. Hey, I'm moving here, I'm doing this, and as an informative, I'm gonna let my leadership know almost as much as I can, but in terms of like, I don't know if I should do this. I'm gonna, I think I and stopping with the flow, this tempo to get permission, because my leadership had created this level of friction that I couldn't make real time decisions. The deference to the chain of command that up and down that he talked about. We even went so far to if you were my squadron commander and I was a captain

• 2:50:17Speaker 01

  and you were a colonel and on this particular mission, I was the flight lead and you were number two, you were my wingman. Your rank did not go with you into the cockpit. It didn't matter that you were the squadron commander. I wouldn't treat you like a squadron commander in the airplane. I'd treat you like a wingman. And the expectation was that you would treat me like a flight lead and whatever the natural relationship is there.

• 2:50:37Jocko Willink?

  And that's a good one, because we often get asked, well, you know, your your chain of command is so higher hierarchy in the military. And the example that I always bring up is a breacher, a breach team. So you have a breach team leader that's running the breach. And when that breach team leader looks at me, even though I'm nine ranks above him in the military or whatever, four ranks above him, five ranks, actually more than that, a lot of ranks above him. If he looks at me and says, back up, you know what I do? I back up. If he tells me to get down, you know what I do? Get down. That's the way it works. So he's got the tactical control over that situation and he's the guy in charge. And also, I'd say this. When you, when you talk about asking me like asking, like how often did Leif or Seth or one of the other junior officers say, "Hey, what should I do?" They almost never did that

• 2:51:22Jocko Willink?

  because I beat that one out of them early on. Like that, that we're not doing this. We're not doing this. You come up with a solution. You tell me what you're going to do. So it was almost always they were telling me for giving me the opportunity to negate. If, you know, if they said, "Hey, I want to go to move across this limit of advance," gives me the opportunity to say, "Do it," or negative, "There's already friendly forces in that building hold which got," whatever. Yeah. So yeah, there was, there was not a lot of asking me what to do. And, and was there early on? Sure. The further along we got, the less and less those guys asked me anything.

• 2:51:55Speaker 01

  I was just going to conclude with that same thing is, is that how I was as a squadron commander on day one? No. No. On day one, I wasn't like that. And it, that took a little bit of time to get to that evolution. That idea of decentralized command is built on those relationships. And on day one, you got to figure out those, those things. And it does take a little bit of time. So if you've got a brand new team and you just got brought into an organization and run your team, that doesn't mean you just cut them loose on day one. It doesn't mean that you actually need to spend some time with a little more closer control than you might like. The sooner you get to that, the better. But yeah, absolutely. You got to build those relationships out of the gate so you can get to that point. And if you cut them loose too soon, it's every bit as bad as micromanaging them when they don't need to be micromanaged.

• 2:52:35Jocko Willink?

  Back to the book. A fourth way to become faster is by the commander's positioning himself at the point of friction. This position may be with the main effort, a supporting effort, or in the rear. A commander who is forward can instantly influence the battle as a situation develops. For the same reason, a commander may choose a position at a crucial crossroad during a night movement, or where the unit is pushing supplies forward, or where a counterattack force is in the defense may be sighted. The key is to be where we can best influence the actions of our units. As Marines, we believe in leading from the front, since that is where most friction points occur, but they may occur elsewhere.

• 2:53:15Jocko Willink?

  We must choose our positions accordingly. Throughout World War II and his career, Lieutenant General.

• 2:53:23Jocko Willink?

  Louis B Chesty Puller believed that Marines had to lead from where the fighting was. This command quote, post-business, this command post-business will ruin the American Army and Marines if it isn't watched. He said while he was the commanding officer of First Battalion Seventh Marines at Guadalcanal. As a battalion commander, Puller usually positioned himself directly behind the point element of his battalion and his headquarters element directly behind the lead company so that he could best influence the actions of his unit. From this location, he was able to impose his will and personally affect the outcome of the engagement. Depending on the situation, he could also be found at other points on the march or in his perimeter. His idea was to be where he could best influence the action.

• 2:54:08Jocko Willink?

  Notice even though it's leading from the front, he put himself behind the point element of his battalion. That's not in the point element because then he's the guy shooting his freaking rifle, not making decisions.

• 2:54:23Speaker 01

  It's the same thing in aviation. And so there's a little bit of inherent inflexibility in aviation because you can't take your aircraft and go 75 miles. You can't just leave yourself as the mission commander. So actually, when you have a mission of 24 airplanes, you've got guys that are dedicated as fighters to shoot down enemy aircraft. And you know what? That's the sexy mission. Everybody wants a mid-kill. I want to shoot my missile and shoot down an airplane because that sounds cool and that sounds like the most fun. And that's what people want. The real reason we're out there, the mission we're almost always doing is to do, is to blow something up on the ground, to affect some air-to-ground influence, to kill some target on the ground. So you know where the mission commander is, the guy in charge of the whole thing on every mission? He's with the strike element.

• 2:55:04Speaker 01

  He's with the element that's actually a full wave behind the leading element, which is the fighter element, which clears everything out. And he's actually in the striker element because he, A, can see everything that's out in front of him. And he's actually with the element that will have the most of an amount of impact to the mission, or at least that's the plan.

• 2:55:19Jocko Willink?

  Is he dropping bombs too?

• 2:55:21Speaker 01

  Oh, he is. I mean, every airplane eventually, I mean, from resources.

• 2:55:24Jocko Willink?

  We're up there.

• 2:55:25Speaker 01

  Yeah, we're up there. We're dropping bombs. And he's going to be, at some point, he's going to roll and go, he'll get tactical for a few minutes. He will. He'll go right through the soda straw.

• 2:55:32Jocko Willink?

  In the pop.

• 2:55:33Speaker 01

  Yeah, that's exactly right, in the pop. But the, just like the amount of time that he's going to be doing that is.

• 2:55:43Speaker 01

  90 seconds on an hour and a half mission and he will actually put himself behind that initial wave and be with what is most likely the point of friction. The bottom line is this tactical principle that could apply to a Marine Lance Corporal, a platoon commander, a battalion. It's the same thing in aviation. It's the same responsibility. And the mission commander, oh, by the way, doesn't have to be the senior ranking guy. It doesn't have to be who is the squad. It's not always the squadron commander. He's not. It's, it's, you guys are going here, we're going here and this is, and once I cut you loose and go do your thing. And I was, you know, first, when we did OEF, you know, and we were in Afghanistan, this Operation Anaconda was this big mission. I was on night zero of Anaconda as a captain. I was leading a formation and the guy I was leading was my operations officer.

• 2:56:28Speaker 01

  He outranked me by two ranks. He was way more experienced than me, but on that mission, the squadron commander gave me the lead and he flew off my wing.

• 2:56:37Jocko Willink?

  Is it a workload? Is it a workload issue? Why, why, why do they do it that way?

• 2:56:42Speaker 01

  Um, it's

• 2:56:43Jocko Willink?

  In other words, if I plan every single mission, eventually I just can't, don't have the capacity to plan them all. So instead you plan the next one and that way I can get some rest or I can, you know, be ready.

• 2:56:54Speaker 01

  Yeah. So he can actually go be an operations officer because what he was doing for most of that day, rather than planning that mission, he was forecasting the next 96 hours of sustained combat operations. I can't, the opsO can't afford to, we, he's got to fly. We only have a certain number of pilots, certain number of airplanes. But the rank, it wasn't a matter is who's going to be able to get that job done in the opsO and the squadron commander. We're doing long range strategic stuff. I spent the entire day planning and he jumped on my wing and never once did he take, try to take control of that situation from me, you know, from beginning to end.

• 2:57:25Jocko Willink?

  Got to stay humble. Back to the book. Finally, it is important not only to be faster, but to maintain that speed through time. This endurance is made possible through physical and mental fitness. Physical fitness develops not only speed, energy and agility to move faster, but it also develops the endurance to maintain that speed for longer durations. With endurance, we not only outpace the enemy, but maintain a higher tempo longer than he can.

• 2:58:02Jocko Willink?

  Mental fitness builds the ability to concentrate for longer periods of time and to penetrate below the surface of a problem. For this reason, fitness plays an important part in the life of every Marine. Patton once said, "High physical condition is vital to victory." And here's the conclusion of this chapter. We must be faster than our opponent. This means we must move fast, but more importantly, we must act faster than our enemy. The aim is to tailor our tactics so that we can act faster than the enemy force can react.

• 2:58:43Jocko Willink?

  Our ability to plan, decide, and execute faster than our enemy creates advantage that we can exploit. We have just discussed ways to improve our speed. Readers of this publication may think of additional ways to be fast. When you find one that works, tell your fellow Marines about it so they can use it too. Anything that works to make you faster is good, even if it is not yet in the books. Well, uh, speed-wise, we're not doing real good on this podcast right now because we are now, I don't know, something like three hours deep.

• 2:59:27Jocko Willink?

  And we only made it through another two chapters. So probably not exactly the fastest thing, but we are going deep and we're getting into it. The fact that, you know, we, we were just talking about the fact that we need to keep our mental and physical fitness up in the game. There's ways that we can, there's ways that we can do that. One of the ways that we can do that is a little thing that we like to call jujitsu.

• 3:00:02Jocko Willink?

  How many times have we talked about jiu jitsu today? I don't think it's an overwhelming number of times, but it's definitely there.

• 3:00:09Speaker 01

  Ask me how many times I thought about it.

• 3:00:13Jocko Willink?

  So jiu jitsu, Brazilian jiu jitsu, if you're not training in it.

• 3:00:19Jocko Willink?

  There's no real good reason not to train in it. I get asked a lot, hey, well, you know, I'm 52 years old. Should I start jiu jitsu? Yes. I'm a 130 pound female. That's 48 years old. Should I start jiu jitsu? Yes. I'm, my, my son is only nine years old. Should he start jiu jitsu? Yes. Well, it's my daughter and she gets uncomfortable around people. Should she do jiu jitsu? Yes. You, you get where I'm going here?

• 3:00:48Speaker 01

  Yes.

• 3:00:49Jocko Willink?

  So you're going to change some jiu jitsu. If you're going to train some jiu jitsu, you're going to want to get a gi. Cause you're going to want to do gi and no gi jiu jitsu. Originmain.com. This is our jiu jitsu company. And we're not just making gees. We're also making rash guards. We're making t-shirts. We're making, do you wear joggers? We have no one here to talk about joggers since Echo's on vacation.

• 3:01:17Jocko Willink?

  Apparently Echo likes the joggers. I tried them on one time. It was hilarious. They are not for me. But you know what are for me? Jeans, Origin jeans, made in America.

• 3:01:28Jocko Willink?

  They have a little bit of stretch, a little bit of flexibility. When you see them, you have to kind of break, actually watch the, watch the, uh, video that Pete made, that kind of, he turns the jeans inside out and shows you what quality looks like. That's something that's, that's important to see. Otherwise you don't understand it.

• 3:01:51Jocko Willink?

  And then we got supplements too at originmain.com. Joint Warfare, Krill Oil, Discipline, and Discipline Go, of which Dave partook again. Like clockwork, we're about to, I'm about to say good evening, and he's taking a Discipline Go.

• 3:02:10Speaker 01

  Yep.

• 3:02:11Jocko Willink?

  Getting it in the gullet.

• 3:02:13Speaker 01

  Yeah, you were talking about sample events too, just real quick on the Joint Warfare. The best way to know if Joint Warfare is working? Stop taking it for a couple of days. Go on the road and don't bring it with you.

• 3:02:24Jocko Willink?

  Oh, that's it.

• 3:02:24Speaker 01

  And then.

• 3:02:25Jocko Willink?

  I don't make that mistake.

• 3:02:25Speaker 01

  Yeah, that you won't make it more than once, but if you want to know if it's working, stop taking it for a couple of days. That stuff is working. Uh, we talked about discipline last time, but the, the Joint Warfare. Knee, uh, whatever it is, that stuff is working. If you get off that, you're going to feel it right away.

• 3:02:40Jocko Willink?

  You know, that's, uh, we have, you can get subscriptions to our, to our gear at originmaine.com. And that's one, that's, I think that's the highest subscription rate.

• 3:02:51Speaker 01

  The auto refill.

• 3:02:52Jocko Willink?

  The auto refill. For sure. You're gonna get this and why, you wonder, hmm, why, why do people want to auto refill that? That's why.

• 3:02:57Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 3:02:57Jocko Willink?

  Because people, they forget to reorder it and all of a sudden they're off the, off the Joint Warfare for a few days. They feel like crap. And so they go, I'm never making that mistake again. You should see the stockpile of Joint Warfare I have. It's ridiculous. I will never run out of Joint Warfare.

• 3:03:14Speaker 01

  Good.

• 3:03:15Jocko Willink?

  So Joint Warfare, Krill Oil. Krill Oil is another, like a universal, just universal goodness. And, and I haven't not taken Krill Oil and, and Joint Warfare in so long, I can't even tell you like what it feels like to not take them. I'm not, I'm not going there.

• 3:03:35Jocko Willink?

  And Molk. Which apparently, according to our last podcast, you're just, you're on the strawberry milk train.

• 3:03:43Speaker 01

  So the thing with strawberry is it's the one, it's so of all, and look, I have a good supply of all of them. The, what strawberry did to me is the first one I'm taking.

• 3:03:55Jocko Willink?

  What it did to you.

• 3:03:56Speaker 01

  There is no reason to have it. Like every other time was, hey, I want to replace a meal or I need a little extra protein or I'm on the go. I'll take strawberry for no reason. It's that good. That's the one little difference between strawberry and the rest is I was like, no reason for this other than I just love it. So I can blame, I guess I can blame strawberry, but that's what my relationship with strawberries. I'll take it when I don't need to because it's just so good.

• 3:04:21Jocko Willink?

  The thing that I love about all the flavors of Malt is

• 3:04:27Jocko Willink?

  when I get done eating, even if I'm like happy, I had a good meal, I had a big giant, let's face it, I'm having a big ribeye, maybe it's a bone in ribeye, maybe it's a tomahawk ribeye, which I will not hesitate to order at all. Even then I'll get home, I mean, I'll eat a, eat a, you know, a 22 ounce tomahawk ribeye. Bless that thing. Beautiful. I'll destroy that thing. I'll get home and I'll be like, you know what, you little, I need just a little hitter. You need to get that Malt hitter to, to, I mean, why would you, you know, they have dessert on the menu, right? You have, they have, there's a reason that they have dessert on the menu in a steakhouse, right?

• 3:05:08Jocko Willink?

  It's because people, even though they got to eat the steak, even though they, they put down the tomahawk ribeye, even though they did that, they still want something like that little dichotomy. They want a little, little, little palate dichotomy is what's going on. And the, the, the Malt hitter, Theo Von style, the Malt hitter can definitely get you that dichotomy of flavor that you need.

• 3:05:36Speaker 01

  It can, and I know we're not being disciplined with time, but here's the thing with the Malt too, is it used to be that if you wanted to get that little sweetness, the thing, there wasn't any real substitute for what was on the dessert menu. Everything was gonna be kinda not quite right and a little chocolatey, but, and so you had to get the dessert and actually with the Malt, you don't go, you know what, it was good, but it wasn't quite, it's now just as good. So you don't, you don't need that dessert menu anymore because that used to be the only way to get that hitter was. The milk is like, it's that good.

• 3:06:10Jocko Willink?

  It's that good.

• 3:06:11Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 3:06:11Jocko Willink?

  Alright. And there's Warrior Kid milk too, cuz if, cuz most of us are not trying to literally give our children poison in the form of sugar. So get your kids those strawberry or chocolate Warrior Kid milk hitters. So they get stronger and faster and become better human beings. And don't forget about that white tea.

• 3:06:40Jocko Willink?

  Because there's not too many people out there that just don't want an eight thousand pound deadlift, which is guaranteed, hundred percent, double. I'm trying to think of Echo, you normally covers this part cuz he's more, you know, got the science down. Triple placebo. Triple blind study has been done. And then we have a store. It's called Jaco Store.

• 3:07:05Jocko Willink?

  Where you can get, you can get t-shirts, rash guards, truckers hats, beanies, you can get flex fits hats. I don't think, were you wearing a baseball hat ever?

• 3:07:16Speaker 01

  Uh, yeah, I have the, I got the trucker hat.

• 3:07:19Jocko Willink?

  Oh, okay.

• 3:07:20Speaker 01

  So here's the thing with the Jaco Store is, so I actually have access to the Jaco Store directly. I don't, I don't have to go to jacostore.com. I'm one of the lucky ones that has access to this. But here's the thing. I don't get stuff from the Jaco Store because it's accessible to me. I get it because those are the best t-shirts that I got. I'm serious, like I get that stuff and when, and when Echo hears, hears a rash guard, I don't wear it just because he gave it to me. Cuz I actually could, if I, if I didn't, I'd go buy a rash guard. I would, I'd spend the money to get the rash guard that I wanted. I actually use this, wear this stuff because it's the stuff that I like the most.

• 3:08:03Speaker 01

  And it isn't just because I can call Echo like, hey, bro, hook me up, which I can. And that, you know what? That's good to go.

• 3:08:08Jocko Willink?

  Does he hook you up?

• 3:08:10Speaker 01

  He, he hooks me up.

• 3:08:11Jocko Willink?

  Echo just went on report.

• 3:08:12Speaker 01

  And not only does he hook me up, Koa, his cousin Koa, he hooks me up. It's good stuff.

• 3:08:18Jocko Willink?

  And if you don't know this, if you support Origin or you support the store, that's actually what supports this podcast. If you, if you ever listen to this podcast and you say to yourself, "That was pretty good. I got something out of that," then that's, we appreciate, because that's, that's how we make this podcast is through your support to this podcast, which if you want to subscribe to it, you can do so because, well, if you listen to it, you should subscribe to it. And Echo thinks that people don't subscribe to it. Is he paranoid? Should I be more paranoid? Should I be freaking out? People aren't subscribing. No, they're subscribing. If you haven't subscribed, subscribe.

• 3:09:00Jocko Willink?

  And also check out the Warrior Kid Podcast. How often do you listen to Warrior Kid Podcast with your children? Dave Berke, go.

• 3:09:08Speaker 01

  Only when they're with me in the car, which is every time I'm with them, I'm driving them somewhere.

• 3:09:14Jocko Willink?

  Right.

• 3:09:14Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 3:09:15Jocko Willink?

  And are they, you, you feel like the lessons are, are sinking in?

• 3:09:24Speaker 01

  They are. Two things. One, I learned from the podcast that my kids will learn things at the ages they are when I didn't think they could. I, I always, "Ah, they're too young. They're not going to get it." They do, because they reference it. They, they will tell me things that they heard. They'll, "Chaco said this." And, and actually, they don't even, they actually say Uncle Jake said this. They say that. And then the other piece, and if you're not, if you're, if you're a Jocko Podcast listener that doesn't have kids and you're not listening to Warrior Kid Podcast, I have learned things on the Warrior Kid Podcast as a parent, a ton of things. So it isn't just for them. As much as it is for them, I am the beneficiary of that as well. And it is good for them and it is good for me too.

• 3:10:08Jocko Willink?

  Do you like my Warrior Kid Podcast voice?

• 3:10:12Speaker 01

  So not, I have been a guest on the Warrior Kid Podcast and I know how to change my voice just a little bit to make it more appropriate for the kids. No doubt.

• 3:10:22Jocko Willink?

  I didn't consciously do that. I didn't consciously say, "You know what? I gotta, that's just like, I was just like, okay, I'm talking to kids."

• 3:10:28Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 3:10:29Jocko Willink?

  "Hey, kids, this is the Warrior." It's like, that just what came out of me. I didn't say, "Okay, need to think about, need to get into Warrior Kid Podcast character." No, that's just when I'm talking to, trying to engage a bunch of kids, you gotta give it a little bit of that. Little bit of that thing.

• 3:10:44Speaker 01

  Absolutely.

• 3:10:45Jocko Willink?

  Little bit of that, little bit of that. So yeah, Warrior Kid Podcast, if you want to check that out, and don't forget to check out IrishOaksRanch.com for young Aiden that's making soap on his farm.

• 3:10:58Speaker 01

  Aiden's in the game.

• 3:10:59Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, so you can stay clean. YouTube channel, the YouTube channel is called the Jocko Podcast, and there's videos on it of this podcast. If you want to see what Dave Berke looks like, you can see. If you want to see what any of the guests, if you want to see what I look like, then you can go to there. And if you want to get small excerpts that Echo Charles made that he thinks are legit, you can check out, you can subscribe to the YouTube channel. And we've got Psychological Warfare, a couple of tracks, so that you can overcome moments of weakness. And we also have FlipsideCanvas.com, that's Dakota Meyer. Listen to Podcast 115.

• 3:11:39Speaker 01

  Yes.

• 3:11:40Jocko Willink?

  Listen to Podcast 115. Just listen to Podcast 115. Dakota Meyer, hear his story, hear what he has done, what he's been through, his life. And I talk to Dakota on a fairly regular basis. And just check out FlipsideCanvas.com. That's, that's all you really need to say. OnIt.com/Jaco, if you need some workout gear, have the word fitness there. If you need some workout gear, so you can jack some steel, check out OnIt.com/Jaco and get some gear for yourself. And we've got some books. Dave, what do you think of the books?

• 3:12:25Speaker 01

  Get some books. Same thing with the podcast. You've got the Warrior Kid Podcast. You have the Warrior Kid books, Way of the Warrior Kid, and Mark's Mission. I've got the third book now, Way of the Warrior Kid, Where There's a Will. And we are talking a lot about Danny Reinhardt in my house right now. And, and how much Mark can't stand Danny Reinhardt.

• 3:12:51Speaker 01

  That book, the, the stories in all three of those books, just like with the podcast, my kids are learning things that I didn't think they were able to learn at their age and they are, and there are lessons that are applying to their, my daughter's going into fifth grade. It's applying to her world and the people and the things that she's doing. And as a parent, I am stealing so much from those books. To be able to better parent my kids because of what I know is working for them in these books. So the Warrior Kids series, you gotta get that series and Mikey and the Dragons too. Uh, just because it's sort of geared towards a younger kid. Same exact thing. The, the story in that, my kids get it. They understand that it is so legit.

• 3:13:29Jocko Willink?

  And then there's Discipline Equals Freedom Field Manual, which is a book that I wrote. And it's, answers a lot of questions that I got asked a lot about my own personal kind of operating system, I guess for lack of a better word. What to eat? How to rest, workouts, and I guess the more impactful part is what I'm thinking about.

• 3:13:57Jocko Willink?

  Discipline Equals Freedom Field Manual, how to get after it. The audio is on Amazon. It's on, it's on MP3. It's not on, it's not on Audible. So you can check that out. And then there's Extreme Ownership and the Academy of Leadership, which were written by me and my brother Leif Babin. When did you read Extreme Ownership for the first time, Dave?

• 3:14:17Speaker 01

  I was at the first book release. Leif gave it to me. I met him in DC. And I had never, didn't even know you guys were writing a book. He, he said, come out and join us. Uh, he was in DC for that release and that probably late 2015, I'm guessing, October of 15, something like that. Handed me a copy of the book.

• 3:14:30Jocko Willink?

  Was that when, when we were all together at an event?

• 3:14:33Speaker 01

  No, it was, it was just Leif. Uh, he was in DC on, on his own.

• 3:14:37Jocko Willink?

  Was it before that? I'm trying to think when you.

• 3:14:42Jocko Willink?

  Okay, okay.

• 3:14:43Speaker 01

  It was before you and I actually met again, which was probably the following month. It was probably a month before that.

• 3:14:49Jocko Willink?

  Check.

• 3:14:50Speaker 01

  And, uh, cause I was going to school in, in DC and he was out there and he's like, hey, jump. And I hadn't seen him in a while. He handed me a copy of the book and it was all new to me. And, and for all the other books on there, you gotta start, you have to start with Extreme Ownership, because that's really the thing that, that makes all of it make sense is you have to understand that of what that mindset really means. And you have to read that. Everything we're talking about today was a dichotomy. This entire one tech, three manual is a dichotomy. And that's why you sort of have to have both of those together. And you need to read those for the rest of them, even for the field manual to really make sense. That mindset of, of really what Extreme Ownership means, it, it underpins all of it. You have to have, you have to have both of those books. You gotta read them.

• 3:15:33Jocko Willink?

  And then we got Echelon Front, where Dave Berke goes in with the rest of the team. And what we do is we, we talk about things that we talked about today, but more important, we give the actual pragmatic, hands-on instruction and assessment to make sure that leadership inside of an organization is actually moving in the right direction from a strategic perspective and that everyone is on board and aligned and got that. If you need, if you have a problem in your organization of any kind, it's a leadership problem. And we can help you with

• 3:16:10Jocko Willink?

  your problems, all of them. Echelonfront.com for details on that. We have EF Online, which is a, it's a tool. It's an interactive leadership training tool where you will not just get some repetition on the information, but more important, you'll start to absorb it in a different way, in a more comprehensive way. You'll be put into leadership scenarios that you have to unfold and unwind and make decisions in, by the way, this is interactive online leadership training. You have to make decisions.

• 3:16:46Speaker 01

  And as for good as the face-to-face training is, as critical as that face-to-face training is with us, it's simply not an inoculation. It is not a one-time thing in this EF Online resource, because it actually, it's dynamic. Even though it's dynamic, that's what allows you to get the additional reputations. That isn't just the same thing over and over again. It allows you to think about what it means to be a leader and how to actually problem solve in real time, and the recognition that you gotta think about that stuff every single day.

• 3:17:14Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, and the way technology is now, I mean, there's so many advantages to it.

• 3:17:20Jocko Willink?

  For instance, you're in a classroom with 170 people at your event, and you're taking notes on something that Dave Berke just said, and then all of a sudden you look up and you missed his next little topic. That's not happening with EF Online. You're pressing pause, you're rewinding it, you're watching it again, you're submitting a question. You know, you've got that going on. You're going to the Q and A, you're watching. You're trying to make decisions based on what you just learned. When you don't make the right decision, you're having it explained to you why that decision wasn't the best decision for you to make at that time? So yeah, it's a great training tool.

• 3:17:58Speaker 01

  It is. And one last thing, there's a lot of people that are on EF Online right now, a lot of people. And about once a month, Flynn, JP, Leif, we actually get on to a live Q and A session. So what folks will do is they'll go through this training and they'll, "Hey, I need a little more fidelity on it, a little more detail on this one," and they'll write that down. They'll submit it, and I'm on a live Skype session. And I'm like, "Hey, Jaco, what's your question?" He'll ask me that question. There'll be 100 people listening to that, and we'll dig deep into that one question to really drive that home. And that's for the folks that are on EF Online. Not only does it help the person ask the question, there's 100 people listening, they're taking notes too, because it's all the same stuff. So I love, one of my favorite things about EF Online is those live Skype sessions that we're doing with the people that are running through that training.

• 3:18:39Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, and one thing that's nice from my perspective is, you know, doing the live stuff for me on social media, for instance. It got, I still do it, I need to do it a little bit more often, but it gets a little crazy because there's people that are... What they, they, they might not want to ask, talk about leadership, which, which is fine, which is great, you know, I get that, that's, there's a broad audience out there. But if you are on EF online,

• 3:19:04Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 3:19:05Jocko Willink?

  You can ask me a question about your particular situation.

• 3:19:10Speaker 01

  Yep.

• 3:19:10Jocko Willink?

  And you know how many questions I get when I go online and do a, do a Facebook Live or a, or a Instagram Live or a, or a Twitter, what's it called, Periscope Live? I mean, there's literally, there'll be a thousand questions in, in 20 minutes. When I did it with, I was with Pete and, and Brian, and we were in New York, and they're like, you gotta do, do an Instagram Live, you know, Q and A. I said, okay, who's got questions? And they break it down, um, how old the question is. So like, this question came three minutes ago. This question came four minutes ago. My questions, it would say, there would be between five and 10 questions. No, I think it was between like three and six questions every second.

• 3:19:55Jocko Willink?

  So it'd say, there'd be six questions, it'd be this question came four seconds ago. And so it just wasn't feasible. And then, and then I gotta sort through all those. So with EF online, you're getting that narrower, you're getting a group of people, what are they interested in? They're interested in learning about leadership. There's, it's a closed group. So yeah, check out EF online, that's a good point. The muster, Chicago's done. Uh, next up is September 19th and 20th, Denver. It's, it's gonna sell out, they've all sold out. If you want to come, register now, go to extremeownership.com for those details. And then of course, we have EF Overwatch, which, what do you think about EF Overwatch, Dave?

• 3:20:36Speaker 01

  I just came back from a client last week where we had, I spent a day with their executive leadership team, and it's the first time I've been with a client where one of their executive leaders was placed from EF Overwatch. A guy who, long service in the military, an amazing career, looked to transition to, to continue to make big impact in a company. They get screened and, and through our organization, what Mike Sorelli has done with Overwatch is make sure they understand these principles. He went off to this company, and the dude is crushing it. He's crushing it. He's making massive impact in that organization, and they're benefiting hugely. This, this idea of taking the lessons that they learn in the military and then centering around the Extreme Ownership concepts that we teach, and putting them in an organization, and how much reach they have, it's-

• 3:21:20Speaker 01

  Overwatch is awesome. It gives a place for veterans to go, but it also gives for the private sector to get those lessons in there. And man, to see what that guy's doing is so legit.

• 3:21:28Jocko Willink?

  And the, the idea that we've talked about on the last podcast, and we brought up a little bit today, but you're overlaying what you know, right? We're not, we're not taking and imposing, "Hey, well, this is how we did in the military." No, no, no, no. And this, we talk about this with our, with our candidates that we place. It's like, hey, you don't impose, you take what you know and what you understand, you overlay it onto what this company's trying to do. The leadership principles are going to be the same. But we take your knowledge and your experience and you have so, like these, these guys that we're getting to fill these slots, they have so much, they have so many overlays to place that they've seen this before. They've done this before. Maybe it's not, hey, it's not the exact same thing.

• 3:22:09Jocko Willink?

  It wasn't in a manufacturing plant. It was in a, it was in a squadron. It was as a troop commander. It was as a battalion commander. It was like one of these situations where they're going, okay, oh yeah, I've dealt with this situation before. Here's how we can fix it. Here's where I see a lack of decentralized command. Here's where I see priorities not being set. So that is efoverwatch.com. And if you are not sick of Dave and I yet talking, which you can see, we can talk, especially when it comes to these subjects. But if you want to talk to us a little bit more about it, you can find us on the interwebs, on Twitter,

• 3:22:47Jocko Willink?

  Instagram, and on the Facebook. Dave is at David R. Burke, B E R K E, and I am at Jaco Willink. Dave, any closing thoughts?

• 3:23:05Speaker 01

  Marine Corps Manual 1 Tag 3 is about Marine Corps tactics. And what it is, is actually about leadership. And it applies everywhere. And this has been a blast. This is awesome.

• 3:23:15Jocko Willink?

  And we're only four chapters deep.

• 3:23:19Jocko Willink?

  And to all the service members out there in the Army, in the Navy, in the Air Force, in the Coast Guard, and yes, in the Marine Corps. And that includes reservists and guard units, everyone that's out there that have worn the cloth of this nation. Thank you for making the podcast possible by upholding freedom and democracy in the world. And of course, to our police and law enforcement and firefighters and paramedics and EMTs and dispatchers and correctional officers and Border Patrol and Secret Service and all the first responders out there. You also make this podcast possible by providing the safety that we cherish in our great homeland.

• 3:24:04Jocko Willink?

  And to everyone else that is out there, remember some of those things that we talked about today. Remember to make maximum use of every hour and every minute. Remember that a good tactician has a constant sense of urgency. We should feel guilty when we're idle. Guilty when we're idle. Never waste time and never be content. Never be content with the pace at which things are happening. You should always try and drive it faster.

• 3:24:45Jocko Willink?

  Time is important and we have a absolute responsibility to make things happen. And in order to do that, what you have to do is get up every day and go get after it. And until next time, this is Jaco and Dave. Out.