Part One: The Men Who Might Have Killed Us All

Robert sits down with Margaret Killjoy to talk about how mankind went from building one atomic bomb to building tens of thousands of them, permanently 15 minutes or less away from ending all life on earth. (5 Part Series) Sources: https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/a-horrifying-and-believable-path-to-nuclear-war-with-north-korea/ https://mwi.westpoint.edu/inside-frighteningly-plausible-nuclear-attack-scenario/ https://sci-hub.ru/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10736700.2018.1513920 https://sci-hub.ru/https:/www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10736700.2018.1513920 https://www.si.edu/media/NASM/NASM-DoomsdayDelayed.pdf https://doomsdaymachines.net/p/i-have-sought-to-slaughter-as-few https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1996/november/strategic-bombing-always-myth https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/does-strategic-bombing-work-world-war-ii-test-case-proved-it-or-not-173621 https://www.junobeach.org/canada-in-wwii/articles/rcaf-bomber-squadrons-overseas/strategic-bombing/ https://www.npr.org/2021/08/06/1025059199/fallout-tells-the-story-of-the-journalist-who-exposed-the-hiroshima-cover-up https://secretaryrofdefenserock.substack.com/p/bombing-because-you-can-operation https://www.amazon.com/Bombing-Win-Coercion-Cornell-Security/dp/0801483115 https://www.amazon.com/15-Minutes-General-Countdown-Annihilation/dp/1250002087 https://www.amazon.com/Command-Control-Damascus-Accident-Illusion/dp/0143125788 https://www.amazon.com/Nuclear-War-Scenario-Annie-Jacobsen/dp/0593476093 See omnystudio.com/listener https://omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Speaker names marked ? are inferred from speaking time and the show’s known hosts — they are not voice-verified.

• 0:01Speaker 00

  Cool Zone Media.

• 0:07Speaker 01

  I was just doing the atonal screaming for you, Robert. What did you think?

• 0:10Robert Evans?

  Well, now, now you fucked up the introduction, so it doesn't feel good now, does it? It feels bad.

• 0:18Speaker 01

  Well done, Magpie.

• 0:19Robert Evans?

  See, it's harder than it sounds, you know?

• 0:20Speaker 01

  You know what? Honestly, kinda fun.

• 0:23Robert Evans?

  I'm just hoping that the, the listeners here will appreciate how much work goes into my atonal screeches, because to be polite, they sound a lot better than your atonal screeches. That's all I'm saying.

• 0:34Speaker 01

  I, I actu- I absolutely agree. So give the listeners one.

• 0:38Robert Evans?

  No, no, no. I think they've gotten enough atonal screeches.

• 0:41Speaker 01

  Ah, okay.

• 0:43Robert Evans?

  Instead, let's talk about, I don't know, I'm not, we're not on video this week, folks. I'm not feeling well. I just had a vasectomy, uh, which,

• 0:51Speaker 01

  Brag.

• 0:52Robert Evans?

  I debated on, because I don't like talking about my private life on this show too much, but I also think it's a good thing to encourage. So guys out there, if you, if you're thinking about getting a vasectomy, if you're like, should I get a vasectomy? Go do it. Or do it yourself, you know? It doesn't look that hard.

• 1:07Speaker 01

  Don't do that.

• 1:07Robert Evans?

  The doctor wasn't down there very long. You could figure it out, you know? Pruners. Pruners? Sure. You know, whatever it takes. Rubber band, that's how we do it on the, uh, the sheep. Uh, anyway. Margaret, Killjoy, guest, how, how are you doing? I'm good. I didn't have surgery this week. That's also good. That's better than having surgery as a general.

• 1:29Speaker 01

  I love that for you, Magpie.

• 1:31Robert Evans?

  I certainly prefer the weeks when I don't have surgery. Even if it's minor surgery, it's never very fun.

• 1:39Speaker 00

  This is an iHeart Podcast. Guaranteed Human.

• 1:43Speaker 03

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• 2:11Robert Evans?

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• 2:42Speaker 04

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• 3:16Robert Evans?

  Margaret? How often do you think about the fact that, at any given moment, we're at the most 30 minutes away from the entire planet being wiped out?

• 3:27Speaker 05

  Well, I've been thinking about it more recently.

• 3:29Robert Evans?

  Robert, that was depressing. Yeah, yeah, it's a...

• 3:33Speaker 05

  I watched a movie about this recently, and it's back on my mind.

• 3:36Robert Evans?

  A lot of people have, a lot, which is kind of why I haven't actually seen that movie yet, but I've, this is always on my mind. It's a special, the whole nuclear doomsday, planetary nuclear doomsday device that we largely co-created with Russia is on my mind a lot. I'm just interested in the facts of how it came together and who made it. And I'm interested in, because our subjects this week are, broadly speaking, all of the people in the US at least who built that, because we don't have quite as much granular detail on their counterparts in the Soviet Union. You can generally assume a version of everything we're talking about this week happened over there, too, right? Like, they didn't not create a planetary-killing doomsday device.

• 4:16Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 4:17Robert Evans?

  We both just kind of built one that was heavily based on our game theory understanding of how the other side would respond in like, an escalating nuclear scenario. And the end result of that was, both countries were ready perpetually, and are still today, ready at all times, to wipe out more or less all of human civilization, but in roughly 15 to 30 minutes. That's, that's about how long it would take.

• 4:42Speaker 05

  Do you ever think about quantum immortality? Sorry, I'm just gonna go straight into wig net shit.

• 4:47Robert Evans?

  That's a nice thing to think about. It's comforting at least, the idea that like we'll never experience the worst case scenario because our consciousness doesn't persist in those moments.

• 4:55Speaker 05

  Except ki- that's okay, that is, that is, and I think about that specifically around nuclear destruction because I think about how often the people of the generation, you know, ahead of mine are like, they almost seem silly how worried they were about nuclear apocalypse because it didn't happen during the Cold War. So we're like, oh, obviously humanity would never do that, but it would be impossible for me to be alive now if the world had been destroyed. So even if nine times out of 10, we destroyed the world, we're stuck being alive in the one, the one out of 10. So it actually makes me more fearful because I'm like, well, it might just be pure raw luck that we didn't annihilate ourselves.

• 5:38Robert Evans?

  Yes, and unfortunately, I think that is, if you're trying to look at this from an educated and accurate perspective, that is the only reason we're all alive. Because it, we nearly wiped out, we like, the number of times that the whole world nearly got wiped out in atomic hellfire is like, you have, you have too many to count on all of our fingers and toes in this podcast combined, right?

• 6:02Speaker 05

  Oh, God.

• 6:02Robert Evans?

  It happens so many times.

• 6:06Robert Evans?

  And, and the, the amount of resistance, whenever someone pointed out, oh, hey, the way this was built could kill us all at any moment accidentally, that happens so many times. We'll be talking about the fucking Minutemen missiles and how they were initially set up. But what's interesting about this week is that our, our subjects are kind of like Schrodinger's bastards, where some of these guys do have big body counts, especially the folks who were, you know, responsible for getting the, like Leslie Groves, right? Who was the general who oversaw Manhattan Project, right? You can put a lot of deaths under his, his name. But most of the people who built this system never killed anybody, even indirectly, really.

• 6:42Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 6:43Robert Evans?

  But they could at any moment, guys, in fact, guys who's, whose last bit of work was in the 60s, could 15 minutes from now, if, if the right things had started happening 15 minutes ago, or a couple of seconds ago, 15 minutes from now, all of these guys could become the biggest murderers in world history, right? Collectively.

• 7:01Speaker 05

  But they won't be remembered.

• 7:02Robert Evans?

  But they won't, no one will be, nothing will be, right? That's the beauty of atomic hellfire. History is written by the victors and there's no victors. There's gonna be no victors of a nuclear war, simply no history written. But they are, they are interesting in that, because a lot of them are not like, bad, and some of them are even deeply sympathetic. There's a guy we're gonna talk about who may have saved all of human life, but also helped, still did help build the machine that could at any moment end it all, right? Because it's, and I need to correct this from the start, all of this is still relevant, because absolutely nothing has been done to make this system safer since the end of the Cold War. And in fact, it's significantly more dangerous than it was at the end of the Cold War, in part because Russia's no longer pretending to not be in a launch on Warren situation,

• 7:46Robert Evans?

  which is where both Russia and the United States are today, is launch on Warren, which means that the policy of both governments is to start shooting everything they have when they have a credible warning that they're being nuked, right? And our best case scenario would be like, one crazy country, like North Korea decides to fire a single ICBM at the United States, but that would still trigger a massive nuclear response. And if for some reason, we couldn't get in touch with the Russian government, and as a heads up, there have been times where we've been out of touch with them for as much as 48 hours, when there's been like, critical things to, like, that happens. The gaps in comms like that, especially since Ukraine happened. And if we started launching missiles, the way that most of our missiles would work,

• 8:29Robert Evans?

  a lot of them would go through, or at least appear to be going towards Russian airspace or Chinese airspace for a while, and none of these radar systems are perfect. So there's a very good chance, even if we weren't, didn't have it set up to cross Russian or Chinese airspace, they would think that for a period of time that is longer than the amount of time they know they have to choose to launch their arsenals in response, as per the way deterrence theory works. This could happen at any moment, this could have started happening seconds ago, right? So that's what we're talking about this week, is how we got to this point, that we have not ever stepped back from, we are just as close as we were during the Cold War. That's very important for people to understand. So this, these next couple of weeks, we're going to talk about how this all came to be, right?

• 9:14Robert Evans?

  Because all of the men we're talking about this week, most of whom, again, have no body count and probably lived otherwise decent lives, all of these guys... Put the work in to make this machine, knowing that they were building a system that if used would lead to planetary genocide, and they built it anyway. They built it because they knew it would work that way, right? Uh huh. So, we're gonna talk about why, we're gonna talk about, because they thought they were doing the morally right thing. And up until now, you could make a case, up until the missiles fly, you could continue making a case that it was the right thing to do, which is part of one of the fucked up things about it, right? Right. Um, so this is, this is a complicated topic, but I do think these people are worth

• 9:56Robert Evans?

  discussing, in part because these are all people who sat down and had conversations about like, okay, we do this, and that'll kill about 600 million people. Yeah, build it, you know? Like, these are, these are the talks that they were having. There's, there's a joke that gets made online today a lot, a meme about a tech company building the Torment Nexus, an imitation of classic sci-fi novel, Don't Create the Torment Nexus. It's kind of a joke about the way a lot of tech bro, a lot of tech projects feel now, where it's like, this is exactly what the sci-fi that inspired you was warning against, right? But that really is the reality of the atom bomb. And this is not something I knew until I read the book Command and Control by Eric Schlosser, which is one of the sources, one of several books that I used as sources for these episodes. And at the start of his book, Schlosser points out that the first person to conceive directly

• 10:41Robert Evans?

  of an atomic bomb was H.G. Wells, who wrote a 1914 novel titled The World Set Free. Um, I was not aware, now, there's some other candidates, but this is like the first, I'll, I'll tell you why this is, I think, the best candidate for like, the first guy to imagine an accurate, a semi-accurate conception of an atomic bomb. In it, Wells puts together a story that is weirdly like the backstory of the Federation in Star Trek. Scientists create the ultimate explosive, a radioactive bomb that allowed someone to carry in a purse or suitcase, quote, "an amount of latent energy sufficient to wreck half a city." As Schlosser writes, "These atomic bombs threaten the survival of mankind, as every nation seeks to obtain them and use them before being attacked. Millions die, the world's great capitals are destroyed, and civilization nears collapse."

• 11:26Robert Evans?

  But the novel ends on an optimistic note, as fear of a nuclear apocalypse leads to the establishment of world government. And this is Wells. "The catastrophe of the atomic bombs, which shook men out of cities, shook them also out of their old established habits of thought," Wells wrote, full of hope. And yeah, I think that's fascinating. I didn't know any of that. Yeah. Well, he also, he's really into wargaming. He also, he would have, oh, he would have been so into Warhammer if he was alive. He genuinely was into wargaming. Yes, I know. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah. Him as Warhammer man. I like that idea. He would have been also another war, big wargaming nerd who would have been into Warhammer was the guy who played Grand Moff Tarkin. Early Napoleonic wargamer. Anyway. Oh, yeah.

• 12:08Robert Evans?

  Wells's nukes didn't work quite like the real things. They went off slowly and they let off huge amounts of radiation over years of time. But Wells came pretty close to foreseeing that the real thing, close enough to foreseeing the real thing. That in 1929, a Hungarian physicist named Leo Szilard, S Z I L A R D, met with Wells to try and purchase the literary rights to publish his novel in Central Europe. This is relevant in terms of like, who was the closest to a nuke? Because Leo Szilard is one of the fathers of the atom bomb. A decade or so after trying to buy the rights to this. Oh, God. He comes, he comes to the US and he's, he becomes one of the architects of the Manhattan Project. And he's a guy, you can't really blame Szilard, right? Again, if we're talking about where does the moral blame lay?

• 12:54Robert Evans?

  Sure. He has the most understandable reason for wanting to help the US build a nuke of anybody. And it's kind of good to talk about him because it does make the point that it's a little unfair to judge these men without talking about the circumstances in the world that formed them. Szilard was a Jewish refugee. He fled Nazi Germany and he wound up in the United States. Because he was a physicist and because he was a refugee of the Holocaust, he knew not only the threat that fascism represented, but he knew that Hitler had a bomb program going. Yeah. And in 1939, he sends a letter to Albert Einstein, laying out his fears and Einstein's like- This is the guy who sent the letter? To Einstein and then Einstein helps him write a letter to FDR. Yeah, please, yeah. Yeah. But and then they send like Einstein helps him craft this letter and he sends it to FDR.

• 13:37Robert Evans?

  And this letter warns about bombs of a new type. And FDR takes the warning seriously that he keeps exploring the idea, which helps lead to the establishment of the Manhattan Project in 1942. Like that's Leo Szilard and he ties directly back to the Wells idea. That's-

• 13:52Speaker 05

  Awful. That's so, the fact that we can like literally say, not only don't build the torment nexus, but maybe don't write the torment.

• 14:00Robert Evans?

  Maybe don't write about the torment nexus. I mean, it's, I think Sillard probably was, I think he probably was into Wells because he, he, like, people had theorized before Wells that something like an atom bomb might be feasible, unlike the physicists had. And I think Sillard was impressed that Wells had gotten something so close. And also, he clearly wanted to warn the world about this thing, which I think is why he was interested in purchasing the rights to this. And we'll talk a little bit more about him later, but it is, it is so tragic, because you, you can't blame him. Like, he's like, his attitude is like, we need, we need to have this because Hitler might have it, right? Which like, yeah, maybe, I don't know. But that's the same logic that like, and you know, the USSR is

• 14:43Robert Evans?

  not Nazi Germany, obviously. We can, the proof of that is as simple as what happened in the Cold War, right? And to be fair, neither is the United States. Neither country used the damn things on the scale that would have ended civilization.

• 14:56Speaker 05

  Right.

• 14:57Robert Evans?

  You know, we'll talk about Hiroshima and Nagasaki too, but it's, you understand, like, Sillard's motivations are deeply sympathetic, right? And a number of scientists behind the Manhattan Project, some of them are refugees, right? But the ones that aren't still get into it because they're reading the news. They're see, they're aware of how dangerous the US, like, the US's enemies are during World War II. And it's a legitimate threat that Germany in particular might get the bomb before we do, right? And those stories are like, half the reason this happened, because a lot of people of goodwill got involved with the Manhattan Project, because they were like, well, this is probably the lesser, it's probably better that the US has this than that a fascist country is the only one with a nuke, right?

• 15:38Speaker 05

  Right.

• 15:38Robert Evans?

  Like, that's their logic here. And they, they, they had to operate on, we know that the Nazis were never gonna get a nuke, right? Just based on the choice, because they didn't, right? They went in different directions. They did not make the choices, ultimately, that would have given.

• 15:51Speaker 05

  Have you, have you heard this? Like, maybe it's in the script, or maybe I'm like, wrong about this, that there was a work slowdown of the Nazi. The Nazi bomb program where they were like, and they went and they tried to tell their US counterparts like, hey, we're slowing down this bomb. You all need to slow it down too. But the person that they told didn't believe them and was like, oh shit, they're trying to lie to us. They must be like right about to build this bomb. Have you heard this story?

• 16:17Robert Evans?

  No, I haven't actually. No, no, no, it's not.

• 16:20Speaker 05

  Uh, I, I, okay. I can never remember the name of the book because I found it in a trash can 20 years ago. It was about the social history of building of the bomb. And I read this and, and it like changed the way that I was perceiving this stuff. But I've since read more about this and researched more about this. And I think it's like messier than that. But I think, again, just from memory, that there was like a work slowdown in the Nazi program because it was all of these physicists who it used to work with Jews because before all the Jews got kicked out of the physicists programs. I don't know. I don't know if that's true or not.

• 16:54Robert Evans?

  Uh, neither do I. Um, so check on that. But uh,

• 16:59Speaker 05

  I want to believe.

• 16:59Robert Evans?

  Yeah. I mean, there's a couple, there's some good, there's some stories like, I mean, and espionage is heavily baked into the whole story of how this all happened, right?

• 17:08Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 17:08Robert Evans?

  And it's a, the spies in the US who bring bomb information to the USSR are people working on a similar logic to Zillard where they're like, well, the US is obviously not a good actor. And if they're the only ones with the nuke, they're going to kill everyone in the Soviet Union, right?

• 17:24Speaker 05

  Oh, yeah.

• 17:25Robert Evans?

  Like, and maybe, you know, they, we talked about it. Plenty of you guys talked about it. We had a plan to do it, you know? So you're not, and maybe by, by the way, it's, if it's arguable that building this doomsday device stopped a war that would have killed hundreds of millions and was ultimately the right thing to do, and a lot of people argue that to this day, then it was certainly morally right for scientists to leak information to the Soviet Union because otherwise the US would have killed 600 or so million people.

• 17:56Speaker 05

  Right.

• 17:57Robert Evans?

  Right? Um, we know that because we talked about doing it a lot.

• 18:03Speaker 05

  You were really right with the like Schrodinger's bastards.

• 18:06Robert Evans?

  Yeah, exactly.

• 18:06Speaker 05

  These people are heroes or bastards and we will never know. And in half the timelines, they're one and then half they're the other.

• 18:13Robert Evans?

  I guess part of why I'm doing this is that if this happens, like 15 minutes after you finish listening to this podcast, you'll know who to be angry at in your last couple of seconds of consciousness, assuming you're not near ground zero for one of these things.

• 18:28Robert Evans?

  And you probably want to be at ground zero. It's the least painful option available.

• 18:34Robert Evans?

  The road is optimistic in terms of like the aftermath of thermonuclear war on a planetary scale.

• 18:42Robert Evans?

  Anyway, so those guys, but guys with that logic, basically that like, well, this is a messy thing. I don't really want to be building a giant bomb, but it might save a lot of lives in the long run. That's like a sizable chunk of the Manhattan Project, right? That's like a big amount of the logic behind the reason individual people got involved, right? The other half, though, is a, and this is largely on the military side of things. It's not exclusively military thinkers, but this is, this is how the military thinks of these weapons, both when we're starting to plan one and then immediately after we start using them, right? And the military logic for why this is, why building this system, why getting as many of these things as possible is a good idea, is based on a military theory that starts

• 19:27Robert Evans?

  to take hold after the end of the First World War. And this is ultimately the theory that leads us to the system of international mutually assured destruction that we live in today, right? And there's a, there's an element of historical rhyming here that we, we build this global, real literal global doomsday device as a result of a theory that takes off in the end of World War One, based on what happened in World War One, because World War One is itself the result of a doomsday device going off, a device that was never supposed to go off and a device that a lot of people, if you, right up until the start of World War One, if you talked about this, this system of alliances and military buildup, right? And like, and arms buildup, that like you've got all these munitions refit schedules and whatnot and interlocking alliances.

• 20:12Robert Evans?

  Was meant to ensure that there wasn't going to be a colossal European war, right? That was the people who would defend it would say that like, well, if everyone's really well armed and if everybody's always and if we have all these alliances between different powers that make it an unwinnable situation, we won't have this war, right? People would make that argument, you know? Now, obviously, the technology at the time, they didn't have access to ICBMs and nuclear submarines. So they had to make do with defensive alliances that promised one country would enter a theoretical war on another's behalf. And these do work like a machine, right? And that's, that is what happens, you know? You have Austria declares war on Serbia. That brings France and Germany into it. The German plan that they had built meant that like, well, the only way we can possibly

• 20:57Robert Evans?

  win this war is we have to do this specific kind of invasion that takes us through Belgium. That brings Great Britain into the, you know, and so on and so forth. Right. And they have Maxim gun. And they've got, everyone's got a version of the Maxim gun. And everyone's got, you're, everyone's also thinking, well, I just re, like, we just refurbished and upgraded our artillery. And France is, France has just upgraded this thing, but they haven't upgraded this thing. And if we go now, they won't have the new version of this thing and ours will still be the, like, that's a big part of the thinking too, right? And this is like, always the case. And it had been for decades prior to World War I. And prior to World War I, the fact that it would be so costly and it was so, like, everyone's

• 21:39Robert Evans?

  plan to, for victory rested on so many, like, assumptions and was sketchy enough. No one really wanted to do this, right? I mean, with the exception of the military thinkers, who had spent their entire lives building and planning out these, the system of like, this is how we're going to activate our troops. This is the order at which we'll get them marching and this is where they'll move in. They really, so you have this mix of, nobody on the civilian side of governance wants to think about this seriously because it would be a calamity and they know it. And everyone in the military is thinking about it constantly. So the instant you start having leaders need to make a decision as to whether or not they're going to go to war, the loudest voice in their ear is this general who's thought of nothing else his entire professional life.

• 22:24Robert Evans?

  And by the way, in the six minutes a US president would have to shut, decide whether or not to launch the nukes, the loudest voice in his ear is going to be a guy who thinks about using the nukes nonstop. Yeah, it's like his job. It's his job.

• 22:38Speaker 05

  This is like the, you know, the whole like, an armed society is a polite society?

• 22:43Robert Evans?

  Uh huh.

• 22:43Speaker 05

  Logical fallacy?

• 22:45Robert Evans?

  Yeah.

• 22:46Speaker 05

  You know, like, it's, it's just so interesting that it's this writ large where we have.

• 22:50Robert Evans?

  Yeah.

• 22:51Speaker 05

  We have data that shows that an armed society is not a polite society.

• 22:54Robert Evans?

  It sure isn't.

• 22:55Speaker 05

  Not, I, I pro second amendment for complicated reasons, but.

• 22:59Robert Evans?

  Very complicated.

• 23:00Speaker 05

  But like, it's just not, it's like, you could watch all the videos of people being like, you parked in my space and now they're shooting at each other.

• 23:06Robert Evans?

  Yeah.

• 23:06Speaker 05

  And they would have been punching each other in a different world.

• 23:09Robert Evans?

  Yes. And it's one of those things, I have had, I've literally had the exact situation of like, I had a situation that would have been violent, but we all had guns and knew it, and so nobody started shit.

• 23:22Speaker 05

  Right.

• 23:22Robert Evans?

  And I'm also more than aware of the fact that like, the United States is more violent than a lot of unarmed societies, right? Um, and.

• 23:31Speaker 05

  Yeah, because if you carry a gun, you have to have an entirely different mindset where you kind of can't.

• 23:35Robert Evans?

  It changes everything. Yeah.

• 23:36Speaker 05

  You actually can't stand up to your, for yourself. You kind of have to take, possibly even the first punch, right? You just have to be, you have to do everything possible to de-escalate.

• 23:46Robert Evans?

  Literally everything to avoid violence.

• 23:48Speaker 05

  Taking a couple hits.

• 23:50Robert Evans?

  Yeah.

• 23:50Speaker 05

  Because you know that you're capable of an overwhelming capacity of violence.

• 23:55Robert Evans?

  Yeah.

• 23:55Speaker 05

  And it, people don't do that. Instead, they're like, isn't this sick? I've got overwhelming capacity of violence.

• 24:01Robert Evans?

  And that's one of the worries with like, the nukes is when they go from, because prior, one thing I will say, and this is something I'll even give Nixon, basically all of our leaders and all of the Soviet leaders, right? It's, it's a mistake to leave them out too. This is the thing that would only have worked if both sides were similar for all of the flaws of all of the men running both countries, the duration of the Cold War, all of them had one thing in common, which is they were guys who were like, no, that would be fucked up.

• 24:25Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 24:26Robert Evans?

  No, that, that'd be fucked up. We're just not gonna do that.

• 24:28Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 24:29Robert Evans?

  Right? There's some great, I mean, fucking Reagan has some really good quotes of like, oh, like, where he's like having this conscience of like, I can't believe we as human beings created this nightmare system. This is so much worse than I ever knew it was. What's wrong with people? Reagan had those moments, right?

• 24:46Speaker 05

  Cause he wants to punch people. You know, he wants that.

• 24:48Robert Evans?

  Yeah.

• 24:48Speaker 05

  He wants to do the lower level of violence, like.

• 24:52Robert Evans?

  And there's some good, there's a good JFK quote when this all got explained to him for the first, because JFK, one of the things he did is he took away the military's control of the nukes, right, and made it, because the military used to be, have a, basically theoretically could have made the call to launch the missiles without presidential authority. It wasn't mechanically necessary, the way it is now, right? Like, the way the code system works now, you mechanically have to have the president looped in, right?

• 25:19Robert Evans?

  Although there, we'll talk about that, it's not a perfect system either. But that, that became the way we do it during JFK's administration. And when he, when all of this got explained to him, how this works, I think his exact quote was like, can we call ourselves the human race? Like, what, what the fuck?

• 25:37Robert Evans?

  Are you fucking kidding me?

• 25:38Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 25:40Robert Evans?

  And they all, like, there's a lot, you get a lot of reactions like that from presidents, and that's the only reason we're all alive to this day. And that's the thing, not just with the US and Russia, but with any country that gets a nuclear power, is maybe you get someone at the head of that country who can think about that, and who can think about, for whom it's not an unthinkable, right? And that changes everybody's calculus to a startling degree, right? This is why a lot of people, there's a good book called Nuclear War by Annie Jacobson, that lays all of this out in a pretty unsparing term, and she provides like a theoretical, and her theoretical is, North Korea's mad king launches missiles for unclear reasons, right? And I, what I don't like about it is I don't really agree with the whole, the, the Kim family are like crazy thing.

• 26:24Robert Evans?

  I think they're pretty rational actors, I just don't think they're thinking about the same things that other countries are entirely.

• 26:31Speaker 05

  Yeah, their backs are to the wall, like, I'm not trying to apologize for them, but, you know.

• 26:35Robert Evans?

  I, I, I see a logic in what they're doing, I don't think they're crazy, right? And I don't, I, which is, there's a, what I think is, I don't think his book is as good, but there was another book that came out a year or two previously by another, like, a scholar interested in the nuclear mutually assured destruction system, that was also a North Korea-US exchange hypothetical, but that didn't rely. On North Korea being crazy. In fact, everyone was performing logically, right? Like, basically, the premise was, uh, North Korea does something that kills some South Korean civilians, right? I think it's they either shoot or they fire a missile and it hits, which has happened before, right? North Korea has, in fact, killed South Korean civilians, uh, not all that long ago, right?

• 27:20Robert Evans?

  And as a result, the North Korean president, without seeking US approval, fires missiles at military targets, non-nuclear missiles at military targets in North Korea. But the, the leader of North Korea, uh, doesn't know that the US didn't approve of the firing of missiles. And their system can't entirely tell what's incoming and what's not. And they see, once North or South Korea fires missiles into North Korea, the US starts raising its alert level and North Korea becomes aware. And anyway, it's this whole, it's this whole cycle of escalation that doesn't require anyone being crazy. It just requires, and by the way, one of the things we found out very recently is that the currently imprisoned former president of South Korea, who is being charged with, I believe, insurrection at the moment,

• 28:05Robert Evans?

  actually did send drones into North Korea illegally without, uh, getting US approval or anything while he was president as part of some boondoggle to basically get to declare martial law, right? So like, this stuff, like, shit like that happens all the time and just hasn't escalated. But like, we have had the first couple of stages of a few different apocalypses occur. This is not a cra- this is not crazy and it doesn't require any power, Russia, the United States, North Korea with nukes, to be like a mustache-twirling madman. It just requires them to all be, have incomplete, imperfect information and focused on their own survival, right?

• 28:42Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 28:43Robert Evans?

  It's, it's good. I love this stuff.

• 28:45Speaker 05

  While you're talking, I'm thinking about all the other countries that also have nukes and like their own things going on, like, you know, like, like, I mean, Israel and North Korea are like comparable entities in my mind in terms of being like, small powers with, that are like pariah states that probably aren't going to do something to get themselves, like, I actually could see personally, I could see a big state feeling more confident to do it, you know, but...

• 29:13Robert Evans?

  Yeah. Uh, anyway, we'll keep talking about this, Margaret, but, uh, first, here's some ads.

• 29:22Speaker 06

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• 29:51Robert Evans?

  This ad is brought to you by ViiV Healthcare, the makers of Devoto, Dolutegravir, Lamivudine. If you're living with HIV, do learn about Devoto. Devoto is a complete HIV treatment by prescription only for some people 12 and older. Your doctor will determine if Devoto is right for you. Most HIV pills contain three or four medicines. Devoto is as effective with just two. No other complete HIV pill contains fewer medicines than Devoto.

• 30:15Speaker 07

  It is unknown if Devoto is safe and effective if you have HIV and hepatitis B. If you have Hep B, don't stop Devoto without talking to your doctor, as it may get worse or harder to treat. Don't take Devoto if you're allergic to its ingredients or taking Dofetilide due to serious or life-threatening side effects. If you have a rash or allergic reaction symptoms, stop Devoto and get medical help right away. Other serious or life-threatening side effects include severe liver problems and lactic acid buildup. If you're female or obese, you may be more at risk. Tell your doctor about your medicines or supplements, medical conditions, liver or kidney problems, pregnancy, breastfeeding, or planned pregnancy.

• 30:50Robert Evans?

  Do ask your doctor about fewer medicines. Visit devoto.com or call 1-877-844-8872.

• 30:57Speaker 04

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• 31:31Robert Evans?

  We're back. Um, yeah, so we got off on a little bit of a tangent, but I wanted to get back to a point I was making, which is the historical rhyming between the, the system, like the mutually assured destruction is a product of a military theory that gets born at the, this like, this theory of strategic bombing that gets born at the end of World War I, right? And that theory only exists because World War I happens and World War I is the result of a doomsday device that wasn't supposed to go off, going off, right? You have all these like treaties and stuff that basically guarantee that if one of a couple of different powers goes to war against basically anyone around them, it will start a chain reaction that leads to a general European war, right?

• 32:16Robert Evans?

  And because of the way that armies work in this period, right? And, and all, basically all military wisdom at this point is based on the last war, as it always is. And the last war for Europe is the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 to 1871. That's not literally the last conflict in Europe during this period, but it's the last big one that people are generally concerned with when they're making their predictions like this. Well, Germany versus France is the only way to have a European war, as far as I can tell, so. Oh, man. I mean, we have not had a good European war since those two got their shit together. And that's why I think we should start tweaking them both, you know? Just, just start, see who we can make angrier at the other, you know? Germany, I hear France has been talking hell of shit, you know? Just set the riot on fire. Maybe invade a little bit. Yeah, shit, set the riot on fire. Fuck it. Let's see what happens.

• 33:00Robert Evans?

  Only France has nukes, so we should be fine. Uh, anyway, the great land powers of Europe, namely France, Russia, Germany, and to a lesser extent Austro-Hungary, knew that the instant war was declared, there was this clock ticking, right? Because most of your army is reserves, right? The largest amount of manpower you have isn't your active duty. It's this, this mass of like reserve troops, these guys who, when they're 18 or whatever, they're basically drafted, they sometimes serve like a year, and then for a period of time, they have to do, it's basically they're all in the National Guard, right? That's the norm in most of these states. You have some version of that. And so it takes a period of time to call these guys up from civilian life. Issue them their gear to get them moved into their units and then to get them moved to the front.

• 33:44Robert Evans?

  So everyone is working, not just, not only do you have this interlocking series of alliances, but once war starts, every side knows I have to be able to get my reserves ready for active duty before the enemy can. Otherwise, they're going to invade before I have my army, which means I have a ticket, like I, once the Archduke of Austria-Hungary is assassinated and then people start to realize that general European war is in play. It's not just a matter of diplomatically, can we smooth this? It's the every, all of my generals are shouting that like, if we don't mobilize now, we don't know that France isn't mobilizing, right? We can't tell. They might be mobilizing. And if they're mobilizing, we only have this period of time to start mobilizing in turn, right?

• 34:25Robert Evans?

  That's a big part of everybody's thinking here. And that's the same with nuclear war, right? Where you don't know entirely what the other side is doing. We, the US, have pretty good data on when people are, because we have this nuts, insane, like level of like spy satellites and shit like that, although all of it has errors, all of it has things that can go wrong, right? None of it's perfect. Soon AI will run it, it'll be fine. Yeah. So everyone's acting off of imperfect information and everybody has a very limited timeframe. And they're being shouted at by their generals that if we don't move in time, we're fucked, right? The whole country could be fucked and you have X amount of time. Now, they have, it's days and weeks, you know, in the case of these European monarchs, right? But that's still a ticking clock, right?

• 35:11Robert Evans?

  Anyway, we all know how World War One goes. Not, not great. Badly for everyone. European power is seriously hobbled worldwide. And, and basically all of the, one of the things that's fascinated to me, and this is the case in a lot of wars, everyone's planning at the start of World War One is based on how the last war had gone and everyone's planning is wrong. Germany, Germany's plan to knock France out of the war in the first couple of months doesn't work. France and Russia have this plan where like, we'll both hit Germany on either side, right? If Germany starts some shit, we'll come in on both flanks and we'll be able to knock out their ability to prosecute the war pretty quickly. Doesn't work that way. Great Britain has this fairly small, really highly trained army that they're like,

• 35:53Robert Evans?

  "Well, we can insert this into the continent if something brushes up and it'll probably be fine," right? And they realize, "Oh, no, actually, we're kinda, you have to have actually millions of guys with guns." You know? "How fast can we draft all the coal miners?" All of these, and Germany, or Great Britain's plans are based in part on like, "Well, we've got this great navy. That's probably all we'll need," right? Yeah, and they have a token. And they got, they got Jero Tolkien somewhere in there, you know? Surely we'll be okay. Anyway, everyone's plans are basically wrong at the start of the war, and it leads to disaster. And so after the carnage, a bunch of military leaders around the world started studying what had happened to try to make predictions about what would happen in the next war, which is the same thing that had happened after 1871, and they'd made the wrong predictions.

• 36:38Robert Evans?

  But they're sure, "This time we'll get it, we're smarter than that last generation of military thinkers." We'll make conclusions from the last war that are right, you know? And one of these guys, among the most influential of these fuckers, is an Italian general named Guilio Duhey. Now, he had been born in Caserta, Italy in 1869, but his family were refugees from Savoy, which was a former Italian possession that had been ceded to the perfidious French. As a young man, he'd attended a military academy and became an artillery officer in the Italian army. He continued his formal education by studying engineering at a university in Turin. Duhey rose steadily through the ranks, and by the early 1900s, he was a member of the Italian General Staff. Basically, they're joint chiefs, right? That's kind of the idea.

• 37:22Robert Evans?

  Uh, he had been an early advocate for dirigibles, uh, initially used as spotters for artillery and the like. And once the first aircraft started taking off, he became an immediate advocate for aircraft as a weapon system, right? Now, this on its own isn't noteworthy. He was right. Obviously, aircraft are pretty important in modern war. Yeah. Very, a lot of people, I'm not, it wasn't universal. There were certainly some guys being like, no, the infantry man with a rifleless would be the, always be the core of any warfighting effort. We don't need planes. There were some nuts, but most intelligent people were like, obviously planes are gonna be useful, you know? Being able to have the sky seems helpful in the event of a conflict. And Duhae, but one thing that did make him noteworthy, where he was kind of seeing far

• 38:07Robert Evans?

  ahead, was that he suggested air power shouldn't entirely be the purview of ground commanders, right? It would effectively need to be its own kind of service, you know? And this is something, even during World War II, there's not an air force in the US. We have the Army Air Corps, right? It's a part of the army. Duhae, ahead of times, is like, no, the air, air, air power should be its independent, its own independent branch. It's different enough, right? It's like the Navy. In 1911, he got a chance to act on some of his theories when Italy went to war in Libya against the Ottomans, because an awful lot of Italians had never really gotten over the Roman Empire. That's the gist of why we keep fucking with Ethiopia. Duhae's conclusion from this was, and this was like the first real world use of air

• 38:48Robert Evans?

  combat power for Italy, and his conclusion is that in the future, planes will get better and high altitude bombing will become the number one battlefield role of planes, right? This is not true for World War II entirely. Uh, I mean, it's debatable, right? But there's a lot of argument that that's not entirely, that high altitude bombing was not the number one battlefield use of air power. Yeah, wasn't high altitude bombing more like bombing civilians? Civilian targets, right? Close air support is less high altitude, because you can't do it as accurately, right? Like, you need to be closer to not hit your own guys as much. This is one of those things, technology's made this kind of true, because like, even a lot of what we'd call close air support today is still pretty high altitude, because you can-

• 39:33Robert Evans?

  Fire missile from pretty high altitude, right? Like if, like modern, like modern weapon systems, you can shoot from higher up, but he's wrong in, in spirit, right? Which is that, like, this is not the way most milit-, most effective combat use of air power in World War II is not high altitude bombing, right? And even if you look in the, the Pacific Theater, right? Like, it's a lot of naval aviation being used to knock out other ships, but it's not really high altitude bombing, you know? Pearl Harbor isn't high altitude bombing, right? Like, like, it's, it's a different kind of use of aircraft. But Duhé is certain that high altitude bombing is gonna be like, almost the, not just, like, critical, but basically the only thing that air power will be used for, right?

• 40:19Robert Evans?

  And he's, he's so certain of this that he becomes kind of an asshole about it, right? Like, he illegally orders the construction of bombers without getting, like, approval to actually spend the money, and it burns out his career. He gets forced into the infantry, and he spends the early stages of World War I basically screaming that Italy can win, we can, we can break this deadlock, you know, in the mountains and make the enemy harmless if we could just gain command of the air. And he calls for the construction of 500 bombers to drop 125 tons of bombs on Austria-Daly in order to break the stalemate of trench warfare. Now, um, yeah, so this is the kind of thing, it seems ahead of its time, right? Because this is sort of where military thinking went, right?

• 41:00Robert Evans?

  Like, it was certainly the way military thinkers were thinking in World War II because of Duhé, but it's not correct ahead of its time. In part, like, Italy simply couldn't have built 500 high altitude bombers to drop that kind of tonnage on Austria-Daly. They did not have the capacity. Like, the Italian, Italian industry, the Italian military, in the middle of World War I, was not going to be able to do that, right? It's just not a realistic ask of the country. Yeah, they're busy not getting slaughtered in the war already. Yeah, they don't have the spare resources, and also bombers aren't that good yet, right? Like, they will be by World War II, but Duhé is not saying this is what, I mean, he will eventually say this is how the future should work, but he- Is also arguing, we should be trying to do this right now.

• 41:45Robert Evans?

  And Italy just doesn't have the resources or technical know-how to create the bomber fleet he wants in 1915. When he's shouting about it to everybody who will listen. And he is such an asshole about this that he is imprisoned for a year for not shutting up about how because he's calling his superiors incompetent for not following through with his impossible plan. Yeah, you don't get away with that during a war. No, they they lock him up for a while. But he keeps writing about his ideas while he's in jail and the war gets worse and worse for Italy. And he's eventually brought back and given command of the aviation bureau, which shows you how desperate Italy is. After the end of hostilities, he starts work on his magnum opus, a manifesto on the future of strategic air power. In 1921, it was published under the title, The Command of the Air.

• 42:29Robert Evans?

  Now, some of his arguments are pretty strong, right? One of the things he's saying is that like, look at what happened in this fucking First World War. It was a shit show. Bomber aircraft aren't blocked by trenches, right? You can get right over them. You can hit targets behind the trenches like their artillery, right? And you could maybe knock infantry out of trenches. Now, this is actually something, one of the things will be proved wrong on that is that infantry in trenches are a lot less vulnerable to aerial bombing than everybody wants them to be, right? Turns out trenches are pretty good at protecting people. Especially with the kind of technology they're going to have by World War Two. It's better than just shelling them endlessly, but it is not the get out of trench free card. Duhé pretends it is, right?

• 43:12Robert Evans?

  Now, Duhé is also, he's one of a number of growing military theorists who who had learned from the last war that these huge conscript armies that everybody has moved towards. Like, if that's how war works, if the whole civil male civilian population is potentially part of the military and the whole country is being mobilized to support the military, then you can't limit yourself to just striking troops in the field in future wars. Civilian populations, Duhé's attitude is civilian populations make continued resistance possible. And thus civilians participating in the infrastructure of war must be attacked. Right? Yep. Oops.

• 43:52Speaker 05

  You know, it's funny, whenever there are these things that are technologically developed that I just would have assumed are older, like, I would have just assumed somehow that, like, bombing civilian populations is somehow older than this as a, like, tactic, you know?

• 44:05Robert Evans?

  It is. Like, this, Du Hey is not the first military leader to be, like, civilians are a valid, this, in fact, is the norm in a lot of ancient warfare, right? Like, fucking, a lot of times in ancient Greece, one city-state goes to war against the other, the one that loses does not get to keep being a city-state. You annihilate them, right? You kill the men, you rape the women, right? Like, that's not every war, but a lot of wars in classical history go that way, so...

• 44:33Speaker 05

  I've been reading that for my show recently, and I suddenly, like, had to realize, I was like, oh, the concept of surrender is sort of new. It's like a new technology, is you actually, like, let people go home after you beat them.

• 44:48Robert Evans?

  It's more that it had stopped being the norm to consider the whole country to be enemies, but even during World War I, right? Great Britain starves a million Germans to death by blocking ports. Germany, we know they can't grow, they don't have the ability to produce sufficient foodstuffs on their own, that's part of the military effort, right? It's not as direct as bombing civilians, but it would be, it would be very inaccurate to pretend Du Hey is the first guy who is like, civilians are on the table, right?

• 45:15Speaker 05

  No, totally, but specifically the idea of this, like, type of bombing.

• 45:18Robert Evans?

  Yeah, exactly, exactly. It's meaningful.

• 45:21Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 45:22Robert Evans?

  Yeah. Like, I think that that is important, that he is the guy writing in a book, this is the strat, this is a logical strategy for how modern war ought to be pursued, is the systematic destruction of civilian populations through strategic bombing, right? It is, does matter that he's the first guy to write that out, you know? Like, that's, that's upon his soul.

• 45:42Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 45:43Robert Evans?

  Yeah. Um, which is not to say that nobody would have thought to do stuff like this if he hadn't been around, right?

• 45:49Speaker 05

  No, but I mean, just because someone else will invent the torment nexus is not a reason to invent the torment nexus.

• 45:53Robert Evans?

  And no, nor does it erase your culpability in making it. Now, one of my sources for this episode is an article by Colonel Everest Rucioni, of the one of the more, who's one of the more influential pilots in US Combat Aviation history. He's an interesting guy. He was a key member of what became known as the Fighter Mafia, which is a group of guys in the Air Force who argue, and this is in like the latter half of the 20th century, they argue that like the branch's bureaucracy was corrupt and lying about the, this is like right before the birth of, I think, the F-16. They're, they're saying the Air Force bureaucracy is corrupt and it's lying about how well certain weapon systems work for corrupt reasons. And as a result, they have all these complaints about like hybrid role fighters as opposed to dedicated anti-aircraft fighters. There's

• 46:36Robert Evans?

  a lot of debate as to whether or not the Fighter Mafia was right. I'm just bringing this up because this is a guy who has a history of being on controversial sides of arguments, right? Okay. And he wrote an interesting article about the history of strategic bombing for the Air Force, right? Where he is kind of laying out his thinking as to why Duhae was wrong. And he summarizes Duhae's arguments this way. "He also believed that air forces would dominate surface forces on land and at sea, and that an enemy's ability to sustain a war could be eliminated. He preached the destruction of enemy air power in the air and on the ground. The need is not only to kill the enemy's eagles, but also to destroy their eggs and their nests," Duhae wrote. Enemy aircraft production plants were defined as prime strategic targets. He believed that bomber attacks were inevitable and that defenses

• 47:19Robert Evans?

  against them were useless. He believed that attacking populations with relatively small amounts of explosives, incendiary, and gas weapons would make populations force their leaders to sue for peace. He believed that a powerful strategic bombing force could deter potential enemies from attacking." Now, a lot of this is the way very influential people in military planning still think to this day. Duhae's thinking is incredibly common, or at least a descent, descendants of Duhae's thinking, is incredibly common within military planners to this day. And this is the root of mutually assured destruction. It starts with these ideas, right? Particularly the idea, yeah. That people won't put up with it from their leaders. That people won't put up with it, that it will end that a powerful strategic bombing

• 48:04Robert Evans?

  force can deter an attack. Right? Right. Okay. Because your ability, because they can't be stopped. You can't stop a bombing run, right? It's impossible. His part of his attitude is that the sky is too big, right? You can't actually stop bombers from getting to where they're going to go. So if you have a powerful enough bombing fleet, like, no one will attack you because they know they're doomed in that instance, right? Yeah. And it like, this is basically how we think about near peer nuclear warfare to this day, right? And that knowledge deters those sort of wars. So this is part of why people will argue Du Hey wound up being right, even though he did not foresee nuclear weapons, right? In any way, shape or form. And to be clear, he's not right. Right. He was wrong about bombers, but he was right for now about nukes.

• 48:48Robert Evans?

  Well, this is kind of the theme of our episodes is that a lot of people buy into Du Hey's theories and base their careers in the air force on believing that this is more or less right. And once nukes come around, that's the thing that like, makes that they're the things they had already believed true. And is part of why they become such advocates for nuclear warfare, right? Now, I want to really emphasize how wrong Du Hey is here because he is not making grand predictions about the distant future, nor is he theorizing about 21st century nuclear warfare or even late 20th century warfare. He is discussing the war he expected to break out in the next 20 years or so. And on basically every technical point, Du Hey was desperately wrong. Again, he argues the sky is so big that air power should only be offensive

• 49:31Robert Evans?

  because air power cannot defend territory. And the only way to protect the homeland is to build an air force that can bomb the enemy into the ground before your opponent can do the same. He makes really specific predictions, arguing in 1928 that dropping a payload of just 300 tons of bombs over a capital city in under a month would be enough to end a war. This would all be proven catastrophically wrong. But for the later period of his life, Du Hey is effectively the first air power influencer. His book doesn't sell quickly at first, but it becomes the bible of how to make an air force for basically all of the men who were in charge of the air forces in World War II. Like on every site, he's super influential. And that's not entirely accurate. He has his detractors, obviously, but he's massively

• 50:16Robert Evans?

  influential. And I'm sure Duhae would have been thrilled to have had such an influence because everyone in World War Two tries out his ideas, but he never gets a chance to see that. Shortly after Benito Mussolini makes him the Italian Chief of Aviation, he dies of a heart attack in 1930. So by the way, ends his life as a fascist, too. Couldn't have happened to a worse guy. Really tragic. You know who else died of a heart attack in 1930 after being made the fascist Minister of Aviation by Benito Mussolini? Uh, his twin brother? Yeah, sure. Or these sponsors. I don't know. Great.

• 50:56Speaker 08

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• 51:26Robert Evans?

  This ad is brought to you by ViiV Healthcare, the makers of Dovato, Dolutegravir, Lamivudine. If you're living with HIV, do learn about Dovato. Dovato is a complete HIV treatment by prescription only for some people 12 and older. Your doctor will determine if Dovato was right for you. Most HIV pills contain three or four medicines. Dovato is as effective with just two. No other complete HIV pill contains fewer medicines than Dovato.

• 51:50Speaker 07

  It is unknown if Dovato is safe and effective if you have HIV and hepatitis B. If you have Hep B, don't stop Dovato without talking to your doctor, as it may get worse or harder to treat. Don't take Dovato if you're allergic to its ingredients, or taking Dofetilide due to serious or life-threatening side effects. If you have a rash or allergic reaction symptoms, stop Dovato and get medical help right away. Other serious or life-threatening side effects include severe liver problems and lactic acid buildup. If you're female or obese, you may be more at risk. Tell your doctor about your medicines or supplements, medical conditions, liver or kidney problems, pregnancy, breastfeeding, or planned pregnancy.

• 52:25Robert Evans?

  Do ask your doctor about fewer medicines. Visit dovato.com or call 1-877-844-8872.

• 52:33Speaker 04

  Network freedom and flexibility. That's what you want in a healthcare plan. With a Humana Medicare Advantage PPO plan, you can see any doctor in the country who accepts Medicare, including specialists. No referrals. No kidding. Learn more at gethumana.com. See any doctor who accepts Medicare and is willing to bill Humana. Humana PPOs may not be available in all areas. Benefits and costs share may vary. Humana is a Medicare Advantage PPO organization with a Medicare contract. Enrollment in any Humana plan depends on contract renewal.

• 53:07Robert Evans?

  And we're back. That was an awkward ad pivot. I'm not gonna lie, Margaret. I'm not gonna lie. But I think the audience will forgive us.

• 53:14Speaker 05

  I think they will. I think they'll be able to find it in their heart attack to do it.

• 53:18Robert Evans?

  Yeah, yeah.

• 53:19Speaker 05

  That's actually, what I'm trying to do is make you feel better by making a terrible joke so that people have already forgotten about your bad ad pivot.

• 53:26Robert Evans?

  Thank you. Thank you, Margaret. Let's continue talking about this guy's stupid ideas about how planes work, right?

• 53:35Speaker 05

  300 bombs. 300 pounds of bombs.

• 53:38Robert Evans?

  Yeah, 300 tons of bombs. All you need. That'll wipe out any city's will to fight. So, German war planners, influenced by Duhé, built a bomber fleet that was tailored for the attack, not operations on enemy cities, but providing close support to their advancing infantry and armor. And this is, you could call this an adaptation if some of Duhé's certainly influenced by it, this idea that like, air power should just be for the offense, right? Like, that's its primary purpose. And so it's kind of an adaptation, right? England also, Duhé's attitude have a lot of influence on how the Royal Air Force is constructed in the interwar period. And England spends a lot of resources creating a bomber command that was meant to deter German action on the continent

• 54:20Robert Evans?

  without requiring another painful mass conscription for British kids, you know? That does not exactly work out. Here's how Colonel Rucioni describes what happened next. Germany then turned to the invasion of England in its first test of Du Hey's theories. The Battle of Britain was engaged to gain air superiority for Operation Sea Lion. Britain's bomber command had failed to deter the war and the attacks on England, but Germany's bomber fleets also failed to bring England to its knees. The Luftwaffe tried to gain air superiority over England. The initially frail fighter force of the Royal Air Force, under the competent command of Air Marshal Sir Hugh Douding, and using the nascent technology of radar, was able to inflict unacceptable losses on the German bombers and their fighter escorts. After the Battle of Britain was won by England, Hitler turned his aerial weapons on London to bring the population to its knees.

• 55:05Robert Evans?

  Churchill cheered quietly. The bombing only stiffened the morale of Londoners and brought England's war effort to a higher pitch.

• 55:12Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 55:13Robert Evans?

  From the start, Du Hey has proven wrong, just immediately.

• 55:16Speaker 05

  On both counts about, yeah.

• 55:17Robert Evans?

  Yes, yeah. Having a big bomber fleet does not deter enemy action. Also, you can defend from a bombing attack, and aircraft are great on the defense. Having fighters to intercept bombers works really fucking well.

• 55:34Speaker 05

  It's funny, because like, this is the, Europe gave, medieval warfare was a big part of medieval Europe, right? And like, the development of armor, until you get to guns.

• 55:44Robert Evans?

  Yeah.

• 55:45Speaker 05

  It's like, it's the development of armor that is the new technology that's changing shit. You put a fucking armored knight against anybody, and they're just like, "Yeah, you kinda can't do anything unless you get a dagger to my throat," you know?

• 55:56Robert Evans?

  Yeah, yeah. No, that's, like, it is, it is the same, it takes place over a shorter period of time with air power, because shit moves faster now, right? But it is the, I mean, it's the, it's the Red Queen hypothesis, right? Like, everyone is constantly moving as fast as they can just to stay in place, you know? Like, you build up this great bomber fleet just in time to get attacked by a bomber fleet of your own and realize, "Actually, we probably should have had more fighters." That might have been, that might have been handier to jump, right?

• 56:25Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 56:26Robert Evans?

  But also, the Germans are learning, "All you need is a bunch of bombers, we've got a bunch of bombers." "Oh shit, fighter aircraft really fuck up bombers." "Oh no, all our pilots are gone."

• 56:36Speaker 05

  Who'd have thought Mussolini would have named a guy who wasn't actually as good at things as he said he was?

• 56:40Robert Evans?

  Who'd have thought the Italian fascist Minister of Aviation was wrong about some important points, right?

• 56:48Robert Evans?

  Now, one of the things that is important for what will come next is it is true. Air power is great on the defensive and it's actually very possible to interdict and damage bombers before they can hit their targets, but not a single group of bombers on any side during the war is turned back, right, entirely without being able to drop any bombs. That doesn't happen, which for nuclear planning, this is again, one of these things nuclear warfare retroactively makes Du Hey correct on is that like, well, once you've got nukes, if you have a thousand bombers flying towards London with conventional bombs, then yeah, fighters can

• 57:28Robert Evans?

  kill a bunch of those bombers and do enough damage that it renders like, you know, the Germans will drop some bombs in response, but you can make it be more costly for the Germans than it is for Great Britain.

• 57:39Speaker 05

  Right.

• 57:39Robert Evans?

  If a thousand bombers each have a nuke, you're not stopping every nuke from hitting and all they need is one.

• 57:45Speaker 05

  Right.

• 57:46Robert Evans?

  Right? That is an important point about, this is another lesson that's being learned, right? At the same time as we're learning how wrong Du Hey is, once the nukes come into the picture, people are going to be looking at this data and seeing something different, which is that you can't stop a nuclear attack of sufficient size, even before ICBMs.

• 58:04Speaker 05

  Yeah. Yeah, the scale of destructiveness of a nuke is just so different.

• 58:08Robert Evans?

  Yeah, yeah.

• 58:09Speaker 05

  It's, huh.

• 58:11Robert Evans?

  Yeah. Now, I do want to really emphasize the wrongness that Du Hey was, because again, he said that about 300 tons of explosives in a month dropped over an enemy capital would be enough to break any people's will to fight. During a single night during the Battle of Britain, May 10th to May 11th, 1941, Germany dropped more than 700 tons of high explosives on London as well as 86,000 incendiary devices.

• 58:35Robert Evans?

  England kept fighting.

• 58:36Speaker 05

  Yeah, no, they, they, they came up with a whole catchy slogan about it.

• 58:40Robert Evans?

  Yeah.

• 58:41Speaker 05

  Everyone pulled together, you have socialists like Orwell, like organizing in the Home Guard.

• 58:46Robert Evans?

  Yeah, a lot of people felt better.

• 58:48Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 58:50Robert Evans?

  Which is a fun story.

• 58:52Speaker 05

  Gives us punk rock that people grew up out of that.

• 58:54Robert Evans?

  Gives us punk rock. Sure. Yeah.

• 58:58Robert Evans?

  But yeah, that is an important point. Again, just to how wrong Du Hey is like, yeah, we took more than twice as much as he said would break any city in a month and a night London did. And it people don't break under bombing, you know, which is also going to influence nuclear thinkers because then the attitude becomes, well, you just have to kill all of them then.

• 59:16Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 59:17Robert Evans?

  Yeah. So despite the fact that Du Hey is right out the gate proven wrong, war planners on the allied side continue to give a great deal of credence to his now badly marred theories. One advocate was Sir Arthur Harris, also known as Bomber Harris, who became head of the RAF's bomber command. He was a huge advocate of area bombing. Precision bombing, which is another thing people are the strategic bombing side also breaks down to a couple of broad schools. And as is always the case, most people are, are, you know, have our little take some from column A, some from column B. But there's, you've got area bombing and precision bombing, right? And the idea behind precision bombing is that you can hit just the target you want. That is like the factory making bombs or

• 1:00:00Robert Evans?

  the factory making planes, right? Or a barracks and not hit the high rise apartment structure near it. Now, precision bombing is a lie, right? It's especially, it's, it's not all that true today, but it's especially a lie in World War Two, right? It's a lot, now you can kind of do it, although it never works as well as planners like to claim it does. But in World War Two, it's just a fantasy, right? And so there's a lot of, that, that gives a lot more push to people like Bomber Harris, who are like, well, fuck precision bombing, just bomb, saturate an area with bombing, right? You accept greater civilian casualties so that you can cripple their industrial capabilities, right? That's the public argument. In private, they're saying something different, but the public argument

• 1:00:44Robert Evans?

  is that this is just the way it has to work. The first area bombings by the RAF on German cities was in 1941, in 1942. And they did not work very well, right? They're spun as winds, but on an actual strategic level, they're not huge hits. Caused some shock to the German citizenry, but they don't accomplish the stated goal, which is to damage war production, right? And the RAF suffers high casualties because German air defenses are excellent. You know, Duhé continues to be very wrong about air defense. It is possible, I mean, in Vietnam, North Vietnam, part of why the war goes the way it does is that North Vietnam has excellent, very advanced air defenses, right?

• 1:01:21Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 1:01:21Robert Evans?

  Something that gets lost in the whole, it was just some farmers in the jungle that beat the US. No, they had an army. They had radar guided missiles and everything, you know?

• 1:01:33Robert Evans?

  When Arthur Harris took over Bomber Command for Great Britain, he immediately organized a much bigger area bombing campaign, Operation Millennium. On May 30th of 1942, nearly 1,100 Allied bombers hit Cologne, annihilating some 600 acres of the city and rendering 100,000 people homeless. Harris declared the raid a success. The British press did too, but they focused on the destruction of war industry, not the civilian cost. And this frustrated Harris, in part because it was inaccurate. While dozens of factories had been damaged or destroyed, the city only lost the equivalent of a month's war production. The real cost to Germany, as Bomber Harris saw it, was human. Here's how he later described the purpose of Bomber Command in his eyes.

• 1:02:17Robert Evans?

  "The aim is the destruction of German cities, the killing of German workers and the disruption of civilized community life throughout Germany. It should be emphasized that the destruction of houses, public utilities, transport and lives, the creation of a refugee problem on an unprecedented scale and the breakdown of morale both at home and on the battlefronts by the fear of extended and intensified bombing are acceptable and intended aims of our bombing policy. They are not byproducts of attempts to hit factories."

• 1:02:43Speaker 05

  Yeah, that makes sense. But it also does the same stealing the reserve. Like I've met someone whose family, I think it was Cologne or Cologne. I just did the asshole thing where I've been to a city. So I'm like, let me use the whatever.

• 1:02:58Speaker 05

  But, you know, it's like I've met someone who was like, oh yeah, my whole family was like staunch anti Nazis. And then 80% of the family was wiped out in one night by a bombing. And then they all joined the army. And I'm like, yeah, they still joined the Nazi army, so fuck them, but like. Also like, man, I couldn't tell you that anyone I've ever met would do anything different.

• 1:03:15Robert Evans?

  That's just how people work when their family gets killed in a bombing. They get pissed. They don't always, they're not their best selves, you know?

• 1:03:23Speaker 05

  Yeah, exactly.

• 1:03:24Robert Evans?

  That's, that's just how people be, homie. I don't know what to tell you. They don't like having their families killed by bombs.

• 1:03:32Robert Evans?

  And there's, as we'll talk about, a lot of debate as to the influence of strategic bombing on, on the German civilian population. But what we can say is that it's not why they lose. However, however, whatever it does to morale doesn't end the war, you know? Yeah, so Bomber Harris is wrong in his primary attitude, right? As to like, what would work to actually end the war? And he doesn't, he never gets called on that because we win the war anyway. And everyone kind of thinks, fuck those guys, low key or high key. But, and you know, fuck them, but it doesn't work. That is important. Now, there's not agreement, and in fact, a huge, a lot of conflict between the US and Great Britain over the strategy initially. The guys in the US Army Air Command do not all agree with Harris.

• 1:04:17Robert Evans?

  And in fact, we keep conducting, the Brits are doing nighttime raids, which allows you to lose the least aircraft while killing the most civilians, or killing the most people. We do daytime raids for a long time, which are way more dangerous because the idea is it gives the, the civilians more of a chance to get away, right? That's part of why you're doing it. It's, it's more honorable, basically, right? Which it is, but it also means you lose a lot more guys, right? Like, it's way more dangerous.

• 1:04:44Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 1:04:45Robert Evans?

  It's a very admirable thing, I think, that we're doing for a while. We're not always going to be that way.

• 1:04:52Robert Evans?

  So yeah, this, this debate really starts to erupt after this point. And on one hand, you've got these area bombing, strategic bombing advocates saying like, you know, I know it, it hasn't quite worked yet, right? Like, we haven't knocked Germany out of the fight. They're not giving up yet. But if we just get more bombers, bro, it'll work, right?

• 1:05:10Speaker 05

  Yeah, yeah.

• 1:05:11Robert Evans?

  And on the other side, and again, a lot of people do kind of wind up... In the middle here, but the other side broadly are like, well, close air support is what's most important, right? Air power's primary use is its ability to augment conventional forces in taking and holding territory, right? It is very good at that, right? Works really well, right? It had proved to be tantalizingly potent in North Africa, and guys in the US like General Pete Casada were bullish about its potential in a future invasion of France. An early test for the strategic bombing advocates, on the other hand, came prior to the invasion of Sicily. There's this island called Pantelleria, which is garrisoned with about 11,000 Italian troops that we need to take before we invade Sicily and then invade Italy.

• 1:05:53Robert Evans?

  And I'm going to quote from an article in National Interest by James Stevenson here. "The bombing of Pantelleria became an experiment, one anticipated to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that bombing would ratify what up to then had been a matter of faith, but would soon offer proof through bombing alone, surrender was a certainty. All these forces were assembled to test the assertion that if you destroy what a man has and remove the possibility of his bringing more in, then in due course of time, it becomes impossible for him to defend himself," Major General Jimmy Doolittle said. "If bombing alone did not force a surrender, the Allies planned to invade the island by June 11th. In an attempt to avoid the need for an invasion, the Allies generated 5,284 sorties, dropping a total of 12.4 million pounds of bombs on Pantelleria." Jesus. Did it work? Kinda.

• 1:06:38Robert Evans?

  After a month of unopposed, round-the-clock bombing, the Italians surrendered after Allied ground troops had approached the island, right? Oh, yeah. They didn't surrender on their own from the bombing, they surrendered before ground troops came in. Now, you could still say, but that still worked, right? However, there's a couple of other issues. For one, Italian defenses were remarkably intact still, given the force deployed against them, because nearly every bomb missed. The B-17s were most accurate with a 22% hit rate. That's defined as landing a bomb within 100 yards of its target. So the B-17s hit 22% of the time, and that's our best bomber. And that's within a football field, because like- Yeah, and that's still within a football field. Yeah.

• 1:07:21Robert Evans?

  And our, our medium bombers hit rate is about 6%. Now, this is a problem because we had been claiming very different things about the accuracy of our bombs. Back at the start of 1943, we'd had something called the Casablanca Conference, in which Winston Churchill sat down with the 8th Air Force Commander Ira Ecker, who promised the British Prime Minister that the B-17 Flying Fortress, which that's fancy new, we had these things called the Norden Bomb Site, which was like, this is the shit, this makes precision bombing possible, it's like a, almost, it's like a little computerized bombing system that like, we can do things with bombs we never could do before. You can drop a bomb from 25,000 feet and hit a target the size of a pickle barrel, right? That's the promise Ira Ecker makes Winston Churchill, when he's like- Holy shit.

• 1:08:05Robert Evans?

  They're sitting down, he's like, "We can hit a pickle barrel at 25,000 feet." Now, in combat, a few months later, these things would hit within a football field, only 22% of the time. Yeah. So, you're getting this, this is going to be also a theme with all of the nuke stuff that the Air Force builds. They will make all these claims about, yes, it, you know, it'll, it's, it's this accurate, and it's this safe, and it can only be activated if this and this and this happens, so it like, could never be accidentally fired, and they're like, "Oh wait, but what if this thing happens that happens every day? Oh yeah, that could accidentally launch all of our missiles." Yeah. "Are you guys gonna fix it?" We actually don't wanna. That's the story of the Minuteman in a nutshell, but we'll talk more about that later. Oh, fuck. Anyway, "With a fleet of these," Ecker promised, "we can disembowel the German Reich

• 1:08:47Robert Evans?

  and destroy its industrial capacity with no need for ground forces." Right? We can just gut the Reich entirely through precision bombing. Now Churchill has some direct experience with aerial warfare, and he does not believe Ecker, right? He doesn't believe about the accuracy. And the other thing that Ira Ecker is saying is, "We don't need fighter escorts for our B-17s, because they have all these guns on them, that will, that'll be enough to deter attack." We can just send the bombers in alone. That was at the Flying Fortress part? Yeah, that's basically the idea behind that title. But like, yeah, because these B-17s are surrounded in machine guns, fighters won't be able to, if they attack us, they won't be able to penetrate. And that's necessary because the bombers can fly a lot further than the fighters.

• 1:09:29Robert Evans?

  So what Iker is saying is we can send these bombers into the heart of enemy territory. We don't need to worry about the range of the fighters and they'll be fine. And he's going to be wrong about that, too. So one result of this, the Casablanca Conference, is that the Allies put together a list of military assets they want to prioritize destroying or disabling, a task that would overwhelmingly fall on air power. These included submarine bases, train lines, fuel storage, aircraft production facilities and other crucial war industry sites. One of the first of these targets was a ball bearing production facility in Regensburg. Ball bearings were critical for constructing aircraft and a number of other important military vehicles. Operation Double Strike was launched by Major General Iker's 8th Army Air Force

• 1:10:12Robert Evans?

  on August 17, 1943. 376 bombers plowed deep into German territory beyond the range of any fighters to escort them. Per the website Codenames: Operations of World War II, "The mission inflicted heavy damage on the Regensburg target, but only a catastrophic loss to the force, inasmuch as 60 bombers were lost and many more damaged beyond economical repair. As a result, the 8th Air Force was incapable of immediately following Double Strike with a second attack that might have seriously crippled German industry. When Schweinfurt, that's the industrial facility, was attacked again two months later, the lack of long-range fighter escorts still had not been addressed and losses were even higher. As a consequence, the US deep penetration strategic bombing effort was curtailed for five months."

• 1:10:55Speaker 05

  Could you imagine going on a thing where you're like, well, last time we did this, about, you know, 1 in 6 of us died. Anyway, so...

• 1:11:05Speaker 05

  We didn't change anything, so let's just go do it.

• 1:11:07Robert Evans?

  Yeah. Are we doing anything new?

• 1:11:10Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 1:11:10Robert Evans?

  No, same plan, huh? Okay. I mean, you talk to anyone who saw heavy combat and they have stories like that, where it's like, "Well, this was, this went really badly last, so we're just doing the same thing, huh?"

• 1:11:21Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 1:11:21Robert Evans?

  Okay. That is, that is how armies work.

• 1:11:26Robert Evans?

  Now, this was a double failure, not just for Eager, but for Duhae's theories. Once again, the vastness of the sky didn't stop a defending military from inflicting severe casualties on a bomber fleet. And that despite the damage done to the Regensburg plant, German industrial capabilities were not seriously harmed. As Reich Minister of Supply Albert Speer stated after the war, "No plane or tank failed to be built for lack of ball bearings."

• 1:11:51Robert Evans?

  Yeah, it just didn't work. Colonel Rissioni noted in his article, "The Allies failed in their choice of a target because they hadn't learned their intelligence was bad. Germany was importing ball bearings from Sweden and Switzerland by this point, and it also stopped, they had foreseen this and stockpiled pre-war. They'd also redesigned a bunch of aircraft and shit to not need as many ball bearings."

• 1:12:13Speaker 05

  This was for like a Home Alone-style plan they had. That was actually, the stockpile was unrelated.

• 1:12:17Robert Evans?

  It was, they were dropping it down the stairs.

• 1:12:19Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 1:12:19Robert Evans?

  Did horrible damage to the 3rd Army.

• 1:12:21Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 1:12:23Robert Evans?

  So, yeah. Rissioni writes, "This was a failure both in target definition and target priority. Worse, because it was vulnerable, the 8th Air Force had become the target." Now, over in England, Arthur Harris never accepted the primary contentions of the advocates of precision strategic bombing. In October of 1943, not long after Regensburg, he stated, "The aim is destruction of German cities, the killing of German workers, and the disruption of civilized community life throughout Germany. It should be emphasized that the destruction of houses, public utilities, transport, and lives, the creation of a refugee problem on an unprecedented scale, and the breakdown of morale both at home and at the battlefronts by fear of extended and intensified bombing are acceptable and intended aims of our bombing policy.

• 1:13:06Robert Evans?

  They are not byproducts of attempts to hit factories."

• 1:13:09Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 1:13:09Robert Evans?

  Bobmer Harris, one thing you have to give him, he's very clear. "No, no, no, this is about killing women and children and rendering them homeless. That's what we're doing. That's the business the RAF is in. You guys need to stop pretending that you're fucking with ball bearings."

• 1:13:25Speaker 05

  I mean, there's like a, there's an honesty to that that I respect.

• 1:13:28Robert Evans?

  Yes. The man knows what he's about. It's killing civilians, but he's about it.

• 1:13:34Speaker 05

  Yeah. Um, he has made his peace with whatever he believes and he thinks that this is the lesser evil is by doing a lot of evil. And like, you know, he's not lying.

• 1:13:42Robert Evans?

  Quickly. Right.

• 1:13:43Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 1:13:44Robert Evans?

  A little before the Regensburg attack, bomber Harris had launched a nighttime raid on Hamburg. It was the opposite of a precise attempt to destroy a specific target. Incendiaries created a firestorm that swept through the downtown area, incinerating roughly 40,000 civilians. This is like, and this is one of, this becomes a theory, right? Like, and not, there's a theory put into practice, but there'd been this theory that by dropping incendiaries in the right place in a certain parts of a city, you can create these firestorms that massively amplify the damage of your bombing campaign. Right? And this is like when it, when it really works for the first time. This is going to be a massive part of our strategy and, and when we're bombing the Japanese home islands, right? Is creating these, these hideous firestorms.

• 1:14:26Robert Evans?

  And this also, this becomes, like, I think the term is literally like bonus damage, basically. This is like a concept of nuclear war, too, is a big part of the appeal of nuclear weapons to the people planning to use them. Is that you create these firestorms the size of states? And like, that's really handy. It really amplifies the amount of a country you could destroy. When you create firestorms that wipe out thousands of miles of terrain.

• 1:14:50Speaker 05

  So, I, has never occurred to me until this moment that the phrase firestorm. I'm aware that firestorms happen in wildfires. It has never really actually occurred to me until this moment that people artificially create them. And that's where a firestorm, like, uh, you know, a firestorm to purify if you're into shitty hardcore music.

• 1:15:10Robert Evans?

  Yeah.

• 1:15:11Speaker 05

  Yep. Okay.

• 1:15:12Robert Evans?

  Yep. Yep. I mean, I think most people have learned the term firestorm from Command and Conquer Tiberian Sun. Firestorm, obviously, the, the Tiberian Sun Expansion Pact that was pretty good.

• 1:15:23Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 1:15:23Robert Evans?

  But some people learned it from history, I'm sure.

• 1:15:27Robert Evans?

  I learned it from a shitty hardcore band. You learned it from a hardcore band. I learned it from Command and Conquer. Yeah. In November of 1943 and March of 1944, vast, there were vast raids on Berlin, uh, which left much of the capital in ruins. And yet, German morale continued to hold. This is the thing. Bomber Harris, he's more honest, but what he's saying will happen still doesn't happen. Yeah, he's wrong. Like, no amount of bombing causes Germany to give up. By the time the war in Europe enters its endgame, there were very mixed conclusions to draw from the actual efficacy of strategic bombing and precision bombing. Both ideologies had suffered failures and both had claimed successes, although some of those were dubious claims of success. Months earlier, Bomber

• 1:16:09Robert Evans?

  Harris had considered strategic bombing the same as opening a new front. Summarized in a write-up for the Juno Beach Center, quote, "Until D-Day, he was convinced that bombings, if they were destructive enough, could force Germany into submission without the Allied casualties that were bound to result from a massive landing operation in continental Europe." And in part two, we're gonna talk about what happens next. We'll get to Japan finally, and we'll talk, start talking about the nukes. But this is all necessary. These are the, these are the foundational assumptions of the people who build the doomsday device that we all live under right now. Like, this second, an incident could have started, maybe just because a radar station was wrong. That will in 15 to 30 minutes result in the annihilation

• 1:16:52Robert Evans?

  of all organized life, human life on the planet. That could have happened as I say this sentence. Um, and we mostly won't know until the bombs fall. And there's really nothing, like, one thing that maybe will comfort you is that that, like, none of the facilities we have to protect our, our government will work. Like, none of them are sufficient for the amount, the tonnage, the megatonnage of explosives coming at them. That little, like, this is a good, this is a good thing about Jacobson's book Nuclear War. She, one thing she points out is like, yeah, there's bunkers underneath the Pentagon and the White House. Everyone will bake to death slowly, as if they're in an oven. Like, we know what kind of forces will be deployed against DC. There's no surviving in those bunkers. It's

• 1:17:37Robert Evans?

  a much worse death than the people topside will have.

• 1:17:40Speaker 05

  Well, that's good.

• 1:17:41Robert Evans?

  That's good. Anyway, maybe that'll cheer you up as we roll out of part one.

• 1:17:47Speaker 05

  I appreciate this idea of like, I hadn't put together this idea that World War I, the powder keg was intentional.

• 1:17:54Robert Evans?

  Yeah.

• 1:17:55Speaker 05

  You know, that it was this mutually assured destruction concept and like seeing the through line is fascinating.

• 1:18:02Robert Evans?

  It wasn't as direct because it did kind of, a lot of this started to, like this evolved accidentally out of stuff that had existed before. It was not constructed as consciously as nuclear mad.

• 1:18:13Speaker 05

  Right.

• 1:18:13Robert Evans?

  But it was something people were conscious of. People talked about it. There's, that's a reason why so many historians have discussed the system of alliances and like military armament schedules and like the different like arming schedules for reserves as a doomsday device, right? Because it worked that way. And it is really relevant to discuss that in the context of the doomsday device that we all live under right now.

• 1:18:37Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 1:18:38Robert Evans?

  Yep.

• 1:18:39Speaker 05

  Cool.

• 1:18:40Robert Evans?

  Cool. All right. All right, everybody.

• 1:18:44Speaker 01

  Macpie, do you want to plug anything?

• 1:18:46Speaker 05

  Oh, well, if you respond to the possible imminent destruction of all things by retreating a little bit into escapism, you could listen to me and Robert and some of our friends play Pathfinder where we're just pretending to be people in a fantasy world.

• 1:19:04Robert Evans?

  If you don't know what Pathfinder is, it's a tabletop game thing.

• 1:19:07Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 1:19:08Robert Evans?

  Much in the vein of Dungeons and Dragons or a number of other games.

• 1:19:11Speaker 05

  Just legally distinct.

• 1:19:12Robert Evans?

  Legally distinct. Yeah.

• 1:19:13Speaker 05

  And if you like weird history, I have a podcast called Cool People Who Did Cool Stuff with a totally original, the format, Robert, you got to try this format. What I do is I research a topic every week. Okay. And then I get a guest who doesn't know as much about that topic, but sometimes knows like kind of related things around that topic. And then I tell them what I've learned.

• 1:19:36Robert Evans?

  That seems like the newest idea in podcasting.

• 1:19:39Speaker 01

  Is there a producer named Sophie there that doesn't say very much, but sometimes talks a lot?

• 1:19:45Robert Evans?

  That doesn't sound possible.

• 1:19:47Speaker 05

  Robert, you should, you should use that part too. Get a producer named Sophie.

• 1:19:52Robert Evans?

  I'll see. I'll think about it, Mark.

• 1:19:53Speaker 05

  Okay.

• 1:19:53Robert Evans?

  I'll think about it. I'll think about it.

• 1:19:55Speaker 05

  But, uh, but don't take my name. You already, you have a decent name for Behind the Bastards. Mine's Cool People Who Did Cool Stuff.

• 1:20:01Robert Evans?

  Okay. Cool People Who Did Cool Stuff. Check out us playing Pathfinder on It Could Happen Here's Book Club. And, uh, remember, if there is a nuclear war, all of the people who got us into it will also die unthinkable deaths. So...

• 1:20:16Speaker 05

  Yay!

• 1:20:17Robert Evans?

  I don't know. Try to live near the center of a city and just, you know, say the things to your loved ones that you need to say.

• 1:20:23Speaker 05

  Yeah, tell your friends you love them.

• 1:20:24Robert Evans?

  Tell your friends you love them.

• 1:20:26Speaker 05

  Yeah.

• 1:20:26Robert Evans?

  Bye.

• 1:20:27Speaker 05

  Bye.

• 1:20:31Speaker 01

  Behind the Bastards is a production of Cool Zone Media. For more from Cool Zone Media, visit our website, coolzonemedia.com, or check us out on the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts. Behind the Bastards is now available on YouTube. New episodes every Wednesday and Friday. Subscribe to our channel, youtube.com slash at Behind the Bastards.

• 1:20:55Speaker 03

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• 1:21:23Speaker 04

  At Humana, our Medicare Advantage plans are easy to understand and easy on your wallet, like offering more benefits than you'd get from an original Medicare loan, and including dental, vision, and hearing coverage in every plan. And the best part is, every plan has a $0 or low monthly plan premium, which makes it easier to save, too. So this Medicare planning season, plan well with Humana. Learn more at gethumana.com. Humana is a Medicare Advantage HMO and PPO organization with a Medicare contract. Enrollment in any Humana plan depends on contract renewal.

• 1:21:54Speaker 09

  How do you know that Claude won't become manipulative?

• 1:21:58Speaker 10

  This is a constant worry. And you can actually catch the model thinking, I think X is actually true, but I'm going to tell the user Y.

• 1:22:06Speaker 09

  I'm Walter Isaacson. On my new podcast, The Builders, I'm going inside the minds of the people shaping our future. Listen to The Builders starting October 13th on the iHeart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts.

• 1:22:23Speaker 00

  This is an iHeart Podcast. Guaranteed human.