438: How We Can Learn From People We Don't Like or Agree With.

>Join Jocko Underground< https://www.jockounderground.com/subscribe Exploring 11 lessons in the book, "In Retrospect", to live a better more informed life. Support this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/jocko-podcast/exclusive-content

Speaker names marked ? are inferred from speaking time and the show’s known hosts — they are not voice-verified.

• 0:00Jocko Willink?

  This is Jocko Podcast number 438 with Echo Charles and me Jocko Willink. Good evening, Echo. Good evening. David Hackworth, Colonel, US Army, retired. The most decorated American veteran of the Vietnam War. Writing in Newsweek, April 24th, 1995, quoted a fellow veteran as saying, when he first heard of the book, he quote, "felt a sense of rage beginning to well up deep inside me, a rage I have worked hard to suppress over the last 25 years," end quote.

• 0:41Jocko Willink?

  But Hackworth ended his article with these words. McNamara's book is an important step toward understanding what happened, and it may help some of the walking wounded to move further along the healing path of forgiveness. And that's good for America's collective soul.

• 1:04Jocko Willink?

  So that right there, that's a quote from, what is it called? The new forward, the additional, the updated forward

• 1:14Jocko Willink?

  for a book that is called In Retrospect, which is written by Robert S. McNamara. So the original book came out in 1991, and that book was reviewed clearly by David Hackworth. And then in this new version of the book, which came out in 1995, McNamara quotes what Hackworth had said. Now, as you may know, I'm not a fan of McNamara, who was John F. Kennedy's and then Lyndon B. Johnson's Secretary of Defense. And there's a whole slew of reasons why I've never liked him. And in fact, why I have always pretty much despised him. There's a bunch of reasons.

• 1:59Jocko Willink?

  He always seemed arrogant. He seemed like a know-it-all. And more important than any of that, he sent tens of thousands of men.

• 2:10Jocko Willink?

  Including mentally disabled men, which we covered on podcast 315, talking about Project 100,000, where they lowered the standards in a physical and mental areas to allow more people to go into the military, including people that were mentally disabled. And McNamara had a huge part in that. And he sent thousands of these, tens of thousands of these men to their deaths in the Vietnam War. And he is the Secretary of Defense. And so he's responsible for how the war is being fought, how it was escalated. And that's hand in hand with Lyndon

• 2:50Jocko Willink?

  Johnson, who I also dislike immensely, for a bunch of reasons, primarily based on his leadership of the war in Vietnam, also based on who he was as a person. So I'm not a big fan of Johnson, not a big fan of McNamara. But in talking with Robert F. Kennedy Jr. a few weeks ago, maybe a month, month and a half ago, he actually knew McNamara. And Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is a very critical person, and he knew McNamara and saw him

• 3:30Jocko Willink?

  carried out his duties as SecDef. And RFK Jr., he, he painted a better picture of McNamara than I ever had. So I've had his book for a long time. In retrospect, I've, I've read chunks of it in the past. But it, I realized I had a very, I have a very closed mind, and I needed to open my mind up and try and figure out what I can learn from McNamara. And, and that quote from Hackworth in the beginning always intrigued me a bit, because if you've got Hackworth, and we all know Hackworth's attitude, if we, if he's saying, hey, there's

• 4:13Jocko Willink?

  lesson to be learned, and maybe it can prevent us from making mistakes, then I thought it was at least exploring what those lessons are. And I've, as I went through the book,

• 4:24Jocko Willink?

  It's very, in, in the end of the book, it, it actually goes through these 11 lessons to be learned. And I found that many of them are very applicable. Not just to government, not just to war policy, but to life in general. So I'm gonna not cover this whole book. I'm not going to cover the whole war. I'm not going to cover the intricacies of the war and every single failure of the administration. But I do want to cover some of the highlights of the war, of the escalation of the war. And I'm going to use, there's a lot of this book, not a lot, but there's a decent amount of this book. Is actually quotes from people and quotes from documentation inside the administration.

• 5:08Jocko Willink?

  Just to give us a feel for how this unfolded. So that when we get to the 11 lessons that he addresses at the end of the book, which we'll go through. We can relate them not only to the Vietnam War, but also we can see how they fit in the context of everything that we do. So before I do jump into the book, just to give you some background on McNamara, Robert S. McNamara. His middle name is Strange, by the way, which is interesting. I guess it's a family name. Robert S. McNamara, middle name is Strange, born in 1916 in San Francisco, California, went to Berkeley, went to Harvard. He ends up in the Army Air Force during World War II.

• 5:49Jocko Willink?

  But he ends up as a, an individual that's teaching analytics to officers. He's not, he's not a combat soldier, he's not a combat airman. But he does his job, he does what the nation wanted him to do, which was help them with their analytics. That's where they needed help and that's what he did. So salute. After the war, he went to Ford, Ford Motor Company. And there he made a name for himself. The Whiz Kids. This group of, of smart individuals, they used data and statistics and analytics to help Ford, which had been in a slump financially. Help them become profitable again. You know, it reminds me nowadays, you know, you get all the, the data mining that's happening with, with,

• 6:33Jocko Willink?

  on the internet with social media and Google and all these things. It's all about data, data, data, data. And he, you know, these guys were the first people to start looking at the data and making decisions based on the data. And this is one of those things which I've talked about before. That's good, but you cannot just rely solely on the data. And those are one of the many mistakes made in Vietnam was a guy that is always making decisions based on data. And by the way, has been very successful making decisions based on data. And now all of a sudden, you're trying to make decisions in a war where you have to, you have to put other variables into the calculus, not just the data.

• 7:13Jocko Willink?

  So,

• 7:15Jocko Willink?

  he's doing that at Ford. He's, he be, he actually becomes president of Ford. And then after he's president of Ford for a short period of time, Kennedy pulls him away to be SecDef. We end up with the Bay of Pigs, we end up with the Cuban Missile Crisis. And of course, then we end up in Vietnam.

• 7:33Jocko Willink?

  We know about the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which is detailed in the book. The book is, the book actually, quite frankly, is a very good book. It's, it's always interesting to hear what was happening from a leadership dynamic inside an administration. And this book absolutely does that. And it does, it talks about the Gulf of Tonkin. It talks about the escalation of the war. It talks about the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, talks about those things. But it talks about the escalation, it talks about the doubt and the instability. It talks about the corruption of the South Vietnamese government and the South Vietnamese military. And we know about those things. We know about the micromanagement from our, from our military and civilian leadership that was happening.

• 8:13Jocko Willink?

  We've all heard about Washington DC picking the targets that they're gonna bomb in Vietnam.

• 8:22Jocko Willink?

  However many miles away, 7,000 miles away or whatever. Oh yeah, here's the target we want you to hit tonight, because we know better than you. So we know these things. We know these things and, and look, at some point, I'm sure I will go into detail, but every one of those topics that I just talked about is probably two or three, four, four hour podcasts. So what I wanted to get to is some of these lessons learned. I'm not going to cover everything, but I do want to give you, like I said, the quotes of quotes, things that were actually written, things that were actually said, things that were actually discussed and documented at the highest level of our country, of the administration about the Vietnam War.

• 9:06Jocko Willink?

  And then we'll get to the lessons learned. But to set the stage, we will kick it off here. And again, a lot of these are just quotes of things that are being said, March 26, 1964. So Kennedy's already dead, we got LBJ in charge. The, and this is the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman William Fulbright. He says this, "It seems clear that only two realistic options are open to us in the immediate future. The expansion of the conflict in one way or another, or a renewed effort to bolster the capacity of the South Vietnamese to prosecute the war successfully on its present scale.

• 9:48Jocko Willink?

  The matter calls for thorough examination by responsible officials in the executive branch, and until they have had the, an opportunity to evaluate the contingencies and feasibilities of the options open to us, it seems that we have no choice but to support the South Vietnamese government and army by the most effective means available. Whatever specific policy decisions are made, it should be clear to all concerned that the United States will continue to meet its obligations and fulfill its commitments with respect to Vietnam." So, so from, from the beginning, we see that this is going to be complex. We see that there's multiple different options.

• 10:29Jocko Willink?

  And we also, kind of out of the gate, are saying, "Look, we gotta do something. We gotta be there for them." So, out of the gate, there's questions and more questions. And this thing escalated quickly. And this very quickly became a topic. And April 24th...

• 10:53Jocko Willink?

  1964, a Pentagon news conference. And there's a reporter. Here's the exchange that happens between McNamara and a reporter. Reporter says, "Mr. Secretary, Senator Morse has been calling this McNamara's War. What is your response to this?" And his response is, "This is a war of the United States government. I am following the President's policy and obviously acting in close cooperation with the Secretary of State," which is Dean Rusk at this time. "I must say, I don't object to it being called McNamara's War. I think it is a very important war, and I am pleased to be identified with it and

• 11:35Jocko Willink?

  do whatever I can to win it." So out of the gate, he's, he's kind of grabbed on to this thing. You could see him avoiding it a little bit at first, right? This is the war of the United States government, and it's the President's policy. But then in the end, he probably recognized, "Hey, I need to take ownership of this thing. So, hey, I think this is an important war. I don't object to it being called McNamara's War." He does say, in this book, he says, "What I was attempting to say was that I felt a responsibility to do everything I possibly could to protect the nation's interests in what had become a significant conflict." And by the way, 64, it really hadn't become a significant conflict yet. It was significant, but it wasn't escalated to the point where it very quickly escalated

• 12:20Jocko Willink?

  too. Fast forward a little bit, and now, now we start getting into the real obvious issues. On May 15th, 1964, the CIA submitted an assessment on Vietnam to the President. And here we go, this is 1964. "The overall situation in South Vietnam remains extremely fragile. Although there has been some improvement in South Vietnam's military performance, sustained Viet Cong pressure continues to erode the government's authority throughout the country, undercut US and Vietnamese programs, and depress South Vietnamese morale. We do not see any signs that these trends are yet bottoming out.

• 13:02Jocko Willink?

  If the tide of deterioration has not been arrested by the end of the year, the anti-communist position in South Vietnam is likely to become untenable."

• 13:14Jocko Willink?

  That's 1964. And the CIA is already saying like, hey, the situation is bad and it, and we haven't seen the bottom yet. It hasn't bottomed out and he's got that in quotes. So I'm sure there's people saying, look, this will bottom out. These are just some pushback. We'll, we'll get through this. No, actually we won't. And he says, if it doesn't change, the anti-communist position, which was our position, by the way, in South Vietnam is going to be untenable. We're not going to be able to, it's not going to work. This is 1964. This is being reported.

• 13:49Jocko Willink?

  Now there's, fast forward a little bit, December 1st, 1964. There's a working group. They're called the working group. And some of the people in it are Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, Vice Admiral Lloyd M. Austin, Senior Operation Officer of the Joint Chiefs, Harold Ford, Senior China Asia Officer at CIA, John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. So this is, these are heavy hitters.

• 14:21Jocko Willink?

  And they put together this report and they say this.

• 14:26Jocko Willink?

  Again, this is 1964, end of 1964. "We cannot guarantee to maintain a non-communist South Vietnam short of committing ourselves to whatever degree of military action would be required to defeat North Vietnam and probably Communist China militarily."

• 14:48Jocko Willink?

  Do you, do you hear what I'm saying? "We need to commit ourselves to whatever degree." This is a total unknown. Whatever it would take from a military perspective, not only to defeat North Vietnam, but probably China as well.

• 15:02Jocko Willink?

  It continues on, "Such a commitment would involve high risks of a major conflict in Asia, which could not be confined to air and naval action, but would almost inevitably involve a Korean-scale ground action and possibly even the use of nuclear weapons at some point." This is 1964.

• 15:25Jocko Willink?

  So this is like, you know, you're, you're gonna go into a, uh, into a haunted house. And they're like, hey, there's people with chainsaws in there for real. You're not gonna get out of this unscathed. And by the way, if you make it past the chainsaws, there's people with machine guns, this is gonna be bad.

• 15:42Jocko Willink?

  And by the way, you might have to go against all this, a whole other neighborhood of haunted houses. That's how bad this is gonna be.

• 15:49Jocko Willink?

  So these are the kind of, this is the kind of information that was making it to the White House. And it's so weird, you know, we talk about, talk about decision making. And one of the things that I talk about at, at the muster is when you, you know, I go through that extreme ownership, leadership loop. And part of it is like, okay, what, how much is this my emotions? What are my emotions playing into this? How much is my ego playing into this? And then on top of that, when we talk about the OODA loop, we talk about what are the sources of information? That I'm receiving? And how accurate are those sources of information? And then what are my biases and what are my natural instincts?

• 16:33Jocko Willink?

  Because we have to go and fight our biases and fight our natural instincts. Cause they're there. And if you don't watch out for them, if you've got a, if you've got a natural instinct for war, everything looks like we should go to war. If you've got a natural instinct for peace, well, we shouldn't do anything. So you gotta understand what your own natural instinct is. And then you've got to lean in the other direction to make sure you're getting a balanced approach. But these are, when you have this strong statements, these strong types of statements that are coming in, they've got, you've gotta weigh those things heavily. But, and this is the thing I talk about at the muster.

• 17:12Jocko Willink?

  We get information and we just deny it. That's how you fail. You fail when you deny the feedback loop. When you deny a feedback loop and you don't pay attention to the feedback, that's when you, that's when you get crushed. Because you're getting feedback, you're getting information, you're getting data and you go, yeah, that data's not right. Oh, wait a second, the people that are on the ground, the CIA that's there, intermingled with the South Vietnamese that are gathering intelligence, that have spies, they're telling me this stuff and I'm like, ah, you know, I don't think it'll be that bad.

• 17:42Jocko Willink?

  We have to be careful for that, careful of that. All right, fast forward a little bit. Now we're going a few months later, early January 1965. Max Taylor, he's a Vietnam advisor. He, he, like, these guys are in Vietnam and coming back and placing reports. So these guys are, have been on the ground.

• 18:02Jocko Willink?

  He says this, "We are faced here with a seriously deteriorating situation characterized by continual political turmoil, irresponsibility, irresponsibility and division within the armed forces, lethargy in the pacification program and some anti-US feeling which could grow, signs of mounting terrorism by VC directly at US personnel and deepening discouragement and loss of morale throughout the South Viet, throughout the South Vietnam. Unless these conditions are somehow changed, we are likely soon to face installation of a hostile government, which will ask us to leave while it seeks accommodation with the National Liberation Front,

• 18:47Jocko Willink?

  which is the Vietcong's political win, wing and Hanoi. There is a comparatively short time fuse in this situation.

• 18:57Jocko Willink?

  It's really difficult to paint a worse picture than, than these statements that I'm reading. That, that's one of the reasons I wanted to read them, because when you read the book, you're like, how? You know, when you're watching a horror movie and the persons, they hear noise and screams down in the cellar, the dark cellar and the lights aren't working. But luckily there's a candle nearby, so they pick up the candle and they're walking into the cellar. And there's chainsaws down there and people are screaming and, and they're just light the candle and walk on down. That's what you get the feeling of here. That's how bad the signs are.

• 19:34Jocko Willink?

  He refers a lot to a national security advisor guy named McGeorge Bundy, calls him Mac. So Robert McNamara and Mac, which is, which is McGeorge Bundy, that's his first name. Again, he's the now, he's national security advisor and they write another extensive report to the president.

• 19:57Jocko Willink?

  Says, "We told LBJ that both of us are now pretty well convinced that our current policy can only lead to disastrous defeat."

• 20:07Jocko Willink?

  This is 1965, January 27th, 1965.

• 20:11Jocko Willink?

  Disastrous defeat.

• 20:15Jocko Willink?

  Fast forward a little bit, "The underlying difficulties in Saigon arise from the spreading conviction that there, that the future is without hope for anti-communists." So people on the ground are telling you like, "Look, we see that you're here, but we don't think there's hope for the, for the anti-communists. We don't think it's, we think they're too strong."

• 20:32Jocko Willink?

  And he goes on to say, "Both of us understand the very grave question presented by any decision of this sort. We both recognize that the ultimate responsibility is not ours. Both of us had fully, have fully supported your unwillingness in earlier months to move out of the middle course. We both agree that every effort should still be made to improve our operations on the ground and to prop up authorities in South Vietnam as best we can. But we are both convinced that none of this is enough and that the time has come for harder choices." And some of these harder choices would be leaving, negotiating, a bunch of, a bunch of other options. "You should know that Dean Rusk does not agree with us."

• 21:17Jocko Willink?

  He's Secretary of State. "He does not quarrel with our assertion that things are going very badly and the situation is unraveling."

• 21:28Jocko Willink?

  He does not assert that this deterioration can be stopped. What he does say is that the consequences of both escalation and withdrawal are so bad that we simply must find a way of making our present policy work. This would be good if it was possible. Bob and I do not think it is. Stark warnings. Stark warnings, and these are written reports to LBJ. We don't think this is gonna work. In fact, we think it's gonna be disastrous. And by the way, the two ways that we can go, either escalation or withdrawal, both of those are bad. Which those are kind of the two opposing ends of the spectrum.

• 22:13Jocko Willink?

  Like if we escalate, it's gonna get really gnarly. If we leave, it's gonna get really gnarly. So then what do you do? Well, then you break down, you look at that decision. Okay, what's good for America? Right? Because at some point, you have to ask that question.

• 22:29Jocko Willink?

  So then we roll in this decision to escalate. This is January 28th through July 28th, 1965. And there's, again, the book gives some really great detail. I'm hitting some of the highlights. June 7th, 1965. This is Westy, William Westmoreland. He sends this.

• 22:49Jocko Willink?

  "The conflict in Southeast Asia is in the process of moving to a higher level. Some North Vietnamese forces have entered South Vietnam, and more may well be on the way. So far, the VC have not employed their full capabilities in this campaign. The South Vietnamese Army forces, on the other hand, are already experiencing difficulty in coping with this increased VC capability. Desertion rates are inordinately high. Battle losses have been higher than expected. As a result, Arvin troops are beginning to show signs of reluctance to assume the offensive, and in some cases, their steadfastness under fire is coming into doubt.

• 23:32Jocko Willink?

  The force ratios continue to change in favor of the VC." The government of Vietnam cannot stand up successfully to this kind of pressure without reinforcement. I see no course of action open to us except to reinforce our efforts in South Vietnam with additional US or third country forces as rapidly as is practical during the critical weeks ahead. The basic purpose of the additional deployments recommended is to give us a substantial and hard hitting offensive capability on the ground to convince the VC that they cannot win.

• 24:13Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, and it says in the book here, Westy said that he needed forty one thousand more combat troops now and another fifty two thousand later. This would increase the total US strength from eighty two thousand to one hundred and seventy five thousand. The last paragraph of his cable read, "Studies must continue and plans developed to deploy even greater forces if and when required."

• 24:36Jocko Willink?

  His request meant a dramatic and open ended expansion of a military of American military involvement.

• 24:45Jocko Willink?

  So.

• 24:48Jocko Willink?

  This is one of those moments where you can, you've got to check your bias. Because if you have a positive outlook, like, well, you know, once we get there and we'll get on the ground and the the the VC will see our extraordinary strength and capability and they'll, they'll, they'll, what does he say? Convince them that they can't win. Like, that's one attitude you can have. Or you can have a little bit more pessimistic, probably a little more realistic attitude, which is, oh. They've been, they live there.

• 25:19Jocko Willink?

  Right? They live there. There's nowhere for them to go. That's where they live. So they're not going anywhere.

• 25:25Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 25:26Jocko Willink?

  We very seldom put that into the calculus, which is a bad move.

• 25:31Speaker 01

  Yeah, and is that a situation where, yeah, they straight up just don't consider that? Because it seems like something that you would consider.

• 25:38Jocko Willink?

  Well, I mean, in this particular case, you've got the South Vietnamese and they also can't leave, right? That's their home as well. So we'll back the people that believe more in line with what we believe.

• 25:50Jocko Willink?

  But how do you convince someone to believe something different? That's not an easy thing to do. You can't do it very quickly. And it's very difficult, as you hear me talk about all the time, to impose your beliefs on someone else. It's very difficult. In some cases, it's impossible. Yeah.

• 26:10Jocko Willink?

  Now, here's where we get into some politics. President Johnson read polls the next afternoon that showed a public prepared for further action. Sixty-five percent approved his handling of the war. Forty-seven percent favored sending more troops. This was double those, quote, "not sure," which was twenty-three percent. Two and a half times those wishing to, quote, "keep the present number," which was nineteen percent, and more than quadruple those wanting to take troops out, which was eleven percent. So according to the polls, sixty-five percent say he's doing a good job. Forty-seven percent said, "Send more."

• 26:49Jocko Willink?

  Only eleven percent were saying, "Take the troops out." So you got Johnson. He's hearing what the polls are saying. The thing you gotta remember about polls are, they don't have all this other information. They don't have these CIA reports. They don't have these, these deep, deeply studied pieces of information from people on the ground. What do they say? They say on TV?

• 27:14Jocko Willink?

  "Hey, communists are trying to take over Vietnam. Let's go fight them."

• 27:20Jocko Willink?

  He did say this.

• 27:23Jocko Willink?

  On June twenty-first, I think that in time, this is, this is LBJ talking. The president. "I think that in time, it's going to be difficult for us to very long prosecute, effectively, a war that far away from home with the divisions that we have here, and particularly the potential divisions." So this is sixty-five, right? So he's already talking about divisions in America.

• 27:52Jocko Willink?

  And it's back to the book and it's really had me concerned for a month and I'm very depressed about it because I see no program from either defense or state that gives me much hope of doing anything except just praying and grasping to hold on during the monsoon season and hope they'll quit. And I don't believe they're going to quit. And I don't see that we have any plan for victory militarily or diplomatically. Russell, and that's Russell, uh, Richard B. Russell Johnson's old senate mentor and powerful chairman of the senate arms services committee. Russell thinks we ought to take one of these regime changes to get out of there.

• 28:38Jocko Willink?

  I do not think we can get out of there with our treaty like it is and with what all we've said and I think it would just lose us face in the world and I just shudder to think what all of them would say.

• 28:55Jocko Willink?

  So in 1965, he doesn't think they're gonna quit. He doesn't see a way to win militarily or diplomatically.

• 29:05Jocko Willink?

  And yet he doesn't want to lose face and he doesn't want America to lose face.

• 29:11Jocko Willink?

  So we have an ego, we have ego, national ego and individual ego driving decision-making process, which we know is not going to be good.

• 29:25Jocko Willink?

  Here's, here's another, this is the other side.

• 29:31Jocko Willink?

  So not everyone's got the same idea of like, hey, this is a disaster. Dean Rusk says,

• 29:39Jocko Willink?

  "The integrity of the US commitment is the principal pillar of peace throughout the world. If that commitment comes, becomes unreliable, the communist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war. So long as the South Vietnamese are prepared to fight for themselves, we cannot abandon them without disaster to peace and to our interests throughout the world."

• 30:11Jocko Willink?

  So this is catastrophizing, right? Like, he's saying if we don't back up the Vietnam, the South Vietnamese, that shows the whole world that we're weak and communism could spread. And that's what they were thinking at the time. But I, I wanted to give you the other side, which is that attitude. Look, if we bail out of Vietnam, communism is going to take over. And by the way, then they're going to go into these other areas of the world. So we need to hold the line here.

• 30:41Jocko Willink?

  Also, when people have what they want to happen, they explain things a certain way, right? Yeah. And that's why it's important to be unbiased. It's important to be unbiased from your decision-making process. Because otherwise, if you're, if you think, yeah, the communists are going to take over everywhere, as soon as someone gives you a little piece of information, you're like, we're going to fight them.

• 31:06Jocko Willink?

  Terrible.

• 31:09Jocko Willink?

  Fast forward a little bit, July 17th, 1965. And this is, this is something that McNamara presents.

• 31:18Jocko Willink?

  "These are my conclusions, but I would like you to prove me wrong. The VC and North Vietnam can recruit a lot more people than they currently have. We should be prepared to increase our strength accordingly. It has not taken, number two, it has not taken many supplies to support the VC in the past. It doesn't take many supplies now. And I don't think it's going to take many in the future." So what that's talking about is you got this, the VC Army, they're guerrillas. You know what kind of logistics they need? Do you know? No. No, they don't need any logistics. Yeah. They figured it out. They're in the jungle. They grew up in the jungle. They'll, they'll be fine in the jungle. You don't need to get them, uh, MREs shipped in.

• 32:01Jocko Willink?

  No, they're eating rice, they're eating mangoes, they're eating whatever jungle food out there. They're, they know how to survive. Their weapons, what do they need for weapons? They have an AK-47. They got 30 rounds. They got some improvised explosives. There's not, there's not this big logistics train that the Nazis needed or that the Japanese needed. Oh, the Japanese are on an island? The Imperial Japanese are on an island? Cool, we'll cut off the supplies. They're not going to survive. They're going to run out of ammunition. You can't do that to the Vietnamese because they don't need any supplies. They're going to be fine. And he's making note of that. And then number three, because it takes so few supplies, aerial attacks are not going to cut into the VC logistics to a damaging degree.

• 32:43Jocko Willink?

  I'm not saying that we should stop our aerial attacks. However, I do say that we are going to need a lot more men in the South to effectively counter this on the ground.

• 32:54Jocko Willink?

  So then he goes to Saigon and when he comes back a few days later in July 21st, I return to Washington and here's his assessment, 1965.

• 33:06Jocko Willink?

  "The situation in South Vietnam is worse than a year ago, when it was worse a year before that. A few months of stalemate, after a few months of stalemate, the tempo of the war has quickened. A hard VC push is now on to dismember the nation and to maul the army. Without further outside help, the Arvin is faced with successive tactical reverses, loss of key communication and population centers, particularly in the Highlands, piecemeal destruction of Arvin units, and loss of civilian confidence. There are no signs that we have throttled the inflow of supply for the VC or can throttle

• 33:51Jocko Willink?

  the flow while their materials, while their material needs are as low as they are. Nor have our air attacks in North Vietnam produced tangible evidence of the willingness on the part of Hanoi to come to the conference table in a reasonable mood.

• 34:07Jocko Willink?

  The Democratic Republic of North Vietnam and the Vietcong seem to believe that South Vietnam is on the run and near collapse. They show no signs of settling for less than a complete takeover."

• 34:22Jocko Willink?

  That's, that's about as dire of a, of a message that you could send. And that's what he, that's what he reports after he gets back from Vietnam. He goes, gets on the ground, talks to all the people. They all brief him what's going on. And by the way, look, these, these generals and stuff, they give shiny reports, right? Everyone's Mr. Positive. "Oh, how's the war going? It's going great. We've, we might've taken a couple hits there and there, but we're gonna, we're back, coming back. Everyone's got the good news story to tell us." When he come back from a trip and he gets bad news and gives a bad news story, that's not a good sign.

• 34:59Jocko Willink?

  And this is interesting.

• 35:02Jocko Willink?

  Fast forward a little bit. Anti-war protests had been sporadic and limited up to this time and had not compelled attention. Then came the afternoon of November 2nd, 1965. At twilight that day, a young Quaker named Norman R. Morrison, father of three and an officer of the Stony Run Friends Meeting in Baltimore, burned himself to death within forty feet of my Pentagon window.

• 35:33Jocko Willink?

  He doused himself with fuel from a gallon jug. When he set himself on fire, he was holding his one-year-old daughter in his arms. Bystanders screamed, "Save the child!" and he flung her out of his arms. She survived without injury. After Morrison's death, his wife issued a statement. Norman Morrison gave his life to express his concern over the great loss of life and human suffering caused by the war in Vietnam. He was protesting our government's deep military involvement in this war. He felt that all citizens must speak their convictions about our country's action.

• 36:13Jocko Willink?

  So this is 1965.

• 36:17Jocko Willink?

  And you've got an American that's setting himself on fire outside of your window with his daughter. So listen, you can say, "Oh, that guy's crazy." You can say, "He's obviously got mental issues," or maybe he's really passionate. But one thing you have to do is say, "Okay, this needs to go into the calculus of my decision-making. We've got people that are willing to set themselves on fire and kill their daughter because they don't like what's happening." Hey, if that guy's mentally unstable, okay. But guess what he did? Set himself on fire. So that means, that means people are taking notice and some of them are clearly not happy.

• 37:01Jocko Willink?

  Fast forward a little bit, December 3rd, 1965, there's a story that comes out in The Washington Star, written by Mary McGory, who's a syndicated columnist. And so she's got an interview going with, with, or she's writing a story about McNamara.

• 37:18Jocko Willink?

  And the, the topic comes up of, you know, this nation has a tradition of protecting our free speech and the right to dissent. Our policies become stronger as the result of the debate.

• 37:29Jocko Willink?

  And it says, "The secretary is an admirer of Norman Thomas, the venerable socialist leader, who is the most effective orator in last Saturday's demonstration here. But he takes issue with Thomas's contention that he would, quote, "would rather see America save her soul than her face in Southeast Asia." And McNamara is quoted as saying, "How do you save your soul? Do you save your soul by pulling out of a situation? Or do you save it by fulfilling your commitments?" end quote.

• 38:05Jocko Willink?

  Obviously, his thought is you fulfill your commitments. But what commitments did we make and why did we make them? November 29th, 1965.

• 38:15Jocko Willink?

  This is McNamara talking again, talking to the press. And this is when he comes back from Saigon from another trip. He says, "We have stopped losing the war. But despite that fact, we've had that success. The Vietcong and North Vietnamese have more than offset the very heavy losses which they have suffered. The level of infiltration has increased. And I think this represents a clear decision on the part of Hanoi to raise the level of the conflict. The decision by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army to stand and fight at the recent Battle of Idrang, recognizing the level of force we can bring to bear against them,

• 38:57Jocko Willink?

  expresses their determination to carry on on the conflict that can only lead to one conclusion. It will be a long war."

• 39:09Jocko Willink?

  1965, he's saying that.

• 39:13Jocko Willink?

  December 17th, 1965. Talking to the president.

• 39:21Jocko Willink?

  McNamara, "A military solution to the problem is not certain. One out of three or one out of two, ultimately, we must find a diplomatic solution." So imagine that you're gonna go to war and you got a 1 in 3 chance of winning? There's something wrong. 1 in 2 chance of winning. If there's not an existential threat, meaning we are gonna lose our country and be enslaved, you're not rolling in just going to a war with a 1 in 3 chance of winning. What are you doing?

• 39:52Jocko Willink?

  The president says, "Then no matter what we do in the military field, there is no sure victory." McNamara, "That's right. We've been too optimistic." Rusk, "I'm more optimistic, but I can't prove it." McNamara, "I'm saying we may not find a military solution. We need to explore other means. Our military action approach is an unacceptable way to a successful conclusion. This seems a contradiction. I come to you for a huge increase in Vietnam, 400,000 men, but at the same time, it may lead to escalation and undesirable results. I suggest we now look at other alternatives."

• 40:38Jocko Willink?

  Hey, can you give me 400,000 men to go and send into combat? And I'm not sure we're gonna win.

• 40:50Jocko Willink?

  Now we're getting 1966, January 1966. He gives another somber assessment.

• 40:57Jocko Willink?

  "Even though the communists will continue to suffer heavily from our ground and air action, we expect them upon learning of any US intentions to augment forces, to boost their own commitment, and to test US capabilities and will to preserve at a higher level of conflict and casualty, and casualties. The US killed in action with the recommended deployments can be expected to reach 1,000 a month." It follows therefore that the odds are about even that even with the recommended deployments will be faced in early 1967 with a military standoff at a much higher level with pacification hardly underway and with the requirement for the deployment of still more US forces.

• 41:47Jocko Willink?

  Not good.

• 41:49Jocko Willink?

  And what are they doing this whole time escalating just continuing to escalate? June 23rd, 1966. He tells the president in a lengthy report.

• 42:00Jocko Willink?

  1966. Enemy morale has not broken. He apparently has adjusted to our stopping his drive for military victory and has adopted a strategy of keeping us busy and waiting us out. A strategy of a trading our national will. Hundred percent right. It's a hundred percent accurate. He knows that we have not been, and he believes we probably will not be able to translate our military successes into the end products, broken enemy morale and political achievements by the government of South Vietnam. So they're actually accurate.

• 42:40Jocko Willink?

  The one thing demonstrably going for us in Vietnam over the past year has been the large number of enemy killed in action resulting from the big military operations. Allowing for possible exaggeration in reports, the enemy must be taking losses at the rate of more than 60,000 a year. The info, and this is where the whole body count thing comes from when this guy's a

• 43:07Jocko Willink?

  statistics guy.

• 43:10Jocko Willink?

  And I've talked about this many times that Battle of the Idrang Valley. That, that

• 43:17Jocko Willink?

  increased the thought that, oh, we can kill 20 of them for every one they kill of us and therefore we getting involved in a war of attrition, they won't be able to take it anymore. That was the thought. But, and you can see it backed up here. Hey, listen, the good news is we're killing a lot of them 60,000 a year. How long can they sustain that for? Well, there's a huge, this is where we, this is where we make a huge mistake. We think that they think how we think. And for us, every American soldier, sailor, marine, airman that's killed, it's a travesty. For them, that's part of life and death. So the 60,000, that's part of them preserving their country. It's their home.

• 44:02Jocko Willink?

  Continuing on, the infiltration routes would seem to be one-way trails to death for the North Vietnamese. Yet there is no sign of an impending break in enemy morale, and it appears that he can more than replace his losses by infiltration from North Vietnam and recruitment in South Vietnam.

• 44:22Jocko Willink?

  Pacification has, if anything, gone backward. As compared with two, four, two or four years ago, enemy full-time regional forces and part-time guerrilla forces are larger. Attacks, terrorism, and sabotage have increased in scope and intensity. We control little, if any, more of the population. The VC, political infrastructure thrives in most of the country, continuing to give the enemy his enormous intelligence advantage. Full security exists nowhere, not even behind the US Marines' lines and in Saigon. In the countryside, the enemy almost completely controls the night.

• 45:04Jocko Willink?

  Nor has the Rolling Thunder program of bombing the North either significantly affected infiltration or cracked the morale of Hanoi.

• 45:14Jocko Willink?

  There is agreement in the intelligence community on these facts. In essence, we find ourselves, from the point of view of the important war for the hearts and minds of the people, no better, and if anything, worse off.

• 45:27Jocko Willink?

  This important war must be fought and won by the Vietnamese themselves. We have known this from the beginning. But the discouraging truth is that, as was in the case in 1961 and 1963 and 1965, we have not found the formula, the catalyst for training and inspiring them into effective action. So who, who is, where is this coming from? This is McNamara writes it for the president. Okay. He's telling the president what's going on.

• 46:00Jocko Willink?

  And this is what he's doing. He's writing these memos and he's trying to be very straightforward in these memos. Here's another one. May 19th, 1967.

• 46:12Jocko Willink?

  This memo here. This memorandum is written at a time when there appears to be no attractive course of action. The probabilities are that Hanoi has decided not to negotiate until the American electorate has been heard in November 1968. Continuation of our present moderate policy while avoiding a larger war will not change Hanoi's mind so is not enough to satisfy the American people. Increased force levels and actions against the North are likewise unlikely to change Hanoi's mind and are likely to get us even deeper in Southeast Asia into a serious confrontation, if not war with China and Russia. And we are not

• 46:54Jocko Willink?

  willing to yield. So we must choose among imperfect alternatives. The Vietnam War is unpopular in this country. This is 1967. So now we have, like, we're full on into it. The Vietnam War is unpopular in this country. It is becoming increasingly unpopular as it escalates, causing more American casualties, more fear of its growing into a wider war, more privation of the domestic sector, and more distress at the amount of suffering being visited on the non-combatants in Vietnam, South and North. Most Americans do not know how we got where we are, and most, without knowing why, but taking advantage of hindsight,

• 47:34Jocko Willink?

  are convinced that somehow we should not have gotten in this deeply. All want the war ended and expect their president to end it successfully, or else. This state of mind in the US generates impatience in the political structure of the United States. It unfortunately also generates patience in Hanoi. It is commonly supposed that Hanoi will not give anything away pending the trial of the US elections in November 1968.

• 48:05Jocko Willink?

  He goes on, "The other war against the VC is still not going well. Corruption is widespread, real government control is confined to enclaves. There is rot in the fabric. The population remains apathetic. The Army of the South Vietnam is tired, passive, and accommodation prone, and is moving too slowly, if at all, into pacification work. Hanoi's attitude toward negotiations has never been soft nor open-minded. They seem uninterested in political settlement and determined to match US military expansion of the conflict. There continues to be no sign that the bombing has reduced Hanoi's will to resist or her ability to ship the necessary supplies south.

• 48:47Jocko Willink?

  Hanoi shows no signs of ending the large war and advising the VC to melt into the jungles. The North Vietnamese believe they are right. They consider the key regime to be puppets. They believe the world is with them and that the American public will not have the staying power against them. Thus, although they may have factions in the regime favoring different approaches, they believe that, in the long run, they are stronger than we are for the purpose." Continuing on, "There may be a limit beyond which many Americans and much of the world

• 49:32Jocko Willink?

  will not permit the United States to go. The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring a thousand non-combatants a week while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed is not a pretty one. It could conceivably produce costly distortion in the American national conscience and in the world image of the United States, especially if the damage to North Vietnam is complete enough to be, quote, 'successful.'"

• 50:15Jocko Willink?

  How does that look? Oh, you're gonna smash this little country, killing thousands of noncombatants, wounding thousands of noncombatants. And if, and if we really do enough damage to where we're quote, "successful", that means it looks like

• 50:34Jocko Willink?

  a Holocaust, like everyone's dead. And so how's that gonna make us look?

• 50:39Jocko Willink?

  And it's, you're, you're, this is McNamara, this is a guy talking to the president, telling him this stuff.

• 50:49Jocko Willink?

  Now, here's a report from CIA Director Richard Helms, September 1967. And here we go. "Any honest and dispassionate analysis must conclude that if the US accepts failure in Vietnam, it will pay some price in the form of new risks, which success there would preclude." So look, if you fail there, there's gonna be some problems. "The frustration of a world power, once it has committed vast resources and much prestige to a military enterprise, must be in some degree damaging to the general security system it upholds. In the case of Vietnam,

• 51:30Jocko Willink?

  there does not seem to be a common denominator which permits such eventual risks to be measured reliably against the obvious and immediate cost of continuing the war." So he's saying like, "Look, there could be problems, we get it. It might look as bad on a national level, but

• 51:47Jocko Willink?

  we can't even know what that is, compared to the immediate cost of continuing the war." It's like, "Hey Echo, if you don't do this, something really bad could happen." You're like, "Yeah, but right now I'm bleeding."

• 51:57Jocko Willink?

  "Hey, you know, Echo, if you, if you don't, you don't make a move right now, you're gonna bleed all over the carpet." You're like, "Yeah, but I gotta stop the bleeding right now."

• 52:06Jocko Willink?

  "If the analysis here advances the discussion at all, it is in the direction of suggesting that the risks are probably more limited and controllable than most previous argument had indicated." So he's saying, "Look, we get it, the communism is, it could spread, and it's gonna make us look weak, and maybe..." He's saying, "Yep, I get all that. Compared to what's going on right now in Vietnam, it's not worth it."

• 52:33Jocko Willink?

  The CIA guy? CIA, yep. CIA Director, by the way. Richard Helms.

• 52:43Jocko Willink?

  November 2nd, 1967. This is McNamara to LBJ, to the President. "Nothing can be expected to break this will other than the conviction that they cannot succeed. This conviction will not be created unless and until they come to the conclusion that the US is prepared to remain in Vietnam for whatever period of time is necessary to assure the independent choice of the South Vietnamese people. The enemy cannot be expected to arrive at that conclusion in advance of the American public." So how are the North Vietnam going to think that we're going to stay if we can't even convince the Americans that we're going to stay? Or that we're going to win? "And the American public frustrated by the slow

• 53:28Jocko Willink?

  rate of progress, fearing continued escalation, and doubting that all approaches to peace have been sincerely probed, does not give the appearance of having the will to persist. As the months go by, there will be both increasing pressure for widening the war and continued loss of support for American participation in the struggle." So both those things are happening at the same time. Pressure to widen the war and support to get out of there.

• 53:59Jocko Willink?

  "There will be increasing calls for American withdrawal. There is, in my opinion, a very real question whether, under these circumstances, it will be possible to maintain our efforts in South Vietnam for the time necessary to accomplish our objectives there."

• 54:19Jocko Willink?

  So that's what's happening. And I'm going to read, this isn't a quote inside the book. This is actually just the book itself. So I'm going to read this section so you have a... Well, you won't have a clear idea because you'll see from this opening sentence, not even McNamara has a clear idea. He says this. "I do not know to this day whether I quit or was fired." Maybe it was both. I had long been interested in developing countries in a highly controversial speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Montreal, May 18, 1966. I spoke on that subject. I said, quote, "There is among us a tendency to think of our security problem as being exclusively a military problem. I disagree.

• 54:59Jocko Willink?

  A nation can reach a point at which it does not buy more security for itself by buying more military hardware, and we are at that point.

• 55:10Jocko Willink?

  I believe the relationship between defense expenditures and security takes the shape of a curve in which, up to a point, security increases as defense expenditures increase, then the curve flattens out and may even decline. I judge the United States to be on the flat of that curve in 1966. I believe we're on it today. Rather than increased military spending, I told the editors, "We should assist those developing countries which genuinely need and request our help and which, as an essential precondition, are willing and able to help themselves." I noted that the already dangerous gap between rich and poor nations was widening and that poverty within nations produced social and political tensions that often spilled over into conflict between nations.

• 55:53Jocko Willink?

  In sum, I believe that we would achieve greater security by transferring marginal dollar expenditures from defense to foreign aid.

• 56:04Jocko Willink?

  One did not expect to hear such a speech from a Defense Secretary in a time of war, led to harsh criticism. So, he makes this speech, people are saying, "Wait a second. You're running this war and you're saying we shouldn't be spending any money on war? We should be doing aid?"

• 56:20Jocko Willink?

  So, he's speaking his mind, makes sense, but from that position, not supported. So then, he goes into, there's this, the World Bank, the President of the World Bank, a guy named George Woods, he's ending his five-year term and basically...

• 56:39Jocko Willink?

  Ask McNamara, would you like the job? McNamara starts thinking about it. He also gets offered, you know, jobs in Wall Street, making a bunch of money. And he actually tells the president about it. Like, hey, I got some options. I'm just letting you know, like, people are approaching me. And then, um, fast forward a little bit on November 27th, the London Financial Times printed a rumor of my nomination. That's the nomination for this position as the president of World Bank. Two days later, George and five World Bank directors came to my office and offered me the post. I accepted. The next day, President Johnson announced I would be leaving the Pentagon to go to the World Bank. One of the great ironies is that I do not know whether the president himself knew exactly how and why my departure came about.

• 57:23Jocko Willink?

  He knew I was loyal to the presidency and to him. That's a really interesting statement. Loyalty to the presidency and to him. That's very important. And it's a, it's a, in my opinion, it's a positive thing. So.

• 57:38Jocko Willink?

  You know, obviously you've got the man and then you've got the position. And I, I was, uh, when I was the admiral's aide, it's like.

• 57:46Jocko Willink?

  You, you are doing a job. You're supporting the guy and you're supporting the position. Like the guy's in charge of all the seals. He, we need to make sure that he has what he needs to do his job, that everything's professional, that everything's on time. Like, that's part of it. So for me, like I had this responsibility, because if my admiral that represents all seals goes in and is giving a briefing to the four-star general. And his slides aren't right, or his uniform is messed up, or he shows up late, like, all those things are bad. And they're all bad for all seals. And so we can't let that happen. That's a loyalty to the position. And then also you have this loyalty to like, you know, you've met Admiral McGuire. Great guy.

• 58:31Jocko Willink?

  Takes cares of the troops, cares about people, like, so you have both those loyalties and that's what he's talking about here. He knew I was, because you could be loyal to the person and not the position, and you could be loyal to the position and not to the president. So he says, he knew I was loyal to the presidency and to him. And as I've said, I sensed his, his equally strong feelings towards me despite our deep differences over Vietnam.

• 58:53Jocko Willink?

  He must have assumed I had thought of resigning and I believe he felt relieved that I had not. Why then did I leave? It was not because I was ill, although newspaper reported such stories, and the president told his aides he was worried I might commit suicide as Truman's first Defense Secretary, James Forrestal, had done. It has since become a common assumption that I was near emotional and physical collapse. I was not. I was indeed feeling stress. I was at loggerheads with the President of the United States. Because by the way, all these things that I've read, Johnson's basically not listened to. Which is bad. "I was not getting answers to my questions and I was tense as hell. But I was not under medical care, not taking drugs except for an occasional sleeping pill,

• 59:37Jocko Willink?

  and never contemplated suicide. The fact is, I'd come to the conclusion and had told him point-blank that we could not achieve our objective in Vietnam through any reasonable military means, and we therefore should seek a lesser political objective through negotiations." President Johnson was not ready to accept that. "It was becoming clear to both of us that I would not change my judgment, nor would he change his. Something had to give." "Many friends, then and since, have told me I was wrong not to have resigned in protest over the president's policy. Let me explain why I did not." The president, with the exception of the Vice President, is the only elected official of the executive branch.

• 1:00:18Jocko Willink?

  He appoints each cabinet officer who should have no constant, uh, no loyalty other than him. That is how cabinet officers are kept accountable to the people. A cabinet officer's authority and legitimacy derives from the president. "It is also true, however, that because of their frequent public explo- exposure, some cabinet officers develop power independent of the president. To a degree, I held such power. And some said I should have used it by resigning, challenging the president's Vietnam policy and leading those who sought to force a change." "I believe that would have been a violation of my responsibility to the president

• 1:01:02Jocko Willink?

  and my oath to uphold the Constitution." It's a weird dynamic, right? So, hey. You appoint me. And since you got elected and I didn't, you got elected because of what you, because of your policies. I'm here to support your policies. That's basically what he's saying. So if I don't believe in your policies, it's not my job to like resign. It's my job to support your policies. If you hire me as a cook and you want hot dogs, I cook you hot dogs. You want hamburgers, I cook you hamburgers. You, you want salmon, I cook you salmon. You want steak? I don't say, well, actually, I think you, no, I don't get to do that. You hired me. I cook what you want me to cook. And I don't, when you want steak, I go, I protest. I don't think you should, you know, I don't think you should have steak. I don't protest about that. That's not my job. My job is to cook the steak.

• 1:01:51Jocko Willink?

  So, like he said, I believe that would have been a violation of my responsibility to the president and my oath to uphold the constitution. Because what the constitution says, the president is the executive.

• 1:02:02Jocko Willink?

  I will never forget what Dean Acheson told me. Dean said that when he had served as under secretary of the treasury in the early 1930s, under Franklin Roosevelt, he had found himself unable to accept the president's monetary policy. So he had resigned silently. Roosevelt had told him that he was the only official he had ever known to resign as the constitution intended. I never forgot that lesson. Simply put, despite my deep differences with Lyndon Johnson over Vietnam, I was loyal to the presidency and loyal to him, and I sensed his equally strong feelings towards me.

• 1:02:41Jocko Willink?

  Moreover, until the day I left, I believed I could influence his decisions. I therefore felt I had a responsibility to stay at my post. Now, that's something we've debated many times, right? Hackworth ends up speaking out against the army and the leadership in the army, and he ends up getting drummed out of the army. He could have been a division commander, could have been a brigade commander, division commander, whatever. He could have had way more influence inside the Navy than he did with that one report. Now, that's questionable. That report did, when he got, when that report went to the press, a lot of people saw it and maybe shifted their minds. We could, we could argue that. So that's a very tough decision to make. If you don't like what someone is doing, do you stay there and try and influence them? Or do you just retire or resign in protest?

• 1:03:26Jocko Willink?

  We saw what Mattis did with Trump. Mattis didn't like what he was doing. He resigned in protest. How long did we hear about that? Did Mattis lose the influence that he had over the president? You know, those are things that we could discuss, debate. I don't know the answer. But it's weird because McNamara doesn't even think that that's a thing you do. He's like, if you're gonna, if you want to resign because you don't want to support it, you do it quietly. You don't make a spectacle, you just, um, you know, whatever, I'm moving on.

• 1:03:57Jocko Willink?

  Back to the book, between November 29th and when I left the Pentagon, three months later, crisis piled on top of crisis. North Vietnamese troops led a siege to the marine base at Khe Sanh in the far northwestern corner of South Vietnam. North Korea seized the US intelligence ship Pueblo in international waters off the Korean peninsula. On January 23rd, 1968, a week later, the Vietcong blasted their way into the American Embassy Combine in Saigon, launching the bloody Tet Offensive. In my last official act on Vietnam, on February 27th, 1968, I opposed West's renewed appeal for 200,000 troops on economic, political, and moral grounds. My successor, Clark Clifford, adopted this, later adopted the same position.

• 1:04:43Jocko Willink?

  As the day of my departure neared, I wrote this letter to LBJ. February 23rd, 1968, Dear Mr. President, I cannot find words to express to you the feelings that lie in my heart. Fifty-one months ago, you asked me to serve in your cabinet. No other period in my life has brought so much struggle or so much satisfaction. The struggle would have been infinitely greater and the satisfaction, satisfaction immeasurably less if I had not received your full support every step of the way. No man could fail to be proud of service in administration, which has recorded the progress yours has in the fields of civil rights, health, and education. And, and look, yeah, LBJ was running front on the civil rights movement and pushing those things through.

• 1:05:32Jocko Willink?

  Um, back. One hundred years of neglect cannot be overcome overnight. But you have pushed, dragged and cajoled the nation into basic reforms from which my children and my children's children will benefit for decades to come. I know the price you have paid, both personally and politically, every citizen of our land is in your debt. I will not say goodbye, you know. You have but to call and I will respond sincerely, Bob. So that's it. That's it. It's over right there. Um. But it's not over because that was nineteen sixty seven. And we have troops in Vietnam until nineteen seventy four.

• 1:06:16Jocko Willink?

  Until nineteen or nineteen seventy three, I guess nineteen seventy three. So. It's that six more years. When the prediction was in nineteen sixty five, the prediction was pretty clear.

• 1:06:33Jocko Willink?

  So I wanted to lay that groundwork so we could get into some of these. Lessons learned. And he says here, it is sometimes said that the post Cold War world will be so different from the world of the past that the lessons of Vietnam will be inapplicable. Or of no relevance to the twenty first century. I disagree. That said, if we are to learn from our experience in Vietnam, we must first pinpoint our failures. There were eleven major causes for our disaster in Vietnam. So you know, even that that statement right there is very hundred percent statement. There's eleven major causes for our disaster in Vietnam. I would, if I was to say that, I'd say something like.

• 1:07:19Jocko Willink?

  From what I saw. Here's eleven things that I would think about.

• 1:07:26Jocko Willink?

  From my perspective, he's like, no, there's eleven lessons. Yeah, yeah, straight up. He's straight up like he's he's definitely thought he knew a lot. He's definitely an arrogant guy. And that arrogance, even after the humility of his judgment here still kind of shines through a little bit. Am I being a little bit harsh? Yes, I am. I'm judging.

• 1:07:47Jocko Willink?

  So here we go. One, we misjudged then, as we have since, the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries, in this case, North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, supported by China and the Soviet Union. And we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions.

• 1:08:07Jocko Willink?

  So, misjudgment. Misjudgment of your competition, misjudgment of the people that you work with, like, just misjudging their intentions. And this is obviously still going on today. What are the intentions? What are the intentions of Putin, for instance? Oh, Putin wants to take over all of Europe. No, Putin, he doesn't care, he just wants to secure his own border. So, who's right?

• 1:08:35Jocko Willink?

  That's, that's something that can easily be misjudged.

• 1:08:42Jocko Willink?

  What, so we need to really think through the actions that people are taking and we can't, my judgment would be like, hey, look, you know what my answer to that is? Is Putin trying to take over Europe? Or is he just trying to secure his borders? You know what my answer is? I don't know. I don't know. So I don't make plans based on he's trying to take over Europe and I don't make plans based on he's just trying to secure his border. I make plans that are flexible and adaptable and I can make adjustments. And I'm gonna make plans that don't trigger him to do one thing, but don't allow him to do something else. We tend to make extreme plans. So we gotta watch out for that. That's number one.

• 1:09:27Jocko Willink?

  Number two. We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam's in terms of our own experience.

• 1:09:37Jocko Willink?

  We saw in them a thirst for and a determination to fight for freedom and democracy. We totally misjudged the political forces within the country. So, this is, this is another mistake that we make all the time. And look, I'm not just talking about political, I'm talking about like us as humans. We see in someone else what we feel. Like, I can't believe Echo's not showing up early to, to come and go through this new sales program with me. Echo doesn't care. Echo doesn't want, he, he's good with making his, paying his rent and paying his car payment. He's got enough money to go out to eat on Fridays. He's good to go. He doesn't care.

• 1:10:13Speaker 01

  That's the, it's a good dream meme essentially.

• 1:10:16Jocko Willink?

  Oh, yeah.

• 1:10:17Speaker 01

  Your one.

• 1:10:18Jocko Willink?

  Oh, yeah. Yeah. Why are you skill, why are you yelling? Cause it's a good dream. Yeah, that, believe me, that one gets recycled quite a bit in my family.

• 1:10:25Speaker 01

  Yes.

• 1:10:26Jocko Willink?

  Cause if you think I didn't have a pull-up bar in my son's room, I mounted, there's a pull-up bar on the wall.

• 1:10:31Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:10:33Jocko Willink?

  There was mats at my house. I built a whole freaking outdoor arena at my house.

• 1:10:38Speaker 01

  Yeah. So, so the kids could fulfill their dream of being champions.

• 1:10:42Jocko Willink?

  Yes, yes. How else are you gonna become champion? It's a good dream.

• 1:10:46Speaker 01

  It's true. It's true.

• 1:10:48Jocko Willink?

  But that's what we do.

• 1:10:49Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:10:49Jocko Willink?

  We, we see them in terms of the, of our own experience. We see, we saw in them a thirst for and a determination for freedom and democracy. We imposed our thought process into their head. It didn't, it wasn't there. When you, most of the time now, it's like, you know what, you know what Vietnam wanted? People in Vietnam wanted to be Vietnamese people. That's what they wanted to be Vietnamese. Like, they're Vietnamese. That was their thing. They wanted to be Vietnamese. They didn't want to be American. They didn't want to be communist. They didn't want to be Chinese. They wanted to be Vietnamese. They didn't want to be French. They already fought the French. They didn't want to be French. They didn't want to be American. They didn't want to be Chinese. They wanted to be Vietnamese. This, this is, this is who we are. This is what we are.

• 1:11:32Jocko Willink?

  We're not doing, and so when we come and start looking like, well, we can be American. Okay, then some people that go, wait a second, we're not gonna be American. So who can help us? Oh, the Chinese? Cool. You help us. The communist? Cool. You help us.

• 1:11:45Jocko Willink?

  We imposed our thoughts into them. Same thing in Iraq. Like, oh, we want you to be a certain way. Well, it's gonna take generations if we're gonna make that happen. It's gonna take generations.

• 1:11:59Jocko Willink?

  And you know, interesting thing about Iraq is you can see like there's a, there's areas of Iraq that are very westernized. Sometimes in Baghdad, if you're driving in a Baghdad, you like driving down the street, you think you're on the I five north in California. Like it's a big highway, there's stores, like there's people. And there's westernized people there. So you could maybe make a stronger case for that. That you're, that they're gonna be rooting for that, but you can't expect it to be universal in a short period of time.

• 1:12:33Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:12:34Jocko Willink?

  I've always suspected that when people have a taste of freedom, it tastes good. And they'll start to bring that into their diet. And eventually that other people will get to try it and eventually say, oh yeah, we're not gonna go without this stuff. But that doesn't happen overnight, it takes generations for that to happen.

• 1:12:50Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:12:52Speaker 01

  Yeah, cuz no, no situation is perfect. So you know, when you get used to certain things and then you lose those things that you get used to, it's kinda like, oh. And then other things might not be as clear to them, or even be, other things might not be straight up embraced.

• 1:13:05Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, and also when it's death. So like, oh, you can either have freedom or you can have death. Look, not everyone has that, give me liberty or give me death. Some people, no, no, no, no, give me life. I'll take it, I'm not gonna die.

• 1:13:16Speaker 01

  Hundred percent.

• 1:13:16Jocko Willink?

  When you, so when you have a tyrannical leader or you have ISIS rolls through. It's like, no, no, no, you're gonna do what we say or we're gonna kill you.

• 1:13:23Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:13:23Jocko Willink?

  You know what a lot of people say? Cool, I'll do what you say. I wanna live.

• 1:13:26Speaker 01

  You know what's a real like day to day version of that is. It sounds like a joke, but it's not. Where, you know, when you ask your wife or your friends or whatever, like, hey, where do you wanna eat? And they say, oh no, wherever, up to you. It kinda feels like you're giving them, oh, of course you'd want any choice you want. Literally choose wherever you want. That's a good thing, right? But a lot, some people, they're like, well, more so than I want to choose wherever I want, I don't wanna be burdened with the decision, you know? It's like that. It's like you kinda got it backwards.

• 1:13:56Jocko Willink?

  I, I say what you, I see what you're saying there, and I don't think that's wrong. I think there's certainly people that are. Can become accustomed to a more tyrannical lifestyle. And it and we did see that in Iraq, like some people that are like, oh, we the governments tell us to do something. That's what we're doing because we've been gassed. We've been tortured like we're on board for whatever you're gonna say like we're we get it. We're not looking to protest. But what I'm saying is when you have freedom as an option. It's it's yeah, it tastes good. Oh, I like this. I get accustomed to it. But when someone else comes in and says, no, actually, you're gonna do what I say, or I'm gonna kill you and your whole family. A lot of people go, no. A lot of people say, okay, cool. I'm on board with whatever you're saying. That's what that's why, like, the American Revolution.

• 1:14:42Jocko Willink?

  Where people said, we'll kill you. And they said, no, we'll fight you. Let's go. Yeah. It's a big deal. Especially because in the American Revolution, a lot of those revolutionaries were prominent people that had a lot to lose. It's a lot easier when you're in a country where you don't have anything. Oh, we'll fight anybody. You got nothing to lose. Right. What do you take away from me? Nothing. So I'll fight you and I I might win. And when I win, I can go take your car and your house and your land. So I'll fight you. Let's go because I right now I don't have anything. So I'll fight you for something. So the American revolutionaries that had farms and properties and businesses and they were like, oh. We'll we'll sacrifice that if we have to because we want freedom. That's rare. That's not normal. That's not normal. But what we think is everybody just wants freedom. And you know what?

• 1:15:26Jocko Willink?

  When you're like, this is the Afghanistan scenario. And the Vietnam scenario is like, dude, I live on a farm. I just I just have my farm out here. I want to keep growing rice. That's what I'm doing. Right. So why are you here? Who who are you? Americans? Like, I don't know what you are, but you're in my rice paddy. And I'm not happy about it. Yeah. I don't care what like government? What are you talking about? We don't. The government is I have my family. We have this, you know, this rice production that we're doing. And that's what we're doing. So why are you here?

• 1:15:59Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:15:59Jocko Willink?

  So you're not giving me freedom. I have, I do what I want to do every day.

• 1:16:02Speaker 01

  Right.

• 1:16:02Jocko Willink?

  What are you trying, what are you talking about?

• 1:16:04Speaker 01

  Yeah, and that's kind of the point where regardless of how it plays itself out, it's like there, it's like this, this miscommunication, for lack of a better term, of where you think this is the obvious choice. It's so much better. This decision or this thing that I'm offering or whatever. And it is, to you, it's like factually better, objectively.

• 1:16:24Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, yeah, yeah.

• 1:16:24Speaker 01

  But since they literally are coming from a different perspective, it's like, Brad, it's not factually. In fact, I'm kind of cool with what I'm doing here.

• 1:16:31Jocko Willink?

  In fact, never mind, kind of. I'm very cool. Yeah. My family's been here for generations. This is what we do. We work the land, we raise our food, we raise our kids. This is what we do.

• 1:16:41Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:16:41Jocko Willink?

  What are you talking about?

• 1:16:42Speaker 01

  And in fact.

• 1:16:43Jocko Willink?

  What are you talking about freedom? I have total freedom.

• 1:16:45Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:16:45Jocko Willink?

  Like I'm, I'm free to till my land all day, do my work. That's what I do. That's what my kids, that's what's happening. What's wrong?

• 1:16:50Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:16:51Jocko Willink?

  What are you talking about?

• 1:16:52Speaker 01

  And in fact, the stuff that you're saying kind of sounds kind of hard.

• 1:16:55Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, yeah. Like, what do you mean go to work? I mean, go to a city. What are you talking about? We don't want to do that.

• 1:16:59Speaker 01

  Exactly right. And yeah, and it's, but a lot of it's just a matter of perspective, but yeah, that, that mistake, right? That you assume, oh yeah, I know, I know what's better for you than you do. And actually, not just you, kind of everybody.

• 1:17:11Jocko Willink?

  Yeah.

• 1:17:12Speaker 01

  Everybody here.

• 1:17:14Jocko Willink?

  Yeah.

• 1:17:17Jocko Willink?

  Very similar, number three. We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people. In this case, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to fight and die for their beliefs and values. And we continue to do so today in many parts of the world.

• 1:17:32Speaker 01

  Yep.

• 1:17:32Jocko Willink?

  Nationalism. These people, like I said, and this is a common theme when I read about the Vietnamese in the Vietnam War. They're like, we're Vietnamese. That's who we are. And so all this other stuff that you're talking about, we're not doing it. America, communism, like, that's not happening. We're doing what we're doing.

• 1:17:53Jocko Willink?

  Number four. Our misjudgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of people in the area and the personalities and habits of their leaders. We might have made similar misjudgments regarding the Soviets during our frequent confrontations over Berlin, Cuba, and Middle East, for example, had we not had the advice of Tommy Thompson, Chip Bolin, George Kennan. These senior diplomats had spent decades studying the Soviet Union and its people and its leaders, why they behaved as they did, and how they would react to our actions. Their advice proved invaluable in shaping our judgments and decision. No Southeast Asian counterparts existed for senior officials to consult when making decisions

• 1:18:38Jocko Willink?

  on Vietnam. So you've got to understand what, you know, who the people are, what their culture is, what's going on with them, what they're thinking, how they're going to react to it. You know, a good example in Iraq, if we needed to do, we're going to go do an operation with the Iraqi forces. And say, if we said, "Hey, can you bring 30 guys for this mission tonight?" The Iraqi platoon commander would say, "Yep." And you'd be like, "Awesome." You show up there, two hours later, for the brief, and there's like nine of them. And you say, "Hey, I thought you were bringing 30." Well, they're, they're trying to please you, they're trying to, you're, you're asking for something and they want to take care of you. That's their culture is like, "Oh yeah, we can do it, we'll make it happen."

• 1:19:22Jocko Willink?

  They're very, um, you know, what's the word, polite, right? Like you ask for something, "Yeah, we'll give it to you." What they don't want to say is, "No, I can't do that." So... Even if they kind of can't. Yeah, even if they kind of can't, right. But they, but in their mind, also Inshallah, right? Which is like, "God willing." So it's like, "Can you bring 30 people tonight? Inshallah." Yeah, so, "God willing, I'll have 30 people here." Yeah. God doesn't always will 30 people to show up for a dangerous operation. So, so what we ended up having to do is ask questions like, "How many people can you bring tonight?" Ahhh. So we got to figure out their culture so it matches what we're trying to understand about the scenario. If you don't understand that culture, you're making all kinds of mistakes. And I've told the story many times before, but the same thing with the officers that

• 1:20:07Jocko Willink?

  were skimming money off the soldiers' paychecks. Yeah. It's like... My, one of my guys was freaking out like they're skimming money. They're taking money from the soldiers. And I was like, damn, you know, I was kind of, that's ridiculous. And then you talk to the interpreters who are talking to the soldiers. They're like, well, of course the, of course the boss takes a cut. Yeah. That's, he's the boss. Yeah. And we were like, gonna try and get people arrested, like, I'm exaggerating. We were definitely concerned that it was a problem with morale. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And we were, okay, how do we fix this? How do we explain to these officers like, that's illegal, you can't do that? And even the E dogs, look, some of the, some of the enlisted guys were like, yeah, they take our money. We're like, oh my gosh. And they're like, well, yeah, of course they take our money. They're, they're the officer. They're, they're gonna get their cut.

• 1:20:53Jocko Willink?

  So we had this real extreme view, when for them, that was just kind of the way of life, right? It's just a, you can't call it, you don't, you don't even call it like corruption. You just call it the way things are. Yeah. Like, you ever been in a situation where that's just the way it is? Even though you look at it from a distance, you're like, wait, wait a second. Yeah, fully. You know, like when you were a, when you were a bar, uh, bouncer, right? I used to go to this bar in San Diego. Which one? I forget the name. I would walk up to the guy each time, and he would recognize me, I'd give him a 20. Yeah. Like the, the door guy had cut the whole line, walk up, give him a 20, which was a big deal back in the day. Yeah. He would shake my hand, there'd be a 20 in my hand, and he'd let me and my buddies in. Yep.

• 1:21:38Jocko Willink?

  Right? Boom, done. Sure. That's corruption, right? Well, depends. You see what I'm saying? Yeah. But it's the way that's, that's happening. Yeah.

• 1:21:47Jocko Willink?

  So it's, the culture is like, hey, this guy, I'm gonna take care of him, he's gonna take care of me. Boom, we're, we're good. Yeah. Now someone in the back of the line could be like, hey, what are you doing letting that guy in? Right. And he'd be like, hey, that's my buddy, you, you stay back there. Yeah. Matter of fact, you're not coming in. Yeah. So there's, there's things that the culture is, the way the culture is. It's another thing with unwritten rules in like sports. Unwritten rules in sports. There's, there's a whole slew of unwritten rules in professional sports. Yeah. Where, hey, if you're up by this many points, you don't like dunk.

• 1:22:24Speaker 01

  You don't run up the score like there's all these unwritten rules in hockey in in you know in hockey it's like you don't the star player you don't freaking hurt that guy he's the star if you hurt him you're gonna get jacked yeah yeah so there's unwritten rules in there is there any unwritten rules in NFL football yeah like well actually oddly find that's the first thing I thought of where it was an unwritten rule and then it became an actual written rule that was like roughing the quarterback so yeah you smash the quarterback it's like oh brother that's kind of you know but now there's rule roughing you know yeah but yeah like you know like in MMA or boxing you know when they like the last round or whatever which are around they they kind of do their own handshake and

• 1:23:08Speaker 01

  then they start fighting right but the round is technically live so you know the guys who act like they're gonna do the handshake or fist bump and then they you know they false them or whatever it's like that you know kind of a thing yeah it's not cool but as far as the difference in culture but you get that like from top to bottom so you get like like Hawaiian time right we're also known or there's also Brazilian time same thing by the way it's called late yeah it's late bro I'm telling you and then you have the opposite the inverse which is like military guys guys who have like military careers and the more deep into the military like culture brother they're gonna come 15 20 30 minutes early bro you crazy

• 1:23:42Jocko Willink?

  We'll be recording with someone that's military yeah and we're gonna start recording at whatever time yeah and I know that we have to get there like literally an hour before they show up because they're gonna be here in half an hour before we show up exactly right before we're supposed to start yeah now you get somebody that's just a normal person they're gonna be here at whatever 10 minutes after three minutes before seven minutes after it's all it's all a big mystery yeah but a military military dude showing up early 15 minutes early minimum

• 1:24:10Speaker 01

  yeah even even you saying the word it's a big mystery that's like your military background saying that because bro Hawaiian time it's not a mystery because I know that it's gonna be roughly here and we you know we all kind of have we have like the roughly this or roughly that in our lives you know like do you count every single calorie You're a health conscious guy. No, roughly here, roughly that, you know, that's how so. You know, in Hawaii, that's how we regard time, you know, for the most part. I mean, there's certain things where, yeah, you gotta be on time for sure. A hundred percent, but just part of the culture. If you don't, no one's gonna start tripping. Cause it's not like, you know, this has to happen before this, before it's not that serious, you know, in, in most scenarios in Hawaii. So, yeah, man.

• 1:24:52Speaker 01

  So I get it, but I, I do understand the military culture, part of it. But so it is interesting how consistent and reliable that is like, especially the old school military guys, bro, they're half an hour, super patient too. Yeah, yeah, I'm here like forty five minutes early. I could be doing a bunch of other stuff, but I'm here early because it means a lot. You know, it's like, it's pretty deep in the culture. I dig it, man. But you can run into miscommunications there though. The clash of cultures.

• 1:25:21Jocko Willink?

  Oh, yeah, that's what, that's exactly what we're talking about. Exactly what we're talking about. Like I said, the Iraqi leadership, they don't want to let you down. They want to be able to please. And so Inshallah will be there with thirty guys.

• 1:25:32Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:25:34Jocko Willink?

  They show up with nine. That's, that's what's happening. So you have to reframe your, and same thing with the money. Like you have to reframe the way you look at them and look at them as they look at them. And realize that your culture is not correct. Your culture is your culture, their culture is their culture.

• 1:25:54Jocko Willink?

  All right. Number five. We failed then, as we have since, to recognize the limitations of modern, high technology, military equipment, forces and doctrine confronting unconventional, highly motivated people's movements. We failed as well to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of the people from a totally different culture. So clearly, this is a.

• 1:26:25Jocko Willink?

  Something that we continue to fall into, right? You, you, you can't, your, your technology is not the master. And look, it's getting better. It's definitely getting better, but it, it, it, it's not a permanent presence. It doesn't interact with other human beings. And so that's a mistake. And then focusing on, you know, like he did focusing on the body count like, oh, just kills, kill more of them than they do of us. And eventually they'll give up. It's like, no, you have to secure the populace, take care of the populace. Otherwise you're not going to be able to get them on your side. They're going to turn against you. They're going to fight against you and things get worse.

• 1:27:08Jocko Willink?

  Number six.

• 1:27:11Jocko Willink?

  We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of large scale US military involvement in Southeast Asia before we initiated the action, before we initiated the action. So all these conversations that were happening about how difficult it was going to be? No one was getting up and briefing this or talking through this. And what sucks is we could actually pull this off now. Like, how would you do that in 1964? There was no freaking cable TV. I guess you could put hours of them debating, but you, you can't record it. You can't make it readily accessible to everyone because everyone's at work all day. So Congress is in there debating, you know what the hell they said?

• 1:27:52Jocko Willink?

  Whereas nowadays we could actually do a really incredible job of getting people informed about what's happening.

• 1:28:01Jocko Willink?

  Having these frank discussions, letting people understand the pros and cons.

• 1:28:06Jocko Willink?

  And that's very important, but right now, another thing that we do is we, we, we kind of all have the mindset of black and white, yes or no, conservative, liberal, Republican, Democrat, and that's it. It's just, everything's binary. There's absolutely no way to believe two things at the same time that seem somewhat opposing, but they're both true. Like you just can't do it. And so we've reduced our debate into black and white, yes or no.

• 1:28:42Jocko Willink?

  Right on down the line.

• 1:28:43Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:28:44Jocko Willink?

  And those things aren't binary. Things aren't black and white, especially when you get into global politics. There's huge areas of gray. And if we can't operate in those areas of gray. And when you operate in the areas of gray.

• 1:29:02Jocko Willink?

  You learn. And you adjust. And you make other decisions. So, cause, cause I know it sounds, oh, what's the expression? If you stand in the middle of the road, you'll get hit, right? You remember that expression?

• 1:29:18Speaker 01

  Yes, it's from Karate Kid.

• 1:29:21Jocko Willink?

  Okay, so if you stand in the middle of the road, you get hit. So people say, well, oh, you need to take a stance one way or the other. It's like, well, actually, I'm not sure. So I'd like to make a small step. And then see what we learned. And then I can take another step, either continuing that direction or going to the. These are things that we don't do.

• 1:29:41Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:29:42Jocko Willink?

  We just go completely binary, black, white, left, right, conservative, Republican, or conservative, liberal, Democrat, Republican. Um, rural, city, like we're, it just, that's what we're doing.

• 1:29:55Speaker 01

  Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, well, the Karate Kid one is do karate, yes, do karate, no. Do karate, yes.

• 1:30:04Speaker 01

  It's like one side of the road.

• 1:30:05Jocko Willink?

  Hmm.

• 1:30:05Speaker 01

  I don't know the exact quote, but it's like do karate, yes, do karate, no. Do karate, guess so, squish.

• 1:30:11Jocko Willink?

  Hmm.

• 1:30:11Speaker 01

  Just like a grape, is what he says.

• 1:30:13Jocko Willink?

  There you go.

• 1:30:14Speaker 01

  But, yes, true. And even if you want to even go one level bigger. It's kind of like some things are like that. Some things are either go full speed or don't go at all. Otherwise, if you half step it, you'll get jammed up.

• 1:30:25Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, like what?

• 1:30:27Speaker 01

  Now you gotta put me on the spot. I don't know, um, snowboarding.

• 1:30:31Jocko Willink?

  What about it?

• 1:30:31Speaker 01

  So, okay, so snowboarding, you gotta have a forward lean.

• 1:30:35Jocko Willink?

  Okay.

• 1:30:36Speaker 01

  So. It's either forward lean, then you have the the most control. You go, if you start like going down a hill, which is a forward trajectory, but you lean back, that's half stepping.

• 1:30:46Jocko Willink?

  And what happens?

• 1:30:47Speaker 01

  You have no control.

• 1:30:48Jocko Willink?

  What if you're in pow pow?

• 1:30:49Speaker 01

  You crash, crash.

• 1:30:50Jocko Willink?

  What if you're in powder, lean back a little bit?

• 1:30:51Speaker 01

  Then the crash is, oh yeah, a little bit, but you still have to have like a forward lean for control. You're trying to turn. You can't turn leaning back, see what I'm saying? So you're going down a hill leaning back, that's half stepping. We, we cannot.

• 1:31:02Jocko Willink?

  Okay, that was a really bad example.

• 1:31:04Speaker 01

  Bro, well, you know, it's a

• 1:31:05Jocko Willink?

  Give me, give me a better, do you have a better example than that?

• 1:31:07Speaker 01

  If you're half stepping?

• 1:31:08Jocko Willink?

  Yeah.

• 1:31:09Speaker 01

  Oh yeah, I feel like in a fight, you know, if you half step like in the attack, I feel like that's where you're most vulnerable for sure. Um, if you're, you know, like if you're a counter puncher, that makes sense. If you're just like aggressive.

• 1:31:23Jocko Willink?

  Do you have any, do you have anything that's, that's a little bit larger in scale? Because I agree, you know, you get to some very kind of small tactical things and it's like, yeah, if you, if you don't go hard, you don't go all in, well, then it's going to be like shooting a takedown. Like if you shoot a takedown half ass, you're not getting the takedown. Chances are you're not getting it.

• 1:31:44Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:31:44Jocko Willink?

  You have to shoot that takedown with a hundred percent commitment to make it happen.

• 1:31:48Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:31:48Jocko Willink?

  I get that. But as soon as you start talking about larger scale things where there's economies and global countries involved.

• 1:32:00Jocko Willink?

  Oftentimes, we try and make it all in or all out, but it's not. And it's, it's to me, in many cases, it's a fool's move to go all in or all out. It's better to assess and make, this is what the iterative decision making process is all about. It's like, oh, I'm going to make it, I'm going to make this move and we'll see how it works and we'll judge the feedback. And once we get feedback, we'll make another move.

• 1:32:25Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 1:32:25Jocko Willink?

  And then once we make that move, we'll judge the feedback and see if we should go for it. We just keep doing that. Unfortunately, right now, we're just, we're either all in or all out on so many different subjects that we, you know, we end up doing now. This is a good point. Either all in or all out. So guess what we do? Nothing because we can't decide which one, whether we should go all in or whether we should go all out. So we do like half. Now we do half measures or we don't do anything.

• 1:32:47Speaker 01

  Yeah. Yeah. It does seem like the more complex things get and the more, the more complex things get, the more the whole iterative decision making is more appropriate. It's what it seems like.

• 1:32:58Jocko Willink?

  Because you don't know everything.

• 1:32:59Speaker 01

  Exactly right. There's so much to know and it's almost like most of the time it kind of seems like you can't know everything. So you gotta kind of do the right thing as you go along, kind of a, kind of a scenario. So yeah, you're right. And yeah, and in a general way of looking at it, that's, that's.

• 1:33:15Jocko Willink?

  Yeah. And look, I'm sure we could sit here and think about some things that are large and complex that you do need to make a more bold and binary decision on, but off the top of my head, I can't think of one. So there's that.

• 1:33:30Speaker 01

  Got you. I understand.

• 1:33:32Jocko Willink?

  Next one.

• 1:33:35Jocko Willink?

  After the action got underway and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course, we failed to retain popular support in part because we did not fully explain what was happening and why we were doing what we did.

• 1:33:53Jocko Willink?

  We had not prepared the public to understand the complex events we face and how to react constructively to the need for changes in the course, in course as the nation confronted uncharted seas in an alien environment. A nation's deepest strength lies not in its military prowess, but rather in the unity of its people, we failed to maintain it. This is, this is great for leadership in any situation. Why isn't the team on board? Cause they don't know, they don't know why you're doing what you're doing. Another reason that the team's not on board is because when you presented the team the plan, you presented it like this, hey guys, here's what we're going to do and this is going to be the outcome.

• 1:34:31Jocko Willink?

  How do you know what the outcome is going to be? You don't know what the outcome is going to be. Hey, listen Echo, we're going to move into this market area. We're going to invest this money and here's what ROI, ROI is going to be. And you're like, oh, that sounds awesome. We look up and it doesn't go that way. You, all of a sudden you're questioning me as, as a leader and my decision-making process. But I say, hey Echo, here's the numbers that we're looking at. Here's the statistics that we've got. Here's the move that I think is going to benefit us. But I'm not sure, so we're gonna take a step in this direction. We'll see where it lands. Hopefully, I'm right. That means more income for us. And if I'm wrong, these are some adjustments we can make. Boom. All of a sudden, your mind's open. You understand why we're doing what we're doing. You understand that I don't think I'm 100% right. When some contingencies come up that we didn't think of, you're okay with it. Because I already told you that I wasn't 100% right.

• 1:35:18Jocko Willink?

  So these are very important. And just again, explaining why you're doing something to the team, to the country, to your family, explain to them why you are doing what you're doing. What you're doing and why you're doing it. Absolutely critical. Next one.

• 1:35:39Jocko Willink?

  We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders were omniscient. Where our own security is not directly at stake, our judgment of what is in another people's or country's best interests should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our own image or as we choose. So this is very important. Our people and our leaders don't know everything. They don't know everything. They're not God. They're gonna make mistakes. They're not gonna see everything.

• 1:36:22Jocko Willink?

  They're not gonna understand everything. And we as a country don't know everything. We don't understand everything. We don't see everything. So if you think that we as a country know everything, see everything, understand everything, you're wrong. If you think that our leaders know everything, see everything, understand everything, you're wrong. We don't. They don't. If you think that as the boss of your company, you know everything, see everything, understand everything, you're wrong. If you think that as the leader of your family, you know everything, see everything, understand, it's not true. If you think as the leader of your family that you can impose your will and shape every person in your family how you want, you're wrong. If you think you can shape every person in your company, you're wrong.

• 1:37:06Jocko Willink?

  Going back to the dream. It's a good dream. No, it's your dream, not theirs.

• 1:37:15Jocko Willink?

  So recognize that. We have to recognize that. We failed to do that. We, look, should we be proud to be American? Sure. Have we done some good things? Yes. Do we have a lot of power? Yes. Have we made mistakes? Yep. Do we have infinite power? Nope.

• 1:37:35Jocko Willink?

  Is our way of living better than someone else's way of living? We might think so, but they might not.

• 1:37:43Jocko Willink?

  So we have to keep that in mind as we move forward.

• 1:37:48Jocko Willink?

  Number nine.

• 1:37:51Jocko Willink?

  "We did not hold to the principle that US military action, other than in response to direct threats to our own security, should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational national forces, supported fully and not merely cosmetically by the international community." Check.

• 1:38:15Jocko Willink?

  You know what that's about? It's about relationships.

• 1:38:19Jocko Willink?

  And this is why, when I talk about that, that extreme ownership leadership loop, the most heavily weighted thing in my calculus is how's this gonna affect my relationship? When I'm making a decision, how's this gonna affect my relationships?

• 1:38:31Jocko Willink?

  With my team, with my boss, with my peer.

• 1:38:36Jocko Willink?

  And can you always make that work? Nope, you can't always make it work. Sometimes I gotta go to Echo and say, "Hey Echo, I'm cutting your marketing budget for your department by this much. We don't have any choice. Here's what's going on. We're not gonna survive if we don't make some cutbacks." Yep, I gotta do that sometimes. But if I'm like, "Well, you know, Echo, do you really need to spend that money on that thing?" And you're like, "Yo, I've been working on this project for this long. It's gonna be great. It's gonna be the..." Well, you know what? I'm not gonna do it. I gotta weigh, how much is that gonna negatively impact our relationship? It's the heaviest weight that I have. So it's the same thing with the international community. That should weigh so heavily on our decision-making process.

• 1:39:15Jocko Willink?

  Because once we break those relationships that we have with people, it causes long-term problems. Again, does this mean that every single time you get to make the decision that's unified and everyone's on board? Nope, doesn't mean that. But it means you should absolutely weigh those relationships, the heaviest of every part of your decision. Oh, I gotta do something. Oh, I gotta do this. Sometimes you do have to take leadership, spend leadership capital to do something. Sometimes that happens. Avoid it as much as you can. And then just don't make it cosmetic, right? There's a lot of that stuff that happens. Yeah, we're on board with America. America, you go, you guys send all your troops and

• 1:39:54Jocko Willink?

  fight and die. We'll be over here clapping. Like that bar fight that happens. You know what I mean? With the little guy that's like, yo, if you keep running your mouth, my buddy's gonna fight you. So be careful of that.

• 1:40:12Jocko Willink?

  Number 10. We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, it's the only time he mentions that these things apply, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions. For one whose life has been dedicated to the belief and practice of problem solving, this is particularly hard to admit. I think he's talking to himself, right? For one whose life has been dedicated to the belief and practice of problem solving, this is particularly hard to admit. But at times, we may have to live with an imperfect, untidy world. There's not always a solution. And there's certainly not always an academic solution. Doesn't work that way. Oftentimes, there's

• 1:40:56Jocko Willink?

  the, the way things are is the way things are, and you're gonna be able to influence it maybe a little bit in one way or the other. But it's not gonna look pretty. And by the way, if you're gonna put yourself in a position, like it was, it's real obvious, I know hindsight's 2020, I get it. But it's real obvious that you were going to a party where there was gonna be problems.

• 1:41:21Jocko Willink?

  Right? Yeah. Like you roll up and you see what's going on and you're like, there's people walking around with freaking knives. There's people walking around with chains. There's people drunk, there's people on drugs. And you see all this mayhem and you're like, hey, let's go and check it out. Looks fun. Yeah. That's not a good move. You know that there's all kinds of problems you're gonna get yourself into. And if you didn't hear these reports that I read, it didn't see that we were facing some significant problems. It's, how does that happen? Well, you let your biases get ahead of you. You let your ego get ahead of you.

• 1:41:59Jocko Willink?

  Number 11.

• 1:42:02Jocko Willink?

  Underlying many, this is the last one. Underlying many of these errors lay our failure to organize the top echelons of the executive branch to deal effectively with the extraordinarily complex range of political and military issues involving the great risks and costs, including above all else, loss of life associated with the application of military force under substantial constraints over a long period of time.

• 1:42:32Jocko Willink?

  Such organizational weakness would have been costly had this been the only task confronting the president and his advisors. So yeah, if this was the only thing going on, that would have been way much. It of course was not. It coexisted with a wide array of other domestic and international problems confronting us. We thus failed to analyze and debate our actions in Southeast Asia, our objectives, the risks and costs of alternative ways of dealing with them and the necessity of changing course when failure was clear. With the intensity and thoroughness that characterized the debates of the executive committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

• 1:43:14Jocko Willink?

  So they weren't even having the kind of discussions that they needed to have to suss out what they should do.

• 1:43:25Jocko Willink?

  And this is

• 1:43:29Jocko Willink?

  This, this idea of going to war. If you're gonna go to war, and people go to war, people are gonna die, Americans are gonna die, and enemy are gonna die, and civilians are gonna die. That's what's happening. And anybody that thinks, oh, well, we'll be able to go to war, the casualties will be minimal on American side. Okay, what if that's your kid?

• 1:43:52Jocko Willink?

  And by the way, you think there's gonna be low casualties? You think in Vietnam, they thought there's gonna be fifty eight thousand guys? They didn't think that. They didn't think that at all. These things escalate. It's escalate, escalate, escalate. That's the way these things happen. At Gettys, at Gettysburg, I talked about

• 1:44:10Jocko Willink?

  the Vietnam War Memorial. And it's, it's this, the wall, right? And it starts off small, a few inches, maybe a few inches tall, maybe a half a foot tall, or maybe a foot tall when it starts off. And so you don't really, it's not overwhelming, right? You're like looking at the names and you're feeling the, the solemn respect for the people that died. And, and as you continue to walk

• 1:44:36Jocko Willink?

  towards the center of the wall, towards the center of the apex of this V that it forms, by the time you're in the middle of that thing, it's tall, it's very tall and it's overwhelming. And that, to me, is a metaphor of how that war, how we got into that war. It's like a little bit, a little bit at a time, a little bit more, a little bit more, oh, a little bit more. And the next thing you know, you look up and you're surrounded by this.

• 1:45:03Jocko Willink?

  So, the idea that you're gonna get engaged in war, it's, it's like, I'm trying to think of a good explanation of something that when you start it, you don't have control over it anymore. Like, it doesn't matter what you think. When you

• 1:45:23Jocko Willink?

  let that thing go, when you put that dog, like, if you go to a dog park with your dog, once you let that dog off the leash, it's out of control. Like, it doesn't matter how well-trained it is, because it's gonna, other dogs, all these things are gonna come into factors and someone's gonna have a treat, and someone else is gonna have a frisbee, and someone else is gonna have a really aggressive dog, and someone's gonna have a really hot dog, and there's gonna be all these things going on, and you take that thing off the leash, doesn't matter how well-trained your dog is, doesn't matter what's going on, you're, you're, it's now not under your control anymore.

• 1:45:56Jocko Willink?

  It's the same thing with war. Once that initiates, doesn't matter what you fought, doesn't matter your plan, doesn't matter your intention, doesn't matter how well-trained your troops are, doesn't matter how, what you think of your assessment of the enemy, all these things that you think, that you know, that you think you know, you don't. So when you let that dog off the leash, stand by, because you're about to be having to pay for a dog, another dog that got bit. Your dog got bit, your dog got pregnant, your dog impregnated another dog, your dog broke a frisbee, your dog jumped over and caused a car crash from jumping over the fence, like, all these things are gonna happen, or can't happen. Hmm. And sure, you go in there, and you're like, oh, well, every other time I've gone in, it's been pretty mellow. Yeah. Doesn't matter.

• 1:46:38Jocko Willink?

  There's elements that are beyond your control and beyond our control. That's what war is. And for some reason, we're able to convince ourselves over and over again that this time it's gonna be different. This time it's gonna be different. And sometimes we get that reinforced, because we go to the Gulf War I, where it's over in 72 hours, and there's limited casualties, and we're able to just kind of crush the enemy and achieve our goals very quickly, and it's like, a high five. That's rare. It's not the way it works. The way it works is Korea. The way it works is Vietnam. The way it works is Afghanistan. The way it works is Iraq. That's the way it works.

• 1:47:22Jocko Willink?

  You let that dog off, and it's gonna be mayhem, and all your little predictions are wrong. And the worst part is, when the, when this happens, you don't make any changes, you don't make any adjustments, you keep trying to do the same thing over and over and over again. Exactly what they did here, exactly what he says. We didn't change our course of action, when it was very clear that we should. Hmm. When it's very clear that the outcome was not going to be good. They're saying, hey, either way this goes, it's gonna be bad. Do you still want to play the game? Yes. Hey, either way it goes, this dog is gonna get, there's gonna be chaos. Do you still want to go? Yeah, let him off the leash, let's go.

• 1:48:13Jocko Willink?

  That's what happens.

• 1:48:17Jocko Willink?

  Those are the lessons learned from McNamara.

• 1:48:22Jocko Willink?

  And I'm going to close out the book with this. He says, "I want to add a final word on Vietnam. Let me be simple and direct. I want to be clearly understood. The United States of America fought in Vietnam for eight years for what it believed to be good and honest reasons. By such action, administrations of both parties sought to protect our security, prevent the spread of totalitarian communism, and promote individual freedom and political democracy. The Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations made their decisions and by those decisions demanded sacrifices, sacrifices, and yes, inflicted terrible suffering in light of those goals and values."

• 1:49:07Jocko Willink?

  Just on that note,

• 1:49:10Jocko Willink?

  there's an idea of ownership or taking ownership. And the lightest version of that is in the SEAL teams, somebody messes something up, and they're like, "Hey, what happened?" And someone goes, "Hey, that was on my, that's on me, my bust." And they expect like, "Oh, just because you said it's on me, it's my bust." Everyone goes, "Okay, cool, then we forgive you." No, actually, if you do something stupid and it's your fault, you take ownership, you still have to pay for it.

• 1:49:37Jocko Willink?

  There still is, there still is punishment that's going to happen.

• 1:49:42Jocko Willink?

  And that's, I get a little bit of that vibe from this. Like, hey, they made their decisions with the best intentions and sacrifices were demanded, and terrible suffering was inflicted. But we had, we had the right idea in mind. It's like, "Bro, it's a day late and a dollar short."

• 1:50:05Jocko Willink?

  Continue on, "Their hindsight was better than their foresight. The adage echoes down the corridors of time applying to many individuals in many situations in many ages. People are human. They are fallible. I concede with painful candor and a heavy heart that, that the, the adage applies to me and to my generation of American leadership regarding Vietnam. Although we sought to do the right thing and believed we were doing the right thing, in my judgment, hindsight proves us wrong."

• 1:50:33Jocko Willink?

  We both overestimated the effect of South Vietnam's loss on the security of the West. And failed, so they overestimated, look, if South Vietnam goes by, everything's gonna fall apart. Guess what? South Vietnam did go down. Everything didn't fall apart. And failed to adhere to the fundamental principle that in the final analysis, if the South Vietnamese were to be saved, they had to win the war for themselves. And again, that's a test of wills. You've heard me say that war is a test of wills? We gotta test the people's wills that actually are gonna have to fight it. And if they don't wanna step up and fight it, then you're not gonna be able to win over the long run.

• 1:51:12Jocko Willink?

  Straying from this central truth, we built a progressively more massive effort on an inherently unstable foundation. External military force cannot substitute for the political order and stability that must be forged by a people for themselves.

• 1:51:31Jocko Willink?

  And then he says this, "In the end, we must confront the fate of those Americans who served in Vietnam and never returned. Does the unwisdom of our intervention nullify their effort and their loss? I think not. They did not make the decisions, they answered the nation's call to service, they went in harm's way on its behalf, and they gave their lives for their country and its ideals.

• 1:51:58Jocko Willink?

  That our effort in Vietnam proved unwise does not make their sacrifices less noble. It endures for all to see.

• 1:52:07Jocko Willink?

  Let us learn from their sacrifice and by doing so, validate and honor it."

• 1:52:14Jocko Willink?

  And clearly, I agree with that, that the men and women that stepped up and fought with honor to do their job as the nation called them to do.

• 1:52:30Jocko Willink?

  Isn't is the highest of nobility.

• 1:52:35Jocko Willink?

  But we need to make sure that we learn from these lessons.

• 1:52:43Jocko Willink?

  And and although I don't like McNamara.

• 1:52:47Jocko Willink?

  Still.

• 1:52:50Jocko Willink?

  I think that we should learn from him and and his apply and his lessons. Yes, they apply to the way we interact with other human beings. They also apply to us as people. They apply to us as a country.

• 1:53:04Jocko Willink?

  These are these are lessons that we we really, in many cases, we still haven't learned them, obviously.

• 1:53:14Jocko Willink?

  Don't hear some of his lessons. Don't be extreme with your assessment, right? Don't when you hear an assessment, don't take it 100% fact. Don't take it 0% fact. Put it into the calculus of your decision making.

• 1:53:28Jocko Willink?

  Make sure you understand other people's perspectives. These are things that you hear me talk about all the time. Understand other people's perspectives. Listen, don't be arrogant.

• 1:53:38Jocko Willink?

  And that's a huge part of, you know, that's my my initial case with McNamara, just the arrogance.

• 1:53:45Jocko Willink?

  And this is the way he presented himself, by the way, too. Like, you watch him speak in this time period. Very self assured, overly self assured.

• 1:53:56Jocko Willink?

  Don't underestimate your opponent's will. Don't overestimate your own will.

• 1:54:02Jocko Willink?

  People are going to die. If you're going to war, people are going to die. The enemy is going to die. Civilians are going to die.

• 1:54:11Jocko Willink?

  And our own people are going to die. That's what war is.

• 1:54:18Jocko Willink?

  And that is the test of will.

• 1:54:23Jocko Willink?

  Technology doesn't solve all problems.

• 1:54:27Jocko Willink?

  Fact.

• 1:54:30Jocko Willink?

  Technology. Isn't the one coming home in a flag draped coffin. It's people.

• 1:54:39Jocko Willink?

  Full and frank discussions, you have to have full and frank discussions and just FYI, that means you should be listening to the other side.

• 1:54:51Jocko Willink?

  That's what a full and frank discussion is. A full and frank discussion, I know there's some people listening right now, "Cool, I'm gonna go tell everyone what I think." No, actually, full and frank discussion means you shut your mouth and you listen to what other people say.

• 1:55:04Jocko Willink?

  Like, LBJ could have shut his mouth and listened to all this information that he was receiving. Well-written documents that explained the predicament that he's setting himself up for.

• 1:55:18Jocko Willink?

  So, listen. And put your ego in check.

• 1:55:24Jocko Willink?

  Explain why you're doing what you're doing. You have to do that. If you don't explain why, they're gonna make up their own and it's not gonna be good. No one's perfect. It's okay. It's a lesson. A lesson is no one's perfect. Up, down, or across the chain of command.

• 1:55:43Jocko Willink?

  Relationships are paramount.

• 1:55:46Jocko Willink?

  Yeah. Prioritize the relationships.

• 1:55:51Jocko Willink?

  If you prioritize the relationships, everything else is going to go better.

• 1:55:57Jocko Willink?

  And, and of course, change the course when things are not working. Very difficult to do. Everyone gets their ego all wrapped up in the plan that they came up with. But your plan is dumb, and it's not working, so move on to a different one.

• 1:56:14Jocko Willink?

  And that brings me to another topic that I didn't get to. I sort of brushed up against it, but so, so one of McNamara's strategies in this war was something that he called graduated pressure. Graduated pressure, so we're gonna increase the increase the attacks that we're making, increase the bombing that we're doing, increase the troops that we're sending, increase the ships that we're sending over there. These little steps, we're gonna take these little steps.

• 1:56:45Jocko Willink?

  And this kind of falls into what you were talking about, Echo Charles, so little half-measures, right?

• 1:56:51Jocko Willink?

  And you've heard me over here promoting the idea, and I've written about the idea of iterative decision-making. So, wait, Jocko, you're for iterative decision-making, which is taking small steps.

• 1:57:03Jocko Willink?

  And yet you're against this idea of graduated pressure. Why is that? Explain this to me. Well, it's a very obvious reason.

• 1:57:11Jocko Willink?

  When you do iterative decision making, what you do is you make a small step and then you listen to the feedback.

• 1:57:19Jocko Willink?

  You assess whether that decision was good or not, what impact it had, whether it was working. And then you make adjustments based on the feedback that you get. Well, this idea that graduated pressure, all they did was take iterative steps slowly over time, but they didn't change anything. They, "Oh, we just more bombs, more bombs, more troops, more troops." They just kept going in the same direction and just increasing in that direction.

• 1:57:48Jocko Willink?

  You heard the feedback. The feedback is, "Hey, the North Vietnamese are not going to..." It doesn't matter how much you bomb, they don't need supplies. And what do we do? Bomb more, bomb more, bomb more. And by the way, every time you're bombing, guess what you're doing? You're killing some civilians. You're turning the hearts and minds against the coalition forces, against the Americans, against the South Vietnamese. Some of those bombs killed some South Vietnamese relatives. What happens now? Now they're on the other side.

• 1:58:17Jocko Willink?

  So we graduated pressure. We made small steps. We never adjusted what we were doing.

• 1:58:24Jocko Willink?

  And that's why it's problematic.

• 1:58:28Jocko Willink?

  So iterative decision making is not the same as graduated pressure because iterative decision making, you make adjustments to what you're doing.

• 1:58:40Jocko Willink?

  So that's that.

• 1:58:43Jocko Willink?

  Obviously, lots of lessons learned and for me, opening my mind to learn lessons from someone that I don't like and I don't respect. But I want to learn from everybody.

• 1:58:58Jocko Willink?

  If we don't do that, we fail.

• 1:59:02Jocko Willink?

  So.

• 1:59:05Jocko Willink?

  Keep an open mind and keep learning. And that's what I got. Echo Charles?

• 1:59:10Speaker 01

  Yep, makes sense.

• 1:59:11Jocko Willink?

  Yep.

• 1:59:13Speaker 01

  Yeah, that's, especially when you can successfully justify your rejection of another person's ideas. For like to yourself, you know, like, you know, the old memes about I subscribe to the Jim Bro memes. And they always like hate on cardio.

• 1:59:33Jocko Willink?

  Oh, okay.

• 1:59:34Speaker 01

  But cardio is important.

• 1:59:36Jocko Willink?

  Yeah.

• 1:59:36Speaker 01

  I'm saying.

• 1:59:37Jocko Willink?

  So you keep an open mind, even though you might send me some memes, some anti cardio memes, you still support it?

• 1:59:42Speaker 01

  In the background, we're supporting cardio, for example. Yeah. Um, I keep thinking about the, the clash of cultures, you know? And it's like, yeah, so obvious. You should be on time or whatever. And then even the bouncer example that you brought. And I'm like, so what's like the solution there? Uh, you know, aside from obviously keeping an open mind, but still you can still have the clash, you know? Cause some things are unexpected, but maybe like in a collaborative effort or a collaborative situation. Maybe more establish the unwritten rules into written rules, or at least explain them.

• 2:00:17Jocko Willink?

  Yeah. So when I, when people talk to me about the culture piece, I say, okay. So we've got to merge two cultures, my culture and your culture. I'm going to subordinate my culture to yours as much as possible. So, hey, this is what we did in Ramadi. We're working with the army. We're working with the Marine Corps. The way they program their radios is different than the way we program our radios. Did we roll in there and be like, no, you got to program, no. Well, how do you, how do you guys do it? We'll do it your way. Oh, what's your near and far recognition symbol? We'll do the same thing. Oh, how are you approaching these scenarios? We'll approach them the same way. What do you set up your, what, what? How are you mapping out the city? What are you calling the various districts?

• 2:01:02Jocko Willink?

  Yep, we'll use that too. And so we adopted their culture. And then guess what it did to their mind? Opened their mind to us.

• 2:01:09Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 2:01:10Jocko Willink?

  So the, the, the battle maps that we used, when we got there, the, the way that the, the way that they were doing it in the battle space was basically each block of buildings had a number.

• 2:01:26Jocko Willink?

  So each block of buildings would be like J1, J2, J3, J4. And in the SEAL teams, the way I was a radio man and I made a lot of battle maps in my day. It's important to not just have the block, but what building?

• 2:01:44Jocko Willink?

  And so I talked to some of the leadership and said, hey, you know, when we do this, this is after we were clearly adopting some of their culture. I said, hey, when we do these types of things, we like to actually number each individual building. And they kind of looked at me a little bit crazy because imagine that you're looking at the city of Ramadi, there's thousands of buildings. Wait a second, you mean you think we should number each individual building and each individual block? Well, it would make communication a lot easier because instead of now, hey, we've got enemy fighters. Block J2, building north side, six buildings down. Has a round window towards the aft, you know, you see what I'm saying?

• 2:02:31Jocko Willink?

  Now it's like enemy building J, block J10, building six. Everybody knows right where that is in an instant. And so they actually did that. And I actually was, I, I had talked to the, one of the commanders about it. And then I showed up there two hours later and I saw a couple of the, the intel guys just sitting there putting numbers. And I could see they were a little bit annoyed by it, but I knew it was going to be helpful and that's, that took over the whole city. Yeah. So in order to get there, I didn't roll in there and say, hey, the way we do this. No, I was like, wait, what's your near and far recognition? How do you guys program your radios? What, what are you guys using for marking? What's your night marking? What's your day marking like, we, we want to adopt your culture. Oh, what, by the way, what uniforms are you wearing? Oh, you're wearing for Seth's guys, you're wearing ACUs?

• 2:03:16Jocko Willink?

  Cool. Guess what they're gonna wear? ACUs, same as you. That's what we're doing. We're going to adopt their culture.

• 2:03:20Speaker 01

  Yeah. So that's why you don't come 20 minutes early, you come.

• 2:03:27Speaker 01

  Eight minutes early now?

• 2:03:28Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, yeah.

• 2:03:29Speaker 01

  And I try to make it on time when I can.

• 2:03:31Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, you're usually only four to seven minutes behind me when I show up here.

• 2:03:38Speaker 01

  There you go.

• 2:03:38Jocko Willink?

  You know, so we're merging cultures. I'm adapting some of the culture.

• 2:03:41Speaker 01

  Yep, there you go. Is that why you did tricep extension today?

• 2:03:44Jocko Willink?

  Yeah.

• 2:03:44Speaker 01

  Okay, alright.

• 2:03:45Jocko Willink?

  You notice that?

• 2:03:46Speaker 01

  Yeah, how could I not?

• 2:03:47Jocko Willink?

  You know, I have doms in a kind of a big way.

• 2:03:49Speaker 01

  What, in your triceps?

• 2:03:50Jocko Willink?

  No, no, no, I have doms in my body.

• 2:03:53Speaker 01

  Sure.

• 2:03:53Jocko Willink?

  And probably one of the few places I did not have doms right now was in my trice.

• 2:03:57Speaker 01

  Mm hmm.

• 2:03:58Jocko Willink?

  So I did a little bit, I did a little bit of movement, but then I was like, you know what? That easy curl, easy curl bar was looking lonely. So let's get in there. And I, and by the way, I also did tricep pull downs.

• 2:04:07Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 2:04:08Jocko Willink?

  Both rope and like, whatever that bar is called. I was in the game, bro.

• 2:04:11Speaker 01

  Good.

• 2:04:12Jocko Willink?

  Trying to work those triceps.

• 2:04:12Speaker 01

  I could not be more proud.

• 2:04:14Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, I know you were fired up. I forgot to tag you. I'm sorry. I apologize.

• 2:04:17Speaker 01

  It's okay. It, it, I'm always tagged in spirit with that kind of stuff.

• 2:04:21Jocko Willink?

  There you go.

• 2:04:22Speaker 01

  So boom, Jocko's doing it.

• 2:04:23Jocko Willink?

  Yep.

• 2:04:24Speaker 01

  He's in the game, expanding his, uh, culture.

• 2:04:27Jocko Willink?

  Mm hmm.

• 2:04:29Speaker 01

  You know, we're all training. That's why I do deep, deep squats.

• 2:04:31Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, yeah, you got in the game.

• 2:04:33Speaker 01

  Yep. I was always down for squats. You know, I took a, I took a year, maybe two, off squats, but they were parallel squats. You know what I'm saying? Now I'm back in squats. Been there for years. Deep squats. Thank you, Jocko.

• 2:04:46Speaker 01

  Anyway, the point there being we're all on the path in our own way, keeping an open mind for sure. Um, one thing that I think is pretty established is that we're working out. Keeping our bodies strong. You know, how you do that, boom, that's, that part is up to you.

• 2:05:01Jocko Willink?

  Yeah.

• 2:05:01Speaker 01

  You see what I'm saying? A bunch of different ways to success in that regard. Um, nonetheless, if you're on the path, you're on the path, you're gonna need fuel.

• 2:05:08Jocko Willink?

  Mm hmm.

• 2:05:09Speaker 01

  It's true.

• 2:05:10Jocko Willink?

  I actually recommend Jocko Fuel. Jacofuel.com, y'all, check it out. We got drinks, we got protein. What's it, what's the, what's the deal on protein? What's our thirty?

• 2:05:18Speaker 01

  Okay.

• 2:05:18Jocko Willink?

  So I just got done lifting.

• 2:05:19Speaker 01

  Yep.

• 2:05:20Jocko Willink?

  When do I need to drink my milk?

• 2:05:21Speaker 01

  Right after.

• 2:05:21Jocko Willink?

  Yeah.

• 2:05:22Speaker 01

  Yep. And so it's like, one, it depends how big you are, but you know, one, if you want to go too cool, but the more you start to drink these.

• 2:05:33Speaker 01

  Faster digesting proteins. The more you drink them at once, the more diminishing returns it elicits. You see what I'm saying? So you hit that one, perfect. Then go eat your high protein meal. Perfect. That's the protocol.

• 2:05:46Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, that's what we're doing. So jockofuel.com, get yourself some more, get yourself, go. Get yourself some hydrate very soon.

• 2:05:53Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 2:05:53Jocko Willink?

  What's your assessment of hydrates?

• 2:05:55Speaker 01

  Hundred percent. Yeah, better than, okay, especially like, okay, so. If you choose the ones with sugar, I don't even know really what you're doing there. That's a different thing, you know, like you might as well drink soda, I guess, in a way, you know?

• 2:06:09Jocko Willink?

  Crack open a Coke.

• 2:06:10Speaker 01

  Yeah, yeah, you know, but most of us, we're not doing that. And if you're doing that, cool, do you, but that's not what we're doing. So the fact that there's no sugar in all, like, like the perfect formula. And everything you think, oh yeah, it's gonna sacrifice, I get it, I'll sacrifice the taste for that good formula. But there is no sacrifice in taste. And in fact, it tastes better than most other hydrate beverages. Even the ones with sugar.

• 2:06:34Jocko Willink?

  Yeah.

• 2:06:35Speaker 01

  So yeah, that's surprising. Yeah, it's funny, because like, you know, every once in a while, we'll encounter our peers. And they're like ingredients people, you know, when they have like expertise. So first thing they go, they boom, they look at the ingredients and they're all, it's funny. I'll look at your face when they go to look for the ingredients.

• 2:06:50Jocko Willink?

  I'm always like, I was like, that's right. How you like me now?

• 2:06:53Speaker 01

  Yeah, it's like Christmas for you. You're like, oh yeah, I can't wait. But yeah, good. Yeah. Yeah. The combination of taste and ingredients is, yeah.

• 2:07:02Jocko Willink?

  Yeah, so this is, I really haven't talked about this. This is a ready to drink hydrate that's out. It's awesome. So check it out, jockofuel.com, get your, get your joint warfare, get your super krill. Just get after it. And if you want to go to a store, Wawa. Has the protein, vitamin shop, GNC, military commissaries, A fees, Hannaford, Dash stores. Wakefern, ShopRite, Meyer.

• 2:07:30Jocko Willink?

  Did I say HEB?

• 2:07:32Speaker 01

  You did just now.

• 2:07:33Jocko Willink?

  HEB, get in there Meyer, get in there Wegmans, Harris Teeter, Lifetime, Lifetime Fitness, that is. Lifetime Fitness got, they, they, they resisted getting Molk protein in there. They've, they've had Go in there. Go's been doing great, but they're kind of like, well, protein does not really do as well here. And we were like, okay, well, can we try it? And they said, sure. Now they're just ordering it, ordering it, ordering it. So same thing. People know I just got done working out. Guess what I need? Protein. Thirty grams, right delivered to the system. So Lifetime Fitness Shields, by the way. You ever been to a Shields before? Dude, they are like two hundred, three hundred thousand square feet of just

• 2:08:15Jocko Willink?

  gear, just outdoor gear, hunting gear, bows, just everything. They have a, they have a Ferris wheel in them. That's how big they are.

• 2:08:23Speaker 01

  Where is that?

• 2:08:24Jocko Willink?

  Like Colorado, like those, like the western states. There's not a ton of them, but they're epic. If you ever get a chance to go to Shields and if you go to Shields, you can get Jocko Fuel there. So that's awesome. And small gyms, basically just getting after it.

• 2:08:41Jocko Willink?

  Jared, Jackson and Chaz, they're just out there, just inner going into CrossFit, going into Jiu Jitsu, going into whatever powerlifting gyms and setting people up. So if you're in one of those gyms and you want to have Jocko Fuel, email J F sales at Jocko Fuel dot com. That's where we got going on.

• 2:09:02Jocko Willink?

  What else?

• 2:09:02Speaker 01

  Origin USA. Look, we're doing the Jiu Jitsu. You know, you're going to need a gi, you need a rash guard, you're going to need a uniform. You want to pay, look, you have the right, this is America. You choose whichever one you want.

• 2:09:13Jocko Willink?

  Get your junk if you want.

• 2:09:14Speaker 01

  Yeah, totally. Yeah, you can, you know, but it's one of those things where if you get the best one, you're going to, you're going to be happy you did that. So, and not to mention, these are all made in USA. Hundred percent. Even the cotton that they've grown to turn into the fabric, to turn into the gi and everything else. OriginUSA.com, by the way.

• 2:09:32Jocko Willink?

  We all good.

• 2:09:33Speaker 01

  Yeah, all good. Get the good one. You'll be glad you did on many levels. Also, I mentioned other, uh, the quote unquote other stuff. That includes jeans, best jeans there is, by the way, even the factory jeans. You'd think that that was the first one, right? The factory jeans. So you'd think, oh yeah, that's just the fundamental or whatever, but they're, in my opinion, because I put them on, I know this because it's fresh in my head. I put them on the other day or used them the other day and they still hold up.

• 2:09:56Jocko Willink?

  Yeah.

• 2:09:57Speaker 01

  Right next to the Delta sixty eight. Oh yeah.

• 2:09:59Jocko Willink?

  Well, the, just so everyone knows, the, the factory, the original ones were heavier.

• 2:10:03Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 2:10:04Jocko Willink?

  So they're like, if you're from Maine, if you're from Montana, if you're from Minnesota, you might want to get a pair of those for the October.

• 2:10:12Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 2:10:12Jocko Willink?

  To May, March.

• 2:10:15Speaker 01

  Sure.

• 2:10:15Jocko Willink?

  Timeframe. And then you go Deltas all day, unless you're out there working in the field.

• 2:10:20Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 2:10:20Jocko Willink?

  Then you gotta, you might want to keep those factory ones on.

• 2:10:23Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 2:10:23Jocko Willink?

  But yeah, we got you covered. OriginUSA.com. Also, we have a, a jujitsu camp. And this year, we're, after jujitsu camp, that one's sold out. The jujitsu camp's sold out, but we have a, a law enforcement jujitsu training. So that's August 27th through the 31st up in Maine. Come and train. Come and train till you're ready for whatever you might face. OriginUSA.com. Check it out.

• 2:10:45Speaker 01

  It's true. Also Jock has a store called Jocko Store.

• 2:10:50Speaker 01

  This is Discipline Equals Freedom apparel. We got shirts and hoodies, hats. We got shorts on there too, by the way.

• 2:10:57Speaker 01

  You know, I just realized right now, I haven't released the socks yet.

• 2:11:02Speaker 01

  It's interesting.

• 2:11:03Jocko Willink?

  We have Discipline Equals Freedom socks?

• 2:11:04Speaker 01

  Yeah. That's a, and see, even you kind of like with that, with that, we'll call it an attitude. Um. Is really in this, i- it's kind of an explanation why I keep forgetting to announce this. Because if you don't have Discipline Equals Freedom socks, there's no hole in your life, you know? It's not like you're like, dang, where's my, you know? But if you don't have the shirt, you're like, bro, you know, that's the kind of fundamental way to represent, I think, in many ways. I mean, there's other, other ways for sure, hats and stuff. Which we have, by the way, but you don't think that with socks is what I'm saying.

• 2:11:37Jocko Willink?

  What color are the socks?

• 2:11:38Speaker 01

  Black with red. All day, bro. I'm here to tell you. I'll, I'll make an announcement. It'll be all good. Everyone will be taken care of. Also.

• 2:11:45Jocko Willink?

  Are they available on the website right now?

• 2:11:46Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 2:11:47Jocko Willink?

  Jocko Store. But you just haven't told anybody about it?

• 2:11:49Speaker 01

  Yeah. Let me double check.

• 2:11:50Jocko Willink?

  The socks.

• 2:11:51Speaker 01

  Put it this way, by the time this comes out, hey, look, it's available in all intents and purposes. They live, they're ready. Also have the shirt locker. That's a subscription scenario, different design every month.

• 2:12:03Jocko Willink?

  Lies, lies.

• 2:12:04Speaker 01

  Sugar coated. Lies, lies. Yeah.

• 2:12:07Speaker 01

  That's good that you're still thinking about that one. It's a few months ago, but hey, man, it has staying power. We like that. Um, nonetheless, like I said, new design every month. People seem to like it. Check it out. You just click on the shirt locker and you can see there's some examples of the, some of the past designs and stuff and which you can get, by the way.

• 2:12:22Jocko Willink?

  If you're a member?

• 2:12:23Speaker 01

  If you're a member, you can get any fast design you want. It's good. It's a good deal. I think. Anyway, but yeah, people seem to like that. Check it out. It's all, all on jocko store.com.

• 2:12:32Jocko Willink?

  Right on. Also check out coloradocraftbeef.com and primalbeef.com because you need steak in your life.

• 2:12:40Speaker 01

  It's true.

• 2:12:41Jocko Willink?

  Get good steak. Get American steak that's grown on local farms in the Shenandoah Valley for primal beef and in Colorado for Colorado craft beef. Check it out. Go get your steaks. Taste good. Feel good. Are good.

• 2:13:00Jocko Willink?

  Also subscribe to the podcast. Also jocko underground.com. Also YouTube. Check that out. Also psychological warfare. Somebody just posted that today. I saw on the interwebs.

• 2:13:09Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 2:13:10Jocko Willink?

  Getting after it. Flipsidecanvas.com Dakota Meyer got cool stuff to hang on your wall. Written a bunch of books. Check them out. You know what they're about. Hey, and look, you're listening right now, but your kid's not listening to this, but they could be getting on the path. If you get in the way of the warrior kid books, check them out. One, two, three, four, and five. Got a movie coming directed by Mick G. Chris Pratt's gonna be Uncle Jake. Come on. Let's get in the game. That's what we're doing. Mikey and the Dragons for the littler kids. Best little kids book ever. That's what the, the polls say.

• 2:13:45Speaker 01

  Yeah.

• 2:13:45Jocko Willink?

  A hundred percent.

• 2:13:46Speaker 01

  Tons. All of them. Every last one of them.

• 2:13:49Jocko Willink?

  And um, Ashland Front, we have a leadership consultancy. So check that out. If you want to come to one of our live events. The next big one is the Dallas muster 16 through 18 October. Also, we have council. Number four sold out. Number five is, we think we still have a few seats right now. June 26th through 29th up in the mouth, mountains of Washington, totally detached from the world, riding horses, hiking and talking about leadership. Come and check it out. Also Women's Assembly 11 through 13 in San Antonio, Texas.

• 2:14:24Jocko Willink?

  If you can't make it to one of those, that's okay. We got online training, extremeownership.com. Come and check that out if you want to learn how to lead in every aspect of your life. Extremeownership.com. And if you want to help service members, active and retired, you want to help their families, you want to help Gold Star families, check out Mark Lee's mom, Mama Lee. She's got a charity organization. I'm on the board of it now, by the way.

• 2:14:44Speaker 01

  Oh damn, okay.

• 2:14:44Jocko Willink?

  Honored to be on the board of AmericasMightyWarriors.org. Amazing organization, has helped so many of people that I know personally. I've seen what it, what, what that organization, what Mama Lee does to take care of veterans, take care of their families, Gold Star families. She's just an amazing human and she's carrying on the spirit of Mark Lee. So AmericasMightyWarriors.org, if you want to donate or you want to get involved. Also, heroesandhorses.org, up there in the mountains of Montana. Micah Fink, just helping veterans move through life, move through struggle,

• 2:15:26Jocko Willink?

  and come out the other side stronger in spirit and mind and body. And also Jimmy May has got an organization, beyondthebrotherhood.org. Check that out if you want to help with, with military, getting out, moving into the civilian sector. He's doing a great job with that. If you want to connect with us, I'm at jocko.com. I'm on social media. Echo is on social media. Echo is at Echo Charles. I'm at Jocko Willink. Just be careful because the algorithm will grab you. It'll hold you underwater until you aren't here anymore. Thanks to all of our uniform personnel out there on the front lines, especially our Vietnam veterans

• 2:16:06Jocko Willink?

  that stepped up for all of us in that rough war. They did their duty. So thanks to all of you for protecting our way of life when the nation called. Also, thanks to our police, law enforcement, firefighters, paramedics, EMTs, dispatchers, correctional officers, Border Patrol, Secret Service, as well as all other first responders. Thank you for your service and sacrifice to keep us safe here at home. And everyone else out there, you can always learn. You can always learn from anyone, but you have to have an open mind. You have to listen.

• 2:16:45Jocko Willink?

  You have to make adjustments when you're wrong. When you make a decision and it seems to be going a way you did not expect, you have to adjust. You have to be humble enough to say, I was wrong. We're going to move in a different direction. And that's what you do if you're going down the wrong path. Stop. And get on the right path.

• 2:17:08Jocko Willink?

  And that's all we've got for tonight. And until next time, this is Echo and Jocko out.