Pod Insights How I Invest with David Weisburd E350: How Family Offices Quietly Build Generational Wealth About this episode Is the real edge in investing not picking assets but structuring how you allocate capital?
Terence Thompson is a Vice President of Investments at DF Enterprises, about how single family offices think about portfolio construction, liquidity, and structural alpha. We break down why Terry uses a total portfolio approach, how family offices create edge through flexibility, and why being a liquidity provider during market stress is one of the most powerful strategies. We also discuss concentration risk in public markets, the evolution of private markets, and how allocators can think about illiquidity, secondaries, and niche opportunities.
Transcript Speaker names marked ? are inferred from speaking time and the show’s known hosts — they are not voice-verified.
0:00 David Weisburd? Single-family office is in some ways much more pure of investment arm than the multifamily office. As you start to bring in other family offices, what dilutes in terms of focus?
0:10 Speaker 01 I don't want to bemoan the multifamily office strategy. I think it's a great approach for maybe the 100 million to 500 million asset-based families, where building out their own team does get cost prohibitive. And the private banks are largely not set up to serve that cohort very well. There's a reason for it to exist. It's the specificity that comes with putting your time and attention and the team's time and attention into solving the needs and issues of one particular family. And when you start layering in five to 10 operating businesses, there's only so much resources to be spread around with lean teams.
0:53 David Weisburd? Do the principal agent problems become greater when you're dealing with multifamily offices than single-family offices? Or is it the same situation where you're simply the principal is not the agency, you have this conflict?
1:04 Speaker 01 That's inherent regardless of the asset owner type. The principal agent issues get exacerbated when you co-mingle assets with different pools of capital that have different liquidity provisions, different time horizons, different tax situations. There's enough to do with managing the family dynamics of one family. Yeah, I don't envy the multifamily office CIOs and portfolio managers that have multiple families that they need to contend with and sources of liquidity concerns, drama issues, whatever.
1:37 David Weisburd? So TF Enterprises, you have a large single-family office, and you've decided to go with the TPA approach versus the traditional endowment approach. Why?
1:45 Speaker 01 I call it a TPA-like kind of approach since the textbook strategic asset allocation process doesn't allow for sufficient dynamism to be a liquidity provider in times of heightened volatility, broad market stress, which are typically the most compelling entry chords for long-term investors. While you can use strategic asset allocation to rebalance out of what's working and into what's not working relative to your targets, it really stops there. And it also, on the flip side of that, serves as a good governor against momentum, which interestingly has been the best factor trade of the last three, five years.
2:14 David Weisburd? What do you think is behind these momentum trades in the market? Is this a psychological phenomenon? Is there an economic rationale behind it? Double-click on that.
2:24 Speaker 01 When you have low rates...
2:28 Speaker 01 And a technical innovation breakthrough like we've had with AI, it does create a winner take most kind of environment that permeates beyond just the tech and plays itself out into other areas of the market. You know, there's an anecdote I read last week where, you know, you mentioned SpaceX earlier. SpaceX, OpenAI, Anthropic, Android, were to go public this year. Once they're eligible for inclusion of the S and P 500, concentration in the S and P 500 goes from 40% to 50% of the top 10 names. The market concentration issue isn't going anywhere. And I think investors seem to be very cognizant of where those concentrations exist and how diversified they want to be relative to the go forward prospects in those names.
3:09 David Weisburd? One of the managers I love in today's market is Brad Gersner. So his previous podcast guest, Brad Gersner of Altimeter. And what I love about his strategy is first of all, he's obviously incredibly bright, but he is smart enough and humble enough not to say OpenAI versus Anthropic or Anthropic versus SpaceX. He's essentially indexing in a capacity constrained strategy into all the top companies, knowing that one of them is going to win. And I think when I look at a lot of errors that people make in these tech revolutions, same with the dot com boom, is this, for lack of a better word, picking bias, where I need to pick OpenAI and Anthropic. I'm going to put a billion dollars into one of them. And if I'm right, obviously I do really well, but the rational investment is to put
3:53 David Weisburd? half a billion in both of them. Is that the right way to think about it? Or is there a flaw in that rationale?
3:59 Speaker 01 It's fascinating because even I would beat up our public equity active managers when they would pick a space to make it easy. Beverages and they don't Coke and Pepsi, right? Because they like the space. And I would always push them to defend why they wouldn't pick one. Because as a fee paying client, I'm paying them to underwrite not only the subsector of the space, but also the balance sheet of the company, the governance structure that goes forward to our prospects, the entry point, what their target return is. It does get more complicated when you look at late stage privates, particularly the large L L Ms, because the space is changing and so dynamic. And I heard Zach Crass speak, who is OpenAI's go to market head.
4:46 Speaker 01 He framed it like cheering for the newest model release is like, like losing your mind for a basket made in the, in the, in the first quarter of a basketball game. Like they're, they're going to continue to one another. We don't know who the ultimate winner is going to be. There can be scenarios where you do have a preference for, for one versus another. Maybe not on a product or capabilities basis, but what do the customers say? Well, who are their customers? From an enterprise versus, versus a consumer lens, you can take a view that way and say, one has, has had much more success selling through to enterprises and actually making the large language models driven by a, a revenue model and meeting those customers where they are. When you're trying to boil the ocean and you've got five different, you know, consumer segments
5:29 Speaker 01 that you're, you're chasing all at once, that's a, that's a harder sell and, and more capital intensive because it suggests a, a much larger, uh, sales and marketing.
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7:25 David Weisburd? Tell me about your single-family office. How are you investing into different assets? And what's your portfolio construction?
7:30 Speaker 01 I did my best to throw strategic asset allocation under the rug. That is what we use as a starting point for asset allocation. And so we really look at it from a, the starting point for us is a 70% growth or equity beta late allocation, and then 30% of our spine alternatives are really anything else. And that growth bucket split between publics and privates, private side has its own sub-tar targets across strategies, but also fund structures, which we think is important as well. And then one not to be lost, if you're truly being intentional about what your target returns are in cash flow profile, liquidity, etc. So in terms of strategies themselves, we obviously have splits between venture growth and buyout, but also primary commitments, secondary commitments, and co-investments.
8:14 Speaker 01 Like most families, our public exposure is largely semi-passive, tax-managed, directly indexed equity. But we still maintain some active management exposure in managers that we think have a slight edge or a differentiated complement to what we have in passive. The point that's lost on passive is you are betting on a benchmark, right, at that point? And we already mentioned how concentrated the large benchmarks are. And there's issues with the small benchmarks as well. I just came off of doing a deep dive into the small and mid-space. And it's evolved a ton in the last 30 years. And I think a lot of folks in our seats kind of anchor on the Fama-French models and, okay, you should get a small-cap premium. You're taking incremental risk. You should be compensated for that. We haven't been in the last 25 years.
8:57 Speaker 01 And so what is it about the microstructure of markets that have shifted, both on the private side and also on public, that have created that environment? Private companies are staying private longer. Private markets have evolved to create liquidity for founders and management teams that didn't necessarily exist in the same way they do today, 20, 30 years ago. And the IPOs that we do see, which were historically the growth engines for small and mid-cap indices. The IPOs are skipping those and going straight to large cap. You know, we saw it with with Allen here. We've seen it with Robinhood. We'll definitely see it with SpaceX and and Android and Anthropic and likely OpenAI. As a result, those the SMIT indices, which it's the quality there continues to sour
9:38 Speaker 01 because I think there is some adverse selection in the companies that choose to go public at a smaller scale, especially given the compliance and reporting costs of being a public company. And so you see a lot of profitless biotech and materials miners in that in that cohort. And we see that data reflected in the Russell 2000 is 40% or so of the companies in that index are unprofitable, which is up 3X from 30 years ago. It's being intentional on what benchmarks you're choosing. If you choose to be a benchmark relative investor and ensuring you have the types of exposure you want.
10:13 David Weisburd? Ken Fench was my business school professor, so one of the smartest people I've ever met. I think that model was right for the last generation. But I do think small values, just fundamentally different asset class. An entire podcast with this with the CIO of Hurdle Callahan, Brad Conger. And he talked about what is small value today? Small value today is companies that are fallen angels, companies that were once large value and now just somehow are smaller and their market share has decreased. A lot of these small values are broken go-public transactions, most notably around SPACs that might have gone badly. And then what would have been great small value companies earlier, to your point, these private companies are staying private longer and oftentimes just for going to public markets.
10:56 David Weisburd? So it's not that the analysis, the five factor analysis was wrong. It's that it was just over a different data set and different time where it was easier to go public. Companies were going public earlier and there wasn't as much many companies that had gone public that shouldn't have gone public.
11:11 Speaker 01 You know, when you go back to the to the 70s, 80s, 90s, private markets weren't as efficient as they are today. There wasn't trillions of dollars of dry powder sitting on the sidelines waiting either to extend the cash runways of the more venture-backed companies or to reinvigorate the the private companies that were either looking at a generational transition or a management team turnover or a buyout or even like a corporate carve-outs. I mean, they're the the small cap indices have been starved of of what their historic growth engines have been. And I mean, you could talk to small cap managers and I don't think they can they can argue against that sentiment. It's a it's a pretty pervasive fact in the data.
11:49 David Weisburd? I think the basic fallacies of asset management is that you will have positive or negative tilts on asset classes as if the asset classes themselves don't have capital markets provision. So if small cap value, if everybody now agrees called small cap value is bad, and this proliferates, this meme proliferates throughout institutional markets for five years. In five years, it's going to be the perfect opportunity to buy something.
12:10 Speaker 01 It'll be a buy point. Exactly. Absolutely. Yeah. Sentiment has a massive impact on multiple appreciation or degradation. And so the multiple that investors are willing to pay is going to be informed by market sentiment. I mean, you can make the argument that once the Pharma French three factor model came out, that that premia got squeezed to zero because investors bought into that that narrative and said, I should be earning 11 to 12% rather than nine to 10% than I do have historically in large caps. But that that also misses what you were alluding to too, is the changing macro environment where you do have ample
12:48 Speaker 01 liquidity, sufficient private market participation, and then the costs and regulations of being a public company. I think it's not, it doesn't have the same shine that it had 20, 30 years ago, when you talk about all the reporting requirements and SOX regulations and it's a very, it's a very different market structure today than it was 30 years ago.
13:10 David Weisburd? One of the biggest trends in private markets is now the rise of the retail investor, which really is the rise of the 5 million plus net worth qualified purchaser. What are the second order effects of by some measures, the tens or even $100 trillion from qualified purchasers that are going to enter the market over the next decade?
13:29 Speaker 01 Qualified purchasers and retail capital is not going to flow into small buyout strategies. It's going to go to the KKR's and Carlisle's and Blackstones of the world that have. The infrastructure to accept that capital and the means to deploy it quickly and its scale. What that means from a second order effect, the small buyout managers that aren't getting the benefits of the retail inflows should see a higher bid for their assets when they take it to market to sell to the bigger fish. There's a lot of pearl clutching and hand wringing around, what is this going to mean? Is it going to drive down the cost of capital? Yeah, it will, but for the large buyout strategies, for the direct lending strategies that are uniquely set up to deploy that capital.
14:14 Speaker 01 The smaller, niche, your parts of the market will even be more compelling than they are today because there's just going to be more dry powder at the top going to take out those strategies.
14:23 David Weisburd? Ties together with what you were saying around the pharma French model. Once that research came out, the institutional bid came in and bid it up and maybe took away that alpha. And the question is, well, why won't that happen? When the retail investors come in is because retail investors, without being disparaging, are not going to be primarily driven through first principles, alpha decision making. They're going to be driven by brand.
14:46 Speaker 01 Right, yeah, I think that's right.
14:48 David Weisburd? More specifically, the agent sitting between the funds and the retail investors, the RA's, multifamily offices, private banks, everybody's part of this system. They're going to be driven by telling their retail investors to access the KKR, the Blackstones of the world. On top of that, if you look at what's already happening, 95% of funds from retail today have actually only gone to five firms. Those top five firms, so it's already happening. Question is, will something change in the future? And maybe it'll probably go down to maybe 90, 10. But if you think about the incentives, driving the mechanisms, if you think about the bankers, the multifamily offices, are they going to want to go to their client and say, well, great, now you can invest into private equity funds,
15:30 David Weisburd? invest into KKR or Blackstone, or are they going to say, invest in this lower middle market firm? And although there are some, there are a handful of very sharp, very kind of aligned, principled private bankers, the majority are not going to stake their career on an unknown brand. Because one of the biases that come in is attribution bias. So let's say KKR and a lower middle market investor invest into the same exact company. Let's say it's that one company that doesn't do well. If it's KKR or Blackstone, they're going to say bad company. If it's the lower middle market firm, they're going to say bad manager. And that fundamental attribution bias is something that really distorts thinking in this part of the market.
16:08 Speaker 01 Loss aversion plays into it as well, right? As you go down market, you're going to see greater dispersion. And so loss rates are going to be higher. And that is probably the key benefit of targeting larger strategies is tighter dispersion and lower loss rates, which I think retail is uniquely situated to invest in because we see they are driven by fear and panic. What concerns me the most about it is anytime there's financial engineering or innovation that creates new ways for the mass market to access strategies that where the assets and where the duration of the investment and the liquidity provisions aren't aligned.
16:53 Speaker 01 We're seeing it play out in real time with the BDCs, right? And there's good reasons that a lot of those are trained down in annual funds in the credit space. Levers loans, right? Like it takes three weeks to three months to settle some levers loan trades. Those are thought of as relatively liquid. But if my liquidity provisions in my interval funds say I need to be able to get capital out with 30 day notice at the end of the quarter, there's a misalignment there. And then the manager is forced to sell something that's more liquid that maybe that can settle in two to three days rather than two to three months. And then you have the kind of death spiral effect that we've seen. Anytime these structures come out where that mismatch is at the chagrin of underlying investors.
17:34 David Weisburd? So another way, if you want to be a liquidity provider, when there's a lot of liquidity, AKA panic in the market, and you want to avoid being the opposite. If you're part of a highly liquid structure, that structure could itself hurt your returns by selling at the exact wrong time.
17:48 Speaker 01 Exactly. Yeah, we see it all the time in uni markets, right? You know, uni funds are historically retail driven, given the large taxable investor base there. And when there's panic in the streets, the uni funds have to sell their most liquid strategies. And so the resulting fund looks a lot junkier than it otherwise would have been if there hadn't been the run on assets. And so it's A tale that's played itself out throughout the history of financial markets and this is just the latest iteration of it.
18:14 David Weisburd? Makes me wonder whether smart investors are going to set up funds that essentially predict this sell off and essentially a secondary fund that take advantage of these structural disadvantages of the liquid funds.
18:24 Speaker 01 It absolutely will feed the secondary market as that continues to evolve.
18:29 David Weisburd? It's almost like this parasite swimming around a fish who are waiting for that fish to go to sleep. There's this meme in the market that is there even an illiquidity premium in today's market? Is there illiquidity premium in the market today?
18:43 Speaker 01 As a private markets investor, I have to believe that there is. Otherwise, why would I even bother with it? It takes way more time, resources, attention to diligence of private strategy than it does a public strategy. It's just a fact, a costly doing business. While the last three years, you have seen public equities in particular outperform private equity and venture in aggregate. We think over a secular horizon, there is still an illiquidity premium and why does it exist? It's structural inefficiencies, opacity of the market and price discovery, right? And so if capital markets were open in a way that we were seeing lots of IPOs, credit was flowing freely, there wasn't a fear or continued hand wringing or defaults.
19:29 Speaker 01 I think that you'd see private equity and venture continue to outperform public equities. But that's not the environment that we're in today, but we don't expect that to persist. These things happen in cycles. I mean, we think over the long term, there is still an illiquidity premium to be harvested. That said, if retail capital really buys the private equity story and comes into that market en masse, perhaps that inefficiency is ground down like we've talked about in other markets. And that premium or alpha that you thought you were getting above and beyond what's available and cheap with other markets is squeezed. So I think that suggests for a dynamic allocation posture and maintaining a liquid bucket to
20:13 Speaker 01 you can use as a funding mechanism for your private commitments.
20:18 David Weisburd? When people ask Is there a liquidity premium? I think that's fundamentally the wrong question. And the right question is, what is the right amount of capital for a specific sector or for specific manager? So you could kind of take two extremes. One is, let's say, the large buyouts. I'm not going to use their names. But let's say that there's a good way for them to deploy $5 billion in capital in their strategy. If there's $50 billion in capital they're able to raise, the nicest way to put that is, at best, their alpha is diluted on a 10 to 1 basis. At worst, they're probably actually getting negative alpha. They're deploying into the marginal opportunities. And if you keep on doing that to the extreme, you're actually losing money. You're actually underperforming a liquid index. And then on the other side, because these are dynamic situations, if now you have
21:02 David Weisburd? buyouts deploying $50 billion instead of $5 billion, now you have this lower middle market where there's 10 times more demand for the same assets. And if they don't have 10 times more capital, or let's say they're even underfunded, then that illiquidity premium goes from the large buyouts to the small buyouts versus this private versus public, which is kind of an overgeneralization.
21:22 Speaker 01 It's economics 101, right? It's supply and demand. But where is there a demand for capital and how much supply of capital are chasing those opportunities? You alluded to it. Our kind of core private equity exposure is small buyout. And one of our managers has this great chart where they show there's a trillion in capital in mega funds, as defined by funds that have over a billion in fund size, chasing 9,000 companies with revenues over 250, 250 million. There's 150 billion of capital in funds, 250 million to a billion, chasing 110,000 companies with revenues from 10 to 250 million. So it's a broad generalization, but you have a much more compelling supply-demand backdrop, which warrants a higher cost of capital, which means GBs can be more discerning on
22:07 Speaker 01 valuation, selection, if there's 15% of the capital chasing 12x the gilt one.
22:12 David Weisburd? You've told me privately your tech size and your access. You have access to some of the best asset classes and sub asset classes in the world. What's the most underrated sub asset class today?
22:22 Speaker 01 I don't know if I could, I could pick just one. So if you'd humor me, I may, I may, I may have to give you a handful. I mentioned our core private equity exposure is, is small buyout. That seems to be getting more traction, given the optionality at exit. Large allocators are trying to figure out ways, yeah, SMAs and other, other mechanisms to come down market or fund up on shops, et cetera. You know, VCs going through a consolidation cycle. I think you can, you can get, you can make an argument there for barbell exposure, whether it's to the very early stage and some of the crossover names. Our law is undefeated and you've got to be ultra diversified there to, to keep up and make sure you've got some access to the right tail outcomes that it does feel like fall into, into this, most of the, you know, established brands, tier one shops in that space.
23:04 Speaker 01 Despite the, the negative headline private credit right now that are largely focused on the BDCs and interval funds. There are still really compelling opportunities in some of the esoteric credit strategies. Credit secondaries is an asset class that's still at its relative infancy. We like that space a lot. Actually, the kind of secondaries on probably syndicated loans or kind of traditional private credit. If you go farther out of the risk spectrum and distress and distress, we think there's really compelling opportunities there.
23:31 Speaker 01 Real estate credit continues to be of interest despite the space changing rapidly since the talk of privatizing the GSEs has come back to the fore. Your Freddie KP pieces was one of our favorite trades until Freddie put a gavosh on it like last year, early this year. Um, and we still like, uh, loan compounding tax credit debt, which is super nichey, regulation driven, and there's a moat around the size there.
23:51 Speaker 01 The last two I'd give you, biotech launch short is really compelling here. There's a large dispersion of outcomes. It's not really tied to the broader economic cycle. I haven't spent as much time on it to have a, a, a perspective on underlying strategies, but from a portfolio perspective, it's, it's very compelling. But perhaps the most out of consensus call that I would have on underappreciated assets is active management of large gap equities. You know, I told you most of our, our public exposure is passive or semi passive, which is at an incredible run and as passive tends to win in, in, in markets that are driven by momentum. But given the potential for continued concentration today and winners and losers, both in hardware, software, which is, you know, such a massive part of the market.
24:35 Speaker 01 If, if AI works and they can figure out a revenue model, overcome the hype cycle that, you know, typifies called activity, it'll create even more market dispersion than we've seen this year in public equities. And so we could be entering a new age of, uh, golden age for active equity managers that can execute strategies which benefit from AI disruption, not just in the large language models and, and the tech providers that are, are building out the infrastructure, but cross sectionally. So, yeah, when you're looking at staples companies or energy companies, what companies can drive down their cost structure? So much attention gets paid to the revenue model of, of the large language companies. But how can companies implement AI strategies to reduce their costs?
25:15 Speaker 01 That's largely lost in, in just looking at the, the TAM increase or potential revenue of, of, of the AI model companies themselves.
25:25 David Weisburd? Given how much of a factor AI is playing across the market, but also in the public markets, they're not an argument that there should be AI first. Managers, not that AI should be running the fund, but that they should be taking an AI based fundamental research versus a human based.
25:40 Speaker 01 It, it, there could be, and I mean, I think Andreessen should, should get their flowers for this, right? It was four or five years ago, they pivoted the entire firm to AI. And I think at the time, everyone is thinking, okay, wasn't this the, the software is going to eat the world shop? And then they're, they're betting the farm on AI working in it. I don't know the, the specifics, but it seems like almost every incremental dollar being allocated in DC is, is, is going that direction. Perhaps there's a, there's a point in time when two engineers and, and a CEO can scale a company to a hundred million in ARR. That is a thing. Implementing it for investment research is going to continue to be a very powerful tool. But when it comes time to actively make a decision, present a recommendation, those are going to be.
26:25 Speaker 01 I haven't seen an asset owner that's willing to accept the output of an AI-generated investment thesis. There's always going to be a human element in the actual decision making.
26:35 David Weisburd? Prior to DF Enterprises, he spent six years at Blue Cross Blue Shield, which of course is a tax exempt investor. In what ways is being a taxable investor change your strategy?
26:44 Speaker 01 I won't belabor you with the taxability of or the organization of the Blue Cross system, but they are actually a fully federally taxable nonprofit. Don't think about that too long or make your head hurt like it did mine. So while taxes undeniably drive a huge part of investment strategy, we're cautious at the family office and we're the same at the insurance company to not let the tax tail lag the investment dog. It absolutely informs those decisions, but we wanted to be cautious of it. But with with families of a certain wealth, it can very easily wag the dog. And there are a lot of stories of single family offices born of a kind of principle and they hire a tax person first.
27:28 Speaker 01 The investment people come later. The tax people come first. And if there's a reason for that, it's a massive cost.
27:33 David Weisburd? Is that the right model direction?
27:35 Speaker 01 I don't I don't know if it's the right model necessarily. It's more typical because the psychology around paying taxes and then generating a return. I think everybody sees investments as more accessible than taxes. And so getting professional tax advice and somebody that can understand the dynamics there first is of import. And then getting more specific and complex on the investment side comes after you've figured out governance structure, you know, trusts, what the broader tax strategy is, what the liability is going to look like today and into the future. And then we can sprinkle in investments to complement that strategy.
28:13 David Weisburd? If you could go back in time, right? When you graduated undergrad and you could give younger version of yourself, one piece of timeless advice that would have either accelerated your career or helped you avoid cost of mistakes. What would that one timeless piece of advice be?
28:26 Speaker 01 Like a lot of folks in my generation, and more specifically in the cohort coming out of undergrad into the financial crisis and coming to the labor market during that time. That experience really informed and I would argue hampered our collective willingness to bear and accept risk, both human capital and investment. And so I'd likely encourage myself to be more comfortable taking risks, be less risk averse. If I were to tie things back to my military days and in my home in Arizona, Barry Goldwater had a quote where he said, "There are old pilots and old pilots, but no old old pilots." And that sense of risk aversion, I think, is prevalent in many asset allocators
29:09 Speaker 01 who, like me, were being more comfortable being a mile wide and inch deep generalist to avoid the career risk in tying your career to external forces that are outside of your control, like the economic cycle, the rate cycle, or like we talked about earlier, investor preferences and tastes and sentiment. That seemed very scary to me as a 22 year old. But obviously, there's a ton of wealth created in specialization and in specific strategies. But in a portfolio context or professionally, the market isn't tied to complacency. So being comfortable taking risks, being comfortable being dynamic, not getting too dogmatic about any particular investment school of thought or philosophy is something that I would push my earlier self to.
29:54 Speaker 01 I think there's some real psychology behind risk aversion sounding smarter and risk taking sounding naive. But longer term, given the history of market returns and the equity market in particular being a positive sum game, why do we pay so much attention to the vocal minority who always seem to claim that the sky is falling, right? One of my favorite clips of any of these clip bait, do the gloom market posts is someone invariably going back and charting out that the author is. Successfully predicted 100 of the last five recessions or whatever. You know, the US economic machine is undefeated. And while we can all wring our hands about valuations and edge multiples and distribution teaser and leverage and geopolitics and dollar strength, I continue to believe in the resilience of the US innovation engine.
30:39 Speaker 01 And I think we do our best to keep that front of mind, especially in times in heightened volatility like we're experiencing today.
30:45 David Weisburd? I was recently at a dinner with one of large banks and their chief economist or whatever his title was, talking about their predictions of their last three, four years. And people were literally sitting there eating up this absurd narrative how they were correct in every single quarter. It was one of the most absurd things I've heard. And then I look even more crazy. I looked around and everyone was buying it. I'm like, this is crazy. I'm like, am I losing my mind or has everybody else lost their mind? Every shop on the street predicted three years straight of 20% returns. I'm like, let me see your prop book. This must be like the best performing fund of all time. On that note, Terry, thanks so much for jumping on podcasts and looking forward to continue this conversation live.
31:21 Speaker 01 Thanks for having me. I appreciate it.
31:23 David Weisburd? If you found this conversation valuable, please click follow how I invest so that you don't miss the next episode with the world's top investors.
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